上市公司高管股权激励与公司绩效相关性研究
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摘要
上市公司的基本经营目标为股东财富最大化,而上市公司中作为所有者的股东和作为经营者的高管人员由于目标利益的不一致,信息不对称和责任风险不一致会产生委托——代理问题,从而阻碍该目标的实现。客观上要求存在一种机制来刺激高管人员从自身利益出发创造优秀业绩。上市公司高管人员股权激励作为一种有效解决这种委托—代理矛盾的机制,通过让高管人员持有一定比例的公司股权,把上市公司的股票价格与高管人员的所获报酬结合起来,促使高管人员最大程度的发挥其经营能力,为股东创造财富。虽然我国上市公司从上世纪90年代末就开始了股权激励的探索,但由于我国制度环境等因素的制约,实施遇到了很多障碍。2005年5月,随着我国股权分置改革的开展以及《公司法》、《证券法》等相关法规的修订,上市公司资本市场制度、公司股票回购制度和高级管理人员任职期内转让股票等方面均较原法律规定有所突破,上市公司实施股权激励的法律障碍得以消除。2006年1月4日,中国证监会发布《上市公司股权激励管理办法》,允许已完成股权分置改革的上市公司实施股权激励,上述新的制度和形势都为我国上市公司股权激励制度的发展提供了很好的机会。
本文第一章介绍了股权激励的概念及实施意义——可以让经营者实现增量财富的剩余索取;使经营者更加注重自身以及企业的长远利益;纠正经营者的风险偏好等。进而介绍了股权激励的理论基础——委托代理理论和人力资本理论。股权激励与公司业绩的相关性研究成果方面,国外的研究结果的主要分歧点是上市公司高管持股比例与公司绩效的关系,是线形相关还是非线性相关两类。而国内学者的研究结果表现出明显的对立性,即一部分认为高管持股比例与上市公司业绩不相关,一部分认为两者存在明显的正相关关系。
第二章研究了我国自90年代以来上市公司股权激励采用的模式,包括虚拟股票激励模式、业绩股票激励模式、股票期权激励模式、股票增值权激励模式、延期支付模式和期股加期权的复合激励模式,通过对每种模式在上市公司中实施的案例研究,实例性阐述了每种激励模式的运作方式、实施过程、所达到的激励效果及存在的不足。并个案分析了股权分置改革以后上市股票期权激励方案的实施、运行、有关改进和意义,通过股权分置改革前后上市公司股权激励模式及效应的对比分析,总结我国股权分置改革后上市公司股权激励的新特点。
第三章选取了完成股权分置改革且实行股权激励的上市45家上市公司2005、2006、2007三个年度的数据,提出相关假设,运用以年度为时间序列的纵向对比法和多元回归分析法实证分析了上市公司的股权激励与公司业绩间的关系,发现股权激励对上市公司的业绩提升有明显的作用。研究结果显示:1上市公司的高管持股比例越高,上市公司业绩越好,即上市公司高管持股比例与公司经营绩效呈正比例关系。2不同行业的股权激励效果不同,某些行业间甚至存在巨大差异。3不同的股权激励模式产生的效果不同,相比较限制性股票激励模式,期权激励模式的效果要好一些。
第四章在研究结论评述的基础上对我国将要实行高管股权激励上市公司提出建议:1加大用于高管股权激励的股份占公司总股本的比例份额。2在一些适合进行高管股权激励的行业里,要加大推行股权激励的力度。3采用期权激励模式应该成为上市公司设计股权激励方案的首选。同时对我国当前改善股权激励机制提出建议。
本文的主要创新点在于研究在股改后新的环境体制下股权激励与公司业绩之间的相关性,所用数据为股改后的上市公司数据。研究结果对于我国计划实施股权激励的上市公司在设计激励方案时有一定的借鉴意义。
The basic target of the management of listed company is maximize the shareholder's wealth,but in listed company the shareholder of proprietor and operators will entrust each-other because of the inconformity,information dissymmetry and responsibility risk inconformity with target benefits-acts, so obstruct the target being come-out.There request a kind of mechanism to stimulate the operators to sets an excellent accomplishment from the self interest.Operators ownership of a share in the listed company's is a effectively methods to solve this kind of to entrust-act for this sell-contradict mechanism,give operators ownership of a share,will having the stock price of listed company to put together with operators' acquisition guerdon,urging operators take their management ability mostly, create more wealth for the shareholder.Although listed companies in China from the late 1990s began to explore equity incentives,but because of our system and environment factors,the implementation encountered many obstacles.In May,2005,along with our country ownership of a share cent and emendation of laws such as《company law》,《stock certificate method》etc.The incentive system environment of the listed company ownership of a share got to improve more and greatly.Company capital system,system of stock return buy and the law of manager holding the post transfers stock when they on duty have breakthrough,the obstacle has remove.On January 4,2006,the Chinese certificate law of《the management of listed company stock right stimulates》,allow company which have already completed an cent of ownership of a share to place the implement ownership of a share, build up sound encourage and a control mechanism to promote listed company to operation and develop continuously.Those new system and situations all provided a good development opportunity for the development of our country listed company ownership of a share incentive system.
