技术标准与相应法律政策协同机制研究
摘要
我国在技术标准的开发和应用上长期发展缓慢,体系和制度的完善程度不高,协调机制缺乏,在很多情况下,技术标准滞后于市场需求。近年来,受外界压力的影响(如技术性贸易壁垒、国际技术标准竞争、国际协调机构的要求),技术标准建设亟待发展。
技术标准建设是一个十分复杂的系统,它不仅和自身的技术开发有关,还和其相应的制度环境有着密切的关系。技术标准本身有着多重功能,如克服信息不对称、网络外部性、生产/消费外部性、减少多样性等等。首先,这些功能在不同条件下常常会表现出不同的影响,如减少多样性功能,一方面能促进规模经济,从而促进生产率的提高,另一方面也会抑制创新,阻碍生产率的提高。其次,这些功能常常会同时作用于同一产品,在多重功能的综合作用下,技术标准对技术进步、竞争、国际贸易和经济发展等方面的影响都是不确定的,有时是积极影响,有时则是消极影响。根据新熊彼得理论,技术进步和制度密切相关,作为技术的一个组成部分,技术标准同样也跟周围的制度环境密切相连。因此,要使技术标准发挥积极影响,必须考虑与它相关的法律政策等制度环境的协同性,使它们彼此促进,协调发展。本论文所说的协同机制具体指两个方面:第一、相应法律政策有利于技术标准的制定和执行,从而有利于社会质量水平的提升、技术进步和经济发展;第二,在技术标准和相应法律政策的共同作用下,它们对质量提升、技术进步和经济发展的综合作用结果表现为积极影响。从经济学角度来讲,两方面的作用结果都是使社会总福利最大化。
目前我国的技术标准体系建设主要依靠政府推动,这种自上而下的机制常常忽略了市场的调节作用和各方利益之间的相互影响,所以在制定和执行过程中往往依靠行政和强制手段,执行效果较差。从长期发展战略来看,政府在技术标准建设中的主要任务应该是创造有利于技术标准开发和执行的制度环境,增强企业的主导地位和它们的自主自发行为。同时,考虑到我国“追赶型”的经济发展模式,应该在标准开发和实施中采取一定的扶植政策。
从技术标准的功能来看,技术标准可以分成两大类:质量标准和兼容性标准。两者又都可细分成法定标准和自愿标准。质量标准中的法定标准主要有两大类:环保标准和安全标准。相对应地,与各类标准关系最密切的法律政策分别为研发激励政策、环保税政策、产品责任法、产业政策、知识产权法和反垄断法,论文就这些类型的标准和与之相对应的法律政策之间的协同机制进行了研究。
本文的第二章到第四章着重研究了质量标准。对所有质量标准来说,其标准制定和市场总体质量水平有关,要提高质量标准,必须以较高的市场质量水平为基础。要提高产品质量,最直接的办法是进行研发投资,许多研究都着眼于研发投资对产品质量的直接作用,但本文第二章讨论的是研发投资对替代技术/产品非质量成本的作用,进而对市场总体质量水平的间接影响。一般研究结果都强调“优胜劣汰”对市场质量水平的积极意义,但本章的研究结果表明:如果研发投资政策能更有效地降低低质量企业的生产成本,低质量企业将由此获得更大的成本竞争优势,从而迫使高质量企业提高质量水平以保持竞争地位,有利于市场总体质量水平的提高。
在第三章和第四章,本文分别研究了质量标准中最重要的两类标准:环保标准和安全标准。从我国的实际情况来看,我国的环保产业和环保技术都比较落后,一方面急待加强环保,另一方面还要兼顾创造有利于本国企业参与竞争的发展环境,因此本文第三章中提出了在统一税制基础上实行差异化标准的建议。表面来看,这和国民待遇原则背道而驰,但从社会福利最大化角度来看,这是一种最优制度安排。事实上,表面公平的统一环保标准政策反而会加强强势企业的垄断地位,不利于消费者利益和社会总福利最大化。就安全标准来说,对任何人的人身安全和健康都应该一视同仁,不可能像环保标准那样实行差异化政策,因此相应法律的作用应着重于为安全标准创造适宜的执行环境。第四章的分析表明,消费者导向型产品责任法(相对于生产者导向型)会促使企业自发产生实施安全标准的要求,因此为安全标准的执行创造了有利的环境。
