矿业政府规制研究
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摘要
矿产资源是国民经济发展的重要物质,矿产业则是国民经济发展的重要基础产业之一。进入21世纪的中国,在全面建成小康社会、到2020年经济总量在2000年基础上翻两番的宏伟发展目标、基本实现工业化的要求下,中国矿产资源需求呈刚性增长。但与此不相适应的是,中国矿产资源保障程度总体不足,资源短缺将呈“钢性”状态,矿产资源供需矛盾十分突出,特别是石油、铁矿石、铜、钾等资源面临对外依存度较高的压力。资源国情和当前经济社会发展所处阶段特征决定了矿产资源的大幅消耗在短期内难以转变,供需矛盾日益突出,而国内矿业在矿产资源利用效率不高、矿业粗放式的经营、矿业市场化程度低、矿山安全事故多发、环境污染严重等一系列问题下,使得我国矿业的可持续发展面临极大挑战。
新一轮全国矿产资源规划中,明确提出要大力推进矿业经济重点发展区建设,目的是通过对矿业区域的建设来统筹资源配置,以资源为基础,引导和优化资源开发利用合理布局和结构,提高矿业集中度以及矿产资源开发的科学性和可操作性,促进区域资源优势转化为发展优势。作为矿产业良性发展的示范和试点,除国家给予政策支持外,科学有效的管理机制是必不可少的,这其中也包括微观层面的政府规制,因此研究对矿业的政府规制问题就显的十分必要和迫切。这不仅对实现矿产资源可持续利用、提高矿业竞争能力,保障经济社会可持续发展、建设资源节约和环境友好型社会、走新型工业化道路有着重要的现实意义,同时,也是在社会主义经济体制改革进一步深入,政府体制改革中政府职能转变的必然要求。
本文主要运用规范分析、制度分析和系统分析的方法对当前矿业规制做了全面系统的梳理和分析,通过对矿业规制中反映出的问题的研究,寻求改进完善的对策。全文共分七章。第一章绪论,分析了关注矿业、关注政府规制问题的社会经济背景和选题研究意义;对文中涉及的主要概念——矿业、矿业经济区和政府规制的内涵做分析和界定；介绍本文主要研究内容、方法,创新点和不足。第二章理论基础及相关研究综述,就政府规制的理论基础——规制经济学的国内外研究,以及目前国内有关矿业的规制研究做了评述。在放松规制浪潮后,西方的规制更注重对经济性规制中委托——代理关系的研究,同时规制经济学研究的重点开始向正在起步的社会性规制研究转移。我国在广泛学习和借鉴国外规制经济学研究的成果的基础上,也开始对矿业发展从制度、市场、法律等方面尝试用规制的视角进行研究。第三章矿业政府规制变迁,对当前我国矿业政府规制的基础——矿业法律体系、矿业政府规制的机构都做了详尽的梳理,并就这一体系中存在的问题做了剖析,主要是法律体系还不健全,规制机构较为分散,以及对规制机构本身缺乏监管机制等。
第四章矿业经济性规制和第五章矿业社会性规制为本文的主要部分,从经济性规制和社会性规制两个方面,全面系统地分析了矿业领域内的政府规制现状以及存在的问题。
从矿业经济性规制看,主要是在进入和退出以及矿业权市场这三个方面的规制。就进入规制而言,它是对矿业权申请人的资格审查。之所以对其进行行政许可的限制,原因主要是矿业权是“准用益物权”。它的获得不同于其他用意物权,不需要通过设定用益物权合同的方式来完成,而要通过行政许可,即采矿企业对矿山的开采经营权利须经国土资源部门行政审批获得许可,即获取采矿权。这种行政许可实际上是在申请人符合法定的条件时,政府授予其具有探矿、采矿等资格。由于不动产的开发和利用与国民经济关系重大,涉及到资源的合理利用和配置问题,且矿业权客体包括矿产资源和矿区,具有复合性,又因为矿区及其所蕴涵的矿藏种类规模不同对采矿权的取得及行使有着重要影响。因此,政府对涉及自然资源的开发和利用活动都应当进行必要的管理,所以对矿业权的取得必须要采用行政许可的方式。当前,在进入规制上存在的问题主要是：政府对市场主体在所有制间的人为歧视,致使我国矿业市场的交易主体并不丰富；对进入须具备特定的行为能力及相关实质要件规定的过于原则化,并无具体操作标准；审批资质条件的环境、安全约束性不强,成为导致在目前矿业生产中事故不断的重要原因,加重了社会及政府行政成本；行政许可性质不清,一个采矿权实际肩负了财产权和市场准入资格两种属性,这就有悖于让市场配置资源这一前提。在退出规制上,我国目前还没有建立相应的矿业退出规制。《矿产资源法》中也未涉及矿业企业正常退出的机制。实际情况中矿业生产具有投资大、沉淀成本高的特点,退出壁垒较一般行业高,企业自身难以全身而退,一方面必须完成对开采矿山的环境恢复治理,另一方面需要解决企业员工的安置问题,其中一些问题超出了企业的控制范围,而我国退出机制的缺失给对大型矿业企业退出造成更大难度,矿业市场无法实现优势劣汰的竞争机制。在矿业权市场方面,作为矿业资本市场的重要组成部分,国家最新出台了专门的矿业权交易规制对矿业权交易机构、矿业权人交易行为做了较全面的规范,但在以往规制执行中暴露出几个问题：各级国土资源部门在代理国家进行矿业权交易的同时又是规制者的特殊定位,使得政府对交易本事干预过多；法规条例多而杂；对交易主体的限制和监管越位和缺位等问题,矿业权市场不能很好发挥配置矿业权的作用,市场失灵较为明显。
从矿业社会性规制看。矿业活动的特殊性使得矿产资源开发过程中的负外部性和内部性无法避免,市场对公共利益的维护失效的情况下,政府通过规制手段将负外部性内部化、降低内部性风险就显得非常重要。不过,政府规制的目标并非彻底消灭污染或破坏,而是将其限制在最适范围内。矿业社会性规制主要是矿山环境规制、矿山生产安全规制两大内容。对矿山环境的规制,我国主要实施的是行政手段和经济手段。矿山环境标准作为行政手段在市场经济发育还不完善的情况下,还是一种见效快的方式。但这种方式是政府职能部门依照命令的要求监督、检查手约束企业是否有违规情况存在,所以存在较高成本,需要对机构、人员、资金的投入。并且由于规制和被规制者间的信息不对称,环境标准方式的实施成本和对污染的控制体系成本偏高。作为经济手段,我国使用矿山排污费、矿山地质环境治理恢复保证金等方式间接通过市场干预企业行为。排污收费作为庇古税,它的征收会促使企业在成本压力下进行控制污染排放的技术革新。对政府而言,不需要大量投入来核定企业污染物排放量,只要确定需征收排污费的企业以及相应生产规模下的排污量征收排污费即可。而在实际中存在操作难的问题,由于信息的严重不对称,政府无法准确计算对环境的最优排污量。除了税,矿山地质环境治理恢复保证金与土地复垦费和水土流失防治与补偿费也是出于对环境的补偿,但他们之间重复征收也引发了一些问题。在矿山生产安全上,矿业属高危行业,其生产直接关系到劳动者生命、健康、安全等切身利益,同时,只有做好安全生产才能实现企业经济效益最大化,才能更好地保持矿业企业的发展。国家从法律层面和其他配套具体实施办法对矿山安全生产进行规制。但具体在实践操作过程中反映出,矿山安全作为一项标准,其技术标准更新缓慢、严重老化,地方国土资源管理部门监管因经费、人员配备、执法设备投入等问题上的监管不力,对规制者本身监督的匮乏也导致监管部门的无为甚至是合谋,在鼓励安全生产技术创新和应用上的激励机制亦不显著,包括对矿山开采人员的职业健康和职业教育培训的不重视都严重制约了矿山安全规制的实际效果和对劳动职工的保护力度。
