后危机时代的中国金融宏观审慎监管研究
|
摘要
2007年美国次贷危机引发的国际金融危机，对现行金融监管体系是一次巨大冲击。目前距离危机爆发已四年有余，尽管一些国家出现了经济复苏迹象，但全球经济尚未从阴影中走出，何时能够完全摆脱危机阴影，还有待时日检验。国际金融危机使人们看到了长期以来被严重忽视的影子银行体系的巨大破坏力，影子银行自身具有的高风险和脆弱性，加上外部监管的缺失和不受存款保险及央行最后贷款人的保护，使得其在近三十年间极大地推动金融发展的同时，累积了巨大风险。与此同时，中央银行虽然承担了维护金融稳定的职责，但是一直以来对金融市场的有效性持乐观态度，以为只要保证价格水平的稳定，金融体系就可以通过自我调节实现稳定。其他监管当局更多的实施微观审慎监管，关注于金融机构的个体风险，却忽略了金融风险跨业、跨境、跨机构的传染及金融系统内生的顺周期性。因此，后危机时代，世界各主要经济体在对本次危机不断反思的过程中，得出一个普遍共识，即危机产生和蔓延的重要监管层面原因在于旨在防范系统性风险、维护金融稳定的金融宏观审慎监管的缺失。于是，作为完善金融监管体系的核心环节，构建金融宏观审慎监管政策框架就成为了一项迫在眉睫的重要任务。在巴塞尔银行监管委员会、国际货币基金组织、金融稳定理事会、国际清算银行等国际组织的带头下，各国政府陆续启动了大规模的金融监管体系改革，特别是2010年以来，在构建金融宏观审慎监管政策框架方面取得了积极进展。监管理念的这一重大调整和改革，对于全球金融稳定和经济发展具有深远意义。
中国金融系统虽然在本次危机中受到的冲击较小，但是不容忽视的是，目前中国金融体系内存在着大量影子银行业务，系统性风险不断积聚并在机构之间扩散蔓延，分业的微观审慎监管模式已不能适应混业经营的现实及满足金融创新的需要。构建金融宏观审慎监管框架，对中国金融监管体制改革同样具有重要意义，有助于提高金融系统的稳定性，减少宏观经济波动的风险。
本文通过对国内外金融宏观审慎监管的相关文献进行回顾梳理，总结了目前最新的研究进展，分别从监管的必要性、监管目标、监管组织架构三个方面，对金融宏观审慎监管进行了深入的理论和实证分析。监管必要性上，探讨了影子银行的运作机制和自身的脆弱性，指出由于金融宏观审慎监管缺失而助长了影子银行体系的崩塌，是导致金融危机爆发的监管根源。监管目标上，分别从截面维度和时间维度实证检验了我国商业银行的系统性风险溢价和顺周期性，并对各自的影响因素进行度量。监管组织架构上，论述了中央银行在金融宏观审慎监管体系中的地位和作用，以及承担起维护金融稳定的职能可能面临的困难与挑战。此外，在实践层面，关注了我国影子银行体系的发展现状和风险隐患，及我国监管机构在金融宏观审慎监管改革中所做的探索和努力，同时充分借鉴国际组织和各主要经济体的实践经验，为我国的金融监管改革以启示。本文的主要结构、内容以及研究思路如下：
第一章为导言部分，介绍了论文的研究背景意义、研究思路方法、创新和不足等，并回顾了金融宏观审慎监管的最新学术成果，为之后的研究做理论上的铺垫。
第二章对金融宏观审慎监管进行全面介绍，从概念界定、理念演进、监管的必要性、目标框架等方面详细勾画了金融宏观审慎监管框架的主要内容。
第三章指出金融危机爆发的监管层面原因，着重探讨了影子银行的作用机制和风险脆弱性，并关注了我国影子银行的发展现状和风险隐患。
第四章分别从金融宏观审慎监管的截面维度和时间维度对中国商业银行的风险状况进行了实证研究。测量了部分商业银行的系统性风险溢价，验证内在顺周期行为，并考察了银行主要指标变量对系统性风险的影响程度。
第五章分析了中央银行在金融宏观审慎监管中的地位和作用。认为中央银行在行使金融宏观审慎监管权时具有诸多优势，应赋予其更大的系统性监管职能，确保其金融宏观审慎监管的主体地位。
第六章充分借鉴国际社会在金融宏观审慎监管改革上取得的进展和成就，对比中国目前在该领域的探索与实践，为今后的改革总结经验、做出启示。
The international financial crisis, triggered by U.S. subprime mortgage crisis in2007, has a huge impact on the current financial supervision system. More than fouryears, the global economy hasn’t yet to be out of the shadow, there is still a long wayto go before a return to the balance. The international financial crisis has made peoplesee the tremendous destructive power of the shadow banking system that has longbeen seriously neglected. Some reasons, such as the features of high risk andvulnerability, the absence of external supervision, without deposit insurance and theprotect of central bank lender of last resort, make the shadow banks accumulating intoa huge risk while promoting financial development in nearly three decades. At thesame time, the central bank which assumed the duties of maintaining financialstability, over-optimistic about the effectiveness of the financial markets, hadthought that the financial system could achieve stability through self-regulation whilethe price level was guaranteed to be stabile. Some other regulatory authorities in theimplementation of micro-prudential supervision, concerned themselves more aboutthe individual risk at financial institutions, but ignored the cross-industry,cross-border, cross-institution infection of the financial risks, and pro-cyclical effectsof financial systems. Therefore, in the post-crisis era, the world's major economiescame to a consensus in the process of reflection on the crisis: the important reason inregulatory level is the lack of macro-prudential supervision, which is designed toguard against systemic risk and maintain financial stability. Thus, as the core areas toimprove the financial supervision system, building financial macro-prudential policyframework had become an urgent task. Under the lead of international organizations,such as Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International MonetaryFund (IMF), Financial Stability Board (FSB), Bank of International Settlements (BIS)etc., national governments had launched a large-scale reform of financial supervisionsystem, especially after the year of2010, they had made positive progresses inbuilding the policy framework of macro-prudential financial supervision. This major adjustment and reform of the regulatory concept would have a far-reachingsignificance for global financial stability and economic development.
Although the impact of this crisis to China was relatively insignificant, we couldnot ignored that there were a lot of shadow banking in current Chinese financialsystem, systemic risk accumulated and spread between the institutions, andmicro-prudential supervision could not adapt to the reality of mixed operation andthe needs of financial innovation. So, building a financial macro-prudentialframework is also of great significance for financial supervision reform, which, nodoubt, will help to improve the stability of the financial system, and minimize the riskof macroeconomic fluctuations.
This paper reviewed both domestic and foreign studies of macro-prudentialsupervision, summarized the latest development, conducted an in-depth theoreticaland empirical analysis from the necessity、objectives and organizational structure ofsupervision. For the necessity, we discussed the operation mechanism of the shadowbanking and their own vulnerability, pointing out that the collapse of the shadowbanking system is the principal regulatory root of the financial crisis. For theobjectives, we tested empirically the systemic risk premium and procyclical effect ofChina's commercial banks from cross-sectional dimension and time dimension, andmeasured their impact factors. For the organizational structure, we discussed thestatus and role of the central bank in financial macro-prudential supervision system,studied difficulties and challenges while assuming the functions of maintainingfinancial stability. In a practical level, we also paid more attention to the developmentstatus and potential risks of the shadow banking system in China, and the explorationand efforts of our regulatory agencies in the reform of financial macro-prudentialsupervision. We fully learned the practical experience of international organizationsand the major economies, so that these would be enlightenment to China's financialregulatory reform.
The main structure, content and research ideas are as follows:
The first chapter is the introductory section, where we introduced the researchbackground, significance, ideas, innovations and deficiencies, reviewed the latestacademic achievements of financial macro-prudential supervision. These are the theoretical basis of following research.
The second chapter is the comprehensive introduction of the financialmacro-prudential supervision, in which we drew the main content from the definition,the concept of evolution, the need for regulation, the framework of the objectives etc.
The third chapter pointed out the reasons of the financial crisis from theregulatory level. We focused on the mechanism of action and risk vulnerability of theshadow banking, and also concerned of the development status and potential risks ofthe shadow banking.
The fourth chapter made an empirical study on the risk profile of the Chinesecommercial banks from the cross-section dimensions and time dimension of thefinancial macro-prudential supervision. We measured the systemic risk premium ofsome commercial banks, verified the inherent pro-cyclical behavior, and examinedthe impact of bank indicator variables for systematic risk.
The fifth chapter analyzed the status and role of the central bank in financialmacro-prudential supervision. The central bank has many advantages in the exerciseof financial macro-prudential supervision, and should be given greater systemicregulatory functions to ensure the dominant position in the financial macro-prudentialsupervision.
The last chapter listed the progress and achievements made by the internationalcommunity in the reform of financial macro-prudential supervision, compared toChina's current exploration and practice in this field, in order to sum up experienceand make the revelation for future reform.
