中国铁路重组利益相关者利益需求及协调研究
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摘要
随着世界铁路重组改革的进行,中国铁路在十多年前也开始了轰轰烈烈的理论界和实务界的探讨,学者们依据新古典经济学关于铁路规模经济、范围经济理论,新制度经济学关于铁路制度变迁理论,交易成本经济学关于企业组织边界理论,以及现代竞争理论,对中国铁路重组所可能选择的模式进行了广泛深入的探讨,并说明每种重组模式都有采用的充分理由,也都同时指出了每种模式的弊端。
但近几年铁路重组这个“古老”的话题似乎被人们遗忘了,是铁路重组改革所涉及的问题都解决了吗?还是中国铁路不再选择重组改革了呢?答案当然是否定的。
中国铁路重组改革毫无疑问是要进行的,但为什么在对每种重组模式的利弊都进行了详细的分析之后,中国铁路仍然无视世界铁路的改革步伐,无视其他网络型产业改革的步伐,维持着目前的铁道部政企合一管理体制下的管理模式呢?这不能不让人进一步思考,这个“古老”的,但没有真正解决中国铁路现实问题的重组话题,是值得进一步变换角度进行研究的。
本文正是基于这样的背景,以利益相关者理论为基础,变换研究角度,通过对中国铁路重组利益相关者及其需求的界定,对中国铁路重组需要协调的关键利益需求进行探讨,期望从利益相关者角度对中国铁路重组提供一些新的思路。
尽管某些学者在论述中国铁路重组模式时,或多或少提到了铁路重组改革对利益相关者的利益会造成一定的影响,但都没有能够系统的运用利益相关者理论的理念,对中国铁路重组所涉及的利益相关者进行具体的界定,对其利益需求进行具体的分析。
本文认为任何一种重组模式都有一定的限制条件,在不同的条件下,可以采取不同的重组模式,而这种条件又会随着宏观经济环境的变化,随着铁路的发展而变化,可能以前不适用的模式,会在条件发生变化后,又适宜采用。因此,本文认为铁路重组改革的关键是找出铁路重组最关键的利益相关者,并对他们的利益需求进行分析,因为这些关键利益相关者的利益需求往往体现了中国铁路重组的关键因素,只有关键因素分析清楚了,中国铁路重组模式才能够确定,只有关键利益需求协调好了,中国铁路重组才能够顺利的进行下去。
论文的主要研究内容如下:
(1)对中国铁路重组相关研究文献以及利益相关者理论进行综述
论文首先对中国铁路重组已有的研究成果进行回顾和总结,在此基础上指出尽管学者们无论是从理论上还是从重组模式上都对中国铁路重组进行了较深入的研究,但现实的问题是中国铁路仍然没有迈出实质性重组的步伐,这在一定程度上说明需要变换角度对中国铁路重组进行研究。
论文同时对利益相关者理论进行了回顾和总结,说明以利益相关者理论为基础研究铁路重组所涉及的利益相关者及其需求是可行的。
(2)对中国铁路重组利益相关者进行了界定和分类
论文首先采用专家评分法界定出中国铁路重组的十二类利益相关者,并在试问卷的基础上形成关于铁路重组利益相关者的正式问卷。所设计的调查问卷表向铁路各个部门发放,包括铁道部、铁路局/公司以及基层站段,同时向路外单位/公司(包括政府相关部门、银行、学校学者、地方政府、机车车辆等铁路供应单位、民航等竞争者以及普通的消费者)发放。
论文针对调查问卷的统计数据,采用描述性统计、均值比较、配对样本T检验和单因素方差分析方法,对铁路重组的利益相关者按照积极性和重要性两个维度进行分类。最终将铁路重组利益相关者分为三类,关键利益相关者、重要利益相关者和一般利益相关者。关键利益相关者包括铁道部、中央政府和铁路运输企业。重要利益相关者包括地方政府、铁路管理人员、铁路员工和其他投资者。一般利益相关者包括竞争者、债权人、消费者、供应商与分销商。
(3)对铁路重组利益相关者的利益需求进行分析排序
论文利用调查问卷的数据对十二类利益相关者的利益需求的内容进行实证研究。首先根据铁路重组的相关理论和实务研究文献,对各利益相关者的利益需求进行归纳总结,将总结出来的各项利益需求列在试问卷中,然后向7位具有多年研究铁路运输企业改革的专家学者以及高级别的铁路实务工作者征求意见,最后按照专家的意见进行修改,形成了最终的正式问卷。
