中国上市公司CEO变更的影响因素与经济后果研究
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摘要
国外关于CEO变更问题的研究始于20世纪60年代,公司治理学者、财务学者在非完备契约的分析框架下,基于传统的委托代理理论与早期的公司治理理论,对工业化国家上市公司的CEO变更问题进行了卓有成效的大量研究。然而,20世纪90年代以来兴起的“法经济学”揭示了大股东与小股东的利益冲突,大股东控制及其与中小股东的利益冲突日益成为公司治理研究的核心问题。现有CEO变更的研究对转型经济国家以及大股东控制下的CEO变更行为的研究相对不足。
基于上述原因,论文在不完全契约框架下,基于两类代理问题及大股东的双重价值取向,结合转型时期中国上市公司的制度背景及公司治理的最新实践,以大股东及代理人的行为动机为切入点,对大股东控制下的CEO变更问题加以理论分析与实证检验,进而为有效发挥CEO变更机制优胜劣汰的作用,以及为客观评价其它公司治理机制效率,完善公司治理提供政策建议。
论文的研究工作从结构上分为绪论、理论基础、制度背景、实证研究及政策建议几个部分。具体分为八章,各章的研究内容和研究结论如下:
第一章绪论。首先给出论文选题的理论价值与现实意义;其次总括论文的研究内容、逻辑思路与研究方法,并提出了论文的主要创新点;最后,对论文涉及到的关键概念加以清晰界定。
第二章大股东控制下CEO变更问题研究的相关理论。由于契约的非完备性、投资者与经理人之间信息的非对称性以及行为主体的有限理性,代理人的机会主义行为比非机会主义行为更具有常态性。因此,基于非完全契约下的两类委托代理理论以及公司治理理论成为论文研究的理论支撑。
第三章中国上市公司CEO变更的制度背景及变更趋势。本章从宏观体制的市场化改革与微观企业的产权改革两方面为大股东控制下的CEO变更问题研究提供了详实的制度背景分析。本章对制度背景的分析表明:不成熟、不平衡的市场经济条件与微观企业国有股权“一股独大”的产权结构成为中国上市公司CEO变更行为的路径依赖。
第四章大股东控制对CEO变更行为的影响研究。大股东控制构成中国上市公司CEO变更的微观制度约束。本章首先研究大股东双重价值取向对CEO变更行为的影响。为此,以公司业绩作为大股东的共享收益,以大股东对上市公司的资金净占用率作为大股东控制权私利的替代变量,实证检验了CEO变更与公司业绩、大股东资金净占用率之间的相关性,研究发现:①CEO变更与公司业绩显著负相关,“能力假设”获得初步证据。②总体上CEO变更与大股东资金净占用率负相关,但不显著;但按大股东资金净占用率是否大于0(Private>0)进行分组检验,发现当Private>0时,CEO变更与大股东资金净占用率显著负相关,从而,“合谋假设”获得一定的经验支持。
其次研究了大股东控制特征对CEO变更行为的影响。与小股东相比,大股东的最大特征在于凭借控制权对上市公司拥有较强的控制力和影响力,因此,重点分析了大股东控制权水平对CEO变更行为的影响,预期CEO变更与大股东的控制权水平具有区间特征。为此,本文将上市公司按控制权水平大小分成制衡公司、大股东相对控制公司以及大股东绝对控制公司三组,进行分组检验,发现制衡公司的CEO变更与大股东控制权水平负相关,但没有通过显著性检验,而大股东相对控制公司的CEO变更与控制权水平显著正相关,大股东绝对控制公司的CEO变更与控制权水平正相关,但没有通过显著性检验。这在一定程度上证实了CEO变更与大股东控制权水平之间的相关性具有区间特征的假设。
第五章市场约束对大股东控制下CEO变更行为的影响研究。宏观制度环境构成大股东行为选择的路径依赖。因此,本章结合中国上市公司所面临的制度环境,实证研究产品市场竞争对大股东控制下CEO变更行为的影响。为此,计算了反映各行业产品市场竞争程度的HHI,并预期:CEO变更与HHI负相关。首先从全样本角度检验HHI对CEO变更的影响,并根据行业竞争程度进行分组检验,发现CEO变更与HHI的负相关关系不显著;但是在高竞争行业,CEO变更与公司业绩特别是总资产主营业务利润率以及与其它公司治理机制的关系更加显著,这在一定程度上为假设提供了间接支持。其次,根据最终控制人的控制权水平进行分组检验,发现产品市场竞争的公司治理效应在很大程度上与信号接收主体的效率有关,制衡型公司对市场信号的反应相对更加灵敏。
第六章大股东控制下CEO变更行为的经济后果研究。本章采用主营业务收入管理费用率以及主营业务收入经营费用率作为第一类代理成本的替代变量,以大股东对上市公司的资金净占用率作为第二类代理成本的替代变量,从代理成本变化以及公司业绩变化角度检验CEO变更的经济结果。研究发现:①CEO变更特别是非常规变更在一定程度上有助于缓解投资者与经理人之间的代理问题以及大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突,但是,CEO变更后并没有带来业绩的相应提高,CEO变更的“能力假设”未获得完全支持。②CEO非常规变更缓解代理问题以及对公司业绩的改善的效率受大股东控制特征以及外部市场约束程度的影响。相对而言,制衡公司中的CEO非常规变更在一定程度上发挥了公司治理的作用;在高竞争行业,CEO非常规变更在一定程度上有助于公司业绩的改善。
