中国中小上市公司治理与技术创新的关联性研究
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摘要
在剧烈变化的竞争环境中,具有持续的创新能力是现代企业成功所必需的前提条件之一。尤其是对于中小上市公司而言,提高技术创新能力是其应对以市场导向为主题的战略变革的必然选择,也是其在国际竞争新形势下提升可持续发展能力的积极途径。为何不同中小上市公司的技术创新能力迥然不同?何种要素决定了一家中小公司的技术创新绩效?上述问题的解决是为中小上市公司培育与提高技术创新能力提供重要理论支持的前提。
西方众多学者曾从市场结构、产业特征、企业家能力以及财务结构等方面对企业技术创新问题进行了积极的探索,并积累了大量的文献。然而,传统创新理论以及由其发展而来的诸多理论与文献,似乎都难以解释：“为什么在相似的外部环境、相似规模与市场控制能力的条件之下,企业在技术创新绩效方面却存在迥异的差别?”随着对该问题质疑的日益激烈,技术创新与制度创新的互动与协同理论逐渐形成,并成为创新经济学研究的重要主题。而作为企业重要的制度基础,公司治理与技术创新的关联性问题也受到国内外学者越来越多的关注。然而,以中国中小上市公司为研究对象的文献较少,且存在诸多尚待完善之处。
鉴于此,本文基于创新经济学框架下的组织控制理论,提出中小上市公司技术创新内生动力观点,并构建公司治理与技术创新的关联模型,并对其关联机理进行深入剖析。以此为基础,运用中国中小上市公司的平衡面板数据,对股权结构、董事会治理与经营层激励等公司治理因素与技术创新之间的关联性进行实证检验,以期进一步深化与拓展公司治理与技术创新的理论体系。最后,根据理论与实证研究结论,构建基于公司治理优化的中小上市公司技术创新促进模型,揭示如何通过公司治理结构与机制的完善,为中国中小上市公司技术创新提供一种稳定的动力机制,即如何以技术创新为导向进一步优化公司治理制度。主要创新点如下：第一,以创新经济学分析框架下的组织控制理论为基础,提出中小上市公司技术创新内生动力观,构建了基于组织控制的公司治理与技术创新关联模型,从理论层面揭示了两者的关联机理；第二,在对公司治理与技术创新关联性的实证检验中,实现了从单一维度到多重维度、从静态视角向动态视角、从线性视角到非线性视角的深化与拓展；第三,构建基于公司治理优化的中小上市公司技术创新促进模型,并从强化技术创新促进因素、弱化技术创新抑制因素与控制技术创新权变因素等三个维度出发提出了技术创新导向的公司治理优化措施。
第3章首先对公司治理的演进路径进行描述,然后对组织控制理论的逻辑架构与核心观点进行诠释。在对中国中小上市公司技术创新特征与现状进行描述的基础上,提出中小上市公司内生动力观。然后从组织控制视角出发,对公司治理维度进行解构,并构建公司治理与技术创新关联模型,对公司治理与技术创新的关联机理及其具体维度进行了形象的描述。由其可知,公司治理与技术创新的关联机理为：技术创新的固有特征(如风险性、长期性与动态性等),从本质上要求在上市公司中应该运用强调“价值创造”的组织控制而非强调“价值分配”的市场控制手段。基于创新经济学的相关观点,公司治理制度是最为重要的组织控制手段,而根据组织控制理论的核心观点,只有建立在创新型资源配置观基础上的具有“财务承诺”、“战略控制”与“组织整合”等特征的公司治理制度才利于公司的技术创新。在实践中,也只有这样的公司治理制度才能够促进公司的技术创新绩效。
第4-6章基于公司治理与技术创新的关联模型,运用中国中小上市公司面板数据,分别对股权结构、董事会治理与经营层激励与技术创新的关联性进行实证检验。在对股权结构与技术创新关联性的实证研究方面,将实证研究方法与比较研究方法相结合,深入探讨了终极产权性质对两者关系的影响,即将国有控制上市公司与非国有控股上市公司等不同产权性质的公司进行比较研究；在对董事会治理与技术创新关联性的实证研究方面,针对目前研究主要关注董事会结构这一现状,本文将董事会治理的研究维度扩展到董事会结构、董事会行为与董事会资本三个层面,进行了基于董事会三重维度的实证检验,得出了重要结论；在对经营层激励与技术创新关联性的实证研究方面,基于高管激励效应的双重性,从非线性视角出发,对高管激励契约与技术创新之间的曲线关系进行了验证,克服了以往线性视角的局限性。通过实证检验发现,机构投资者持股比例、董事会独立性与两职合一情况、董事会会议频率、董事会人力资本是影响技术创新的公司治理促进因素：股权集中程度、终极控制人控制权、两权分离程度、独立董事委托参加会议情况是影响技术创新的公司治理抑制因素；董事会规模、董事平均年龄、经营层薪酬激励、股权激励与在职消费等是影响技术创新的公司治理权变因素。