第六章,矿业政府规制安排建议。在结合之前章节的分析后,尝试在矿业经济区这一试点范围内,给出健全、完善政府规制的制度安排的对策和建议。在法律层面,需要理清矿业现行法律法规,完善和健全法律体系,降低规制的随意性;建立独立矿业规制机构,将规制从相关管理部门中抽离,做到从产业发展角度的有效监督；在进入退出规制上,进入行政许可要明晰和区别矿业权的财产权和经营权,简化行政手续的同时强化进入中的资金、生产技术、环境等进入门槛；建立普遍适用的矿业企业退出援助机制,疏通市场进出机制；放松矿业权交易的进入规制,加快矿业权电子交易平台建设；强化矿业的社会性规制,包括对矿山安全与健康监管体系的建设,进行矿山排污权交易试点；树立规制信息公开意识,建立规制信息披露制度和政府信息服务平台建设等。第七章,主要结论和展望。总结全文研究后,指出今后需要做进一步研究的问题。
Mineral resources are an important material for national economic development. The mining industry is an important basis for national economic development. Into the21st century, in order to complete a comprehensive well-off society and to achieve the total economy in2020, the demand for mineral resources in China was rigid growth. But there is incompatible with which that the overall level of China's inadequate protection of mineral resources is lack, shortage of resources will show a "rigid" state, highlight the contradiction between supply and demand of mineral resources, especially oil, iron ore, copper, potassium and other resources to face external dependence high degree of pressure. Resource conditions and the current stage of economic and social development in which the determinants of consumption of mineral resources in the short term is difficult to significantly change, supply and demand have become increasingly prominent, while the domestic mining industry in the inefficient use of mineral resources, mining, extensive business, mining, market-oriented low-fat mine safety accidents, environmental pollution and high incidence of accidents under a range of issues, sustainable development of the mining industry is facing great challenges.
A new planning of national mineral resources has a proposal which is to promote the mining economy zones. Purpose is to focus on building co-ordination of resources through the guidance and constraints of space, optimizing resources development and utilization of the layout and structure, improve concentration of and mining industry and operability on exploitation of mineral resources, promote regional resource advantages into development advantages. This means that scientific and effective management mechanism is indispensable especially the government regulation. Therefore, the research on mining regulation is very necessary and urgent. This is not only the sustainable use of mineral resources, improve mining competitiveness, sustainable development of economy and society, building a resource-saving and environment-friendly society, to take a new road to industrialization has important practical significance, and also in the socialist economic system reform further, an inevitable requirement for the transformation of government functions in government reform. In this paper, it used the method of normative analysis, system analysis to analysis the current mining regulation and with the research on the problems of the mining regulation, seek improved countermeasures. The paper has seven chapters.
