经济全球化条件下中国政府在制度变迁中的作用研究
|
摘要
始于20世纪80年代的经济全球化现已成为21世纪经济发展的重要趋势。经济全球化条件下,各种资源在全球范围内的配置和整合更加便捷,资源的丰缺不再是一国生产能力的主要决定因素,制度因素在全球竞争中的重要性突显。为了增强制度对各种资源的吸引力,制度变迁成了世界各国面临的主要任务。中国既是一个发展中大国,又是一个处于转轨过程中的国家。中国的市场制度建设严重滞后,制度变迁就成了更加紧迫的工作。中国能否及时有效地进行制度变迁对于综合国力的提高,对于在世界经济体系中的福利分配和经济的健康、持续发展具有决定性的影响。
制度变迁是制度的替代、转换与交易过程,组织和组织中的个人是制度变迁的实施者。而政府作为最具有权威性、实力最强大并担负着供给社会所需要的公共产品义务的组织,在制度变迁中发挥着不可替代的作用。关于政府在制度变迁中的行为和作用的问题理应成为制度变迁理论研究的重要问题。尤其是随着经济全球化的不断深入,对制度变迁中的政府作用提出了许多新的要求。需要我们在借鉴国内外学者研究成果的基础上,总结我国制度变迁的实践经验,通过制度变迁中政府行为的深入而系统的分析,对政府在制度变迁中的作用进行合理的定位,为我国制度变迁的实践提供正确的理论指导。在这一背景下,《经济全球化条件下中国政府在制度变迁中的作用研究》这一课题的提出具有重要的理论意义和现实意义,通过本课题的研究,我们可以更清晰的了解全球化对制度变迁带来的种种影响及对政府在制度变迁中行为和作用的新的要求,既把握政府作用的共性,又关注不同时期和不同国家政府作用的特殊性,从而,为我国政府决策提供参考和借鉴。在我国的制度设计和制度引进中,政府应注重制度的互补性和多样性,从本国的国情出发,选择适宜的制度体系。避免盲目性、减少被动性、增强针对性、提高前瞻性,卓有成效地推进我国的制度变迁进程,并为多种经济模式共存的世界经济体系增添新的活力。
在经济学中,对政府行为的探讨集中于公共经济学、规制经济学、宏观经济学等领域。本文从新的角度,以制度变迁中的政府作用为主题,并将之置于经济全球化的大背景下,结合全球化对制度变迁的影响,全面系统地探讨了政府行为问题。本文在方法论上也具有自己的特色。目前制度变迁研究的主流方法是新制度经济学的分析方法。自20世纪80年代以来,经济学的研究方法已开始趋于多元化,借助于不断发展的经济学方法论,人们已经能够分析经济系统运行的各种复杂关系和环境,从而达到对经济行为和经济现实的了解。本文在吸收新古典和新制度主义的合理方法如成本收益分析法、需求与供给分析法的基础上,以演化博弈理论和利益集团博弈理论为主体,借鉴和整合了公共选择理论、博弈论、信息经济学、演化经济学、比较制度分
Starting from the eighties in the last century, economic globalization has become an important trend in world development. Under conditions of globalization, the allocation and integration of various resources within the whole world are considerably facilitated. Thus the abundance or shortage of resources are no more a decisive factor of the productive power of a country, while the importance of institutional elements in international competition has become prominent. To strengthen the attraction of institutions to various resources, institutional change is the primary task confronting all countries of the world. Since China is a big developing nation and also an economy in the process of transition, its market system is seriously underdeveloped, and therefore its institutional change is all the more urgent. Whether China could realize its institutional change will have a decisive impact on the raising of its overall national strength, its share of welfare in world economic system and its healthy and sustainable development in the future.Institutional change is the process of displacement, transformation and transaction of institutions. The organizations and the individuals in them are the main performers of this change while the government as the most authoritative and powerful organization responsible for the supply of public goods and services. In society has a unique role to play in the process. Thus government behavior and function in institutional change should be important problems for theoretical research. With the deepening of economic globalization many new requirement have been put forward on the role of government. It is imperative for us to summarize the research findings of scholars both within this country and abroad and the practical experience of China's institutional change, to conduct in-depth and systematic analysis of government behavior and its proper position in the process of institutional change in order to provide a set of correct theoretical guidelines for further practices in this change. It is against this background that the "Study on the Role of Chinese Government in Institutional Change under Conditions of Economic Globalization " is made and the theoretical and practical significance of the topic can be clearly depicted. It is hoped that through this study we could better understand the impact of globalization upon institutional change and the new requirements for government behavior and function , so that at the same time of grasping the common character of government role in general, special attentions are paid to peculiarities of different countries at different periods of time in order to offer useful reference for Chinese government in decision-making. In our system designing or introduction, the government
should attach importance to the variety and compatibility of various institutions, and starting from the national condition of our own country ,choose the most appropriate system of institutions. The aim is to avoid blindness, passivity and increase the sense of purpose and farsightedness so as to effectively promote the institutional change in our country while adding stamina to the heterogeneous world economy system.In the sphere of economic research, the study of government behavior is focused in Public Economics, Regulation Economics and Macroeconomics. Starting from a fresh viewpoint, this thesis fakes the role of government in institutional change as its point of departure and places it in the background of economic globalization to study its impact upon institutional change and to analyze the problem of government behavior in a systematic and comprehensive way. There is also some innovation in its methodology of approach. The mainstream method applied in researches of institutional change is the analytical tool of the New Institutional School. From 1980s on, however, the method in economic research has shown a trend of heterogeneity, Drawing from the ever developing economic methodology, people are able to deal with the complicated relationship and environment in which the economic system unfolds and operates, and attain a more thorough understanding of economic reality. Based on the Cost-Benefit analysis and Supply-Demand analysis of the New Classical and Neo-Institutional Schools, this thesis takes Evolutionary Game Theory and Interest Groups Game Theory as its mainstay ,while borrows different tools from the Theory of Public Choice, Game Theory, Economic of Information, Evolutionary Economics, Comparative system Analysis and Behavioral Economics and integrates them into a unique set of multiple methods so as to provide a comprehensive and effective tool-box to meet the requirements of analysis the psychological analysis of various of individual behaviors, system analysis and process analysis.The thesis is consisted of an introduction and six chapters. In the introduction, the author puts forward the background of choosing the topic of the thesis and the purpose and significance of the research. The fundamental theoretical hypotheses are laid out at the outset. Since the primary object of research of this thesis is government behavior in institutional change, and the purpose of government is to steer the social groups and individuals through a set of strategies to guide their rational behavior and influence their choice in order to conduct the institutional change in its intended direction, in some sense this thesis can also be said to be a study of behavior science. Thus its fundamental hypotheses are made from the individual behavior of human race. This is both like theoretical premise and micro foundation for the analysis of government behavior. In the later part of the introduction, the main methods employed in this thesis are also explained. It is pointed out that based on the useful theoretical
