经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益与董事会结构关系研究
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摘要
自从公司的所有权与控制权分离以来,如何让经理更好地为股东利益服务就一直是理论界与实务界争论的热点。为此,公司股东设计了一系列的监督与激励机制来实现这一目标,而董事会则是这一系列治理机制的核心。董事会能否发挥其监督经理的职能?如何才能更好地发挥董事会的监督职能?这些问题受到了人们的普遍关注。尤其是2008年全球金融危机的爆发,促使人们对于董事会在公司治理中的作用进行了深入反思。目前,对于董事会作用的研究主要是从董事会结构入手,涉及了董事会结构与公司绩效关系、董事会结构与经理行为关系、董事会结构的影响因素等方面。但学者们的研究大多仅分析了董事会结构对于经理“败德行为”的影响,而没有分析这一监督过程对董事会结构自身所产生的影响,这就使得这方面的研究具有一定的片面性,甚至有可能会出现偏误。可以说,只有细致分析董事会结构是否受到监督行动本身的影响,才能更客观的认清董事会是如何实现对经理“败德行为”的有效抑制。本研究从董事会监督经理这一过程出发,细致分析了监督经理所产生的成本—收益与董事会结构的关系,不仅丰富了有关公司内部治理机制的相关理论,而且有利于完善我国上市公司董事会建设。
本文采用了理论与实证相结合的研究方法,对经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益与董事会结构关系进行了深入的分析。具体来说,在理论分析部分,本文指出监督强度是分析董事会监督经理的关键变量,而这种监督强度主要体现在董事会的结构特征上,公司正是通过调整董事会结构来实现监督的强弱变化。同时,提出董事会在监督经理的过程中,会产生监督成本与监督收益,而只有当监督收益大于成本时,公司才应该通过调整董事会结构来加大监督强度,进而实现对经理“败德行为”的有效抑制。在此基础上,运用完全信息动态博弈的研究方法构建了董事会监督经理行为的博弈模型,通过求解与分析,提出了本文的三大研究假设。在实证分析部分,本文运用独立样本T检验、多元线性回归、Logistic回归等多种统计分析方法,实证分析了监督经理“败德行为”所发生的成本与收益能否影响董事会结构特征,进而实证验证了经过监督成本—收益分析后所确定的董事会结构能否有效地抑制经理“败德行为”。
本文共分八章,具体章节安排如下：
第1章是本文的绪论,主要对本论文的研究进行简要的介绍,具体包括问题提出、研究思路与研究方法、研究创新点以及本文的结构安排。
第2章是文献综述。在本部分,首先将以往学者有关经理“败德行为”的研究进行回顾与整理,并主要从过度投资和在职消费两个角度进行系统的分析论述。其次,对董事会结构与经理“败德行为”的现有研究进行总结。再次,从董事会结构影响因素方面,对现有学者的研究进行整理与归纳。最后,对相关文献进行评述,并针对现有研究的不足,提出本文的研究内容。
第3章是经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益与董事会结构关系的理论分析。在本部分,首先运用委托—代理理论进行分析,指出董事会监督经理的必要性,以及监督经理的两个主要方面。其次,运用成本—收益分析的方法,将董事会结构与经理“败德行为”纳入到一个统一的分析框架中进行系统地分析。最后,在上面两类分析的基础上,建立一个关于董事会与经理之间的博弈分析模型,以期从博弈模型的构建与求解中,发现董事会监督经理所产生的监督成本—收益对自身结构的影响,以及董事会结构在抑制经理“败德行为”中所起到的作用。在此基础之上,提出本文所要求证的假设。
第4章是经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益与董事会结构关系的实证研究设计。本章对实证研究各部分所分析的内容进行了具体的说明,同时,进行了样本与变量的选择,并对主要变量进行了描述统计,为其后的实证分析奠定基础。
第5章是经理“败德行为”的监督收益对董事会结构的影响。首先对相关文献进行梳理,并从理论上探讨与董事会监督收益有关的因素,进而提出本章要验证的各分项假设。其次,运用独立样本T检验与回归分析的方法对监督收益对董事会结构的影响进行实证检验。最后,考虑到我国国有企业与非国有企业的在所有权性质上有所不同,这可能会使公司股东在董事的选择上有所不同,进而导致董事会的结构出现较大差异。因此,本章进一步将样本分为两组,分别进行实证检验,并进行比较分析。研究发现,随着监督收益的增加,公司倾向于选择较大的董事会规模。然而,监督收益并不能显著地影响公司董事会的独立董事比例与两职合一。
第6章是经理“败德行为”的监督成本对董事会结构的影响。首先对相关文献进行梳理,并从理论上探讨与董事会监督成本有关的因素,进而提出本章要验证的各分项假设。其次,运用独立样本T检验与回归分析的方法对监督成本对董事会结构的影响进行实证检验。最后,考虑到我国国有企业与非国有企业的所有权性质有所不同,进一步将样本分为两组,分别进行实证检验。研究发现,我国上市公司的董事会结构并不受监督成本的影响。
