阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的法理与实践研究
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摘要
20世纪初,阿根廷吸收了大量的外资,经济发展迅速,国民收入颇丰。2001年底至2002年初阿根廷却经历了历史上最为严重的经济危机。为了缓解危机的冲击,阿根廷政府宣布全国进入“紧急状态”,国会颁布《公共紧急状态法》。阿根廷实施上述措施一方面促使了阿根廷经济的复苏,另一方面使参与阿根廷私有化进程的外国投资者遭受了巨额损失。为了挽回损失,众多外国投资者向国际投资仲裁庭提起了以阿根廷为被申请人的国际投资仲裁申请。截止到2008年8月,仅在ICSID体制内阿根廷便涉案47起,且这些案件多半与阿根廷经济危机有关。在已经做出终局裁决的案件中,阿根廷多以失败而告终。阿根廷现象在ICSID体制内前所未有,即使在整个国际投资仲裁历史上也属罕见。
因此,本文以阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作为研究对象,探讨阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的背景、原因以及阿根廷在国际层面和国内层面的应对措施。通过考察,本文指出阿根廷经济危机是阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的直接原因,阿根廷国际投资法律自由化改革是阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的根本原因。20世纪90年代末期,阿根廷签订的双边投资条约背弃了卡尔沃主义,完全接受了国际投资仲裁机构的管辖权,并给予外国投资者高标准的保护。正是阿根廷双边投资条约过于自由化的规定导致阿根廷在国际层面的抗辩多以失败告终。阿根廷试图通过国内司法审查的方式否定仲裁裁决在阿根廷国内的执行又蕴含着极大的危险,这种救济方式将导致阿根廷违背《ICSID公约》的规定,损害阿根廷在国际商业社会的声誉。
中国与阿根廷同属于发展中国家,都面临着大力发展本国经济的重任。为了改善中国的投资环境,中国双边投资条约也出现了自由化的趋势。虽然目前在ICSID体制内尚未出现以中国为被申请人的案件,但是这种可能性并非不存在。中国应当未雨绸缪,吸取阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的教训,修改中国双边投资条约的规定,平衡投资者的财产利益与东道国主权权利,防止中国重蹈阿根廷的覆辙。
除前言与结论外,本论文共分为六章。
第一章首先对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作出概要介绍。本章主要涉及三个问题,即国际投资仲裁的基本理论问题、阿根廷国际投资仲裁涉案情况和阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的社会经济背景分析。
第二章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作出了法理分析。本章主要涉及阿根廷国内投资法律体制的自由化改革。在本章中,笔者将首先对卡尔沃主义进行历史回顾,并对阿根廷传统国际投资法对卡尔沃主义的坚持作出介绍。然后笔者将对阿根廷国际投资法制自由化改革作出介绍与评价,指出阿根廷国际投资法制对卡尔沃主义的背弃构成了阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机深层次的国内法原因。
第三章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作出了进一步的法理分析。文章首先对阿根廷双边投资条约的程序条款做出分析,指出阿根廷双边投资条约完全接受了ICSID的仲裁管辖权,背弃了卡尔沃主义。其次对阿根廷双边投资条约的实体条款做出分析,指出阿根廷双边投资条约赋予投资者高标准的保护。正是阿根廷双边投资条约过于自由化的规定导致阿根廷在国际投资仲裁危机面前捉襟见肘,应对无门。
第四章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机在国际层面的应对措施作出了实证考察。文章在分析了阿根廷的主要抗辩理由后指出阿根廷在国际仲裁庭抗辩的失败归结于阿根廷双边投资条约的规定。文章同时指出国际投资仲裁规则的缺陷对阿根廷仲裁案件也产生了不利影响。
第五章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机国内层面的应对措施作出了实证考察。阿根廷官员和学者对ICSID体制提出严厉的批评,并试图采取措施阻止仲裁裁决在阿根廷国内的执行。阿根廷最高法院也通过判例表明,任何不合宪、不合法、不合理的仲裁裁决均须受到阿根廷国内法院的审查。在对上述措施进行考察以后,本文指出阿根廷国内应对措施面临巨大的风险。
第六章在分析阿根廷国际仲裁危机的基础上对中国双边投资条约缔约实践作出分析与评价,并提出修改中国双边投资条约的意见,寻求投资者财产利益保护与东道国主权权利行使的平衡。
Argentina was one of the richest countries in the world in the early 20's century. Argentina experienced a very serious economic crisis from the late 2001 to the early 2002. In order to alleviate the effect of the crisis, the government announced that Argentina was in a state of emergency, the parliament promulgated the law of emergency. The actions taken prevented the breakdown of the economy, meanwhile the foreign investors suffered tremendous economic loses. So many foreign investors filed the request for arbitration against the Argentina Republic with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Up to the 20 August 2008, there are 47 cases against Argentina in the ICSID, most of which related to the economic crisis. In most of the cases concluded, Argentina was defeated. Thus Argentina experiences another serious crisis in the field of international investment arbitration. The phenomenon of Argentina is unprecedented in the history of ICSID and in the history of international investment arbitration.
The subject of the dissertation is the crisis experienced by Argentina in the field of international investment arbitration. The dissertation will introduce the background of the crisis, trying to find out the reasons, discussing the measures Argentina taken in the international arbitral tribunals, the means will be taken in the courts of Argentina. The dissertation points out that the economic crisis directly caused the international investment arbitration crisis and the investment law reformation constitutes the basic reason. In the late 1990, Argentina signed lots of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which abandoned the Calvo Doctrine, accepted the jurisdiction of ICSID, and accorded the foreign investors high level protection. It is the BITs that caused the failure of Argentina in most of the cases. Trying to review the awards and denying them in the courts of Argentina is very unadvisable, which will lead Argentina to breach its international treaty obligation and will do harm to Argentina's reputation in the international business society.
Just like Argentina, China is a developing country. The primary task of China is to stimulate the development of the economy. In order to improve the investment environment, China has changed its attitude to the BIT, giving the foreign investor high level protection. Despite now there are no cases against China in ICSID, China should make ready for it. China should amend the regulations of the BITs; balance the protection to the investors and the host state, thus avoiding the crisis.
Besides preamble and conclusion, the dissertation comprises six chapters.
Chapter 1 introduces the Argentina's international investment crisis briefly, which composed of three parts. Part 1 introduces the fundamental theory of international investment arbitration. Part 2 gives out the cases now Argentina facing. Part 3 discusses the background of the crisis.
Chapter 2 analyzes the jurisprudential reason of the crisis. Firstly, the dissertation explicates the history and the meaning of Calvo Doctrine, finds out that Calvo Doctrine is the most powerful weapon that the developing countries could use to oppose the jurisdiction of international arbitration tribunal. Then the dissertation points out that Argentina abandoned the Calvo Doctrine when it signed the BITs, which caused the crisis.
Chapter 3 analyzes another jurisprudential reason of the crisis. According to the BITs, Argentina accepted the jurisdiction of the international arbitration tribunals; meanwhile Argentina granted the foreign investors high level protection. It is the regulations of the BITs caused the crisis.
Chapter 4 reviews the objections of Argentina to the cases in ICSID. The dissertation explicates and appraises the objections to the jurisdiction and to the merits, pointing out that the regulations of the Argentina's BITs caused the failure. The defects of international arbitration process aggravated the situation.
Chapter 5 reviews the measures Argentina will take in its own country. Because the awards released contradicted each other, Argentine officials and scholars sternly criticized the ICSID system. The supreme court of Argentina also said that any awards that are unconstitutional, illegal or unreasonable must be reviewed by the Argentine courts. After analyzing the measures above, the dissertation indicates that it is unadvisable for Argentina to take such measures.
Chapter 6 compares the Bilateral Investment Treaties signed by China with that of Argentina, putting forward the suggestions to perfect the BIT of China to prevent China from experiencing such crisis.
因此,本文以阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作为研究对象,探讨阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的背景、原因以及阿根廷在国际层面和国内层面的应对措施。通过考察,本文指出阿根廷经济危机是阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的直接原因,阿根廷国际投资法律自由化改革是阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的根本原因。20世纪90年代末期,阿根廷签订的双边投资条约背弃了卡尔沃主义,完全接受了国际投资仲裁机构的管辖权,并给予外国投资者高标准的保护。正是阿根廷双边投资条约过于自由化的规定导致阿根廷在国际层面的抗辩多以失败告终。阿根廷试图通过国内司法审查的方式否定仲裁裁决在阿根廷国内的执行又蕴含着极大的危险,这种救济方式将导致阿根廷违背《ICSID公约》的规定,损害阿根廷在国际商业社会的声誉。
中国与阿根廷同属于发展中国家,都面临着大力发展本国经济的重任。为了改善中国的投资环境,中国双边投资条约也出现了自由化的趋势。虽然目前在ICSID体制内尚未出现以中国为被申请人的案件,但是这种可能性并非不存在。中国应当未雨绸缪,吸取阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的教训,修改中国双边投资条约的规定,平衡投资者的财产利益与东道国主权权利,防止中国重蹈阿根廷的覆辙。
除前言与结论外,本论文共分为六章。
第一章首先对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作出概要介绍。本章主要涉及三个问题,即国际投资仲裁的基本理论问题、阿根廷国际投资仲裁涉案情况和阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机的社会经济背景分析。
第二章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作出了法理分析。本章主要涉及阿根廷国内投资法律体制的自由化改革。在本章中,笔者将首先对卡尔沃主义进行历史回顾,并对阿根廷传统国际投资法对卡尔沃主义的坚持作出介绍。然后笔者将对阿根廷国际投资法制自由化改革作出介绍与评价,指出阿根廷国际投资法制对卡尔沃主义的背弃构成了阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机深层次的国内法原因。
第三章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机作出了进一步的法理分析。文章首先对阿根廷双边投资条约的程序条款做出分析,指出阿根廷双边投资条约完全接受了ICSID的仲裁管辖权,背弃了卡尔沃主义。其次对阿根廷双边投资条约的实体条款做出分析,指出阿根廷双边投资条约赋予投资者高标准的保护。正是阿根廷双边投资条约过于自由化的规定导致阿根廷在国际投资仲裁危机面前捉襟见肘,应对无门。
第四章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机在国际层面的应对措施作出了实证考察。文章在分析了阿根廷的主要抗辩理由后指出阿根廷在国际仲裁庭抗辩的失败归结于阿根廷双边投资条约的规定。文章同时指出国际投资仲裁规则的缺陷对阿根廷仲裁案件也产生了不利影响。
第五章对阿根廷国际投资仲裁危机国内层面的应对措施作出了实证考察。阿根廷官员和学者对ICSID体制提出严厉的批评,并试图采取措施阻止仲裁裁决在阿根廷国内的执行。阿根廷最高法院也通过判例表明,任何不合宪、不合法、不合理的仲裁裁决均须受到阿根廷国内法院的审查。在对上述措施进行考察以后,本文指出阿根廷国内应对措施面临巨大的风险。
第六章在分析阿根廷国际仲裁危机的基础上对中国双边投资条约缔约实践作出分析与评价,并提出修改中国双边投资条约的意见,寻求投资者财产利益保护与东道国主权权利行使的平衡。
Argentina was one of the richest countries in the world in the early 20's century. Argentina experienced a very serious economic crisis from the late 2001 to the early 2002. In order to alleviate the effect of the crisis, the government announced that Argentina was in a state of emergency, the parliament promulgated the law of emergency. The actions taken prevented the breakdown of the economy, meanwhile the foreign investors suffered tremendous economic loses. So many foreign investors filed the request for arbitration against the Argentina Republic with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Up to the 20 August 2008, there are 47 cases against Argentina in the ICSID, most of which related to the economic crisis. In most of the cases concluded, Argentina was defeated. Thus Argentina experiences another serious crisis in the field of international investment arbitration. The phenomenon of Argentina is unprecedented in the history of ICSID and in the history of international investment arbitration.
The subject of the dissertation is the crisis experienced by Argentina in the field of international investment arbitration. The dissertation will introduce the background of the crisis, trying to find out the reasons, discussing the measures Argentina taken in the international arbitral tribunals, the means will be taken in the courts of Argentina. The dissertation points out that the economic crisis directly caused the international investment arbitration crisis and the investment law reformation constitutes the basic reason. In the late 1990, Argentina signed lots of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), which abandoned the Calvo Doctrine, accepted the jurisdiction of ICSID, and accorded the foreign investors high level protection. It is the BITs that caused the failure of Argentina in most of the cases. Trying to review the awards and denying them in the courts of Argentina is very unadvisable, which will lead Argentina to breach its international treaty obligation and will do harm to Argentina's reputation in the international business society.
Just like Argentina, China is a developing country. The primary task of China is to stimulate the development of the economy. In order to improve the investment environment, China has changed its attitude to the BIT, giving the foreign investor high level protection. Despite now there are no cases against China in ICSID, China should make ready for it. China should amend the regulations of the BITs; balance the protection to the investors and the host state, thus avoiding the crisis.
Besides preamble and conclusion, the dissertation comprises six chapters.
Chapter 1 introduces the Argentina's international investment crisis briefly, which composed of three parts. Part 1 introduces the fundamental theory of international investment arbitration. Part 2 gives out the cases now Argentina facing. Part 3 discusses the background of the crisis.
Chapter 2 analyzes the jurisprudential reason of the crisis. Firstly, the dissertation explicates the history and the meaning of Calvo Doctrine, finds out that Calvo Doctrine is the most powerful weapon that the developing countries could use to oppose the jurisdiction of international arbitration tribunal. Then the dissertation points out that Argentina abandoned the Calvo Doctrine when it signed the BITs, which caused the crisis.
Chapter 3 analyzes another jurisprudential reason of the crisis. According to the BITs, Argentina accepted the jurisdiction of the international arbitration tribunals; meanwhile Argentina granted the foreign investors high level protection. It is the regulations of the BITs caused the crisis.
Chapter 4 reviews the objections of Argentina to the cases in ICSID. The dissertation explicates and appraises the objections to the jurisdiction and to the merits, pointing out that the regulations of the Argentina's BITs caused the failure. The defects of international arbitration process aggravated the situation.
Chapter 5 reviews the measures Argentina will take in its own country. Because the awards released contradicted each other, Argentine officials and scholars sternly criticized the ICSID system. The supreme court of Argentina also said that any awards that are unconstitutional, illegal or unreasonable must be reviewed by the Argentine courts. After analyzing the measures above, the dissertation indicates that it is unadvisable for Argentina to take such measures.
Chapter 6 compares the Bilateral Investment Treaties signed by China with that of Argentina, putting forward the suggestions to perfect the BIT of China to prevent China from experiencing such crisis.
引文
[1]徐崇利.国际投资法中的重大争议问题与我国的对策[J].中国社会科学,1994,(1):23-38.
[2]1990年,美国国际经济研究所在华盛顿召开了一个讨论80年代后期以来拉美经济调整和改革的研讨会。出席会议的有拉美国家的政府官员、美国财政部等部门的官员、金融界和企业界人士以及世界上若干高等院校和研究机构的经济学家。世界银行、国际货币基金组织以及面向拉美的美洲开发银行等国际机构的代表也参加了会议。在会议的最后阶段,该研究所前所长约翰·威廉姆斯说,经过讨论,与会者在拉美国家已经采用和将要采用的十个政策取向方面取得了较为一致的看法,甚至在一定程度上达成了共识。由于上述国际机构的总部和美国财政部都在华盛顿,加之会议又是在华盛顿召开的,因此这一共识可以被称作“华盛顿共识”。威廉姆斯在会后将会议论文汇编成册,并于同年出版。在这本题为《拉美调整的成效》的论文集中,威廉姆斯更加明确的阐述了拉美国家在经济调整和改革过程中应该采纳的“处方”。它包括以下十个方面的政策取向:(1)加强财政纪律,压缩财政赤字,降低通货膨胀率,稳定宏观经济形势。(2)把政府开支的重点转向经济效益高的领域以及有利于改善收入分配的领域(如文教卫生和基础设施)。(3)开展税制改革,降低边际税率,扩大税基。(4)实施利率市场化。(5)采用一种具有竞争力的汇率制度。(6)实施贸易自由化,开放市场。(7)放松对外资的限制。(8)对国有企业实施私有化。(9)放松政府的管制。(10)保护私人财产权。江时学,新自由主义、“华盛顿共识”与拉美国家的改革[J].当代世界与社会主义,2003,(6):31.
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[1][宋]“以铜为鉴,可正衣冠;以古为鉴,可知兴替;以人为鉴,可知得失”。欧阳修、宋祁.新唐书.卷九七,列传二十二,魏征[M].北京:中华书局,1975.3880.
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[3]他们之间的冲突,导致了20世纪70年代联合国大会一系列有关建立国际经济新秩序宣言的出现。陈安.国际经济法刍言[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,61-64.
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[3]Id.
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[3]同上,第56页。
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[2]UNCTAD.Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement[Z].http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/webiteiia200611_en.pdf.2008-8-16.
[1]参见ICSID网站,at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language =English.2008-8-16.
[2]参见ICSID网站,at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases.2008-8-16.
[3]OLORUNDA,DANIEL O.To Peg or not to Peg:The Pro and Cons of Pegging the Argentine Peso to the U.S.Dollar and Balancing FDI Incentives.[J].Regent Journal of International Law,2003/2004,(2):59.
