归纳在知识建构中的认知作用研究
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摘要
本文是教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“现代归纳逻辑的创新功能与应用及其认知基础研究”(编号05JZD0008)的研究内容之一,文章主要是在认识世界和追求知识的层面上研究归纳,并关照归纳的应用功能。
认知是一个跨领域的热点学术问题和基本方法论,与逻辑结合的地方甚多,本文选取知识建构为切入点,用描述的方法展现了在追求可靠知识的动态过程中归纳推理的嵌入作用,并进一步结合归纳的特性,检视知识互为因应情状的增长本性与信息扩容能力。然后,在此基础上过渡到复杂的社会背景下认知主体如何审慎的使用归纳逻辑工具追求知识,在运用工具的过程中不断用实践的塑造力来检验归纳结论,在追求真知的过程中彰显人性光辉,从而推动归纳工具在其他社会科学、自然科学、生产实践中的合理应用。
知识增长可大致的分为之前、之中两个时间纬度。文章首先分析了知识构建之前有哪些因素是先在的,这其中分析了乔姆斯基的语言功能学说,探讨了知识建构前所面对的范式、框架,研究了潜存的语境平台,从而探讨了人类运用归纳推理工具之前会面对哪些初始因素。
然后,本文用如何追求可靠性知识为引子,概述了知识论中关于可信赖主义的相关理论,并由可信赖主义的外在的、客观的、程式化的方法论引出了动态的知识建构模式。文章有选择地分析了几个典型的日常知识构建情景,并将归纳的相似性与或然性特征镶嵌其间,从而指出知识建构的动态过程也是在一个相似性基础上不断收敛致结果域的过程。
最后,本文探讨如何在更复杂的语境下用解释引导推理以及如何用最佳解释的推理提升归纳实践,并利用此理论结合“反思平衡理论”,促成归纳工具穿梭往返于理论与实践之中,从而为建构更为精确的知识打下坚实的基础,文章最后从知识库的固化和流变的角度来强调包容的归纳工具在人类认知上的创新运用功能。
文章的主要工作和创新点体现在以下三个方面：第一,从动态和静态两个维度分析主体知识建构过程中知识获得的认知过程；揭示此过程中,归纳推理的嵌入性作用,描述了归纳的实践特征与获取知识的行动特征之间的竞合,也即是将知识建构过程中的所依赖的相似性、因应知识库流变的社会性,分别与归纳的或然性、扩展性形成了良好的对应,进而从认知哲学的角度系统地展现了归纳的应用价值。第二,在研究主体追求真知的过程中以可信赖主义学说为域分析了此种学说的优劣,并提出为了弥补其不足增加期待可能性作为桥接内在主义与外在主义的工具。同时,借可信赖主义的程式化方法论,描述了典型的几例动态的知识建构过程,从而形成良好的映衬效果。第三,展示主体如何在复杂的、现实的社会语境下运用更为精致的推理工具,并将归纳的结论投入到实践中往返。“最佳解释推理”和“反思平衡”看似相隔较远的哲学理论作为归纳实践的基准点,全面提升归纳工具的使用。
This dissertation is part of the project "Research on the Innovation and Application of Modern Inductive Logic and its Cognitive Basis" which is one of the Key Projects of Philosophy and Social Sciences Research supported by Ministry of Education. This dissertation studies induction on the level of understanding the world and pursuing knowledge and further explores the applications of induction.
Cognition is a cross-domain topic and basic methodology in academic studies, which is widely intertwined with logic. This dissertation having taken knowledge construction as the starting point, with a descriptive method it demonstrates the embedding function of inductive reasoning in the dynamic process of pursuing reliable knowledge, and further, integrated with the characteristics of induction, investigates the cause-effect relation between the growing nature and information expansion capability of knowledge. Then, extending to the complex social context, the dissertation further discusses how a cognitive subject cautiously employs inductive logic tools in pursuit of knowledge, regulating the balance of inductive reasoning in the process of tool applications, highlighting human brilliance in the process of knowledge construction and accordingly promoting the effective application of inductive tools to other social sciences, natural sciences and production practice.