第7章根据前文的理论与实证研究结论,构建“基于公司治理优化的中小上市公司技术创新促进模型”。该模型将技术创新分解为“技术创新投入与技术创新产出”两个方面,将影响技术创新的公司治理因素分为“促进因素”、“抑制因素”与“权变因素”三种类型,以此为基础,将优化措施归纳为“强化技术创新促进因素、弱化技术创新抑制因素与控制技术创新权变因素”三个方面。因此,若要提升中小上市公司的技术创新能力,从外部进行各种政策支持仅仅是权宜之计,只有从内部构建中小上市公司技术创新的内源性动力机制才是治本之策。
综上所述,中国上市公司进行以技术创新为导向的公司治理优化应包括三个层面的措施。第一,强化公司治理中的技术创新促进因素：引入多元持股主体,尤其是机构投资者等,并强化机构投资者的积极治理行为；优化董事会结构,增强董事会独立性；积极引导董事会行为加强其尽职程度；重视董事会人力资本的提升并优化董事会的资源配置。第二,弱化公司治理中的技术创新抑制因素：构建控股股东声誉激励机制与诚信评价制度,充分引导其对技术创新等长期投资的偏好；对中小上市公司的金字塔结构进行合理优化,尽量减少金字塔层级,降低控制权与现金流权的分离程度；从内部与外部双重途径提高独立董事的积极性,尽量减少独立董事委托参加会议次数。第三,控制公司治理中的技术创新权变因素：保持合理的董事会规模与董事平均年龄,在董事会多样化与决策效率之间找寻平衡点,同时通过多种方式增强董事之间的沟通；由薪酬委员会独立地设计合理的经营者薪酬计划,保持合理的经营者薪酬水平,加强高管薪酬激励与中小上市公司技术创新绩效之间的敏感度；合理安排股东与经营者之间的股权配置比例,同时强化股权激励契约的长期性与约束性,将技术创新相关指标作为上市公司股权激励行权条件(或解锁条件)的重要维度之一；保持合理的在职消费水平,为经营者提供相应的控制权激励,但应以构建完善的公司治理约束机制为前提。
本文仍存在以下局限性：研究样本的时间跨度较小；在变量选取方面有待进一步完善；研究对象局限在内部公司治理机制,对外部治理机制并未加以阐述。后续研究应从下面几方面进行延伸：从权变视角出发,进行基于多层次情境因素的研究；将公司治理研究维度从内部治理机制向外部治理机制延伸；基于公司治理整合视角来研究公司治理与企业技术创新的关联性,揭示不同公司治理机制之间的交互作用及其对技术创新的综合效应。
Under the competitive circumstance that is changing dramatically, possessing the sustainable innovation capability is one of preconditions for the success of the modern companies. Especially for small and medium-sized listed companies, to improve the ability of technological innovation is not only the inevitable choice to deal with the theme of market-oriented strategic change, but a positive way to enhance the capacity for sustainable development in the international competition under the new situation. Why the technological innovation capacities in different small and medium-sized listed companies are widely distinct? Which kind of factors determines the technological innovation performance in the small and medium-sized companies? To solve the above problems is the premise of providing important theoretical support for small and medium-sized listed companies to enhance their technological innovation capability.
