美国对华贸易保护成因研究
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摘要
中美双边贸易对中美两国发展生产力、调整产业结构、实现产业升级都具有重要意义。但是,美国对华贸易保护的问题日益突出,阻碍着中美经贸关系健康发展,对中国产业结构升级和经济稳定发展造成不利影响。
现有关于美国对华贸易保护的研究大多限于对美国对华贸易争端某一种或几种形式的分析或者理论评述,对美国对华贸易保护成因的分析还不够系统,一些结论也缺乏实证数据的支持。因此,全面考察美国外贸发展和中美经贸关系发展状况,深入剖析美国对华贸易保护的政治、经济、政策成因,对美国对华贸易保护行为与影响因素的相关性进行实证分析,找出美国对华贸易保护的关键成因,有助于积极主动地采取更有针对性的措施,减少贸易争端带来的损失,维护中美经贸关系健康发展。
本文分为七章。第一章为导论部分,概述中美贸易关系的重要意义、美国对华贸易保护状况、特点及其危害,表明本文研究的动机和意义,说明全文的研究思路、结构安排和创新点。第二章简要回顾贸易保护主义观点的发展脉络、学者们对美国对外贸易政策和美国对华贸易政策的研究文献,阐明本文的分析框架。第三章系统分析美国外贸发展中的主要问题、外贸政策的演变,从美国对外贸易发展的角度对美国对华贸易保护做出解释。第四章全面评述中美贸易的发展状况和存在的主要问题,从中美经贸关系的角度对美国对华贸易保护做出解释。第五章重点分析美国对华贸易政策的演变、发展特点和利益集团在美国对华贸易政策决策中的作用,考察中美政治制度差异、经济制度差异、战略冲突对美国对华贸易政策的影响,从政治经济体制的角度对美国对华贸易保护做出解释。第六章根据前几章的分析,提出关于美国对华贸易保护主要影响因素的10个命题,建立模型考察影响美国对华贸易保护的宏观政治经济因素、产业因素,采用逐步剔除的方法找出关键因素和核心因素。第七章对全文进行总结,分析美国对华贸易保护的发展趋势,提出应对政策建议。
通过理论和实证分析,本文得出以下主要结论:
第一,在经济全球化背景下,美国进一步调整产业结构,进行国际产业转移,经济增长呈现周期性波动,制造业发展慢于服务业,传统产业发展慢于高新技术产业,部分战略产业和传统产业国际竞争力下降,贸易失衡问题非常突出,导致美国对外贸易理念从自由贸易转向公平贸易,对外贸易政策从自由贸易政策转向管理贸易政策、战略贸易政策,进行贸易保护是其限制进口、扩大出口、平抑贸易逆差的重要手段。
第二,中美经贸关系正常化以来,中美贸易既实现了规模扩张,也实现了质量和水平的升级,商品结构逐步优化,中高技术产品逐渐成为主体,对美国相关产业特别是敏感产业形成不小的竞争压力,相关产业借助贸易保护维护自身利益的动力增强。贸易失衡、知识产权、市场开放、最惠国待遇和非市场经济地位、人民币汇率制度等问题成为美国对华贸易保护的主要理由或借口。
第三,中美同为政治大国和对世界经济影响越来越大的经济大国,基本政治制度、经济制度具有显著差异,在全球范围内存在一些战略冲突,双方发展双边经贸关系的目标不同。工商、劳工、意识形态等领域的利益集团积极参与美国对华贸易政策的制定过程,使美国对华贸易政策具有显著的实用性、阶段性、波动性、歧视性,这与中美政治关系不稳定的状况一起促成美国借助对华贸易及对华贸易政策遏制中国发展,迫使中国让步。
第四,美国对华贸易保护的成因非常复杂。最主要的经济成因是:中美经贸关系深入发展,美国制造业国际竞争力下降,中国经济发展壮大,中国对美出口贸易结构升级等。最主要的政治成因是:中国崛起改变国际政治经济格局,美国利益集团的活动,中美政治关系不稳定发展等。以WTO为主的国际经济协调机制为美国对华贸易保护提供了便利。
第五,美国对华贸易保护将长期存在。中美经贸关系越是发展,中国经济越是发展,对美出口商品结构越是优化,美国对华贸易争端就越多发、越复杂。
第六,贸易保护不会影响中美经贸关系发展大局。中美经济互补性强,双边经贸关系对中美两国都非常重要,双方不会为了局部利益而破坏互利共赢的大局。
第七,虽然美国对华贸易保护具有必然性,中国仍可采取积极措施,避免贸易争端多发或激化。要加强对话和制度协调,建立和发展多边、双边贸易政策协调机制、贸易争端磋商机制;要大力推进比较优势和产业结构升级,进一步改善进出口商品结构;要积极参与新一轮国际产业转移,全面实施“走出去”发展战略;要重视做美国相关利益集团的工作,发挥其促进中美经贸关系稳定发展、抑制贸易争端多发的作用;要扩大自美进口,逐步改变中美贸易失衡状况;要建立贸易保护预警体系和应对机制,减少贸易争端及其带来的损失;要加强区域经济合作,增强抵御贸易保护风险的能力。
The bilateral trade between China and the US is of great importance to both countries for the development of their productivity, the adjustment and upgrade of industry structures. However, the US trade protection against China has been a protruding problem affecting the sound development of Sino-US trade relationship, China's industry upgrade and steady economic development.