根据问卷的统计结果,对各类利益相关者的利益需求进行排序。统计结果说明中央政府一直把确保铁路安全作为利益需求的第一位,其次是构建铁路运输市场有序竞争,确保铁路产业安全,维持/增加政府的国防需要,维持/增加社会福利;地方政府在铁路重组过程中最重要的利益需求是确保区域铁路运输能力,其次是争取中央政府给予的各方面政策;铁道部对铁路重组的利益需求将调度指挥集中统一放在最重要的位置,其次是保持对铁路产业的监管与平稳过渡;铁路运输企业最重要的利益需求是“国家对公益性造成的亏损的承担以及相应的政策”,而且显著区别于其他选项;铁路员工最主要的利益需求是维持/增加工资福利待遇,其次是不被解雇;债权人对铁路重组的利益需求中,保障债权不受损失是最重要的;消费者将方便购票/运货与安全放在第一位;其他投资者在铁路重组过程中对未来企业的盈利前景最关注,其次是“良好的行业政策”与“透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则;铁路管理人员将“高额薪酬”与“稳定的工作”作为最重要的利益需求;竞争者对铁路重组最重要的需求是建立透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则;供应商的最重要的利益需求是“稳定的需求”与“及时付款”,其次是建立透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则;分销商最重要的利益需求是稳定的政策,其次是“透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则”与“企业的可持续发展”。
(4)铁路重组利益相关者关键利益需求的协调
铁路重组利益相关者的利益需求是不同的,也可能存在冲突,而铁路重组的关键就是对这些利益相关者的利益需求进行协调。论文在关键利益相关者、重要利益相关者以及一般利益相关者的界定的基础上,结合各类利益相关者的利益需求的排序结果,确定了铁路重组需要考虑的最关键的利益需求,包括①铁路运输安全需求:②铁路的调度指挥集中统一需求;③公益性运输需求。既包括铁路运输企业规范市场化运作所带来的公益性问题,也包括中央政府对铁路运输在国防、增加社会福利等方面的需求的满足;④铁路运输市场有序竞争的构建需求;⑤透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则需求。包括各项完善的法律制度以及行业政策等;⑥对铁路运输能力的需求。包括相对于消费者的整体运输能力,也包括相对于地方政府的区域运输能力;⑦各利益相关者与铁路运输企业保持长期合作关系的需求。
针对利益相关者的关键利益需求,论文对如何满足和协调利益相关者的关键利益需求进行了深入的分析,得出了制约中国铁路重组进程缓慢的关键原因是作为关键利益相关者的中央政府、铁道部与铁路运输企业之间在利益需求方面存在着不易协调的矛盾冲突,即调度指挥集中统一与铁路竞争,公益性运输的承担与补偿等,认为中国铁路重组现阶段最关键的问题是解决公益性运输问题以及运输能力不足问题,并在此基础上对中国铁路重组提出了原则性的建议。
With the restructuring reforms of the world railways, China Railway has also started an emotional discussion in the theory and practice community more than a decade ago. Scholars who based on neo-classical economics on the railway scale economies and the density of economic theory, new institutional economics on the changes in the railway system theory, transaction cost economics theory on enterprise organizational boundaries theory, as well as the modern competition theory, carried out the extensive and in-depth discussion about the alterative model of China Railway restructuring, then explained the rationality of each model to be chosen, and also pointed out the drawbacks of each model.
The "old" topic railway restructuring in recent years seems to be forgotten. Are the issues involved in the railway restructuring reform resolved completely? Or doesn't China Railway choose restructuring reform any longer? Of course, the answer is no.