第五章的研究对象为兼容性标准。在国际竞争中,兼容性标准常常作为扶植本国企业、阻碍外国企业进入的手段。第五章的研究结果表明,静态标准政策——即坚持把本国技术定设为国家标准会产生两种不利结果:第一,如果外国企业抢先于本国企业先行研制成功被设定为国家标准的产品,那么标准政策不仅无法保护本国企业,反而会损害本国企业利益;第二,在本国企业未形成自身标准,外国企业已完成标准开发而未被本国采用时,消费者利益受损,社会总福利水平较低。本章提出,应采用状态依赖型的标准政策来克服上述问题。所谓状态依赖型标准,即指当外国企业答应以合理价格转移其技术时,可以考虑把外国企业的标准设定为国家标准。
第六章讨论了目前有很大争议的技术标准和知识产权之间的协调问题。这种争议主要出现在高新技术产业,因为它们的产品历史短,沉淀技术/公有技术少,更新速度又很快,知识产权容易阻碍新技术的开发。技术标准包含了大量知识产权,它一方面依靠知识产权得以存在,另一方面也受到“路障型专利”的困扰,因此建立反垄断机制十分必要。不过根据各国创新能力的不同,它们对知识产权和反垄断之间的制衡会有不同的倾向。就我国现实情况来说,目前我国整体创新能力较弱,应偏向于社会共享的一面,即更倾向于反垄断,随着我国创新能力的加强,则应逐渐向加强知识产权保护靠拢。所以目前反垄断法的出台非常必要。
最后,论文研究了技术标准的国际协调机制,通过理论模型说明了现有技术标准国际协调机制的作用,同时也指出了在技术禀赋不对称条件下其协调功效的不足,并提出将各国之间的磋商和内部协调机制与WTO技术标准协调机制相结合的建议。
本论文的主要创新之处
1、在研发激励政策和质量标准的协同机制研究中,本文讨论了研发投资对产品非质量成本的作用,进而对市场总体质量水平的间接影响。这和其他文章的切入点完全不同,其研究结果也有很大差异。通常的学术研究都强调“优胜劣汰”对市场质量水平的积极意义,但本文的一个重要研究结论是,研发投资政策如果更有利于降低低质量企业的非质量成本,则市场总体质量水平会提高。
2、本文针对兼容性标准静态标准政策的弊端创新性地提出了“状态依赖型标准”的概念,所谓状态依赖型标准,即指当外国企业答应以合理价格转移其技术时,可以考虑把外国企业的标准设定为国家标准。
3、本文结合我国的实际情况对知识产权法、反垄断法之间的平衡进行了分析,并提出了现阶段我国应采取的政策建议。目前我国整体创新能力较弱,应偏向于社会共享的一面,即更倾向于反垄断,随着我国创新能力的加强,则应逐渐向加强知识产权保护靠拢。
4、在对技术标准的协调机制进行阐述时,通过模型分析说明了现有国际协调机制关键条款的必要性和作用。在此基础上,对技术禀赋不对称的情况进行了扩展分析,说明了非歧视条款实施的具体辅助条件,即向发展中国家提供的技术咨询和协助。另外还说明了对所有国家,不管是禀赋对称国家还是不对称国家,信息透明度都十分重要,这是争端解决程序发挥执行效力的重要保障。不过分析也说明,具有所有这些构成要件的《TBT协定》并不足以实现帕累托最优,只能实现帕累托改善,因此,应该将各国之间的磋商和内部协调与《TBT协定》结合在一起,形成相互补充的平衡力量,共同发挥作用。
Due to historical reasons, our technical standard system is far behind that in developed countries, even worse, sometimes it cannot satisfy our own domestic demand. This is sure to change under the pressure of high quality demand from export market, technical barriers to trade, international technical standard competition and demand from international coordinative organizations.