[4]江时学.阿根廷经济危机的由来及其教训[J].拉丁美洲研究,2002.(2):1.
[5]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.前言。
[1]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.30-31.
[2]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.世界银行指出阿经济危机已经探底[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200210/20021000043146.html,2008-8-18.
[3]SHIHATA,IBRAHIM E I.The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment:The Role of the World Bank,with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA[J].American University Journal of International Law,1986,(1):104-106.
[1]参见ICSID网站,http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases.2008-8-14.
[2]DANINO,ROBERTO.Opening Remarks Presented at the Symposium on "Making the Most of International Investment Agreements:A Common Agenda"[z].Co-organized by ICSID,OECD and UNCITRAD,25 December 2005,Paris.See,http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en 2649 33783766 35501697 1111,00.html.2008-8-20.
[3]Compania Aguas del Aconquija.S.A & Compagnie Generale Eaux v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/97/3),Award of 21 November 2000.
[1]由于UNCITRAL秉承仲裁秘密性原则,因此笔者无法确知UNCITRAL体制下,涉及阿根廷的案件。
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentina Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on the Argentina Republic's Request for a continued stay of the enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,para.23.
[2]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged by the Argentine Government.[EB/OL].http://www.mondaq.com,2008-08-20.
[3]ALFARO,CARLOS E.& LORENTI,PEDRO M.The Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals—A Conflict between International and Domestic Law.[J].The Journal of World Trade and Investment,2005,6(3):417.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/08),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.468-471.
[5]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,paras,1-3.
[6]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine Public of 25 September 2007.para.163.
[1]Enron Corporation v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007.
[2]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007.
[3]参见ICISD网站资料,http:/icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending.2008-8-20.
[4]陈安.中外双边投资协定中四大“安全阀”不宜贸然拆除[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.27.
[5]SNYDER,EDWARD C.The Menem Revolution in Argentina:Progress toward a Hemispheric Free Trade Area[J].Texas International Law Journal,1994,(29):101.
[1][美]艾·巴·托马斯.拉丁美洲史[M].寿进文译.商务印书馆,1973.466-471.
[2]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996:吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002;江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.
[3]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.11.
[4]张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.348.
[1]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.2.
[2]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.283.
[3]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.2.
[4]同本页注①,第12-14页。
[5]同本页注①,第14-15页。
[1]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.284.
[2][英]L·贝瑟尔,主编.剑桥拉丁美洲史(中文版)[M].中国社会科学院拉丁美洲研究所组译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,1992.41.
[1]江时学.拉丁美洲发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.20.
[2]李明德,江时学,主编.现代化:拉美和东亚的发展模式[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000.105.
[3]江时学.拉美与东亚发展模式比较研究[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2001.28.
[4]庇隆在阿根廷历史上,曾经两次执政。第一次为1946年至1955年,第二次为1973年至1976年。第二届庇隆政府先后由奉行庇隆主义的正义党领导人坎波拉、庇隆和马丁内斯·德·庇隆执政。参见吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002,289-290.苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国家经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.60.
[1]1946年,庇隆决定以1.5亿英镑赎买英国资本的24000公里铁路及其附属设施,以1100万英镑赎买法国资本的铁路,以相当于3.19亿比索的外汇赎买美国资本的电话公司。苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国际经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.41.
[2]庇隆政府执政后期,阿根廷的经济出现严重困难:通货恶性膨胀(1976年批发价上涨449%);生产停滞、下降(1976年国内生产总值下降2.9%);国际支付手段濒于枯竭(1976年3月,国际储备中可自由支配的外汇仅2300万美元,只及支付当年进口总额的0.8%)。苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国家经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.60.
[3]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.286-287;江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.92-93.
[4]阿根廷投资立法深受拉丁美洲国家投资立法的影响。在进口替代经济发展模式期间,拉丁美洲国家对外国直接投资普遍采取了限制的政策,制定了比较严格的外资政策。例如1970年,安第斯条约组织制定了《对待外资、商标、专利、许可证和特许权的共同条例》即第24号决议。这一条例从1971年7月起正式实施,主要内容包括:(1)外资企业每年汇出利润不得超过外国投资额的14%;(2)外资企业每年的利润再投资不得超过外国投资额的5%;(3)禁止新的外资进入水、电、交通等公用事业及银行业、保险业、报纸杂志、电台和电视等行业;(4)在上述部门已有的外资企业必须在3年内至少把80%的股票出售给本国投资人,使外资企业转变为民族企业;(5)在安第斯条约组织成员国的现有外资企业,必须逐步出让股权给本国投资人,以便在15年至20年限期内使本国资本在这些企业内至少掌握51%的股权而把企业转变为合营企业。参见:张森根,拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.346.
[5]张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.347-348.
[1]据美国摩根信托银行估计,到1980年石油资金盈余累计达2000多亿美元,相当于70年代后期欧洲货币市场拥有的欧洲美元的近1/3。陈芝芸.拉丁美洲对外经济关系[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2007.89.
[2]同上。
[3]同上。
[4]同上。
[5]同上,第90页。
[1]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.293.
[2]20世纪70年代,包括阿根廷在内的拉丁美洲国家的债务危机与这些国家大多数年份平均三位数的通货膨胀率存在因果关系。借入外债有生产性用途和非生产性用途。生产性用途的大量借债使投资过度扩张,在投资未形成生产能力和实现最终产品之前会使需求扩张先于供给的增加,从而推进通过膨胀。而非生产性用途的大量借债,则往往直接增加货币投放量,使通货膨胀率加速上升。而在发生债务危机的时,为了还债而紧缩经济,引起经济萎靡,破坏了供给能力,又从另一个角度推进通货膨胀。陈芝芸.拉丁美洲对外经济关系[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2007.98.
[3]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.64.
[4]同上,第65页。
[5]同本页注①,第299-300页。
[1]PADDOCK,JOHN V.Comment:IMF Policy and the Argentina Crisis[J].Miami Inter-American Law Review,2002,winter,(34):156.
[2]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.97-102.
[3]由于阿根廷与许多南美国家一样奉行伊比利亚天主教文化,这种文化的特点之一是鼓励消费。阿根廷人的超前消费意识是很强的,国民储蓄率一直很低,以1998年为例,阿根廷的储蓄率为17.4%,既低于拉美的平均水平19%,又低于巴西的18.6%,墨西哥的22.4%和智利的25.2%,更低于韩国的33.8%。事实上阿根廷的人均GDP不如韩国,1998年两国分别为8030美元和8600美元,但是阿根廷的年个人人均消费为7818美元,而韩国仅为6695美元。江时学,阿根廷经济的由来及其教训[J].拉丁美洲研究,2002.(2):2.
[4]BOUZAS,ROBERTO.&CHUDNOVSKY,DANIEL.Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development——the Argentina Experience[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_renort_argentina.pdf,2008-08-19.
[1]BOUZAS,ROBERTO.& CHUDNOVSKY,DANIEL.Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development——the Argentina Experience[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_report_argentina.pdf,2008-O8-19.
[2]ROSA,PAOLO,DI.The Recent Wave of Arbitrations against Argentina under Bilateral Investment Treaties:Background and Principal Legal Issues[J].The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,2004,(36):48.
[3]见本文第一章第二节第三目。
[4]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.313.
[5]同上。
[6]同上,第314页。
[7]FALCONE,JAYSON J.Argentina's Plight-An Unusual Temporary Solution to a Sovereign Debt Crisis[J].Suffolk Transnational Law Review,2004,(27):357.
[8]叶姿攸.90年代外国直接投资对阿根廷经济发展影响之研究(硕士学位论文)[D].台北:淡江大学,民国94年.45.
[9]高静.阿根廷经济危机前后的外国直接投资[J].拉丁美洲研究,2003,(3):20.
[1]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.29-31.
[2]同上,第29-45页。
[1]宋晓平.阿根廷陷入经济和社会危机[J].拉丁美洲研究.2002,(1):18.
[2]同上。
[3]以一家阿根廷电力外资企业为例来说明这一问题。这家电力公司向消费者提供电力服务,在政府改革前,假如某一消费者消费30美元电力,在其向投资商支付时按1:1的兑换率支付给投资者30比索,投资者再按1:1的兑换率向阿根廷银行兑换30美元。而在货币“比索化”改革后,根据《公共紧急状态法》的规定,投资者应向消费者收取的30美元使用费按照1:1兑换率以比索计价,消费者向投资者支付30比索使用费,投资者按比索对美元的市场价即3:1的兑换率向阿根廷银行兑换10美元,同时禁止投资者涨价抵消货币贬值给他们带来的损失。阿根廷政府这样的做法旨在平稳公共产品的市场价格,维护社会的稳定,从而促进经济的复苏。ROSA,PAOLO DI.The Recent Wave of Arbitration against Argentina under Bilateral Investment Treaties:Background and Principal Legal Issues[J].The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,2004,(36):47.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.54.
[5]叶姿攸.90年代外国直接投资对阿根廷经济发展影响之研究(硕士学位论文)[D].台北:淡江大学,民国94年.72.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.57.
[2]Id.,para.58.
[3]Id.,para.68.
[4]Id.,para.60.
[5]Id.,para.61.
[6]Id.,para.65.
[7]Id.,para.4.
[1]陈安,主编.国际经济法专论[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2002.63-72.
[2]余劲松,主编.国际投资法[M].北京:法律出版社,1994.130-132.
[3]同上,第242页。
[4]关于发达资本输出国与发展中资本输入国之间的斗争与对抗,中外法学家都做过充分的研究与分析。参见:徐崇利.从南北纷争焦点的转移看国际投资法的晚近发展[J].比较法研究,1997,(1).
[1]关于建立国际经济新秩序的斗争,参见:陈安.国际经济法刍言[M].北京:北京出版社,2002.61-64.
[2]Secretary Hull responded in an August 22,1938 note with his now-famous assertion of the international legal standard of compensation:"Under every rule of law and equity,no government is entitled to expropriate private property,for whatever purpose,without provision for prompt,adequate and effective payment…"LEVY,TALL NAFTA's Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation:A Reassessment of the "Prompt,Adequate and Effective"Standard[J].Stanford Journal of International Law,1995,(31):427.
[3]SORNARAJAH,M.,ed.The International Law on Foreign Investment(2)[M].New York:Cambridge university press,2004.19.
[4]Id.,pp.18-19.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.5.
[2]Id.
[3]Id.
[4][美]艾·巴·托马斯.拉丁美洲史[M].寿进文译.商务印书馆,1973.434-537.
[5]DALRYMPLE,CHRISTOPHER K.Politics and Foreign Direct Investment-The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Clavo Clause[J].Cornell International Law Journal,1996,(29):165.
[6]同本页注①,第10页。
[7]同本页注①,第11页。
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.12.
[2]Id.,p.13.
[3]原文为:"the public debt of an American State can not occasion armed intervention,nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power."SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.14-15.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.15.
[2]CALVO,CHARLES.Le droit international theorique et pratique(5th)[M].Paris:Librairie nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence,1896.350.see:HEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.18.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.
[5]Id.
[6]Id.
[1]SHAN,WENHUA.Is Calvo Dead?[J].American Journal of Comparative Law,2007,(55):124.
[2]First,that sovereign states,being free and independent,enjoy the fight,on the basis of equality,to freedom from "interference of any sort" by other states,whether it be by force or diplomacy,and second,that aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to nationals,and that therefore they may seek redress for grievances only before the local authorities.These two concepts of nonintervention and absolute equality of foreigners with nationals are the essence of the Calvo Doctrine.SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.19.
[3]MANNING-CABROL,DENISE.The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle:Equality of Foreign and National Investors[J].Law and Policy in International Business,(26):1172.
[4]参见单文华.卡尔沃主义的死亡与再生[A].际安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.:SHAN,WENHUA.Is Calvo Dead[J].American Journal of Comparative Law,2007,(55):123;VANDEVELDE,KENNETH J.Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime[J].Michigan Journal of International Law,1998,(19):379-381.
[1]SHAN,WENHUA.Is Calvo Dead?[J].American Journal of Comparative Law,2007,(55):127.
[2]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.20.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.,p.23.
[5]Id.,p.27.
[1]Calvo Clause is an attempt to implement the Calvo Doctrine by including in contracts concluded with aliens a provision which binds the alien to local redress and obligates him to forgo his right of appeal for diplomatic protection in case of any dispute or controversy which might arise from the contractual relationships.SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.28.
[2]Id.
[3]Id.,p.45.
[4]Id.,pp.30-31.
[5]1910年,墨西哥发生针对Porfirio Diaz政权的革命,此后墨西哥国内政治形式的混乱与动荡给墨西哥境内的外国投资者造成了极大的损失。在几次努力失败后,1923年9月8日,美国终于与墨西哥签署条约成立美国—墨西哥仲裁委员会处理墨西哥革命期间,美国投资者在墨西哥境内遭受损失的赔偿问题。随后,法国、德国、英国、意大利、西班牙和比利时分别与墨西哥签订条约,成立委员会以国际仲裁的方式解决他们之间的争端。SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.194-195.
[6]Id.,pp.194-230.
[7]Id.,p.217.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.222.
[2]Id.,p.216.
[3]Id.,p.207.
[4]Id.,pp.121-193.
[5]Id.,pp.231-257.
[1]截至2007年12月4日,拉丁美洲共有22个国家签署《华盛顿公约》加入ICSID。其中20世纪60年代,有3个国家签署并批准《公约》,分别是牙买加(1965年)、特立尼达和多巴哥(1966年)、圭亚那(1969年);20世纪80年代有7个国家签署并批准《公约》,分别是巴拉圭(1981年)、巴巴多斯岛(1981年)、哥斯达黎加(1981年)、萨尔瓦多(1982年)、圣卢西亚(1984)、厄瓜多尔(1986)、洪都拉斯(1986);20世纪90年代共有11个国家签署并批准《公约》,分别是阿根廷(1991年)、秘鲁(1991年)、格林纳达(1991年)、乌拉圭(1992年)、哥伦比亚(1993年)、委内瑞拉(1993年)、尼加拉瓜(1994年)、圣基茨和尼维斯(1994年)、巴拿马(1995年)、危地马拉(1995年)、巴哈马群岛(1995年);2001年,圣文森特和格林纳丁斯签署并批准《公约》。此外,玻利维亚1991年5月3日签署《公约》,1995年6月23日批准《公约》,《公约》于1995年7月23日对玻利维亚生效。玻利维亚于2007年5月2日通知中心退出《公约》,2007年12月3日玻利维亚退出《公约》的行为生效。See,ICSID.List of Contracting States and other signatories of the Convention[EB/OL].http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&ReqFro m=Main.2008-8-6.
[2]根据谢伊考证,在拉丁美洲国家中,只有阿根廷、海地和多米尼加共和国没有采用卡尔沃条款。See SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.275-279.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.194.
[2]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.7.
[3]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.283.
[4]苏振兴,主编.拉丁美洲的经济发展[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2000.270.
[5]同本页注②,第284页。
[1]张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.347-348.
[2]阿根廷1958年8月26日签署《纽约公约》,1989年3月14日批准该公约,1989年6月12日《纽约公约》对阿根廷生效。见联合国国际贸易法委员会网站,http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/zh/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.2008-8-20.
[3]江时学,主编.拉美国家的经济改革[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1998.32.
[4]复旦大学拉丁美洲研究室.拉丁美洲经济[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1986.598.
[5]修改的主要内容包括:(1)外资利润汇出率的限制,从每年14%提高到20%,并允许各成员国批准更高的利润汇出率;(2)外资利润再投资的限额从每年5%提高到7%,允许各成员国同意外国企业把超额利润用于再投资或用于对其他公司进行投资,这些再投资或投资都作为新的外国直接投资对待;(3)外资企业可以取得当地的短期和中期信贷(过去规定只能取得短期信贷),但不能取得当地的长期信贷;(4)外国投资人可以利用资本增值购买当地本国企业或合营企业的股票,但这些企业外资股权不得超过49%;(5)关于外资企业向本国投资人出售股份以便在限期内转变为民族企业或合营企业的办法,修改为也可通过增加本国投资人的资本来实现这一目标;经营旅游业的外资企业或合营企业可不必逐步减少外资股份;(6)外资企业限期转为民族企业或合营企业的起算日期从1971年7月1日推迟到1974年7月1日;(7)安约成员国的相互投资人尽管可以和其他外国投资者一样汇出利润和抽回资本,仍将享有特殊待遇,可以和本国投资人同样对待;(8)非安约成员国的拉美国家的投资人可以享有比本地区外国家投资人更为优惠的待遇;(9)大幅度降低对外的最低共同关税。张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.349.
[1]政局动荡是二次世界大战之后阿根廷政治的一大特点。1930年至1999年,阿根廷政府变更25次,其中军人执政达到14次之多。军人频频干预政治,导致政府更迭频繁,造成经济政策的多变。新政府上台后大多改变前届政府的经济政策,在很多情况下往往是政策方向上的逆转。吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.288.1976年3月,阿根廷武装部队发动政变,推翻了又一届庇隆主义政府,陆军司令魏地拉出任总统。魏地拉政府与庇隆政府的经济思想与经济政策截然不同,其中许多政策措施是与庇隆政府针锋相对的。苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国家经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.60-61.