There is no doubt that China Railway restructuring reform should be carried out. However, why, after the analysis in detail about the pros and cons of each restructuring model, does China Railway still ignore the world railway reform, ignore the reform pace of other network-based industries, and maintain the Ministry of Railways current management model without separating itself from enterprise business in China? People can not help thinking further the "old" restructuring topic that hasn't really solve China railway practical problems, which is worthy of further study by perspective transformation.
Considering the condition, by perspective transformation and defining the key stakeholders of China Railway restructuring and their demand, this paper based on the stakeholder theory discusses the key interest demands in China Railway restructuring, so as to provide some new thoughts to China Railway restructuring from the point of stockholders.
Although some scholars refer more or less that the railway restructuring reform will have effect on the interests of stakeholders when they discuss China railway restructuring model, they are not able to use stakeholder theory systematically to define specifically the stakeholders involved in China Railway restructuring and analyze concretely their interest requirements.
This paper believes that any restructuring model has certain limitations. In different conditions can take different restructuring modes, and this condition will change with the macroeconomic environment and with the development of railway. Previously, it may be not applied model, but with changes in the conditions it is suitable for using again. Therefore, this paper believes that the key to Railway restructuring reform is to identify the key stakeholders, further to analyze their interests and requirements, because these key stakeholders interests often represent the key factor in China railway restructuring. Only if the key factor is analyzed clearly, China railway restructuring model will be able to determine, and only if the key interests is coordinated, China railway restructuring can proceed smoothly.
Major research contexts of this paper are as follows:
(1) An Overview of China Railway Restructuring-related Research Literature and Stakeholder Theory
Firstly, this paper reviews and summaries the existing research about China railway restructuring. On this basis that, scholars have a more in-depth study on China railway restructuring from theory and models, but the real issue is that China railway still do not make substantial restructuring pace, to some extent, which demonstrates that it is need changing the perspective to study China railway restructuring.
Meanwhile, this paper reviews and summaries stakeholder theory to illustrate that it is feasible to study the China railway restructuring stakeholders and their interests based on the stakeholder theory.
(2) Definition and Classification to China Railway Restructuring Stakeholders
This paper defines stakeholders of China railway restructuring as 12 types at first,and then form the formal questionnaire about railway restructuring stakeholders based on the trial questionnaire. The questionnaire is distributed to all sectors of the railway, including the Ministry of Railways, railway administrations / companies, and transport stations and depots, while the nor-railway units / companies (including relevant government departments, banks, schools scholars, local government, railway supply department etc., civil aviation and other competitors and ordinary consumers).
This paper bases on the questionnaire statistics, using descriptive statistics, mean comparison, paired samples T test and one-factor analysis of variance, from activity and importance two dimensions to classify railway restructuring stakeholders. It eventually is divided into three groups of stakeholders, key stakeholders, important stakeholders and other common stakeholders. Key stakeholders include the Ministry of Railways, the Central Government and railway transportation enterprises. Important stakeholders include local governments, railway managers, railway employees and other investors. Other common stakeholders include competitors, creditors, customers, suppliers and distributors.
(3) Analysis of the Interests of the Stakeholdersin the China Railway Restructuring
This paper adopts questionnaire data to do empirical research on the 12 types stakeholders interests. Firstly, sum up the interests of the various stakeholders according to the railway restructuring theory and practical literature, list all the interests in the test questionnaire, then consults 7 experts and scholars who have been studying railway transport enterprise reform for years and high-level practitioners, and the last modify in accordance with the experts opinions to form the final formal questionnaire.
According to the questionnaire results, interests of various stakeholders are sorted. Statistical results indicate that the Central Government takes the ensuring railway safety as the first interests, followed by building an orderly competition market of railway transport, to ensure the railway industry safety, maintenance / increase the Government's national defense requirements, maintenance / increase social welfare. The most important interests to local governments during the railway restructuring are to ensure capacity of the regional railway transport, followed by striving for all aspects of policy by the central government. Ministry of Railways put centralized and unified scheduling and command on the most important position to interests of railway restructuring, followed by maintaining the railway industry regulation and a smooth transition. The most important interests of railway transport enterprises is "the state's commitment to public-benefit losses and the corresponding policy", which is significantly different from the other options.The most important interests of railway employees is to maintenance / increase wages and benefits, followed by the dismissal. As for the interests of creditors in railway restructuring , to protect against the loss claims is the most important. Consumers put facilitated purchase / shipping and security on the first place. Other investors in the railway restructuring process are most concerned about profitable prospects of the corporate, followed by favorable industrial policies; transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules. Railway managers put "high salaries" and "stable job" as the most important interests. The most important interests of competitors for railway restructuring are to establish transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules. The most important interests of suppliers are "stable demand" and "the timely payment", followed by the establishment of transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules. The most important interests of distributors are stable policies, followed by " the establishment of transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules " and "sustainable development of enterprises".