第七章CEO变更研究的政策启示。本章根据前述各章的研究结论,运用规范分析方法,结合中国产权改革与市场化改革的大背景,针对上市公司CEO变更中存在的问题,提出以下几点政策建议:一是进一步深化市场改革,降低信号显示的交易成本。二是继续完善公司治理机制,提高信号接收主体的效率。三是加强法制等正式制度约束,重视守法执法精神以及法制意识等非正式制度的变革。
第八章研究结论与后续研究的设想。本章总结了以上各章节的研究结论和论文研究的局限,在此基础上提出一些后续研究的设想。预期社会网络理论对CEO变更的解释将有着更广阔的前景,而结构方程分析方法的运用将会得出更可靠的结论。
与以往的研究相比,论文的创新体现在以下几个方面:
①关于大股东控制对CEO变更行为的影响研究,以往的研究基于传统的委托代理理论和早期的公司治理理论,对CEO变更与公司业绩之间的关系进行了实证检验,没有考虑大股东双重价值取向及控制特征对CEO变更行为的影响。论文从最终控制人角度,首先,基于大股东双重价值取向,实证检验了CEO变更与公司业绩、大股东控制权私利之间的相关性,并以大股东对上市公司的资金净占用率作为大股东控制权私利的替代变量,研究发现CEO变更与大股东资金净占用率负相关,控制权私利的存在弱化了大股东对CEO的监督。其次,根据大股东控制权水平,将样本公司分为制衡公司、大股东相对控制公司以及大股东绝对控制公司,分组检验了大股东控制特征特别是控制权水平对CEO变更的影响,在一定程度上发现大股东控制权水平对CEO变更的影响具有区间特征。
②关于市场约束特别是产品市场竞争程度对大股东控制下CEO变更行为的影响研究,国内尚缺乏有关产品市场竞争对大股东控制下CEO变更行为影响的实证研究文献。论文首先按产品市场竞争程度将样本分为高竞争行业和低竞争行业,以检验不同市场约束下公司治理机制特别是大股东控制特征对CEO变更的影响,发现高竞争行业的公司治理机制更有效率,公司内外治理机制具有互补效应。然后,按大股东控制权水平分组,以检验不同市场竞争主体对市场信号的反应,发现制衡公司对市场信号的反应更灵敏。
③关于大股东控制下CEO变更行为的经济后果研究,论文实证检验了CEO变更后公司代理成本的变化以及公司业绩的变化。研究发现,CEO变更特别是非常规变更在一定程度上有助于缓解代理问题,不过CEO变更后公司业绩并没有相应提高;并且发现大股东控制特征以及市场竞争程度是影响CEO变更经济后果的重要因素。
The research on CEO turnover abroad started in the 60th of 20~(th) century. Under the analytical framework of the incomplete contracts, and based on the traditional principle-agency theory and early corporate governance theory, the corporate governance scholars, financial scholars, carried out a large amount of effective research. However, the“Law and Economics”which emerged in the 90th of 20th century revealed the conflict of interest between large shareholders and small shareholders. The conflict between the control of large shareholders and the interest of medium and small shareholders has gradually become the core problem of corporate governance research. The existed experience research on CEO turnover mainly concentrates on industrialized countries. The research on the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders in transfer economy countries is comparatively not enough.