中国金融系统虽然在本次危机中受到的冲击较小，但是不容忽视的是，目前中国金融体系内存在着大量影子银行业务，系统性风险不断积聚并在机构之间扩散蔓延，分业的微观审慎监管模式已不能适应混业经营的现实及满足金融创新的需要。构建金融宏观审慎监管框架，对中国金融监管体制改革同样具有重要意义，有助于提高金融系统的稳定性，减少宏观经济波动的风险。
本文通过对国内外金融宏观审慎监管的相关文献进行回顾梳理，总结了目前最新的研究进展，分别从监管的必要性、监管目标、监管组织架构三个方面，对金融宏观审慎监管进行了深入的理论和实证分析。监管必要性上，探讨了影子银行的运作机制和自身的脆弱性，指出由于金融宏观审慎监管缺失而助长了影子银行体系的崩塌，是导致金融危机爆发的监管根源。监管目标上，分别从截面维度和时间维度实证检验了我国商业银行的系统性风险溢价和顺周期性，并对各自的影响因素进行度量。监管组织架构上，论述了中央银行在金融宏观审慎监管体系中的地位和作用，以及承担起维护金融稳定的职能可能面临的困难与挑战。此外，在实践层面，关注了我国影子银行体系的发展现状和风险隐患，及我国监管机构在金融宏观审慎监管改革中所做的探索和努力，同时充分借鉴国际组织和各主要经济体的实践经验，为我国的金融监管改革以启示。本文的主要结构、内容以及研究思路如下：
第一章为导言部分，介绍了论文的研究背景意义、研究思路方法、创新和不足等，并回顾了金融宏观审慎监管的最新学术成果，为之后的研究做理论上的铺垫。
第二章对金融宏观审慎监管进行全面介绍，从概念界定、理念演进、监管的必要性、目标框架等方面详细勾画了金融宏观审慎监管框架的主要内容。
第三章指出金融危机爆发的监管层面原因，着重探讨了影子银行的作用机制和风险脆弱性，并关注了我国影子银行的发展现状和风险隐患。
第四章分别从金融宏观审慎监管的截面维度和时间维度对中国商业银行的风险状况进行了实证研究。测量了部分商业银行的系统性风险溢价，验证内在顺周期行为，并考察了银行主要指标变量对系统性风险的影响程度。
第五章分析了中央银行在金融宏观审慎监管中的地位和作用。认为中央银行在行使金融宏观审慎监管权时具有诸多优势，应赋予其更大的系统性监管职能，确保其金融宏观审慎监管的主体地位。
第六章充分借鉴国际社会在金融宏观审慎监管改革上取得的进展和成就，对比中国目前在该领域的探索与实践，为今后的改革总结经验、做出启示。
The international financial crisis, triggered by U.S. subprime mortgage crisis in2007, has a huge impact on the current financial supervision system. More than fouryears, the global economy hasn’t yet to be out of the shadow, there is still a long wayto go before a return to the balance. The international financial crisis has made peoplesee the tremendous destructive power of the shadow banking system that has longbeen seriously neglected. Some reasons, such as the features of high risk andvulnerability, the absence of external supervision, without deposit insurance and theprotect of central bank lender of last resort, make the shadow banks accumulating intoa huge risk while promoting financial development in nearly three decades. At thesame time, the central bank which assumed the duties of maintaining financialstability, over-optimistic about the effectiveness of the financial markets, hadthought that the financial system could achieve stability through self-regulation whilethe price level was guaranteed to be stabile. Some other regulatory authorities in theimplementation of micro-prudential supervision, concerned themselves more aboutthe individual risk at financial institutions, but ignored the cross-industry,cross-border, cross-institution infection of the financial risks, and pro-cyclical effectsof financial systems. Therefore, in the post-crisis era, the world's major economiescame to a consensus in the process of reflection on the crisis: the important reason inregulatory level is the lack of macro-prudential supervision, which is designed toguard against systemic risk and maintain financial stability. Thus, as the core areas toimprove the financial supervision system, building financial macro-prudential policyframework had become an urgent task. Under the lead of international organizations,such as Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), International MonetaryFund (IMF), Financial Stability Board (FSB), Bank of International Settlements (BIS)etc., national governments had launched a large-scale reform of financial supervisionsystem, especially after the year of2010, they had made positive progresses inbuilding the policy framework of macro-prudential financial supervision. This major adjustment and reform of the regulatory concept would have a far-reachingsignificance for global financial stability and economic development.
Although the impact of this crisis to China was relatively insignificant, we couldnot ignored that there were a lot of shadow banking in current Chinese financialsystem, systemic risk accumulated and spread between the institutions, andmicro-prudential supervision could not adapt to the reality of mixed operation andthe needs of financial innovation. So, building a financial macro-prudentialframework is also of great significance for financial supervision reform, which, nodoubt, will help to improve the stability of the financial system, and minimize the riskof macroeconomic fluctuations.
This paper reviewed both domestic and foreign studies of macro-prudentialsupervision, summarized the latest development, conducted an in-depth theoreticaland empirical analysis from the necessity、objectives and organizational structure ofsupervision. For the necessity, we discussed the operation mechanism of the shadowbanking and their own vulnerability, pointing out that the collapse of the shadowbanking system is the principal regulatory root of the financial crisis. For theobjectives, we tested empirically the systemic risk premium and procyclical effect ofChina's commercial banks from cross-sectional dimension and time dimension, andmeasured their impact factors. For the organizational structure, we discussed thestatus and role of the central bank in financial macro-prudential supervision system,studied difficulties and challenges while assuming the functions of maintainingfinancial stability. In a practical level, we also paid more attention to the developmentstatus and potential risks of the shadow banking system in China, and the explorationand efforts of our regulatory agencies in the reform of financial macro-prudentialsupervision. We fully learned the practical experience of international organizationsand the major economies, so that these would be enlightenment to China's financialregulatory reform.
The main structure, content and research ideas are as follows:
The first chapter is the introductory section, where we introduced the researchbackground, significance, ideas, innovations and deficiencies, reviewed the latestacademic achievements of financial macro-prudential supervision. These are the theoretical basis of following research.
The second chapter is the comprehensive introduction of the financialmacro-prudential supervision, in which we drew the main content from the definition,the concept of evolution, the need for regulation, the framework of the objectives etc.
The third chapter pointed out the reasons of the financial crisis from theregulatory level. We focused on the mechanism of action and risk vulnerability of theshadow banking, and also concerned of the development status and potential risks ofthe shadow banking.
The fourth chapter made an empirical study on the risk profile of the Chinesecommercial banks from the cross-section dimensions and time dimension of thefinancial macro-prudential supervision. We measured the systemic risk premium ofsome commercial banks, verified the inherent pro-cyclical behavior, and examinedthe impact of bank indicator variables for systematic risk.
The fifth chapter analyzed the status and role of the central bank in financialmacro-prudential supervision. The central bank has many advantages in the exerciseof financial macro-prudential supervision, and should be given greater systemicregulatory functions to ensure the dominant position in the financial macro-prudentialsupervision.
The last chapter listed the progress and achievements made by the internationalcommunity in the reform of financial macro-prudential supervision, compared toChina's current exploration and practice in this field, in order to sum up experienceand make the revelation for future reform.
引文
[1]巴曙松，王凤娇，孔颜.系统性金融风险的测度方法比较[J].湖北经济学院学报，2011（1）：32-38.
[2]陈柳钦.金融危机背景下美国金融监管构架改革剖析[J].湖北经济学院学报，2009（5）：48-55.
[3]陈璐.银行信贷的顺周期性与逆周期政策选择[J].新金融，2010(1):34-40.
[4]陈强，乔兆纲.宏观压力测试特征、实施框架与政策建议[J].金融论坛，2011（7）：32-34.
[5]陈强.高级计量经济学及Stata应用[M].北京：高等教育出版社，2010.10.
[6]陈莹.中国股市账面—市值比效应的检验及解释[J].证券市场导报，2008（2）：35-40.
[7]陈志毅.金融宏观审慎监管:趋势、挑战与中国适用前瞻[J].上海金融，2011（12）：74-79.
[8]戴国强，梁福涛.中国金融市场基准利率选择的经验分析[J].世界经济，2006(4):26-27.
[9]邓洪.债券业务创新：解决我国商业银行资产负债期限结构错配问题的现实选择[J].南方金融，2005（8）：23-28.
[10]方迎定.影子银行解剖：银信合作是最大资金来源，借贷风险逐渐累积[EB/OL].财经国家周刊，http://capital.cyzone.cn/article/215965/.2011-09-09.
[11]房晓怡，王浣尘.实际波动率—一种更有效的波动率估计方法[J].技术经济与管理研究，2003（2）：40-41.
[12]傅强，蒋安玲.国债即期利率期限结构研究[J].金融与经济，2005（3）：57-59.
[13]高国华，潘丽英.我国商业银行资本充足率顺周期效应研究[J].经济与管理研究，2010（12）：82-89.
[14]高婧.小额贷款公司洗钱风险及监管对策[J].中国金融，2011（20）：78-79.
[15]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模：EViews应用及实例（第二版）[M].北京：清华大学出版社，2009.5.
[16]高玮.中国银行业盈利影响因素分析[J].当代经济管理，2010（3）：73-76.
[17]高志勇.系统性风险与宏观审慎监管——基于美国银行业的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践，2010（5）：12-18.
[18]戈建国.巴塞尔新协议下中国银行业问题前瞻[J].银行家，2011(4):17-22.
[19]何德旭，吴伯磊、谢晨.系统性风险与宏观审慎监管:理论框架及相关建议[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报，2010（6）：5-14.
[20]河合正弘（Masahiro Kawai），迈克尔波默里诺（Michael Pomerleano）.防范金融危机：宏观审慎监管与最低国际标准[J].新金融，2010（4）.