Chapter one, introduction. It analyzes the socio-economic background and topics of researc h significance concerned about the mining industry and government regulation issues; analy sis and definite of the main concepts involved-mining, mining economic zone and gover nment regulation connotation; introduces the main research contents, methods, innovation a nd in adequate. Chapter two, the theoretical basis and research summary. In the chapter, it do a commentary on the research of theory of governmental regulations abroad, as well a s the domestic mining regulation research. With the deregulation wave of regulation in the West, academic now pay more attention on delegate-agency relationship, while the focu s of the study began to be transferred to the social regulation. Based on learning of the st udy of regulation economics of western world, the researchers of China try to research on regulation of mining. Chapter three, mining government regulation changes. It summarized our regulation legal system of mining, government regulation agencies, and analyzes the p roblems existing in the system:main legal system is not perfect, the regulatory agencies ar e more dispersed, lack of regulatory mechanisms and regulatory agencies.
Chapter four and five study in economic and social mining regulation, they are the main parts of this paper, it analysis present situation of government regulation and open problem s comprehensively and systematically. In economic mining regulation, the main part is abo ut the regulation of entry and exit, and the mining right market. In terms of the entry regulation, it is the qualification of mining rights applicants. The reason
which its administrative licensing restrictions is mainly due to mineral rights, it is a "quasi-usufruct right". It acquirement unlike other real right intention, doesn't need to be completed by setting the contract, mining companies need administrative licensing then has the mining operating rights. This administrative license actually means when the applicant meets the statutory conditions, the government granted the prospecting, mining and other qualifications. Due to major real estate development and utilization of national economic relations related to the rational use of resources and configuration issues, including mineral resources and the mining area and mining rights object, therefore, the regulation on the development and utilization of natural resources is necessary. Now the main problems are:there has discrimination between different system of ownership, so the main trading bodies in the mining right market are not very rich. The specific capacity and substantial elements become too principle, and lack of specific operating standards. Qualifications of environment and production security constraints are not strong, these increased social and government administrative costs. The administrative license has unclear nature. A mining right actually responsible for the two attributes of property rights and market access qualifications, which is contrary to the market allocation of resources.
