审计质量与真实盈余管理关系的实证研究
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摘要
在我国上市公司的财务报告中,盈余管理是普遍存在的现象,这无疑会影响到财务信息的客观性、公允性,也在一定程度上会制约财务信息的使用者依据财务信息做出合理的决策。而通过注册会计师的审计工作,作为控制财务信息真实性、合法性和公允性的一个有力手段,其对财务信息的把关无疑具有非常重要的作用。在理论上,审计意见作为审计检验的工作成果,审计质量应该与财务报表信息所反映的公司的偿债能力、盈利能力和资产管理水平息息相关,而且审计意见应该能够有效地抑制公司的盈余管理,同样,公司的盈余管理变动也应该能够恰当地反映出审计意见对其的制约作用。
应计项和真实营业活动是管理盈余的两种基本方法。早期的研究强调应计项盈余管理,而近期很多研究表明企业也存在真实盈余管理,然而真实盈余管理比应计盈余管理会增加股东潜在的地长期花费,因为从长远来看真实盈余管理会对企业未来现金流产生负面的影响,并且可能危害企业价值。这是由于临时价格折扣或者更加宽松的信用期限所引起的长期花费会导致未来销售利润率降低、以及研发费用、销售费用、综合费用和行政费用方面价值投资的减少,并且增加了企业不必要的清查库存方面的投入。而管理真实的营业活动引起审计师和监管部门的审查可能性较小,管理者管理真实的营业活动的成本就更低,并且只要真实盈余在财务报表中得到很好的披露,就不会影响到审计师的意见和监管者的决策。
由于企业会在应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理之间进行选择,本文认为当企业操纵应计项的能力受到约束时,他们就有可能从事更加广泛的真实盈余管理。这一期望来自于Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005)的理论,他们的模型显示当企业的会计灵活性减弱时企业会采取真实盈余管理的方式。减弱企业的会计灵活性的方式之一是聘用一位对盈余管理有保留意见的审计师。以前的研究显示高质量的审计师更能有效地约束应计盈余管理,即：他们约束管理者的会计灵活性。因此,较高的审计质量应该与更高程度的真实盈余管理相联系。
研究认为审计师的行业专业性和任期可以作为审计质量的代理变量来计量审计质量,行业专家审计师与低程度的应计盈余管理相关,所涉及的证券交易委员会的执法行动的可能性越低,客户重述的可能性也越低；尽管审计师任期和盈余质量之间的理论联系存在争议,但在实证检验中,很多的研究发现审计任期越长与应计盈余管理的程度越低,客户重述的可能性也越低,并且客户进行财务诈骗的可能性也越低。因此,本文采用两个审计师特征(审计师的行业专业性和任期)来检验其与真实盈余管理程度的关系。
Earnings management is quite a common phenomenon in China's listed companies which will undoubtedly affect the objectivity and fairness of financial information. What's more, it will affect the decision-making process of financial information. Certified Accountants and auditors play important role to ensure the authenticity legitimacy and fairness of financial information. Audit opinion is the result of audit quality on the theory, the audit quality should have a close relationship with the solvency、profitability and asset management levels of entities and auditing opinion should be able to effectively control the earnings management. At the same time, variables on earning management should be able to properly reflect the constrain effect of auditing opinion.
Prior research suggests that accruals and real activities are two alternative ways to manage earnings. While earlier studies focus on accruals earnings management, more recent papers suggest that firms also engage in real earnings management. Real earnings management potentially imposes greater long term costs on shareholders than accruals earnings management because it has negative consequences on future cash flows and might hurt firm value in the long run. Such long term costs are driven by temporary price discounts or more lenient credit terms that lower margins on future sales, reductions in valuable investments in research and development and SG&A activities, and/or increasing investments in un-needed inventories via inventory over-production. However, managing real activities is less costly to the managers because it is less likely to draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny. Real earnings management, as long as it is properly disclosed in the financial statements, cannot influence auditors'opinions or regulators' actions.
Because firms choose between accruals and real earnings management, we expect that they are more likely to engage in more extensive real earnings management when their ability to manage accruals is constrained. We derive this expectation from the theoretical work of Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) whose model shows that firms resort to real earnings management when their accounting flexibility is reduced. One way to reduce a firm's accounting flexibility is to engage an auditor who is less agreeable to earnings management.1 Prior research shows that higher quality auditors are more successful in constraining accrual earnings management, i.e. they constrain accounting flexibility of managers. Consequently, higher audit quality could be associated with higher levels of real earnings management. Prior research suggests that auditor industry expertise and tenure are both associated with proxies of higher audit quality. Studies find that industry expert auditors are associated with lower levels of accruals earnings management, lower likelihood to be involved in the SEC enforcement actions, and lower probabilities of restatements. Although the theoretical link between auditor tenure and earnings quality is somewhat controversial, empirically, most studies find that longer auditor tenure is associated with lower levels of accruals earnings management, lower probabilities of client restatements, and lower incidence of client financial fraud. Thus, we focus on these two auditor characteristics (namely auditor industry expertise and tenure) and examine their association with levels of real earnings management.