[21]胡滨.构建我国金融审慎管理框架的两步走设想[EB/OL].http://opinion.hexun.com/2011-07-29/131865948.html.2011-07-29.
[22]华化成.委托贷款激增放大金融风险[N].新京报，http://www.foundersc.com/financialComm/.2012-03-02.
[23]滑静，肖庆宪.我国商业银行亲周期性的实证研究[J].上海理工大学学报，2007（6）：610-612.
[24]黄隽，章艳红.商业银行的风险：规模和非利息收入——以美国为例[J].金融研究，2010（6）：75-89.
[25]黄隽.对美国商业银行规模的反思[J].经济纵横，2010（4）：23-26.
[26]孔爱国，卢嘉圆.市场约束、商业银行治理与风险的实证研究[J].金融研究，2010(5):102-114.
[27]李丹，董玲.中国股市波动与成交量动态关系研究——基于分位数回归的角度[J].山西财经大学学报，2008(7):76-80.
[28]李怀珍.银行业动态拨备制度研究[C].中国银行业监督管理委员会工作论文，2011（6）：2-10.
[29]李文泓，罗猛.关于我国商业银行资本充足率顺周期性的实证研究[J].金融研究，2010（2）：147-155.
[30]李文泓.宏观审慎监管框架下的逆周期政策研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社，2011.6：198-200.
[31]李文泓.关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨[J].金融研究，2009（7）：7-23.
[32]李文泓.银行业宏观审慎监管：思路和政策框架[J].中国金融，2010（13）：40-42.
[33]李妍.宏观审慎监管与金融稳定[J].金融研究，2009（8）：52-59.
[34]梁琪，张孝岩，过新伟.中国金融市场基准利率的培育—基于构建完整基准收益率曲线的实证分析[J].金融研究，2010（9）：87-105.
[35]刘百花.银行资本监管对东亚新兴经济体宏观经济影响的实证分析[J].经济与管理研究，2006（2）：57-60.
[36]刘广伟.系统风险、宏观审慎与中央银行的相对独立性[J].西南金融，2011(5):24-26.
[37]刘胜会.基于通胀和稳定的多目标宏观审慎政策框架——兼论中央银行在宏观审慎中的地位和作用[J].金融与经济，2011（8）：11-17.
[38]刘扬.宏观审慎监管框架下中国金融监管的政策选择——基于巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的视角[J].当代经济管理，2011（6）：87-90.
[39]吕江林，赵征.基于收益率视角的中国股市和与国际股票市场联动性研究[J].金融与经济，2010（6）：42-45.
[40]马宇.量化宽松货币政策的理论基础、政策效果与潜在风险[J].武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2011（5）：70-74.
[41]苗晓宇.（超）高频数据视角下金融风险度量研究进展[J].经济论坛，2010（8）：202-207.
[42]彭刚，苗永旺.宏观审慎监管框架构建的国际借鉴与中国的选择[J].经济理论与经济管理，2010（11）：15-22.
[43]彭红枫，鲁维洁.中国金融市场基准利率的选择研究[J].管理世界，2010（11）：166-167.
[44]钱争鸣，郭鹏辉.上海证券交易市场量价关系的分位回归分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究，2007（10）：141-150.
[45]施红俊，马玉林，陈伟忠.实际波动率理论及实证综述[J].山东科技大学学报（自然科学版），2003（9）：101-105.
[46]史建平，高宇.宏观审慎监管理论研究综述[J].国际金融研究，2011（8）：66-73.
[47]宋清华，曲良波，陈雄兵.中国商业银行规模、治理与风险承担的实证研究[J].当代财经，2011（11）：57-68.
[48]汤柳，王旭祥.后危机时期国际组织金融监管改革评析及启示[J].中国货币市场，2010（8）：11-14.
[49]汤柳.后危机时期国际组织监管改革评析[J].武汉金融，2010（9）:17-19.
[50]陶诚.对我国银行业存贷款期限错配现象的思考[N].金融时报，http://news.hexun.com/2010-08-23/124672122.html.2010-8-23.
[51]田艳芬，邵志高.银行存贷款期限错配影响因素实证分析[J].当代经济，2008（6）：154-155.
[52]王力伟.宏观审慎监管研究的最新进展：从理论基础到政策工具[J].国际金融研究，2010（11）：62-71.
[53]王秀颖.海峡两岸经济区居民消费问题研究——基于面板数据分位数回归的分析与应用[D].厦门大学，2009（4）：15-30.
[54]王赟.宏观审慎监管——一种新型的金融监管模式[N].人民日报,http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/jjyj/201005/t20100524_30782.htm.2010-5-24.
[55]王增武.影子银行体系对我国货币供应量的影响——以银行理财产品市场为例[J].中国金融，2010（23）：30-31.
[56]王兆星.国际银行监管改革对我国银行业的影响[J].国际金融研究，2010（3）：4-10.
[57]王兆旭，王媛.宏观审慎管理研究综述—基于中央银行宏观金融调控的视角[J].山东社会科学，2011（2）：105-109.
[58]吴正光.金融风险顺周期效应的实证研究[J].金融理论与实践，2009（9）：27-31.
[59]武建新，张智勤.基于基准利率视角的Shibor和我国国债收益率比较研究[J].金融纵横，2008（8）：32-35.
[60]肖怀洋.影子银行7万亿规模藏风险，推动利率市场化是关键[N].证券日报，http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2011-12/13/c_122414328_3.htm.2011-12-13.
[61]肖崎.流动性、杠杆率与金融稳定[J].金融发展研究,2010(10):9-14.
[62]肖瑞婷《.欧盟信用评级机构监管法规》及对我国的启示[J].西部金融，2010（10）：30-31.
[63]谢福座.基于CoVaR方法的金融风险溢出效应研究[J].金融发展研究，2010（6）：59-61.
[64]闫海.后金融危机时代的宏观审慎监管工具创新[J].财经科学，2010（10）：1-8.
[65]闫海.后危机时代的金融监管体制立法研究——基于宏观审慎监管的革新[J].安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2010（6）：111-116.
[66]叶五一，缪柏其.基于分位点回归模型的条件VaR估计以及杠杆效应分析[J].统计研究，2010（9）：78-83.
[67]易宪容，王国刚.美国次贷危机的流动性传导机制的金融分析[J].金融研究，2010（5）：41-56.
[68]银监会.商业银行资本充足率管理办法[EB/OL].http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-03/01/content_1338449.htm.2004-3-1.
[69]尹继志.美国金融救援与最后贷款人制度的演进[J].云南财经大学学报，2010（2）：49-53.
[70]尹继志.中央银行在宏观审慎监管体系中的地位与权限[J].财经科学，2011（1）：1-10.
[71]张晓慧.从中央银行政策框架的演变看构建宏观审慎性政策体系[J].中国金融，2010（23）：13-16.
[72]张亦春，胡晓.宏观审慎视角下的最优货币政策框架[J].金融研究，2010（5）：30-39.
[73]张羽，李黎.非利息收入有利于降低银行风险吗？——基于中国银行业的数据[J].南开经济研究，2010（4）：69-89.
[74]张宗新，徐冰玉.监管政策能否抑制商业银行亲周期行为——基于中国上市银行面板数据的经验证据[J].财贸经济，2011（2）：36-42.
[75]郑振龙，陈志英.中国股票市场和债券市场收益率动态相关性分析[J].当代财经，2011（2）：45-51.
[76]中国工商银行城市金融研究所课题组.银行间市场基准利率体系选择及Shibor运行分析——兼析基准利率变动对商业银行的影响[J].金融论坛，2008（4）:3-8.
[77]中国人民银行.商业银行中间业务暂行规定[EB/OL].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/finance/20011401f.htm.2001
[78]中国人民银行.中国金融稳定报告（2011）[EB/OL].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/jinrongwendingju/369/index.html.2011-6-14.
[79]中国人民银行大同市中心支行课题组.宏观审慎监管政策框架及央行作用[J].内蒙古金融研究，2010（4）：15-17.
[80]中国人民银行济南分行课题组.宏观审慎管理制度综述及对我国的启示[J].金融发展研究，2011（1）：14-19.
[81]中国人民银行上海总部国际金融市场分析小组.2010国际金融市场报告[R].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/goutongjiaoliu/524/2011/20110325153152445488612/20110325153152445488612_.html.2011-3-25.
[82]中国银行国际金融研究所课题组.新一轮市场化改革——“十二五”金融改革热点探讨
[M].北京：人民出版社，2010.11.
[83]钟伟，顾弦.从金融危机看金融机构的去杠杆化及其风险[J].中国金融，2009(2):24-25.
[84]钟伟，谢婷.迷途难返——货币政策与金融监管新走向[M].北京：中国经济出版社，2011.8：180-185.
[85]周小川.金融政策对金融危机的响应[EB/OL].财经网，http://www.caijing.com.cn/2011-01-04/110610313.html.2011-1-4.
[86]周小川.金融政策对金融危机的响应——宏观审慎政策框架的形成背景、内在逻辑和主要内容[J].金融研究，2011（1）：1-13.
[87]周助新，胡王婉.我国信贷市场上的顺周期实证分析[J].武汉金融，2009（10）：30-32.
[88]朱宏泉，周丽，余江.我国商业银行非利息收入及其影响因素分析[J].管理评论，2011（6）：23-30.
[89]朱小川.宏观审慎监管的国际趋势及对我国的启示[J].南方金融，2010(3):35-37.