tools inherited from New Classical Economics and Neo-Institutional School, a synthesis is made of the chief methods prevailing in cotemporary economic profession to meet the requirements of behavioral analysis of governments during institutional change.Chapter one is a general discussion of government behavior in institutional change. At present these is a lack of literature directly addressing government behavior during institutional change. Therefore the author refers to some representative economists and their contributions in the sphere of institutional change such as Friedrich Hayeke, the proponent of Evolutionary Rationalism in his "Spontaneous Social Order "doctrine; Douglas North the representative figure of Neo-Institutional School in his institutional change theory characterized by cost-benefit and supply-demand analyses, especially his theory of the state; Murrell Olson , the pioneer of Public Choice School in his "Interest Group Theory "; and Aoki Masahiko the Comparative System analysis school founder and his institutional change theory which uses evolutionary game theory as his analytical tool. The author distills and summarizes the general standpoint they arrived at about government behavior in institutional change, and, basing on this, puts forward her own constructive analytical framework, By integrating Interest Group Game Theory with Evolutionary Game Theory, for the first timeshe set forward the four-stage framework (Evolutionary Game—partial Equilibrium-----Interest Group Game—General Equilibrium), and elaborates the specific target of government behavior in each stage in order to arrive at a penetrating and comprehensive analysis of government behavior in the process of institutional change.Chapter two focuses on the characteristics of China's government behavior in institutional change under the specific conditions of economic globalization. First of all, the impact of globalization upon institutional change is examined in some detail. Economic globalization has changed the international environment of all countries in the world. Though the change of a series of factors such as the accessibility of information, risks and uncertainties, the speed of knowledge accumulation and renewal, the change of relative price of factors of production and the preference in society, the demand and supply of institutional change also shift in tandem. As the biggest developing country in the world, China shares the common features of all developing countries in their institutional change such as the lagging of development, the imbalance of economic structure, the weakness of market forces, the dominance of the government in economic life, the wide discrepancy of power between different interest groups, and the inertia in technological and institutional innovations. At the same time, China is also a country in transition. It also shares the problems of all other economies in transition such as path-reliance on old institutions and the short supply of new institutions, i.e., the co-existence of shortage and surplus of institutions, the absence and
trespass of the government at the same time. Besides, due to the different initial conditions and specific social content, China possesses its distinct features different from those of other developing countries and countries in transition. Under conditions of globalization these exists a variety of development models in different nation-states. How to choose the appropriate government behavior model to suit our own national reality in institutional change is the main problem under discussion in this chapter.Chapter three concerns the government behavior in China's property rights change. Starting from a general survey of the role of government in the change of property rights, the author attempts to analyze the influence of economic globalization upon the change of property rights. Addressing the main inadequacies of china's property rights institutions, the target of government behavior in institutional change of property rights should be the raising of allocation efficiency of resources and promotion of social justice. With this target in mind, the author suggests that the institutional reform of property rights should adopt a transitional and gradual pattern. Priority should be given to reforms in state-owned-enterprises, land tenure in rural areas and private enterprises. For the achievement of targets of the reform in property rights, the combination of strategies which the government should adopt is recommended.Chapter four is an inquiry into the micro regulation and macro co-ordination of the Chinese government. These are the two fundamental activities with which the government intervenes with economic affairs. Economic globalization has brought new features to the government's activities. Under conditions of economic globalization, the frequency of mobility of productive factors has quickened. The relations between countries are increasingly closer and closer. Thus on the whole the micro regulations reveal a tendency of loosening (although in some particular parts it maybe tightening). But in the macro-economic sphere, owing to more violent fluctuations, uncertainties, risks and inequalities in the distribution of economic welfare, the macro coordination and adjustment of national government have been steadily intensified. From the viewpoint of China's specific conditions the author explains the difference of micro regulation and macro coordination between this country and the Western countries in general, points out the existing problems and the measures we should take for improvement.In chapter five the government behavior in the informal institutional change in our country is discussed. Informal institutions are important supplements of formal institutions and form the ideological foundation for the latten to take effect. They are closely combined with formal institutions. Economic globalization has changed the social-economic environment as the objective background of informal institutions and exerts its influence upon
informal institutions through the change of formal institutions. At the same time, economic globalization has accelerated the spread of values and the fusion of cultures within the world arena and thus affected direct changes in informal institutions. Under these circumstances the government should fully recognize the role of informal institutions, promote their change with various effective measures, and establish the system of informal institutions to match the formal institutions of the market of the economy.Finally, chapter six offers an analysis of the relationship between institutional change and the reform of organizational system of the government itself. With the employment of public choice theory, Principal-Agency theory and the theory of the state in Neo- Institutional Economics, the author explains the universality of government failure and the necessity of regulating the regulators themselves within the framework of government structure. Economic globalization has added to the urgency of the problem. The author analyses the flaws and maladies of the existing government hierarchy in China, and suggests the direction of reform and the essentials of change in the organizational system of the government under conditions of economic globalization.