Based on the reasons listed above, the paper, under the framework of imcomplete contracts, on the basis of the two kinds of agency problems, and the double value directions of large shareholders, combining the system background and the latest practice of corporate governance of the Chinese listed firms in the transitional period, from the viewpoint of action motivation of the large shareholders and the agents, carries out the the theoretical analysis and empirical tests of the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders, hoping that this research can provide policy suggestions for bringing CEO turnover mechanism into play effectively, objectively commenting on the other corporate governance mechanism efficiency objectively, and perfecting corporate governance.
From the perspective of structure, the paper is divided into the parts of introduction, theoretical basis, system background, empirical research and policy suggestions. In detail, the paper is divided into 9 chapters. The research content and conclusion is as follows:
Chapter 1, introduction. The paper first of all gives out the theoretical value and practical significance of the research. Then it outlines the research content, the logic thought, and the research methods. Then it points out the main innovative points of the paper. Finally it defines the key concepts the paper concerned.
Chapter 2, the relevant theories of the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders.
Because of the incompleteness of the contracts, the asymmetry of information between investors and CEOs, and the limited since of action subjects, the opportunist behavior of the agents is more constant than non-oppertunist. Therefor, the two kinds of principle-agency theories and corporate governance theories based on the incomplete contracts have become the theoretical support of the research.
Chapter 3, the system background and turnover trends of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms. From the perspective of marketization reform of the macroscopical system and the property right reform of the microcosmic enterprises, the paper provides detailed system background analysis for the research on the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders. The analysis of the system background shows: the immature, imbalanced market economy condition and the property right which the state share is one and only large shareholder in the microcosmic enterprises have become the path dependence of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms.
Chapter 4, the research on the influence of the control of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover. The control of the large shareholders has constructed the microcosmic system restriction of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms. This chapter first of all researches on the influence of the double value direction of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover. Because of this, this chapter empirically testes the the corelation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance,the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders. In doing so, we use corporate performance as the share return of the large shareholders, the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders in the listed firms as the alternantive variable. The finding is:①the CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the corporate performance. Ability hypothesis has got initial evidence.②Generally, CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders, yet not outstandingly. However, when we divide the groups according to whether the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders is larger than 0, we find that when the Private>0, CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders outstandingly, so that the cahoots hypothesis has got certain empirical support.
Then we study the influence of large shareholder character on the CEO turnover. Compared with the small shareholders, the greatest characteristics of the large shareholders lie in that they hold strong control power and influence power on the listed firms depending on their control power. Therefore, we mainly analyze the influence of the level of control right of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover, expecting that the CEO turnover and the control right of the large shareholders have section characteristics. So, we divide the listed firms into closely held corporations, relative control corporations of the large shareholders and the absolute control corporations based on the control power level and test. We find that the CEO turnover of the closely held corporations is negatively corelative to the control power of the large shareholders, yet it has not passed the outstandingness test. Yet the relative control corporations of the large shareholders is positively corelative to the control power level, the CEO turnover of the absolute control corporations is positive coorelative to the control power level, but has not passed the outstandingness test. This proves the hypothesis that the corelation between CEO turnover and the control power of the large shareholders possesses section characteristics to a certain degree.