(4) Coordination to Key Interests of Railway Restructuring Stakeholders
Interests of Railway restructuring stakeholders are different, and even there may be conflicts, while the key to Railway restructuring is to coordinate interests of stakeholders. This papers bases on of the definition to key stakeholders, important stakeholders, and other common stakeholders, combining the sort results of the interests of various stakeholders to determine the most critical interests of railway restructuring, including①railway transport security requirements;②centralized and unified scheduling and command requirements;③public-benefit transport requirements. It includes both railway transport public-benefit brought about by railway enterprises standardized market operation and central government to meet the requirements of railway transport in the national defense, social welfare increase;④railway transport market construction orderly competition requirements;⑤transparent , scientific, fair and equitable procedures and regulatory requirements. It includes the various sound legal system and trade policies;⑥railway transport capacity requirements. It includes in relation to the overall transport capacity of consumers, and regional transportation capacity in relation to local governments;⑦stakeholders and the railway transport enterprises to maintain their long-term relationship requirements.
Towards the key interests requirements of stakeholders, this papers take a in-depth analysis on how to meet and coordinate the key interests requirements of stakeholders, and finally get the result that a key factor which results in slow process of China railway restructuring is for there are irreconcilable contradictions and conflicts on the interests among the key stakeholders of the central government, Ministry of Railways and railway transport enterprises, that is, centralized and unified scheduling and command and railway competition, commitment and compensation for public-benefit transport. This paper believes that the most critical problem of China railway restructuring at present stage is to solve public-benefit transport and insufficient transport capacity, and on this basis to make the principle proposal on the China railway restructuring.
但近几年铁路重组这个“古老”的话题似乎被人们遗忘了,是铁路重组改革所涉及的问题都解决了吗?还是中国铁路不再选择重组改革了呢?答案当然是否定的。
中国铁路重组改革毫无疑问是要进行的,但为什么在对每种重组模式的利弊都进行了详细的分析之后,中国铁路仍然无视世界铁路的改革步伐,无视其他网络型产业改革的步伐,维持着目前的铁道部政企合一管理体制下的管理模式呢?这不能不让人进一步思考,这个“古老”的,但没有真正解决中国铁路现实问题的重组话题,是值得进一步变换角度进行研究的。
本文正是基于这样的背景,以利益相关者理论为基础,变换研究角度,通过对中国铁路重组利益相关者及其需求的界定,对中国铁路重组需要协调的关键利益需求进行探讨,期望从利益相关者角度对中国铁路重组提供一些新的思路。
尽管某些学者在论述中国铁路重组模式时,或多或少提到了铁路重组改革对利益相关者的利益会造成一定的影响,但都没有能够系统的运用利益相关者理论的理念,对中国铁路重组所涉及的利益相关者进行具体的界定,对其利益需求进行具体的分析。
本文认为任何一种重组模式都有一定的限制条件,在不同的条件下,可以采取不同的重组模式,而这种条件又会随着宏观经济环境的变化,随着铁路的发展而变化,可能以前不适用的模式,会在条件发生变化后,又适宜采用。因此,本文认为铁路重组改革的关键是找出铁路重组最关键的利益相关者,并对他们的利益需求进行分析,因为这些关键利益相关者的利益需求往往体现了中国铁路重组的关键因素,只有关键因素分析清楚了,中国铁路重组模式才能够确定,只有关键利益需求协调好了,中国铁路重组才能够顺利的进行下去。
论文的主要研究内容如下:
(1)对中国铁路重组相关研究文献以及利益相关者理论进行综述
论文首先对中国铁路重组已有的研究成果进行回顾和总结,在此基础上指出尽管学者们无论是从理论上还是从重组模式上都对中国铁路重组进行了较深入的研究,但现实的问题是中国铁路仍然没有迈出实质性重组的步伐,这在一定程度上说明需要变换角度对中国铁路重组进行研究。
论文同时对利益相关者理论进行了回顾和总结,说明以利益相关者理论为基础研究铁路重组所涉及的利益相关者及其需求是可行的。
(2)对中国铁路重组利益相关者进行了界定和分类