制度变迁是制度的替代、转换与交易过程,组织和组织中的个人是制度变迁的实施者。而政府作为最具有权威性、实力最强大并担负着供给社会所需要的公共产品义务的组织,在制度变迁中发挥着不可替代的作用。关于政府在制度变迁中的行为和作用的问题理应成为制度变迁理论研究的重要问题。尤其是随着经济全球化的不断深入,对制度变迁中的政府作用提出了许多新的要求。需要我们在借鉴国内外学者研究成果的基础上,总结我国制度变迁的实践经验,通过制度变迁中政府行为的深入而系统的分析,对政府在制度变迁中的作用进行合理的定位,为我国制度变迁的实践提供正确的理论指导。在这一背景下,《经济全球化条件下中国政府在制度变迁中的作用研究》这一课题的提出具有重要的理论意义和现实意义,通过本课题的研究,我们可以更清晰的了解全球化对制度变迁带来的种种影响及对政府在制度变迁中行为和作用的新的要求,既把握政府作用的共性,又关注不同时期和不同国家政府作用的特殊性,从而,为我国政府决策提供参考和借鉴。在我国的制度设计和制度引进中,政府应注重制度的互补性和多样性,从本国的国情出发,选择适宜的制度体系。避免盲目性、减少被动性、增强针对性、提高前瞻性,卓有成效地推进我国的制度变迁进程,并为多种经济模式共存的世界经济体系增添新的活力。
在经济学中,对政府行为的探讨集中于公共经济学、规制经济学、宏观经济学等领域。本文从新的角度,以制度变迁中的政府作用为主题,并将之置于经济全球化的大背景下,结合全球化对制度变迁的影响,全面系统地探讨了政府行为问题。本文在方法论上也具有自己的特色。目前制度变迁研究的主流方法是新制度经济学的分析方法。自20世纪80年代以来,经济学的研究方法已开始趋于多元化,借助于不断发展的经济学方法论,人们已经能够分析经济系统运行的各种复杂关系和环境,从而达到对经济行为和经济现实的了解。本文在吸收新古典和新制度主义的合理方法如成本收益分析法、需求与供给分析法的基础上,以演化博弈理论和利益集团博弈理论为主体,借鉴和整合了公共选择理论、博弈论、信息经济学、演化经济学、比较制度分
Starting from the eighties in the last century, economic globalization has become an important trend in world development. Under conditions of globalization, the allocation and integration of various resources within the whole world are considerably facilitated. Thus the abundance or shortage of resources are no more a decisive factor of the productive power of a country, while the importance of institutional elements in international competition has become prominent. To strengthen the attraction of institutions to various resources, institutional change is the primary task confronting all countries of the world. Since China is a big developing nation and also an economy in the process of transition, its market system is seriously underdeveloped, and therefore its institutional change is all the more urgent. Whether China could realize its institutional change will have a decisive impact on the raising of its overall national strength, its share of welfare in world economic system and its healthy and sustainable development in the future.Institutional change is the process of displacement, transformation and transaction of institutions. The organizations and the individuals in them are the main performers of this change while the government as the most authoritative and powerful organization responsible for the supply of public goods and services. In society has a unique role to play in the process. Thus government behavior and function in institutional change should be important problems for theoretical research. With the deepening of economic globalization many new requirement have been put forward on the role of government. It is imperative for us to summarize the research findings of scholars both within this country and abroad and the practical experience of China's institutional change, to conduct in-depth and systematic analysis of government behavior and its proper position in the process of institutional change in order to provide a set of correct theoretical guidelines for further practices in this change. It is against this background that the "Study on the Role of Chinese Government in Institutional Change under Conditions of Economic Globalization " is made and the theoretical and practical significance of the topic can be clearly depicted. It is hoped that through this study we could better understand the impact of globalization upon institutional change and the new requirements for government behavior and function , so that at the same time of grasping the common character of government role in general, special attentions are paid to peculiarities of different countries at different periods of time in order to offer useful reference for Chinese government in decision-making. In our system designing or introduction, the government
should attach importance to the variety and compatibility of various institutions, and starting from the national condition of our own country ,choose the most appropriate system of institutions. The aim is to avoid blindness, passivity and increase the sense of purpose and farsightedness so as to effectively promote the institutional change in our country while adding stamina to the heterogeneous world economy system.In the sphere of economic research, the study of government behavior is focused in Public Economics, Regulation Economics and Macroeconomics. Starting from a fresh viewpoint, this thesis fakes the role of government in institutional change as its point of departure and places it in the background of economic globalization to study its impact upon institutional change and to analyze the problem of government behavior in a systematic and comprehensive way. There is also some innovation in its methodology of approach. The mainstream method applied in researches of institutional change is the analytical tool of the New Institutional School. From 1980s on, however, the method in economic research has shown a trend of heterogeneity, Drawing from the ever developing economic methodology, people are able to deal with the complicated relationship and environment in which the economic system unfolds and operates, and attain a more thorough understanding of economic reality. Based on the Cost-Benefit analysis and Supply-Demand analysis of the New Classical and Neo-Institutional Schools, this thesis takes Evolutionary Game Theory and Interest Groups Game Theory as its mainstay ,while borrows different tools from the Theory of Public Choice, Game Theory, Economic of Information, Evolutionary Economics, Comparative system Analysis and Behavioral Economics and integrates them into a unique set of multiple methods so as to provide a comprehensive and effective tool-box to meet the requirements of analysis the psychological analysis of various of individual behaviors, system analysis and process analysis.The thesis is consisted of an introduction and six chapters. In the introduction, the author puts forward the background of choosing the topic of the thesis and the purpose and significance of the research. The fundamental theoretical hypotheses are laid out at the outset. Since the primary object of research of this thesis is government behavior in institutional change, and the purpose of government is to steer the social groups and individuals through a set of strategies to guide their rational behavior and influence their choice in order to conduct the institutional change in its intended direction, in some sense this thesis can also be said to be a study of behavior science. Thus its fundamental hypotheses are made from the individual behavior of human race. This is both like theoretical premise and micro foundation for the analysis of government behavior. In the later part of the introduction, the main methods employed in this thesis are also explained. It is pointed out that based on the useful theoretical