Chapter 5, the study of the influence of the market restriction on the CEO turnover under the control of the large share shareholders. Macroscopical system environment constructs the dependence path of the behaviour choice of the large shareholders. Therfore, combining the system environment the Chinese listed firms face, we empirically test the influence of the market competition of product on the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders. We calculate the HHI which reflects the level of competition of product market of each industry. We expect: CEO turnover is negatively corelative to HHI. First of all, we test the influence of HHI on CEO turnover fron the perspective of the whole samples, and then we test by groups according to the competition strength of the industry. We find that the negative corelation between CEO turnover and HHI is not outstanding. Yet in the high degree competition industries, the relation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance, especially the Major business profit to asset and the governance mechanism of the corporates is more outstanding. This gives indirect support to the hypothesis to a certain degree. Then, we test by dividng groups according to the control power of the ultimate controller and the property right and property right character.We find that the corporate governance effect of market competition is corelative to the efficiency of the signal receiver subjects to a large degree. The closely held corporations are more alert to the market signal.
Chapter 6, the research on the economic consequence of the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders. This chapter mainly uses overhead expenses to major business return and running expenses to major business return as the alternative variables of the first kind of agency cost, the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders as the alternative variables of the second kind of agency cost, from the perspective of the change of agency cost and the change of firm performance, tests the economic consequence of the CEO turnover. The research finding is:①CEO turnover, especially the nor turnover helps to ease the agency problem between investors and the managers and the interest conflict between the large shareholders and the medium and small shareholders to a certain degree.But, the achivement has notbeen improved after the CEO turnover. The“Ability Hypothesis”of the CEO turnover has not got absolute support.②The easing of the agency problem coming from the nor turnover of CEO and the efficiency improvement of the corporate achivements are influenced by the control characteristics of the large shareholders and the outside market restriction intensity. Comparatively speaking, the nor CEO turnover of the closely held corporations play a better role in corporate governance. Under the restriction of market competition, the nor turnover helps more in the improvement of corporate achivements.
Chapter 7, the policy enlightment of the CEO turnover research. Based on the research conclusion of the previous chapters, this chapter , by using criterion analytical method, combining the background of property right reform and marketization reform in China, aiming at the problems existed in CEO turnover of the listed firms, proposes the following suggestions:①deepening market reform, lowering the deal cost of signal revelence.②continuing to perfect the corporate governance mechanism, improving the efficiency of the signal receiving subjects.③strengthening the formal system restriction of the laws, emphasing the spirit of abing the laws, etc.
Chapter 8, research conclusion and the further research direction suggestions. This chapter concludes the research conclusions of the previous chapters and the limitation of the research of the paper. Based on this, it provides further research direction suggestions. We expect that the social network theory may have a greater expection in explaining the CEO turnover, and the use of SME can draw a more dependable conclusion.
Compared with the previous research, the innovative points of the paper lie in the following aspects:
①The previous research carried out the empirical analysis of the relationship between the CEO turnover and the corporate achievements based on the traditional principal-agency theory and the early corporate govenance theories, and did not take the influence of the double value direction and character of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover into consideration. This paper, From the perspective of the ultimate controller, Firstly , based on the value direction of the large shareholders, tests the corelation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance, the private benefit of the control right of the large shareholders, and by using the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders as the alternative variable, finds that CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders, the existence of the private benefit of the control right weekens the supervision of the large shareholders on CEO.
Secondly, we divide the sample corporations into closely held corperations, relative control corporations of the large shareholders and the absolute control corporations, and empically test the influence of the control power level of the large shareholders on CEO turnover by groups.We find that the influence of the control power level of the large shareholders on CEO turnover has got shape of“U”.
②This paper mainly test the influence of competition strength of the product market on CEO turnover. We find that under the market restriction, the corporate governance mechanism is more efficient, the inward and outward governance mechanism have complementary effect, different market competition subjects react differently to the market signals. The closely held corporations and the government property right are more alert to the market signals.