Up to now, most of the literature studying the US trade protection against China is about a certain or several types of trade disputes between the two countries, or is confined as theoretical comments. The analysis is inadequate, and some arguments are weak in empirical data support. Therefore, in accordance with the characteristics of the US trade protection against China, to study systematically the states of the development of the US foreign trade as well as Sino-US business and trade relationship, to make a thorough analysis on the political, economic and policy causes of the US trade protection against China, and to make empirical analysis on the correlation between the protection actions and the affecting factors, all contribute to taking more active measures to cut down the loss brought about by trade disputes and maintain the sound development of the bilateral trade relationship.
This dissertation is composed of seven chapters. The first chapter gives a brief account of the importance of Sino-US trade relationship, and the state, characteristics and negative impact of the US trade protection against China, showing the motives and significance of this study, and then expounds the logicality, structure and innovative features of the dissertation. The second chapter reviews the development of trade protection viewpoints and the literature on the US foreign trade policy and its trade policy toward China, and expounds the analysis structure of the dissertation. The third chapter systemically analyzes main problems in the development of the US foreign trade and the evolution of the US foreign trade policy, looking into the causes of the US trade protection against China from the development of the US foreign trade. The fourth chapter makes commentaries of the development of Sino-US trade and the main problems, looking into the causes of the US trade protection against China from the development of Sino-US trade relationship. The fifth chapter analyzes the evolution, features of the US trade policy toward China and the roles of interest groups in the formulation of the US trade policy toward China, studies the impacts of the difference of the two countries' political and economic systems and the strategy conflicts between the two countries, looking into the causes of the US trade protection against China from political and economic systems. The sixth chapter puts forward ten propositions on the affecting factors of the US trade protection against China, based on the analysis of the previous chapters, and builds up empirical models to study the political, economic and industry factors affecting the US trade protection against China, finding out the key affecting factors and the affecting factors at the core. The seventh chapter concludes the dissertation, forecasts the development trend of the US trade protection against China, and suggests countermeasures in policy.
With the theoretical and empirical analysis, the dissertation draws the following conclusions,
Firstly, in the process of economic globalization, the US has further adjusted its industry structure, transferred some of its industries to other countries. The US economy fluctuates periodically with manufacturing industry lagging behind service sector, traditional industries behind high-tech industries. The competitiveness of some strategic industries and traditional industries declines in the international market while trade deficits increase. Under such circumstances, the US foreign trade ideas have shifted from Manchesterism to fair trade, and its foreign trade policy has shifted from free trade to managed trade and strategic trade. Trade protection becomes one of its main measures to restrict imports, increase exports and reduce trade deficits.
Secondly, since the normalization of Sino-US trade relationship, the bilateral trade has expanded in scale, improved in quality and upgraded in levels. The trade structure has been optimized with medium and high-tech products taking the lead. All these factors bring about increasing competing pressure on the US relative industries, especially the hypersensitive industries. The US relevant industries have strong incentives to take advantage of trade disputes to protect their own interests. Main issues such as trade imbalance, intellectual property right (IPR) protection, market access, most-favored-nation (MFN) status and non-market-economy status, the RMB exchange rate regime, have become main causes or excuses when the US launches trade disputes against China.
Thirdly, on the one hand, both China and the US are political giants and huge economies gaining more and more influence on the global economy, on the other hand, the two countries differ in political and economic systems, and have strategy conflicts all over the world and different aims for developing the bilateral trade relationship. Interest groups from the business and trade circles, labor organizations and those ideological ones have been taking active parts in the formulation of the US trade policy toward China, which turns the policy practical, periodical, fluctuant and discriminating. Besides, the unsteady development of the bilateral political relationship also helps the US to manipulate the bilateral trade and policy as an instrument to contain China's development and force China to give in.
Fourthly, the causes of the US trade protection against China are very complicated. The most significant economic causes include the further development of Sino-US economic and trade relationship, the decline of the US manufacturing competitiveness, the growth of China's economy, the upgrade of the structure of China's export to the US, etc. The most significant political causes include the change of the international political and economic structures caused by China's rise up, the actions of the US interest groups, the unsteady development of the bilateral political relationship, etc. The international economic coordination mechanism mainly shaped by WTO also facilitates the US trade protection against China.
Fifthly, the US trade protection against China will last long. With China's economy becoming larger and stronger, export structure more optimized, and the bilateral trade relationship furthered, the US trade disputes against China will become constant and more complicated.
Sixthly, the US trade protection against China will not hinder the main stream of Sino-US economic and trade relationship. The two countries' economies are highly complementary, and the bilateral economic and trade relationship is of great importance to both sides. Therefore, they would not breach the overall situation of the mutual benefit and win-win for partial interest.
Seventhly and lastly, although the US trade protection against China is inevitable to some extent, China can take active measures to decrease the frequency and intensity of trade disputes. It is necessary to strengthen bilateral dialogues and institutional coordination, and to set up and develop coordination mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral trade policies and trade disputes. It is important to push forward the comparative advantage, upgrade the industry structure and improve the export mix. China should play an active role in the new round of international industry transfer, and implement the "Going Global" strategy in comprehensive ways. China should facilitate better communication with relevant US interest groups and bring their initiatives into full play to stabilize the bilateral economic and trade relationship and restrain trade disputes from frequent occurrence. In addition, China should take vigorous actions to increase imports from the US, gradually reducing the bilateral trade imbalance. It is necessary to build up early warning mechanisms and coping mechanisms against trade protection to cut down the quantity and loss of trade disputes. Besides, China should also strengthen regional economic cooperation to enhance its capacity to withstand the risks arising from trade protection.