Knowledge growth can be roughly divided into two chronological dimensions: pre-growth and in-growth. The dissertation first analyzes the priori factors before knowledge construction, such as Chomsky's language function hypothesis. Then it explores the paradigms and frameworks prior to knowledge construction, potential contextual platforms and the various initial factors human face before the application of reasoning tools.
Then, with how to pursue reliable knowledge as the clue, this dissertation sketches the related theories regarding reliability theory involving external, objective and formulaic methods through which a dynamic knowledge construction model is introduced. Several typical knowledge construction scenes are selected and analyzed in this research, and similarities and probabilistic features are dealt with in the analysis. It is therefore concluded that the dynamic process of knowledge construction is a constant convergence inducing results process based on similarities.
Finally, this dissertation discusses how to guide reasoning through explanation in a more complex context and enhance induction practice via the optimal explanation. Application of this theory is coupled with Reflective Equilibrium Theory, which makes inductive tools a free player from theory and practice and lays a solid foundation for constructing more precise knowledge. Finally, from the perspective of the solidification and alteration of knowledge base, this dissertation emphasizes the creative function of inductive tools in human cognition.
The value and innovation of this dissertation is reflected in the following three aspects. First, in the process of constructing knowledge, we analyze the cognitive process of knowledge acquisition in both dynamic and static dimensions. In this process, inductive reasoning has an embedding function. And the practical characteristics of induction and acting characteristics of knowledge acquisition have something in common. In other words, the similarity in knowledge construction and the changing sociality in the knowledge base correspond respectively with the probability and the expandability of induction. In this way, the application value of induction is systematically displayed from the perspective of cognitive philosophy. Second, in researching on the subject's pursuing knowledge process, reliability theory is applied to analyze its merits and demerits. Meanwhile, some typical cases of dynamic knowledge construction are described through formulaic methodology of reliability theory. Third, the dissertation analyzes the evidence that the subject uses more precise induction tools in complex and real social language contexts and that the conclusion of inductive reasoning can be put into practice. The primal explanation, and introspection and balance as the basic points in induction practice, though seemingly distant philosophical theories, can comprehensively promote the use of induction tools.
认知是一个跨领域的热点学术问题和基本方法论,与逻辑结合的地方甚多,本文选取知识建构为切入点,用描述的方法展现了在追求可靠知识的动态过程中归纳推理的嵌入作用,并进一步结合归纳的特性,检视知识互为因应情状的增长本性与信息扩容能力。然后,在此基础上过渡到复杂的社会背景下认知主体如何审慎的使用归纳逻辑工具追求知识,在运用工具的过程中不断用实践的塑造力来检验归纳结论,在追求真知的过程中彰显人性光辉,从而推动归纳工具在其他社会科学、自然科学、生产实践中的合理应用。
知识增长可大致的分为之前、之中两个时间纬度。文章首先分析了知识构建之前有哪些因素是先在的,这其中分析了乔姆斯基的语言功能学说,探讨了知识建构前所面对的范式、框架,研究了潜存的语境平台,从而探讨了人类运用归纳推理工具之前会面对哪些初始因素。
然后,本文用如何追求可靠性知识为引子,概述了知识论中关于可信赖主义的相关理论,并由可信赖主义的外在的、客观的、程式化的方法论引出了动态的知识建构模式。文章有选择地分析了几个典型的日常知识构建情景,并将归纳的相似性与或然性特征镶嵌其间,从而指出知识建构的动态过程也是在一个相似性基础上不断收敛致结果域的过程。
最后,本文探讨如何在更复杂的语境下用解释引导推理以及如何用最佳解释的推理提升归纳实践,并利用此理论结合“反思平衡理论”,促成归纳工具穿梭往返于理论与实践之中,从而为建构更为精确的知识打下坚实的基础,文章最后从知识库的固化和流变的角度来强调包容的归纳工具在人类认知上的创新运用功能。
文章的主要工作和创新点体现在以下三个方面：第一,从动态和静态两个维度分析主体知识建构过程中知识获得的认知过程；揭示此过程中,归纳推理的嵌入性作用,描述了归纳的实践特征与获取知识的行动特征之间的竞合,也即是将知识建构过程中的所依赖的相似性、因应知识库流变的社会性,分别与归纳的或然性、扩展性形成了良好的对应,进而从认知哲学的角度系统地展现了归纳的应用价值。第二,在研究主体追求真知的过程中以可信赖主义学说为域分析了此种学说的优劣,并提出为了弥补其不足增加期待可能性作为桥接内在主义与外在主义的工具。同时,借可信赖主义的程式化方法论,描述了典型的几例动态的知识建构过程,从而形成良好的映衬效果。第三,展示主体如何在复杂的、现实的社会语境下运用更为精致的推理工具,并将归纳的结论投入到实践中往返。“最佳解释推理”和“反思平衡”看似相隔较远的哲学理论作为归纳实践的基准点,全面提升归纳工具的使用。
This dissertation is part of the project "Research on the Innovation and Application of Modern Inductive Logic and its Cognitive Basis" which is one of the Key Projects of Philosophy and Social Sciences Research supported by Ministry of Education. This dissertation studies induction on the level of understanding the world and pursuing knowledge and further explores the applications of induction.