③From the perspective of the economic consequence of the CEO turnover, we further test the“Ability Hypothesis”of the CEO turnover. The finding is: to a certain degree, the CEO turnover, especially the nor turnover of the CEO, eases the agency problem. But the corporate performance has not corresponding improvement, and the“Ability Hypothesis”of the CEO has not got absolute support.
基于上述原因,论文在不完全契约框架下,基于两类代理问题及大股东的双重价值取向,结合转型时期中国上市公司的制度背景及公司治理的最新实践,以大股东及代理人的行为动机为切入点,对大股东控制下的CEO变更问题加以理论分析与实证检验,进而为有效发挥CEO变更机制优胜劣汰的作用,以及为客观评价其它公司治理机制效率,完善公司治理提供政策建议。
论文的研究工作从结构上分为绪论、理论基础、制度背景、实证研究及政策建议几个部分。具体分为八章,各章的研究内容和研究结论如下:
第一章绪论。首先给出论文选题的理论价值与现实意义;其次总括论文的研究内容、逻辑思路与研究方法,并提出了论文的主要创新点;最后,对论文涉及到的关键概念加以清晰界定。
第二章大股东控制下CEO变更问题研究的相关理论。由于契约的非完备性、投资者与经理人之间信息的非对称性以及行为主体的有限理性,代理人的机会主义行为比非机会主义行为更具有常态性。因此,基于非完全契约下的两类委托代理理论以及公司治理理论成为论文研究的理论支撑。
第三章中国上市公司CEO变更的制度背景及变更趋势。本章从宏观体制的市场化改革与微观企业的产权改革两方面为大股东控制下的CEO变更问题研究提供了详实的制度背景分析。本章对制度背景的分析表明:不成熟、不平衡的市场经济条件与微观企业国有股权“一股独大”的产权结构成为中国上市公司CEO变更行为的路径依赖。
第四章大股东控制对CEO变更行为的影响研究。大股东控制构成中国上市公司CEO变更的微观制度约束。本章首先研究大股东双重价值取向对CEO变更行为的影响。为此,以公司业绩作为大股东的共享收益,以大股东对上市公司的资金净占用率作为大股东控制权私利的替代变量,实证检验了CEO变更与公司业绩、大股东资金净占用率之间的相关性,研究发现:①CEO变更与公司业绩显著负相关,“能力假设”获得初步证据。②总体上CEO变更与大股东资金净占用率负相关,但不显著;但按大股东资金净占用率是否大于0(Private>0)进行分组检验,发现当Private>0时,CEO变更与大股东资金净占用率显著负相关,从而,“合谋假设”获得一定的经验支持。
其次研究了大股东控制特征对CEO变更行为的影响。与小股东相比,大股东的最大特征在于凭借控制权对上市公司拥有较强的控制力和影响力,因此,重点分析了大股东控制权水平对CEO变更行为的影响,预期CEO变更与大股东的控制权水平具有区间特征。为此,本文将上市公司按控制权水平大小分成制衡公司、大股东相对控制公司以及大股东绝对控制公司三组,进行分组检验,发现制衡公司的CEO变更与大股东控制权水平负相关,但没有通过显著性检验,而大股东相对控制公司的CEO变更与控制权水平显著正相关,大股东绝对控制公司的CEO变更与控制权水平正相关,但没有通过显著性检验。这在一定程度上证实了CEO变更与大股东控制权水平之间的相关性具有区间特征的假设。
第五章市场约束对大股东控制下CEO变更行为的影响研究。宏观制度环境构成大股东行为选择的路径依赖。因此,本章结合中国上市公司所面临的制度环境,实证研究产品市场竞争对大股东控制下CEO变更行为的影响。为此,计算了反映各行业产品市场竞争程度的HHI,并预期:CEO变更与HHI负相关。首先从全样本角度检验HHI对CEO变更的影响,并根据行业竞争程度进行分组检验,发现CEO变更与HHI的负相关关系不显著;但是在高竞争行业,CEO变更与公司业绩特别是总资产主营业务利润率以及与其它公司治理机制的关系更加显著,这在一定程度上为假设提供了间接支持。其次,根据最终控制人的控制权水平进行分组检验,发现产品市场竞争的公司治理效应在很大程度上与信号接收主体的效率有关,制衡型公司对市场信号的反应相对更加灵敏。