The first chapter of this paper introduced equity incentives and the implementation significance of the concept- will allow operators to achieve incremental wealth of the remaining cable;enabling operators to pay more attention to their own enterprises,as well as the long-term interests of the operator to rectify the risk of such preferences.Further equity incentives introduced the basis theoretical-principal-agent theory and the human capital theory.The research of abroad mainly hold a comparison that the relation between the company performance and the stock option is line related or not line related 2.But the local scholar's research expresses an obvious opposition as a result,someone reviews the stock option and listed company performance is not related,others reviews they are obvious relativity.
The second chapter research used equity incentive mode in China since 1990s.Including virtual stock encourage mode,accomplishment stock encourage mode,stock option encourage mode,stock to increase in value power encourage mode,holdover to pay mode and an option of the compound encourage mode,given case research to every mode's operation in the listed company each time, example the operation method.Implement process,attain of encourage result and existent shortage in every models.And analyzed by individual case the operation,the improvement and meaning which complete the reform of cent an ownership.How the incentive mechanism encourages operators in work effect.Contrast the relation between list company performance and equality incentive before ownership of a share to place reform for cent and after it,summary the new characteristics of our country list company after ownership of a share the cent place reform.
ChapterⅢhas been selected to complete share reform and the implementation of incentive shares listed 45 listed companies in the three years 2005,2006 data,a related assumptions used to the annual time series for the longitudinal comparative law and multiple regression analysis Positive Analysis of the shares of listed companies and encourage the relationship between the performance of the company and found that equity incentives to improve the performance of listed companies have an obvious role.The results showed that:1.The high the executives of listed companies equity ratio,the better the performance of listed companies,namely,the equity ratio of listed company executives and companies operating performance was direct proportion relations.2 Different industries equity incentive effects of different,even among some sectors there is a huge difference.3 Different equity incentive models effects different.Compared with restricted stock incentive model,the effect of option incentive model is better.
ChapterⅣis the conclusion of the study,reviews proposals on the basis of China will implement a listed company executive equity incentive:1 Enlargements used for the share that the high tube ownership of a share encourages to have the comparison quota of the company total subscribed capital.2.In some in keeping with carry on the profession that the high tube ownership of a share encourages,the enlargement promotes the strength that the ownership of a share encourages.3 Different equity incentive model has different effect,adoption options encourage model is better than restricted stock incentive model.
The main innovation of this paper is to study the shares of incentive and the correlation between the performances of companies to the new environment after the shares under the system,the data used for the shares to the listed company data.The results have some reference for the implementation of China's equity incentive plan listed companies in the design of incentive program.
本文第一章介绍了股权激励的概念及实施意义——可以让经营者实现增量财富的剩余索取;使经营者更加注重自身以及企业的长远利益;纠正经营者的风险偏好等。进而介绍了股权激励的理论基础——委托代理理论和人力资本理论。股权激励与公司业绩的相关性研究成果方面,国外的研究结果的主要分歧点是上市公司高管持股比例与公司绩效的关系,是线形相关还是非线性相关两类。而国内学者的研究结果表现出明显的对立性,即一部分认为高管持股比例与上市公司业绩不相关,一部分认为两者存在明显的正相关关系。
第二章研究了我国自90年代以来上市公司股权激励采用的模式,包括虚拟股票激励模式、业绩股票激励模式、股票期权激励模式、股票增值权激励模式、延期支付模式和期股加期权的复合激励模式,通过对每种模式在上市公司中实施的案例研究,实例性阐述了每种激励模式的运作方式、实施过程、所达到的激励效果及存在的不足。并个案分析了股权分置改革以后上市股票期权激励方案的实施、运行、有关改进和意义,通过股权分置改革前后上市公司股权激励模式及效应的对比分析,总结我国股权分置改革后上市公司股权激励的新特点。
第三章选取了完成股权分置改革且实行股权激励的上市45家上市公司2005、2006、2007三个年度的数据,提出相关假设,运用以年度为时间序列的纵向对比法和多元回归分析法实证分析了上市公司的股权激励与公司业绩间的关系,发现股权激励对上市公司的业绩提升有明显的作用。研究结果显示:1上市公司的高管持股比例越高,上市公司业绩越好,即上市公司高管持股比例与公司经营绩效呈正比例关系。2不同行业的股权激励效果不同,某些行业间甚至存在巨大差异。3不同的股权激励模式产生的效果不同,相比较限制性股票激励模式,期权激励模式的效果要好一些。
第四章在研究结论评述的基础上对我国将要实行高管股权激励上市公司提出建议:1加大用于高管股权激励的股份占公司总股本的比例份额。2在一些适合进行高管股权激励的行业里,要加大推行股权激励的力度。3采用期权激励模式应该成为上市公司设计股权激励方案的首选。同时对我国当前改善股权激励机制提出建议。
本文的主要创新点在于研究在股改后新的环境体制下股权激励与公司业绩之间的相关性,所用数据为股改后的上市公司数据。研究结果对于我国计划实施股权激励的上市公司在设计激励方案时有一定的借鉴意义。