Technical standard development is a complicated task as it has multi-functions, i.e., information symmetry, network externality, production/consumption externality, variety reduction, etc. These functions work differently under various contexts, which leads to uncertainty in terms of their impact on technical change, competition, international trade and economic growth. According to new Shumpeterian theory, technical change is closely linked with institution. As a part of technology, technical standard should also establish close relations with its surrounding institutions. If technical standard is expected to perform well, favorable relation between technical standard and its surrounding institutional environment has to be ensured, which is what we called synergism. To put in more detail, synergism is defined in two ways: firstly, it means the corresponding law or policy is helpful for the development and execution of technical standard, which in turn contributes to overall market quality level, technical progress and economic growth; secondly, it means the joint forces of technical standard and surrounding laws or policies can make positive contributions to the quality improvement, technical progress and economic growth. In short, it means maximization of social welfare.
Currently, the development of technical standards in our country is government-oriented. Such top-bottom mechanism always relies on administrative or compulsory measures in implementation, which is not expected to work effectively. From a long-term viewpoint, government should not take the major role in developing technical standards, instead, it should help to create a favorable environment for the enterprises to play the major role. Meanwhile, given our“catching up”growth pattern, the state should consider intervening to protect some strategic industries and to maintain the competitive structure of the market.
Based on the functions, technical standards can be divided into two categories: quality standard and compatible standard. They both can be divided into legislative standard and voluntary standard. In the legislative quality standard category, environment standard and safety standard are two most important types. This dissertation identifies several laws and policies which are regarded as having the closest relation with the technical standards, including research and development incentive policy, environment protection tax, product liability, industry protection policy, intellectual property law and anti-trust law. The synergism between technical standards and its relevant laws and policies is analyzed.
Sections 2 to 4 focus on quality standard. For all kinds of quality standards, its design is based on overall quality level. The direct way to improve quality level is to invest in research and development. A lot of research papers have focused on investment in quality improvement, this paper takes on a different viewpoint, focusing on the investment in reducing non-quality cost. The findings are quite different from others. It emphasizes that the efficient investment by low-quality enterprises can improve the overall quality level because its efficient investment in reducing cost will compel the high-quality enterprise to improve quality even more to maintain its competence, therefore, the overall quality level is improved.
Sections 3 and 4 deal with two most important standards in quality standard category: environment standard and safety standard. Given our realistic situation, our task is to improve environment while maintaining the competitive market structure, which means monopoly by foreign enterprises should be avoided. Therefore, section 3 proposes to adopt uniform environment tax and differential standard. Though it seems to be a discriminated measure, our analysis shows it’s a fair treatment based on social welfare maximization principle. On the contrary, the seemingly fair treatment between different enterprises will strengthen technology advanced enterprises’advantage in competition and ensure them to gain huge rent. As to safety standard, it is a different story. As everyone should enjoy the same protection from risk, discriminated treatment is not suitable to be applied. Its focus should be on creating more favorable environment for its implementation. The analysis shows that consumption-type (in contrast to production-type) will encourage enterprises to voluntarily adopt higher safety standards, which is helpful for its implementation.
Section 5 studies compatible standard. In international competition, compatible standards are sometimes used as a tool to protect domestic enterprises and block foreign enterprises. The analysis shows that static standard policy which consistently set domestic technology as national standard has at least two shortcomings: firstly, foreign enterprise might take a leap in developing standard; secondly, it has time-inconsistency problem, i.e., social welfare is not always the maximum. State-contingent standard policy can overcome these problems, but it is only a better choice, not the best one, as it also has its shortcoming, such as the technology-lagged domestic enterprise might just wait for the new technology to be developed.
Section 6 discusses the highly controversial issue of the relation between technical standard and intellectual property right. The issue mainly occurs in high technology as there is a shortage of public technology in this area, at the same time, they are updated very quickly, therefore, intellectual property right can be a huge blocking tool in new technology development. Technical standard comprises a lot of intellectual property rights, actually, it relies heavily on intellectual property right, on the other hand, it is troubled by such intellectual property rights as“blocking patents”. Therefore, establishment of anti-trust law is quite necessary. However, based on their innovative capacities, various countries have their own preference in balancing intellectual property rights and anti-trust. As per our country, the overall innovative capacities in our country is low, our preference should be more inclined towards sharing knowledge, then moving towards knowledge monopoly with the improvement of innovative capacities. Currently anti-trust law is needed to make a balancing power..