第7章实证检验了基于监督成本—收益的董事会结构对经理“败德行为”的影响。在分析过程中,本文以经理的过度投资和在职消费作为经理“败德行为”的替代变量,实证检验了董事会结构对经理“败德行为”的影响。同时,考虑到董事会结构变量受到监督成本—收益的影响,如果用普通最小二乘法(OLS)可能会出现研究偏误,因此,本章决定建立联立方程组,利用两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS),对方程进行回归分析。研究发现,当考虑到监督成本—收益后,董事会监督强度的增加将有利于抑制公司经理的“败德行为”。
第8章是研究结论与建议。本部分首先对全文的研究结论进行总结；其次,在所获得结论的基础上对我国上市公司和政府监管部门提出相关的建议；最后,分析本文研究的局限性,并指出进一步研究方向。
论文的创新点主要体现在：(1)以往研究仅仅分析了董事会对于经理行为的影响,而没有考虑这一监督过程对于董事会自身的影响。本文将监督过程中产生的监督成本—收益、董事会结构与经理“败德行为”纳入到一个统一的分析框架中,使分析更为科学、完整。(2)从董事会监督职能出发,系统地分析了监督经理“败德行为”产生的成本—收益对董事会结构的影响,避免了以往相关研究忽视董事会监督职能的缺陷。(3)从内生性视角研究了董事会结构对经理“败德行为”的抑制作用,在分析过程中考虑了经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益,使得研究结论更有说服力。
Since corporate ownership and control had been separated, how to make managers serve for the benefit of shareholders well is a hot issue. In this process, corporate shareholders had designed a series of supervision and the incentive mechanism to realize the aim, and the board of directors is the core. Whether the boards can play their function of monitor managers? How make it better? These questions were paid attention widely. Especially in this financial crisis, people pay more attention to corporate boards. Today, researches on corporate boards almost around the board structure:the relationship between board structure and corporate performance, the relationship between board structure and managers'behavior, and influencing factors on board structure and so on. However most researches analysis board structures and managers'moral hazard from only one aspect, and do not analyse which foctors influence the board structure in the process of monitor. It can make researches appearance one-sidedness, even research bias. In my opinion, only analyse the influence of monitor cost-benefit in the process of monitor, can we real know the influence of board structure to managers'"moral hazard", and propose valuable suggestion to our country's listed companies. From this process of supervision, this research meticulous analysis the relationship between monitors cost-benefit and board structure. This paper not only enriches the relevant theories about internal management mechanism, but also improves the listed company's board construction.
