反倾销视角下的中国贸易政策内生性研究
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摘要
主流贸易理论将贸易政策视为提高经济效率(或福利)的一种手段,而贸易的政治经济学则认为贸易政策是政府、利益集团、民众各方博弈的结果,是不同经济个体、决策者等异质性的利益集团在既定偏好和社会制度下作用的均衡解,是利益集团和政府在权力资源基础上的利益表达和利益选择的结果。政府出台的贸易政策并不是社会福利(或者经济效率)最大化的政策,其产生具有内生性,反映了特定利用集团的偏好。
反倾销政策作为贸易政策的重要组成部分,本文运用贸易政治经济学的概念框架和方法论,以反倾销政策为视角,分析中国贸易政策的内生性。文章首先分析世界反倾销政策内生形成的两种机制,一种源于贸易政策参与人之间的利益博弈;另外一种则是出于贸易政策的保险和社会福利动机。尽管在现实中,这两种内生机制形成的反倾销贸易政策有时很难完全区分开,往往兼具这两种性质。在此基础上,分析反倾销政策的经济效率,发现从经济的角度考察,反倾销政策至多是一个“次优”的选择。这从侧面进一步验证了反倾销政策的内生性——它不是政府提高经济效率(或福利)的一种手段,而是政府、利益集团、民众各方博弈的结果。
在分析世界反倾销政策内生形成机制的基础上,本文考察中国反倾销政策需求和供应的决定因素,并选取适当的变量,对中国反倾销政策的内生性进行了实证分析。目前,贸易的政治经济学理论分析都是基于西方民主代议制的政治框架下,对中国这种民主集中制的发展中国家是否适用,还不得而知。在计划经济条件下中国制定贸易政策唯一遵循的是公共经济目标,贸易政策形成曲线与经济个体偏好曲线平行,政府出台的贸易政策不受经济个体偏好的影响。可以说在传统的计划经济体制下和改革开放以来的相当长时期内,中国的贸易政策是一个相对独立于标准的厂商和需求理论中的企业和消费者目标的外生变量。目前,中国的市场化变革使得中国社会发展发生了“四个深刻”变化:经济体制深刻变革,社会结构深刻变动,利益格局深刻调整,思想观念深刻变化。我国的利益诉求在不断地加大、增多和交叉,而且通过不断的利益分化,正在逐步结成众多、复杂且力量对比不一的利益团体或者利益集团。这些利益集团会抱着某些共同目标,努力去影响贸易政策。在这种情况下,我们想探求如下问题:中国贸易政策的决策是否受到社会多元化利益结构的影响而具有内生性?国内的利益集团对贸易政策的形成产生了怎样的影响?中国政府的目标函数中各经济个体的权重是否相等?
本文共包括九章内容。其基本结构和主要内容如下:第1章是导论,介绍本文的研究背景、研究目的、研究方法、主要内容和创新点以及其他需要说明的事项。第2章是关于贸易政策理论从外生性到内生性演进的文献综述,对已有的贸易理论按照其性质是具有外生性还是具有内生性这样一个标准进行分类,对贸易政策形成的主流理论进行了梳理和分析,并指出内生性贸易政策理论的产生和繁荣并不意味着外生性贸易政策理论的衰退和不合适宜,外生性贸易政策理论在现代经济社会依然具有强大的解释力。第3章对一般层面上反倾销政策的内生性进行分析,指出世界反倾销政策的内生形成有两种机制,一种源于贸易政策参与人之间的利益博弈;另外一种则是出于贸易政策的保险和社会福利动机。第4章对反倾销贸易政策的社会福利及作用进行分析和评价。分别基于大国模型和小国模型以及在多个产品市场和不完全竞争条件下反倾销政策的福利效应进行了分析,从侧面说明反倾销政策具有内生性。第5章和第6章分别对影响中国反倾销政策需求和供给的因素进行了分析,说明中国的反倾销政策同样是具有内生性的,但其内生形成机制又具有自己鲜明的特点。第7章分别就企业异质性对中国反倾销政策的需求影响和政府决策的有限理性对中国反倾销政策的供给影响进行分析。第8章运用计量经济学的方法对中国反倾销政策的内生性进行了经验检验。利用1997-2006这十年中国反倾销的实际数据建立模型,在盛斌(2002)的基础上,采用新的计量方法(盛斌(2002)运用的是普通OLS的计量方法,本文运用变截距面板模型的固定效应组内差分方法),进行实证分析,结果表明中国反倾销政策具有内生性,它的形成是不同利益集团和政府在权力资源基础上的利益表达和利益选择的结果。第9章在总结全文的基础上,得出简要的结论,并指出了未来的研究问题。
通过全面的分析和考察,本文得到以下主要结论:
(1)反倾销政策具有两种内生形成机制。一是其形成源于利益集团之间的利益博弈。在这种情形下,政府也是最大化自身利益的“经济人”,具有自己特殊的偏好。反倾销政策的供给是对竞争性利益集团需求的一种反应。反倾销政策的决定是供给和需求均衡的内生结果,其需求和供给分别来自于政策中受益者和受损者利益集团和政府更具自身偏好的利益最大化行为。任何一次反倾销政策不可能公平地满足和实现所有政策需求者的利益,这取决于利益集团和政府在讨价还价谈判中的可支配力量的大小。二是源于保险和社会福利动机,认为反倾销政策的提供是应公众要求为抵御未来收入水平因外国竞争而下降的风险以及政府出于追求社会和公共利益的反应而做出的。
