目标公司董事会反收购法律问题研究
摘要
在反收购中,目标公司董事常常处于利益冲突中,一方面要考虑其在公司中的地位和权益,另一方面要考虑公司和股东的利益。为了平衡各方利益,防止董事会滥用反收购权力,就必须对董事会反收购加以有效规制。首先,要明确董事会在反收购中的的权限。其次,要确立董事在反收购中的信义义务,而要判断董事信义义务的履行情况又要确立相应的司法审查标准。美国立法例和英国立法例对董事会在反收购中的权限,董事在反收购中的信义义务及司法审查标准做出了不同的规定。本文旨在立足我国立法现状,借鉴国外立法例的内容,提出完善我国目标公司董事会反收购立法的具体建议,包括明确目标公司董事会在公司反收购中的权力,完善目标公司董事的信义义务和建立对目标公司董事信义义务的司法审查标准。
Anti-takeover are measures taken by the target company to defeat takeover actions toward it, especially in the case of a hostile takeover take place. The directors of the target company are always in a conflict of interest with the shock holders and the company in the process of anti-takeover. They could consider their own interest and the interest of the company at the same time. So the power of the directors may be abused and the interest of shareholders and the company may be affected. In fact, the directors always have something to do in anti-takeover in any country. But their legislations are different on how to allocate the power between the target company's board of directors and shareholders. And the legislations are different in different country.
Fiduciary duty of directors is a legal means to guarantee the interests of investors under a company system in which the ownership and management right is separated. Company Laws in America and Britain give the directors the power to the company's management and operation of the business. The power can be used for the interest of the company. In order to prevent abusing of that power, the directors must perform their statutory obligations. From the performance of fiduciary duty of the directors, the existence of power abusing can be recognized.
To solve the problem on conflict of interest issues, legislation in America, Britain and the European Union have different designs. In Britain, anti-takeover was decided by the shareholders’assembly. Though the directors are restrained by the shareholders’assembly .In American, anti-takeover was decided by the directors. The directors have more power in anti-takeover than directors in a British company. In order to regulate the directors better, some abstract requirements of fiduciary duty were formed in case law.
Theory and legislative practice in America and Britain have accepted that the directors of the target company are always in a conflict of interest with the shock holders and the company in the process of anti-takeover. Britain and American use fiduciary duty to rule the directors, though they are different in anti-takeover deciding Mechanism.
To sum up, though there are differences between the legislations of the American model and the British model, both of them conform that the directors are in the conflict of the interest of themselves and the interest of the target company and the shareholders. And the two models design system different to deal with the problem that the power of the directors may be abused. Though the system in America and Britain are different, fiduciary duty and its judicial review standards are contained in the system both of them. So the two models achieve the same goal with methods different.
Anti-takeover legislation in China includes rules contained in the legal system and administrative regulations, and administrative regulations and self-discipline. Anti-take is just referred in most of the rules. The law governs the activities of anti-takeover is mainly relied on the“The Regulations of Acquisitions and Administrations of Listing Company”, which is promulgated and executed by the China’s Securities Regulatory Commissions (CSRC) in 2006.
Though the anti-takeover legislation is rich in China, the content of the anti-takeover legislation is very barren. First, the power of the directors in the target company should be clearly defined. By comparing the differences between the fiduciary duty in China and Britain, some anti-takeover measures can be taken by the directors should be list clearly in law, for example, the right to persuade shareholders accept anti-takeover. Second, the fiduciary duty of the directors in the target company should be specified. By comparing the obligations of the directors of the target company in Britain and America, we find that the American legislation on fiduciary duty is more suitable for us to learn from. The duty of care of directors of the target company should be detailed. Third, the judicial review mechanism on directors` fiduciary duty should be build. The foreign review standards have certain shortcomings, and are difficult to adapt to China's legal environment.
So we should design a standard with substantive rules and procedural rules of to review the performance of the directors of the target company. The procedural rules should let the directors provide proof to support their decision. The substantive rules should include four elements. They are necessity, proportionality, adequacy and independence. If the anti-takeover measures carried out by the directors comply with the requirements above, the measures is legitimate, and should be protected by law. Or else, the measures should be revoked, and directors of the target company should be held responsible.
Anti-takeover are measures taken by the target company to defeat takeover actions toward it, especially in the case of a hostile takeover take place. The directors of the target company are always in a conflict of interest with the shock holders and the company in the process of anti-takeover. They could consider their own interest and the interest of the company at the same time. So the power of the directors may be abused and the interest of shareholders and the company may be affected. In fact, the directors always have something to do in anti-takeover in any country. But their legislations are different on how to allocate the power between the target company's board of directors and shareholders. And the legislations are different in different country.