[90]诸葛隽.民间金融：基于温州的探索[M].北京：中国经济出版社，2007:4-6.
[91]宗良.构建逆周期宏观审慎制度框架具现实意义[EB/OL].中新网，http://www.chinanews.com/fortune/2011/04-07/2957439.shtml.2011-4-7.
[1] Acharya V V., Pedersen L H., Philippon T., et al. Measuring systemic risk. NYU SternWorking Paper10-02，2010：26-50.
[2] Acharya V., Richardson M.(eds). Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a FailedSystem. Wiley, March2009.
[3] Adrian T., Brunnermeier M K. CoVaR. Fed Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report，2009:1-27.
[4] Aikman D., Alessandri P., Eklund B., et al. Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model ofSystemic Stability. Bank of England Working Papers, No372.2009.
[5] Alexandre Lamfalussy. The Use of Prudential Measures in the International Banking Markets.BISA,7.18(15) LAM25/F67. October1979:1-2.
[6] Alistair Milne. Macro-prodential Policy: an Assessment. CESifo DICE Report2010,1.
[7] Allen L., Bali T G., Tang Y. Does systemic risk in the financial sector predict future economicdownturns?. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623577,2010,6:3-48.
[8] Allen N., Berger. The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality on bank lendingbehavior. Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May2003:151-169.
[9] Allen W., Wood G. Defining and Achieving Financial Stability. Journal of Financial Stability,2006,2:152-172.
[10] Andersen T G., Bollerslev T., Diebold F X., et al. Realized volatility and correlation.http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/fdiebold/papers/paper29/temp.pdf,1999-10-26：2-20.
[11] Andersen T G., Bollerslev T. Answering the skeptics: Yes, standard volatility models doprovide accurate forecasts. International Economic Review,1998,39(4):885-905.
[12] Ayuso J., Pérez D., Saurina J. Are capital buffers procyclical? Evidence from Spanish paneldata. Journal of Financial Intermediation.2004,13:249-260.
[13] Bank for International Settlements. Recent Innovations in International Banking, reportprepared by a study group established by the central banks of the G10countries. Basel, April(Cross Report).1986.
[14] Bank of England. The Role of Macropudential Policy: A Discussion Pape.http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudentialpolicy091121.pdf.2009.
[15] BCBS. Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector–Consultative Document.December2009.
[16] BCBS. Global systemically important banks: Assessment methodology and the additionalloss absorbency requirement (Consultative Document). www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm. Jul2011.
[17] Benford B., Nier E. Monitoring cyclicality of Basel II capital requirements. FinancialStability Paper, No3, December2007.
[18] Bernanke B., Lown C. The credit Crunch. Brookings Papers on Economics Activity.1991,2:205-207.
[19] Besar D., Booth P., Chan K.K., et al. Systemic Risk in Financial Services. British ActuarialJournal,2010,14.
[20] Bikker J., Metzemakers P. Is bank capital procyclical? A cross-country analysis. DNBWorking Papers009, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.2004.
[21] Billio M., Getmansky M., Lo A. W., et al. Econometric measures of systemic risk in thefinance and insurance sectors. NBER Working Paper No16223，2011：16-48.
[22] BIS. Financial regulatory reform: accomplishments, pitfalls and prospects.http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2011e5.pdf. June2011.
[23] BIS. Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a stocktaking of issues and experiences.CGFS Publications No38. May2010.
[24] BIS. The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality. CGFS Publications No36. March2010.
[25] BIS. The role of valuation and leverage in procyclicality. CGFS Publications No34. April2009.
[26] Blanchard O., Dell’Ariccia G., Mauro P. Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy. IMF StaffPosition Note SPN/10/03,12February2010.
[27] Bleakley H., Cowan K. Maturity mismatch and financial crises: evidence from emergingmarket corporations. Journal of Development Economics forthcoming.2010.
[28] Blinder A. Making Monetary Policy by Committee. Bank of Canada conference.2008.
[29] Blum J., Hellwig M. The Macroeconomic Implications of Capital Adequacy Requirementsfor Banks. European Economic Review. April1995:740-748.
[30] Board. Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions、Markets andInstruments: Initial Considerations. October2009.
[31] Bodie Z. On asset-liability matching and federal deposit and pension insurance. FederalReserve Bank of St. Louis Review,2006,88:323-329.
[32] Bond S. Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and practice.CEMMAP Working Paper CWP09/02, Department of Economics, Institute for Fiscal Studies,London.2002.
[33] Borio C. Implementing the Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation andSupervision.2009:32-39.
[34] Borio C. Implementing a Macroprudential Framework:Blending Boldness and Realism.BISmimeo, July2010.
[35] Borio C. Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?.CESifo Economic Studies, February2003,49:181-216.
[36] Borio C., Zhu H. Capital Regulation, Risk-taking and Monetary Policy: a Missing Link in theTransmission Mechanism?. BIS Working Papers, no268, December2008.
[37] Borio C., Furfine C., Lowe P. Procyclicality of the Financial System and Financial Stability:Issues and Policy Options. BIS Papers, No1, March2001:1-57.
[38] Borio、Shim. What Can (macro-) Prudential Policy Do to Support Monetary Policy? BISWorking Paper242,2007.
[39] Brunnermeier M., Dong G., Palia D. Banks’non-interest income and systemic risk [EB/OL].http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786738,2011.4:1-20.
[40] Brunnermeier M., Crockett A., Goodhart C., et al. The Fundamental Principles of FinancialRegulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy11,2009.
[41] Buiter W. Regulating the new financial sector [EB/OL].http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/02/regulating-the-new-financial-sector/，2009-2-25.
[42] Caruana J. Systemic Risk: How to Deal With It?. Bank for International Settlements,12February2010.
[43] Caruana J. Macroprudential Policy: Working Towards a New Consensus. Remark at thehigh-level meeting on “The Emergng Framework for Financial Regulation and Monetary Policy”jointly organised by the BIS’s Financial Stability Institute and the IMF Institute, Washington DC,23April2010.
[44] Cecchetti S. On the Similarities of Capital Adequacy and Monetary Policy. The ThirteenthAnnual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile,19November2009.
[45] Chan-Lau J A. Regulatory capital charges for too-connected-to-fail institutions: a practicalproposal. IMF Working Paper10/98,2010,4：11-20.
[46] Crockett A. Marrying the Micro-and Macroprudential Dimensions of Financial Stability.BIS Speeches,21September2000.
[47] David Longworth. A Survey of Macroprudential Policy Issues. March2011.www.carleton.ca/economics/ccms/wp.../brownbag-paper-110329.pdf.
[48] De Larosière, et al. Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System. Financial StabilityForum, Basel, April2009.
[49] De Young R. Non Interest Income and Financial Performance at U.S. Commercial Banks.Journal of Financial Review,2004,39:101-127.
[50] Diamond D., Rajan R. A Theory of Bank Capital. The Journal of finance,2000,55:2431-2465.
[51] Diamond D.W., Dybvig P.H. Bank Runs,Deposit Insurance and Liquidity. Journal ofPolitical Economy,1983,91:401~419.
[52] Drumond. Bank Capital Requirements. Bussiness Cycle Fluctuations and the Basel Accords:A Synthesis. FEP Working Papers, No277,2008.
[53] Ediz T., Michael I., Perraudian W. The Impact of Capital Requirements on U. K. BankBehaviour. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review. October1998:15-22.
[54] Estrella A. The cyclical behaviour of optimal bank capital. Mimeo.2001.
[55] Fama E., French K. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance,1992,46:427-466.
[56] Fama E., French K. Value versus Growth: The International Evidence. Journal of Finance,1998,53:1975-1999.
[57] Fillat J., Montoriol-Garriga J. Addressing the Pro-cyclicality of Capital Requirements With aDynamic Loan Loss Provision System. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Papers,2010,QAU10-4.
[58] Financial Services Authority. The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the GlobalBanking Crisis.March2009.
[59] FSF. Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Procyclicality in the FinancialSystem. http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf. April2009.
[60] French, Kenneth R., Martin N., et al. The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System.Princeton University Press.2010.
[61] Froot K.A., Stein J.C. Risk management, capital budgeting and capital structure policy forfinancial institutions: an integrated approach. Journal Finance of Economics.1998,47:55–82.
[62] Gabriele Galati,Richhild Moessner (2011).“Macroprudential Policy—a Literature Review”.BIS Working Papers. No337.
[63] Gary Gorton. Slapped in the face by the invisible hand: Banking and the panic of2007. TheFederal Reserve Bank of Atlanta2009Financial Markets Conference:12-40.
[64] Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick. Regulating the Shadow Banking System.http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/documents/nfbtermsheet.pdf.2010
[65] Gauthier C., Lehar A., Souissi M. Macroprudential capital requirements and systemic risk.Bank of Canada, mimeo,2010：3-31.
[66] Goodhart C., Taylor A. procyclicality and volatility in the financial system: theimplementation of Basel Ⅱ and IAS39. Draft paper, Financial Markets Group, London School ofEconomics.2004.
[67] Goodhart C A E. Some New Directions for Financial Stability?, The Per Jacobsson Lecture,Zürich, Switzerland,27June2004.
[68] Group of Twenty. Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency.25March2009.
[69] Guttentag J., Herring R. Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder. Journal of Finance,American Finance Association. Dec1984.39(5):1359-1382.
[70] Haldane A. Rethinking the Financial Network.www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf.2009.
