机构投资者对公司管理层薪酬影响的研究
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摘要
1932年,Berle和Means在《现代公司和私有财产》中提出,现代企业公司治理问题源于企业所有权与控制权的分离,这种分离使得管理者有机会按照自身的利益而不是股东利益行事,这就产生了股东与管理者的利益冲突,即委托代理问题。怎样解决委托代理所带来的公司治理问题,一直以来都是理论界和实务界所关心的热点问题,也是悬而未决的难点问题。近年来机构投资者的异军突起,让我们看到了解决这一问题的希望。机构投资者作为公司的所有者之一,具有专业的理财队伍,较为理性的投资行为,并兼具规模经济所带来的成本优势,其发展壮大将改善证券市场的投资者结构,起到稳定市场、活跃交易、完善上市公司治理结构等作用。因此,机构投资者不仅应该参与公司治理,更应该成为公司治理的中坚力量。
机构投资者参与公司治理的一种主要方式就是积极参与管理层业绩的评价和薪酬制度设计。在市场经济条件下,要保证公司管理层具有强烈的责任心和积极进取的工作态度,就必须建立科学、合理的高管薪酬制度,给予公司管理层有效的激励,逐步引导他们的行为与股东的利益趋于一致,唯有这样,才有可能解决由委托代理所引发的公司治理问题。基于此,笔者选择了这个题目,并重点做了以下工作:构建了机构投资者与公司管理层薪酬的博弈模型,从博弈论的视角深入分析了机构投资者对公司管理层薪酬的影响;在规范研究的基础上,结合我国特有的经济环境,采用实证分析方法考察了机构投资者对公司管理层薪酬的影响。
本文具体分为五章内容。首先,在第一章绪论的基础上,第二章论述了机构投资者与公司管理层薪酬的相关理论基础,并阐述了它们之间的逻辑关系。然后,第三章系统地分析了机构投资者影响公司管理层薪酬的动因、效应以及方式,并构建了机构投资者与公司管理层薪酬的博弈模型。进而,第四章以2004—2006年共4123家上市公司公布的年报为分析对象,采用多元回归方法对机构投资者与我国上市公司管理层薪酬关系进行实证研究。最后,第五章得出了本文的研究结论并提出了对策建议,同时也指出了本文的不足之处。
In 1932, Berle and Means proposed, in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, that modern corporate governance derives from the separation between ownership and control power, and the separation makes managers have the opportunity to act according to their own interests rather than shareholders’, which leads to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, namely Principal-Agent problem. How to deal with the corporate governance problems caused by Principal-Agent has always been a hot and unsolved topic both in theory and practice. Recently, the emergence of institutional investors let us see the hope to solve this problem. Institutional investors as one owner of the corporate have professional financial team, rational investment behavior and the cost advantage brought by scale economies, and their growth and development will improve the structure of the investors in the securities market, playing a role in stabilizing the market, trading activity, improving the corporate governance of listed companies. As a result, institutional investors should not only participate in corporate governance, but also should become the backbone of corporate governance.
For institutional investors, a main way of participating in corporate governance is to take an active part in the management performance evaluation and compensation system design. Under the market economy condition, in order to guarantee the management has a strong sense of responsibility as well as a positive work attitude, it is necessary to establish a scientific and rational system of management compensation motivating management effectively and guiding them step by step to act in the interests of stakeholders, only in this way, is it possible to resolve corporate governance problems triggered by Principal-Agent. Based on the above reasons, this topic was chose and some specific work that has been done is as follows: Constructing a game model of institutional investors and management compensation; Deeply analyzing the Influence of Institutional Investors on management compensation from the perspective of game theory; Considering China’s unique economic environment, the method of empirical research was used to investigate the influence of the institutional investors on management compensation on the basis of normative research.
This paper consists of five chapters. First of all, on the basis of introduction in the first chapter, the second chapter discusses the basic theories relating to institutional investors and management compensation, and explains the logical relationship between them. Then, the third chapter gives a systematical analysis on motivation, effect and system of the influence of institutional Investors on management compensation, and constructs a game model between institutional investors and management compensation. Further, Chapter four analyses the influence of institutional investors on management compensation with the date collecting from the annual report of 4123 listed companies from 2004 to 2006, with the method of Multiple Regression Analyses. Finally, Chapter Five gives conclusions and suggestions, and also points out the limits of the paper.
