多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为研究
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摘要
城市基础设施是城市的立足之本,是城市经济发展、社会稳定的保证。进入21世纪以来,我国城市化水平以年均1%以上的速度向前推进,伴随着城市化进程的加快,我国对城市基础设施的需求将更加迫切。长期以来,政府一直是城市基础设施的主要提供者,但随着城市人口、经济增长引发的基础设施需求的迅速增长,政府有限的财政收入已不能满足城市基础设施建设巨额的资金需求,许多地方政府的城市基础设施建设投资力度大大超前于其财政增长的速度,使得财政不堪重负。在此背景下,我国借鉴国际经验,引入政府之外的投资者参与城市基础设施供给的融资模式,即多方参与下城市基础设施融资模式,并取得了很好的应用效果。在新的融资模式下,政府的角色及参与行为发生了较大的变化,政府如何明确自身的角色定位,认知自身的行为将直接影响到该模式的顺利实现,因此,研究多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为,以突破城市基础设施融资困境成为了一个具有重要意义的课题。
本文立足我国国情,从政府参与城市基础设施融资的角色出发,探索多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为的机理、价值及实施途径,系统研究该模式下政府的项目参与人选择行为、承诺行为及监控行为,其研究目的在于为多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为的实施、控制、优化提供理论依据,推动城市基础设施的建设和发展。
在梳理既有研究成果的基础上,本文基于政府参与城市基础设施融资的角色,站在政府视角对城市基础设施融资模式进行了分类,提出了多方参与下城市基础设施融资模式的理论框架,分析了该框架下政府行为的动因及约束,并依据特许经营合同签订的时点,指出了政府的三种基本行为,即项目参与人选择行为、承诺行为和监控行为。
关于在特许经营合同签订前政府的项目参与人选择行为,本文对项目参与人选择过程进行了分析,并指出了项目参与人选择过程的特性及关键环节。针对招标代理机构比选环节,运用竞标理论设计了招标代理机构比选的最优支付合约,以降低招标委员会的支付成本;针对整个项目参与人选择过程中可能存在的双重串谋行为,应用博弈论建立了招标代理机构触发的串谋模型和招标负责人触发的串谋模型,并提出了相应的治理措施;针对项目参与人选择方法的问题,将粗糙集理论与灰色关联度理论相结合建立了参与人选择模型,并通过算例分析,验证了模型的有效性。
关于在特许经营合同签订时政府的承诺行为,本文对政府作出的出资承诺、特许经营权授予承诺及投资收益保证承诺进行了研究,运用博弈论建立了政府在出资承诺时可能出现的因项目公司经理与政府授权部门项目负责人员之间的合谋而导致的国有资产流失模型,并提出了针对合谋行为的机制设计;分析了特许经营权授予承诺的一般形式,论证了多期特许经营权的授予可能,应用实物期权中的增长期权理论建立了多期特许经营权授予承诺的期权定价模型,并通过算例验证了模型的有效性;分析了政府浮动收益率保证承诺存在的问题,提出了嵌入激励行为的政府投资收益保证承诺模式,应用实物期权中的有效障碍期权理论建立了嵌入激励行为的政府投资收益保证承诺定价模型,并通过算例验证了模型的有效性。
关于在特许经营合同签订后政府的监控行为,本文分析了多方参与下城市基础设施融资项目公司可能存在的违约行为,提出了政府委托中介机构进行监控的模式,并应用博弈论建立了其监控过程的中介机构违规上报模型及政府尽职检查模型;针对项目公司的违约行为,建立了政府监控指标体系,基于支持向量机(SVM)理论构建了监控模型,并通过监控模拟,验证了模型的精度;针对政府根据中介机构上报的监控报告所可能采取的激励措施,应用元胞自动机(CA)理论建立了基于监控结果的仿真模型,通过对演化结果分析,得出了各种激励方式下的演化特征。
本文针对多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为进行了系统的研究,为多方参与下政府行为的实施、控制及优化提供了有效的工具,丰富了我国城市基础设施融资的理论与方法。
Urban infrastructure is not only the foundation of the city but also the guarantee of urban economic development and social stability. Since entering into the 21st century, China's urbanization has made forward with an average annual rate of more than 1%, the demand for urban infrastructure will be even more urgent. For a long time, the Government has been the main supplier of urban infrastructure. However, with the rapid growth of infrastructure needs involved by city population rising and economic growth, the limited revenue can not meet such a huge amount of fund to improve urban infrastructure. Many local governments’investment in urban infrastructure is more than the local fiscal financial growth, which made fiscal overwhelmed. At this background, by drawing on international experience, China applied a new financing mode which introduced the participants other than government to financing urban infrastructure, that is, urban infrastructure financing mode under multi-participant with good results. With the new financing mode, government's role and behavior had been changed a lot. .How to clearly define the role of government and recognize itself will directly affect the smooth realization of the mode. Therefore, in order to breakthrough the financing dilemma, it is important and significant topic to research government behavior in the process of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant.