Fiduciary duty of directors is a legal means to guarantee the interests of investors under a company system in which the ownership and management right is separated. Company Laws in America and Britain give the directors the power to the company's management and operation of the business. The power can be used for the interest of the company. In order to prevent abusing of that power, the directors must perform their statutory obligations. From the performance of fiduciary duty of the directors, the existence of power abusing can be recognized.
To solve the problem on conflict of interest issues, legislation in America, Britain and the European Union have different designs. In Britain, anti-takeover was decided by the shareholders’assembly. Though the directors are restrained by the shareholders’assembly .In American, anti-takeover was decided by the directors. The directors have more power in anti-takeover than directors in a British company. In order to regulate the directors better, some abstract requirements of fiduciary duty were formed in case law.
Theory and legislative practice in America and Britain have accepted that the directors of the target company are always in a conflict of interest with the shock holders and the company in the process of anti-takeover. Britain and American use fiduciary duty to rule the directors, though they are different in anti-takeover deciding Mechanism.
To sum up, though there are differences between the legislations of the American model and the British model, both of them conform that the directors are in the conflict of the interest of themselves and the interest of the target company and the shareholders. And the two models design system different to deal with the problem that the power of the directors may be abused. Though the system in America and Britain are different, fiduciary duty and its judicial review standards are contained in the system both of them. So the two models achieve the same goal with methods different.
Anti-takeover legislation in China includes rules contained in the legal system and administrative regulations, and administrative regulations and self-discipline. Anti-take is just referred in most of the rules. The law governs the activities of anti-takeover is mainly relied on the“The Regulations of Acquisitions and Administrations of Listing Company”, which is promulgated and executed by the China’s Securities Regulatory Commissions (CSRC) in 2006.
Though the anti-takeover legislation is rich in China, the content of the anti-takeover legislation is very barren. First, the power of the directors in the target company should be clearly defined. By comparing the differences between the fiduciary duty in China and Britain, some anti-takeover measures can be taken by the directors should be list clearly in law, for example, the right to persuade shareholders accept anti-takeover. Second, the fiduciary duty of the directors in the target company should be specified. By comparing the obligations of the directors of the target company in Britain and America, we find that the American legislation on fiduciary duty is more suitable for us to learn from. The duty of care of directors of the target company should be detailed. Third, the judicial review mechanism on directors` fiduciary duty should be build. The foreign review standards have certain shortcomings, and are difficult to adapt to China's legal environment.