The basic target of the management of listed company is maximize the shareholder's wealth,but in listed company the shareholder of proprietor and operators will entrust each-other because of the inconformity,information dissymmetry and responsibility risk inconformity with target benefits-acts, so obstruct the target being come-out.There request a kind of mechanism to stimulate the operators to sets an excellent accomplishment from the self interest.Operators ownership of a share in the listed company's is a effectively methods to solve this kind of to entrust-act for this sell-contradict mechanism,give operators ownership of a share,will having the stock price of listed company to put together with operators' acquisition guerdon,urging operators take their management ability mostly, create more wealth for the shareholder.Although listed companies in China from the late 1990s began to explore equity incentives,but because of our system and environment factors,the implementation encountered many obstacles.In May,2005,along with our country ownership of a share cent and emendation of laws such as《company law》,《stock certificate method》etc.The incentive system environment of the listed company ownership of a share got to improve more and greatly.Company capital system,system of stock return buy and the law of manager holding the post transfers stock when they on duty have breakthrough,the obstacle has remove.On January 4,2006,the Chinese certificate law of《the management of listed company stock right stimulates》,allow company which have already completed an cent of ownership of a share to place the implement ownership of a share, build up sound encourage and a control mechanism to promote listed company to operation and develop continuously.Those new system and situations all provided a good development opportunity for the development of our country listed company ownership of a share incentive system.
The first chapter of this paper introduced equity incentives and the implementation significance of the concept- will allow operators to achieve incremental wealth of the remaining cable;enabling operators to pay more attention to their own enterprises,as well as the long-term interests of the operator to rectify the risk of such preferences.Further equity incentives introduced the basis theoretical-principal-agent theory and the human capital theory.The research of abroad mainly hold a comparison that the relation between the company performance and the stock option is line related or not line related 2.But the local scholar's research expresses an obvious opposition as a result,someone reviews the stock option and listed company performance is not related,others reviews they are obvious relativity.
The second chapter research used equity incentive mode in China since 1990s.Including virtual stock encourage mode,accomplishment stock encourage mode,stock option encourage mode,stock to increase in value power encourage mode,holdover to pay mode and an option of the compound encourage mode,given case research to every mode's operation in the listed company each time, example the operation method.Implement process,attain of encourage result and existent shortage in every models.And analyzed by individual case the operation,the improvement and meaning which complete the reform of cent an ownership.How the incentive mechanism encourages operators in work effect.Contrast the relation between list company performance and equality incentive before ownership of a share to place reform for cent and after it,summary the new characteristics of our country list company after ownership of a share the cent place reform.
ChapterⅢhas been selected to complete share reform and the implementation of incentive shares listed 45 listed companies in the three years 2005,2006 data,a related assumptions used to the annual time series for the longitudinal comparative law and multiple regression analysis Positive Analysis of the shares of listed companies and encourage the relationship between the performance of the company and found that equity incentives to improve the performance of listed companies have an obvious role.The results showed that:1.The high the executives of listed companies equity ratio,the better the performance of listed companies,namely,the equity ratio of listed company executives and companies operating performance was direct proportion relations.2 Different industries equity incentive effects of different,even among some sectors there is a huge difference.3 Different equity incentive models effects different.Compared with restricted stock incentive model,the effect of option incentive model is better.
ChapterⅣis the conclusion of the study,reviews proposals on the basis of China will implement a listed company executive equity incentive:1 Enlargements used for the share that the high tube ownership of a share encourages to have the comparison quota of the company total subscribed capital.2.In some in keeping with carry on the profession that the high tube ownership of a share encourages,the enlargement promotes the strength that the ownership of a share encourages.3 Different equity incentive model has different effect,adoption options encourage model is better than restricted stock incentive model.
The main innovation of this paper is to study the shares of incentive and the correlation between the performances of companies to the new environment after the shares under the system,the data used for the shares to the listed company data.The results have some reference for the implementation of China's equity incentive plan listed companies in the design of incentive program.
引文
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[2]李宝元:人本发展经济学[M].经济科学出版社
[3]张维迎.产权、激励与公司治理[M].经济科学出版社.2005年版
[4]王化成:企业激励制度[M].中国人民大学出版社
[5]董辅:董辅纵论中国经济[M]].上海交通大学出版社.2005
[6]Donald H.Chew:公司财务和治理机制—美国、日本和欧洲的比较[M].中国人民大学出版社
[7]王凌峰:薪酬设计与管理策略,[M].中国时代经济出版社
[8]徐茂魁:《现代公司制度概论》,[M].中国人民出版社
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