Cognition is a cross-domain topic and basic methodology in academic studies, which is widely intertwined with logic. This dissertation having taken knowledge construction as the starting point, with a descriptive method it demonstrates the embedding function of inductive reasoning in the dynamic process of pursuing reliable knowledge, and further, integrated with the characteristics of induction, investigates the cause-effect relation between the growing nature and information expansion capability of knowledge. Then, extending to the complex social context, the dissertation further discusses how a cognitive subject cautiously employs inductive logic tools in pursuit of knowledge, regulating the balance of inductive reasoning in the process of tool applications, highlighting human brilliance in the process of knowledge construction and accordingly promoting the effective application of inductive tools to other social sciences, natural sciences and production practice.
Knowledge growth can be roughly divided into two chronological dimensions: pre-growth and in-growth. The dissertation first analyzes the priori factors before knowledge construction, such as Chomsky's language function hypothesis. Then it explores the paradigms and frameworks prior to knowledge construction, potential contextual platforms and the various initial factors human face before the application of reasoning tools.
Then, with how to pursue reliable knowledge as the clue, this dissertation sketches the related theories regarding reliability theory involving external, objective and formulaic methods through which a dynamic knowledge construction model is introduced. Several typical knowledge construction scenes are selected and analyzed in this research, and similarities and probabilistic features are dealt with in the analysis. It is therefore concluded that the dynamic process of knowledge construction is a constant convergence inducing results process based on similarities.
Finally, this dissertation discusses how to guide reasoning through explanation in a more complex context and enhance induction practice via the optimal explanation. Application of this theory is coupled with Reflective Equilibrium Theory, which makes inductive tools a free player from theory and practice and lays a solid foundation for constructing more precise knowledge. Finally, from the perspective of the solidification and alteration of knowledge base, this dissertation emphasizes the creative function of inductive tools in human cognition.
The value and innovation of this dissertation is reflected in the following three aspects. First, in the process of constructing knowledge, we analyze the cognitive process of knowledge acquisition in both dynamic and static dimensions. In this process, inductive reasoning has an embedding function. And the practical characteristics of induction and acting characteristics of knowledge acquisition have something in common. In other words, the similarity in knowledge construction and the changing sociality in the knowledge base correspond respectively with the probability and the expandability of induction. In this way, the application value of induction is systematically displayed from the perspective of cognitive philosophy. Second, in researching on the subject's pursuing knowledge process, reliability theory is applied to analyze its merits and demerits. Meanwhile, some typical cases of dynamic knowledge construction are described through formulaic methodology of reliability theory. Third, the dissertation analyzes the evidence that the subject uses more precise induction tools in complex and real social language contexts and that the conclusion of inductive reasoning can be put into practice. The primal explanation, and introspection and balance as the basic points in induction practice, though seemingly distant philosophical theories, can comprehensively promote the use of induction tools.
引文
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92为行文方便文中多简称为IBE.最佳解释推理,国内也有学者,郭贵春与王航赞将其翻译为最佳说明1推理
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