现有关于美国对华贸易保护的研究大多限于对美国对华贸易争端某一种或几种形式的分析或者理论评述,对美国对华贸易保护成因的分析还不够系统,一些结论也缺乏实证数据的支持。因此,全面考察美国外贸发展和中美经贸关系发展状况,深入剖析美国对华贸易保护的政治、经济、政策成因,对美国对华贸易保护行为与影响因素的相关性进行实证分析,找出美国对华贸易保护的关键成因,有助于积极主动地采取更有针对性的措施,减少贸易争端带来的损失,维护中美经贸关系健康发展。
本文分为七章。第一章为导论部分,概述中美贸易关系的重要意义、美国对华贸易保护状况、特点及其危害,表明本文研究的动机和意义,说明全文的研究思路、结构安排和创新点。第二章简要回顾贸易保护主义观点的发展脉络、学者们对美国对外贸易政策和美国对华贸易政策的研究文献,阐明本文的分析框架。第三章系统分析美国外贸发展中的主要问题、外贸政策的演变,从美国对外贸易发展的角度对美国对华贸易保护做出解释。第四章全面评述中美贸易的发展状况和存在的主要问题,从中美经贸关系的角度对美国对华贸易保护做出解释。第五章重点分析美国对华贸易政策的演变、发展特点和利益集团在美国对华贸易政策决策中的作用,考察中美政治制度差异、经济制度差异、战略冲突对美国对华贸易政策的影响,从政治经济体制的角度对美国对华贸易保护做出解释。第六章根据前几章的分析,提出关于美国对华贸易保护主要影响因素的10个命题,建立模型考察影响美国对华贸易保护的宏观政治经济因素、产业因素,采用逐步剔除的方法找出关键因素和核心因素。第七章对全文进行总结,分析美国对华贸易保护的发展趋势,提出应对政策建议。
通过理论和实证分析,本文得出以下主要结论:
第一,在经济全球化背景下,美国进一步调整产业结构,进行国际产业转移,经济增长呈现周期性波动,制造业发展慢于服务业,传统产业发展慢于高新技术产业,部分战略产业和传统产业国际竞争力下降,贸易失衡问题非常突出,导致美国对外贸易理念从自由贸易转向公平贸易,对外贸易政策从自由贸易政策转向管理贸易政策、战略贸易政策,进行贸易保护是其限制进口、扩大出口、平抑贸易逆差的重要手段。
第二,中美经贸关系正常化以来,中美贸易既实现了规模扩张,也实现了质量和水平的升级,商品结构逐步优化,中高技术产品逐渐成为主体,对美国相关产业特别是敏感产业形成不小的竞争压力,相关产业借助贸易保护维护自身利益的动力增强。贸易失衡、知识产权、市场开放、最惠国待遇和非市场经济地位、人民币汇率制度等问题成为美国对华贸易保护的主要理由或借口。
第三,中美同为政治大国和对世界经济影响越来越大的经济大国,基本政治制度、经济制度具有显著差异,在全球范围内存在一些战略冲突,双方发展双边经贸关系的目标不同。工商、劳工、意识形态等领域的利益集团积极参与美国对华贸易政策的制定过程,使美国对华贸易政策具有显著的实用性、阶段性、波动性、歧视性,这与中美政治关系不稳定的状况一起促成美国借助对华贸易及对华贸易政策遏制中国发展,迫使中国让步。
第四,美国对华贸易保护的成因非常复杂。最主要的经济成因是:中美经贸关系深入发展,美国制造业国际竞争力下降,中国经济发展壮大,中国对美出口贸易结构升级等。最主要的政治成因是:中国崛起改变国际政治经济格局,美国利益集团的活动,中美政治关系不稳定发展等。以WTO为主的国际经济协调机制为美国对华贸易保护提供了便利。
第五,美国对华贸易保护将长期存在。中美经贸关系越是发展,中国经济越是发展,对美出口商品结构越是优化,美国对华贸易争端就越多发、越复杂。
第六,贸易保护不会影响中美经贸关系发展大局。中美经济互补性强,双边经贸关系对中美两国都非常重要,双方不会为了局部利益而破坏互利共赢的大局。
第七,虽然美国对华贸易保护具有必然性,中国仍可采取积极措施,避免贸易争端多发或激化。要加强对话和制度协调,建立和发展多边、双边贸易政策协调机制、贸易争端磋商机制;要大力推进比较优势和产业结构升级,进一步改善进出口商品结构;要积极参与新一轮国际产业转移,全面实施“走出去”发展战略;要重视做美国相关利益集团的工作,发挥其促进中美经贸关系稳定发展、抑制贸易争端多发的作用;要扩大自美进口,逐步改变中美贸易失衡状况;要建立贸易保护预警体系和应对机制,减少贸易争端及其带来的损失;要加强区域经济合作,增强抵御贸易保护风险的能力。
The bilateral trade between China and the US is of great importance to both countries for the development of their productivity, the adjustment and upgrade of industry structures. However, the US trade protection against China has been a protruding problem affecting the sound development of Sino-US trade relationship, China's industry upgrade and steady economic development.