[71] Hilbers P., Otker-Robe I., Pazarbasioglu C., et al. Assessing and Managing Rapid CreditGrowth and the Role of Supervisory and Prudential Policies. IMF Working Papers, no05/151,July2005.
[72] Hildebrand P. Is Basel II Enough? The Benefits of a Leverage Ratio. Lecture presented at theLondon School of Economics, Dec2008,15.
[73] HM Treasury. A New Approach to Fiancial Regulation: Judgement, Focus and Stability.http://www.tsoshop.co.uk. July2010:3-58.
[74] Holmstrom B., Tirole J. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector.Quarterly Journal of Economics.1997,112:663-691.
[75] Huang X., Zhou H., Zhu H. A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financialinstitutions. BIS Working Paper No281，2009：1-37.
[76] Huang X., Zhou H., Zhu H. Assessing the systemic risk of a heterogeneous portfolio of banksduring the recent financial crisis. BIS Working Paper No296，2010:1-43.
[77] Huang X., Zhou H., Zhu H. Systemic risk contributions. FRB Working Paper,2011:1-42.
[78] Hyman Minsky. The Federal Reserve: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. In Can “It” HappenAgain? Essay on Instability and Finance. Armonk, N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe,1982:192-202.
[79] IMF. Macroprudential Policy: an Organizing Framework. March14,2011.
[80] IMF. Sovereigns, Funding and Systemic Liquidity. Global Financial Stability Report. Oct2010.
[81] IMF. Global Financial Stability Report. June2011.
[82] Independent Commission on Banking. Publication of Interim Report. April2011,11.
[83] International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, and Financial Stability.Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments:Initial Considerations-Background Paper. October2009.
[84] Jeremy C., Stein. Securitization, Shadow Banking, and Financial Fragility. workingpaper(Harvard University),2010:1-16.
[85] Jokipii T., Milne A. The Cyclical Behaviour of European Bank Capital Buffers. SIFRResearch Report56, Institute for Financial Research. Jul2007:1-22.
[86] Kashyap A., Stein J. Cyclical Implications of Basel II Capital Standards. Federal ReserveBank of Chicago, Economic Perspectives,1st Quarter2004:18-31.
[87] Kashyap, Anil K, Raghuram Rajan, et al. Rethinkng Capital Regulation. in MaintainingStability in a Changing Financial System, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,2008:431-471.
[88] Koehn M., Santomero A.M. Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk. Journal of Finance,1980,35(5).
[89] Koenker R., Hallock K F. Quantile regression. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,4：143-156.
[90] Lakonishok J., Shleifer A., Vishny R. Contrarian investment, extrapolation and risk. Journalof Finance,1994,49:1541-1578.
[91] Leptit L., Nys E., Rous P., et al. Bank Income Structure and Risk: An Empirical Analysis ofEuropean Banks, Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32:1452-1467.
[92] Libertucci M., Quagliariello M. Rules vs Discretion in Macroprudential Policies. VoxEu,24February2010(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4670).
[93] Lo, A. The Feasibility of Systemic Risk Measurements, written testimony for the HouseFinancial Services Committee on Systemic Risk Regulation, October2009.
[94] Martin A., Skeie D., Lvon Thadden E. Repo Runs. Mimeo Economics Department,Mannheim University,2010.http://vonthadden.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/fileadmin/user_upload/thadden/research/reporuns.pdf.
[95] Mayes D., Pringle R., Taylor M. Towards a New Framework for Financial Stability, CentralBanking Publications,2009(editors)
[96] McCulley, Paul. Teton Reflections. PIMCO Global Central Bank Focus, Agu/Sept2007.
[97] Merton R C. On estimating the expected return on the market: an exploratory investigation.Journal of Financial Economics,1980,8:323-361.
[98] Mishkin F.S. Lessons from the Asian crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance.1999,18:709-723.
[99] Modigliani F., Miller M.H. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: a Correction.American Economic Review, June1963,53.
[100] Modigliani F., Miller M.H. The cost of capital, corporate finance，and the theory ofinvestment. American Economic Review,1958,48.
[101] Moreno R. Policymaking From a ‘Macroprudential’ Perspective in Emerging MarketEconomies. BIS Working Papers, No336,2011.
[102] Morgan Ricks. Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation. Columbia Law and EconomicsWorking Paper, No.370,2010：58-70.
[103] Nadauld T., Sherlund S. The Role of the Securitization Process in the Expansion ofSubprime Credit, Finance and Economics Discussion Series2009-28.Washington: Board ofGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, April2009.
[104] Oliver E., Williamson. Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior. American EconomicReview, Dec1963,53(3):1032-1057.
[105] Ostry J., Chamon M., Ghosh A., et al. Capital Inflows: the Role of Controls,,IMF StaffPosition Notes, SPN/10/04,2010.
[106] Padoa-Schioppa T. Central Banks and Financial Stability: Exploring the Land in Between,in V Gaspar, P Hartmann and O Sleijpen (eds),The transmission of the European financial system,European Central Bank,2003.
[107] Peek J., Rosengren E. Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch. Journal of Banking andFinance.1995,19:679-692.
[108] Piet Clement. The Term “Macroprudential”: Origins and Evolution. BIS Quartlerly Review,2010:59-65.
[109] Raghuram G., Rajan. Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(2):399-441.
[110] Rajan R.S., Bird G. Banks, maturity mismatches and liquidity crises: a simple model.International Economics,2003,56:185-192.
[111] Repullo R., Saurina J., Trucharte C. Mitigating The Pro-cyclicality of Basel Ⅱ. Conferenceon the Future of Financial Regulation, Banco de Espa a, October2010:659-702.
[112] Repullo R., Suárez J. The Procyclical Effects of Basel II. CEPR Discussion Paper6862.2009.
[113] Samuel Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, Jeremy C., et al. A Macroprudential Approach toFinancial Regulation, Journal of Economic Perspectives.July,2010:2-35.
[114] Saurina J. Loan Loss Provisions in Spain. a Working Macroprudential Tool, Bank of SpainFinancial Stability review No.17,2009:11-26.
[115] Schinasi G. Safeguarding Financial Stability, Theory and Practice. IMF Working Papers,WP/04/101,2004.
[116] Shigenori Shiratsuka. A Macroprudential Perspective in Central Banking. IMES discussionpaper, No2011-E-3,2011.
[117] Shin. H S. Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System. BIS WorkingPapers No304, March2010.
[118] Sibert A. A Systemic Risk Warning System. VoxEU,16January2010.(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4495).
[119] Stephen Morris., Hyun Song Shin. Financial Regulation in a System Context Commentsand Discussion. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity,2008:229-274.
[120] Tarashev N., Borio C., Tsatsaronis K. Attributing systemic risk to individual institutions.BIS Working Papers No308，2010:1-21.
[121] Taylor S J., XU X. The incremental volatility information in one million foreign exchangequotations. Journal of Empirical Finance,1997,4:317-340.
[122] The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The financial crisis inquiry report. Pursuant toPublic Law111-21,2011:27-40.
[123] Tobias Adrian., Hyun Song Shin. The Shadow Banking System: Implications for FinancialRegulation. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, No.382,2009:1-18.
[124] United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Wall Street and theFinancial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks.2010(http://hsgac.senate.gov/public).
[125] Van Lelyveld I. Stress Testing-The Link between Macro and Micro, Introduction to aSpecial Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking, forthcoming,2011.
[126] Young A.T., Wiseman T., Hogan T l. Changing Perceptions of Maturity Mismatch in theUS Banking System: Evidence from Equity Markets. SSRN working paper, April2010:1-21.
[127] Yung Chul Park. The Role of Macroprudential Policy for Financial Stability in East Asia’sEmerging Economies. ADBI Working Paper No284. May2011:15-19.
[128] Zoltan Pozsar., Tobias Adrian., Adam Ashcraft., et al. Shadow Banking. Staff Report, No.458,2010:26-45.
[2]陈柳钦.金融危机背景下美国金融监管构架改革剖析[J].湖北经济学院学报，2009（5）：48-55.
[3]陈璐.银行信贷的顺周期性与逆周期政策选择[J].新金融，2010(1):34-40.
[4]陈强，乔兆纲.宏观压力测试特征、实施框架与政策建议[J].金融论坛，2011（7）：32-34.
[5]陈强.高级计量经济学及Stata应用[M].北京：高等教育出版社，2010.10.
[6]陈莹.中国股市账面—市值比效应的检验及解释[J].证券市场导报，2008（2）：35-40.
[7]陈志毅.金融宏观审慎监管:趋势、挑战与中国适用前瞻[J].上海金融，2011（12）：74-79.
[8]戴国强，梁福涛.中国金融市场基准利率选择的经验分析[J].世界经济，2006(4):26-27.
[9]邓洪.债券业务创新：解决我国商业银行资产负债期限结构错配问题的现实选择[J].南方金融，2005（8）：23-28.
[10]方迎定.影子银行解剖：银信合作是最大资金来源，借贷风险逐渐累积[EB/OL].财经国家周刊，http://capital.cyzone.cn/article/215965/.2011-09-09.
[11]房晓怡，王浣尘.实际波动率—一种更有效的波动率估计方法[J].技术经济与管理研究，2003（2）：40-41.
[12]傅强，蒋安玲.国债即期利率期限结构研究[J].金融与经济，2005（3）：57-59.