机构投资者参与公司治理的一种主要方式就是积极参与管理层业绩的评价和薪酬制度设计。在市场经济条件下,要保证公司管理层具有强烈的责任心和积极进取的工作态度,就必须建立科学、合理的高管薪酬制度,给予公司管理层有效的激励,逐步引导他们的行为与股东的利益趋于一致,唯有这样,才有可能解决由委托代理所引发的公司治理问题。基于此,笔者选择了这个题目,并重点做了以下工作:构建了机构投资者与公司管理层薪酬的博弈模型,从博弈论的视角深入分析了机构投资者对公司管理层薪酬的影响;在规范研究的基础上,结合我国特有的经济环境,采用实证分析方法考察了机构投资者对公司管理层薪酬的影响。
本文具体分为五章内容。首先,在第一章绪论的基础上,第二章论述了机构投资者与公司管理层薪酬的相关理论基础,并阐述了它们之间的逻辑关系。然后,第三章系统地分析了机构投资者影响公司管理层薪酬的动因、效应以及方式,并构建了机构投资者与公司管理层薪酬的博弈模型。进而,第四章以2004—2006年共4123家上市公司公布的年报为分析对象,采用多元回归方法对机构投资者与我国上市公司管理层薪酬关系进行实证研究。最后,第五章得出了本文的研究结论并提出了对策建议,同时也指出了本文的不足之处。
In 1932, Berle and Means proposed, in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, that modern corporate governance derives from the separation between ownership and control power, and the separation makes managers have the opportunity to act according to their own interests rather than shareholders’, which leads to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, namely Principal-Agent problem. How to deal with the corporate governance problems caused by Principal-Agent has always been a hot and unsolved topic both in theory and practice. Recently, the emergence of institutional investors let us see the hope to solve this problem. Institutional investors as one owner of the corporate have professional financial team, rational investment behavior and the cost advantage brought by scale economies, and their growth and development will improve the structure of the investors in the securities market, playing a role in stabilizing the market, trading activity, improving the corporate governance of listed companies. As a result, institutional investors should not only participate in corporate governance, but also should become the backbone of corporate governance.
For institutional investors, a main way of participating in corporate governance is to take an active part in the management performance evaluation and compensation system design. Under the market economy condition, in order to guarantee the management has a strong sense of responsibility as well as a positive work attitude, it is necessary to establish a scientific and rational system of management compensation motivating management effectively and guiding them step by step to act in the interests of stakeholders, only in this way, is it possible to resolve corporate governance problems triggered by Principal-Agent. Based on the above reasons, this topic was chose and some specific work that has been done is as follows: Constructing a game model of institutional investors and management compensation; Deeply analyzing the Influence of Institutional Investors on management compensation from the perspective of game theory; Considering China’s unique economic environment, the method of empirical research was used to investigate the influence of the institutional investors on management compensation on the basis of normative research.
This paper consists of five chapters. First of all, on the basis of introduction in the first chapter, the second chapter discusses the basic theories relating to institutional investors and management compensation, and explains the logical relationship between them. Then, the third chapter gives a systematical analysis on motivation, effect and system of the influence of institutional Investors on management compensation, and constructs a game model between institutional investors and management compensation. Further, Chapter four analyses the influence of institutional investors on management compensation with the date collecting from the annual report of 4123 listed companies from 2004 to 2006, with the method of Multiple Regression Analyses. Finally, Chapter Five gives conclusions and suggestions, and also points out the limits of the paper.
引文
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[11]Gomes. Going public without governance: managerial reputation effects. Journalof Finance,2000 ,55(2):615-646
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[2] Grossman S ,O Hart . An analysis of the principal-agent problem.Econometrica ,1983 ,51 :7– 45.
[3] Black, B. Institutional investor and corporate governance: the case forInstitutional voice. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1992,5(3):19-32
[4] Shieifer A. and R. Vishny. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance,1997, 52 (2):737-775.
[5] Maxey, D., and R. ten Wolde, 1998, CEO Pay May be Crucial as Funds Shop, Wall Street Journal May 26, C25.
[6] Hotchkiss, Edith, and Deon Strickland, 2000, Does Shareholder Composition Affect Stock Returns? Evidence from Corporate Earnings Announcements, Boston College and Ohio State University working paper.