Up to now, most of the literature studying the US trade protection against China is about a certain or several types of trade disputes between the two countries, or is confined as theoretical comments. The analysis is inadequate, and some arguments are weak in empirical data support. Therefore, in accordance with the characteristics of the US trade protection against China, to study systematically the states of the development of the US foreign trade as well as Sino-US business and trade relationship, to make a thorough analysis on the political, economic and policy causes of the US trade protection against China, and to make empirical analysis on the correlation between the protection actions and the affecting factors, all contribute to taking more active measures to cut down the loss brought about by trade disputes and maintain the sound development of the bilateral trade relationship.
This dissertation is composed of seven chapters. The first chapter gives a brief account of the importance of Sino-US trade relationship, and the state, characteristics and negative impact of the US trade protection against China, showing the motives and significance of this study, and then expounds the logicality, structure and innovative features of the dissertation. The second chapter reviews the development of trade protection viewpoints and the literature on the US foreign trade policy and its trade policy toward China, and expounds the analysis structure of the dissertation. The third chapter systemically analyzes main problems in the development of the US foreign trade and the evolution of the US foreign trade policy, looking into the causes of the US trade protection against China from the development of the US foreign trade. The fourth chapter makes commentaries of the development of Sino-US trade and the main problems, looking into the causes of the US trade protection against China from the development of Sino-US trade relationship. The fifth chapter analyzes the evolution, features of the US trade policy toward China and the roles of interest groups in the formulation of the US trade policy toward China, studies the impacts of the difference of the two countries' political and economic systems and the strategy conflicts between the two countries, looking into the causes of the US trade protection against China from political and economic systems. The sixth chapter puts forward ten propositions on the affecting factors of the US trade protection against China, based on the analysis of the previous chapters, and builds up empirical models to study the political, economic and industry factors affecting the US trade protection against China, finding out the key affecting factors and the affecting factors at the core. The seventh chapter concludes the dissertation, forecasts the development trend of the US trade protection against China, and suggests countermeasures in policy.
With the theoretical and empirical analysis, the dissertation draws the following conclusions,
Firstly, in the process of economic globalization, the US has further adjusted its industry structure, transferred some of its industries to other countries. The US economy fluctuates periodically with manufacturing industry lagging behind service sector, traditional industries behind high-tech industries. The competitiveness of some strategic industries and traditional industries declines in the international market while trade deficits increase. Under such circumstances, the US foreign trade ideas have shifted from Manchesterism to fair trade, and its foreign trade policy has shifted from free trade to managed trade and strategic trade. Trade protection becomes one of its main measures to restrict imports, increase exports and reduce trade deficits.
Secondly, since the normalization of Sino-US trade relationship, the bilateral trade has expanded in scale, improved in quality and upgraded in levels. The trade structure has been optimized with medium and high-tech products taking the lead. All these factors bring about increasing competing pressure on the US relative industries, especially the hypersensitive industries. The US relevant industries have strong incentives to take advantage of trade disputes to protect their own interests. Main issues such as trade imbalance, intellectual property right (IPR) protection, market access, most-favored-nation (MFN) status and non-market-economy status, the RMB exchange rate regime, have become main causes or excuses when the US launches trade disputes against China.
Thirdly, on the one hand, both China and the US are political giants and huge economies gaining more and more influence on the global economy, on the other hand, the two countries differ in political and economic systems, and have strategy conflicts all over the world and different aims for developing the bilateral trade relationship. Interest groups from the business and trade circles, labor organizations and those ideological ones have been taking active parts in the formulation of the US trade policy toward China, which turns the policy practical, periodical, fluctuant and discriminating. Besides, the unsteady development of the bilateral political relationship also helps the US to manipulate the bilateral trade and policy as an instrument to contain China's development and force China to give in.
Fourthly, the causes of the US trade protection against China are very complicated. The most significant economic causes include the further development of Sino-US economic and trade relationship, the decline of the US manufacturing competitiveness, the growth of China's economy, the upgrade of the structure of China's export to the US, etc. The most significant political causes include the change of the international political and economic structures caused by China's rise up, the actions of the US interest groups, the unsteady development of the bilateral political relationship, etc. The international economic coordination mechanism mainly shaped by WTO also facilitates the US trade protection against China.
Fifthly, the US trade protection against China will last long. With China's economy becoming larger and stronger, export structure more optimized, and the bilateral trade relationship furthered, the US trade disputes against China will become constant and more complicated.
Sixthly, the US trade protection against China will not hinder the main stream of Sino-US economic and trade relationship. The two countries' economies are highly complementary, and the bilateral economic and trade relationship is of great importance to both sides. Therefore, they would not breach the overall situation of the mutual benefit and win-win for partial interest.
Seventhly and lastly, although the US trade protection against China is inevitable to some extent, China can take active measures to decrease the frequency and intensity of trade disputes. It is necessary to strengthen bilateral dialogues and institutional coordination, and to set up and develop coordination mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral trade policies and trade disputes. It is important to push forward the comparative advantage, upgrade the industry structure and improve the export mix. China should play an active role in the new round of international industry transfer, and implement the "Going Global" strategy in comprehensive ways. China should facilitate better communication with relevant US interest groups and bring their initiatives into full play to stabilize the bilateral economic and trade relationship and restrain trade disputes from frequent occurrence. In addition, China should take vigorous actions to increase imports from the US, gradually reducing the bilateral trade imbalance. It is necessary to build up early warning mechanisms and coping mechanisms against trade protection to cut down the quantity and loss of trade disputes. Besides, China should also strengthen regional economic cooperation to enhance its capacity to withstand the risks arising from trade protection.