Many scholars in the West have actively explored and accumulated a great deal literature in terms of market structure, industry characteristics, entrepreneurship and financial structure of enterprise technological innovation issues. However, the traditional innovation theory of Schumpeter, and many theoretical literatures developed from the theory are all difficult to explain the question:"Why the technological innovation performance of different enterprises is distinct under the similar environment, size and marketing control ability?" With the increasingly fierce on the issue questioned, the interaction of technological innovation and institutional innovation and collaboration theory gradually formed and became the important theme of innovation economics research. As the most important institution, corporate governance and its effect on technological innovation has also been more and more concerned by the domestic and foreign scholars. Many scholars generally recognize that the corporate governance may influence the entrepreneurs'innovation behavior by the two modes of market control and organizational control. And corporate governance can also enhance technological innovation capability and performance by using incentive and constraint as the key methods and from external and internal channels. Specifically, scholars analysis and discuss the relevance of corporate governance and technological innovation in terms of ownership structure, board structure and executive incentives. However, there are still many limitations at present.
In view of this, this paper builds relevance model of corporate governance to technological innovation, and deeply analyze the relevant mechanism on the basis of organizational control theory under the framework of innovation economics. Based on that model, we tests the relevance of ownership structure, board structure and executive incentive to technological innovation and hope to explore the theory system of corporate governance and technological innovation by using the panel data of Chinese small and medium-sized listed companies. According to the theoretical and empirical findings, this paper constructs a model to promote technological innovation of the small and medium-sized listed companies based on optimization of corporate governance. The model reveals how to provide a stable power mechanism through the improvement of corporate governance structures and mechanisms, namely, how to further optimize the technological innovation-oriented corporate governance system. The main innovate points are as follows:(1) based on organizational control theory under the frame work of innovation economics, we construct the relevance model of corporate governance and technological innovation on the basis of organizational control theory. It reveals the relevant mechanism between the two from the theoretical level;(2) considering to the dynamic characteristics of technological innovation, we divide the technological innovation into innovation input and output in the empirical studies;(3) we innovate and improve the empirical studies from the aspects of methods, perspectives and dimensions;(4) we construct the model to promote the technological innovation of the small and medium-sized listed companies based on corporate governance optimization.
In the third chapter, we describe the evolution path of the Corporate Governance and then interpret the logical framework of organizational control theory with core ideas. On this basis, we build relevance model of corporate governance and technological innovation based on organizational control theory. This model vividly describes the relevate mechanism and specific dimensions of corporate governance and technological innovation. From that, the relevant mechanism between corporate governance and technological innovation is that the inherent characteristics of the technological innovation (e.g. risk, long-term and dynamic etc.), essentially requires listed companies should use the organizational control model which emphasizes on "value creation" rather than the control of the market control model which emphasizes the "value distribution". Corporate governance system is the most important means of control of the organization based on innovation economics perspective. But according to the core points of the theory of organizational control, only corporate governance that is established on the concept of innovation oriented resource allocation and with the characteristics of "financial commitment","strategic control" and "organizational integration" is conducive to the technological innovation of the companies. In practice, only this kind of corporate governance system is able to promote the technological innovation performance of the company.
In Chapter four to six, we do empirical testes on the correlation of corporate governance (e.g. ownership structure, board governance and executive incentives) to technological innovation respectively with the panel data of Chinese small and medium-sized listed companies according to the relevance model of corporate governance and technological innovation. In the empirical research on the relevance of the shareholding structure to technological innovation, we combine empirical research methods with comparative research methods and then explore in depth how the ultimate ownership nature influences the results. That is, to research on the differences between state-controlled and non-state-owned listed companies. In the empirical research on the relevance of the board governance to technological innovation, this paper expands the research dimension of board governance to three dimensions, that is board structure, board behavior and board capital. And based on this we make empirical test on triple dimensions and then achieve some important conclusions. In the empirical research on the relevance of the executive incentive to technological innovation, we verify the curve relationship between the executive incentive contract and technological innovation from the nonlinear perspective which based on the duality of management incentive. It overcomes the limitations of conventional linear perspective. Confirmed by empirical studies, examining, degree of concentration of ownership, shareholding proportion of institutional investors, independence of the board, CEO duality, frequency of meetings of the Board, human capital of the Directors are the stimulus of corporate governance which influence the technological innovation; control right of the ultimate controller, separation of two rights, frequency that independent directors commissioned to attend the meeting are the inhibited factors of corporate governance which decrease the technological innovation; size of the board, average age of the members, the salary incentive, equity incentive and perk are the optimum factors of corporate governance which influence the technological innovation.