tools inherited from New Classical Economics and Neo-Institutional School, a synthesis is made of the chief methods prevailing in cotemporary economic profession to meet the requirements of behavioral analysis of governments during institutional change.Chapter one is a general discussion of government behavior in institutional change. At present these is a lack of literature directly addressing government behavior during institutional change. Therefore the author refers to some representative economists and their contributions in the sphere of institutional change such as Friedrich Hayeke, the proponent of Evolutionary Rationalism in his "Spontaneous Social Order "doctrine; Douglas North the representative figure of Neo-Institutional School in his institutional change theory characterized by cost-benefit and supply-demand analyses, especially his theory of the state; Murrell Olson , the pioneer of Public Choice School in his "Interest Group Theory "; and Aoki Masahiko the Comparative System analysis school founder and his institutional change theory which uses evolutionary game theory as his analytical tool. The author distills and summarizes the general standpoint they arrived at about government behavior in institutional change, and, basing on this, puts forward her own constructive analytical framework, By integrating Interest Group Game Theory with Evolutionary Game Theory, for the first timeshe set forward the four-stage framework (Evolutionary Game—partial Equilibrium-----Interest Group Game—General Equilibrium), and elaborates the specific target of government behavior in each stage in order to arrive at a penetrating and comprehensive analysis of government behavior in the process of institutional change.Chapter two focuses on the characteristics of China's government behavior in institutional change under the specific conditions of economic globalization. First of all, the impact of globalization upon institutional change is examined in some detail. Economic globalization has changed the international environment of all countries in the world. Though the change of a series of factors such as the accessibility of information, risks and uncertainties, the speed of knowledge accumulation and renewal, the change of relative price of factors of production and the preference in society, the demand and supply of institutional change also shift in tandem. As the biggest developing country in the world, China shares the common features of all developing countries in their institutional change such as the lagging of development, the imbalance of economic structure, the weakness of market forces, the dominance of the government in economic life, the wide discrepancy of power between different interest groups, and the inertia in technological and institutional innovations. At the same time, China is also a country in transition. It also shares the problems of all other economies in transition such as path-reliance on old institutions and the short supply of new institutions, i.e., the co-existence of shortage and surplus of institutions, the absence and
trespass of the government at the same time. Besides, due to the different initial conditions and specific social content, China possesses its distinct features different from those of other developing countries and countries in transition. Under conditions of globalization these exists a variety of development models in different nation-states. How to choose the appropriate government behavior model to suit our own national reality in institutional change is the main problem under discussion in this chapter.Chapter three concerns the government behavior in China's property rights change. Starting from a general survey of the role of government in the change of property rights, the author attempts to analyze the influence of economic globalization upon the change of property rights. Addressing the main inadequacies of china's property rights institutions, the target of government behavior in institutional change of property rights should be the raising of allocation efficiency of resources and promotion of social justice. With this target in mind, the author suggests that the institutional reform of property rights should adopt a transitional and gradual pattern. Priority should be given to reforms in state-owned-enterprises, land tenure in rural areas and private enterprises. For the achievement of targets of the reform in property rights, the combination of strategies which the government should adopt is recommended.Chapter four is an inquiry into the micro regulation and macro co-ordination of the Chinese government. These are the two fundamental activities with which the government intervenes with economic affairs. Economic globalization has brought new features to the government's activities. Under conditions of economic globalization, the frequency of mobility of productive factors has quickened. The relations between countries are increasingly closer and closer. Thus on the whole the micro regulations reveal a tendency of loosening (although in some particular parts it maybe tightening). But in the macro-economic sphere, owing to more violent fluctuations, uncertainties, risks and inequalities in the distribution of economic welfare, the macro coordination and adjustment of national government have been steadily intensified. From the viewpoint of China's specific conditions the author explains the difference of micro regulation and macro coordination between this country and the Western countries in general, points out the existing problems and the measures we should take for improvement.In chapter five the government behavior in the informal institutional change in our country is discussed. Informal institutions are important supplements of formal institutions and form the ideological foundation for the latten to take effect. They are closely combined with formal institutions. Economic globalization has changed the social-economic environment as the objective background of informal institutions and exerts its influence upon
informal institutions through the change of formal institutions. At the same time, economic globalization has accelerated the spread of values and the fusion of cultures within the world arena and thus affected direct changes in informal institutions. Under these circumstances the government should fully recognize the role of informal institutions, promote their change with various effective measures, and establish the system of informal institutions to match the formal institutions of the market of the economy.Finally, chapter six offers an analysis of the relationship between institutional change and the reform of organizational system of the government itself. With the employment of public choice theory, Principal-Agency theory and the theory of the state in Neo- Institutional Economics, the author explains the universality of government failure and the necessity of regulating the regulators themselves within the framework of government structure. Economic globalization has added to the urgency of the problem. The author analyses the flaws and maladies of the existing government hierarchy in China, and suggests the direction of reform and the essentials of change in the organizational system of the government under conditions of economic globalization.
