中国上市公司投资效率研究
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摘要
我国企业投资行为的特殊性是由中国经济发展模式的特殊性决定的。我国经济的发展处于政府完全配给资源到市场完全配给资源的一个转轨阶段,“转轨”意味着经济运行模式处于非均衡状态及其变革的澎湃动力。在转轨的动态过程中,了解转轨经济模式对企业投资行为和投资效率的影响,对有效提高政府投资的实际效率水平,提升经济体的活力和可持续性都至关重要。
转轨经济的制度背景特点在于政府深深的嵌入微观经济活动,其干预力量和程度与西方经济体有着本质区别,这种区别突出表现在资源配置主体的微观经济体所有权安排上的差异、转轨过程中地区经济模式的差异,以及大量政府控制资源变更控制权时的独特方式。本文以我国上市公司所处的转轨进程为背景,引入制度性因素来对我国企业投资行为的影响因素做了一个全面的,深层次的研究,其研究目的在于探寻主导我国企业投资行为的诸多因素中,当前制度环境到底扮演了什么角色,造成了什么后果?如何才能切实有效的提高我国企业的投资行为效率。为了解决这些问题,本文分三个层次进行研究：
第一,本文研究了我国上市公司投资效率的发展历史及其现状。从制度背景的视角寻找影响我国上市公司投资效率的诸多因素,探索我国上市公司投资效率的变化规律,转轨进程的变革对这些效率变化赋予的制度性烙印。本文的研究从我国上市公司投资效率的测定,及其制度环境下的时序分析开始,重点考察时间历史进程对于投资效率的影响；
第二,本文研究了我国上市公司投资行为的动机及其公司治理效应。研究公司投资效率的影响,离不开对投资行为本身影响因素的追溯和探索。投资效率作为投资行为的后果,必然受到初始动机及其公司内部契约的约束和影响。所以,研究制度环境对公司投资效率的影响,离不开研究投资效率在公司内部的影响因素的诸多传导链条。在本文中,我们研究了我国经济独特的制度环境在投资动机和公司治理环节的传导,以及其对投资效率水平影响。这为我们摸清制度环境的传导过程提供了有力的经验研究证据。
第三,本文研究了我国上市公司投资效率与制度背景关系。在前述两个层面对我国上市公司投资效率的研究基础上,通过了解转轨经济发展进程影响投资效率的模式,以及公司投资效率影响因素的诸多传导链条,研究了转轨经济特殊制度背景下国家所有权介入微观经济体的经济后果,以及在上述传导机制下,公司投资效率的影响及其发展方向。从而改善我国转轨经济环境下的投资效率水平,建立适合我国国情的资金投资模式,明晰我国经济转轨的方向和目标,进而实现本文的研究目标。
本文的研究创新在于,基于转轨经济的制度性视角,研究了我国转轨经济进程中的企业动态投资效率水平及其影响因素和传导机制。本文的研究框架大大延伸了以往研究中零散的投资效率公司治理框架,主要从三个部分实现了对于企业投资效率影响因素的研究突破：
首先,本文测算我国企业在改革进程中的动态投资效率水平,从时间—效率层次对转轨经济进程的投资效率水平进行了描述；
其次,基于“投资效率一经济成分—时间序列”模式进一步测算投资效率的历史发展状况,基于转轨经济的制度环境变化对效率水平的影响做了进一步的研究。
最后,基于公司治理框架分析了我国企业投资效率的传导链条,引入转轨经济体特殊的制度性因素,讨论了我国经济转轨进程中企业投资效率的影响因素和传导机制。
The unique of China's economic development model determines the particularity of corporate investment behaviors under this background. The economic development of China is at the transition stage from resources fully distributed by government to market,"transition" means that the non-equilibrium status of economic model and the power of transform. During the dynamic process of transition, understanding the effect that transition economic model on investment and efficiency of enterprises could effectively improve the actual level of government investment efficiency, and it is essential to enhance the vitality and sustainability of economies at the micro level.