According to the foregoing theoretical and empirical findings, we build a model to promote technological innovation of the small and medium-sized listed companies based on corporate governance optimization in Chapter7. The model classifies technological innovation into two aspects:output and input and classifies corporate governance factors into three categories:positive factors, negative factors and neutral factors. And based on this, we induce the optimization methods into three aspects such as "strengthening positive factors","weakening negative factors" and "controlling neutral factors". Therefore, to enhance the technological innovation capability of small and medium-sized listed companies, it is a temporary expedient to make variety policy support from outside. The fundamental way is to construct the endogenous mechanism to motive power of the technological innovation capability of small and medium-sized listed companies.
From the all, we conclude that the optimized method of corporate governance should include three levels:technological innovation oriented ownership structure optimization, board governance optimization and executive optimization. First, it is important to establish controlling shareholder reputation incentive mechanism and credibility evaluation system. And the pyramid structure of the small and medium-sized listed companies should be optimized and the levels of the pyramid should be decreased. Institutional investors should be lead into listed companies and their positive governance behavior should be reinforced. Second, it is important to maintain the optimized board size and strengthen the communication between the directors. The independence of board should be reinforced and the positive behaviors of independent directors should be irritated. More attention should be paid to the human resource capital and social resource capital of the boards. Third, it is also important to optimize executive incentive contract. Remuneration committee of listed companies should independently design the executive incentive contract. The sensitivity between executive compensation and technological innovation should be increased. The equity incentive plan should be long-term and moderate constraint and technological innovation index should be added into the index system of vesting condition. The moderate perk level should be maintained and it can provide the executives implicit incentives to some degree.
Nevertheless, this paper has some limitations below:the time span of research sample is narrow; variable design needs to be improved; research object is only confined to the internal corporate governance mechanisms, but not including the external mechanisms as well. Hence, the subsequent research should be improved in the aspects below:(1) do researches based on different contextual factors from the contingency perspective;(2) extend corporate governance from internal mechanisms to external mechanisms;(3) find the interactions between the corporate governance mechanisms and their integrated effect on technological innovation based on corporate governance integration perspective.
西方众多学者曾从市场结构、产业特征、企业家能力以及财务结构等方面对企业技术创新问题进行了积极的探索,并积累了大量的文献。然而,传统创新理论以及由其发展而来的诸多理论与文献,似乎都难以解释：“为什么在相似的外部环境、相似规模与市场控制能力的条件之下,企业在技术创新绩效方面却存在迥异的差别?”随着对该问题质疑的日益激烈,技术创新与制度创新的互动与协同理论逐渐形成,并成为创新经济学研究的重要主题。而作为企业重要的制度基础,公司治理与技术创新的关联性问题也受到国内外学者越来越多的关注。然而,以中国中小上市公司为研究对象的文献较少,且存在诸多尚待完善之处。