引文
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[2]杠杆收购是指收购者用自己很少的本钱为基础,从投资银行或其他金融机构筹集、借贷大量、足够的资金进行收购活动,收购后公司的收入(包括拍卖资产的营业利益)刚好支付因收购而产生的高比例负债,这样能达到以很少的资金赚取高额利润的目的。
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[3]美国《出口管制条例》把除加拿大之外的所有国家分为七个组:(1)Z组:出于外交政策等原因实行全面禁运的国家;(2)S组:出于国家安全、反恐怖、不扩散和地区稳定需要,除药品、医疗用品、食品和农产品外全面管制的国家:(3)Y组:允许非战略物资出口,但出于国家安全需要,禁止任何涉及军事、有助于提高军事能力、有损美国安全的商品和技术出口:(4)W组:基本原则同上。但管制范围更宽松;(5)Q组:基本规定同上,限制更少一些;(6)T组:总原则和政策与V组相同,但对刑侦、军用设备出口实施限制:(7)V组:基本不存在管制的国家。
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.2 2005年世界银行对中国120个城市的1.24万家企业进行调查,结果表明,外资企业在中国投资的回报率最高,达到22%,超过中国私营企业和国有企业的回报率。中国美国商会的调查也显示,在华美国公司表示“非常盈利”、“盈利”的企业所占比重在2003年达到75%,2004年达到72%,2005年也达到64%。
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[1]反倾销、反补贴、“特保”措施、“337调查”所关注的问题都是进口商品对本国产业的影响,比如,美国反倾销法律强调倾销与美国产业受到损害或实质性损害威胁之间的因果关系,特别是在诉讼程序中,美国法律要求国际贸易委员会(ITC)严格调查倾销对美国相关产业的损害情况,其结果是决定是否采取反倾销措施的主要依据。反补贴是根据国内相关产业的申请,对受补贴的进口产品进行调查,通过征收反补贴税或采取价格承诺等方式,抵消进口产品所享受的补贴,保护受损害的国内产业。特别保障措施也是在进口产品大量增加对国内产业造成一定程度的损害或损害威胁时采取的进口限制措施。“377调查”则是ITC根据美国《1930年关税法》第337节的规定,对进口中的不公平贸易做法进行调查和裁处,其特殊性在于迄今为止几乎所有的“337调查”案件都涉及知识产权问题。一旦美国企业或产业界在反倾销、反补贴、“特保”措施、“337调查”胜诉后,美国所采取的措施也是相似的,主要是征收惩罚性关税。另外,最近几年美国对华发动的反倾销调查数量有所减少,反补贴、“特保”措施、“337调查”却明显增多。这说明,这些贸易保护手段具有互补性。
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[1]中国外交部新闻发言人孔泉在2005年1月27日的例行记者会上做出这一表示。
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[2]林毅夫(2004)指出,新技术的研发投资大,但成功率不高,95%的研发项目没有产生任何结果,只有5%的项目最后取得可以申请专利的技术。申请专利以后的技术并非都有商业价值,因为采用有些新技术生产出来的产品消费者不喜欢。有些研究表明,申请专利的技术中,10—20%最终投入商业生产,给公司带来回报,另外的80—90%被束诸高阁。将所有研发投入,包括95%不成功项目的研发投入、申请专利成功后80%以上的市场失败率全部计算进去,整个新技术的研发投资巨大,风险很高,回报率低。
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[1]资料来源:根据美国国际贸易委员会2008年1月发布的Import Injury Investigations Case Statistics(FY 1980-2006)数据统计而得。
[2]参见苗迎春.中美经贸摩擦的主要特征.WTO实务,2007(5):39-42。
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[1]参见联合国贸发会议网站:http://www.unctad.org/sections/stats/docs//gds_csiro_c&td-1-1_en.pdf。
[2]资料来源:根据UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics Online (http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890&lang=1)数据计算而得。
[1]资料来源:根据UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics Online (http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890&lang=1)数据统计而得。
[1]资料来源:根据UN Common Database(http://comtrade.un.org/db/)数据计算而得。
[2]资料来源:根据UN Comtrade Database(http://comtrade.un.org/db/)数据计算而得。
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[5]网址:http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/Trade.Resources/tradeconcordances.html。
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[2]资料来源:世界贸易组织网站(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm)。
[1]廖光军.美国对外贸易及其政策的变化.国际贸易问题,2001(12):26。
[2]资料来源:根据联合国贸易和发展会议Hsndbook of Statistics On-line和美国经济分析局网站(http://www.bea.gov/)数据计算而得。
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[1]资料来源:根据美国劳工统计局网站(http://www.bls.gov/ces/)数据计算而得。
[2]资料来源:根据美国劳工统计局网站数据计算而得。
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[1]资料来源:宋玉华,杨莉莉.从美国新经济周期的发展看美国经济.世界经济,1998(6):12-16。
[2]资料来源:邵娴.美国高科技产业发展扫描.中国创业投资与高科技,2006(1):41-42。
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[1]沈国兵.中美贸易平衡问题研究.中国财政经济出版社,2007:87。
[2]资料来源:根据《香港经济年鉴》、《中国统计年鉴》、美国商务部经济分析局网站数据计算而得。
[1]参见K.C.Fung,Lawrence Lau,Yanyan Xiong.Adjusted Estimates of United States-China Bilateral Trade Balances:an Update.Pacific Economic Review,Vol.11,2006,3:299-314。
[2]杠杆收购是指收购者用自己很少的本钱为基础,从投资银行或其他金融机构筹集、借贷大量、足够的资金进行收购活动,收购后公司的收入(包括拍卖资产的营业利益)刚好支付因收购而产生的高比例负债,这样能达到以很少的资金赚取高额利润的目的。
[1]参见WING THYE WOO.The Structural Nature of Internal and External Imbalances in China.Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies,Vol.4,2006,1:1-19.