In term of exit regulation, China is still not established mining exit regulation."Mineral Resources Law" is also not covered by the normal exit mechanism for mining companies. Mining production has a big investment, precipitated high cost exit barriers than the general industry, the enterprise itself is difficult to get out. On the one hand, they must complete the recovery and management of mining on the environment, on the other hand need to solve the resettlement of employees problems, some of these issues are beyond the scope of control. So the lack of exit mechanism to cause greater difficulty for those large mining companies to exit, and advantage of survival of the fittest cannot be achieved.
Concerning mining rights market, as an important part of the mining capital market, government layouts the latest rules to regulate mining rights trading, institutions, and trading behavior. But there have a few issues:land and resources departments are the agents and the same time they are the regulators. Government interferes too much in mining rights trading. There are many laws and regulations and mixed; restrictions and supervision of trade subject offside and the absence of other issues, the mining rights market is not good to play the role of configuration mining rights, market failure is more obvious.
Concern to social mining regulation, the special nature of mining activities can't avoid negative externality and internality, and the failure of the market for the maintenance of the public interest, the Government through regulatory means to internalize the negative externalities, reduce internal risk makes the process of development of mineral resources in the negative external and internal important. However, the goal of the government regulation is not completely eliminate pollution or destruction, but limited within the optimal range. The social mining regulation is mine environmental regulation and production safety regulation. In our country, the main methods in regulation of the mining environment are administrative and economic methods. The mining environmental standards are a quick way as an administrative means in the case of market economic development is not perfect. But this kind of means is the functions of the government departments in accordance with the requirements of the order supervision and inspection hand, constraint enterprise have illegal situation exists, there is a higher cost, need to institution, personnel, capital input. And due to the information asymmetry between the regulator and the be regulators, the cost of environment standard of the pollution control system cost on the high side. We use mining sewage charge and mining geological environment treatment deposit to intervene enterprise behavior indirectly. Pollution charges as Pigovian tax will encourage enterprises to do technological innovation under the cost pressure. For the government, it don't need huge investments to approved enterprises pollutant emissions, just make sure that enterprises need to pollution charges as well as the appropriate scale of production, the volume of pollution collection of sewage charges. But in practice operation is a difficult problem. The government can't be accurately calculated the optimal amount of pollution discharged to the environment due to severe asymmetry of information. In addition to the tax, mine geological environment recovering deposit and land reclamation fee and soil erosion prevention and compensation are also led to some of the problems when they are repeat collected. In mine production safety, mining is a high-risk industry. Its production is directly related to the vital interests of the workers'lives and health, safety. Good safe production can achieve maximum economic efficiency of enterprises. But in specific practical process, mine safety as a standard, the technical standards update slow, serious aging. Also because of lack of invest, human resource, equipment investment and other issues, the regulator may led to inaction or even collusion. Other problems are there's no significantly encouragement in the safe production of technological innovation, ignored occupational health and vocational education. All these restricted the actual effect of the mine safety regulation and efforts in protecting labor workers.
Chapter six, mining regulation proposed arrangement. Combined with the analysis of the previous chapters, I try to give countermeasures and suggestions to improve the institutional arrangements of government regulation, especially with the mining economic zone. In the legal aspects, it is necessary to clarify the existing laws and regulations of the mining industry to improve and perfect the legal system, and reduce the arbitrariness of the regulation; It should establish an independent mining regulatory agencies, people will come from the relevant administrative departments to achieve effective supervision from the point of view of the industrial development; In entry and exit regulation aspects, the administrative licensing clarity and distinction property rights and the right to operate rights, and administrative procedures should be simplified, at the same time strengthen enter the capital, production, technical, environmental barriers to entry; Establish exit the assistance mechanism to dredge the market out of the mechanism; Relaxed entry regulations for mining rights trading system, speed up the construction of mining rights electronic trading platform; Strengthen the social regulation of mining, including the construction of the mine safety and health regulatory system and mine pollution's discharge right trading pilot; Establish regulatory information public awareness, establish regulatory information disclosure system and the government information service platform construction. Chapter seven, the main conclusions and outlook. Concludes the paper research, and pointed out that further research needs to be done in the future.