鉴于此,本文基于创新经济学框架下的组织控制理论,提出中小上市公司技术创新内生动力观点,并构建公司治理与技术创新的关联模型,并对其关联机理进行深入剖析。以此为基础,运用中国中小上市公司的平衡面板数据,对股权结构、董事会治理与经营层激励等公司治理因素与技术创新之间的关联性进行实证检验,以期进一步深化与拓展公司治理与技术创新的理论体系。最后,根据理论与实证研究结论,构建基于公司治理优化的中小上市公司技术创新促进模型,揭示如何通过公司治理结构与机制的完善,为中国中小上市公司技术创新提供一种稳定的动力机制,即如何以技术创新为导向进一步优化公司治理制度。主要创新点如下：第一,以创新经济学分析框架下的组织控制理论为基础,提出中小上市公司技术创新内生动力观,构建了基于组织控制的公司治理与技术创新关联模型,从理论层面揭示了两者的关联机理；第二,在对公司治理与技术创新关联性的实证检验中,实现了从单一维度到多重维度、从静态视角向动态视角、从线性视角到非线性视角的深化与拓展；第三,构建基于公司治理优化的中小上市公司技术创新促进模型,并从强化技术创新促进因素、弱化技术创新抑制因素与控制技术创新权变因素等三个维度出发提出了技术创新导向的公司治理优化措施。
第3章首先对公司治理的演进路径进行描述,然后对组织控制理论的逻辑架构与核心观点进行诠释。在对中国中小上市公司技术创新特征与现状进行描述的基础上,提出中小上市公司内生动力观。然后从组织控制视角出发,对公司治理维度进行解构,并构建公司治理与技术创新关联模型,对公司治理与技术创新的关联机理及其具体维度进行了形象的描述。由其可知,公司治理与技术创新的关联机理为：技术创新的固有特征(如风险性、长期性与动态性等),从本质上要求在上市公司中应该运用强调“价值创造”的组织控制而非强调“价值分配”的市场控制手段。基于创新经济学的相关观点,公司治理制度是最为重要的组织控制手段,而根据组织控制理论的核心观点,只有建立在创新型资源配置观基础上的具有“财务承诺”、“战略控制”与“组织整合”等特征的公司治理制度才利于公司的技术创新。在实践中,也只有这样的公司治理制度才能够促进公司的技术创新绩效。
第4-6章基于公司治理与技术创新的关联模型,运用中国中小上市公司面板数据,分别对股权结构、董事会治理与经营层激励与技术创新的关联性进行实证检验。在对股权结构与技术创新关联性的实证研究方面,将实证研究方法与比较研究方法相结合,深入探讨了终极产权性质对两者关系的影响,即将国有控制上市公司与非国有控股上市公司等不同产权性质的公司进行比较研究；在对董事会治理与技术创新关联性的实证研究方面,针对目前研究主要关注董事会结构这一现状,本文将董事会治理的研究维度扩展到董事会结构、董事会行为与董事会资本三个层面,进行了基于董事会三重维度的实证检验,得出了重要结论；在对经营层激励与技术创新关联性的实证研究方面,基于高管激励效应的双重性,从非线性视角出发,对高管激励契约与技术创新之间的曲线关系进行了验证,克服了以往线性视角的局限性。通过实证检验发现,机构投资者持股比例、董事会独立性与两职合一情况、董事会会议频率、董事会人力资本是影响技术创新的公司治理促进因素：股权集中程度、终极控制人控制权、两权分离程度、独立董事委托参加会议情况是影响技术创新的公司治理抑制因素；董事会规模、董事平均年龄、经营层薪酬激励、股权激励与在职消费等是影响技术创新的公司治理权变因素。
第7章根据前文的理论与实证研究结论,构建“基于公司治理优化的中小上市公司技术创新促进模型”。该模型将技术创新分解为“技术创新投入与技术创新产出”两个方面,将影响技术创新的公司治理因素分为“促进因素”、“抑制因素”与“权变因素”三种类型,以此为基础,将优化措施归纳为“强化技术创新促进因素、弱化技术创新抑制因素与控制技术创新权变因素”三个方面。因此,若要提升中小上市公司的技术创新能力,从外部进行各种政策支持仅仅是权宜之计,只有从内部构建中小上市公司技术创新的内源性动力机制才是治本之策。
综上所述,中国上市公司进行以技术创新为导向的公司治理优化应包括三个层面的措施。第一,强化公司治理中的技术创新促进因素：引入多元持股主体,尤其是机构投资者等,并强化机构投资者的积极治理行为；优化董事会结构,增强董事会独立性；积极引导董事会行为加强其尽职程度；重视董事会人力资本的提升并优化董事会的资源配置。第二,弱化公司治理中的技术创新抑制因素：构建控股股东声誉激励机制与诚信评价制度,充分引导其对技术创新等长期投资的偏好；对中小上市公司的金字塔结构进行合理优化,尽量减少金字塔层级,降低控制权与现金流权的分离程度；从内部与外部双重途径提高独立董事的积极性,尽量减少独立董事委托参加会议次数。第三,控制公司治理中的技术创新权变因素：保持合理的董事会规模与董事平均年龄,在董事会多样化与决策效率之间找寻平衡点,同时通过多种方式增强董事之间的沟通；由薪酬委员会独立地设计合理的经营者薪酬计划,保持合理的经营者薪酬水平,加强高管薪酬激励与中小上市公司技术创新绩效之间的敏感度；合理安排股东与经营者之间的股权配置比例,同时强化股权激励契约的长期性与约束性,将技术创新相关指标作为上市公司股权激励行权条件(或解锁条件)的重要维度之一；保持合理的在职消费水平,为经营者提供相应的控制权激励,但应以构建完善的公司治理约束机制为前提。
本文仍存在以下局限性：研究样本的时间跨度较小；在变量选取方面有待进一步完善；研究对象局限在内部公司治理机制,对外部治理机制并未加以阐述。后续研究应从下面几方面进行延伸：从权变视角出发,进行基于多层次情境因素的研究；将公司治理研究维度从内部治理机制向外部治理机制延伸；基于公司治理整合视角来研究公司治理与企业技术创新的关联性,揭示不同公司治理机制之间的交互作用及其对技术创新的综合效应。
Under the competitive circumstance that is changing dramatically, possessing the sustainable innovation capability is one of preconditions for the success of the modern companies. Especially for small and medium-sized listed companies, to improve the ability of technological innovation is not only the inevitable choice to deal with the theme of market-oriented strategic change, but a positive way to enhance the capacity for sustainable development in the international competition under the new situation. Why the technological innovation capacities in different small and medium-sized listed companies are widely distinct? Which kind of factors determines the technological innovation performance in the small and medium-sized companies? To solve the above problems is the premise of providing important theoretical support for small and medium-sized listed companies to enhance their technological innovation capability.