[1]马亚华,刘光卫.论中美关于贸易不平衡规模的争议.世界经济研究,2002(6):55-60。
[1]美国贸易代表办公室.U.S.-China Trade RELATIONs:Entering a New Phase of Greater Accountabilty and Enforcement.美国贸易代表办公室网站,http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/assct_upload_file921_8938.pdf。
[2]2006年3月28日,中国商务部部长薄熙来与美国商务部部长古铁雷斯会谈时做出这一表示。
[1]资料来源:美国国际知识产权联盟网站(http://www.iipa.com/countryreports.html)。
[1]数据来源:李邦君.我国农产品市场开放的现状及其进一步发展的对策探讨.国际商务研究,2007(4):27-31。
[1]美听证中国市场经济地位,迈出解决问题第一步.人民网,http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/103712546359.html。
[2]朱颖.试论美国对华贸易政策的歧视性.世界经济与政治论坛,2005(4):43-50。
[3]杨天欣.中美贸易摩擦逐步升级.瞭望周刊,2004(48):23-24。
[1]倪世雄,李淑俊.从公众—国会—政府的互动关系看美国贸易保护主义——以中美贸易摩擦为例.美国研究,2007(4):81-94。
[2]李安方.美国对华技术出口管制的效果评判与前景分析.国际贸易问题。2004(7):54-58。
[3]美国《出口管制条例》把除加拿大之外的所有国家分为七个组:(1)Z组:出于外交政策等原因实行全面禁运的国家;(2)S组:出于国家安全、反恐怖、不扩散和地区稳定需要,除药品、医疗用品、食品和农产品外全面管制的国家:(3)Y组:允许非战略物资出口,但出于国家安全需要,禁止任何涉及军事、有助于提高军事能力、有损美国安全的商品和技术出口:(4)W组:基本原则同上。但管制范围更宽松;(5)Q组:基本规定同上,限制更少一些;(6)T组:总原则和政策与V组相同,但对刑侦、军用设备出口实施限制:(7)V组:基本不存在管制的国家。
[1]相关数据来源于商务部网站(http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/tongjizliao/)、李志军.美国对华出口管制与中美贸易逆差:实质与对策.世界科技研究与发展,1999(4):101-104。
[1]Robert G.Sutter.U.S.Policy Toward China.Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,Inc.,1998:49.
[1]张静春.非经济因素:使问题复杂化.世界知识,2004(11):52-53。
[1]牛鹏.论美国利益集团——理论解读与决策分析.暨南大学硕士学位论文,2003。
[2]祝令建.试论美国利益集团兴盛的原因.河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2003年(1):124-127。
[1]范红娟.后冷战时期美国利益集团对中美关系的影响.江淮论坛,2002(4):73-76。
[1]柳剑平,刘威.美国对外经济制裁决策过程的经济学分析.//陈继勇主编.美国新经济周期与中芙经贸关系.武汉大学出版社,2004:355-361。
[2]何兴强.美国知识产权政策制订中的利益集团因素.人民网,http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49154/49155/4919353.html。
[1]王勇.中美经贸关系.中国市场出版社,2007:162-163。
.2 2005年世界银行对中国120个城市的1.24万家企业进行调查,结果表明,外资企业在中国投资的回报率最高,达到22%,超过中国私营企业和国有企业的回报率。中国美国商会的调查也显示,在华美国公司表示“非常盈利”、“盈利”的企业所占比重在2003年达到75%,2004年达到72%,2005年也达到64%。
[1]Robert G.Sutter.U.S.Policy Toward China.Rowman & Littlefieid Publishers,Inc.,1998:50.
[2]肖虹.中美经贸关系史论.世界知识出版社,2001:121-122。
[1]I.M.戴斯勒(美)著,王恩冕、于少蔚译.美国贸易政治.中国市场出版社,2006:277.
[1]参见Purchasing Power,the Corporate-White House Alliance to Pass the China Trade Bill over the Will of the American People.Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch,Oct.2000.www.citizen.org/documents/purchasingpower.PDF.
[1]Bonnie Glaser.SARS,Summitry,and Sanctions.Comparative Connections,2~(nd) Quarter,2003.
[1]此部分参考王勇.中美经贸关系.中国市场出版社,2007:178-188。
[1]杨洁勉等.大磨合:中美相互战略和政策.天津人民出版社,2007:91。
[1]中央国家机关工委宣传部.我国非公有制经济的科学发展之路——改革30年的理论演变、实践成果与发展进路.http://www.xj71.com/html/30/n-36330.html。
[1]贾怀勤.中美两国贸易政策对双边贸易平衡影响之辨析.国际贸易问题.2004(4):5-7。
[2]参见新华网.入世四年履行承诺,世贸报告称中国取得非凡成就.2006-04-24。
[3]Hongyi Harry Lai.Behind China's World Trade Organization Agreement with the USA.Third World Quarterly,2001,22(2):237-255.