论文首先采用专家评分法界定出中国铁路重组的十二类利益相关者,并在试问卷的基础上形成关于铁路重组利益相关者的正式问卷。所设计的调查问卷表向铁路各个部门发放,包括铁道部、铁路局/公司以及基层站段,同时向路外单位/公司(包括政府相关部门、银行、学校学者、地方政府、机车车辆等铁路供应单位、民航等竞争者以及普通的消费者)发放。
论文针对调查问卷的统计数据,采用描述性统计、均值比较、配对样本T检验和单因素方差分析方法,对铁路重组的利益相关者按照积极性和重要性两个维度进行分类。最终将铁路重组利益相关者分为三类,关键利益相关者、重要利益相关者和一般利益相关者。关键利益相关者包括铁道部、中央政府和铁路运输企业。重要利益相关者包括地方政府、铁路管理人员、铁路员工和其他投资者。一般利益相关者包括竞争者、债权人、消费者、供应商与分销商。
(3)对铁路重组利益相关者的利益需求进行分析排序
论文利用调查问卷的数据对十二类利益相关者的利益需求的内容进行实证研究。首先根据铁路重组的相关理论和实务研究文献,对各利益相关者的利益需求进行归纳总结,将总结出来的各项利益需求列在试问卷中,然后向7位具有多年研究铁路运输企业改革的专家学者以及高级别的铁路实务工作者征求意见,最后按照专家的意见进行修改,形成了最终的正式问卷。
根据问卷的统计结果,对各类利益相关者的利益需求进行排序。统计结果说明中央政府一直把确保铁路安全作为利益需求的第一位,其次是构建铁路运输市场有序竞争,确保铁路产业安全,维持/增加政府的国防需要,维持/增加社会福利;地方政府在铁路重组过程中最重要的利益需求是确保区域铁路运输能力,其次是争取中央政府给予的各方面政策;铁道部对铁路重组的利益需求将调度指挥集中统一放在最重要的位置,其次是保持对铁路产业的监管与平稳过渡;铁路运输企业最重要的利益需求是“国家对公益性造成的亏损的承担以及相应的政策”,而且显著区别于其他选项;铁路员工最主要的利益需求是维持/增加工资福利待遇,其次是不被解雇;债权人对铁路重组的利益需求中,保障债权不受损失是最重要的;消费者将方便购票/运货与安全放在第一位;其他投资者在铁路重组过程中对未来企业的盈利前景最关注,其次是“良好的行业政策”与“透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则;铁路管理人员将“高额薪酬”与“稳定的工作”作为最重要的利益需求;竞争者对铁路重组最重要的需求是建立透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则;供应商的最重要的利益需求是“稳定的需求”与“及时付款”,其次是建立透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则;分销商最重要的利益需求是稳定的政策,其次是“透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则”与“企业的可持续发展”。
(4)铁路重组利益相关者关键利益需求的协调
铁路重组利益相关者的利益需求是不同的,也可能存在冲突,而铁路重组的关键就是对这些利益相关者的利益需求进行协调。论文在关键利益相关者、重要利益相关者以及一般利益相关者的界定的基础上,结合各类利益相关者的利益需求的排序结果,确定了铁路重组需要考虑的最关键的利益需求,包括①铁路运输安全需求:②铁路的调度指挥集中统一需求;③公益性运输需求。既包括铁路运输企业规范市场化运作所带来的公益性问题,也包括中央政府对铁路运输在国防、增加社会福利等方面的需求的满足;④铁路运输市场有序竞争的构建需求;⑤透明、科学、公正、公平的程序和规则需求。包括各项完善的法律制度以及行业政策等;⑥对铁路运输能力的需求。包括相对于消费者的整体运输能力,也包括相对于地方政府的区域运输能力;⑦各利益相关者与铁路运输企业保持长期合作关系的需求。
针对利益相关者的关键利益需求,论文对如何满足和协调利益相关者的关键利益需求进行了深入的分析,得出了制约中国铁路重组进程缓慢的关键原因是作为关键利益相关者的中央政府、铁道部与铁路运输企业之间在利益需求方面存在着不易协调的矛盾冲突,即调度指挥集中统一与铁路竞争,公益性运输的承担与补偿等,认为中国铁路重组现阶段最关键的问题是解决公益性运输问题以及运输能力不足问题,并在此基础上对中国铁路重组提出了原则性的建议。
With the restructuring reforms of the world railways, China Railway has also started an emotional discussion in the theory and practice community more than a decade ago. Scholars who based on neo-classical economics on the railway scale economies and the density of economic theory, new institutional economics on the changes in the railway system theory, transaction cost economics theory on enterprise organizational boundaries theory, as well as the modern competition theory, carried out the extensive and in-depth discussion about the alterative model of China Railway restructuring, then explained the rationality of each model to be chosen, and also pointed out the drawbacks of each model.
The "old" topic railway restructuring in recent years seems to be forgotten. Are the issues involved in the railway restructuring reform resolved completely? Or doesn't China Railway choose restructuring reform any longer? Of course, the answer is no.
There is no doubt that China Railway restructuring reform should be carried out. However, why, after the analysis in detail about the pros and cons of each restructuring model, does China Railway still ignore the world railway reform, ignore the reform pace of other network-based industries, and maintain the Ministry of Railways current management model without separating itself from enterprise business in China? People can not help thinking further the "old" restructuring topic that hasn't really solve China railway practical problems, which is worthy of further study by perspective transformation.