Many scholars in the West have actively explored and accumulated a great deal literature in terms of market structure, industry characteristics, entrepreneurship and financial structure of enterprise technological innovation issues. However, the traditional innovation theory of Schumpeter, and many theoretical literatures developed from the theory are all difficult to explain the question:"Why the technological innovation performance of different enterprises is distinct under the similar environment, size and marketing control ability?" With the increasingly fierce on the issue questioned, the interaction of technological innovation and institutional innovation and collaboration theory gradually formed and became the important theme of innovation economics research. As the most important institution, corporate governance and its effect on technological innovation has also been more and more concerned by the domestic and foreign scholars. Many scholars generally recognize that the corporate governance may influence the entrepreneurs'innovation behavior by the two modes of market control and organizational control. And corporate governance can also enhance technological innovation capability and performance by using incentive and constraint as the key methods and from external and internal channels. Specifically, scholars analysis and discuss the relevance of corporate governance and technological innovation in terms of ownership structure, board structure and executive incentives. However, there are still many limitations at present.
In view of this, this paper builds relevance model of corporate governance to technological innovation, and deeply analyze the relevant mechanism on the basis of organizational control theory under the framework of innovation economics. Based on that model, we tests the relevance of ownership structure, board structure and executive incentive to technological innovation and hope to explore the theory system of corporate governance and technological innovation by using the panel data of Chinese small and medium-sized listed companies. According to the theoretical and empirical findings, this paper constructs a model to promote technological innovation of the small and medium-sized listed companies based on optimization of corporate governance. The model reveals how to provide a stable power mechanism through the improvement of corporate governance structures and mechanisms, namely, how to further optimize the technological innovation-oriented corporate governance system. The main innovate points are as follows:(1) based on organizational control theory under the frame work of innovation economics, we construct the relevance model of corporate governance and technological innovation on the basis of organizational control theory. It reveals the relevant mechanism between the two from the theoretical level;(2) considering to the dynamic characteristics of technological innovation, we divide the technological innovation into innovation input and output in the empirical studies;(3) we innovate and improve the empirical studies from the aspects of methods, perspectives and dimensions;(4) we construct the model to promote the technological innovation of the small and medium-sized listed companies based on corporate governance optimization.