新一轮全国矿产资源规划中,明确提出要大力推进矿业经济重点发展区建设,目的是通过对矿业区域的建设来统筹资源配置,以资源为基础,引导和优化资源开发利用合理布局和结构,提高矿业集中度以及矿产资源开发的科学性和可操作性,促进区域资源优势转化为发展优势。作为矿产业良性发展的示范和试点,除国家给予政策支持外,科学有效的管理机制是必不可少的,这其中也包括微观层面的政府规制,因此研究对矿业的政府规制问题就显的十分必要和迫切。这不仅对实现矿产资源可持续利用、提高矿业竞争能力,保障经济社会可持续发展、建设资源节约和环境友好型社会、走新型工业化道路有着重要的现实意义,同时,也是在社会主义经济体制改革进一步深入,政府体制改革中政府职能转变的必然要求。
本文主要运用规范分析、制度分析和系统分析的方法对当前矿业规制做了全面系统的梳理和分析,通过对矿业规制中反映出的问题的研究,寻求改进完善的对策。全文共分七章。第一章绪论,分析了关注矿业、关注政府规制问题的社会经济背景和选题研究意义;对文中涉及的主要概念——矿业、矿业经济区和政府规制的内涵做分析和界定；介绍本文主要研究内容、方法,创新点和不足。第二章理论基础及相关研究综述,就政府规制的理论基础——规制经济学的国内外研究,以及目前国内有关矿业的规制研究做了评述。在放松规制浪潮后,西方的规制更注重对经济性规制中委托——代理关系的研究,同时规制经济学研究的重点开始向正在起步的社会性规制研究转移。我国在广泛学习和借鉴国外规制经济学研究的成果的基础上,也开始对矿业发展从制度、市场、法律等方面尝试用规制的视角进行研究。第三章矿业政府规制变迁,对当前我国矿业政府规制的基础——矿业法律体系、矿业政府规制的机构都做了详尽的梳理,并就这一体系中存在的问题做了剖析,主要是法律体系还不健全,规制机构较为分散,以及对规制机构本身缺乏监管机制等。
第四章矿业经济性规制和第五章矿业社会性规制为本文的主要部分,从经济性规制和社会性规制两个方面,全面系统地分析了矿业领域内的政府规制现状以及存在的问题。
从矿业经济性规制看,主要是在进入和退出以及矿业权市场这三个方面的规制。就进入规制而言,它是对矿业权申请人的资格审查。之所以对其进行行政许可的限制,原因主要是矿业权是“准用益物权”。它的获得不同于其他用意物权,不需要通过设定用益物权合同的方式来完成,而要通过行政许可,即采矿企业对矿山的开采经营权利须经国土资源部门行政审批获得许可,即获取采矿权。这种行政许可实际上是在申请人符合法定的条件时,政府授予其具有探矿、采矿等资格。由于不动产的开发和利用与国民经济关系重大,涉及到资源的合理利用和配置问题,且矿业权客体包括矿产资源和矿区,具有复合性,又因为矿区及其所蕴涵的矿藏种类规模不同对采矿权的取得及行使有着重要影响。因此,政府对涉及自然资源的开发和利用活动都应当进行必要的管理,所以对矿业权的取得必须要采用行政许可的方式。当前,在进入规制上存在的问题主要是：政府对市场主体在所有制间的人为歧视,致使我国矿业市场的交易主体并不丰富；对进入须具备特定的行为能力及相关实质要件规定的过于原则化,并无具体操作标准；审批资质条件的环境、安全约束性不强,成为导致在目前矿业生产中事故不断的重要原因,加重了社会及政府行政成本；行政许可性质不清,一个采矿权实际肩负了财产权和市场准入资格两种属性,这就有悖于让市场配置资源这一前提。在退出规制上,我国目前还没有建立相应的矿业退出规制。《矿产资源法》中也未涉及矿业企业正常退出的机制。实际情况中矿业生产具有投资大、沉淀成本高的特点,退出壁垒较一般行业高,企业自身难以全身而退,一方面必须完成对开采矿山的环境恢复治理,另一方面需要解决企业员工的安置问题,其中一些问题超出了企业的控制范围,而我国退出机制的缺失给对大型矿业企业退出造成更大难度,矿业市场无法实现优势劣汰的竞争机制。在矿业权市场方面,作为矿业资本市场的重要组成部分,国家最新出台了专门的矿业权交易规制对矿业权交易机构、矿业权人交易行为做了较全面的规范,但在以往规制执行中暴露出几个问题：各级国土资源部门在代理国家进行矿业权交易的同时又是规制者的特殊定位,使得政府对交易本事干预过多；法规条例多而杂；对交易主体的限制和监管越位和缺位等问题,矿业权市场不能很好发挥配置矿业权的作用,市场失灵较为明显。
从矿业社会性规制看。矿业活动的特殊性使得矿产资源开发过程中的负外部性和内部性无法避免,市场对公共利益的维护失效的情况下,政府通过规制手段将负外部性内部化、降低内部性风险就显得非常重要。不过,政府规制的目标并非彻底消灭污染或破坏,而是将其限制在最适范围内。矿业社会性规制主要是矿山环境规制、矿山生产安全规制两大内容。对矿山环境的规制,我国主要实施的是行政手段和经济手段。矿山环境标准作为行政手段在市场经济发育还不完善的情况下,还是一种见效快的方式。但这种方式是政府职能部门依照命令的要求监督、检查手约束企业是否有违规情况存在,所以存在较高成本,需要对机构、人员、资金的投入。并且由于规制和被规制者间的信息不对称,环境标准方式的实施成本和对污染的控制体系成本偏高。作为经济手段,我国使用矿山排污费、矿山地质环境治理恢复保证金等方式间接通过市场干预企业行为。