第六章大股东控制下CEO变更行为的经济后果研究。本章采用主营业务收入管理费用率以及主营业务收入经营费用率作为第一类代理成本的替代变量,以大股东对上市公司的资金净占用率作为第二类代理成本的替代变量,从代理成本变化以及公司业绩变化角度检验CEO变更的经济结果。研究发现:①CEO变更特别是非常规变更在一定程度上有助于缓解投资者与经理人之间的代理问题以及大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突,但是,CEO变更后并没有带来业绩的相应提高,CEO变更的“能力假设”未获得完全支持。②CEO非常规变更缓解代理问题以及对公司业绩的改善的效率受大股东控制特征以及外部市场约束程度的影响。相对而言,制衡公司中的CEO非常规变更在一定程度上发挥了公司治理的作用;在高竞争行业,CEO非常规变更在一定程度上有助于公司业绩的改善。
第七章CEO变更研究的政策启示。本章根据前述各章的研究结论,运用规范分析方法,结合中国产权改革与市场化改革的大背景,针对上市公司CEO变更中存在的问题,提出以下几点政策建议:一是进一步深化市场改革,降低信号显示的交易成本。二是继续完善公司治理机制,提高信号接收主体的效率。三是加强法制等正式制度约束,重视守法执法精神以及法制意识等非正式制度的变革。
第八章研究结论与后续研究的设想。本章总结了以上各章节的研究结论和论文研究的局限,在此基础上提出一些后续研究的设想。预期社会网络理论对CEO变更的解释将有着更广阔的前景,而结构方程分析方法的运用将会得出更可靠的结论。
与以往的研究相比,论文的创新体现在以下几个方面:
①关于大股东控制对CEO变更行为的影响研究,以往的研究基于传统的委托代理理论和早期的公司治理理论,对CEO变更与公司业绩之间的关系进行了实证检验,没有考虑大股东双重价值取向及控制特征对CEO变更行为的影响。论文从最终控制人角度,首先,基于大股东双重价值取向,实证检验了CEO变更与公司业绩、大股东控制权私利之间的相关性,并以大股东对上市公司的资金净占用率作为大股东控制权私利的替代变量,研究发现CEO变更与大股东资金净占用率负相关,控制权私利的存在弱化了大股东对CEO的监督。其次,根据大股东控制权水平,将样本公司分为制衡公司、大股东相对控制公司以及大股东绝对控制公司,分组检验了大股东控制特征特别是控制权水平对CEO变更的影响,在一定程度上发现大股东控制权水平对CEO变更的影响具有区间特征。
②关于市场约束特别是产品市场竞争程度对大股东控制下CEO变更行为的影响研究,国内尚缺乏有关产品市场竞争对大股东控制下CEO变更行为影响的实证研究文献。论文首先按产品市场竞争程度将样本分为高竞争行业和低竞争行业,以检验不同市场约束下公司治理机制特别是大股东控制特征对CEO变更的影响,发现高竞争行业的公司治理机制更有效率,公司内外治理机制具有互补效应。然后,按大股东控制权水平分组,以检验不同市场竞争主体对市场信号的反应,发现制衡公司对市场信号的反应更灵敏。
③关于大股东控制下CEO变更行为的经济后果研究,论文实证检验了CEO变更后公司代理成本的变化以及公司业绩的变化。研究发现,CEO变更特别是非常规变更在一定程度上有助于缓解代理问题,不过CEO变更后公司业绩并没有相应提高;并且发现大股东控制特征以及市场竞争程度是影响CEO变更经济后果的重要因素。
The research on CEO turnover abroad started in the 60th of 20~(th) century. Under the analytical framework of the incomplete contracts, and based on the traditional principle-agency theory and early corporate governance theory, the corporate governance scholars, financial scholars, carried out a large amount of effective research. However, the“Law and Economics”which emerged in the 90th of 20th century revealed the conflict of interest between large shareholders and small shareholders. The conflict between the control of large shareholders and the interest of medium and small shareholders has gradually become the core problem of corporate governance research. The existed experience research on CEO turnover mainly concentrates on industrialized countries. The research on the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders in transfer economy countries is comparatively not enough.