引文
1.哈耶克:《致命的自负》,东方出版社 1991年版;
2.哈耶克:《自由秩序原理》,生活·读书·新知三联书店 1997年版;
3.哈耶克:《通往奴役之路》,中国社会科学出版社 1997年版;
4.奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1995年版;
5.奥尔森:《国家兴衰探源》,商务印书馆 1997年版;
6.奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1995年版;
7.诺斯:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1994年版;
8.诺斯:《制度变迁的理论:概念与原因》,《财产权利与制度变迁》上海三联书店上海人民出版社 2003年版;
9.诺斯:《理解经济变迁的过程》,《经济社会体制比较》2004年第1期;
10.诺斯:《制度、意识形态和经济绩效》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 2000年版;
11.诺斯:《制度变迁理论纲要》,《经济学与中国经济改革》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1995年版;
12.诺斯:《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1994年版;
13.青木昌彦、奥野正宽:《经济体制的比较制度分析》,中国发展出版社 1999年版;
14.青木昌彦:《沿着均衡点演进的制度变迁》,见科斯等《制度、契约与组织》,经济科学出版社 2003年版;
15.青木昌彦、奥野正宽:《为什么多样性制度继续在演进?》,《理论经济学》2002年第2期;
16.青木昌彦等:《政府在东亚经济发展中的作用》,中国经济出版社 1998年版;
17.科斯、阿尔钦、诺斯等:《财产权利与制度变迁—产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1994年版;
18.科斯、诺斯、威廉姆森等:《制度、契约与组织—从新制度经济学角度的透视》,经济科学出版社 2003年版;
19.马尔科姆。卢瑟福:《经济学中的制度:老制度主义和新制度主义》,中国社会科学出版社 1999年版;
20.柯武刚、史慢飞:《制度经济学社会秩序与公共政策》,商务印书馆 2000年版:
21.查尔斯·沃尔夫:《市场或政府》,中国发展出版社 1994年版:
22.斯蒂格利茨:《政府为什么干预经济》,中国物资出版社 1998年版;
23.弗罗门:《经济演化—探索新制度经济学的理论基础》,经济科学出版社2003年版;
24.加里·D·利贝卡普:《产权的缔约分析》,中国社会科学出版社2001年版;
25.旦尼尔·F·史普博:《管制与市场》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1998年版;
26.埃格特森:《新制度经济学》,商务印书馆 1996年版;
27.平乔维奇:《产权经济学》,经济科学出版社 1999年版;
28.迈克尔。迪屈奇:《交易成本经济学》,经济科学出版社 1999年版;
29.亚当.斯密:《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》(下卷),商务印书馆 1979年版;
30.阿罗:《经济理论与理性假说》,经济科学出版社 1992年版;
31.霍奇逊:《现代制度主义经济学宣言》,北京大学出版社 1994年版:
32.马歇尔:《经济学原理》(上卷),商务印书馆 1997年版;
33.华勒斯坦:《开放的社会科学》,生活·读书·新知三联书店1 997年版;
34.《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大词典》(第二卷),经济科学出版社 1996年版;
35.贾根良:《理解演化经济学》,《中国社会科学》2004年第2期:
36.凡勃伦:《有闲阶级论》,商务印书馆 1964年版:
37.康芒斯:《制度经济学》(上册),商务印书馆 1962年版;
38.T·w·舒尔茨:《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海三联书店 1991年版:
39.大卫·格林纳韦:《宏观经济学前沿问题》,中国税务出版社 2000年版;
40.马可·斯达德勒、佩内斯·卡斯特里罗:《信息经济学引论:激励与合约》,上海财经大学出版社 2004年版;
41.贺卫、伍山林:《制度经济学》,机械工业出版社 2003年版;
42.纳尔逊、温特:《经济变迁的演化理论》,商务印书馆 1997年版;
43.谭崇台:《发展经济学》,上海人民出版社 1989年版:
44.谭崇台:《发展经济学概论》,辽宁人民出版社 1992年版;
45.谭崇台:《西方经济发展思想史》(修订本),武汉大学出版社 1995年版;
46.张培刚:《农业与工业化(中下合卷)农业国工业化问题再论》,华中科技大学出版社 2002年版:
47.张培刚:《新发展经济学》,河南人民出版社 1992年版:
48.张培刚:《发展经济学教程》,经济科学出版社 2001年版;
49.梁小民:《经济学发展轨迹》,人民日报出版社 2000年版;
50.傅殷才、颜鹏飞:《自由经营还是国家干预—西方两大经济思潮概论》,经济科学出版社 1995年版;
51.郭熙葆:《经济发展》,中国社会科学出版社 2000年版;
52.郭熙葆:《农业发展论》,武汉大学出版社 1995年版;
53.吴易风等:《政府干预和市场经济》,商务印书馆 1998年版;
54.林毅夫:《关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁》,见刘守英等编《财产权利与制度变迁》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社 1994年版;
55.樊刚:《市场机制与经济效率》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社 1995年版;
56.汪丁丁:《“交易费用”与博弈均衡》,《经济研究》1995年第9期;
57.汪丁丁:《经济学视角下的行为和意义》,《学术月刊》2003年第10期;
58.徐滇庆、李瑞:《政府在经济发展中的作用》,上海人民出版社 1999年版;
59.周其仁:《产权与制度变迁》,社会科学文献出版社 2002年版;
60.张曙光主编:《中国制度变迁的案例研究(第一集)》,上海人民出版社 1996年版:
61.张曙光主编:《中国制度变迁的案例研究(第二集)》,中国财政经济出版社 1999年版;
62.盛洪:《寻求改革的稳定形式》,上海财经大学出版社 2002年版。
63.周业安:《中国制度变迁的理论思考——一种演进理论的看法》,北京天则经济研究所内部论文稿系列 1998年第14期。
64.周业安:《中国的经济转轨与中国的新制度经济学》,工作论文,中国人民大学经济学院 1999年。
65.段文斌、陈国富等:《制度经济学—制度主义与经济分析》,南开大学出版社 2003年版;
66.段文斌:《产权、制度变迁与经济发展—新制度经济学前沿专题》,南开大学出版社 2003年版;
67.程虹:《制度变迁的周期—一个一般理论及其对中国改革的研究》,人民出版社 2000年版;
68.张海涛:《金融全球化—发展中国家的利益与风险》,经济科学出版社 2002年版;
69.姚先国、罗卫东:《比较经济体制分析》,浙江大学出版社 1999年版;
70.周喜安:《透视政府经济职能》,经济科学出版社 1999年版;
71.毛寿龙、李梅:《有限政府的经济分析》,上海三联书店 2000年版;
72.胡柄志:《中国金融制度重构研究》,人民出版社 2003年版;
73.吴竞择:《金融外部性与金融制度创新》,经济管理出版社 2003年版;
74.肖兴志:《自然垄断产业规制改革模式研究》,东北财经大学出版社 2003年版;
75.汪洪涛:《制度经济学—制度及制度变迁性质解释》,复旦大学出版社 2003年版:
76.罗金生:《利益集团与制度变迁—渐进转轨中的中小商业银行》,中国金融出版社 2003年版;
77.柳新元:《利益冲突与制度变迁》,武汉大学出版社 2002年版;
78.胡志坚:《国家创新系统理论分析与国家比较》,社会科学文献出版社 2000年版;
79.宋胜洲:《开放经济下政府规制理论的拓展与规则下的可操作空间》,《亚太经济》2004年第4期;
80.韦曙林:《西方政府规制理论与中国规制实践的差异》,《江苏商论》2004年第6期;
81.植草益:《微观规制经济学》,中国发展出版社 1992年版;