[2]BOUZAS,ROBERTO & CHUDNOVSKY,DANIEL.Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development,The Recent Argentina Experience[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_report_argentina.pdf.2008-5-8.
[3]参见ICISD网站,http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&ReqFro m=Main.2008-8-20.
[1]陈安.中外双边投资协定中的四大“安全阀”不宜贸然拆除[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.26.
[2]前14位国家及所缔结的双边投资条约数量分别是德国(124)、瑞士(95)、中国(94)、英国(92)、法国(92)、罗马尼亚(90)、埃及(84)、意大利(77)、荷兰(72)、马亚西亚(63)、波兰(62)、比利时—卢森堡(62)、韩国(60)及土耳其(59)。如果考虑到英国与法国、波兰与比利时—卢森堡的缔结数量分别并列为92和62,阿根廷的位次可以从第15位上午至第13位。
[1][英]伊恩·布朗利.国际公法原理[M].曾令良等译,北京:法律出版社,2003.121;梁西,主编.国际法[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993.90.
[2]当然,这只是从法律层面对跨国公司与东道国政府间的关系进行判断得出跨国公司处于弱者地位的结论。但是在实践中,许多跨国公司所拥有的经济实力以及政治影响力,丝毫不逊于,甚至已经超过许多主权国家。参见陈安,蔡从燕,主编.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2007.3.
[1]第2条主要规定了国民待遇、最惠国待遇、最低国际待遇及法律、法规透明度义务。
[1]ICSID公约第26条规定:“除非另有规定,双方同意根据本公约交付仲裁,应视为同意排除任何其他补救办法而交付上述仲裁。缔约国可以要求用尽当地各种行政或司法补救办法,作为其同意根据本公约交付仲裁的一个条件。”
[1]见本文第二章第二节第三目(三)列表。
[1]所谓岔路口条款是指对于东道国当地救济和国际投资仲裁,投资者只能选择其一,且一旦做出选择便是终局性选择。有关岔路口条款详见本节二(二)的论述。
[1]根据UNCTAD网站提供的英文版和法文版共计19个阿根廷双边投资条约,这19个双边投资条约的缔约另一方分别是英国(1990)、加拿大(1991)、法国(1991)、瑞士(1991)、瑞典(1991)、美国(1991)、中国(1992)、荷兰(1992)、亚美尼亚(1993)、保加利亚(1993)、罗马尼亚(1993)、芬兰(1993)、牙买加(1994)、韩国(1994)、澳大利亚(1995)、希腊(1999)、新西兰(1999)、菲律宾(1999)、泰国(2000),仅有阿根廷—美国式双边投资条约做出了彻底接受国际投资仲裁机构管辖权的规定。
[2]与英国BIT做出相同规定的双边投资条约的另一缔约方分别为:瑞士、韩国、荷兰、加拿大。
[3]与希腊BIT做出相同规定的双边投资条约的另一缔约方分别为:澳大利亚、保加利亚、菲律宾、芬兰、罗马尼亚、瑞典、泰国、中国、亚美尼亚、牙买加、法国。
[4]BIT between Argentina Republic and New Zealand(1999):" Article 12(4):Paragraph(3) of this Article shall not constitute,by itself,the content of the Contracting Party required in Article 25(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes opened for signature in Washington on 18 March 1965."
[1]Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.The Kingdom of Spain(ICSID Case no.ARB/97/7),Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25,2000,para.39.
[1]Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.The Kingdom of Spain(ICSID Case no.ARB/97/7),Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25,2000,para.38.
[2]Id.,para.40.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.,para.64.
[5]Id.,paras.48-50.
[6]Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.The Kingdom of Spain(ICSID Case no.ARB/97/7),Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25,2000,paras.54-56.
[7]与墨菲兹尼案做出相同裁决的仲裁案件包括:Simens v.Argentina案,Camuzzi v.Argentina案,Gas Natural v.Argentina案,Tecmed v.Mexico案,Interaguas v.Argentina案,Grid v.Argentina案,Vivendi v.Argentina 案。参见徐崇利.从实体到程序:最惠国待遇适用范围之争[J].法商研究,2007,(2):42.
[1]王海浪.ICSID管辖权新问题与中国新对策研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2006.60.
[2]有关本案,详见本文第四章第一节一(一)。
[1]王海浪.ICSID管辖权新问题与中国新对策研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2006.64.
[2]所谓国际投资仲裁正当性危机,基本含义是指国际投资仲裁由于在解决国际投资争端方面不胜任而引发的信任危机。参见陈安,蔡从燕,主编.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007.165.
[3]COSBEY,AARON & MANN,HOWARD & PETERSON,LUKE ERIC & MOLTKE,KONRAD VON.Investment and Sustainable Development:A Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_invest_and_sd.pdf.2008-08-19.
[1]在2001-2002年的总结报告中,ICC与SCC官员承认国际投资案件在他们所处理的所有案件当中只占据很小的比例。然而,在过去的五年当中,这两个机构受理的投资案件却呈大幅上升趋势。但是由于它们的保密制度,这两个机构总共受理多少投资仲裁案件,有多少是根据双边投资条约提起的不得而知。PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.All Road Lead out of Rome:Divergent Paths of Disputes Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_nautilus.pdf.2008-08-19.
[2]例如S.D.Myer Inc.v.Government of Canada案,利用联合国贸发会议仲裁程序(UNCITRAL)进行仲裁,实行保密制度。当加拿大对仲裁结果不服,在加拿大国内提起撤销之诉时,案件才进入公众的视线。
[3]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.All Road Lead out of Rome:Divergent Paths of Disputes Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_nautilus.pdf.2008-08-19.
[4]法庭之友(amicus curiae),是英美法系程序法中的一项重要制度。根据布莱克法律词典,法庭之友是指“对于一个诉讼标的具有强烈兴趣或见解,主动向法庭申请,或者根据法庭的要求向法庭提交陈述书的非争端当事人。”GARNER,BRAYAN A,ed.Black's Law Dictionary(7th Edition)[Z].ST.PAUL,MINN.,1999.83.根据《国际公法词典》,法庭之友被认为是英美法系的一个国内法概念,是指“在司法程序中向法庭提交有关案件事实或法律信息,帮助法庭作出正确裁决的非争端当事人的个人或组织。”SALMON,JEAN.Dictionnairc de Droit International Public[Z].Bruxelles:Bruylant Bruxelles,2001.62-63.
[1]例如Aguas Cordobesas S.A.,Suez,and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.v.Argentine Republic (Case No.ARB/03/18),2005年5月19日仲裁庭专门就ACIJ、CELS、CIEL等5个非政府组织作为法庭之友参与案件做出决定。在决定中仲裁庭指出,接受这些非政府组织的报告是仲裁庭的自由裁量权范围内的事,然而允许这些非政府组织参与案件则需要得到争议双方的同意。
[2]ICSID.Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations[EB/OL].http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/03-04-06.htm.2008-08-19.
[1]Sornarajah,M.The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment[J].Canadian Foreign Policy,Winter 2003,(2):10.
[2]参见《华盛顿公约》第52条第3款:任何一方可以根据下列一个或几个理由向秘书长提出书面申请要求取消裁决,(1)仲裁庭的组成不当;(2)仲裁庭显然超越其权力;(3)仲裁庭的一个成员有受贿行为;(4)有严重的背离基本的程序规则的情况;(5)裁决未陈述其所依据的理由。
[1]详见本文第四章第一节第二目。
[2]Lauder v.Czech Republic,UNCITRAL,Final Award of 3 September 2001.
[3]CME Czech Republic B.V.v.Czech Republic,UNCITRAL,Final Award of 14 March 2003.
[1]有关CMS诉阿根廷案与LG＆E诉阿根廷案的具体分析,详见本文第四章第二节。
[1]20世纪90年代以来,双边投资条约的数量急剧上升,仅2005年一年世界各国就缔结了70个双边投资条约,从而使全球双边投资条约的总数达到2495个。联合国贸发会议.2006年世界投资报告—来自发展中经济体和转型期经济体的外国直接投资:对发展的影响[EB/OL].http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflver.asp?docid=7431&intltemID=3968&lang=1&mode=downloads.2008-08-13.
[2]MANN,HOWARD.Private Rights,Public Problems,A Guide to NAFTA's Controversial Chapter on Investor rights[EB/OL],http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_citizensguide.pdf.2008-08-17.
[1]BIT between the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Argentina Republic(1990):"Desiring to create favorable conditions for greater investment by investors of one State in the territory of the other State;Recognizing that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under international agreement of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both States."
[2]BIT between Canada and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Recognizing that the promotion and the protection of investments of investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party will be conducive to the stimulation of business initiative and to the development of economic cooperation between them."
[3]BIT between the Hellenic Republic and the Argentina Republic(1999):"Desiring to intensify economic cooperation between the countries on a long term basis.Aiming at creating favorable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party.Recognizing that the promotion and protection of such investments on the basis of an Agreement will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both countries."
[4]BIT between the United States and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic resources."
[5]BIT between Australia and the Argentina Republic(1995):"Considering that investment relations should be promoted and economic cooperation strengthened in accordance with the internationally accepted principles of mutual respect for sovereignty,equality,mutual benefit,non-discrimination and mutual confidence;Acknowledging that investments of investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of one other Contracting Party would be made within the framework of laws of that other Contracting Party;and Recognizing that the promotion and protection of such investments on the basis of a bilateral agreement will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative to the benefit of both countries."
[1]UNCTAD.Scope and Definition[EB/OL].http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflver.asp?docid=189&intItemID=2322&lang=1.2008-08-14.
[2]投资的定义大体上分为三种类型:以资产为基础的投资定义;以企业为基础的投资定义;以交易为基础的投资定义。对投资的定义方式,主要采取了三种形式,即“开放式”投资定义、“封闭式”投资定义以及介于二者之间的“混合式”投资定义。以资产为基础的投资定义是指缔约各方依照各自法律和法规所允许或接受的各种财产。它不仅包括金融资产及经济概念上的资本,还包括具有创造生产能力的所有有形和无形资产。“开放式”投资定义,又称“非穷尽列举式”投资定义。是指国际投资协定列举出构成投资的各类资产,但是这种列举是非穷尽的。这类国际投资协定通常采用“包括但是不限于”之类的表述。UNCTAD.Scope and Definition[EB/OL].http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflver.asp?docid=189&intItemID=2322&lang=1.2008-5-4.:何树全.国际投资协定中的主要争议和未来的选择分析[J].社会科学,2004,(5):26-27.:詹晓宁,葛顺奇.国际投资协定:投资和投资者的范围与定义[J].国际经济合作,2003,(1):41-42.
[3]BIT between the United States of Ameriea and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 1:a)'investment' means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nations or companies of the other Party,such as:equity,debt,and service and investment contracts;and includes without limitation:(ⅰ) tangible and intangible property,including rights,such as mortgnges,liens and pledges;(ⅱ)a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof;(ⅲ) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value and directly related to an investment;(ⅳ)intellectual property which includes,inter alia,rights relating to:literary and artistic works,including sound recordings,inventions in all fields of human endeavor,industrial designs,semiconductor mask works,trade secrets,know-how,and confidential business information,and trademarks,service marks,and trade names;and(ⅴ)any right conferred by law or contract,and any licenses and permits pursuant to law."
[1]BIT between the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Argentina Republic:" Article 1:A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as investments.The term 'investment' includes all investments,whether made before or after the date of entry into force of this Agreement,but the provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to any dispute concerning an investment which arose,or any claim concerning an investment which was settled,before its entry into force."
[2]BIT between Finland and the Argentina Republic(1993):"Article 1:The term 'investment' means,in conformity with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment is made,every kind of asset invested by an investor of one Contracting Party in the other Contracting Party in accordance with the latter's laws."
[3]BIT between the Hellenic Republic and the Argentina Republic(1999):"Article 1:The meaning and scope of the different assets shall be determined by the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in the territory of which the investment has been made."
[4]S.D.Myer Inc.v.Government of Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),First Partial Award of 13 November 2000,para.232.
[5]Pope & Talbot Inc v.The Government of Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Interim Award of 26 June 2000,paras.96-99.
[1]BIT between the United States and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 2(1):Each Party shall permit and treat investment,and activities associated therewith,on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or companies,or of nationals or companies of any third country,whichever is the more favorable,subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol to this Treaty."
[2]BIT between Canada and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 4:Each Contracting Party shall,to the-extent possible and in accordance with its law and regulations,grant to investments or returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment no less favorable than that which it grants to investments or returns of its investors."
[3]BIT between Australia and the Argentina Republic(1995):"Article 5:Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments by investors of the other Contracting Party,made in its territory,treatment which is not less favorable than that which it accords to investments of investors of any third country and,subject to its laws,regulations and investment policies,than that which it accords to investments by its own investors."
[4]BIT between the Kingdom of Netherlands and the Argentina Republic(1992):"Article 3(2):Each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments the same security and protection as it accords either to those of its own investors or to those of investors of any third State,whichever is more favorable to the investor concerned."
[5]曾华群.国际投资法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.427.
[1]曾华群.国际投资法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.427.
[2]BIT between Canada and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 2(4):Investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment in accordance with principles international and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party."
[3]BIT between the United States and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 2(2)(b):Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management,operation,maintenance,use,enjoyment,acquisition,expansion,or disposal of investment."
[1]曾华群.国际投资法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.439-440.
[1]陈安.国际经济法刍言[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005.61-64.
[2]BIT between the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Argentina Republic(1990):"Article 5(1):Investment of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalized,expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the internal necds of that Contracting Party on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt,adequate and effective compensation."
[1]对于构成间接征收的行为,各国存在很大的分歧。根据国际投资协定和国际投资仲裁案例,以下三种行为往往被界定为间接投资:(1)等同于征收的措施(a measure tantamount to expropriation)。在这种情况下,虽然东道国政府没有直接夺取(taking)外国投资者的财产,但是它所采取措施的后果实际上剥夺了投资者根据投资享有的所有收益。(2)蚕食性征收(creeping expropriation)。东道国采取一系列的措施对外国投资者的投资进行直接或者间接征收。在这种情况下,单独从东道国的任一措施来看,并不构成征收,若综合所有措施的后果,便构成了间接征收。(3)管理性征收(regulatory expropriation)。在这种情况下,东道国采取立法措施对社会进行管理,但是对投资者的投资产生了不利的影响,从而被认定为间接征收。See OSBEY,AARON & MANN,HOWARD & PETERSON,LUKE RIC & MOLTKE,KONRAD VON.Investment and Sustainable Development:A Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=627.2008-08-14.
[1]英文原文为:The provisions of this Agreement shall in no way limit the right of either Contracting Party to take any measures(including the destruction of plants and animals,confiscation of property or the imposition of restrictions on stock movement)necessary for the protection of natural and physical resources or human health,provided such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination.
[2]英文原文为:This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order,the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace of security,or the Protection of its own essential security interests.
[3]根据UNCTAD提供的19个英文版和法文版阿根廷双边投资条约,仅有新西兰—阿根廷BIT和美国—阿根廷BIT做出了重大安全例外的规定。
[1]这两件UNCITRAL案件是根据1990年英国—阿根廷双边投资条约提起的AWG Group Ltd.v The Argentine Republic,UNCITRAL,Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2006;根据1990年英国—阿根廷双边投资条约提起的National Grid plc v.The Argentine Republic,UNCITRAL,Decision on Jurisdiction of 20 June 2006.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of July 17,2003,para.36.
[2]ICSID公约第25条第2款第2项规定:“在争端双发同意将争端交付调解或仲裁之日,具有作为争端一方的国家以外的某一缔约国国籍的任何法人,以及在上述日期也具有争端当事国的缔约国国籍的法人,而该法人因受外国控制,双方同意为了本公约的目的,应看作是另一缔约国国民。”
[3]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005;Camuzzi International S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/2),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005,para.29.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of July 17,2003,para.40.
[5]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005,para.37.
[6]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of July 17,2003,paras.43-65.
[1]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005.paras.45.
[2]Camuzzi International S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/2),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005,para.74.
[3]Id.,para.75.
[4]Id.,paras.83-91.
[1]Azurix Corporation.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/12),Decision on Jurisdiction of December 8,2003,paras.75-80.
[2]Id.,para.81.
[3]Id.,para.85.
[4]Id.,para.86.
[1]Azurix Corp.v.The Argentine Republic(Case No.ARB/01/12),Decision on Jurisdiction of December 8,2003,paras,para.87.
[2]Id.,para.90.
[3]Siemens A.G.v.The Argentine Republic(Case No.ARB/02/8),Decision on Jurisdiction of August 3,2004,para.60.
[4]Id.,para.62
[5]Id.,para.63.
[1]Siemens A.G.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/8),Decision on Jurisdiction of August 3,2004,paras.33-59.
[2]Id.,para.81.
[3]Id.,para.102.
[1]Siemens A.G v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/8),Decision on Jurisdiction of August 3,2004,paras.80-105.
[2]1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第26条规定:“凡有效之条约对其各当事国有拘束力,必须由各该国善意履行。”第27条规定:“一当事国不得援引其国内法规定为理由而不履行条约。此项规则不妨碍第46条。”
[1]原文为:"Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments."