排污收费作为庇古税,它的征收会促使企业在成本压力下进行控制污染排放的技术革新。对政府而言,不需要大量投入来核定企业污染物排放量,只要确定需征收排污费的企业以及相应生产规模下的排污量征收排污费即可。而在实际中存在操作难的问题,由于信息的严重不对称,政府无法准确计算对环境的最优排污量。除了税,矿山地质环境治理恢复保证金与土地复垦费和水土流失防治与补偿费也是出于对环境的补偿,但他们之间重复征收也引发了一些问题。在矿山生产安全上,矿业属高危行业,其生产直接关系到劳动者生命、健康、安全等切身利益,同时,只有做好安全生产才能实现企业经济效益最大化,才能更好地保持矿业企业的发展。国家从法律层面和其他配套具体实施办法对矿山安全生产进行规制。但具体在实践操作过程中反映出,矿山安全作为一项标准,其技术标准更新缓慢、严重老化,地方国土资源管理部门监管因经费、人员配备、执法设备投入等问题上的监管不力,对规制者本身监督的匮乏也导致监管部门的无为甚至是合谋,在鼓励安全生产技术创新和应用上的激励机制亦不显著,包括对矿山开采人员的职业健康和职业教育培训的不重视都严重制约了矿山安全规制的实际效果和对劳动职工的保护力度。
第六章,矿业政府规制安排建议。在结合之前章节的分析后,尝试在矿业经济区这一试点范围内,给出健全、完善政府规制的制度安排的对策和建议。在法律层面,需要理清矿业现行法律法规,完善和健全法律体系,降低规制的随意性;建立独立矿业规制机构,将规制从相关管理部门中抽离,做到从产业发展角度的有效监督；在进入退出规制上,进入行政许可要明晰和区别矿业权的财产权和经营权,简化行政手续的同时强化进入中的资金、生产技术、环境等进入门槛；建立普遍适用的矿业企业退出援助机制,疏通市场进出机制；放松矿业权交易的进入规制,加快矿业权电子交易平台建设；强化矿业的社会性规制,包括对矿山安全与健康监管体系的建设,进行矿山排污权交易试点；树立规制信息公开意识,建立规制信息披露制度和政府信息服务平台建设等。第七章,主要结论和展望。总结全文研究后,指出今后需要做进一步研究的问题。
Mineral resources are an important material for national economic development. The mining industry is an important basis for national economic development. Into the21st century, in order to complete a comprehensive well-off society and to achieve the total economy in2020, the demand for mineral resources in China was rigid growth. But there is incompatible with which that the overall level of China's inadequate protection of mineral resources is lack, shortage of resources will show a "rigid" state, highlight the contradiction between supply and demand of mineral resources, especially oil, iron ore, copper, potassium and other resources to face external dependence high degree of pressure. Resource conditions and the current stage of economic and social development in which the determinants of consumption of mineral resources in the short term is difficult to significantly change, supply and demand have become increasingly prominent, while the domestic mining industry in the inefficient use of mineral resources, mining, extensive business, mining, market-oriented low-fat mine safety accidents, environmental pollution and high incidence of accidents under a range of issues, sustainable development of the mining industry is facing great challenges.