[1]反倾销、反补贴、“特保”措施、“337调查”所关注的问题都是进口商品对本国产业的影响,比如,美国反倾销法律强调倾销与美国产业受到损害或实质性损害威胁之间的因果关系,特别是在诉讼程序中,美国法律要求国际贸易委员会(ITC)严格调查倾销对美国相关产业的损害情况,其结果是决定是否采取反倾销措施的主要依据。反补贴是根据国内相关产业的申请,对受补贴的进口产品进行调查,通过征收反补贴税或采取价格承诺等方式,抵消进口产品所享受的补贴,保护受损害的国内产业。特别保障措施也是在进口产品大量增加对国内产业造成一定程度的损害或损害威胁时采取的进口限制措施。“377调查”则是ITC根据美国《1930年关税法》第337节的规定,对进口中的不公平贸易做法进行调查和裁处,其特殊性在于迄今为止几乎所有的“337调查”案件都涉及知识产权问题。一旦美国企业或产业界在反倾销、反补贴、“特保”措施、“337调查”胜诉后,美国所采取的措施也是相似的,主要是征收惩罚性关税。另外,最近几年美国对华发动的反倾销调查数量有所减少,反补贴、“特保”措施、“337调查”却明显增多。这说明,这些贸易保护手段具有互补性。
[2]易丹辉.数据分析与Eviews应用.中国统计出版社,2002:239。
[1]吴喜梅.WTO反倾销立法与各国实践.郑州大学出版社,2003.105-106。
[1]参见吴喜梅.WTO反倾销立法与各国实践.郑州大学出版社,2003:106-108。
[1]易丹辉.数据分析与Eviews应用.中国统计出版社,2002:215-216。
[2]美国对其对外反倾销案件裁决结果参见美国国际贸易委员会2008年1月发布的Import Injury Investigations Case Statistics(FY 1980-2006)。
[1]网站:http://www.fec.gov/。
[1]网站:http://www.opensecrets.org。
[1]网站:www.campaignmoney.com。
[1]网站:http://www.bls.gov/。
[2]网站:http://www.unionstats.com/。
[3]网站:http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/。
[1]网址:http://www.uoregon.edu/～bruceb/adpage.htrm#data。
[2]网址:http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigmions/completed/index.htm。
[3]网址:http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/download.html。
[4]参见吴喜梅.WTO反倾销立法与各国实践.郑州大学出版社,2003:100-101。
[5]网址:http://www.internationaldata.org/usixd/usixd4sic.html。
[6]网址:http://www.nber.org/data/。
[1]网址:http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/index.html。
[1]网址:http://www.bls.gov/bls/unemployment.htm。
[1]中国外交部新闻发言人孔泉在2005年1月27日的例行记者会上做出这一表示。
[2]参见王国兴.中美战略经济对话:国际经济协调新框架.世界经济研究,2007(3):26-28。
[1]胡锦涛.高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜,为夺取全面建设小康社会新胜利而奋斗——在中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会上的报告.2007-10-15。
[1]王受文.转变外贸增长方式,促进贸易平衡发展.国际贸易,2007(7):4-7。
[2]林毅夫(2004)指出,新技术的研发投资大,但成功率不高,95%的研发项目没有产生任何结果,只有5%的项目最后取得可以申请专利的技术。申请专利以后的技术并非都有商业价值,因为采用有些新技术生产出来的产品消费者不喜欢。有些研究表明,申请专利的技术中,10—20%最终投入商业生产,给公司带来回报,另外的80—90%被束诸高阁。将所有研发投入,包括95%不成功项目的研发投入、申请专利成功后80%以上的市场失败率全部计算进去,整个新技术的研发投资巨大,风险很高,回报率低。
[1]艾尔·L.希尔曼(美)著,彭迪译.贸易保护的政治经济学.北京大学出版社,2005
[2]保罗·克鲁格曼,茅瑞斯·奥伯斯法尔德(美)著,海闻等译.国际经济学(第五版).中国人民大学出版社,2002
[3]蔡奕,宋颖.加入世贸组织过渡期后的中国资本市场开放对策.中国金融,2006(23):35-37
[4]曾寅初,吴金炎,夏薇.农产品国际贸易争端及其影响因素的实证研究.世界经济研究,2007(3):50-54
[5]查贵勇,高凡.贸易摩擦的政治经济学分析——兼析美国对华贸易摩擦的政治性原因.世界贸易组织动态与研究,2006(7):12-18
[6]陈端计.中国经济增长的新路径——中国市场经济中的供给问题研究.经济科学出版社,2004
[7]陈继勇.21世纪初世界经济格局与中美经贸关系:全国美国经济学会会长扩大会议暨“21世纪初世界经济格局与中美经贸关系高级论坛”论文集.西南财经大学出版社,2005
[8]陈继勇.美国新经济周期与中美经贸关系.武汉大学出版社,2004
[9]陈泰锋,李燕垣.美国对华贸易政策最新发展动向.技术经济与管理研究,2006(4):91-93