[2]原文为:"The investments made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in whose territory they are undertaken,enjoy the full protection of this Agreement."
[3]根据王海浪博士的考证,目前国际投资仲裁庭倾向于采用保护伞条款扩展管辖权。王海浪.ICSID管辖权新问题与中国新对策研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2006.147-160.
[1]比如,1994年《英国与阿尔巴尼亚BIT》第3条明确规定:为避免产生疑义,缔约双方确认有关MFN 待遇的规定适用于争端解决机制。
[1]陈安,蔡从燕,主编.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2007.270-271.
[2]目前中国共向ICSID指派了八名法学家作为仲裁员和调解员,分别为厦门大学陈安教授、复旦大学陈泊东教授、武汉大学黄进教授、北京大学邵景春教授、中国政法大学王传丽教授、中国人民大学余劲松教授、外经贸部条法司李玲副司长、对外经贸大学沈四宝教授,任期至2010年4月27日。http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.2008-08-15.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.518-519.
[2]这6个案件分别为Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16);Camuzzi International S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/2):Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/17);Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Vivendi Universal S.A v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/19);Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A.and Vivendi Universal v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/97/3).
[1]第一个案件为AWG Group Ltd.v The Argentine Republic,由于该案与SSA&ISIA诉阿根廷案和SSA&Vivendi诉阿根廷案争议完全相同,因此这第三个案由同一个仲裁庭合并审理。阿根廷对仲裁员的异议,与上两个案件相同。第二个案件为National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic,在该案中,阿根廷对仲裁员贾德·凯斯勒(Judd Kessler)提出异议申请,仲裁庭最终拒绝了阿根廷是请求,并且根据UNCITRAL 的规定,仲裁庭拒绝当事方的仲裁员异议申请无需说明理由。阿根廷不服UNCITRAL的决定,于是在与投资者协商一致的情况下,将案件提交伦敦国际仲裁庭(London Court of International Arbitration,LCIA),由后者对仲裁员异议重新做出审理,并给出理由。由于该案首先根据UNCITRAL程序审理,其后移交伦敦国际仲裁庭,两者均遵循对案件保密的原则,因此笔者无法获得仲裁庭对该仲裁员异议的决定。有关于该案的介绍,详见Peterson,Luke Eric,Argentina and UK Firm Send Arbitrator-Challenge to Venue where Reasons are Provided[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_oct30_2007.pdf.2008.08-10.
[2]British Gas(BG)v.The Argentine Republic,在本案中,阿根廷提出了针对范登堡(van den Berg)教授仲裁员异议申请。
[3]由于有关这两个案件中,阿根廷对仲裁员的异议决定没有在ICSID网站上公布,因此有关这两个案件仲裁员异议的概要介绍参见CABRERA,FERNANDO & PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Argentina Moves to Disqualify Tribunal in Dispute over Admitting Earlier Rulings[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_investsd_may9_2007.pdf.2008-08-10.
[4]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),award of September 28,2007.
[1]即考夫曼作为Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A.and Vivendi Universal v.The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No.ARB/97/3).第二次仲裁程序仲裁庭的仲裁员。
[2]Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/17);Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Vivendi Universal S.A v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/19);and in the arbitration under the rules of UNCITRAL AWG Group Ltd.v.The Argentine Republic,Decision on the proposal for the disqualification of a member of the arbitral tribunal,October 22,2007,paras.12-13.
[3]Id.,paras.18-42.
[4]Id.paras.43-44.
[5]有关对该案的介绍见:PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Secret $185 Million Award against Argentina Comes to Light in D.C.Court[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_investsd_aqrl_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[1]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Secret $185 Million Award against Argentina Comes to Light in D.C.Court [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_investsd_aprl_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[2]Id.
[3]Id.
[1]ICSID.Convention on the settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States:Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention(2)[Z].Washington:ICSID Publication,1968.(以下简称 History of the ICSID Convention(2)[Z].1968) pp.489,729-730,753,935.
[2]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.515-516.
[3]Id.,p.1200.
[1]魏艳茹.ICSID仲裁撤销制度研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2005.53-54.又如在Amco诉印度尼西亚案中,印度尼西亚指出,申请人Amco任命的仲裁员与其存在着利益关系,后者曾经为Amco 公司的实际控制者提出税务安排方面的建议,且后者的法律公司与Amco公司在本案的顾问公司存在合作关系和利益分享关系,这种利益分享关系在案件开始之前就已结束。但是仲裁庭的其他两位仲裁员否决了印度尼西亚的异议申请,认为不存在明显的证据表明仲裁员缺乏独立性。SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.516.
[2]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Analysis:Arbitrator Challenges Raising Tough Questions as to Who Resolves BIT Cases[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_investsd_jan7_2007.pdf.2008-5-10.
[3]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.517.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.1200.
[2]魏艳茹.ICSID仲裁撤销制度研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2005.54.
[1]由于UNCITRAL程序、ICC程序对仲裁案件的保密,因此本文仅就阿根廷在ICSID体制内的仲裁案件做出分析与评价。
[2]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005;LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006;Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007;Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Awardof 28 September 2007.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.88.;LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.72.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,para.89;Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007,para.95.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.256.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.254.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,para.237.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.259.
[4]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,para.238.
[1]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007,para.277.
[2]Id.,para.285.
[3]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.188.
[4]Id.,paras.191-193.
[1]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.195.
[2]Id.,paras.198-200.
[3]Metalclad corporation v.the United Mexican States(ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/97/1),Award of 30 August 2000,paras.102-112.
[4]Pope & Talbot v.the Government of Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Interim Award of 26 June 2000,paras.81-105.
[1]S.D.Myer Inc.v.Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Partial Award on merits of 13 November 2000,para.282.
[2]Marvin Feldman v.Mexico,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Final Award of 16 December 2002,para.99.
[3]Tecnica Medioambientales Tecmed v.United Mexican States(ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/00/2),Award of 29May 2003,para.116.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.267.
[1]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007,para.290.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22May 2007,para.255.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.270-272.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.266-284.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,paras.256-268.
[3]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.131.
[4]Id.,para.139.
[1]Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co S.A.(Greece) v.Egypt(ICSID Case No.ARB/99/6),Award of 12 April 2002,para.143.
[2]Mondev International Ltd.v.United States of America(ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/99/2),Award of 11 October 2002,para.116.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.296-298.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.296-303.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,paras.269-277.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.304.
[2]Id.,para.312.
[3]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.201.
[4]Id.,para.202.
[5]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.304.
[6]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.203.
[1]原文为:1.Necessity may not be invoked by a state as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:(a) is the only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril;and(b) does nor seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists,or of the international community as a whole;2.In any case,necessity may not be invoked by a state as a ground for precluding wrongfulness,if:(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity;or(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.317.
[2]原文为:This treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order,the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security,or the protection of its own essential security interests.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.353-355.
[2]Id.,paras.359-361.
[3]Id.,para.304.
[4]Id.,paras.332-394.
[1]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,paras.205-206.
[2]Id.,para.226.
[1]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,paras.230-242.
[1]原文为:The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to:(a) Compliance with the obligation in question,if and to the extent that the circumstance precluding wrongfulness no longer exists;(b) The question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question.
[1]《ICSID公约》第52条第1款规定:任何一方可以根据下列一个或几个理由,向秘书长提出书面申请要求取消裁决:(1)仲裁庭的组成不当;(2)仲裁庭明显超越其权利;(3)仲裁庭的一个成员有受贿行为(4)有严重的背离基本的程序规则的情况;(5)裁决未陈述其所依据的理由。
[2]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,paras.1-3.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,paras.18.
[2]Id.,para.16.
[3]Id.,para.24.
[4]Id.,para.23.
[5]Id.,para.25.
[6]Id.,para.28.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,para.38.
[2]Id.,para.41-46.
[3]Id.,para.47.
[4]Id.
[5]Id.,paras.49-50.
[1]第52条第1款规定的撤销仲裁裁决的理由包括:仲裁庭的组成不当;仲裁庭显然越权;仲裁庭成员存在受贿行为;存在严重背离基本程序规则情势;裁决未陈述理由。
[2]有关ICSID仲裁撤销制度的讨论,详见陈安,主编.国际投资争端仲裁——“解决投资争端国际中心”机制研究[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.214-260.
[3]ICSID受理的第一起申请撤销仲裁裁决案是在ICSID首次受理投资争端仲裁申请十余年之后的1984年,即克劳科纳诉喀麦隆案。Kl(o|¨)cker industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v.United Republic of Camerroon and Societe Camerounasise de Engrais,(ICSID Case No.ARB/81/2),Decision on Annument of ICSID of 3 July 1985.Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal,Vol.1,NO.1,1986.而到2000年初,ICSID已经受理六起申请撤销仲裁裁决案。SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.897.
[4]OECD Secretariat,Improving the System of Investment-State Dispute Settlement:An Overview,Symposium Co-organized by ICSID,OECD and UNCTAD:Making the Most of International Investment Agreements:A Common Agenda[Z],12 December 2005,Paris.See,http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_355016971_1_1_1,00.html.2008-8-20.
[5]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,para.44.
[6]Id.,para.49.
[7]Id.,para.52.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,para.54.
[2]Id.,para.55.
[3]Id.,para.56.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,para.89-100.
[2]Id.,para.120-127.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,paras.128-136.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,paras.144-150.
[1]例如在CMS诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向CMS公司赔偿1.33亿美元;在ENRON诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向ENRON公司赔偿1.06亿美元;在AZURIX诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向AZURIX公司赔偿1.65亿美元;在SIMENS诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向SIMENS赔偿2.17亿美元;在SEMPRA诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向SENPRA公司赔偿1.28亿美元;即使在LG&E案中,仲裁庭在豁免了阿根廷经济危机期间违背条约义务应该承担的赔偿责任以后,仍然裁决阿根廷向投资者赔偿0.57亿美元。
[2]GOODMAN,CHARITY L.Uncharted Waters:Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina[J].University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law,2007,(28):452.
[3]参见本文第四章第一节关于阿根廷对仲裁员异议的内容。
[4]《公约》第52条其他两款分别为“仲裁庭组成不当”和“仲裁庭的成员有受贿行为”。但是,由于一则ICSID 仲裁庭的组庭事宜皆在秘书长的直接监督之下,发生“仲裁庭组成不当”的可能性几乎不存在,二则ICSID 仲裁庭的仲裁员皆为品德高尚的世界著名人士,让他们收受贿赂的可能性也极为渺茫,所以,从迄今已披露出来的撤销案件看,当事人所援用的ICSID仲裁撤销理由一直都来自剩下的3个撤销理由。魏艳茹.ICSID 仲裁撤销制度研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2005.22.
[5]同上,第105页。
[1]GOODMAN,CHARITY L.Uncharted Waters:Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina[J].University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law,2007,(28):453.
[2]CMS Gas Transmission Corporation v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Respondent's Request for a continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award,para.47.
[3]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later:.The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):679.
[1]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later:.The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):678-680.
[2]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged By the Argentine Government [EB/OL].http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm,2008-08-10.
[3]Id.
[4]陈安.中外双边投资协定中的四大“安全阀”不宜贸然拆除[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006,29.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E & LORENTI,PEDRO.Argentina:The Enforcement Process Of The ICSID Awards:Procedural Issues And Domestic Public Policy[EB/OL].http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=32803&searchresults=1.2008-08-10.
[2]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged By the Argentine Government [EB/OL].http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm.2008-08-10.
[3]RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[4]Color SA v.Max Factor,17 Nov.1994;Meller v.ENTEL,5 Nov.2002.See RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged By the Argentine Government [EB/OL].http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm.2008-08-10.
[2]RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[1]RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E.& LORENTI,PEDRO M.The Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals—A Conflict between International and Domestic Law.[J].The Journal of World Trade and Investment,2005,6(3):423-424.
[2]Id.,p.425.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E.& LORENTI,PEDRO.Argentina:ARGENTINA VS.ICSID:Unconstitutionality of the BITs and ICSID Jurisdiction-the Potential New Government Defenses Against the Enforcement of the ICSID Arbitral Award-Issues That May Subject the Award to Revision by the Argentine Judiciary[EB/OL].http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=-32539&searchresult=1.2008-08-10.
[2]2008年8月1日,负责ICSID仲裁案件应诉事务的阿根廷司法部国际事务处负责人加布里尔·博蒂尼(Gabriel Bottini)致笔者的信,见附录。
[3]同上。
[1]BORALESSA,ANOOSHA.Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID Awards against the Republic of Argentina:Obstacles that Transnational Corporations May Face[J].New York International Law Review,summer,2004(17):59.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.1080-1081.
[2]ICSID.History of the ICSID Convention(2)[Z].1968.pp.273,425,428,430.
[3]Id.pp.161,408,426,427,519,889,901,902,908.
[4]公约第26条规定:除非另有规定,双方同意根据本公约交付仲裁,应视为同意排除任何其他补救办法而交付上述仲裁。缔约国可以要求用尽当地各种行政或司法补救办法作为其同意根据本公约交付仲裁的一个条件。
[5]公约第64条规定:缔约国之间发生的不能通过谈判解决的有关本公约的解释或适用的任何争端,经争端任何一方的申请,得提交国际法院,除非有关国家同意采取另一种解决办法。
[6]同本页注②,第274,438,440页。
[1]ICSID.History of the ICSID Convention(2)[Z].1968.pp.889,890.
[2]公约第69条规定:每一缔约国应采取使本公约的规定在其领土内有效所必需的立法或其他措施。
[3]公约第27条规定:缔约国对于它本国的一个国民和另一缔约国根据本公约已同意交付或已交付仲裁的争端,不得给予外交保护或提出国际要求。除非该另一缔约国未能遵守和履行对此项争端所作出的裁决。
[1]陈安,主编.国际投资争端仲裁[M].上海:复旦大学出版社 2001,282.
[2]目前共有3个案件以国家执行豁免条款为理由,判决对东道国的不利裁决不能予以执行。这三个案件分别为:Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl v.The Government of the People's Republic of the Congo(ICSID Case No.ARB/77/2);Societe Ouest Africaine des Betons Industriels v.State of Senegal(ICSID Case No.ARB/82/1);Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v.Republic of Liberia,(ICSID Case No.ARB/83/2).
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.411.
[2]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.CMS Energy Urges Argentina to Pay ICSID Award,Investment Treaty News [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_jan11_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[3]1945年《国际法院规约》第36条第1款规定:法院之管辖包括各当事国提交之一切案件,及联合国宪章或现行条约即协约中所特定之一切事件。
[4]见本页注①,第1260页。
[5]见本页注①,第1262页。
[1]ICSID.ICSID History(2)[z].1968.pp.346,523,656,885,889,893,900,901,903,904.
[2]BORALESSA,ANOOSHA.Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID Awards against the Republic of Argentina:Obstacles that Transnational Corporations May Face[J].New York International Law Review,2004,(17).
[1]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.CMS Energy Urges Argentina to Pay ICSID Award,Investment Treaty News [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_jan11_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[2]GOODMAN,CHARITY L.Uncharted Waters:Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina[J].University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law,summer,2007,(28):481.
[3]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later:The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):698.
[4]2008年8月1日,Babriel Bottini致笔者的信,见本文附录。
[5]同上。
[6]同上。
[1]United States of America Department of state.U.S.Submission regarding Article 53 and 54 of the ICSID convention of 1 May 2008[Z].http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-USsubmission.pdf.2008-8-10.
[2]Id.
[1]与Sempra案相同的是Enron诉阿根廷案,在这两个案件中,仲裁庭均要求阿根廷向投资者支付损害发生之日至裁决作出之日的利息(pre-award)。投资者不满仲裁庭的上述决定,向美国纽约州南区地区法院提起诉讼要求美国法院判决阿根廷向其支付裁决作出之后,履行之前的所有利息(post-award)。美国纽约州地区法院支持了申请人的请求,要求阿根廷向投资者支付判决之后履行之前的所有利息(post-judgment)。美国纽约州地区法院的判决实际上修改了ICSID仲裁庭的仲裁裁决。有关纽约州地区法院的判决,见附录。
[2]Procuracion del Tesoro de la Nacion.Argentina's Response to US Department of State Letter of 2 June 2008[Z].http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-ArgentinaArt.53-54.pdf.2008-8-10.
[1]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later.The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):696.
[2]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.阿根廷同比外国投资增长143%[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200410/20041000291729.html.2008-08-10.
[3]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.2005年阿根廷吸收外资创7年来最高记录[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200603/20060301717110.html.2008-08-10.
[4]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.在阿根廷经营外资公司利润率创新高[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200704/20070404529828.html.2008-08-10.
[5]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.阿根廷政府决定天然气批发价上涨36%[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200405/20040500218926.html.2008-08-10.
[1]这五个案件为:Camuzzi International S.A v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/7);Pioneer Natural Resources Company,Pioneer Natural Resources(Argentina) S.A.and Pioneer Natural Resources(Tierra del Fuego) S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03//12);Aguas Cordobesas S.A.,Suez,and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/18);France Telecom S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/04/18);RGA Reinsurance Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/04/20).