82.段晓锋:《非正式制度对中国经济制度变迁方式的影响》,经济科学出版社 1998年版。
1. Sen, A., "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory",Philosophy and Public Affairs,1977.
2. Sen, A., "On Ethics and Economics", Oxford: Blackwell Press,1987.
3. Smyth, Russell, "Property rights in China's economic reforms", Communist and PostCommunist Studies,Sep. 1998, Vol.31.
4. Harry G Boardman, "The Chinese state as corporate shareholder", Finance & Development, Sep. 1999, Vol.36.
5. Stephen Green, Lihui Tian, "Another step toward privatization" ,The China Business Review, Nov/Des. 2004, Vol.31.
6. Anonymous, "Public choice theory: A unifying framework for judicial activism", Harvard Law Review,Mar. 1997, Vol.110.
7. Lee, keun, "Property rights and the agency problem in Chinese enterprise reform", Cambridge Journal of Economics, Jun. 1993, Vol.17.
8. Lixin Colin Xu, "Determinants of the repartitioning of property rights between the government and state enterprise", Economic Development and Culture change, Apr. 1998, Vol.46.
9. N·J·Foss, "Realism and Evolutionary Economics", Journal of Social and Evolutionary System, 1994,vol. 17,no. 1.
10. U·Witt, "Evolutionary Economics: An Interpretative Survey", In K·Dopfer (ed.), Evolutionary Economics: Program and Scope, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
11. J·J·Vromen, "Evolutionary Economics: Precursors, Paradigmatic Propositions, Puzzles and Prospects", In J·Reijnders (ed.), Economics and Evolution, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1997.
12. Hayek," Law, Legislation,and Liberty: Rules and Order", The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
13. Hayek, "The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason", Indianapolis 1979.
14. Hayek, "Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics", Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967.
15. Hayek, "Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order", The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
16. Hayek, "The Constitution of Liberty",London and Chicago, 1960.
17. Hayek, "Law, Legislation and Liberty: The Political Order of a Free People",The University of Chicago Press, 1979.
18. John H. Dunning, Khalil A. Hamdani, "The New Globalism and Developing Countries", United Nations University Press Tokyo,1997.
19. Edward L.Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, "The Rise of the Regulatory State", Journal of Economic Literature, June. 2003,Vol. XLI.
20. leh Havrylyshyn , Ron Van Rooden, "Institutions Matter in Transition, But So Do Policies", Comparative Economic Studies. 2002, Vol.45.
21. Arminio Fraga, "Latin America since the 1990s: Rising from the Sickbed?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004,Vol.18.
22. Samuelson, "Evolution and Game Theory" , 2002,Vol.l6,No.2.
23. Arrow, Kenneth J., "The Economics of Information", Basil Blackwell Limited, 1984.
24. Samuelson,L., "Evolution and Game Theory", 2002,Vol.l6,No.2.
25. W.B.Arthur,Y.M.Emotive , Y.M.Kaniovsky, "Pathdependent Processes and the Emergence of Macro-structure" , European Journal of Operational Research,30.1987.
26. R.Coase, "The New Istitutional Economics", American Economic Review, 88,1998.
27. Friedman,D., "Evolutionary Economics Goes Mainstream: A Review of the Theory of Leaning in Games" , Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1998, No.8.
28. Samuelson,L., "Evolution and Game Theory", 2002,Vol.16,No.2.
29. Tony Saich, "The changing Role of Government workpaper", Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,2004.
30. Andrei Shleifer, "Understanding Regulation". European Financial Management, forthcoming, 2005.
31. Thomas,Vinod,Mansoor,Ashok Dhareshwar,Daniel Kaufmann ,Nalin Kishor, Ramon Lopez, Yan Wang, " The Quality of Growth", Oxford University Press, 2000.
32. MinXinPei, "Future shock: the WTO and Political change in China" ,Policy Brief, 2001(8).
33. Gerard Roland, "Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firm", MIT Press, 2000.
34. Polanyi, M., "Personal Knowledge", London: Routledge &Kegan Paul,1958.
35. Umbeck, J. R., "Might makes rights: a theory of the formation and initial distribution of property rights", Economic Inquiry 20(2). 1981.
36. Williamson, O.E. , "The Economic Institutions of Capitalism". New York: Free Press, 1985.
37. Witt, U., "Evolutionary Economics", Cheltenham, UK. and Northampton. 1993.
38. Hardin, R., 1996, "Institutional knowledge and the role of institutions", working paper, New York University.
39. Kasper,W., M.E.Streit, " Institutional Economics" ,Cheltenham, UK.and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 1998.
40. North,D.C, "Government and the cost of exchange in history", Journal of Economic History 44(2). 1984.
41. Jefferson, Gary H., Inderjit Singh, "Enterprise Reform in China", Oxford University Press, 1999.
42. G. Slarter, D. Spencer, "The Uncertainty Foundation of Transaction Cost Economics", Journal of Economic Issues, March 2000.