(2)从经济效率上看,反倾销政策至多是“次佳”的。政府对反倾销政策的供给并不是出于提高经济效率的考虑,这从侧面反映出该政策是出于收入分配效应的考虑而内生形成。反倾销政策的作用(或者说对国内产业的保护程度)由本国产品和外国产品间的替代程度和国内市场竞争激烈程度决定。
(3)中国国内厂商对反倾销政策需求的主要动机来自于国内厂商与国外厂商之间的市场竞争。除此之外,对自身条件的审视,也是国内厂商提起反倾销申请的另外一个重要因素。部门投入要素的流动性、部门利益表达能力等要素对进口竞争部门的反倾销需求会产生很大影响。
中国政府对反倾销政策的供给与西方国家有很大的不同。它不取决于各利益集团的政治捐献和专业化的政治游说。中国政府对反倾销政策的供给是由政府对特定企业利益集团福利状况的关注所决定的,在这个过程中,由于信息的不对称,政府对反倾销政策的供给有可能受到企业信息的牵引。同时,政府对特定企业利益集团福利状况的关注又是由政府的政策偏好以及中国企业的寻租和游说活动所共同决定的。
(4)行业内企业的异质性(或者说行业的集中度)对中国反倾销政策的需求具有重要影响。只有行业内企业的异质性程度足够大,该行业中的领先企业才有可能提起反倾销申请。如果行业内企业的异质性程度很小,行业的集中度低,即使该行业受到国外产品的倾销冲击,受公平相容约束的影响,单个企业也不可能自行通过提起反倾销申请向政府寻求帮助,这在很大程度上影响了中国反倾销政策的需求,行业协会可以在这方面发挥一定的协调作用。
中国反倾销贸易政策的供给面,也受政府有限理性认知的影响。政府的贸易政策归根到底,是由人作出的,受认知能力、信息和环境的不确定性影响,很可能导致政府在反倾销贸易保护政策的决策过程中放弃一部分对该决策有重要影响的因素,因而使政府对反倾销政策的供给偏离了“最优”。
The western democracy representative nation's trade policy is the result of balancing beween the government,the different interest groups and the citizens.So the trade policy made by the government is not possibly maximizing social warefare.It is usually affected by some particular interest groups.It is endogenously determined.For China,in the past command economy,China's trade policy is only aimed to achieve public economy goals.But now China is in the stage of transforming period,the political and economical enviroment have changed greatly.How is its trade policy determination machanism changed? What's the differences between China's trade policy determination machanism and that in the western country? In China there is no political donation,so how the interest groups influence the trade policy determination? With China's entry into WTO,anti-dumping is more frequently implemented by China. As one of important part of trade policy,we would like to analyze the characteristics of China's trade policy in the perspective of anti-dumping,And try to answer the following questions:Is China's anti-dumping trade policy endogenously determined? Is it influenced by some specific interest groups? If the answer is yes,then in what way? What kind of factors affected China's anti-dumping trade policy?