[2]参见ICSID网站资料。
[3]阿喀琉斯之踵指致命的弱点和要害。古希腊神话中的阿喀琉斯是海神之子,荷马史诗中的英雄,传说他的母亲曾把他浸在冥河里使其能刀枪不入。但因冥河水流湍急,母亲捏着他的脚后跟不敢松手,所以脚踵是其致命之处。长大后,阿喀琉斯杀死了特洛伊王子赫克托尔,惹怒了赫克托尔的保护神阿波罗,于是太阳神阿波罗用箭射中了阿喀琉斯的脚后跟,断送了这位勇士的命。这就是流传至今的欧洲谚语“阿喀琉斯之踵”的来历。http://baike.baidu.com/view/17268.htm.2008-8-13.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.1142.
[2]梁西,主编.国际法[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993.92.
[1]陈安.国际投资争端仲裁[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.288-294.
[1]UNCTAD.World Investment Report 2007:Transnational Corporations,Extractive Industries and development[R].At http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=9001&intItemID=4361&lang=1&mode=downloads.2008-8-17.
[2]陈安,主编.国际投资争端仲裁[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.42.
[1]参见UNCTAD网站资料,http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1.2008-8-20.
[2]2008年3月5日,中国国家总理温家宝在政府工作报告中指出,在过去的五年中,中国经济取得了巨大的进展,但是仍然面临诸多新的问题和挑战。经济运行中一些突出问题和深层次矛盾依然存在。固定资产投资过快,货币信贷投放过多,国际收支不平衡。自主创新能力不强,经济增长的资源环境代价过大。农村基础薄弱,城乡、区域发展差距扩大。涉及群众切身利益的问题有待进一步解决。当前物价上涨,通货膨胀压力加大。去年居民消费价格总水平比上年上涨4.8%。参见新华网.2005年3月5日温家宝政府工作报告[R].http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-03/05/content_7720848.htm.2008-8-20.温家宝总理在2008年两会记者招待会上也坦陈,2008年恐怕是中国经济最困难的一年。参见中国网.国务院总理温家宝答中外记者问[EB/OL].http://hxtc.china.cn/2008lianghui/2008-03/18/content_12946727.htm.2008-8-20.
[3]例如,1995～1996年间,海岸公司通过设立合营企业的方式在江苏省设立三个调峰电厂,并向MIGA 申请投保政治风险,包括征收险。有关合营企业与四家国有电力企业订立购电合同,这四家电力企业均有权与供电方谈判购电计价方法和购电数量及其他相关事宜。上述电力项目进入营运阶段后,中国大陆政府开始在全国范围内重新审查电力政策,整顿电价混乱情形。鉴此,1998年底到1999年下半年,江苏省政府出台了被称为“综合电价政策”的系列政策文件和规定,取消了地方电力价格部门审查和调整购电合同项下电价的权力。根据有关文件,江苏省的调峰电厂必须另订新的购电合同,即必须与在购、零售电力方面获得垄断权的江苏省电力公司谈判。在与江苏省方面谈判未果后,海岸公司开始向MIGA求助。在MIGA 与中国大陆政府有关部门的谈判中,后者质疑:为什么违约行为构成一个征收事实,而不是一起可以在当地法院解决的普通商业纠纷。他们向MIGA表明,他们是本着保护中国大陆电力消费者这一全国性的一贯政策,以最大的善意行事。难道合法的国家利益不能优先于投资者的合同权利?虽然经过MIGA、中国大陆政府及该外商的共同努力与彼此谅解,该外商与中国大陆政府就有关问题达成协议,从而没有正式向MIGA提出索赔,但该案无疑给我们敲响了警钟。[美]劳伦·S·威森费尔德.多边投资担保机构的十五年发展历程[A].徐崇利译.陈安.国际经济法学刊(9)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2004.231-236.
[1]这13个接受ICSID仲裁管辖权的BIT的缔约另一方分别是:韩国、立陶宛、智利、冰岛、秘鲁、摩洛哥、以色列、南斯拉夫、沙特阿拉伯、加蓬、喀麦隆、马其顿、也门。其中,我国与喀麦隆签订的BIT已经废止。魏艳茹.论我国晚近全盘接受ICSID仲裁管辖权之不当[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.111.
[1]全面接受ICSID仲裁管辖权的中国双边投资条约的另一缔约方为:巴巴多斯、刚果(布)、博茨瓦纳、塞拉利昂、莫桑比克、肯尼亚、约旦、荷兰、缅甸、塞浦路斯、波黑、特立尼达和多巴哥、科特迪瓦、圭亚那、吉布提、德国、拉脱维亚、乌干达、突尼斯、芬兰、贝宁、朝鲜、西班牙、捷克、葡萄牙、瓦努阿图、俄罗斯、印度。
[1]魏艳茹.论我国晚近全盘接受ICSID仲裁管辖权之不当[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.111-112.
[2]江泽民在中国共产党第十六次全国代表大会上的报告[EB/OL].http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/20021118/300508.asp.2008-8-14.
[1]商务部.2007年我国非金融类对外直接投资统计快报[EB/OL].http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20080128_89251.htm.2008-01-28.2008-8-14.
[2]商务部.2007年1-12月全国吸收外国直接投资快讯[EB/OL].http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/wstztj/lywzkx/t20080121_89048.htm.2008-01-21.2008-8-17.
[1]参见本文第四章第一节第一目。
[2]参见本文第四章第二节第二目。
[1]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Path Cleared for Italian Holders of Argentine Bond to Sue Argentina at ICSID[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_investsd_feb14_2007.pdf.2008-5-10.
[2]Giovanna a Beccara and others v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/07/5).
[3]Id.
[4]同本页注①。
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[1]见本文第四章第二节第四目、第四章第三节第二目。
[2]由于该案根据UNCITRAL进行仲裁,因此有关该案的仲裁裁决没有公开。有关该案的情况介绍请参见PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Secret $185 Million Award against Argentina Comes to Light in D.C.Court [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_investsd_aprl_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
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[2]原文为:"Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the protection of health,safety,and the environment,and the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights."
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[2]1990年,美国国际经济研究所在华盛顿召开了一个讨论80年代后期以来拉美经济调整和改革的研讨会。出席会议的有拉美国家的政府官员、美国财政部等部门的官员、金融界和企业界人士以及世界上若干高等院校和研究机构的经济学家。世界银行、国际货币基金组织以及面向拉美的美洲开发银行等国际机构的代表也参加了会议。在会议的最后阶段,该研究所前所长约翰·威廉姆斯说,经过讨论,与会者在拉美国家已经采用和将要采用的十个政策取向方面取得了较为一致的看法,甚至在一定程度上达成了共识。由于上述国际机构的总部和美国财政部都在华盛顿,加之会议又是在华盛顿召开的,因此这一共识可以被称作“华盛顿共识”。威廉姆斯在会后将会议论文汇编成册,并于同年出版。在这本题为《拉美调整的成效》的论文集中,威廉姆斯更加明确的阐述了拉美国家在经济调整和改革过程中应该采纳的“处方”。它包括以下十个方面的政策取向:(1)加强财政纪律,压缩财政赤字,降低通货膨胀率,稳定宏观经济形势。(2)把政府开支的重点转向经济效益高的领域以及有利于改善收入分配的领域(如文教卫生和基础设施)。(3)开展税制改革,降低边际税率,扩大税基。(4)实施利率市场化。(5)采用一种具有竞争力的汇率制度。(6)实施贸易自由化,开放市场。(7)放松对外资的限制。(8)对国有企业实施私有化。(9)放松政府的管制。(10)保护私人财产权。江时学,新自由主义、“华盛顿共识”与拉美国家的改革[J].当代世界与社会主义,2003,(6):31.
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[1][宋]“以铜为鉴,可正衣冠;以古为鉴,可知兴替;以人为鉴,可知得失”。欧阳修、宋祁.新唐书.卷九七,列传二十二,魏征[M].北京:中华书局,1975.3880.
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[3]他们之间的冲突,导致了20世纪70年代联合国大会一系列有关建立国际经济新秩序宣言的出现。陈安.国际经济法刍言[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,61-64.
[1]周成新.国际投资争议的解决方法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,1989.28.
[2]同上,第53-54页。
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[2]SORNARAJAH,M.The Settlement of foreign investment disputes[M].Hague:Kluwer Law International,2000.152.
[3]Id.
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[2]谢石松,主编.商事仲裁法学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2003.54.
[3]同上,第56页。
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[3]OLORUNDA,DANIEL O.To Peg or not to Peg:The Pro and Cons of Pegging the Argentine Peso to the U.S.Dollar and Balancing FDI Incentives.[J].Regent Journal of International Law,2003/2004,(2):59.
[4]江时学.阿根廷经济危机的由来及其教训[J].拉丁美洲研究,2002.(2):1.
[5]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.前言。
[1]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.30-31.
[2]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.世界银行指出阿经济危机已经探底[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200210/20021000043146.html,2008-8-18.
[3]SHIHATA,IBRAHIM E I.The Settlement of Disputes Regarding Foreign Investment:The Role of the World Bank,with Particular Reference to ICSID and MIGA[J].American University Journal of International Law,1986,(1):104-106.
[1]参见ICSID网站,http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases.2008-8-14.
[2]DANINO,ROBERTO.Opening Remarks Presented at the Symposium on "Making the Most of International Investment Agreements:A Common Agenda"[z].Co-organized by ICSID,OECD and UNCITRAD,25 December 2005,Paris.See,http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en 2649 33783766 35501697 1111,00.html.2008-8-20.
[3]Compania Aguas del Aconquija.S.A & Compagnie Generale Eaux v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/97/3),Award of 21 November 2000.
[1]由于UNCITRAL秉承仲裁秘密性原则,因此笔者无法确知UNCITRAL体制下,涉及阿根廷的案件。
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentina Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on the Argentina Republic's Request for a continued stay of the enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,para.23.
[2]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged by the Argentine Government.[EB/OL].http://www.mondaq.com,2008-08-20.
[3]ALFARO,CARLOS E.& LORENTI,PEDRO M.The Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals—A Conflict between International and Domestic Law.[J].The Journal of World Trade and Investment,2005,6(3):417.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/08),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.468-471.
[5]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,paras,1-3.
[6]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine Public of 25 September 2007.para.163.
[1]Enron Corporation v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007.
[2]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007.
[3]参见ICISD网站资料,http:/icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending.2008-8-20.
[4]陈安.中外双边投资协定中四大“安全阀”不宜贸然拆除[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.27.
[5]SNYDER,EDWARD C.The Menem Revolution in Argentina:Progress toward a Hemispheric Free Trade Area[J].Texas International Law Journal,1994,(29):101.
[1][美]艾·巴·托马斯.拉丁美洲史[M].寿进文译.商务印书馆,1973.466-471.
[2]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996:吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002;江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.
[3]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.11.
[4]张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.348.
[1]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.2.
[2]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.283.
[3]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.2.
[4]同本页注①,第12-14页。
[5]同本页注①,第14-15页。
[1]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.284.
[2][英]L·贝瑟尔,主编.剑桥拉丁美洲史(中文版)[M].中国社会科学院拉丁美洲研究所组译.北京:社会科学文献出版社,1992.41.
[1]江时学.拉丁美洲发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.20.
[2]李明德,江时学,主编.现代化:拉美和东亚的发展模式[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000.105.
[3]江时学.拉美与东亚发展模式比较研究[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2001.28.
[4]庇隆在阿根廷历史上,曾经两次执政。第一次为1946年至1955年,第二次为1973年至1976年。第二届庇隆政府先后由奉行庇隆主义的正义党领导人坎波拉、庇隆和马丁内斯·德·庇隆执政。参见吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002,289-290.苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国家经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.60.
[1]1946年,庇隆决定以1.5亿英镑赎买英国资本的24000公里铁路及其附属设施,以1100万英镑赎买法国资本的铁路,以相当于3.19亿比索的外汇赎买美国资本的电话公司。苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国际经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.41.
[2]庇隆政府执政后期,阿根廷的经济出现严重困难:通货恶性膨胀(1976年批发价上涨449%);生产停滞、下降(1976年国内生产总值下降2.9%);国际支付手段濒于枯竭(1976年3月,国际储备中可自由支配的外汇仅2300万美元,只及支付当年进口总额的0.8%)。苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国家经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.60.
[3]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.286-287;江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.92-93.
[4]阿根廷投资立法深受拉丁美洲国家投资立法的影响。在进口替代经济发展模式期间,拉丁美洲国家对外国直接投资普遍采取了限制的政策,制定了比较严格的外资政策。例如1970年,安第斯条约组织制定了《对待外资、商标、专利、许可证和特许权的共同条例》即第24号决议。这一条例从1971年7月起正式实施,主要内容包括:(1)外资企业每年汇出利润不得超过外国投资额的14%;(2)外资企业每年的利润再投资不得超过外国投资额的5%;(3)禁止新的外资进入水、电、交通等公用事业及银行业、保险业、报纸杂志、电台和电视等行业;(4)在上述部门已有的外资企业必须在3年内至少把80%的股票出售给本国投资人,使外资企业转变为民族企业;(5)在安第斯条约组织成员国的现有外资企业,必须逐步出让股权给本国投资人,以便在15年至20年限期内使本国资本在这些企业内至少掌握51%的股权而把企业转变为合营企业。参见:张森根,拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.346.
[5]张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.347-348.
[1]据美国摩根信托银行估计,到1980年石油资金盈余累计达2000多亿美元,相当于70年代后期欧洲货币市场拥有的欧洲美元的近1/3。陈芝芸.拉丁美洲对外经济关系[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2007.89.
[2]同上。
[3]同上。
[4]同上。
[5]同上,第90页。
[1]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.293.
[2]20世纪70年代,包括阿根廷在内的拉丁美洲国家的债务危机与这些国家大多数年份平均三位数的通货膨胀率存在因果关系。借入外债有生产性用途和非生产性用途。生产性用途的大量借债使投资过度扩张,在投资未形成生产能力和实现最终产品之前会使需求扩张先于供给的增加,从而推进通过膨胀。而非生产性用途的大量借债,则往往直接增加货币投放量,使通货膨胀率加速上升。而在发生债务危机的时,为了还债而紧缩经济,引起经济萎靡,破坏了供给能力,又从另一个角度推进通货膨胀。陈芝芸.拉丁美洲对外经济关系[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2007.98.
[3]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.64.
[4]同上,第65页。
[5]同本页注①,第299-300页。
[1]PADDOCK,JOHN V.Comment:IMF Policy and the Argentina Crisis[J].Miami Inter-American Law Review,2002,winter,(34):156.
[2]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2004.97-102.
[3]由于阿根廷与许多南美国家一样奉行伊比利亚天主教文化,这种文化的特点之一是鼓励消费。阿根廷人的超前消费意识是很强的,国民储蓄率一直很低,以1998年为例,阿根廷的储蓄率为17.4%,既低于拉美的平均水平19%,又低于巴西的18.6%,墨西哥的22.4%和智利的25.2%,更低于韩国的33.8%。事实上阿根廷的人均GDP不如韩国,1998年两国分别为8030美元和8600美元,但是阿根廷的年个人人均消费为7818美元,而韩国仅为6695美元。江时学,阿根廷经济的由来及其教训[J].拉丁美洲研究,2002.(2):2.
[4]BOUZAS,ROBERTO.&CHUDNOVSKY,DANIEL.Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development——the Argentina Experience[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_renort_argentina.pdf,2008-08-19.
[1]BOUZAS,ROBERTO.& CHUDNOVSKY,DANIEL.Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development——the Argentina Experience[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_report_argentina.pdf,2008-O8-19.
[2]ROSA,PAOLO,DI.The Recent Wave of Arbitrations against Argentina under Bilateral Investment Treaties:Background and Principal Legal Issues[J].The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,2004,(36):48.
[3]见本文第一章第二节第三目。
[4]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.313.
[5]同上。
[6]同上,第314页。
[7]FALCONE,JAYSON J.Argentina's Plight-An Unusual Temporary Solution to a Sovereign Debt Crisis[J].Suffolk Transnational Law Review,2004,(27):357.
[8]叶姿攸.90年代外国直接投资对阿根廷经济发展影响之研究(硕士学位论文)[D].台北:淡江大学,民国94年.45.
[9]高静.阿根廷经济危机前后的外国直接投资[J].拉丁美洲研究,2003,(3):20.
[1]江时学,主编.阿根廷危机反思[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2004.29-31.
[2]同上,第29-45页。
[1]宋晓平.阿根廷陷入经济和社会危机[J].拉丁美洲研究.2002,(1):18.
[2]同上。
[3]以一家阿根廷电力外资企业为例来说明这一问题。这家电力公司向消费者提供电力服务,在政府改革前,假如某一消费者消费30美元电力,在其向投资商支付时按1:1的兑换率支付给投资者30比索,投资者再按1:1的兑换率向阿根廷银行兑换30美元。而在货币“比索化”改革后,根据《公共紧急状态法》的规定,投资者应向消费者收取的30美元使用费按照1:1兑换率以比索计价,消费者向投资者支付30比索使用费,投资者按比索对美元的市场价即3:1的兑换率向阿根廷银行兑换10美元,同时禁止投资者涨价抵消货币贬值给他们带来的损失。阿根廷政府这样的做法旨在平稳公共产品的市场价格,维护社会的稳定,从而促进经济的复苏。ROSA,PAOLO DI.The Recent Wave of Arbitration against Argentina under Bilateral Investment Treaties:Background and Principal Legal Issues[J].The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,2004,(36):47.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.54.