2.哈耶克:《自由秩序原理》,生活·读书·新知三联书店 1997年版;
3.哈耶克:《通往奴役之路》,中国社会科学出版社 1997年版;
4.奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1995年版;
5.奥尔森:《国家兴衰探源》,商务印书馆 1997年版;
6.奥尔森:《集体行动的逻辑》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1995年版;
7.诺斯:《经济史中的结构与变迁》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1994年版;
8.诺斯:《制度变迁的理论:概念与原因》,《财产权利与制度变迁》上海三联书店上海人民出版社 2003年版;
9.诺斯:《理解经济变迁的过程》,《经济社会体制比较》2004年第1期;
10.诺斯:《制度、意识形态和经济绩效》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 2000年版;
11.诺斯:《制度变迁理论纲要》,《经济学与中国经济改革》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1995年版;
12.诺斯:《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1994年版;
13.青木昌彦、奥野正宽:《经济体制的比较制度分析》,中国发展出版社 1999年版;
14.青木昌彦:《沿着均衡点演进的制度变迁》,见科斯等《制度、契约与组织》,经济科学出版社 2003年版;
15.青木昌彦、奥野正宽:《为什么多样性制度继续在演进?》,《理论经济学》2002年第2期;
16.青木昌彦等:《政府在东亚经济发展中的作用》,中国经济出版社 1998年版;
17.科斯、阿尔钦、诺斯等:《财产权利与制度变迁—产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1994年版;
18.科斯、诺斯、威廉姆森等:《制度、契约与组织—从新制度经济学角度的透视》,经济科学出版社 2003年版;
19.马尔科姆。卢瑟福:《经济学中的制度:老制度主义和新制度主义》,中国社会科学出版社 1999年版;
20.柯武刚、史慢飞:《制度经济学社会秩序与公共政策》,商务印书馆 2000年版:
21.查尔斯·沃尔夫:《市场或政府》,中国发展出版社 1994年版:
22.斯蒂格利茨:《政府为什么干预经济》,中国物资出版社 1998年版;
23.弗罗门:《经济演化—探索新制度经济学的理论基础》,经济科学出版社2003年版;
24.加里·D·利贝卡普:《产权的缔约分析》,中国社会科学出版社2001年版;
25.旦尼尔·F·史普博:《管制与市场》,上海三联书店上海人民出版社 1998年版;
26.埃格特森:《新制度经济学》,商务印书馆 1996年版;
27.平乔维奇:《产权经济学》,经济科学出版社 1999年版;
28.迈克尔。迪屈奇:《交易成本经济学》,经济科学出版社 1999年版;
29.亚当.斯密:《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》(下卷),商务印书馆 1979年版;
30.阿罗:《经济理论与理性假说》,经济科学出版社 1992年版;
31.霍奇逊:《现代制度主义经济学宣言》,北京大学出版社 1994年版:
32.马歇尔:《经济学原理》(上卷),商务印书馆 1997年版;
33.华勒斯坦:《开放的社会科学》,生活·读书·新知三联书店1 997年版;
34.《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大词典》(第二卷),经济科学出版社 1996年版;
35.贾根良:《理解演化经济学》,《中国社会科学》2004年第2期:
36.凡勃伦:《有闲阶级论》,商务印书馆 1964年版:
37.康芒斯:《制度经济学》(上册),商务印书馆 1962年版;
38.T·w·舒尔茨:《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海三联书店 1991年版:
39.大卫·格林纳韦:《宏观经济学前沿问题》,中国税务出版社 2000年版;
40.马可·斯达德勒、佩内斯·卡斯特里罗:《信息经济学引论:激励与合约》,上海财经大学出版社 2004年版;
41.贺卫、伍山林:《制度经济学》,机械工业出版社 2003年版;
42.纳尔逊、温特:《经济变迁的演化理论》,商务印书馆 1997年版;
43.谭崇台:《发展经济学》,上海人民出版社 1989年版:
44.谭崇台:《发展经济学概论》,辽宁人民出版社 1992年版;
45.谭崇台:《西方经济发展思想史》(修订本),武汉大学出版社 1995年版;
46.张培刚:《农业与工业化(中下合卷)农业国工业化问题再论》,华中科技大学出版社 2002年版:
47.张培刚:《新发展经济学》,河南人民出版社 1992年版:
48.张培刚:《发展经济学教程》,经济科学出版社 2001年版;
49.梁小民:《经济学发展轨迹》,人民日报出版社 2000年版;
50.傅殷才、颜鹏飞:《自由经营还是国家干预—西方两大经济思潮概论》,经济科学出版社 1995年版;
51.郭熙葆:《经济发展》,中国社会科学出版社 2000年版;
52.郭熙葆:《农业发展论》,武汉大学出版社 1995年版;
53.吴易风等:《政府干预和市场经济》,商务印书馆 1998年版;
54.林毅夫:《关于制度变迁的经济学理论:诱致性变迁与强制性变迁》,见刘守英等编《财产权利与制度变迁》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社 1994年版;
55.樊刚:《市场机制与经济效率》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社 1995年版;
56.汪丁丁:《“交易费用”与博弈均衡》,《经济研究》1995年第9期;
57.汪丁丁:《经济学视角下的行为和意义》,《学术月刊》2003年第10期;
58.徐滇庆、李瑞:《政府在经济发展中的作用》,上海人民出版社 1999年版;
59.周其仁:《产权与制度变迁》,社会科学文献出版社 2002年版;
60.张曙光主编:《中国制度变迁的案例研究(第一集)》,上海人民出版社 1996年版:
61.张曙光主编:《中国制度变迁的案例研究(第二集)》,中国财政经济出版社 1999年版;
62.盛洪:《寻求改革的稳定形式》,上海财经大学出版社 2002年版。
63.周业安:《中国制度变迁的理论思考——一种演进理论的看法》,北京天则经济研究所内部论文稿系列 1998年第14期。
64.周业安:《中国的经济转轨与中国的新制度经济学》,工作论文,中国人民大学经济学院 1999年。
65.段文斌、陈国富等:《制度经济学—制度主义与经济分析》,南开大学出版社 2003年版;
66.段文斌:《产权、制度变迁与经济发展—新制度经济学前沿专题》,南开大学出版社 2003年版;
67.程虹:《制度变迁的周期—一个一般理论及其对中国改革的研究》,人民出版社 2000年版;
68.张海涛:《金融全球化—发展中国家的利益与风险》,经济科学出版社 2002年版;
69.姚先国、罗卫东:《比较经济体制分析》,浙江大学出版社 1999年版;
70.周喜安:《透视政府经济职能》,经济科学出版社 1999年版;
71.毛寿龙、李梅:《有限政府的经济分析》,上海三联书店 2000年版;
72.胡柄志:《中国金融制度重构研究》,人民出版社 2003年版;
73.吴竞择:《金融外部性与金融制度创新》,经济管理出版社 2003年版;
74.肖兴志:《自然垄断产业规制改革模式研究》,东北财经大学出版社 2003年版;
75.汪洪涛:《制度经济学—制度及制度变迁性质解释》,复旦大学出版社 2003年版:
76.罗金生:《利益集团与制度变迁—渐进转轨中的中小商业银行》,中国金融出版社 2003年版;
77.柳新元:《利益冲突与制度变迁》,武汉大学出版社 2002年版;
78.胡志坚:《国家创新系统理论分析与国家比较》,社会科学文献出版社 2000年版;
79.宋胜洲:《开放经济下政府规制理论的拓展与规则下的可操作空间》,《亚太经济》2004年第4期;
80.韦曙林:《西方政府规制理论与中国规制实践的差异》,《江苏商论》2004年第6期;
81.植草益:《微观规制经济学》,中国发展出版社 1992年版;