In the third chapter, we describe the evolution path of the Corporate Governance and then interpret the logical framework of organizational control theory with core ideas. On this basis, we build relevance model of corporate governance and technological innovation based on organizational control theory. This model vividly describes the relevate mechanism and specific dimensions of corporate governance and technological innovation. From that, the relevant mechanism between corporate governance and technological innovation is that the inherent characteristics of the technological innovation (e.g. risk, long-term and dynamic etc.), essentially requires listed companies should use the organizational control model which emphasizes on "value creation" rather than the control of the market control model which emphasizes the "value distribution". Corporate governance system is the most important means of control of the organization based on innovation economics perspective. But according to the core points of the theory of organizational control, only corporate governance that is established on the concept of innovation oriented resource allocation and with the characteristics of "financial commitment","strategic control" and "organizational integration" is conducive to the technological innovation of the companies. In practice, only this kind of corporate governance system is able to promote the technological innovation performance of the company.
In Chapter four to six, we do empirical testes on the correlation of corporate governance (e.g. ownership structure, board governance and executive incentives) to technological innovation respectively with the panel data of Chinese small and medium-sized listed companies according to the relevance model of corporate governance and technological innovation. In the empirical research on the relevance of the shareholding structure to technological innovation, we combine empirical research methods with comparative research methods and then explore in depth how the ultimate ownership nature influences the results. That is, to research on the differences between state-controlled and non-state-owned listed companies. In the empirical research on the relevance of the board governance to technological innovation, this paper expands the research dimension of board governance to three dimensions, that is board structure, board behavior and board capital. And based on this we make empirical test on triple dimensions and then achieve some important conclusions. In the empirical research on the relevance of the executive incentive to technological innovation, we verify the curve relationship between the executive incentive contract and technological innovation from the nonlinear perspective which based on the duality of management incentive. It overcomes the limitations of conventional linear perspective. Confirmed by empirical studies, examining, degree of concentration of ownership, shareholding proportion of institutional investors, independence of the board, CEO duality, frequency of meetings of the Board, human capital of the Directors are the stimulus of corporate governance which influence the technological innovation; control right of the ultimate controller, separation of two rights, frequency that independent directors commissioned to attend the meeting are the inhibited factors of corporate governance which decrease the technological innovation; size of the board, average age of the members, the salary incentive, equity incentive and perk are the optimum factors of corporate governance which influence the technological innovation.
According to the foregoing theoretical and empirical findings, we build a model to promote technological innovation of the small and medium-sized listed companies based on corporate governance optimization in Chapter7. The model classifies technological innovation into two aspects:output and input and classifies corporate governance factors into three categories:positive factors, negative factors and neutral factors. And based on this, we induce the optimization methods into three aspects such as "strengthening positive factors","weakening negative factors" and "controlling neutral factors". Therefore, to enhance the technological innovation capability of small and medium-sized listed companies, it is a temporary expedient to make variety policy support from outside. The fundamental way is to construct the endogenous mechanism to motive power of the technological innovation capability of small and medium-sized listed companies.
From the all, we conclude that the optimized method of corporate governance should include three levels:technological innovation oriented ownership structure optimization, board governance optimization and executive optimization. First, it is important to establish controlling shareholder reputation incentive mechanism and credibility evaluation system. And the pyramid structure of the small and medium-sized listed companies should be optimized and the levels of the pyramid should be decreased. Institutional investors should be lead into listed companies and their positive governance behavior should be reinforced. Second, it is important to maintain the optimized board size and strengthen the communication between the directors. The independence of board should be reinforced and the positive behaviors of independent directors should be irritated. More attention should be paid to the human resource capital and social resource capital of the boards. Third, it is also important to optimize executive incentive contract. Remuneration committee of listed companies should independently design the executive incentive contract. The sensitivity between executive compensation and technological innovation should be increased. The equity incentive plan should be long-term and moderate constraint and technological innovation index should be added into the index system of vesting condition. The moderate perk level should be maintained and it can provide the executives implicit incentives to some degree.
Nevertheless, this paper has some limitations below:the time span of research sample is narrow; variable design needs to be improved; research object is only confined to the internal corporate governance mechanisms, but not including the external mechanisms as well. Hence, the subsequent research should be improved in the aspects below:(1) do researches based on different contextual factors from the contingency perspective;(2) extend corporate governance from internal mechanisms to external mechanisms;(3) find the interactions between the corporate governance mechanisms and their integrated effect on technological innovation based on corporate governance integration perspective.
引文
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