The paper use theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to analyse the relationship between cost-benefit of "moral hazard" and board structure. Specifically speaking, in the part of theoretical analysis, I point out the monitor intensity is a key variable to analyze the board monitor the manager, and it can be reflected by board structure. The board can be modified the monitor intensity by the board structure. And then, I point out in the process of monitor manager, it will occur monitor cost-benefit, and corporate can modify it intensity if monitor benefit more than the cost, and it can decrease the manager "moral hazard" effectively.Then I use a complete information dynamic game model to make solutions, and analysis the feature of the solutions, and propose three hypothesis: corporate choose stronger monitor board structure, when monitor benefit is more; corporate choose weeker monitor board structure, when monitor cost is more; managers' moral hazard will be decresed in stronger monitor board structre. In empirical analysis part, I use some kinds of statistical and econometrics technique, such as independent sample T test, multiple linear regression and Logistic regression and so on to analysis whether the monitor cost and benefit can influence the board structure,and whether board structure can influence the manager's "moral hazard" after the cost-benefit analysis.
The paper is divided into eight chapters:
The first chapter is introduction. This chapter's main content is introduce the whole paper briefly, including the research background, research value, research methods, research train of thought and the research innovations, as well as the structure and organization of the paper.
The second chapter is the document review. Firstly, I commend the representative documents about managers' "moral hazard", especially about over-investment, office consume. Secondly, I commend the effect of board structure on corporate performance. Thirdly, I commend the influencing factors on board structure. At the last, I points out these documents'defects and my research direct.
The third chapter is theoretical analysis about the relationship between the monitor cost-benefit of "moral hazard" and board structure. At first, I use principal-agent theory analysis the importance of board monitor function. Secondly, I make board structure and the managers'"moral hazard" into a unified analytical framework from the thought about cost-benefit analysis. Then based on these analyses, I establish a game model about the board of directors and managers, and expect to discuss the relationship between board structure and managers'moral hazard though construct and analysis the game model. And then, proposed the supposition that the article needs to confirm.
The fourth chapter is empirical analysis design about the relationship between the monitor cost-benefit of "moral hazard" and board structure. In this chapter, I analyse the content in the whole empirical analysis part, and analyse their relationship. Then I choose the variable and the sample from our country's listed companies, and process descriptive statistics on main variable. It can make a foundation for empirical analysis.
The fifth chapter is the influence of monitor benefit on board structure. Firstly, analysis related factor on board's monitor benefit from document and theory, and proposed the suppositions that the chapter needs to confirm. Secondly, test the influence of monitor benefit on board structure, which I use the method of independent sample T test and multiple linear regression. At the last, because State-owned companies different from non-State-owned companies in the property rights nature, this possibly make some deference from these two kinds of companies'shareholders behavior on choose corporate board, and then make deference in board structure choice. So, I prepare divide the whole sample into two groups, then empirical analysis separately and process the comparative analysis. Research find during monitor benefit increase, the company tends to expanding board size. However, monitor benefit can't significantly influence the proportion of independent directors and dual role of the board chairman.
The sixth chapter is the influence of monitor cost on board structure. Firstly, analysis related factor on board's monitor cost from document and theory, and proposed the suppositions that the chapter needs to confirm. Secondly, test the influence of monitor cost on board structure, which I use the method of independent sample T test and multiple linear regression. At the last, because State-owned companies different from non-State-owned companies in board structure choice, I divide the whole sample to two groups, then empirical analysis separately and process the compare their defference in board structre choice.Research finds that the board structure was not affected by the monitor cost in Chinese listed companies.
The seventh chapter is the influence of board structure on managers'moral hazard. In the analysis process, I use over-investment and office consume as the substitution variable to managers' moral hazard, and test the influence of board structure on managers'moral hazard empirically. At the mean time, because board structure is an endogenous variable, it is affected by monitor cost-benefit. It will be a research bias if use OLS estimation. So I use OLS and 2SLS to estimate regression model, and compare their diffenerce. As the research before, I divide the whole sample to two groups (State-owned and non-State-owned), then empirical analysis separately and process the comparative analysis.Research finds that when considering the monitor cost-benefit, the increase of monitor intensity will help restrain company manager's "moral hazard"
The eighth chapter is conclusions and suggestions. In this part, I summarize and elaborate the main conclusions, and then gives some suggestions to our country's listed companies, supervise authorities and some other parties. At the last, I point the direct of future researches.