[13]高国华，潘丽英.我国商业银行资本充足率顺周期效应研究[J].经济与管理研究，2010（12）：82-89.
[14]高婧.小额贷款公司洗钱风险及监管对策[J].中国金融，2011（20）：78-79.
[15]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模：EViews应用及实例（第二版）[M].北京：清华大学出版社，2009.5.
[16]高玮.中国银行业盈利影响因素分析[J].当代经济管理，2010（3）：73-76.
[17]高志勇.系统性风险与宏观审慎监管——基于美国银行业的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践，2010（5）：12-18.
[18]戈建国.巴塞尔新协议下中国银行业问题前瞻[J].银行家，2011(4):17-22.
[19]何德旭，吴伯磊、谢晨.系统性风险与宏观审慎监管:理论框架及相关建议[J].中国社会科学院研究生院学报，2010（6）：5-14.
[20]河合正弘（Masahiro Kawai），迈克尔波默里诺（Michael Pomerleano）.防范金融危机：宏观审慎监管与最低国际标准[J].新金融，2010（4）.
[21]胡滨.构建我国金融审慎管理框架的两步走设想[EB/OL].http://opinion.hexun.com/2011-07-29/131865948.html.2011-07-29.
[22]华化成.委托贷款激增放大金融风险[N].新京报，http://www.foundersc.com/financialComm/.2012-03-02.
[23]滑静，肖庆宪.我国商业银行亲周期性的实证研究[J].上海理工大学学报，2007（6）：610-612.
[24]黄隽，章艳红.商业银行的风险：规模和非利息收入——以美国为例[J].金融研究，2010（6）：75-89.
[25]黄隽.对美国商业银行规模的反思[J].经济纵横，2010（4）：23-26.
[26]孔爱国，卢嘉圆.市场约束、商业银行治理与风险的实证研究[J].金融研究，2010(5):102-114.
[27]李丹，董玲.中国股市波动与成交量动态关系研究——基于分位数回归的角度[J].山西财经大学学报，2008(7):76-80.
[28]李怀珍.银行业动态拨备制度研究[C].中国银行业监督管理委员会工作论文，2011（6）：2-10.
[29]李文泓，罗猛.关于我国商业银行资本充足率顺周期性的实证研究[J].金融研究，2010（2）：147-155.
[30]李文泓.宏观审慎监管框架下的逆周期政策研究[M].北京：中国金融出版社，2011.6：198-200.
[31]李文泓.关于宏观审慎监管框架下逆周期政策的探讨[J].金融研究，2009（7）：7-23.
[32]李文泓.银行业宏观审慎监管：思路和政策框架[J].中国金融，2010（13）：40-42.
[33]李妍.宏观审慎监管与金融稳定[J].金融研究，2009（8）：52-59.
[34]梁琪，张孝岩，过新伟.中国金融市场基准利率的培育—基于构建完整基准收益率曲线的实证分析[J].金融研究，2010（9）：87-105.
[35]刘百花.银行资本监管对东亚新兴经济体宏观经济影响的实证分析[J].经济与管理研究，2006（2）：57-60.
[36]刘广伟.系统风险、宏观审慎与中央银行的相对独立性[J].西南金融，2011(5):24-26.
[37]刘胜会.基于通胀和稳定的多目标宏观审慎政策框架——兼论中央银行在宏观审慎中的地位和作用[J].金融与经济，2011（8）：11-17.
[38]刘扬.宏观审慎监管框架下中国金融监管的政策选择——基于巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的视角[J].当代经济管理，2011（6）：87-90.
[39]吕江林，赵征.基于收益率视角的中国股市和与国际股票市场联动性研究[J].金融与经济，2010（6）：42-45.
[40]马宇.量化宽松货币政策的理论基础、政策效果与潜在风险[J].武汉大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2011（5）：70-74.
[41]苗晓宇.（超）高频数据视角下金融风险度量研究进展[J].经济论坛，2010（8）：202-207.
[42]彭刚，苗永旺.宏观审慎监管框架构建的国际借鉴与中国的选择[J].经济理论与经济管理，2010（11）：15-22.
[43]彭红枫，鲁维洁.中国金融市场基准利率的选择研究[J].管理世界，2010（11）：166-167.
[44]钱争鸣，郭鹏辉.上海证券交易市场量价关系的分位回归分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究，2007（10）：141-150.
[45]施红俊，马玉林，陈伟忠.实际波动率理论及实证综述[J].山东科技大学学报（自然科学版），2003（9）：101-105.
[46]史建平，高宇.宏观审慎监管理论研究综述[J].国际金融研究，2011（8）：66-73.
[47]宋清华，曲良波，陈雄兵.中国商业银行规模、治理与风险承担的实证研究[J].当代财经，2011（11）：57-68.
[48]汤柳，王旭祥.后危机时期国际组织金融监管改革评析及启示[J].中国货币市场，2010（8）：11-14.
[49]汤柳.后危机时期国际组织监管改革评析[J].武汉金融，2010（9）:17-19.
[50]陶诚.对我国银行业存贷款期限错配现象的思考[N].金融时报，http://news.hexun.com/2010-08-23/124672122.html.2010-8-23.
[51]田艳芬，邵志高.银行存贷款期限错配影响因素实证分析[J].当代经济，2008（6）：154-155.
[52]王力伟.宏观审慎监管研究的最新进展：从理论基础到政策工具[J].国际金融研究，2010（11）：62-71.
[53]王秀颖.海峡两岸经济区居民消费问题研究——基于面板数据分位数回归的分析与应用[D].厦门大学，2009（4）：15-30.
[54]王赟.宏观审慎监管——一种新型的金融监管模式[N].人民日报,http://www.qstheory.cn/jj/jjyj/201005/t20100524_30782.htm.2010-5-24.
[55]王增武.影子银行体系对我国货币供应量的影响——以银行理财产品市场为例[J].中国金融，2010（23）：30-31.
[56]王兆星.国际银行监管改革对我国银行业的影响[J].国际金融研究，2010（3）：4-10.
[57]王兆旭，王媛.宏观审慎管理研究综述—基于中央银行宏观金融调控的视角[J].山东社会科学，2011（2）：105-109.
[58]吴正光.金融风险顺周期效应的实证研究[J].金融理论与实践，2009（9）：27-31.
[59]武建新，张智勤.基于基准利率视角的Shibor和我国国债收益率比较研究[J].金融纵横，2008（8）：32-35.
[60]肖怀洋.影子银行7万亿规模藏风险，推动利率市场化是关键[N].证券日报，http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2011-12/13/c_122414328_3.htm.2011-12-13.
[61]肖崎.流动性、杠杆率与金融稳定[J].金融发展研究,2010(10):9-14.
[62]肖瑞婷《.欧盟信用评级机构监管法规》及对我国的启示[J].西部金融，2010（10）：30-31.
[63]谢福座.基于CoVaR方法的金融风险溢出效应研究[J].金融发展研究，2010（6）：59-61.
[64]闫海.后金融危机时代的宏观审慎监管工具创新[J].财经科学，2010（10）：1-8.
[65]闫海.后危机时代的金融监管体制立法研究——基于宏观审慎监管的革新[J].安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版），2010（6）：111-116.
[66]叶五一，缪柏其.基于分位点回归模型的条件VaR估计以及杠杆效应分析[J].统计研究，2010（9）：78-83.
[67]易宪容，王国刚.美国次贷危机的流动性传导机制的金融分析[J].金融研究，2010（5）：41-56.
[68]银监会.商业银行资本充足率管理办法[EB/OL].http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-03/01/content_1338449.htm.2004-3-1.
[69]尹继志.美国金融救援与最后贷款人制度的演进[J].云南财经大学学报，2010（2）：49-53.
[70]尹继志.中央银行在宏观审慎监管体系中的地位与权限[J].财经科学，2011（1）：1-10.
[71]张晓慧.从中央银行政策框架的演变看构建宏观审慎性政策体系[J].中国金融，2010（23）：13-16.
[72]张亦春，胡晓.宏观审慎视角下的最优货币政策框架[J].金融研究，2010（5）：30-39.
[73]张羽，李黎.非利息收入有利于降低银行风险吗？——基于中国银行业的数据[J].南开经济研究，2010（4）：69-89.
[74]张宗新，徐冰玉.监管政策能否抑制商业银行亲周期行为——基于中国上市银行面板数据的经验证据[J].财贸经济，2011（2）：36-42.
[75]郑振龙，陈志英.中国股票市场和债券市场收益率动态相关性分析[J].当代财经，2011（2）：45-51.
[76]中国工商银行城市金融研究所课题组.银行间市场基准利率体系选择及Shibor运行分析——兼析基准利率变动对商业银行的影响[J].金融论坛，2008（4）:3-8.
[77]中国人民银行.商业银行中间业务暂行规定[EB/OL].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/finance/20011401f.htm.2001
[78]中国人民银行.中国金融稳定报告（2011）[EB/OL].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/jinrongwendingju/369/index.html.2011-6-14.
[79]中国人民银行大同市中心支行课题组.宏观审慎监管政策框架及央行作用[J].内蒙古金融研究，2010（4）：15-17.
[80]中国人民银行济南分行课题组.宏观审慎管理制度综述及对我国的启示[J].金融发展研究，2011（1）：14-19.
[81]中国人民银行上海总部国际金融市场分析小组.2010国际金融市场报告[R].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/goutongjiaoliu/524/2011/20110325153152445488612/20110325153152445488612_.html.2011-3-25.