Considering the condition, by perspective transformation and defining the key stakeholders of China Railway restructuring and their demand, this paper based on the stakeholder theory discusses the key interest demands in China Railway restructuring, so as to provide some new thoughts to China Railway restructuring from the point of stockholders.
Although some scholars refer more or less that the railway restructuring reform will have effect on the interests of stakeholders when they discuss China railway restructuring model, they are not able to use stakeholder theory systematically to define specifically the stakeholders involved in China Railway restructuring and analyze concretely their interest requirements.
This paper believes that any restructuring model has certain limitations. In different conditions can take different restructuring modes, and this condition will change with the macroeconomic environment and with the development of railway. Previously, it may be not applied model, but with changes in the conditions it is suitable for using again. Therefore, this paper believes that the key to Railway restructuring reform is to identify the key stakeholders, further to analyze their interests and requirements, because these key stakeholders interests often represent the key factor in China railway restructuring. Only if the key factor is analyzed clearly, China railway restructuring model will be able to determine, and only if the key interests is coordinated, China railway restructuring can proceed smoothly.
Major research contexts of this paper are as follows:
(1) An Overview of China Railway Restructuring-related Research Literature and Stakeholder Theory
Firstly, this paper reviews and summaries the existing research about China railway restructuring. On this basis that, scholars have a more in-depth study on China railway restructuring from theory and models, but the real issue is that China railway still do not make substantial restructuring pace, to some extent, which demonstrates that it is need changing the perspective to study China railway restructuring.
Meanwhile, this paper reviews and summaries stakeholder theory to illustrate that it is feasible to study the China railway restructuring stakeholders and their interests based on the stakeholder theory.
(2) Definition and Classification to China Railway Restructuring Stakeholders
This paper defines stakeholders of China railway restructuring as 12 types at first,and then form the formal questionnaire about railway restructuring stakeholders based on the trial questionnaire. The questionnaire is distributed to all sectors of the railway, including the Ministry of Railways, railway administrations / companies, and transport stations and depots, while the nor-railway units / companies (including relevant government departments, banks, schools scholars, local government, railway supply department etc., civil aviation and other competitors and ordinary consumers).