Finally, the paper studies the international coordinative mechanism of technical standards. The analysis shows that the current coordinative mechanism is effective to some extent, but still needs some complementary elements.
The key innovations include:
1. In the study of synergism of research and development incentive policy and quality standard, this paper takes up a different perspective, i.e., research and development investment does not affect quality directly, but indirectly through the competition of the enterprises via cost reduction. This is totally different from other papers.
2. In the study of compatible standards, aiming to overcome the shortcomings of static standard policy, especially the problem of time-inconsistency, this paper proposes“state-contingent standard policy”, that is, when foreign enterprises agrees to transfer technology at reasonable price, the foreign standard can be set as the national standard.
3. This paper illustrates the relation between intellectual property rights, anti-trust law and technical standard, then puts forward some suggestions for China in trading off their relations based on the comparative analysis of the United States and the European Union.
4. This paper analyzes the necessity of the current articles in the WTO/TBT agreement, then expands the analysis to accommodate technology asymmetry. In this case, the paper argues that non-discrimination should be accompanied by provision of technical consulting and assistance service to developing countries. In addition, it also argues that information transparency is most critical for dispute settlement procedure. However, it also shows that all of these articles can only realize Pareto improvement instead of Pareto optimum, therefore, bi-negotiation and bi-coordination should be included as a supplement article.
技术标准建设是一个十分复杂的系统,它不仅和自身的技术开发有关,还和其相应的制度环境有着密切的关系。技术标准本身有着多重功能,如克服信息不对称、网络外部性、生产/消费外部性、减少多样性等等。首先,这些功能在不同条件下常常会表现出不同的影响,如减少多样性功能,一方面能促进规模经济,从而促进生产率的提高,另一方面也会抑制创新,阻碍生产率的提高。其次,这些功能常常会同时作用于同一产品,在多重功能的综合作用下,技术标准对技术进步、竞争、国际贸易和经济发展等方面的影响都是不确定的,有时是积极影响,有时则是消极影响。根据新熊彼得理论,技术进步和制度密切相关,作为技术的一个组成部分,技术标准同样也跟周围的制度环境密切相连。因此,要使技术标准发挥积极影响,必须考虑与它相关的法律政策等制度环境的协同性,使它们彼此促进,协调发展。本论文所说的协同机制具体指两个方面:第一、相应法律政策有利于技术标准的制定和执行,从而有利于社会质量水平的提升、技术进步和经济发展;第二,在技术标准和相应法律政策的共同作用下,它们对质量提升、技术进步和经济发展的综合作用结果表现为积极影响。从经济学角度来讲,两方面的作用结果都是使社会总福利最大化。
目前我国的技术标准体系建设主要依靠政府推动,这种自上而下的机制常常忽略了市场的调节作用和各方利益之间的相互影响,所以在制定和执行过程中往往依靠行政和强制手段,执行效果较差。从长期发展战略来看,政府在技术标准建设中的主要任务应该是创造有利于技术标准开发和执行的制度环境,增强企业的主导地位和它们的自主自发行为。同时,考虑到我国“追赶型”的经济发展模式,应该在标准开发和实施中采取一定的扶植政策。