A new planning of national mineral resources has a proposal which is to promote the mining economy zones. Purpose is to focus on building co-ordination of resources through the guidance and constraints of space, optimizing resources development and utilization of the layout and structure, improve concentration of and mining industry and operability on exploitation of mineral resources, promote regional resource advantages into development advantages. This means that scientific and effective management mechanism is indispensable especially the government regulation. Therefore, the research on mining regulation is very necessary and urgent. This is not only the sustainable use of mineral resources, improve mining competitiveness, sustainable development of economy and society, building a resource-saving and environment-friendly society, to take a new road to industrialization has important practical significance, and also in the socialist economic system reform further, an inevitable requirement for the transformation of government functions in government reform. In this paper, it used the method of normative analysis, system analysis to analysis the current mining regulation and with the research on the problems of the mining regulation, seek improved countermeasures. The paper has seven chapters.
Chapter one, introduction. It analyzes the socio-economic background and topics of researc h significance concerned about the mining industry and government regulation issues; analy sis and definite of the main concepts involved-mining, mining economic zone and gover nment regulation connotation; introduces the main research contents, methods, innovation a nd in adequate. Chapter two, the theoretical basis and research summary. In the chapter, it do a commentary on the research of theory of governmental regulations abroad, as well a s the domestic mining regulation research. With the deregulation wave of regulation in the West, academic now pay more attention on delegate-agency relationship, while the focu s of the study began to be transferred to the social regulation. Based on learning of the st udy of regulation economics of western world, the researchers of China try to research on regulation of mining. Chapter three, mining government regulation changes. It summarized our regulation legal system of mining, government regulation agencies, and analyzes the p roblems existing in the system:main legal system is not perfect, the regulatory agencies ar e more dispersed, lack of regulatory mechanisms and regulatory agencies.
Chapter four and five study in economic and social mining regulation, they are the main parts of this paper, it analysis present situation of government regulation and open problem s comprehensively and systematically. In economic mining regulation, the main part is abo ut the regulation of entry and exit, and the mining right market. In terms of the entry regulation, it is the qualification of mining rights applicants. The reason
which its administrative licensing restrictions is mainly due to mineral rights, it is a "quasi-usufruct right". It acquirement unlike other real right intention, doesn't need to be completed by setting the contract, mining companies need administrative licensing then has the mining operating rights. This administrative license actually means when the applicant meets the statutory conditions, the government granted the prospecting, mining and other qualifications. Due to major real estate development and utilization of national economic relations related to the rational use of resources and configuration issues, including mineral resources and the mining area and mining rights object, therefore, the regulation on the development and utilization of natural resources is necessary. Now the main problems are:there has discrimination between different system of ownership, so the main trading bodies in the mining right market are not very rich. The specific capacity and substantial elements become too principle, and lack of specific operating standards. Qualifications of environment and production security constraints are not strong, these increased social and government administrative costs. The administrative license has unclear nature. A mining right actually responsible for the two attributes of property rights and market access qualifications, which is contrary to the market allocation of resources.