82.段晓锋:《非正式制度对中国经济制度变迁方式的影响》,经济科学出版社 1998年版。
1. Sen, A., "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory",Philosophy and Public Affairs,1977.
2. Sen, A., "On Ethics and Economics", Oxford: Blackwell Press,1987.
3. Smyth, Russell, "Property rights in China's economic reforms", Communist and PostCommunist Studies,Sep. 1998, Vol.31.
4. Harry G Boardman, "The Chinese state as corporate shareholder", Finance & Development, Sep. 1999, Vol.36.
5. Stephen Green, Lihui Tian, "Another step toward privatization" ,The China Business Review, Nov/Des. 2004, Vol.31.
6. Anonymous, "Public choice theory: A unifying framework for judicial activism", Harvard Law Review,Mar. 1997, Vol.110.
7. Lee, keun, "Property rights and the agency problem in Chinese enterprise reform", Cambridge Journal of Economics, Jun. 1993, Vol.17.
8. Lixin Colin Xu, "Determinants of the repartitioning of property rights between the government and state enterprise", Economic Development and Culture change, Apr. 1998, Vol.46.
9. N·J·Foss, "Realism and Evolutionary Economics", Journal of Social and Evolutionary System, 1994,vol. 17,no. 1.
10. U·Witt, "Evolutionary Economics: An Interpretative Survey", In K·Dopfer (ed.), Evolutionary Economics: Program and Scope, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.
11. J·J·Vromen, "Evolutionary Economics: Precursors, Paradigmatic Propositions, Puzzles and Prospects", In J·Reijnders (ed.), Economics and Evolution, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1997.
12. Hayek," Law, Legislation,and Liberty: Rules and Order", The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
13. Hayek, "The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason", Indianapolis 1979.
14. Hayek, "Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics", Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967.
15. Hayek, "Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order", The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
16. Hayek, "The Constitution of Liberty",London and Chicago, 1960.
17. Hayek, "Law, Legislation and Liberty: The Political Order of a Free People",The University of Chicago Press, 1979.
18. John H. Dunning, Khalil A. Hamdani, "The New Globalism and Developing Countries", United Nations University Press Tokyo,1997.
19. Edward L.Glaeser, Andrei Shleifer, "The Rise of the Regulatory State", Journal of Economic Literature, June. 2003,Vol. XLI.
20. leh Havrylyshyn , Ron Van Rooden, "Institutions Matter in Transition, But So Do Policies", Comparative Economic Studies. 2002, Vol.45.
21. Arminio Fraga, "Latin America since the 1990s: Rising from the Sickbed?", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2004,Vol.18.
22. Samuelson, "Evolution and Game Theory" , 2002,Vol.l6,No.2.
23. Arrow, Kenneth J., "The Economics of Information", Basil Blackwell Limited, 1984.
24. Samuelson,L., "Evolution and Game Theory", 2002,Vol.l6,No.2.
25. W.B.Arthur,Y.M.Emotive , Y.M.Kaniovsky, "Pathdependent Processes and the Emergence of Macro-structure" , European Journal of Operational Research,30.1987.
26. R.Coase, "The New Istitutional Economics", American Economic Review, 88,1998.
27. Friedman,D., "Evolutionary Economics Goes Mainstream: A Review of the Theory of Leaning in Games" , Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1998, No.8.
28. Samuelson,L., "Evolution and Game Theory", 2002,Vol.16,No.2.
29. Tony Saich, "The changing Role of Government workpaper", Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,2004.
30. Andrei Shleifer, "Understanding Regulation". European Financial Management, forthcoming, 2005.
31. Thomas,Vinod,Mansoor,Ashok Dhareshwar,Daniel Kaufmann ,Nalin Kishor, Ramon Lopez, Yan Wang, " The Quality of Growth", Oxford University Press, 2000.
32. MinXinPei, "Future shock: the WTO and Political change in China" ,Policy Brief, 2001(8).
33. Gerard Roland, "Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firm", MIT Press, 2000.
34. Polanyi, M., "Personal Knowledge", London: Routledge &Kegan Paul,1958.
35. Umbeck, J. R., "Might makes rights: a theory of the formation and initial distribution of property rights", Economic Inquiry 20(2). 1981.
36. Williamson, O.E. , "The Economic Institutions of Capitalism". New York: Free Press, 1985.
37. Witt, U., "Evolutionary Economics", Cheltenham, UK. and Northampton. 1993.
38. Hardin, R., 1996, "Institutional knowledge and the role of institutions", working paper, New York University.
39. Kasper,W., M.E.Streit, " Institutional Economics" ,Cheltenham, UK.and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 1998.
40. North,D.C, "Government and the cost of exchange in history", Journal of Economic History 44(2). 1984.
41. Jefferson, Gary H., Inderjit Singh, "Enterprise Reform in China", Oxford University Press, 1999.
42. G. Slarter, D. Spencer, "The Uncertainty Foundation of Transaction Cost Economics", Journal of Economic Issues, March 2000.