从技术标准的功能来看,技术标准可以分成两大类:质量标准和兼容性标准。两者又都可细分成法定标准和自愿标准。质量标准中的法定标准主要有两大类:环保标准和安全标准。相对应地,与各类标准关系最密切的法律政策分别为研发激励政策、环保税政策、产品责任法、产业政策、知识产权法和反垄断法,论文就这些类型的标准和与之相对应的法律政策之间的协同机制进行了研究。
本文的第二章到第四章着重研究了质量标准。对所有质量标准来说,其标准制定和市场总体质量水平有关,要提高质量标准,必须以较高的市场质量水平为基础。要提高产品质量,最直接的办法是进行研发投资,许多研究都着眼于研发投资对产品质量的直接作用,但本文第二章讨论的是研发投资对替代技术/产品非质量成本的作用,进而对市场总体质量水平的间接影响。一般研究结果都强调“优胜劣汰”对市场质量水平的积极意义,但本章的研究结果表明:如果研发投资政策能更有效地降低低质量企业的生产成本,低质量企业将由此获得更大的成本竞争优势,从而迫使高质量企业提高质量水平以保持竞争地位,有利于市场总体质量水平的提高。
在第三章和第四章,本文分别研究了质量标准中最重要的两类标准:环保标准和安全标准。从我国的实际情况来看,我国的环保产业和环保技术都比较落后,一方面急待加强环保,另一方面还要兼顾创造有利于本国企业参与竞争的发展环境,因此本文第三章中提出了在统一税制基础上实行差异化标准的建议。表面来看,这和国民待遇原则背道而驰,但从社会福利最大化角度来看,这是一种最优制度安排。事实上,表面公平的统一环保标准政策反而会加强强势企业的垄断地位,不利于消费者利益和社会总福利最大化。就安全标准来说,对任何人的人身安全和健康都应该一视同仁,不可能像环保标准那样实行差异化政策,因此相应法律的作用应着重于为安全标准创造适宜的执行环境。第四章的分析表明,消费者导向型产品责任法(相对于生产者导向型)会促使企业自发产生实施安全标准的要求,因此为安全标准的执行创造了有利的环境。
第五章的研究对象为兼容性标准。在国际竞争中,兼容性标准常常作为扶植本国企业、阻碍外国企业进入的手段。第五章的研究结果表明,静态标准政策——即坚持把本国技术定设为国家标准会产生两种不利结果:第一,如果外国企业抢先于本国企业先行研制成功被设定为国家标准的产品,那么标准政策不仅无法保护本国企业,反而会损害本国企业利益;第二,在本国企业未形成自身标准,外国企业已完成标准开发而未被本国采用时,消费者利益受损,社会总福利水平较低。本章提出,应采用状态依赖型的标准政策来克服上述问题。所谓状态依赖型标准,即指当外国企业答应以合理价格转移其技术时,可以考虑把外国企业的标准设定为国家标准。
第六章讨论了目前有很大争议的技术标准和知识产权之间的协调问题。这种争议主要出现在高新技术产业,因为它们的产品历史短,沉淀技术/公有技术少,更新速度又很快,知识产权容易阻碍新技术的开发。技术标准包含了大量知识产权,它一方面依靠知识产权得以存在,另一方面也受到“路障型专利”的困扰,因此建立反垄断机制十分必要。不过根据各国创新能力的不同,它们对知识产权和反垄断之间的制衡会有不同的倾向。就我国现实情况来说,目前我国整体创新能力较弱,应偏向于社会共享的一面,即更倾向于反垄断,随着我国创新能力的加强,则应逐渐向加强知识产权保护靠拢。所以目前反垄断法的出台非常必要。
最后,论文研究了技术标准的国际协调机制,通过理论模型说明了现有技术标准国际协调机制的作用,同时也指出了在技术禀赋不对称条件下其协调功效的不足,并提出将各国之间的磋商和内部协调机制与WTO技术标准协调机制相结合的建议。
本论文的主要创新之处
1、在研发激励政策和质量标准的协同机制研究中,本文讨论了研发投资对产品非质量成本的作用,进而对市场总体质量水平的间接影响。这和其他文章的切入点完全不同,其研究结果也有很大差异。通常的学术研究都强调“优胜劣汰”对市场质量水平的积极意义,但本文的一个重要研究结论是,研发投资政策如果更有利于降低低质量企业的非质量成本,则市场总体质量水平会提高。
2、本文针对兼容性标准静态标准政策的弊端创新性地提出了“状态依赖型标准”的概念,所谓状态依赖型标准,即指当外国企业答应以合理价格转移其技术时,可以考虑把外国企业的标准设定为国家标准。
3、本文结合我国的实际情况对知识产权法、反垄断法之间的平衡进行了分析,并提出了现阶段我国应采取的政策建议。目前我国整体创新能力较弱,应偏向于社会共享的一面,即更倾向于反垄断,随着我国创新能力的加强,则应逐渐向加强知识产权保护靠拢。
4、在对技术标准的协调机制进行阐述时,通过模型分析说明了现有国际协调机制关键条款的必要性和作用。在此基础上,对技术禀赋不对称的情况进行了扩展分析,说明了非歧视条款实施的具体辅助条件,即向发展中国家提供的技术咨询和协助。另外还说明了对所有国家,不管是禀赋对称国家还是不对称国家,信息透明度都十分重要,这是争端解决程序发挥执行效力的重要保障。不过分析也说明,具有所有这些构成要件的《TBT协定》并不足以实现帕累托最优,只能实现帕累托改善,因此,应该将各国之间的磋商和内部协调与《TBT协定》结合在一起,形成相互补充的平衡力量,共同发挥作用。
Due to historical reasons, our technical standard system is far behind that in developed countries, even worse, sometimes it cannot satisfy our own domestic demand. This is sure to change under the pressure of high quality demand from export market, technical barriers to trade, international technical standard competition and demand from international coordinative organizations.