The innovations are mainly embodied in the following aspects:(1) Documents only analysed the influence of board on manager behavior before, and do not analyse the influence of monitor process to board structure. The paper make monitor cost-benefit, board structure and the managers'"moral hazard" into a unified analytical framework, so that analysis their relationship more scientific and complete. (2) From the monitor function of the board, systematic analysis the influence of monitor cost-benefit to the board structure, and avoid the previous defects that neglected to the monitor functions of the board in the document before. (3) Analysis the effect of board structure to managers "moral hazard" from the perspective of the endogenous, and use monitor cost-benefit as instructment variable. So it makes the conclusion more convincing.
本文采用了理论与实证相结合的研究方法,对经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益与董事会结构关系进行了深入的分析。具体来说,在理论分析部分,本文指出监督强度是分析董事会监督经理的关键变量,而这种监督强度主要体现在董事会的结构特征上,公司正是通过调整董事会结构来实现监督的强弱变化。同时,提出董事会在监督经理的过程中,会产生监督成本与监督收益,而只有当监督收益大于成本时,公司才应该通过调整董事会结构来加大监督强度,进而实现对经理“败德行为”的有效抑制。在此基础上,运用完全信息动态博弈的研究方法构建了董事会监督经理行为的博弈模型,通过求解与分析,提出了本文的三大研究假设。在实证分析部分,本文运用独立样本T检验、多元线性回归、Logistic回归等多种统计分析方法,实证分析了监督经理“败德行为”所发生的成本与收益能否影响董事会结构特征,进而实证验证了经过监督成本—收益分析后所确定的董事会结构能否有效地抑制经理“败德行为”。
本文共分八章,具体章节安排如下：
第1章是本文的绪论,主要对本论文的研究进行简要的介绍,具体包括问题提出、研究思路与研究方法、研究创新点以及本文的结构安排。
第2章是文献综述。在本部分,首先将以往学者有关经理“败德行为”的研究进行回顾与整理,并主要从过度投资和在职消费两个角度进行系统的分析论述。其次,对董事会结构与经理“败德行为”的现有研究进行总结。再次,从董事会结构影响因素方面,对现有学者的研究进行整理与归纳。最后,对相关文献进行评述,并针对现有研究的不足,提出本文的研究内容。
第3章是经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益与董事会结构关系的理论分析。在本部分,首先运用委托—代理理论进行分析,指出董事会监督经理的必要性,以及监督经理的两个主要方面。其次,运用成本—收益分析的方法,将董事会结构与经理“败德行为”纳入到一个统一的分析框架中进行系统地分析。最后,在上面两类分析的基础上,建立一个关于董事会与经理之间的博弈分析模型,以期从博弈模型的构建与求解中,发现董事会监督经理所产生的监督成本—收益对自身结构的影响,以及董事会结构在抑制经理“败德行为”中所起到的作用。在此基础之上,提出本文所要求证的假设。
第4章是经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益与董事会结构关系的实证研究设计。本章对实证研究各部分所分析的内容进行了具体的说明,同时,进行了样本与变量的选择,并对主要变量进行了描述统计,为其后的实证分析奠定基础。
第5章是经理“败德行为”的监督收益对董事会结构的影响。首先对相关文献进行梳理,并从理论上探讨与董事会监督收益有关的因素,进而提出本章要验证的各分项假设。其次,运用独立样本T检验与回归分析的方法对监督收益对董事会结构的影响进行实证检验。最后,考虑到我国国有企业与非国有企业的在所有权性质上有所不同,这可能会使公司股东在董事的选择上有所不同,进而导致董事会的结构出现较大差异。因此,本章进一步将样本分为两组,分别进行实证检验,并进行比较分析。研究发现,随着监督收益的增加,公司倾向于选择较大的董事会规模。然而,监督收益并不能显著地影响公司董事会的独立董事比例与两职合一。
第6章是经理“败德行为”的监督成本对董事会结构的影响。首先对相关文献进行梳理,并从理论上探讨与董事会监督成本有关的因素,进而提出本章要验证的各分项假设。其次,运用独立样本T检验与回归分析的方法对监督成本对董事会结构的影响进行实证检验。最后,考虑到我国国有企业与非国有企业的所有权性质有所不同,进一步将样本分为两组,分别进行实证检验。研究发现,我国上市公司的董事会结构并不受监督成本的影响。
第7章实证检验了基于监督成本—收益的董事会结构对经理“败德行为”的影响。在分析过程中,本文以经理的过度投资和在职消费作为经理“败德行为”的替代变量,实证检验了董事会结构对经理“败德行为”的影响。同时,考虑到董事会结构变量受到监督成本—收益的影响,如果用普通最小二乘法(OLS)可能会出现研究偏误,因此,本章决定建立联立方程组,利用两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS),对方程进行回归分析。研究发现,当考虑到监督成本—收益后,董事会监督强度的增加将有利于抑制公司经理的“败德行为”。
第8章是研究结论与建议。本部分首先对全文的研究结论进行总结；其次,在所获得结论的基础上对我国上市公司和政府监管部门提出相关的建议；最后,分析本文研究的局限性,并指出进一步研究方向。
论文的创新点主要体现在：(1)以往研究仅仅分析了董事会对于经理行为的影响,而没有考虑这一监督过程对于董事会自身的影响。本文将监督过程中产生的监督成本—收益、董事会结构与经理“败德行为”纳入到一个统一的分析框架中,使分析更为科学、完整。(2)从董事会监督职能出发,系统地分析了监督经理“败德行为”产生的成本—收益对董事会结构的影响,避免了以往相关研究忽视董事会监督职能的缺陷。(3)从内生性视角研究了董事会结构对经理“败德行为”的抑制作用,在分析过程中考虑了经理“败德行为”的监督成本—收益,使得研究结论更有说服力。