So we should design a standard with substantive rules and procedural rules of to review the performance of the directors of the target company. The procedural rules should let the directors provide proof to support their decision. The substantive rules should include four elements. They are necessity, proportionality, adequacy and independence. If the anti-takeover measures carried out by the directors comply with the requirements above, the measures is legitimate, and should be protected by law. Or else, the measures should be revoked, and directors of the target company should be held responsible.
引文
[1]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 482 页。
[2]参见汤欣:《公司治理与上市公司收购》,中国人民大学出版社 2001年第 1 版,第 244 页。
[3]参见李劲松:《毒丸反收购措施研究》,王保树主编:《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社 2005 年第 1 版,第 297 页。
[4]参见徐洪涛:《公司反收购法律制度研究》, http://www.civillaw.com.cn/ article/default.asp?id=33101, 2007 年 6 月 18 日。
[5]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 499 页。
[6]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 499 页。
[7]参见[美]帕特里克·A·高根:《兼并、收购与公司重组》,朱宝宪、吴亚君译,机械工业出版社 2004 年第 1 版,第 127 页。
[8]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 503 页。
[9]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 503 页。
[10]参见[美]杰西·H·乔波:《公司法案例与材料》(影印版),中信出版社 2003 年第 5 版,第 930 页。
[11]参见徐洪涛:《公司反收购法律制度研究》, http://www.civillaw.com.cn/ article/default.asp?id=33101, 2007 年 6 月 18 日。
[12]参见吴高臣:《目标公司小股东的法律保护:以要约收购为背景》,中国海关出版社 2003 年第 1 版,第 145 页。
[13]参见樊静:《论目标公司反收购中少数股东利益的保护》,《当代法学》2003 年第 1 期,第 30 页。
[14]参见雷兴虎:《论目标公司反收购权》,王保树主编:《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社 2005 年第 1 版,第 275 页。
[15]参见刘俊海:《新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 396 页。
[16]周友苏:《新公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 389 页。
[17]参见[美]汉米尔顿:《公司法概要》,李存捧译,中国社会科学出版社 1998 年第 1 版,第 263 页。
[18]参见杜枢:《美国对目标公司反收购的规制:商业判断则之运用》,《商业研究》2003 年第 6 期,第 33 页。
[19]参见刘俊海:《新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 396 页。
[20]参见徐晓:《论董事义务与商业裁判规则》,http://www.1488.com/china/Intolaws/LawPoint/22/2007-1/224441.shtml, 2007 年 6 月 18 日。
[21]参见汤欣:《公司治理与上市公司收购》,中国人民大学出版社2001 年第 1 版,第 375 页。
[22]参见汤欣:《目标公司董事会的行为限制》,《中外法学》2001 年第 3 期,第 84 页。
[23]参见符启林:《中国证券交易法律制度研究》,法律出版社 2000 年第 1 版,第 266 页。
[24]参见刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002年第 11 期,第 37 页。
[25]参见周友苏:《新公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 389页。
[26]参见刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002年第 11 期,第 37 页。
[27]参见李劲松:《公司反收购与董事信义义务研究》,《当代法学》2003年第 25 卷第 4 期,第 152 页。
[28]参见刘俊海:《新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 397 页。
[29]参见[美]罗伯特·C·克拉克:《公司法则》,胡平等译,工商出版社 1999 年第 1 版,第 115 页。
[30]参见刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002年第 11 期,第 37 页。
[31]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 508页。
1.施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版。
2. 梁彗星:《民法总论》,法律出版社 2001 年第 2 版。
3. 汤欣:《公司治理与上市公司收购》,中国人民大学出版社 2001 年第1 版。
4. 李建伟:《公司制度、公司治理与公司管理——法律在公管理中的地位与作》,人民法院出版社 2005 年第 1 版。
5. 王保树主编:《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社 2005年第 1 版。
6. 卞耀武:《当代外国公司法》,法律出版社 1996 年第 2 版。
7. 傅穹:《重思公司资本制原理》,法律出版社 2004 年第 1 版。
8. 何勤华:《法的移植法发的本土化》,法律出版社 2001 年第 1 版。
9. 刘俊海:《新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版。
10. 柯芳枝:《公司法论》,中国政法大学出版社 2004 年第 1 版。
11. 周友苏:《新公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版。
12. 张舫:《公司收购法律制度研究》,法律出版社 1998 年第 1 版。
13. 张民安:《现代英美公司董事法律地位研究》,法律出版社 2000 年第 1 版。
14.[日]滨田道代、顾功耘主编:《公司治理:国际借鉴与制度设计》,北京大学出版社 2005 年第 1 版。
15.[韩]李哲松:《韩国公司法》,吴日焕译,中国政法大学出版社 2000年第 1 版。
16.[美]弗兰克?伊斯特布鲁克:《公司法的经济结构》,张建伟、罗培新译,北京大学出版社 2005 年第 1 版。
1. 范健:《我国反收购之立法政策:股东大会中心主义的制度基础与保障》,《商业经济与管理》2006 年第 11 期。
2. 曲冬梅:《目标公司反收购的法律规制》,《法学论坛》2004 年第 2期。