Technical standard development is a complicated task as it has multi-functions, i.e., information symmetry, network externality, production/consumption externality, variety reduction, etc. These functions work differently under various contexts, which leads to uncertainty in terms of their impact on technical change, competition, international trade and economic growth. According to new Shumpeterian theory, technical change is closely linked with institution. As a part of technology, technical standard should also establish close relations with its surrounding institutions. If technical standard is expected to perform well, favorable relation between technical standard and its surrounding institutional environment has to be ensured, which is what we called synergism. To put in more detail, synergism is defined in two ways: firstly, it means the corresponding law or policy is helpful for the development and execution of technical standard, which in turn contributes to overall market quality level, technical progress and economic growth; secondly, it means the joint forces of technical standard and surrounding laws or policies can make positive contributions to the quality improvement, technical progress and economic growth. In short, it means maximization of social welfare.
Currently, the development of technical standards in our country is government-oriented. Such top-bottom mechanism always relies on administrative or compulsory measures in implementation, which is not expected to work effectively. From a long-term viewpoint, government should not take the major role in developing technical standards, instead, it should help to create a favorable environment for the enterprises to play the major role. Meanwhile, given our“catching up”growth pattern, the state should consider intervening to protect some strategic industries and to maintain the competitive structure of the market.
Based on the functions, technical standards can be divided into two categories: quality standard and compatible standard. They both can be divided into legislative standard and voluntary standard. In the legislative quality standard category, environment standard and safety standard are two most important types. This dissertation identifies several laws and policies which are regarded as having the closest relation with the technical standards, including research and development incentive policy, environment protection tax, product liability, industry protection policy, intellectual property law and anti-trust law. The synergism between technical standards and its relevant laws and policies is analyzed.
Sections 2 to 4 focus on quality standard. For all kinds of quality standards, its design is based on overall quality level. The direct way to improve quality level is to invest in research and development. A lot of research papers have focused on investment in quality improvement, this paper takes on a different viewpoint, focusing on the investment in reducing non-quality cost. The findings are quite different from others. It emphasizes that the efficient investment by low-quality enterprises can improve the overall quality level because its efficient investment in reducing cost will compel the high-quality enterprise to improve quality even more to maintain its competence, therefore, the overall quality level is improved.
Sections 3 and 4 deal with two most important standards in quality standard category: environment standard and safety standard. Given our realistic situation, our task is to improve environment while maintaining the competitive market structure, which means monopoly by foreign enterprises should be avoided. Therefore, section 3 proposes to adopt uniform environment tax and differential standard. Though it seems to be a discriminated measure, our analysis shows it’s a fair treatment based on social welfare maximization principle. On the contrary, the seemingly fair treatment between different enterprises will strengthen technology advanced enterprises’advantage in competition and ensure them to gain huge rent. As to safety standard, it is a different story. As everyone should enjoy the same protection from risk, discriminated treatment is not suitable to be applied. Its focus should be on creating more favorable environment for its implementation. The analysis shows that consumption-type (in contrast to production-type) will encourage enterprises to voluntarily adopt higher safety standards, which is helpful for its implementation.
Section 5 studies compatible standard. In international competition, compatible standards are sometimes used as a tool to protect domestic enterprises and block foreign enterprises. The analysis shows that static standard policy which consistently set domestic technology as national standard has at least two shortcomings: firstly, foreign enterprise might take a leap in developing standard; secondly, it has time-inconsistency problem, i.e., social welfare is not always the maximum. State-contingent standard policy can overcome these problems, but it is only a better choice, not the best one, as it also has its shortcoming, such as the technology-lagged domestic enterprise might just wait for the new technology to be developed.