In this paper, based on the condition of our country, from the angle of government's participation in urban infrastructure financing, the mechanism, values and implementation ways of the government's financing behavior under multi-participant is studied and the government participants’selection commitment and monitoring behavior under the mode is analyzed systematically. The purpose of the study is to provide a theoretical basis for the conduction, control and optimization of government behavior in the prosess of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant and to promote the construction and development of urban infrastructure.
According to the existing research, this paper classifies the urban infrastructure financing mode from the view of government, and puts forward a theoretical framework of government behavior in the process of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant, analyzes the motivation and restriction of government behavior under the framework, and pointed out three basic behaviors in accordance with the franchise contract time, which were project participants, selection behavior, commitment behavior and monitoring behavior.
About the selection behavior of government project participants before signing franchise contract, the paper analyzes the selection process of project participants, and points out the characteristics of the selection process and the key section. to the tendering agent selection, the optimal contract of tendering agency is designed by using the auction theory to reduce the cost of the tender committee. to the dual conspiracy of project participants that may exist in entire selection process, game theory is applied to build dual conspiracy model triggered by tendering agency and tendering board, then corresponding countermeasures is promoted. With the issue of selection ways of project participants, the participant selection mode is built by combining the rough set theory and the gray relational grade theory, and calculating examples is analyzed to verifiy the model validity. On Government's commitment during the franchise contract being signed, this paper analyzes funding commitments made by the government, franchise commitment and investment income ensuring commitment, applying the game theory the possible loss of state-owned assets resulted from the conspiracy between project manager and project staff authorized by the Government departments is analyzed, and this paper proposed a mechanism to provent collusive behavior. the general form of commitment to the franchise is analyzed, the grant possibility of the multi-phase franchise is demonstrates. Applying growth option theory of real option, the option pricing model granted by multi-phase franchise is built and the validity of the model is verified by calculating example. this paper analyzes the problems of the government current floating rate of return, presents the government commitment to investment income model which is embedded in motivate behavior, applying effective barrier options theory of real options, the government commitment pricing model embedded in motivate behavior is built to ensuring investment-income, and the validity of the model by is verified calculating example.
On the government monitoring behavior after signing franchise contract, this paper analyzes the possible breach among the project participants of multi-participant financing on urban infrastructure, proposes the mode of intermediaries monitor commissioned by the government, and applied game theory to build the irregularities report model and government check model to monitoring process. On noncompliance of project participants, this paper builds government monitoring indicator system based on support vector machine (SVM) theory, and verifies the accuracy of the model by monitoring simulation. For incentives probably carried by government according to intermediaries’monitoring report, it applies Cellular Automata (CA) theory to build simulation model based on the results of monitor. the features of the evolution under various incentives is found through the analysis of evolution results.
The paper researches government behavior systematically in the prosess of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant, offeres effective instruments to the implementation, controlg and optimization of government behavior of multi-participant, which will enrich the financing theory and method in China's urban infrastructure .
本文立足我国国情,从政府参与城市基础设施融资的角色出发,探索多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为的机理、价值及实施途径,系统研究该模式下政府的项目参与人选择行为、承诺行为及监控行为,其研究目的在于为多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为的实施、控制、优化提供理论依据,推动城市基础设施的建设和发展。
在梳理既有研究成果的基础上,本文基于政府参与城市基础设施融资的角色,站在政府视角对城市基础设施融资模式进行了分类,提出了多方参与下城市基础设施融资模式的理论框架,分析了该框架下政府行为的动因及约束,并依据特许经营合同签订的时点,指出了政府的三种基本行为,即项目参与人选择行为、承诺行为和监控行为。
关于在特许经营合同签订前政府的项目参与人选择行为,本文对项目参与人选择过程进行了分析,并指出了项目参与人选择过程的特性及关键环节。针对招标代理机构比选环节,运用竞标理论设计了招标代理机构比选的最优支付合约,以降低招标委员会的支付成本;针对整个项目参与人选择过程中可能存在的双重串谋行为,应用博弈论建立了招标代理机构触发的串谋模型和招标负责人触发的串谋模型,并提出了相应的治理措施;针对项目参与人选择方法的问题,将粗糙集理论与灰色关联度理论相结合建立了参与人选择模型,并通过算例分析,验证了模型的有效性。
关于在特许经营合同签订时政府的承诺行为,本文对政府作出的出资承诺、特许经营权授予承诺及投资收益保证承诺进行了研究,运用博弈论建立了政府在出资承诺时可能出现的因项目公司经理与政府授权部门项目负责人员之间的合谋而导致的国有资产流失模型,并提出了针对合谋行为的机制设计;分析了特许经营权授予承诺的一般形式,论证了多期特许经营权的授予可能,应用实物期权中的增长期权理论建立了多期特许经营权授予承诺的期权定价模型,并通过算例验证了模型的有效性;分析了政府浮动收益率保证承诺存在的问题,提出了嵌入激励行为的政府投资收益保证承诺模式,应用实物期权中的有效障碍期权理论建立了嵌入激励行为的政府投资收益保证承诺定价模型,并通过算例验证了模型的有效性。
关于在特许经营合同签订后政府的监控行为,本文分析了多方参与下城市基础设施融资项目公司可能存在的违约行为,提出了政府委托中介机构进行监控的模式,并应用博弈论建立了其监控过程的中介机构违规上报模型及政府尽职检查模型;针对项目公司的违约行为,建立了政府监控指标体系,基于支持向量机(SVM)理论构建了监控模型,并通过监控模拟,验证了模型的精度;针对政府根据中介机构上报的监控报告所可能采取的激励措施,应用元胞自动机(CA)理论建立了基于监控结果的仿真模型,通过对演化结果分析,得出了各种激励方式下的演化特征。
本文针对多方参与下城市基础设施融资政府行为进行了系统的研究,为多方参与下政府行为的实施、控制及优化提供了有效的工具,丰富了我国城市基础设施融资的理论与方法。