This paper based on the background of transition process of public company in China. The characteristic of transition economic system is government takes deeply part in the micro-economic, and its intervention and extent is different from the Western economics. These differences are the ownership distinction of micro-economics as the main body of resources distribution, the economic model between areas in transition process and the unique way of government control rights transfer of resources. The introduction of these institutional factors in this paper comprehensively and deeply analyzed the influencing factors of corporate investment in China. It aimed to explore the role of institutional environment and the results caused in these factors leading corporate investment, and how to improve the investment efficiency. To solve these questions, this paper studied in three levels:
Firstly, this paper researched the historical development and the current status of public company's investment efficiency in China. From the perspective of institutional background, we searched the many influencing factors of public company's investment efficiency, explored its change regularity and the institutional mark by transition process transform. This research started from the determination of the public company's investment efficiency in China and the timing analysis of system environment, and then emphasized on the change about the historical process of time affecting the investment efficiency.
Secondly, we studied the motivation of public company's investment and governance effects. It could not evade exploring the investment itself if we study the affection of investment efficiency. Investment efficiency, the result of investment, will be restrained and impacted by the initial motivation and internal contracts. Therefore, we could not study the influence of investment efficiency under institutional background without the many transform chains of internal influencing factors. In this paper, we studied the transform of the unique institutional environment of China's economic on motivation and corporate governance, and the affection on the level investment efficiency. These provided strong empirical research evidences for us to find out the transform process of institutional environment.
Finally, we analyzed the investment efficiency of public company and institutional background in China. Based on the above, through the understandings of the model that influencing investment efficiency during the transition economic development and its many transform chains, we studied the consequences that governmental ownership interfere the micro-economic under the background of transition economic institution and the affection and development direction of corporate investment efficiency. Thereby, we could improve the level of investment efficiency, establish the capital investment model which suitable for China's national condition, and clarity the goals and directions of economic transition, and then achieve the objective of this research.
The innovation of the study is that, based the perspective of institution of transition economic, exploring the level of dynamic investment efficiency of company and its transform system in the process of transition economic in China. This paper greatly extends the previous research framework of corporate governance, and from three main parts to achieve research breakthroughs of influencing factors of corporate investment efficiency.
First, we measured the level of dynamic investment efficiency in the process of corporate reform in China, and from the time-efficiency to describe the investment efficiency in the process of transition economic.
Second, based on the model of "investment efficiency-economy sector-time series", we further measured the historical development of investment efficiency, and researched the influence of the changes of institutional environment of transition economic for the level of efficiency.
Last, based on the transform chain of the corporate governance framework for the corporate investment efficiency in China and the introduction of institutional factors in transition economic, we discussed the influencing factors and transform system of corporate investment efficiency in the process of transition economic in China.
转轨经济的制度背景特点在于政府深深的嵌入微观经济活动,其干预力量和程度与西方经济体有着本质区别,这种区别突出表现在资源配置主体的微观经济体所有权安排上的差异、转轨过程中地区经济模式的差异,以及大量政府控制资源变更控制权时的独特方式。本文以我国上市公司所处的转轨进程为背景,引入制度性因素来对我国企业投资行为的影响因素做了一个全面的,深层次的研究,其研究目的在于探寻主导我国企业投资行为的诸多因素中,当前制度环境到底扮演了什么角色,造成了什么后果?如何才能切实有效的提高我国企业的投资行为效率。为了解决这些问题,本文分三个层次进行研究：
第一,本文研究了我国上市公司投资效率的发展历史及其现状。从制度背景的视角寻找影响我国上市公司投资效率的诸多因素,探索我国上市公司投资效率的变化规律,转轨进程的变革对这些效率变化赋予的制度性烙印。本文的研究从我国上市公司投资效率的测定,及其制度环境下的时序分析开始,重点考察时间历史进程对于投资效率的影响；
第二,本文研究了我国上市公司投资行为的动机及其公司治理效应。研究公司投资效率的影响,离不开对投资行为本身影响因素的追溯和探索。投资效率作为投资行为的后果,必然受到初始动机及其公司内部契约的约束和影响。所以,研究制度环境对公司投资效率的影响,离不开研究投资效率在公司内部的影响因素的诸多传导链条。在本文中,我们研究了我国经济独特的制度环境在投资动机和公司治理环节的传导,以及其对投资效率水平影响。这为我们摸清制度环境的传导过程提供了有力的经验研究证据。
第三,本文研究了我国上市公司投资效率与制度背景关系。在前述两个层面对我国上市公司投资效率的研究基础上,通过了解转轨经济发展进程影响投资效率的模式,以及公司投资效率影响因素的诸多传导链条,研究了转轨经济特殊制度背景下国家所有权介入微观经济体的经济后果,以及在上述传导机制下,公司投资效率的影响及其发展方向。从而改善我国转轨经济环境下的投资效率水平,建立适合我国国情的资金投资模式,明晰我国经济转轨的方向和目标,进而实现本文的研究目标。
本文的研究创新在于,基于转轨经济的制度性视角,研究了我国转轨经济进程中的企业动态投资效率水平及其影响因素和传导机制。本文的研究框架大大延伸了以往研究中零散的投资效率公司治理框架,主要从三个部分实现了对于企业投资效率影响因素的研究突破：