[5]叶姿攸.90年代外国直接投资对阿根廷经济发展影响之研究(硕士学位论文)[D].台北:淡江大学,民国94年.72.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.57.
[2]Id.,para.58.
[3]Id.,para.68.
[4]Id.,para.60.
[5]Id.,para.61.
[6]Id.,para.65.
[7]Id.,para.4.
[1]陈安,主编.国际经济法专论[M].北京:高等教育出版社,2002.63-72.
[2]余劲松,主编.国际投资法[M].北京:法律出版社,1994.130-132.
[3]同上,第242页。
[4]关于发达资本输出国与发展中资本输入国之间的斗争与对抗,中外法学家都做过充分的研究与分析。参见:徐崇利.从南北纷争焦点的转移看国际投资法的晚近发展[J].比较法研究,1997,(1).
[1]关于建立国际经济新秩序的斗争,参见:陈安.国际经济法刍言[M].北京:北京出版社,2002.61-64.
[2]Secretary Hull responded in an August 22,1938 note with his now-famous assertion of the international legal standard of compensation:"Under every rule of law and equity,no government is entitled to expropriate private property,for whatever purpose,without provision for prompt,adequate and effective payment…"LEVY,TALL NAFTA's Provision for Compensation in the Event of Expropriation:A Reassessment of the "Prompt,Adequate and Effective"Standard[J].Stanford Journal of International Law,1995,(31):427.
[3]SORNARAJAH,M.,ed.The International Law on Foreign Investment(2)[M].New York:Cambridge university press,2004.19.
[4]Id.,pp.18-19.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.5.
[2]Id.
[3]Id.
[4][美]艾·巴·托马斯.拉丁美洲史[M].寿进文译.商务印书馆,1973.434-537.
[5]DALRYMPLE,CHRISTOPHER K.Politics and Foreign Direct Investment-The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Clavo Clause[J].Cornell International Law Journal,1996,(29):165.
[6]同本页注①,第10页。
[7]同本页注①,第11页。
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.12.
[2]Id.,p.13.
[3]原文为:"the public debt of an American State can not occasion armed intervention,nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power."SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.14-15.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.15.
[2]CALVO,CHARLES.Le droit international theorique et pratique(5th)[M].Paris:Librairie nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence,1896.350.see:HEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.18.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.
[5]Id.
[6]Id.
[1]SHAN,WENHUA.Is Calvo Dead?[J].American Journal of Comparative Law,2007,(55):124.
[2]First,that sovereign states,being free and independent,enjoy the fight,on the basis of equality,to freedom from "interference of any sort" by other states,whether it be by force or diplomacy,and second,that aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to nationals,and that therefore they may seek redress for grievances only before the local authorities.These two concepts of nonintervention and absolute equality of foreigners with nationals are the essence of the Calvo Doctrine.SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.19.
[3]MANNING-CABROL,DENISE.The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo Principle:Equality of Foreign and National Investors[J].Law and Policy in International Business,(26):1172.
[4]参见单文华.卡尔沃主义的死亡与再生[A].际安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.:SHAN,WENHUA.Is Calvo Dead[J].American Journal of Comparative Law,2007,(55):123;VANDEVELDE,KENNETH J.Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime[J].Michigan Journal of International Law,1998,(19):379-381.
[1]SHAN,WENHUA.Is Calvo Dead?[J].American Journal of Comparative Law,2007,(55):127.
[2]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.20.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.,p.23.
[5]Id.,p.27.
[1]Calvo Clause is an attempt to implement the Calvo Doctrine by including in contracts concluded with aliens a provision which binds the alien to local redress and obligates him to forgo his right of appeal for diplomatic protection in case of any dispute or controversy which might arise from the contractual relationships.SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.28.
[2]Id.
[3]Id.,p.45.
[4]Id.,pp.30-31.
[5]1910年,墨西哥发生针对Porfirio Diaz政权的革命,此后墨西哥国内政治形式的混乱与动荡给墨西哥境内的外国投资者造成了极大的损失。在几次努力失败后,1923年9月8日,美国终于与墨西哥签署条约成立美国—墨西哥仲裁委员会处理墨西哥革命期间,美国投资者在墨西哥境内遭受损失的赔偿问题。随后,法国、德国、英国、意大利、西班牙和比利时分别与墨西哥签订条约,成立委员会以国际仲裁的方式解决他们之间的争端。SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.194-195.
[6]Id.,pp.194-230.
[7]Id.,p.217.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.222.
[2]Id.,p.216.
[3]Id.,p.207.
[4]Id.,pp.121-193.
[5]Id.,pp.231-257.
[1]截至2007年12月4日,拉丁美洲共有22个国家签署《华盛顿公约》加入ICSID。其中20世纪60年代,有3个国家签署并批准《公约》,分别是牙买加(1965年)、特立尼达和多巴哥(1966年)、圭亚那(1969年);20世纪80年代有7个国家签署并批准《公约》,分别是巴拉圭(1981年)、巴巴多斯岛(1981年)、哥斯达黎加(1981年)、萨尔瓦多(1982年)、圣卢西亚(1984)、厄瓜多尔(1986)、洪都拉斯(1986);20世纪90年代共有11个国家签署并批准《公约》,分别是阿根廷(1991年)、秘鲁(1991年)、格林纳达(1991年)、乌拉圭(1992年)、哥伦比亚(1993年)、委内瑞拉(1993年)、尼加拉瓜(1994年)、圣基茨和尼维斯(1994年)、巴拿马(1995年)、危地马拉(1995年)、巴哈马群岛(1995年);2001年,圣文森特和格林纳丁斯签署并批准《公约》。此外,玻利维亚1991年5月3日签署《公约》,1995年6月23日批准《公约》,《公约》于1995年7月23日对玻利维亚生效。玻利维亚于2007年5月2日通知中心退出《公约》,2007年12月3日玻利维亚退出《公约》的行为生效。See,ICSID.List of Contracting States and other signatories of the Convention[EB/OL].http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&ReqFro m=Main.2008-8-6.
[2]根据谢伊考证,在拉丁美洲国家中,只有阿根廷、海地和多米尼加共和国没有采用卡尔沃条款。See SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.275-279.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.
[1]SHEA,DONALD R.The Calvo Clause-A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy[M].Minneapolis:University of Minnesota press,1955.194.
[2]江时学.拉美发展模式研究[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.7.
[3]吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.283.
[4]苏振兴,主编.拉丁美洲的经济发展[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2000.270.
[5]同本页注②,第284页。
[1]张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.347-348.
[2]阿根廷1958年8月26日签署《纽约公约》,1989年3月14日批准该公约,1989年6月12日《纽约公约》对阿根廷生效。见联合国国际贸易法委员会网站,http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/zh/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.2008-8-20.
[3]江时学,主编.拉美国家的经济改革[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1998.32.
[4]复旦大学拉丁美洲研究室.拉丁美洲经济[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1986.598.
[5]修改的主要内容包括:(1)外资利润汇出率的限制,从每年14%提高到20%,并允许各成员国批准更高的利润汇出率;(2)外资利润再投资的限额从每年5%提高到7%,允许各成员国同意外国企业把超额利润用于再投资或用于对其他公司进行投资,这些再投资或投资都作为新的外国直接投资对待;(3)外资企业可以取得当地的短期和中期信贷(过去规定只能取得短期信贷),但不能取得当地的长期信贷;(4)外国投资人可以利用资本增值购买当地本国企业或合营企业的股票,但这些企业外资股权不得超过49%;(5)关于外资企业向本国投资人出售股份以便在限期内转变为民族企业或合营企业的办法,修改为也可通过增加本国投资人的资本来实现这一目标;经营旅游业的外资企业或合营企业可不必逐步减少外资股份;(6)外资企业限期转为民族企业或合营企业的起算日期从1971年7月1日推迟到1974年7月1日;(7)安约成员国的相互投资人尽管可以和其他外国投资者一样汇出利润和抽回资本,仍将享有特殊待遇,可以和本国投资人同样对待;(8)非安约成员国的拉美国家的投资人可以享有比本地区外国家投资人更为优惠的待遇;(9)大幅度降低对外的最低共同关税。张森根.拉丁美洲经济[M].北京:人民出版社,1986.349.
[1]政局动荡是二次世界大战之后阿根廷政治的一大特点。1930年至1999年,阿根廷政府变更25次,其中军人执政达到14次之多。军人频频干预政治,导致政府更迭频繁,造成经济政策的多变。新政府上台后大多改变前届政府的经济政策,在很多情况下往往是政策方向上的逆转。吴国平,主编.21世纪拉丁美洲经济发展大趋势[M].北京:世界知识出版社,2002.288.1976年3月,阿根廷武装部队发动政变,推翻了又一届庇隆主义政府,陆军司令魏地拉出任总统。魏地拉政府与庇隆政府的经济思想与经济政策截然不同,其中许多政策措施是与庇隆政府针锋相对的。苏振兴,徐文渊,主编.拉丁美洲国家经济发展战略研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1987.60-61.
[2]BOUZAS,ROBERTO & CHUDNOVSKY,DANIEL.Foreign Direct Investment and Sustainable Development,The Recent Argentina Experience[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_country_report_argentina.pdf.2008-5-8.
[3]参见ICISD网站,http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&ReqFro m=Main.2008-8-20.
[1]陈安.中外双边投资协定中的四大“安全阀”不宜贸然拆除[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.26.
[2]前14位国家及所缔结的双边投资条约数量分别是德国(124)、瑞士(95)、中国(94)、英国(92)、法国(92)、罗马尼亚(90)、埃及(84)、意大利(77)、荷兰(72)、马亚西亚(63)、波兰(62)、比利时—卢森堡(62)、韩国(60)及土耳其(59)。如果考虑到英国与法国、波兰与比利时—卢森堡的缔结数量分别并列为92和62,阿根廷的位次可以从第15位上午至第13位。
[1][英]伊恩·布朗利.国际公法原理[M].曾令良等译,北京:法律出版社,2003.121;梁西,主编.国际法[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993.90.
[2]当然,这只是从法律层面对跨国公司与东道国政府间的关系进行判断得出跨国公司处于弱者地位的结论。但是在实践中,许多跨国公司所拥有的经济实力以及政治影响力,丝毫不逊于,甚至已经超过许多主权国家。参见陈安,蔡从燕,主编.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2007.3.
[1]第2条主要规定了国民待遇、最惠国待遇、最低国际待遇及法律、法规透明度义务。
[1]ICSID公约第26条规定:“除非另有规定,双方同意根据本公约交付仲裁,应视为同意排除任何其他补救办法而交付上述仲裁。缔约国可以要求用尽当地各种行政或司法补救办法,作为其同意根据本公约交付仲裁的一个条件。”
[1]见本文第二章第二节第三目(三)列表。
[1]所谓岔路口条款是指对于东道国当地救济和国际投资仲裁,投资者只能选择其一,且一旦做出选择便是终局性选择。有关岔路口条款详见本节二(二)的论述。
[1]根据UNCTAD网站提供的英文版和法文版共计19个阿根廷双边投资条约,这19个双边投资条约的缔约另一方分别是英国(1990)、加拿大(1991)、法国(1991)、瑞士(1991)、瑞典(1991)、美国(1991)、中国(1992)、荷兰(1992)、亚美尼亚(1993)、保加利亚(1993)、罗马尼亚(1993)、芬兰(1993)、牙买加(1994)、韩国(1994)、澳大利亚(1995)、希腊(1999)、新西兰(1999)、菲律宾(1999)、泰国(2000),仅有阿根廷—美国式双边投资条约做出了彻底接受国际投资仲裁机构管辖权的规定。
[2]与英国BIT做出相同规定的双边投资条约的另一缔约方分别为:瑞士、韩国、荷兰、加拿大。
[3]与希腊BIT做出相同规定的双边投资条约的另一缔约方分别为:澳大利亚、保加利亚、菲律宾、芬兰、罗马尼亚、瑞典、泰国、中国、亚美尼亚、牙买加、法国。
[4]BIT between Argentina Republic and New Zealand(1999):" Article 12(4):Paragraph(3) of this Article shall not constitute,by itself,the content of the Contracting Party required in Article 25(1) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes opened for signature in Washington on 18 March 1965."
[1]Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.The Kingdom of Spain(ICSID Case no.ARB/97/7),Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25,2000,para.39.
[1]Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.The Kingdom of Spain(ICSID Case no.ARB/97/7),Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25,2000,para.38.
[2]Id.,para.40.
[3]Id.
[4]Id.,para.64.
[5]Id.,paras.48-50.
[6]Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.The Kingdom of Spain(ICSID Case no.ARB/97/7),Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of January 25,2000,paras.54-56.
[7]与墨菲兹尼案做出相同裁决的仲裁案件包括:Simens v.Argentina案,Camuzzi v.Argentina案,Gas Natural v.Argentina案,Tecmed v.Mexico案,Interaguas v.Argentina案,Grid v.Argentina案,Vivendi v.Argentina 案。参见徐崇利.从实体到程序:最惠国待遇适用范围之争[J].法商研究,2007,(2):42.
[1]王海浪.ICSID管辖权新问题与中国新对策研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2006.60.
[2]有关本案,详见本文第四章第一节一(一)。
[1]王海浪.ICSID管辖权新问题与中国新对策研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2006.64.
[2]所谓国际投资仲裁正当性危机,基本含义是指国际投资仲裁由于在解决国际投资争端方面不胜任而引发的信任危机。参见陈安,蔡从燕,主编.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.2007.165.
[3]COSBEY,AARON & MANN,HOWARD & PETERSON,LUKE ERIC & MOLTKE,KONRAD VON.Investment and Sustainable Development:A Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_invest_and_sd.pdf.2008-08-19.
[1]在2001-2002年的总结报告中,ICC与SCC官员承认国际投资案件在他们所处理的所有案件当中只占据很小的比例。然而,在过去的五年当中,这两个机构受理的投资案件却呈大幅上升趋势。但是由于它们的保密制度,这两个机构总共受理多少投资仲裁案件,有多少是根据双边投资条约提起的不得而知。PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.All Road Lead out of Rome:Divergent Paths of Disputes Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_nautilus.pdf.2008-08-19.
[2]例如S.D.Myer Inc.v.Government of Canada案,利用联合国贸发会议仲裁程序(UNCITRAL)进行仲裁,实行保密制度。当加拿大对仲裁结果不服,在加拿大国内提起撤销之诉时,案件才进入公众的视线。
[3]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.All Road Lead out of Rome:Divergent Paths of Disputes Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_nautilus.pdf.2008-08-19.
[4]法庭之友(amicus curiae),是英美法系程序法中的一项重要制度。根据布莱克法律词典,法庭之友是指“对于一个诉讼标的具有强烈兴趣或见解,主动向法庭申请,或者根据法庭的要求向法庭提交陈述书的非争端当事人。”GARNER,BRAYAN A,ed.Black's Law Dictionary(7th Edition)[Z].ST.PAUL,MINN.,1999.83.根据《国际公法词典》,法庭之友被认为是英美法系的一个国内法概念,是指“在司法程序中向法庭提交有关案件事实或法律信息,帮助法庭作出正确裁决的非争端当事人的个人或组织。”SALMON,JEAN.Dictionnairc de Droit International Public[Z].Bruxelles:Bruylant Bruxelles,2001.62-63.
[1]例如Aguas Cordobesas S.A.,Suez,and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.v.Argentine Republic (Case No.ARB/03/18),2005年5月19日仲裁庭专门就ACIJ、CELS、CIEL等5个非政府组织作为法庭之友参与案件做出决定。在决定中仲裁庭指出,接受这些非政府组织的报告是仲裁庭的自由裁量权范围内的事,然而允许这些非政府组织参与案件则需要得到争议双方的同意。
[2]ICSID.Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations[EB/OL].http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/03-04-06.htm.2008-08-19.
[1]Sornarajah,M.The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment[J].Canadian Foreign Policy,Winter 2003,(2):10.
[2]参见《华盛顿公约》第52条第3款:任何一方可以根据下列一个或几个理由向秘书长提出书面申请要求取消裁决,(1)仲裁庭的组成不当;(2)仲裁庭显然超越其权力;(3)仲裁庭的一个成员有受贿行为;(4)有严重的背离基本的程序规则的情况;(5)裁决未陈述其所依据的理由。
[1]详见本文第四章第一节第二目。
[2]Lauder v.Czech Republic,UNCITRAL,Final Award of 3 September 2001.
[3]CME Czech Republic B.V.v.Czech Republic,UNCITRAL,Final Award of 14 March 2003.
[1]有关CMS诉阿根廷案与LG＆E诉阿根廷案的具体分析,详见本文第四章第二节。
[1]20世纪90年代以来,双边投资条约的数量急剧上升,仅2005年一年世界各国就缔结了70个双边投资条约,从而使全球双边投资条约的总数达到2495个。联合国贸发会议.2006年世界投资报告—来自发展中经济体和转型期经济体的外国直接投资:对发展的影响[EB/OL].http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflver.asp?docid=7431&intltemID=3968&lang=1&mode=downloads.2008-08-13.