[10]陈泰锋.美国对华贸易摩擦.社会科学文献出版社,2005
[11]陈卫东.美国对中国保障措施及特保措施案例解析.对外经济贸易大学出版社,2005
[12]程大为.解决美国对华贸易摩擦的战略和战术分析.时代经贸,2003(6):14-20
[13]程新章.基于国际专业化指标的中国对外贸易比较优势研究.世界经济研究,2006(6):65-71
[14]崔伟.美国贸易政策及对中国的影响.科学决策,2003(11):26-31
[15]戴宏伟.国际产业转移的新趋势及其对我国的启示.国际贸易,2007(2):45-49
[16]戴斯勒(美)著,王恩冕,于少蔚译.美国贸易政治.中国市场出版社,2006
[17]杜江.20世纪90年代以来美国对外贸易政策的调整.天津商学院学报,2003(9):18-22
[18]段夫贵.美国利益集团在政策制定中的作用及启示.行政论坛,2004(9):94-96
[19]范红娟.后冷战时期美国利益集团对中美关系的影响.江淮论坛,2002(4):73-76
[20]方虹.经济全球化进程中的美国对华贸易摩擦分析.北京市计划劳动管理干部学院学报,2002(10卷第3):40-43
[21]冯正强,张永.中国遭遇贸易摩擦的原因及其防范对策.山东工商学院学报,2006(2):58-61
[22]高振沧,黄秀梅.美国对华贸易摩擦的成因与对策.辽宁工程技术大学学报(社会科学版),2005(7):368-370
[23]格罗斯曼,赫尔普曼(美)著,李增刚译.利益集团与贸易政策.中国人民大学出版社,2005
[24]耿伟.关于贸易保护政策选择的理论分析.中央财经大学学报,2003(7):48-51
[25]顾美红.论美国利益集团在美对华决策中的影响.南京师范大学硕士学位论文,2005
[26]国彦兵.西方国际贸易理论:历史与发展.浙江大学出版社,2004
[27]韩立余等.美国对外贸易中的知识产权保护.知识产权出版社,2006
[28]侯俊军,王耀中.中美、日美纺织品贸易摩擦比较及其启示.国际贸易问题,2006(4):34-45
[29]胡方.日美经济摩擦的理论与实态.武汉大学出版社,2001
[301胡涵钧.当代中美贸易(1972—2001).复旦大学出版社,2002
[31]黄建康,孙文远.美国实施反倾销贸易政策的动因与绩效分析.世界经济研究,2006(6):22-27,9
[32]贾怀勤.中美贸易平衡问题综论.对外经济贸易大学出版社,2004
[33]贾琳.入世后美国对华经贸政策的两面性.红旗文稿,2003(17):34.36
[34]江小涓,杨圣明,冯雷.中国对外经贸理论前沿Ⅱ.社会科学文献出版社,2001
[35]江小涓,杨圣明,冯雷.中国对外经贸理论前沿Ⅲ.社会科学文献出版社,2003
[36]金芳.国际分工的深化趋势及其对中国国际分工地位的影响.世界经济研究,2003(3):4-9
[37]靳波,蔡丽莉.透视美国利益集团游说.中国纺织,2005(10):109-111
[38]拉尔夫·戈莫里,威廉·鲍莫尔著,文爽,乔羽译.全球贸易和国家利益冲突.中信出版社,2003
[39]郎立华.美国对华贸易政策调整:背景、原则与目标.首都经济贸易大学学报,2007(2):81-85
[40]郎丽华.美国对华贸易政策调整:背景、原则与目标.首都经济贸易大学学报,2007(2):81-85
[41]雷达,于春海.内外均衡、结构调整和贸易摩擦.世界经济与政治.2004(8):70-75,7
[42]雷兴长,高丽敏.中国对外贸易摩擦的原因观点综述.职业圈,2007(4):4-5,7
[43]李菲,秦升.中国制造业国际竞争力的显示性指标分析.统计与决策(理论版),2007(3):80-82
[44]李计广,熊韶辉,张汉林.美国政府贸易摩擦预警机制及启示.国际贸易,2007(6):37-43
[45]李坤望,王孝松.美国对华贸易政策的决策和形成因素——以PNTR议案投票结果为例的政治经济分析.经济学(季刊),2009(2):375-396
[46]李坤望,王孝松.申诉者政治势力与美国对华反倾销的歧视性:美国对华反倾销裁定影响因素的经验分析.世界经济,2008(6):3-16
[47]李丽.中美贸易摩擦的政治经济分析.世界经济研究,2005(1):37-41
[48]李荣林,马海.美国对华贸易政策的政治经济分析.亚太经济,2006(5):59-63
[49]李荣林.动态国际贸易理论研究.中国经济出版社,2000
[50]李石凯.当代美国“新重商主义”述评.世界经济研究,2006(10):39-46
[51]李淑俊,郭增栋.美国贸易保护主义中的国会因素.当代世界与社会主义,2007(4):94-97
[52]李淑俊,倪世雄.美国贸易保护主义的必然性与偶然性——对未来美国贸易政策的政治经济分析.世界经济与政治论坛,2007(3):47.52
[53]李文锋.贸易政策形成研究.中国社会科学院研究生院博士学位论文,2005
[54]李晓刚.劳联一产联影响美国对华贸易政策的机制研究.中共济南市委党校学报,2006(1):25-28
[55]李轩.西方新贸易保护主义理论述评.当代经济研究,2007(5):15-17,56
[56]李嫒,张弛.WTO框架下中国对外贸易制度调整与重构.东北大学出版社,2005
[57]李远.二战后美国对外贸易政策的特点及其评价.社会科学论坛,2006(8):78-81
[58]李增芬.美国对华贸易摩擦与协调机制运用.经济论坛,2006(1):30-32
[59]梁碧波.美国对华贸易政策决定的均衡机理.中国社会科学出版社,2006
[60]梁碧波.美国对华贸易政策决定的外部制度约束.世界经济与政治论坛,2005(4):36-42
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