Based on the reasons listed above, the paper, under the framework of imcomplete contracts, on the basis of the two kinds of agency problems, and the double value directions of large shareholders, combining the system background and the latest practice of corporate governance of the Chinese listed firms in the transitional period, from the viewpoint of action motivation of the large shareholders and the agents, carries out the the theoretical analysis and empirical tests of the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders, hoping that this research can provide policy suggestions for bringing CEO turnover mechanism into play effectively, objectively commenting on the other corporate governance mechanism efficiency objectively, and perfecting corporate governance.
From the perspective of structure, the paper is divided into the parts of introduction, theoretical basis, system background, empirical research and policy suggestions. In detail, the paper is divided into 9 chapters. The research content and conclusion is as follows:
Chapter 1, introduction. The paper first of all gives out the theoretical value and practical significance of the research. Then it outlines the research content, the logic thought, and the research methods. Then it points out the main innovative points of the paper. Finally it defines the key concepts the paper concerned.
Chapter 2, the relevant theories of the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders.
Because of the incompleteness of the contracts, the asymmetry of information between investors and CEOs, and the limited since of action subjects, the opportunist behavior of the agents is more constant than non-oppertunist. Therefor, the two kinds of principle-agency theories and corporate governance theories based on the incomplete contracts have become the theoretical support of the research.
Chapter 3, the system background and turnover trends of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms. From the perspective of marketization reform of the macroscopical system and the property right reform of the microcosmic enterprises, the paper provides detailed system background analysis for the research on the CEO turnover under the control of large shareholders. The analysis of the system background shows: the immature, imbalanced market economy condition and the property right which the state share is one and only large shareholder in the microcosmic enterprises have become the path dependence of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms.
Chapter 4, the research on the influence of the control of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover. The control of the large shareholders has constructed the microcosmic system restriction of the CEO turnover of the Chinese listed firms. This chapter first of all researches on the influence of the double value direction of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover. Because of this, this chapter empirically testes the the corelation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance,the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders. In doing so, we use corporate performance as the share return of the large shareholders, the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders in the listed firms as the alternantive variable. The finding is:①the CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the corporate performance. Ability hypothesis has got initial evidence.②Generally, CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders, yet not outstandingly. However, when we divide the groups according to whether the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders is larger than 0, we find that when the Private>0, CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders outstandingly, so that the cahoots hypothesis has got certain empirical support.
Then we study the influence of large shareholder character on the CEO turnover. Compared with the small shareholders, the greatest characteristics of the large shareholders lie in that they hold strong control power and influence power on the listed firms depending on their control power. Therefore, we mainly analyze the influence of the level of control right of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover, expecting that the CEO turnover and the control right of the large shareholders have section characteristics. So, we divide the listed firms into closely held corporations, relative control corporations of the large shareholders and the absolute control corporations based on the control power level and test. We find that the CEO turnover of the closely held corporations is negatively corelative to the control power of the large shareholders, yet it has not passed the outstandingness test. Yet the relative control corporations of the large shareholders is positively corelative to the control power level, the CEO turnover of the absolute control corporations is positive coorelative to the control power level, but has not passed the outstandingness test. This proves the hypothesis that the corelation between CEO turnover and the control power of the large shareholders possesses section characteristics to a certain degree.