[82]中国银行国际金融研究所课题组.新一轮市场化改革——“十二五”金融改革热点探讨
[M].北京：人民出版社，2010.11.
[83]钟伟，顾弦.从金融危机看金融机构的去杠杆化及其风险[J].中国金融，2009(2):24-25.
[84]钟伟，谢婷.迷途难返——货币政策与金融监管新走向[M].北京：中国经济出版社，2011.8：180-185.
[85]周小川.金融政策对金融危机的响应[EB/OL].财经网，http://www.caijing.com.cn/2011-01-04/110610313.html.2011-1-4.
[86]周小川.金融政策对金融危机的响应——宏观审慎政策框架的形成背景、内在逻辑和主要内容[J].金融研究，2011（1）：1-13.
[87]周助新，胡王婉.我国信贷市场上的顺周期实证分析[J].武汉金融，2009（10）：30-32.
[88]朱宏泉，周丽，余江.我国商业银行非利息收入及其影响因素分析[J].管理评论，2011（6）：23-30.
[89]朱小川.宏观审慎监管的国际趋势及对我国的启示[J].南方金融，2010(3):35-37.
[90]诸葛隽.民间金融：基于温州的探索[M].北京：中国经济出版社，2007:4-6.
[91]宗良.构建逆周期宏观审慎制度框架具现实意义[EB/OL].中新网，http://www.chinanews.com/fortune/2011/04-07/2957439.shtml.2011-4-7.
[1] Acharya V V., Pedersen L H., Philippon T., et al. Measuring systemic risk. NYU SternWorking Paper10-02，2010：26-50.
[2] Acharya V., Richardson M.(eds). Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a FailedSystem. Wiley, March2009.
[3] Adrian T., Brunnermeier M K. CoVaR. Fed Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report，2009:1-27.
[4] Aikman D., Alessandri P., Eklund B., et al. Funding Liquidity Risk in a Quantitative Model ofSystemic Stability. Bank of England Working Papers, No372.2009.
[5] Alexandre Lamfalussy. The Use of Prudential Measures in the International Banking Markets.BISA,7.18(15) LAM25/F67. October1979:1-2.
[6] Alistair Milne. Macro-prodential Policy: an Assessment. CESifo DICE Report2010,1.
[7] Allen L., Bali T G., Tang Y. Does systemic risk in the financial sector predict future economicdownturns?. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1623577,2010,6:3-48.
[8] Allen N., Berger. The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality on bank lendingbehavior. Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May2003:151-169.
[9] Allen W., Wood G. Defining and Achieving Financial Stability. Journal of Financial Stability,2006,2:152-172.
[10] Andersen T G., Bollerslev T., Diebold F X., et al. Realized volatility and correlation.http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/fdiebold/papers/paper29/temp.pdf,1999-10-26：2-20.
[11] Andersen T G., Bollerslev T. Answering the skeptics: Yes, standard volatility models doprovide accurate forecasts. International Economic Review,1998,39(4):885-905.
[12] Ayuso J., Pérez D., Saurina J. Are capital buffers procyclical? Evidence from Spanish paneldata. Journal of Financial Intermediation.2004,13:249-260.
[13] Bank for International Settlements. Recent Innovations in International Banking, reportprepared by a study group established by the central banks of the G10countries. Basel, April(Cross Report).1986.
[14] Bank of England. The Role of Macropudential Policy: A Discussion Pape.http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudentialpolicy091121.pdf.2009.
[15] BCBS. Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector–Consultative Document.December2009.
[16] BCBS. Global systemically important banks: Assessment methodology and the additionalloss absorbency requirement (Consultative Document). www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm. Jul2011.
[17] Benford B., Nier E. Monitoring cyclicality of Basel II capital requirements. FinancialStability Paper, No3, December2007.
[18] Bernanke B., Lown C. The credit Crunch. Brookings Papers on Economics Activity.1991,2:205-207.
[19] Besar D., Booth P., Chan K.K., et al. Systemic Risk in Financial Services. British ActuarialJournal,2010,14.
[20] Bikker J., Metzemakers P. Is bank capital procyclical? A cross-country analysis. DNBWorking Papers009, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.2004.
[21] Billio M., Getmansky M., Lo A. W., et al. Econometric measures of systemic risk in thefinance and insurance sectors. NBER Working Paper No16223，2011：16-48.
[22] BIS. Financial regulatory reform: accomplishments, pitfalls and prospects.http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2011e5.pdf. June2011.
[23] BIS. Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a stocktaking of issues and experiences.CGFS Publications No38. May2010.
[24] BIS. The role of margin requirements and haircuts in procyclicality. CGFS Publications No36. March2010.
[25] BIS. The role of valuation and leverage in procyclicality. CGFS Publications No34. April2009.
[26] Blanchard O., Dell’Ariccia G., Mauro P. Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy. IMF StaffPosition Note SPN/10/03,12February2010.
[27] Bleakley H., Cowan K. Maturity mismatch and financial crises: evidence from emergingmarket corporations. Journal of Development Economics forthcoming.2010.
[28] Blinder A. Making Monetary Policy by Committee. Bank of Canada conference.2008.
[29] Blum J., Hellwig M. The Macroeconomic Implications of Capital Adequacy Requirementsfor Banks. European Economic Review. April1995:740-748.
[30] Board. Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions、Markets andInstruments: Initial Considerations. October2009.
[31] Bodie Z. On asset-liability matching and federal deposit and pension insurance. FederalReserve Bank of St. Louis Review,2006,88:323-329.
[32] Bond S. Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and practice.CEMMAP Working Paper CWP09/02, Department of Economics, Institute for Fiscal Studies,London.2002.
[33] Borio C. Implementing the Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation andSupervision.2009:32-39.
[34] Borio C. Implementing a Macroprudential Framework:Blending Boldness and Realism.BISmimeo, July2010.
[35] Borio C. Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?.CESifo Economic Studies, February2003,49:181-216.
[36] Borio C., Zhu H. Capital Regulation, Risk-taking and Monetary Policy: a Missing Link in theTransmission Mechanism?. BIS Working Papers, no268, December2008.
[37] Borio C., Furfine C., Lowe P. Procyclicality of the Financial System and Financial Stability:Issues and Policy Options. BIS Papers, No1, March2001:1-57.
[38] Borio、Shim. What Can (macro-) Prudential Policy Do to Support Monetary Policy? BISWorking Paper242,2007.
[39] Brunnermeier M., Dong G., Palia D. Banks’non-interest income and systemic risk [EB/OL].http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786738,2011.4:1-20.
[40] Brunnermeier M., Crockett A., Goodhart C., et al. The Fundamental Principles of FinancialRegulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy11,2009.
[41] Buiter W. Regulating the new financial sector [EB/OL].http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/02/regulating-the-new-financial-sector/，2009-2-25.
[42] Caruana J. Systemic Risk: How to Deal With It?. Bank for International Settlements,12February2010.
[43] Caruana J. Macroprudential Policy: Working Towards a New Consensus. Remark at thehigh-level meeting on “The Emergng Framework for Financial Regulation and Monetary Policy”jointly organised by the BIS’s Financial Stability Institute and the IMF Institute, Washington DC,23April2010.
[44] Cecchetti S. On the Similarities of Capital Adequacy and Monetary Policy. The ThirteenthAnnual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile,19November2009.
[45] Chan-Lau J A. Regulatory capital charges for too-connected-to-fail institutions: a practicalproposal. IMF Working Paper10/98,2010,4：11-20.
[46] Crockett A. Marrying the Micro-and Macroprudential Dimensions of Financial Stability.BIS Speeches,21September2000.
[47] David Longworth. A Survey of Macroprudential Policy Issues. March2011.www.carleton.ca/economics/ccms/wp.../brownbag-paper-110329.pdf.
[48] De Larosière, et al. Addressing Procyclicality in the Financial System. Financial StabilityForum, Basel, April2009.
[49] De Young R. Non Interest Income and Financial Performance at U.S. Commercial Banks.Journal of Financial Review,2004,39:101-127.
[50] Diamond D., Rajan R. A Theory of Bank Capital. The Journal of finance,2000,55:2431-2465.
[51] Diamond D.W., Dybvig P.H. Bank Runs,Deposit Insurance and Liquidity. Journal ofPolitical Economy,1983,91:401~419.
[52] Drumond. Bank Capital Requirements. Bussiness Cycle Fluctuations and the Basel Accords:A Synthesis. FEP Working Papers, No277,2008.
[53] Ediz T., Michael I., Perraudian W. The Impact of Capital Requirements on U. K. BankBehaviour. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review. October1998:15-22.
[54] Estrella A. The cyclical behaviour of optimal bank capital. Mimeo.2001.
[55] Fama E., French K. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of Finance,1992,46:427-466.
[56] Fama E., French K. Value versus Growth: The International Evidence. Journal of Finance,1998,53:1975-1999.
[57] Fillat J., Montoriol-Garriga J. Addressing the Pro-cyclicality of Capital Requirements With aDynamic Loan Loss Provision System. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Papers,2010,QAU10-4.
[58] Financial Services Authority. The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the GlobalBanking Crisis.March2009.
[59] FSF. Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Addressing Procyclicality in the FinancialSystem. http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf. April2009.
[60] French, Kenneth R., Martin N., et al. The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System.Princeton University Press.2010.