Section 6 discusses the highly controversial issue of the relation between technical standard and intellectual property right. The issue mainly occurs in high technology as there is a shortage of public technology in this area, at the same time, they are updated very quickly, therefore, intellectual property right can be a huge blocking tool in new technology development. Technical standard comprises a lot of intellectual property rights, actually, it relies heavily on intellectual property right, on the other hand, it is troubled by such intellectual property rights as“blocking patents”. Therefore, establishment of anti-trust law is quite necessary. However, based on their innovative capacities, various countries have their own preference in balancing intellectual property rights and anti-trust. As per our country, the overall innovative capacities in our country is low, our preference should be more inclined towards sharing knowledge, then moving towards knowledge monopoly with the improvement of innovative capacities. Currently anti-trust law is needed to make a balancing power..
Finally, the paper studies the international coordinative mechanism of technical standards. The analysis shows that the current coordinative mechanism is effective to some extent, but still needs some complementary elements.
The key innovations include:
1. In the study of synergism of research and development incentive policy and quality standard, this paper takes up a different perspective, i.e., research and development investment does not affect quality directly, but indirectly through the competition of the enterprises via cost reduction. This is totally different from other papers.
2. In the study of compatible standards, aiming to overcome the shortcomings of static standard policy, especially the problem of time-inconsistency, this paper proposes“state-contingent standard policy”, that is, when foreign enterprises agrees to transfer technology at reasonable price, the foreign standard can be set as the national standard.
3. This paper illustrates the relation between intellectual property rights, anti-trust law and technical standard, then puts forward some suggestions for China in trading off their relations based on the comparative analysis of the United States and the European Union.
4. This paper analyzes the necessity of the current articles in the WTO/TBT agreement, then expands the analysis to accommodate technology asymmetry. In this case, the paper argues that non-discrimination should be accompanied by provision of technical consulting and assistance service to developing countries. In addition, it also argues that information transparency is most critical for dispute settlement procedure. However, it also shows that all of these articles can only realize Pareto improvement instead of Pareto optimum, therefore, bi-negotiation and bi-coordination should be included as a supplement article.
引文
2 参见[美]平狄克/鲁宾费尔德著,《微观经济学》(第四版),中国人民大学出版社,p535-536
3 如 Neil Gandal (2000); David and Greenstein (1990); Swann (1990)。
4 见 Baseman, Warrem-Boulton and Woroch (1995) 及文中引用的参考文献。
5 David 和 Shurmer(1996)指出在 1986 年到 1990 年期间,IEC 标准的数目翻了一倍。
6 Matutes 和 Regibeau,1996。
7 Nicholas Economides (1996)
8 Palmer 和 Leruth, 1996。
10 这部分内容的主要部分已发表于《上海交通大学学报》第 9 期。
11 彭友,《第一财经日报》2006 年 9 月 7 日。
12 见“升值风为何刮得这么猛” 中引用的商务部相关图表数据, 《上海证券报》,2006 年 09 月 01 日。
13 具体定义和解释见周伟民,2004,《TBT 对国民经济的影响和对策》,项目报告。
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3 如 Neil Gandal (2000); David and Greenstein (1990); Swann (1990)。
4 见 Baseman, Warrem-Boulton and Woroch (1995) 及文中引用的参考文献。
5 David 和 Shurmer(1996)指出在 1986 年到 1990 年期间,IEC 标准的数目翻了一倍。
6 Matutes 和 Regibeau,1996。
7 Nicholas Economides (1996)
8 Palmer 和 Leruth, 1996。
10 这部分内容的主要部分已发表于《上海交通大学学报》第 9 期。
11 彭友,《第一财经日报》2006 年 9 月 7 日。
12 见“升值风为何刮得这么猛” 中引用的商务部相关图表数据, 《上海证券报》,2006 年 09 月 01 日。
13 具体定义和解释见周伟民,2004,《TBT 对国民经济的影响和对策》,项目报告。
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