This paper bases on the questionnaire statistics, using descriptive statistics, mean comparison, paired samples T test and one-factor analysis of variance, from activity and importance two dimensions to classify railway restructuring stakeholders. It eventually is divided into three groups of stakeholders, key stakeholders, important stakeholders and other common stakeholders. Key stakeholders include the Ministry of Railways, the Central Government and railway transportation enterprises. Important stakeholders include local governments, railway managers, railway employees and other investors. Other common stakeholders include competitors, creditors, customers, suppliers and distributors.
(3) Analysis of the Interests of the Stakeholdersin the China Railway Restructuring
This paper adopts questionnaire data to do empirical research on the 12 types stakeholders interests. Firstly, sum up the interests of the various stakeholders according to the railway restructuring theory and practical literature, list all the interests in the test questionnaire, then consults 7 experts and scholars who have been studying railway transport enterprise reform for years and high-level practitioners, and the last modify in accordance with the experts opinions to form the final formal questionnaire.
According to the questionnaire results, interests of various stakeholders are sorted. Statistical results indicate that the Central Government takes the ensuring railway safety as the first interests, followed by building an orderly competition market of railway transport, to ensure the railway industry safety, maintenance / increase the Government's national defense requirements, maintenance / increase social welfare. The most important interests to local governments during the railway restructuring are to ensure capacity of the regional railway transport, followed by striving for all aspects of policy by the central government. Ministry of Railways put centralized and unified scheduling and command on the most important position to interests of railway restructuring, followed by maintaining the railway industry regulation and a smooth transition. The most important interests of railway transport enterprises is "the state's commitment to public-benefit losses and the corresponding policy", which is significantly different from the other options.The most important interests of railway employees is to maintenance / increase wages and benefits, followed by the dismissal. As for the interests of creditors in railway restructuring , to protect against the loss claims is the most important. Consumers put facilitated purchase / shipping and security on the first place. Other investors in the railway restructuring process are most concerned about profitable prospects of the corporate, followed by favorable industrial policies; transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules. Railway managers put "high salaries" and "stable job" as the most important interests. The most important interests of competitors for railway restructuring are to establish transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules. The most important interests of suppliers are "stable demand" and "the timely payment", followed by the establishment of transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules. The most important interests of distributors are stable policies, followed by " the establishment of transparent, scientific, fair and equitable procedures and rules " and "sustainable development of enterprises".
(4) Coordination to Key Interests of Railway Restructuring Stakeholders
Interests of Railway restructuring stakeholders are different, and even there may be conflicts, while the key to Railway restructuring is to coordinate interests of stakeholders. This papers bases on of the definition to key stakeholders, important stakeholders, and other common stakeholders, combining the sort results of the interests of various stakeholders to determine the most critical interests of railway restructuring, including①railway transport security requirements;②centralized and unified scheduling and command requirements;③public-benefit transport requirements. It includes both railway transport public-benefit brought about by railway enterprises standardized market operation and central government to meet the requirements of railway transport in the national defense, social welfare increase;④railway transport market construction orderly competition requirements;⑤transparent , scientific, fair and equitable procedures and regulatory requirements. It includes the various sound legal system and trade policies;⑥railway transport capacity requirements. It includes in relation to the overall transport capacity of consumers, and regional transportation capacity in relation to local governments;⑦stakeholders and the railway transport enterprises to maintain their long-term relationship requirements.
Towards the key interests requirements of stakeholders, this papers take a in-depth analysis on how to meet and coordinate the key interests requirements of stakeholders, and finally get the result that a key factor which results in slow process of China railway restructuring is for there are irreconcilable contradictions and conflicts on the interests among the key stakeholders of the central government, Ministry of Railways and railway transport enterprises, that is, centralized and unified scheduling and command and railway competition, commitment and compensation for public-benefit transport. This paper believes that the most critical problem of China railway restructuring at present stage is to solve public-benefit transport and insufficient transport capacity, and on this basis to make the principle proposal on the China railway restructuring.
引文
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