[2]MANN,HOWARD.Private Rights,Public Problems,A Guide to NAFTA's Controversial Chapter on Investor rights[EB/OL],http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_citizensguide.pdf.2008-08-17.
[1]BIT between the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Argentina Republic(1990):"Desiring to create favorable conditions for greater investment by investors of one State in the territory of the other State;Recognizing that the encouragement and reciprocal protection under international agreement of such investments will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both States."
[2]BIT between Canada and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Recognizing that the promotion and the protection of investments of investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party will be conducive to the stimulation of business initiative and to the development of economic cooperation between them."
[3]BIT between the Hellenic Republic and the Argentina Republic(1999):"Desiring to intensify economic cooperation between the countries on a long term basis.Aiming at creating favorable conditions for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party.Recognizing that the promotion and protection of such investments on the basis of an Agreement will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative and will increase prosperity in both countries."
[4]BIT between the United States and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic resources."
[5]BIT between Australia and the Argentina Republic(1995):"Considering that investment relations should be promoted and economic cooperation strengthened in accordance with the internationally accepted principles of mutual respect for sovereignty,equality,mutual benefit,non-discrimination and mutual confidence;Acknowledging that investments of investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of one other Contracting Party would be made within the framework of laws of that other Contracting Party;and Recognizing that the promotion and protection of such investments on the basis of a bilateral agreement will be conducive to the stimulation of individual business initiative to the benefit of both countries."
[1]UNCTAD.Scope and Definition[EB/OL].http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflver.asp?docid=189&intItemID=2322&lang=1.2008-08-14.
[2]投资的定义大体上分为三种类型:以资产为基础的投资定义;以企业为基础的投资定义;以交易为基础的投资定义。对投资的定义方式,主要采取了三种形式,即“开放式”投资定义、“封闭式”投资定义以及介于二者之间的“混合式”投资定义。以资产为基础的投资定义是指缔约各方依照各自法律和法规所允许或接受的各种财产。它不仅包括金融资产及经济概念上的资本,还包括具有创造生产能力的所有有形和无形资产。“开放式”投资定义,又称“非穷尽列举式”投资定义。是指国际投资协定列举出构成投资的各类资产,但是这种列举是非穷尽的。这类国际投资协定通常采用“包括但是不限于”之类的表述。UNCTAD.Scope and Definition[EB/OL].http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflver.asp?docid=189&intItemID=2322&lang=1.2008-5-4.:何树全.国际投资协定中的主要争议和未来的选择分析[J].社会科学,2004,(5):26-27.:詹晓宁,葛顺奇.国际投资协定:投资和投资者的范围与定义[J].国际经济合作,2003,(1):41-42.
[3]BIT between the United States of Ameriea and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 1:a)'investment' means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nations or companies of the other Party,such as:equity,debt,and service and investment contracts;and includes without limitation:(ⅰ) tangible and intangible property,including rights,such as mortgnges,liens and pledges;(ⅱ)a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the assets thereof;(ⅲ) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value and directly related to an investment;(ⅳ)intellectual property which includes,inter alia,rights relating to:literary and artistic works,including sound recordings,inventions in all fields of human endeavor,industrial designs,semiconductor mask works,trade secrets,know-how,and confidential business information,and trademarks,service marks,and trade names;and(ⅴ)any right conferred by law or contract,and any licenses and permits pursuant to law."
[1]BIT between the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Argentina Republic:" Article 1:A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their character as investments.The term 'investment' includes all investments,whether made before or after the date of entry into force of this Agreement,but the provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to any dispute concerning an investment which arose,or any claim concerning an investment which was settled,before its entry into force."
[2]BIT between Finland and the Argentina Republic(1993):"Article 1:The term 'investment' means,in conformity with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment is made,every kind of asset invested by an investor of one Contracting Party in the other Contracting Party in accordance with the latter's laws."
[3]BIT between the Hellenic Republic and the Argentina Republic(1999):"Article 1:The meaning and scope of the different assets shall be determined by the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in the territory of which the investment has been made."
[4]S.D.Myer Inc.v.Government of Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),First Partial Award of 13 November 2000,para.232.
[5]Pope & Talbot Inc v.The Government of Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Interim Award of 26 June 2000,paras.96-99.
[1]BIT between the United States and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 2(1):Each Party shall permit and treat investment,and activities associated therewith,on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or associated activities of its own nationals or companies,or of nationals or companies of any third country,whichever is the more favorable,subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol to this Treaty."
[2]BIT between Canada and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 4:Each Contracting Party shall,to the-extent possible and in accordance with its law and regulations,grant to investments or returns of investors of the other Contracting Party treatment no less favorable than that which it grants to investments or returns of its investors."
[3]BIT between Australia and the Argentina Republic(1995):"Article 5:Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments by investors of the other Contracting Party,made in its territory,treatment which is not less favorable than that which it accords to investments of investors of any third country and,subject to its laws,regulations and investment policies,than that which it accords to investments by its own investors."
[4]BIT between the Kingdom of Netherlands and the Argentina Republic(1992):"Article 3(2):Each Contracting Party shall accord to such investments the same security and protection as it accords either to those of its own investors or to those of investors of any third State,whichever is more favorable to the investor concerned."
[5]曾华群.国际投资法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.427.
[1]曾华群.国际投资法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.427.
[2]BIT between Canada and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 2(4):Investments or returns of investors of either Contracting Party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment in accordance with principles international and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory of the other Contracting Party."
[3]BIT between the United States and the Argentina Republic(1991):"Article 2(2)(b):Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management,operation,maintenance,use,enjoyment,acquisition,expansion,or disposal of investment."
[1]曾华群.国际投资法学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999.439-440.
[1]陈安.国际经济法刍言[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2005.61-64.
[2]BIT between the Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Argentina Republic(1990):"Article 5(1):Investment of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalized,expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to the internal necds of that Contracting Party on a non-discriminatory basis and against prompt,adequate and effective compensation."
[1]对于构成间接征收的行为,各国存在很大的分歧。根据国际投资协定和国际投资仲裁案例,以下三种行为往往被界定为间接投资:(1)等同于征收的措施(a measure tantamount to expropriation)。在这种情况下,虽然东道国政府没有直接夺取(taking)外国投资者的财产,但是它所采取措施的后果实际上剥夺了投资者根据投资享有的所有收益。(2)蚕食性征收(creeping expropriation)。东道国采取一系列的措施对外国投资者的投资进行直接或者间接征收。在这种情况下,单独从东道国的任一措施来看,并不构成征收,若综合所有措施的后果,便构成了间接征收。(3)管理性征收(regulatory expropriation)。在这种情况下,东道国采取立法措施对社会进行管理,但是对投资者的投资产生了不利的影响,从而被认定为间接征收。See OSBEY,AARON & MANN,HOWARD & PETERSON,LUKE RIC & MOLTKE,KONRAD VON.Investment and Sustainable Development:A Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=627.2008-08-14.
[1]英文原文为:The provisions of this Agreement shall in no way limit the right of either Contracting Party to take any measures(including the destruction of plants and animals,confiscation of property or the imposition of restrictions on stock movement)necessary for the protection of natural and physical resources or human health,provided such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified discrimination.
[2]英文原文为:This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order,the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace of security,or the Protection of its own essential security interests.
[3]根据UNCTAD提供的19个英文版和法文版阿根廷双边投资条约,仅有新西兰—阿根廷BIT和美国—阿根廷BIT做出了重大安全例外的规定。
[1]这两件UNCITRAL案件是根据1990年英国—阿根廷双边投资条约提起的AWG Group Ltd.v The Argentine Republic,UNCITRAL,Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2006;根据1990年英国—阿根廷双边投资条约提起的National Grid plc v.The Argentine Republic,UNCITRAL,Decision on Jurisdiction of 20 June 2006.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of July 17,2003,para.36.
[2]ICSID公约第25条第2款第2项规定:“在争端双发同意将争端交付调解或仲裁之日,具有作为争端一方的国家以外的某一缔约国国籍的任何法人,以及在上述日期也具有争端当事国的缔约国国籍的法人,而该法人因受外国控制,双方同意为了本公约的目的,应看作是另一缔约国国民。”
[3]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005;Camuzzi International S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/2),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005,para.29.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of July 17,2003,para.40.
[5]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005,para.37.
[6]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of July 17,2003,paras.43-65.
[1]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005.paras.45.
[2]Camuzzi International S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/2),Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction of May 11,2005,para.74.
[3]Id.,para.75.
[4]Id.,paras.83-91.
[1]Azurix Corporation.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/12),Decision on Jurisdiction of December 8,2003,paras.75-80.
[2]Id.,para.81.
[3]Id.,para.85.
[4]Id.,para.86.
[1]Azurix Corp.v.The Argentine Republic(Case No.ARB/01/12),Decision on Jurisdiction of December 8,2003,paras,para.87.
[2]Id.,para.90.
[3]Siemens A.G.v.The Argentine Republic(Case No.ARB/02/8),Decision on Jurisdiction of August 3,2004,para.60.
[4]Id.,para.62
[5]Id.,para.63.
[1]Siemens A.G.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/8),Decision on Jurisdiction of August 3,2004,paras.33-59.
[2]Id.,para.81.
[3]Id.,para.102.
[1]Siemens A.G v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/8),Decision on Jurisdiction of August 3,2004,paras.80-105.
[2]1969年《维也纳条约法公约》第26条规定:“凡有效之条约对其各当事国有拘束力,必须由各该国善意履行。”第27条规定:“一当事国不得援引其国内法规定为理由而不履行条约。此项规则不妨碍第46条。”
[1]原文为:"Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments."
[2]原文为:"The investments made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Contracting Party in whose territory they are undertaken,enjoy the full protection of this Agreement."
[3]根据王海浪博士的考证,目前国际投资仲裁庭倾向于采用保护伞条款扩展管辖权。王海浪.ICSID管辖权新问题与中国新对策研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2006.147-160.
[1]比如,1994年《英国与阿尔巴尼亚BIT》第3条明确规定:为避免产生疑义,缔约双方确认有关MFN 待遇的规定适用于争端解决机制。
[1]陈安,蔡从燕,主编.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2007.270-271.
[2]目前中国共向ICSID指派了八名法学家作为仲裁员和调解员,分别为厦门大学陈安教授、复旦大学陈泊东教授、武汉大学黄进教授、北京大学邵景春教授、中国政法大学王传丽教授、中国人民大学余劲松教授、外经贸部条法司李玲副司长、对外经贸大学沈四宝教授,任期至2010年4月27日。http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.2008-08-15.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.518-519.
[2]这6个案件分别为Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16);Camuzzi International S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/2):Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/17);Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Vivendi Universal S.A v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/19);Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A.and Vivendi Universal v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/97/3).
[1]第一个案件为AWG Group Ltd.v The Argentine Republic,由于该案与SSA&ISIA诉阿根廷案和SSA&Vivendi诉阿根廷案争议完全相同,因此这第三个案由同一个仲裁庭合并审理。阿根廷对仲裁员的异议,与上两个案件相同。第二个案件为National Grid plc v The Argentine Republic,在该案中,阿根廷对仲裁员贾德·凯斯勒(Judd Kessler)提出异议申请,仲裁庭最终拒绝了阿根廷是请求,并且根据UNCITRAL 的规定,仲裁庭拒绝当事方的仲裁员异议申请无需说明理由。阿根廷不服UNCITRAL的决定,于是在与投资者协商一致的情况下,将案件提交伦敦国际仲裁庭(London Court of International Arbitration,LCIA),由后者对仲裁员异议重新做出审理,并给出理由。由于该案首先根据UNCITRAL程序审理,其后移交伦敦国际仲裁庭,两者均遵循对案件保密的原则,因此笔者无法获得仲裁庭对该仲裁员异议的决定。有关于该案的介绍,详见Peterson,Luke Eric,Argentina and UK Firm Send Arbitrator-Challenge to Venue where Reasons are Provided[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_oct30_2007.pdf.2008.08-10.
[2]British Gas(BG)v.The Argentine Republic,在本案中,阿根廷提出了针对范登堡(van den Berg)教授仲裁员异议申请。
[3]由于有关这两个案件中,阿根廷对仲裁员的异议决定没有在ICSID网站上公布,因此有关这两个案件仲裁员异议的概要介绍参见CABRERA,FERNANDO & PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Argentina Moves to Disqualify Tribunal in Dispute over Admitting Earlier Rulings[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_investsd_may9_2007.pdf.2008-08-10.
[4]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),award of September 28,2007.
[1]即考夫曼作为Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A.and Vivendi Universal v.The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No.ARB/97/3).第二次仲裁程序仲裁庭的仲裁员。
[2]Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/17);Suez,Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.and Vivendi Universal S.A v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/19);and in the arbitration under the rules of UNCITRAL AWG Group Ltd.v.The Argentine Republic,Decision on the proposal for the disqualification of a member of the arbitral tribunal,October 22,2007,paras.12-13.
[3]Id.,paras.18-42.
[4]Id.paras.43-44.
[5]有关对该案的介绍见:PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Secret $185 Million Award against Argentina Comes to Light in D.C.Court[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_investsd_aqrl_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[1]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Secret $185 Million Award against Argentina Comes to Light in D.C.Court [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_investsd_aprl_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[2]Id.
[3]Id.
[1]ICSID.Convention on the settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States:Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention(2)[Z].Washington:ICSID Publication,1968.(以下简称 History of the ICSID Convention(2)[Z].1968) pp.489,729-730,753,935.
[2]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.515-516.
[3]Id.,p.1200.
[1]魏艳茹.ICSID仲裁撤销制度研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2005.53-54.又如在Amco诉印度尼西亚案中,印度尼西亚指出,申请人Amco任命的仲裁员与其存在着利益关系,后者曾经为Amco 公司的实际控制者提出税务安排方面的建议,且后者的法律公司与Amco公司在本案的顾问公司存在合作关系和利益分享关系,这种利益分享关系在案件开始之前就已结束。但是仲裁庭的其他两位仲裁员否决了印度尼西亚的异议申请,认为不存在明显的证据表明仲裁员缺乏独立性。SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.516.
[2]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Analysis:Arbitrator Challenges Raising Tough Questions as to Who Resolves BIT Cases[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_investsd_jan7_2007.pdf.2008-5-10.
[3]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.517.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.1200.
[2]魏艳茹.ICSID仲裁撤销制度研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2005.54.
[1]由于UNCITRAL程序、ICC程序对仲裁案件的保密,因此本文仅就阿根廷在ICSID体制内的仲裁案件做出分析与评价。
[2]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005;LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006;Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007;Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Awardof 28 September 2007.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.88.;LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.72.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,para.89;Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007,para.95.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.256.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.254.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,para.237.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.259.
[4]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,para.238.
[1]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007,para.277.
[2]Id.,para.285.
[3]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.188.
[4]Id.,paras.191-193.
[1]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.195.
[2]Id.,paras.198-200.
[3]Metalclad corporation v.the United Mexican States(ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/97/1),Award of 30 August 2000,paras.102-112.
[4]Pope & Talbot v.the Government of Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Interim Award of 26 June 2000,paras.81-105.
[1]S.D.Myer Inc.v.Canada,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Partial Award on merits of 13 November 2000,para.282.
[2]Marvin Feldman v.Mexico,UNCITRAL(NAFTA),Final Award of 16 December 2002,para.99.
[3]Tecnica Medioambientales Tecmed v.United Mexican States(ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/00/2),Award of 29May 2003,para.116.
[4]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.267.
[1]Sempra Energy International v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/16),Award of 28 September 2007,para.290.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22May 2007,para.255.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.270-272.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.266-284.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,paras.256-268.
[3]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.131.
[4]Id.,para.139.
[1]Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co S.A.(Greece) v.Egypt(ICSID Case No.ARB/99/6),Award of 12 April 2002,para.143.
[2]Mondev International Ltd.v.United States of America(ICSID Case No.ARB(AF)/99/2),Award of 11 October 2002,para.116.
[3]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.296-298.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.296-303.
[2]Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets,L.P.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/3),Award of 22 May 2007,paras.269-277.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.304.
[2]Id.,para.312.
[3]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.201.
[4]Id.,para.202.
[5]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.304.
[6]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,para.203.
[1]原文为:1.Necessity may not be invoked by a state as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act:(a) is the only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril;and(b) does nor seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists,or of the international community as a whole;2.In any case,necessity may not be invoked by a state as a ground for precluding wrongfulness,if:(a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity;or(b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,para.317.
[2]原文为:This treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order,the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security,or the protection of its own essential security interests.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Award of 12 May 2005,paras.353-355.
[2]Id.,paras.359-361.
[3]Id.,para.304.
[4]Id.,paras.332-394.
[1]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,paras.205-206.
[2]Id.,para.226.
[1]LG&E Energy Corporation,LG&E Capital Corporation and LG&E International Inc.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/02/1),Decision on liability of 3 October 2006,paras.230-242.
[1]原文为:The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice to:(a) Compliance with the obligation in question,if and to the extent that the circumstance precluding wrongfulness no longer exists;(b) The question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question.
[1]《ICSID公约》第52条第1款规定:任何一方可以根据下列一个或几个理由,向秘书长提出书面申请要求取消裁决:(1)仲裁庭的组成不当;(2)仲裁庭明显超越其权利;(3)仲裁庭的一个成员有受贿行为(4)有严重的背离基本的程序规则的情况;(5)裁决未陈述其所依据的理由。
[2]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,paras.1-3.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,paras.18.