Since corporate ownership and control had been separated, how to make managers serve for the benefit of shareholders well is a hot issue. In this process, corporate shareholders had designed a series of supervision and the incentive mechanism to realize the aim, and the board of directors is the core. Whether the boards can play their function of monitor managers? How make it better? These questions were paid attention widely. Especially in this financial crisis, people pay more attention to corporate boards. Today, researches on corporate boards almost around the board structure:the relationship between board structure and corporate performance, the relationship between board structure and managers'behavior, and influencing factors on board structure and so on. However most researches analysis board structures and managers'moral hazard from only one aspect, and do not analyse which foctors influence the board structure in the process of monitor. It can make researches appearance one-sidedness, even research bias. In my opinion, only analyse the influence of monitor cost-benefit in the process of monitor, can we real know the influence of board structure to managers'"moral hazard", and propose valuable suggestion to our country's listed companies. From this process of supervision, this research meticulous analysis the relationship between monitors cost-benefit and board structure. This paper not only enriches the relevant theories about internal management mechanism, but also improves the listed company's board construction.
The paper use theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to analyse the relationship between cost-benefit of "moral hazard" and board structure. Specifically speaking, in the part of theoretical analysis, I point out the monitor intensity is a key variable to analyze the board monitor the manager, and it can be reflected by board structure. The board can be modified the monitor intensity by the board structure. And then, I point out in the process of monitor manager, it will occur monitor cost-benefit, and corporate can modify it intensity if monitor benefit more than the cost, and it can decrease the manager "moral hazard" effectively.Then I use a complete information dynamic game model to make solutions, and analysis the feature of the solutions, and propose three hypothesis: corporate choose stronger monitor board structure, when monitor benefit is more; corporate choose weeker monitor board structure, when monitor cost is more; managers' moral hazard will be decresed in stronger monitor board structre. In empirical analysis part, I use some kinds of statistical and econometrics technique, such as independent sample T test, multiple linear regression and Logistic regression and so on to analysis whether the monitor cost and benefit can influence the board structure,and whether board structure can influence the manager's "moral hazard" after the cost-benefit analysis.
The paper is divided into eight chapters:
The first chapter is introduction. This chapter's main content is introduce the whole paper briefly, including the research background, research value, research methods, research train of thought and the research innovations, as well as the structure and organization of the paper.