[7] Hambrick, D.G.,&Finkelstein.S.1995.The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top:The case of CEO pay raises.Strategic Management Journal,16:175-193.
[8] Useem, Michael, 1996, Investor Capitalism: How Money Managers are Changing the Face of Corporate America (New York: Basic Books).
[9] Hartzell, Jay, 1999, The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation, New York University working paper.
[10] Almazan, Andres, Keith Brown, Murray Carlson, and David Chapman, 2000, Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager? University of Texas at Austin working paper.
[11]Gomes. Going public without governance: managerial reputation effects. Journalof Finance,2000 ,55(2):615-646
[12] Jone C. Coffee, JR. Liquidity Versus Control: The InstitutionalInvestor as Corporate Monitor. Columbia Law Review, 1991, 91(6): 1277-1368.
[13] Cosh, A., Hughes A.Executive Remuneration, Executive Dismissal and Institual Shareholdings. International Journal of University of Texas, 2001.
[14] Johnson, Marilyn, and Margaret Shackell, 1997, Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, University of Michigan working paper.
[15]邵颖红,朱哲晗,陈爱军.我国机构投资者参与公司治理实证分析[J].现代管理科学,2006,5:33-37
[16]王琨,肖星.机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2005,2:27-33
[17]孙凌姗,刘健.机构投资者在公司治理中的作用——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].兰州商学院学报,2006,3:90-94
[18]吴晓晖,姜彦福.机构投资者影响下独立董事治理效率变化研究[J].中国工业经济,2006,5:105-111
[19]王永海,王铁林,李青原.机构投资者参与公司治理积极性的分析[J].南开管理评论,2007,1:4-7
[20]李维安,李滨.机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究——基于CCGINK的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2008,1:4-14
[21]曾德明,姚璇.机构投资者、董事会与经营者股票期权激励问题研究[J].经济经纬,2006,2
[22]陈炎炎.机构投资者与上市公司治理研究[MA].湖南大学,2006
[23]李善民,王彩萍.机构持股与上市公司管理层薪酬关系实证研究[J].管理评论,2007,1
[24]周磊.机构投资者和管理层薪酬激励[J].企业研究,2008,2
[25] Alchian and Demsetz. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 693-728.
[26] Jensen, M., Murohy, K. Performance Pay and Top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy,1990(98):225-264
[27]O.Williamson,The Economic Instituions of Capitalism,Free Press,New York.
[28] Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
[29]万俊毅.机构投资股东:理论、实践与政策[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2006
[30] Jensen, Michael, 1993, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, Journal of Finance 48, 831-880.
[31] Shleifer and Vishny. Managerial entrenchment: the case of manager-specificinvestments. Journal ofFinancial Economics ,1989,25(1):123-139
[32] Ross, Stephen, 1999, Some Notes on Compensation, Agency Theory, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness, MIT working paper.
[33] Smith, Michael, 1996, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, Journal of Finance 51, 227-252.
[34] Clay, Darin.The Effects of Institutional Investment on CEO Compensation. Working paper, University of Southern California, 2000
[35] Pound J. The rise of the political model of corporate governance and corporate control. Harvard Business Review,1992,70(2):83-93
[36] Coffee, John, 1991, Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, Columbia Law Review 91, 1277-1368.
[37] Parthiban David, Rahul Kochhar,Edward Levitas. The effect of institutional investors on the level and mix of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 1998,(2):200-208
[38] Smith, Michael, 1996, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS, Journal of Finance 51, 227-252.
[39] Guercio, Hawkins, 1999, The Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk: An Analysis of the Magnitude and Determinants, Journal of Financial Economics 53, 43-71.
[40] Brown, Brooke,1993, Institutional Demand and Security Price Pressure, Financial Analysts Journal, 53-63.
[41] Sias, Richard, and Laura T. Starks, 1997, Institutions and Individuals at the Turn-of-the-Year, Journal of Finance 52, 1543-1562.
[42] Hotehkiss,Strickland, 2000, Does Shareholder Composition Affect Stock Returns? Evidence from Corporate Earnings Announcements, Boston College and Ohio State University working paper.
[43] Chidambaran,John, The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, Dividend, and Financing Policies, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 262-292.
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