应计项和真实营业活动是管理盈余的两种基本方法。早期的研究强调应计项盈余管理,而近期很多研究表明企业也存在真实盈余管理,然而真实盈余管理比应计盈余管理会增加股东潜在的地长期花费,因为从长远来看真实盈余管理会对企业未来现金流产生负面的影响,并且可能危害企业价值。这是由于临时价格折扣或者更加宽松的信用期限所引起的长期花费会导致未来销售利润率降低、以及研发费用、销售费用、综合费用和行政费用方面价值投资的减少,并且增加了企业不必要的清查库存方面的投入。而管理真实的营业活动引起审计师和监管部门的审查可能性较小,管理者管理真实的营业活动的成本就更低,并且只要真实盈余在财务报表中得到很好的披露,就不会影响到审计师的意见和监管者的决策。
由于企业会在应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理之间进行选择,本文认为当企业操纵应计项的能力受到约束时,他们就有可能从事更加广泛的真实盈余管理。这一期望来自于Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005)的理论,他们的模型显示当企业的会计灵活性减弱时企业会采取真实盈余管理的方式。减弱企业的会计灵活性的方式之一是聘用一位对盈余管理有保留意见的审计师。以前的研究显示高质量的审计师更能有效地约束应计盈余管理,即：他们约束管理者的会计灵活性。因此,较高的审计质量应该与更高程度的真实盈余管理相联系。
研究认为审计师的行业专业性和任期可以作为审计质量的代理变量来计量审计质量,行业专家审计师与低程度的应计盈余管理相关,所涉及的证券交易委员会的执法行动的可能性越低,客户重述的可能性也越低；尽管审计师任期和盈余质量之间的理论联系存在争议,但在实证检验中,很多的研究发现审计任期越长与应计盈余管理的程度越低,客户重述的可能性也越低,并且客户进行财务诈骗的可能性也越低。因此,本文采用两个审计师特征(审计师的行业专业性和任期)来检验其与真实盈余管理程度的关系。
Earnings management is quite a common phenomenon in China's listed companies which will undoubtedly affect the objectivity and fairness of financial information. What's more, it will affect the decision-making process of financial information. Certified Accountants and auditors play important role to ensure the authenticity legitimacy and fairness of financial information. Audit opinion is the result of audit quality on the theory, the audit quality should have a close relationship with the solvency、profitability and asset management levels of entities and auditing opinion should be able to effectively control the earnings management. At the same time, variables on earning management should be able to properly reflect the constrain effect of auditing opinion.
Prior research suggests that accruals and real activities are two alternative ways to manage earnings. While earlier studies focus on accruals earnings management, more recent papers suggest that firms also engage in real earnings management. Real earnings management potentially imposes greater long term costs on shareholders than accruals earnings management because it has negative consequences on future cash flows and might hurt firm value in the long run. Such long term costs are driven by temporary price discounts or more lenient credit terms that lower margins on future sales, reductions in valuable investments in research and development and SG&A activities, and/or increasing investments in un-needed inventories via inventory over-production. However, managing real activities is less costly to the managers because it is less likely to draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny. Real earnings management, as long as it is properly disclosed in the financial statements, cannot influence auditors'opinions or regulators' actions.
Because firms choose between accruals and real earnings management, we expect that they are more likely to engage in more extensive real earnings management when their ability to manage accruals is constrained. We derive this expectation from the theoretical work of Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) whose model shows that firms resort to real earnings management when their accounting flexibility is reduced. One way to reduce a firm's accounting flexibility is to engage an auditor who is less agreeable to earnings management.1 Prior research shows that higher quality auditors are more successful in constraining accrual earnings management, i.e. they constrain accounting flexibility of managers. Consequently, higher audit quality could be associated with higher levels of real earnings management. Prior research suggests that auditor industry expertise and tenure are both associated with proxies of higher audit quality. Studies find that industry expert auditors are associated with lower levels of accruals earnings management, lower likelihood to be involved in the SEC enforcement actions, and lower probabilities of restatements. Although the theoretical link between auditor tenure and earnings quality is somewhat controversial, empirically, most studies find that longer auditor tenure is associated with lower levels of accruals earnings management, lower probabilities of client restatements, and lower incidence of client financial fraud. Thus, we focus on these two auditor characteristics (namely auditor industry expertise and tenure) and examine their association with levels of real earnings management.