Urban infrastructure is not only the foundation of the city but also the guarantee of urban economic development and social stability. Since entering into the 21st century, China's urbanization has made forward with an average annual rate of more than 1%, the demand for urban infrastructure will be even more urgent. For a long time, the Government has been the main supplier of urban infrastructure. However, with the rapid growth of infrastructure needs involved by city population rising and economic growth, the limited revenue can not meet such a huge amount of fund to improve urban infrastructure. Many local governments’investment in urban infrastructure is more than the local fiscal financial growth, which made fiscal overwhelmed. At this background, by drawing on international experience, China applied a new financing mode which introduced the participants other than government to financing urban infrastructure, that is, urban infrastructure financing mode under multi-participant with good results. With the new financing mode, government's role and behavior had been changed a lot. .How to clearly define the role of government and recognize itself will directly affect the smooth realization of the mode. Therefore, in order to breakthrough the financing dilemma, it is important and significant topic to research government behavior in the process of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant.
In this paper, based on the condition of our country, from the angle of government's participation in urban infrastructure financing, the mechanism, values and implementation ways of the government's financing behavior under multi-participant is studied and the government participants’selection commitment and monitoring behavior under the mode is analyzed systematically. The purpose of the study is to provide a theoretical basis for the conduction, control and optimization of government behavior in the prosess of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant and to promote the construction and development of urban infrastructure.
According to the existing research, this paper classifies the urban infrastructure financing mode from the view of government, and puts forward a theoretical framework of government behavior in the process of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant, analyzes the motivation and restriction of government behavior under the framework, and pointed out three basic behaviors in accordance with the franchise contract time, which were project participants, selection behavior, commitment behavior and monitoring behavior.
About the selection behavior of government project participants before signing franchise contract, the paper analyzes the selection process of project participants, and points out the characteristics of the selection process and the key section. to the tendering agent selection, the optimal contract of tendering agency is designed by using the auction theory to reduce the cost of the tender committee. to the dual conspiracy of project participants that may exist in entire selection process, game theory is applied to build dual conspiracy model triggered by tendering agency and tendering board, then corresponding countermeasures is promoted. With the issue of selection ways of project participants, the participant selection mode is built by combining the rough set theory and the gray relational grade theory, and calculating examples is analyzed to verifiy the model validity. On Government's commitment during the franchise contract being signed, this paper analyzes funding commitments made by the government, franchise commitment and investment income ensuring commitment, applying the game theory the possible loss of state-owned assets resulted from the conspiracy between project manager and project staff authorized by the Government departments is analyzed, and this paper proposed a mechanism to provent collusive behavior. the general form of commitment to the franchise is analyzed, the grant possibility of the multi-phase franchise is demonstrates. Applying growth option theory of real option, the option pricing model granted by multi-phase franchise is built and the validity of the model is verified by calculating example. this paper analyzes the problems of the government current floating rate of return, presents the government commitment to investment income model which is embedded in motivate behavior, applying effective barrier options theory of real options, the government commitment pricing model embedded in motivate behavior is built to ensuring investment-income, and the validity of the model by is verified calculating example.
On the government monitoring behavior after signing franchise contract, this paper analyzes the possible breach among the project participants of multi-participant financing on urban infrastructure, proposes the mode of intermediaries monitor commissioned by the government, and applied game theory to build the irregularities report model and government check model to monitoring process. On noncompliance of project participants, this paper builds government monitoring indicator system based on support vector machine (SVM) theory, and verifies the accuracy of the model by monitoring simulation. For incentives probably carried by government according to intermediaries’monitoring report, it applies Cellular Automata (CA) theory to build simulation model based on the results of monitor. the features of the evolution under various incentives is found through the analysis of evolution results.
The paper researches government behavior systematically in the prosess of urban infrastructure financing under multi-participant, offeres effective instruments to the implementation, controlg and optimization of government behavior of multi-participant, which will enrich the financing theory and method in China's urban infrastructure .
引文
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