[61] Froot K.A., Stein J.C. Risk management, capital budgeting and capital structure policy forfinancial institutions: an integrated approach. Journal Finance of Economics.1998,47:55–82.
[62] Gabriele Galati,Richhild Moessner (2011).“Macroprudential Policy—a Literature Review”.BIS Working Papers. No337.
[63] Gary Gorton. Slapped in the face by the invisible hand: Banking and the panic of2007. TheFederal Reserve Bank of Atlanta2009Financial Markets Conference:12-40.
[64] Gary Gorton, Andrew Metrick. Regulating the Shadow Banking System.http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/documents/nfbtermsheet.pdf.2010
[65] Gauthier C., Lehar A., Souissi M. Macroprudential capital requirements and systemic risk.Bank of Canada, mimeo,2010：3-31.
[66] Goodhart C., Taylor A. procyclicality and volatility in the financial system: theimplementation of Basel Ⅱ and IAS39. Draft paper, Financial Markets Group, London School ofEconomics.2004.
[67] Goodhart C A E. Some New Directions for Financial Stability?, The Per Jacobsson Lecture,Zürich, Switzerland,27June2004.
[68] Group of Twenty. Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency.25March2009.
[69] Guttentag J., Herring R. Credit Rationing and Financial Disorder. Journal of Finance,American Finance Association. Dec1984.39(5):1359-1382.
[70] Haldane A. Rethinking the Financial Network.www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech386.pdf.2009.
[71] Hilbers P., Otker-Robe I., Pazarbasioglu C., et al. Assessing and Managing Rapid CreditGrowth and the Role of Supervisory and Prudential Policies. IMF Working Papers, no05/151,July2005.
[72] Hildebrand P. Is Basel II Enough? The Benefits of a Leverage Ratio. Lecture presented at theLondon School of Economics, Dec2008,15.
[73] HM Treasury. A New Approach to Fiancial Regulation: Judgement, Focus and Stability.http://www.tsoshop.co.uk. July2010:3-58.
[74] Holmstrom B., Tirole J. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector.Quarterly Journal of Economics.1997,112:663-691.
[75] Huang X., Zhou H., Zhu H. A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major financialinstitutions. BIS Working Paper No281，2009：1-37.
[76] Huang X., Zhou H., Zhu H. Assessing the systemic risk of a heterogeneous portfolio of banksduring the recent financial crisis. BIS Working Paper No296，2010:1-43.
[77] Huang X., Zhou H., Zhu H. Systemic risk contributions. FRB Working Paper,2011:1-42.
[78] Hyman Minsky. The Federal Reserve: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. In Can “It” HappenAgain? Essay on Instability and Finance. Armonk, N.Y.:M.E.Sharpe,1982:192-202.
[79] IMF. Macroprudential Policy: an Organizing Framework. March14,2011.
[80] IMF. Sovereigns, Funding and Systemic Liquidity. Global Financial Stability Report. Oct2010.
[81] IMF. Global Financial Stability Report. June2011.
[82] Independent Commission on Banking. Publication of Interim Report. April2011,11.
[83] International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, and Financial Stability.Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments:Initial Considerations-Background Paper. October2009.
[84] Jeremy C., Stein. Securitization, Shadow Banking, and Financial Fragility. workingpaper(Harvard University),2010:1-16.
[85] Jokipii T., Milne A. The Cyclical Behaviour of European Bank Capital Buffers. SIFRResearch Report56, Institute for Financial Research. Jul2007:1-22.
[86] Kashyap A., Stein J. Cyclical Implications of Basel II Capital Standards. Federal ReserveBank of Chicago, Economic Perspectives,1st Quarter2004:18-31.
[87] Kashyap, Anil K, Raghuram Rajan, et al. Rethinkng Capital Regulation. in MaintainingStability in a Changing Financial System, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,2008:431-471.
[88] Koehn M., Santomero A.M. Regulation of bank capital and portfolio risk. Journal of Finance,1980,35(5).
[89] Koenker R., Hallock K F. Quantile regression. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,4：143-156.
[90] Lakonishok J., Shleifer A., Vishny R. Contrarian investment, extrapolation and risk. Journalof Finance,1994,49:1541-1578.
[91] Leptit L., Nys E., Rous P., et al. Bank Income Structure and Risk: An Empirical Analysis ofEuropean Banks, Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32:1452-1467.
[92] Libertucci M., Quagliariello M. Rules vs Discretion in Macroprudential Policies. VoxEu,24February2010(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4670).
[93] Lo, A. The Feasibility of Systemic Risk Measurements, written testimony for the HouseFinancial Services Committee on Systemic Risk Regulation, October2009.
[94] Martin A., Skeie D., Lvon Thadden E. Repo Runs. Mimeo Economics Department,Mannheim University,2010.http://vonthadden.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/fileadmin/user_upload/thadden/research/reporuns.pdf.
[95] Mayes D., Pringle R., Taylor M. Towards a New Framework for Financial Stability, CentralBanking Publications,2009(editors)
[96] McCulley, Paul. Teton Reflections. PIMCO Global Central Bank Focus, Agu/Sept2007.
[97] Merton R C. On estimating the expected return on the market: an exploratory investigation.Journal of Financial Economics,1980,8:323-361.
[98] Mishkin F.S. Lessons from the Asian crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance.1999,18:709-723.
[99] Modigliani F., Miller M.H. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: a Correction.American Economic Review, June1963,53.
[100] Modigliani F., Miller M.H. The cost of capital, corporate finance，and the theory ofinvestment. American Economic Review,1958,48.
[101] Moreno R. Policymaking From a ‘Macroprudential’ Perspective in Emerging MarketEconomies. BIS Working Papers, No336,2011.
[102] Morgan Ricks. Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation. Columbia Law and EconomicsWorking Paper, No.370,2010：58-70.
[103] Nadauld T., Sherlund S. The Role of the Securitization Process in the Expansion ofSubprime Credit, Finance and Economics Discussion Series2009-28.Washington: Board ofGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, April2009.
[104] Oliver E., Williamson. Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior. American EconomicReview, Dec1963,53(3):1032-1057.
[105] Ostry J., Chamon M., Ghosh A., et al. Capital Inflows: the Role of Controls,,IMF StaffPosition Notes, SPN/10/04,2010.
[106] Padoa-Schioppa T. Central Banks and Financial Stability: Exploring the Land in Between,in V Gaspar, P Hartmann and O Sleijpen (eds),The transmission of the European financial system,European Central Bank,2003.
[107] Peek J., Rosengren E. Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch. Journal of Banking andFinance.1995,19:679-692.
[108] Piet Clement. The Term “Macroprudential”: Origins and Evolution. BIS Quartlerly Review,2010:59-65.
[109] Raghuram G., Rajan. Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence.Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(2):399-441.
[110] Rajan R.S., Bird G. Banks, maturity mismatches and liquidity crises: a simple model.International Economics,2003,56:185-192.
[111] Repullo R., Saurina J., Trucharte C. Mitigating The Pro-cyclicality of Basel Ⅱ. Conferenceon the Future of Financial Regulation, Banco de Espa a, October2010:659-702.
[112] Repullo R., Suárez J. The Procyclical Effects of Basel II. CEPR Discussion Paper6862.2009.
[113] Samuel Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, Jeremy C., et al. A Macroprudential Approach toFinancial Regulation, Journal of Economic Perspectives.July,2010:2-35.
[114] Saurina J. Loan Loss Provisions in Spain. a Working Macroprudential Tool, Bank of SpainFinancial Stability review No.17,2009:11-26.
[115] Schinasi G. Safeguarding Financial Stability, Theory and Practice. IMF Working Papers,WP/04/101,2004.
[116] Shigenori Shiratsuka. A Macroprudential Perspective in Central Banking. IMES discussionpaper, No2011-E-3,2011.
[117] Shin. H S. Financial Intermediation and the Post-Crisis Financial System. BIS WorkingPapers No304, March2010.
[118] Sibert A. A Systemic Risk Warning System. VoxEU,16January2010.(http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4495).
[119] Stephen Morris., Hyun Song Shin. Financial Regulation in a System Context Commentsand Discussion. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity,2008:229-274.
[120] Tarashev N., Borio C., Tsatsaronis K. Attributing systemic risk to individual institutions.BIS Working Papers No308，2010:1-21.
[121] Taylor S J., XU X. The incremental volatility information in one million foreign exchangequotations. Journal of Empirical Finance,1997,4:317-340.
[122] The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. The financial crisis inquiry report. Pursuant toPublic Law111-21,2011:27-40.
[123] Tobias Adrian., Hyun Song Shin. The Shadow Banking System: Implications for FinancialRegulation. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, No.382,2009:1-18.
[124] United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Wall Street and theFinancial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks.2010(http://hsgac.senate.gov/public).
[125] Van Lelyveld I. Stress Testing-The Link between Macro and Micro, Introduction to aSpecial Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking, forthcoming,2011.
[126] Young A.T., Wiseman T., Hogan T l. Changing Perceptions of Maturity Mismatch in theUS Banking System: Evidence from Equity Markets. SSRN working paper, April2010:1-21.
[127] Yung Chul Park. The Role of Macroprudential Policy for Financial Stability in East Asia’sEmerging Economies. ADBI Working Paper No284. May2011:15-19.
[128] Zoltan Pozsar., Tobias Adrian., Adam Ashcraft., et al. Shadow Banking. Staff Report, No.458,2010:26-45.