Chapter 5, the study of the influence of the market restriction on the CEO turnover under the control of the large share shareholders. Macroscopical system environment constructs the dependence path of the behaviour choice of the large shareholders. Therfore, combining the system environment the Chinese listed firms face, we empirically test the influence of the market competition of product on the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders. We calculate the HHI which reflects the level of competition of product market of each industry. We expect: CEO turnover is negatively corelative to HHI. First of all, we test the influence of HHI on CEO turnover fron the perspective of the whole samples, and then we test by groups according to the competition strength of the industry. We find that the negative corelation between CEO turnover and HHI is not outstanding. Yet in the high degree competition industries, the relation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance, especially the Major business profit to asset and the governance mechanism of the corporates is more outstanding. This gives indirect support to the hypothesis to a certain degree. Then, we test by dividng groups according to the control power of the ultimate controller and the property right and property right character.We find that the corporate governance effect of market competition is corelative to the efficiency of the signal receiver subjects to a large degree. The closely held corporations are more alert to the market signal.
Chapter 6, the research on the economic consequence of the CEO turnover under the control of the large shareholders. This chapter mainly uses overhead expenses to major business return and running expenses to major business return as the alternative variables of the first kind of agency cost, the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders as the alternative variables of the second kind of agency cost, from the perspective of the change of agency cost and the change of firm performance, tests the economic consequence of the CEO turnover. The research finding is:①CEO turnover, especially the nor turnover helps to ease the agency problem between investors and the managers and the interest conflict between the large shareholders and the medium and small shareholders to a certain degree.But, the achivement has notbeen improved after the CEO turnover. The“Ability Hypothesis”of the CEO turnover has not got absolute support.②The easing of the agency problem coming from the nor turnover of CEO and the efficiency improvement of the corporate achivements are influenced by the control characteristics of the large shareholders and the outside market restriction intensity. Comparatively speaking, the nor CEO turnover of the closely held corporations play a better role in corporate governance. Under the restriction of market competition, the nor turnover helps more in the improvement of corporate achivements.
Chapter 7, the policy enlightment of the CEO turnover research. Based on the research conclusion of the previous chapters, this chapter , by using criterion analytical method, combining the background of property right reform and marketization reform in China, aiming at the problems existed in CEO turnover of the listed firms, proposes the following suggestions:①deepening market reform, lowering the deal cost of signal revelence.②continuing to perfect the corporate governance mechanism, improving the efficiency of the signal receiving subjects.③strengthening the formal system restriction of the laws, emphasing the spirit of abing the laws, etc.
Chapter 8, research conclusion and the further research direction suggestions. This chapter concludes the research conclusions of the previous chapters and the limitation of the research of the paper. Based on this, it provides further research direction suggestions. We expect that the social network theory may have a greater expection in explaining the CEO turnover, and the use of SME can draw a more dependable conclusion.
Compared with the previous research, the innovative points of the paper lie in the following aspects:
①The previous research carried out the empirical analysis of the relationship between the CEO turnover and the corporate achievements based on the traditional principal-agency theory and the early corporate govenance theories, and did not take the influence of the double value direction and character of the large shareholders on the CEO turnover into consideration. This paper, From the perspective of the ultimate controller, Firstly , based on the value direction of the large shareholders, tests the corelation between CEO turnover and the corporate performance, the private benefit of the control right of the large shareholders, and by using the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders as the alternative variable, finds that CEO turnover is negatively corelative to the net engross of fund to asset of the large shareholders, the existence of the private benefit of the control right weekens the supervision of the large shareholders on CEO.
Secondly, we divide the sample corporations into closely held corperations, relative control corporations of the large shareholders and the absolute control corporations, and empically test the influence of the control power level of the large shareholders on CEO turnover by groups.We find that the influence of the control power level of the large shareholders on CEO turnover has got shape of“U”.
②This paper mainly test the influence of competition strength of the product market on CEO turnover. We find that under the market restriction, the corporate governance mechanism is more efficient, the inward and outward governance mechanism have complementary effect, different market competition subjects react differently to the market signals. The closely held corporations and the government property right are more alert to the market signals.
③From the perspective of the economic consequence of the CEO turnover, we further test the“Ability Hypothesis”of the CEO turnover. The finding is: to a certain degree, the CEO turnover, especially the nor turnover of the CEO, eases the agency problem. But the corporate performance has not corresponding improvement, and the“Ability Hypothesis”of the CEO has not got absolute support.
引文
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