[2]Id.,para.16.
[3]Id.,para.24.
[4]Id.,para.23.
[5]Id.,para.25.
[6]Id.,para.28.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Argentine Republic's Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 1 September 2006,para.38.
[2]Id.,para.41-46.
[3]Id.,para.47.
[4]Id.
[5]Id.,paras.49-50.
[1]第52条第1款规定的撤销仲裁裁决的理由包括:仲裁庭的组成不当;仲裁庭显然越权;仲裁庭成员存在受贿行为;存在严重背离基本程序规则情势;裁决未陈述理由。
[2]有关ICSID仲裁撤销制度的讨论,详见陈安,主编.国际投资争端仲裁——“解决投资争端国际中心”机制研究[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.214-260.
[3]ICSID受理的第一起申请撤销仲裁裁决案是在ICSID首次受理投资争端仲裁申请十余年之后的1984年,即克劳科纳诉喀麦隆案。Kl(o|¨)cker industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v.United Republic of Camerroon and Societe Camerounasise de Engrais,(ICSID Case No.ARB/81/2),Decision on Annument of ICSID of 3 July 1985.Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal,Vol.1,NO.1,1986.而到2000年初,ICSID已经受理六起申请撤销仲裁裁决案。SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.897.
[4]OECD Secretariat,Improving the System of Investment-State Dispute Settlement:An Overview,Symposium Co-organized by ICSID,OECD and UNCTAD:Making the Most of International Investment Agreements:A Common Agenda[Z],12 December 2005,Paris.See,http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_33783766_355016971_1_1_1,00.html.2008-8-20.
[5]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,para.44.
[6]Id.,para.49.
[7]Id.,para.52.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,para.54.
[2]Id.,para.55.
[3]Id.,para.56.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,para.89-100.
[2]Id.,para.120-127.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,paras.128-136.
[1]CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision of the ad hoc committee on the application for annulment of the Argentine republic of 25 September 2007,paras.144-150.
[1]例如在CMS诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向CMS公司赔偿1.33亿美元;在ENRON诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向ENRON公司赔偿1.06亿美元;在AZURIX诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向AZURIX公司赔偿1.65亿美元;在SIMENS诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向SIMENS赔偿2.17亿美元;在SEMPRA诉阿根廷案中,仲裁庭裁决阿根廷向SENPRA公司赔偿1.28亿美元;即使在LG&E案中,仲裁庭在豁免了阿根廷经济危机期间违背条约义务应该承担的赔偿责任以后,仍然裁决阿根廷向投资者赔偿0.57亿美元。
[2]GOODMAN,CHARITY L.Uncharted Waters:Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina[J].University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law,2007,(28):452.
[3]参见本文第四章第一节关于阿根廷对仲裁员异议的内容。
[4]《公约》第52条其他两款分别为“仲裁庭组成不当”和“仲裁庭的成员有受贿行为”。但是,由于一则ICSID 仲裁庭的组庭事宜皆在秘书长的直接监督之下,发生“仲裁庭组成不当”的可能性几乎不存在,二则ICSID 仲裁庭的仲裁员皆为品德高尚的世界著名人士,让他们收受贿赂的可能性也极为渺茫,所以,从迄今已披露出来的撤销案件看,当事人所援用的ICSID仲裁撤销理由一直都来自剩下的3个撤销理由。魏艳茹.ICSID 仲裁撤销制度研究(博士学位论文)[D].厦门:厦门大学,2005.22.
[5]同上,第105页。
[1]GOODMAN,CHARITY L.Uncharted Waters:Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina[J].University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law,2007,(28):453.
[2]CMS Gas Transmission Corporation v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/01/8),Decision on Respondent's Request for a continued Stay of Enforcement of the Award,para.47.
[3]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later:.The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):679.
[1]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later:.The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):678-680.
[2]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged By the Argentine Government [EB/OL].http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm,2008-08-10.
[3]Id.
[4]陈安.中外双边投资协定中的四大“安全阀”不宜贸然拆除[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006,29.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E & LORENTI,PEDRO.Argentina:The Enforcement Process Of The ICSID Awards:Procedural Issues And Domestic Public Policy[EB/OL].http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=32803&searchresults=1.2008-08-10.
[2]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged By the Argentine Government [EB/OL].http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm.2008-08-10.
[3]RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[4]Color SA v.Max Factor,17 Nov.1994;Meller v.ENTEL,5 Nov.2002.See RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E.Argentina:ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged By the Argentine Government [EB/OL].http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm.2008-08-10.
[2]RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[1]RICHARDS,PABLO F.Court Support for Arbitration in Argentina[EB/OL].http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/handbooks/4/sections/8/chapters/48/argentina.2008-08-10.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E.& LORENTI,PEDRO M.The Growing Opposition of Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals—A Conflict between International and Domestic Law.[J].The Journal of World Trade and Investment,2005,6(3):423-424.
[2]Id.,p.425.
[1]ALFARO,CARLOS E.& LORENTI,PEDRO.Argentina:ARGENTINA VS.ICSID:Unconstitutionality of the BITs and ICSID Jurisdiction-the Potential New Government Defenses Against the Enforcement of the ICSID Arbitral Award-Issues That May Subject the Award to Revision by the Argentine Judiciary[EB/OL].http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=-32539&searchresult=1.2008-08-10.
[2]2008年8月1日,负责ICSID仲裁案件应诉事务的阿根廷司法部国际事务处负责人加布里尔·博蒂尼(Gabriel Bottini)致笔者的信,见附录。
[3]同上。
[1]BORALESSA,ANOOSHA.Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID Awards against the Republic of Argentina:Obstacles that Transnational Corporations May Face[J].New York International Law Review,summer,2004(17):59.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.1080-1081.
[2]ICSID.History of the ICSID Convention(2)[Z].1968.pp.273,425,428,430.
[3]Id.pp.161,408,426,427,519,889,901,902,908.
[4]公约第26条规定:除非另有规定,双方同意根据本公约交付仲裁,应视为同意排除任何其他补救办法而交付上述仲裁。缔约国可以要求用尽当地各种行政或司法补救办法作为其同意根据本公约交付仲裁的一个条件。
[5]公约第64条规定:缔约国之间发生的不能通过谈判解决的有关本公约的解释或适用的任何争端,经争端任何一方的申请,得提交国际法院,除非有关国家同意采取另一种解决办法。
[6]同本页注②,第274,438,440页。
[1]ICSID.History of the ICSID Convention(2)[Z].1968.pp.889,890.
[2]公约第69条规定:每一缔约国应采取使本公约的规定在其领土内有效所必需的立法或其他措施。
[3]公约第27条规定:缔约国对于它本国的一个国民和另一缔约国根据本公约已同意交付或已交付仲裁的争端,不得给予外交保护或提出国际要求。除非该另一缔约国未能遵守和履行对此项争端所作出的裁决。
[1]陈安,主编.国际投资争端仲裁[M].上海:复旦大学出版社 2001,282.
[2]目前共有3个案件以国家执行豁免条款为理由,判决对东道国的不利裁决不能予以执行。这三个案件分别为:Benvenuti and Bonfant Srl v.The Government of the People's Republic of the Congo(ICSID Case No.ARB/77/2);Societe Ouest Africaine des Betons Industriels v.State of Senegal(ICSID Case No.ARB/82/1);Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v.Republic of Liberia,(ICSID Case No.ARB/83/2).
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.411.
[2]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.CMS Energy Urges Argentina to Pay ICSID Award,Investment Treaty News [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_jan11_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[3]1945年《国际法院规约》第36条第1款规定:法院之管辖包括各当事国提交之一切案件,及联合国宪章或现行条约即协约中所特定之一切事件。
[4]见本页注①,第1260页。
[5]见本页注①,第1262页。
[1]ICSID.ICSID History(2)[z].1968.pp.346,523,656,885,889,893,900,901,903,904.
[2]BORALESSA,ANOOSHA.Enforcement in the United States and United Kingdom of ICSID Awards against the Republic of Argentina:Obstacles that Transnational Corporations May Face[J].New York International Law Review,2004,(17).
[1]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.CMS Energy Urges Argentina to Pay ICSID Award,Investment Treaty News [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_jan11_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
[2]GOODMAN,CHARITY L.Uncharted Waters:Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina[J].University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law,summer,2007,(28):481.
[3]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later:The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):698.
[4]2008年8月1日,Babriel Bottini致笔者的信,见本文附录。
[5]同上。
[6]同上。
[1]United States of America Department of state.U.S.Submission regarding Article 53 and 54 of the ICSID convention of 1 May 2008[Z].http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-USsubmission.pdf.2008-8-10.
[2]Id.
[1]与Sempra案相同的是Enron诉阿根廷案,在这两个案件中,仲裁庭均要求阿根廷向投资者支付损害发生之日至裁决作出之日的利息(pre-award)。投资者不满仲裁庭的上述决定,向美国纽约州南区地区法院提起诉讼要求美国法院判决阿根廷向其支付裁决作出之后,履行之前的所有利息(post-award)。美国纽约州地区法院支持了申请人的请求,要求阿根廷向投资者支付判决之后履行之前的所有利息(post-judgment)。美国纽约州地区法院的判决实际上修改了ICSID仲裁庭的仲裁裁决。有关纽约州地区法院的判决,见附录。
[2]Procuracion del Tesoro de la Nacion.Argentina's Response to US Department of State Letter of 2 June 2008[Z].http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-ArgentinaArt.53-54.pdf.2008-8-10.
[1]SAMRA,HAROUT.Five Years Later.The CMS Award Placed in the Context of the Argentine Financial Crisis and the ICSID Arbitration Boom[J].University of Miami Inter-American Law Review,Spring/Summer,2006-2007,(38):696.
[2]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.阿根廷同比外国投资增长143%[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200410/20041000291729.html.2008-08-10.
[3]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.2005年阿根廷吸收外资创7年来最高记录[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200603/20060301717110.html.2008-08-10.
[4]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.在阿根廷经营外资公司利润率创新高[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200704/20070404529828.html.2008-08-10.
[5]中华人民共和国驻阿根廷大使馆经济商务参赞处.阿根廷政府决定天然气批发价上涨36%[EB/OL].http://ar.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/jmxw/200405/20040500218926.html.2008-08-10.
[1]这五个案件为:Camuzzi International S.A v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/7);Pioneer Natural Resources Company,Pioneer Natural Resources(Argentina) S.A.and Pioneer Natural Resources(Tierra del Fuego) S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03//12);Aguas Cordobesas S.A.,Suez,and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/03/18);France Telecom S.A.v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/04/18);RGA Reinsurance Company v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/04/20).
[2]参见ICSID网站资料。
[3]阿喀琉斯之踵指致命的弱点和要害。古希腊神话中的阿喀琉斯是海神之子,荷马史诗中的英雄,传说他的母亲曾把他浸在冥河里使其能刀枪不入。但因冥河水流湍急,母亲捏着他的脚后跟不敢松手,所以脚踵是其致命之处。长大后,阿喀琉斯杀死了特洛伊王子赫克托尔,惹怒了赫克托尔的保护神阿波罗,于是太阳神阿波罗用箭射中了阿喀琉斯的脚后跟,断送了这位勇士的命。这就是流传至今的欧洲谚语“阿喀琉斯之踵”的来历。http://baike.baidu.com/view/17268.htm.2008-8-13.
[1]SCHREUER,CHRISTOPH H.The ICSID Convention:A Commentary[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2001.1142.
[2]梁西,主编.国际法[M].武汉:武汉大学出版社,1993.92.
[1]陈安.国际投资争端仲裁[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.288-294.
[1]UNCTAD.World Investment Report 2007:Transnational Corporations,Extractive Industries and development[R].At http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=9001&intItemID=4361&lang=1&mode=downloads.2008-8-17.
[2]陈安,主编.国际投资争端仲裁[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.42.
[1]参见UNCTAD网站资料,http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1.2008-8-20.
[2]2008年3月5日,中国国家总理温家宝在政府工作报告中指出,在过去的五年中,中国经济取得了巨大的进展,但是仍然面临诸多新的问题和挑战。经济运行中一些突出问题和深层次矛盾依然存在。固定资产投资过快,货币信贷投放过多,国际收支不平衡。自主创新能力不强,经济增长的资源环境代价过大。农村基础薄弱,城乡、区域发展差距扩大。涉及群众切身利益的问题有待进一步解决。当前物价上涨,通货膨胀压力加大。去年居民消费价格总水平比上年上涨4.8%。参见新华网.2005年3月5日温家宝政府工作报告[R].http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-03/05/content_7720848.htm.2008-8-20.温家宝总理在2008年两会记者招待会上也坦陈,2008年恐怕是中国经济最困难的一年。参见中国网.国务院总理温家宝答中外记者问[EB/OL].http://hxtc.china.cn/2008lianghui/2008-03/18/content_12946727.htm.2008-8-20.
[3]例如,1995～1996年间,海岸公司通过设立合营企业的方式在江苏省设立三个调峰电厂,并向MIGA 申请投保政治风险,包括征收险。有关合营企业与四家国有电力企业订立购电合同,这四家电力企业均有权与供电方谈判购电计价方法和购电数量及其他相关事宜。上述电力项目进入营运阶段后,中国大陆政府开始在全国范围内重新审查电力政策,整顿电价混乱情形。鉴此,1998年底到1999年下半年,江苏省政府出台了被称为“综合电价政策”的系列政策文件和规定,取消了地方电力价格部门审查和调整购电合同项下电价的权力。根据有关文件,江苏省的调峰电厂必须另订新的购电合同,即必须与在购、零售电力方面获得垄断权的江苏省电力公司谈判。在与江苏省方面谈判未果后,海岸公司开始向MIGA求助。在MIGA 与中国大陆政府有关部门的谈判中,后者质疑:为什么违约行为构成一个征收事实,而不是一起可以在当地法院解决的普通商业纠纷。他们向MIGA表明,他们是本着保护中国大陆电力消费者这一全国性的一贯政策,以最大的善意行事。难道合法的国家利益不能优先于投资者的合同权利?虽然经过MIGA、中国大陆政府及该外商的共同努力与彼此谅解,该外商与中国大陆政府就有关问题达成协议,从而没有正式向MIGA提出索赔,但该案无疑给我们敲响了警钟。[美]劳伦·S·威森费尔德.多边投资担保机构的十五年发展历程[A].徐崇利译.陈安.国际经济法学刊(9)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2004.231-236.
[1]这13个接受ICSID仲裁管辖权的BIT的缔约另一方分别是:韩国、立陶宛、智利、冰岛、秘鲁、摩洛哥、以色列、南斯拉夫、沙特阿拉伯、加蓬、喀麦隆、马其顿、也门。其中,我国与喀麦隆签订的BIT已经废止。魏艳茹.论我国晚近全盘接受ICSID仲裁管辖权之不当[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.111.
[1]全面接受ICSID仲裁管辖权的中国双边投资条约的另一缔约方为:巴巴多斯、刚果(布)、博茨瓦纳、塞拉利昂、莫桑比克、肯尼亚、约旦、荷兰、缅甸、塞浦路斯、波黑、特立尼达和多巴哥、科特迪瓦、圭亚那、吉布提、德国、拉脱维亚、乌干达、突尼斯、芬兰、贝宁、朝鲜、西班牙、捷克、葡萄牙、瓦努阿图、俄罗斯、印度。
[1]魏艳茹.论我国晚近全盘接受ICSID仲裁管辖权之不当[A].陈安.国际经济法学刊13(1)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.111-112.
[2]江泽民在中国共产党第十六次全国代表大会上的报告[EB/OL].http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/20021118/300508.asp.2008-8-14.
[1]商务部.2007年我国非金融类对外直接投资统计快报[EB/OL].http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/jwtztj/t20080128_89251.htm.2008-01-28.2008-8-14.
[2]商务部.2007年1-12月全国吸收外国直接投资快讯[EB/OL].http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/wztj/wstztj/lywzkx/t20080121_89048.htm.2008-01-21.2008-8-17.
[1]参见本文第四章第一节第一目。
[2]参见本文第四章第二节第二目。
[1]PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Path Cleared for Italian Holders of Argentine Bond to Sue Argentina at ICSID[EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/investment_investsd_feb14_2007.pdf.2008-5-10.
[2]Giovanna a Beccara and others v.The Argentine Republic(ICSID Case No.ARB/07/5).
[3]Id.
[4]同本页注①。
[1]徐崇利.从实体到程序:最惠国适用范围之争[J].法商研究,2007,(2):41-43.
[1]陈安,蔡从燕,主编.国际投资法的新发展与中国双边投资条约的新实践[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2007.128.
[1]见本文第四章第二节第四目、第四章第三节第二目。
[2]由于该案根据UNCITRAL进行仲裁,因此有关该案的仲裁裁决没有公开。有关该案的情况介绍请参见PETERSON,LUKE ERIC.Secret $185 Million Award against Argentina Comes to Light in D.C.Court [EB/OL].http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/investment_investsd_aprl_2008.pdf.2008-08-10.
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[2]原文为:"Desiring to achieve these objectives in a manner consistent with the protection of health,safety,and the environment,and the promotion of internationally recognized labor rights."
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