引文
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[2]张俊瑞,李彬,刘东霖.真实活动操控的盈余管理研究——基于保盈动机的经验证据.数理统计与管理,2008
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[6]邓晓岚,王宗军等.非财务视角下的财务困境预警——对中国上市公司的实证研究,管理科学,2006
[7]耿建新,杨鹤.我国上市公司变更会计师事务所情况的分析.会计研究,2001
[8]朱朝晖、丛丽莉.基于保盈动机的经营活动真实盈余管理研究.会计之友,2011
[9]李爽,吴溪.审计师变更研究：中国证券市场的初步证据.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002
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[12]李维安.年报预约披露、年报披露迟滞、未预期盈利与非标准审计意见一一基于2002-2003年上市公司数据的实证研究.中国第三届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2004
[13]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安捧一一来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004
[14]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据,经济研究,2005
[15]刘启亮.事务所任期与审计质量.审计研究,2006
[16]陆正飞,童盼.审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策一项以14号规则为例的经验研究.审计研究,2003
[17]章立军.上市公司盈余管理与审计质量的相关分析.财贸经济,2005
[18]刘继红.国有股权、盈余管理与审计意见.审计研究,2009
[19]张琴.我国上市公司盈余管理研究.西北农林科技大学硕士论文,2006
[20]第一作者.公司治理与真实盈余管理关系研究.中国乡镇企业会计,2011
[21]于鹏.公司特征、国际“十大”与审计意见[J].审计研究,2007
[22]吴联生,谭力.审计师变更决策与审计意见改善.审计研究,2005
[23]夏立军,陈信元,方轶强.事务所任期与审计质量：来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2005
[24]姚婕.论盈余管理.商业经济与管理,2001
[25]余玉苗,李琳.审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析.经济评论,2003
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[2]张俊瑞,李彬,刘东霖.真实活动操控的盈余管理研究——基于保盈动机的经验证据.数理统计与管理,2008
[3]陈欣,胡奕明,王静,马玲.自愿中报审计能减少盈余管理吗?一基于自选择模型的实证研究[J].审计研究,2008。
[4]余玉苗,李琳.审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析.经济评论,2005
[5]陈信元,夏立军.事务所任期与审计质量：来自中国证券市场的经验证据.会计研究,2006
[6]邓晓岚,王宗军等.非财务视角下的财务困境预警——对中国上市公司的实证研究,管理科学,2006
[7]耿建新,杨鹤.我国上市公司变更会计师事务所情况的分析.会计研究,2001
[8]朱朝晖、丛丽莉.基于保盈动机的经营活动真实盈余管理研究.会计之友,2011
[9]李爽,吴溪.审计师变更研究：中国证券市场的初步证据.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2002
[10]丛丽莉,朱朝晖.上市公司真实盈余管理行为探讨,中国乡镇企业会计,2008
[11]李建然,林凤秀.会计师任期与异常应计数之关联性研究.管理评论,2005
[12]李维安.年报预约披露、年报披露迟滞、未预期盈利与非标准审计意见一一基于2002-2003年上市公司数据的实证研究.中国第三届实证会计国际研讨会论文集,2004
[13]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安捧一一来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004
[14]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据,经济研究,2005
[15]刘启亮.事务所任期与审计质量.审计研究,2006
[16]陆正飞,童盼.审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策一项以14号规则为例的经验研究.审计研究,2003
[17]章立军.上市公司盈余管理与审计质量的相关分析.财贸经济,2005
[18]刘继红.国有股权、盈余管理与审计意见.审计研究,2009
[19]张琴.我国上市公司盈余管理研究.西北农林科技大学硕士论文,2006
[20]第一作者.公司治理与真实盈余管理关系研究.中国乡镇企业会计,2011
[21]于鹏.公司特征、国际“十大”与审计意见[J].审计研究,2007
[22]吴联生,谭力.审计师变更决策与审计意见改善.审计研究,2005
[23]夏立军,陈信元,方轶强.事务所任期与审计质量：来自中国证券市场的经验证据.中国会计与财务研究,2005
[24]姚婕.论盈余管理.商业经济与管理,2001
[25]余玉苗,李琳.审计师任期与审计质量之间关系的理论分析.经济评论,2003
[26]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海三联书店,1996
[27]赵山.中国上市公司高层更换实证研究.改革,2001
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