首先,本文测算我国企业在改革进程中的动态投资效率水平,从时间—效率层次对转轨经济进程的投资效率水平进行了描述；
其次,基于“投资效率一经济成分—时间序列”模式进一步测算投资效率的历史发展状况,基于转轨经济的制度环境变化对效率水平的影响做了进一步的研究。
最后,基于公司治理框架分析了我国企业投资效率的传导链条,引入转轨经济体特殊的制度性因素,讨论了我国经济转轨进程中企业投资效率的影响因素和传导机制。
The unique of China's economic development model determines the particularity of corporate investment behaviors under this background. The economic development of China is at the transition stage from resources fully distributed by government to market,"transition" means that the non-equilibrium status of economic model and the power of transform. During the dynamic process of transition, understanding the effect that transition economic model on investment and efficiency of enterprises could effectively improve the actual level of government investment efficiency, and it is essential to enhance the vitality and sustainability of economies at the micro level.
This paper based on the background of transition process of public company in China. The characteristic of transition economic system is government takes deeply part in the micro-economic, and its intervention and extent is different from the Western economics. These differences are the ownership distinction of micro-economics as the main body of resources distribution, the economic model between areas in transition process and the unique way of government control rights transfer of resources. The introduction of these institutional factors in this paper comprehensively and deeply analyzed the influencing factors of corporate investment in China. It aimed to explore the role of institutional environment and the results caused in these factors leading corporate investment, and how to improve the investment efficiency. To solve these questions, this paper studied in three levels:
Firstly, this paper researched the historical development and the current status of public company's investment efficiency in China. From the perspective of institutional background, we searched the many influencing factors of public company's investment efficiency, explored its change regularity and the institutional mark by transition process transform. This research started from the determination of the public company's investment efficiency in China and the timing analysis of system environment, and then emphasized on the change about the historical process of time affecting the investment efficiency.
Secondly, we studied the motivation of public company's investment and governance effects. It could not evade exploring the investment itself if we study the affection of investment efficiency. Investment efficiency, the result of investment, will be restrained and impacted by the initial motivation and internal contracts. Therefore, we could not study the influence of investment efficiency under institutional background without the many transform chains of internal influencing factors. In this paper, we studied the transform of the unique institutional environment of China's economic on motivation and corporate governance, and the affection on the level investment efficiency. These provided strong empirical research evidences for us to find out the transform process of institutional environment.
Finally, we analyzed the investment efficiency of public company and institutional background in China. Based on the above, through the understandings of the model that influencing investment efficiency during the transition economic development and its many transform chains, we studied the consequences that governmental ownership interfere the micro-economic under the background of transition economic institution and the affection and development direction of corporate investment efficiency. Thereby, we could improve the level of investment efficiency, establish the capital investment model which suitable for China's national condition, and clarity the goals and directions of economic transition, and then achieve the objective of this research.
The innovation of the study is that, based the perspective of institution of transition economic, exploring the level of dynamic investment efficiency of company and its transform system in the process of transition economic in China. This paper greatly extends the previous research framework of corporate governance, and from three main parts to achieve research breakthroughs of influencing factors of corporate investment efficiency.
First, we measured the level of dynamic investment efficiency in the process of corporate reform in China, and from the time-efficiency to describe the investment efficiency in the process of transition economic.
Second, based on the model of "investment efficiency-economy sector-time series", we further measured the historical development of investment efficiency, and researched the influence of the changes of institutional environment of transition economic for the level of efficiency.
Last, based on the transform chain of the corporate governance framework for the corporate investment efficiency in China and the introduction of institutional factors in transition economic, we discussed the influencing factors and transform system of corporate investment efficiency in the process of transition economic in China.
引文
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