In term of exit regulation, China is still not established mining exit regulation."Mineral Resources Law" is also not covered by the normal exit mechanism for mining companies. Mining production has a big investment, precipitated high cost exit barriers than the general industry, the enterprise itself is difficult to get out. On the one hand, they must complete the recovery and management of mining on the environment, on the other hand need to solve the resettlement of employees problems, some of these issues are beyond the scope of control. So the lack of exit mechanism to cause greater difficulty for those large mining companies to exit, and advantage of survival of the fittest cannot be achieved.
Concerning mining rights market, as an important part of the mining capital market, government layouts the latest rules to regulate mining rights trading, institutions, and trading behavior. But there have a few issues:land and resources departments are the agents and the same time they are the regulators. Government interferes too much in mining rights trading. There are many laws and regulations and mixed; restrictions and supervision of trade subject offside and the absence of other issues, the mining rights market is not good to play the role of configuration mining rights, market failure is more obvious.
Concern to social mining regulation, the special nature of mining activities can't avoid negative externality and internality, and the failure of the market for the maintenance of the public interest, the Government through regulatory means to internalize the negative externalities, reduce internal risk makes the process of development of mineral resources in the negative external and internal important. However, the goal of the government regulation is not completely eliminate pollution or destruction, but limited within the optimal range. The social mining regulation is mine environmental regulation and production safety regulation. In our country, the main methods in regulation of the mining environment are administrative and economic methods. The mining environmental standards are a quick way as an administrative means in the case of market economic development is not perfect. But this kind of means is the functions of the government departments in accordance with the requirements of the order supervision and inspection hand, constraint enterprise have illegal situation exists, there is a higher cost, need to institution, personnel, capital input. And due to the information asymmetry between the regulator and the be regulators, the cost of environment standard of the pollution control system cost on the high side. We use mining sewage charge and mining geological environment treatment deposit to intervene enterprise behavior indirectly. Pollution charges as Pigovian tax will encourage enterprises to do technological innovation under the cost pressure. For the government, it don't need huge investments to approved enterprises pollutant emissions, just make sure that enterprises need to pollution charges as well as the appropriate scale of production, the volume of pollution collection of sewage charges. But in practice operation is a difficult problem. The government can't be accurately calculated the optimal amount of pollution discharged to the environment due to severe asymmetry of information. In addition to the tax, mine geological environment recovering deposit and land reclamation fee and soil erosion prevention and compensation are also led to some of the problems when they are repeat collected. In mine production safety, mining is a high-risk industry. Its production is directly related to the vital interests of the workers'lives and health, safety. Good safe production can achieve maximum economic efficiency of enterprises. But in specific practical process, mine safety as a standard, the technical standards update slow, serious aging. Also because of lack of invest, human resource, equipment investment and other issues, the regulator may led to inaction or even collusion. Other problems are there's no significantly encouragement in the safe production of technological innovation, ignored occupational health and vocational education. All these restricted the actual effect of the mine safety regulation and efforts in protecting labor workers.
Chapter six, mining regulation proposed arrangement. Combined with the analysis of the previous chapters, I try to give countermeasures and suggestions to improve the institutional arrangements of government regulation, especially with the mining economic zone. In the legal aspects, it is necessary to clarify the existing laws and regulations of the mining industry to improve and perfect the legal system, and reduce the arbitrariness of the regulation; It should establish an independent mining regulatory agencies, people will come from the relevant administrative departments to achieve effective supervision from the point of view of the industrial development; In entry and exit regulation aspects, the administrative licensing clarity and distinction property rights and the right to operate rights, and administrative procedures should be simplified, at the same time strengthen enter the capital, production, technical, environmental barriers to entry; Establish exit the assistance mechanism to dredge the market out of the mechanism; Relaxed entry regulations for mining rights trading system, speed up the construction of mining rights electronic trading platform; Strengthen the social regulation of mining, including the construction of the mine safety and health regulatory system and mine pollution's discharge right trading pilot; Establish regulatory information public awareness, establish regulatory information disclosure system and the government information service platform construction. Chapter seven, the main conclusions and outlook. Concludes the paper research, and pointed out that further research needs to be done in the future.
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