3. 周倩:《规范上市公司反收购行为的立法思考》,《当代法学》2003 年第 11 期。
4.翟靓靓:《论我国反收购制度及困境克服》,《河北经贸大学学报》2007 年第 2 期。
5. 杜枢:《美国对目标公司反收购的规制:商业判断则之运用》,《商业研究》2003 年第 6 期。
6. 朱广东:《上市公司反收购决定权悖论》,《江苏商论》2003 年第 8期。
7. 容缨:《美国商业判断规则对我国公司法的启示——以经济分析为重点》,《政法学刊》2006 年第 2 期。
8.胡鸿高、赵丽梅:《论目标公司反收购行为的决定权及其规制》,《中国法学》2001 年第 2 期。
9.李春林、朱圆:《反收购价值分析》,《当代财经》2005 年第 6 期。
10. 樊静:《论目标公司反收购中少数股东利益的保护》,《当代法学》2003 年第 1 期。
11. 刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002 年第 11期。
12. 李劲松:《公司反收购与董事信义义务研究》,《当代法学》2003 年第 25 卷第 4 期。
[2]参见汤欣:《公司治理与上市公司收购》,中国人民大学出版社 2001年第 1 版,第 244 页。
[3]参见李劲松:《毒丸反收购措施研究》,王保树主编:《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社 2005 年第 1 版,第 297 页。
[4]参见徐洪涛:《公司反收购法律制度研究》, http://www.civillaw.com.cn/ article/default.asp?id=33101, 2007 年 6 月 18 日。
[5]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 499 页。
[6]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 499 页。
[7]参见[美]帕特里克·A·高根:《兼并、收购与公司重组》,朱宝宪、吴亚君译,机械工业出版社 2004 年第 1 版,第 127 页。
[8]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 503 页。
[9]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 503 页。
[10]参见[美]杰西·H·乔波:《公司法案例与材料》(影印版),中信出版社 2003 年第 5 版,第 930 页。
[11]参见徐洪涛:《公司反收购法律制度研究》, http://www.civillaw.com.cn/ article/default.asp?id=33101, 2007 年 6 月 18 日。
[12]参见吴高臣:《目标公司小股东的法律保护:以要约收购为背景》,中国海关出版社 2003 年第 1 版,第 145 页。
[13]参见樊静:《论目标公司反收购中少数股东利益的保护》,《当代法学》2003 年第 1 期,第 30 页。
[14]参见雷兴虎:《论目标公司反收购权》,王保树主编:《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社 2005 年第 1 版,第 275 页。
[15]参见刘俊海:《新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 396 页。
[16]周友苏:《新公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 389 页。
[17]参见[美]汉米尔顿:《公司法概要》,李存捧译,中国社会科学出版社 1998 年第 1 版,第 263 页。
[18]参见杜枢:《美国对目标公司反收购的规制:商业判断则之运用》,《商业研究》2003 年第 6 期,第 33 页。
[19]参见刘俊海:《新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 396 页。
[20]参见徐晓:《论董事义务与商业裁判规则》,http://www.1488.com/china/Intolaws/LawPoint/22/2007-1/224441.shtml, 2007 年 6 月 18 日。
[21]参见汤欣:《公司治理与上市公司收购》,中国人民大学出版社2001 年第 1 版,第 375 页。
[22]参见汤欣:《目标公司董事会的行为限制》,《中外法学》2001 年第 3 期,第 84 页。
[23]参见符启林:《中国证券交易法律制度研究》,法律出版社 2000 年第 1 版,第 266 页。
[24]参见刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002年第 11 期,第 37 页。
[25]参见周友苏:《新公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 389页。
[26]参见刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002年第 11 期,第 37 页。
[27]参见李劲松:《公司反收购与董事信义义务研究》,《当代法学》2003年第 25 卷第 4 期,第 152 页。
[28]参见刘俊海:《新公司法的制度创新:立法争点与解释难点》,法律出版社 2006 年第 1 版,第 397 页。
[29]参见[美]罗伯特·C·克拉克:《公司法则》,胡平等译,工商出版社 1999 年第 1 版,第 115 页。
[30]参见刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002年第 11 期,第 37 页。
[31]参见施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版,第 508页。
1.施天涛:《公司法论》,法律出版社 2006 年第 2 版。
2. 梁彗星:《民法总论》,法律出版社 2001 年第 2 版。
3. 汤欣:《公司治理与上市公司收购》,中国人民大学出版社 2001 年第1 版。
4. 李建伟:《公司制度、公司治理与公司管理——法律在公管理中的地位与作》,人民法院出版社 2005 年第 1 版。
5. 王保树主编:《公司收购:法律与实践》,社会科学文献出版社 2005年第 1 版。
6. 卞耀武:《当代外国公司法》,法律出版社 1996 年第 2 版。
7. 傅穹:《重思公司资本制原理》,法律出版社 2004 年第 1 版。
8. 何勤华:《法的移植法发的本土化》,法律出版社 2001 年第 1 版。
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1. 范健:《我国反收购之立法政策:股东大会中心主义的制度基础与保障》,《商业经济与管理》2006 年第 11 期。
2. 曲冬梅:《目标公司反收购的法律规制》,《法学论坛》2004 年第 2期。
3. 周倩:《规范上市公司反收购行为的立法思考》,《当代法学》2003 年第 11 期。
4.翟靓靓:《论我国反收购制度及困境克服》,《河北经贸大学学报》2007 年第 2 期。
5. 杜枢:《美国对目标公司反收购的规制:商业判断则之运用》,《商业研究》2003 年第 6 期。
6. 朱广东:《上市公司反收购决定权悖论》,《江苏商论》2003 年第 8期。
7. 容缨:《美国商业判断规则对我国公司法的启示——以经济分析为重点》,《政法学刊》2006 年第 2 期。
8.胡鸿高、赵丽梅:《论目标公司反收购行为的决定权及其规制》,《中国法学》2001 年第 2 期。
9.李春林、朱圆:《反收购价值分析》,《当代财经》2005 年第 6 期。
10. 樊静:《论目标公司反收购中少数股东利益的保护》,《当代法学》2003 年第 1 期。
11. 刘桂清:《论目标公司董事的忠实义务》,《河北法学》2002 年第 11期。
12. 李劲松:《公司反收购与董事信义义务研究》,《当代法学》2003 年第 25 卷第 4 期。