The second chapter is the document review. Firstly, I commend the representative documents about managers' "moral hazard", especially about over-investment, office consume. Secondly, I commend the effect of board structure on corporate performance. Thirdly, I commend the influencing factors on board structure. At the last, I points out these documents'defects and my research direct.
The third chapter is theoretical analysis about the relationship between the monitor cost-benefit of "moral hazard" and board structure. At first, I use principal-agent theory analysis the importance of board monitor function. Secondly, I make board structure and the managers'"moral hazard" into a unified analytical framework from the thought about cost-benefit analysis. Then based on these analyses, I establish a game model about the board of directors and managers, and expect to discuss the relationship between board structure and managers'moral hazard though construct and analysis the game model. And then, proposed the supposition that the article needs to confirm.
The fourth chapter is empirical analysis design about the relationship between the monitor cost-benefit of "moral hazard" and board structure. In this chapter, I analyse the content in the whole empirical analysis part, and analyse their relationship. Then I choose the variable and the sample from our country's listed companies, and process descriptive statistics on main variable. It can make a foundation for empirical analysis.
The fifth chapter is the influence of monitor benefit on board structure. Firstly, analysis related factor on board's monitor benefit from document and theory, and proposed the suppositions that the chapter needs to confirm. Secondly, test the influence of monitor benefit on board structure, which I use the method of independent sample T test and multiple linear regression. At the last, because State-owned companies different from non-State-owned companies in the property rights nature, this possibly make some deference from these two kinds of companies'shareholders behavior on choose corporate board, and then make deference in board structure choice. So, I prepare divide the whole sample into two groups, then empirical analysis separately and process the comparative analysis. Research find during monitor benefit increase, the company tends to expanding board size. However, monitor benefit can't significantly influence the proportion of independent directors and dual role of the board chairman.
The sixth chapter is the influence of monitor cost on board structure. Firstly, analysis related factor on board's monitor cost from document and theory, and proposed the suppositions that the chapter needs to confirm. Secondly, test the influence of monitor cost on board structure, which I use the method of independent sample T test and multiple linear regression. At the last, because State-owned companies different from non-State-owned companies in board structure choice, I divide the whole sample to two groups, then empirical analysis separately and process the compare their defference in board structre choice.Research finds that the board structure was not affected by the monitor cost in Chinese listed companies.
The seventh chapter is the influence of board structure on managers'moral hazard. In the analysis process, I use over-investment and office consume as the substitution variable to managers' moral hazard, and test the influence of board structure on managers'moral hazard empirically. At the mean time, because board structure is an endogenous variable, it is affected by monitor cost-benefit. It will be a research bias if use OLS estimation. So I use OLS and 2SLS to estimate regression model, and compare their diffenerce. As the research before, I divide the whole sample to two groups (State-owned and non-State-owned), then empirical analysis separately and process the comparative analysis.Research finds that when considering the monitor cost-benefit, the increase of monitor intensity will help restrain company manager's "moral hazard"
The eighth chapter is conclusions and suggestions. In this part, I summarize and elaborate the main conclusions, and then gives some suggestions to our country's listed companies, supervise authorities and some other parties. At the last, I point the direct of future researches.
The innovations are mainly embodied in the following aspects:(1) Documents only analysed the influence of board on manager behavior before, and do not analyse the influence of monitor process to board structure. The paper make monitor cost-benefit, board structure and the managers'"moral hazard" into a unified analytical framework, so that analysis their relationship more scientific and complete. (2) From the monitor function of the board, systematic analysis the influence of monitor cost-benefit to the board structure, and avoid the previous defects that neglected to the monitor functions of the board in the document before. (3) Analysis the effect of board structure to managers "moral hazard" from the perspective of the endogenous, and use monitor cost-benefit as instructment variable. So it makes the conclusion more convincing.
引文
①阿道夫·A.伯利,加德纳·C.米恩斯.现代公司与私有财产[C].北京：商务印书馆,2005
②美国商业圆桌会议是由美国十几家著名的大型企业CEO组成的一个商业团体。
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