The dissertation is arranged for nine chapters.Chapter 1 is introduction, introducing the research background,purpose of the study,research methodology,the main content and innovation,as well as other explanations.
Chapter 2 is literature review on the development of trade policy theory from exogeneity to endogeity.We devidied the existing theoretical research of trade policy into two parts:exogeneity trade policy and endogeity trade policy.At the same time the thesis point out that the emergence of endogeity trade policy theory does not mean that exogeneity trade policy theory is not fit for explaining the current economic phenomen.
Chapter 3 analyse the endogeity of anti-dumping trade policy on the general level.The dissertation point out that there are two formation mechanisms of anti-dumping policy,one of which stem from the interest game of different participants in trade policy,another of which stem from the motive of social welfare.Even though in reality,government trade policies often take into account personal interests and public interests,the two natures of anti-dumping trade policy are difficult to distinguish completely.
Chapter 4 evaluate the economic efficiency of anti-dumping trade policy.The efficiency of anti-dumping policies is analyzed separately under the large country model and the small country model,as well as in the conditions of multi- product markets and imperfect competition.
Chapter 5,6 and 7 analyze the factors that influence the demand and supply of China's anti-dumping policy.
Chapter 8 make an empirical test of China's data on anti -dumping cases in 1997-2006 to prove that China's anti-dumping policy is endogenously determined.But it's different from that in democracy representative system which is influenced by political donation,China's anti-dumping policy is formed by the government's specific attention to some specific interest groups.
Chapter 9 summarize the whole thesis and draw some conclusions briefly.On the basis of this,points out the outline of future reseach.
According to its research field and characteristics,the thesis integrates normative analysis with positive analysis,integrates theoretical analysis with empirical analysis.
With a complete reseach and analysis,we draw the following conclusions:
First,anti-dumping policy has two endogenous formation mechanism,one of which stems from the interest game of different participants in trade policy,another of which stems from the motive of social welfare.Under such circumstances,as an "Economic Man",the Government also maximize its own interests,the supply of anti-dumping policies is a response to domestic competitive interest groups' demand. Anti-dumping policy is the endogenous result of the balance bewteen the supply and demand from the policy winners and losers and the government's own preference.
Second,from an economic efficiency point of view,the anti-dumping policy is "second best".The aim of government's supply of anti-dumping policy is not to improve economic efficiency,but for the purpose of income distribution effects.The role of anti-dumping policy(or of the degree of protection for domestic industries)depends on the degree of substitution between their products and foreign ones and the degree of competition in the domestic market.
Third,the main demand of China's anti-dumping policy stem from the market competiton between the domestic the import-competing anti-dumping department and the foreign producers.Besides,the liquidity of input elements and the mobility of market transfer as well as the ability to express their interest will also have a significant impact on demand.
The supply of China's anti-dumping policy is also different from that in the western countries.It does not depend on the political donation and professional lobbying.Instead,it depends on the Chinese government's attention to the welfare of some specific interest groups.Because of information asymmetry,the Government's supply of anti-dumping policy may be tracted by some information the domestic producers offered.
Fourth,the enterprise differences in the specific industry affect the demand of China's anti-dumping policy.Only the difference among the enterprises is big enough, can it be possible for the large enterprises to lodge a anti-dumping application.At the same time,the government's limited rational judgements also affect the supply of China's anti-dumping policy.
Compared to the existing literature,the thesis has several exploratory studies:
First,using China's data on anti -dumping cases in 1997-2006,the thesis make an empirical test of China's anti -dumping policy and get some important conclusions.
Second,based on the analysis,the thesis prove that China's anti-dumping policy is endogenously determined.But it's different from democracy representative system which is influenced by political donation.China's anti-dumping policy is formed by the government's specific attention to the welfare of some specific interest groups.
Third,the government's anti-dumping trade policy is affected by its nonrationality. Restricted by information and the complex enviroment,the government can not make the optimal decision,so the government's anti-dumping trade policy decision is inevitably combined with something of non- rationality.
反倾销政策作为贸易政策的重要组成部分,本文运用贸易政治经济学的概念框架和方法论,以反倾销政策为视角,分析中国贸易政策的内生性。文章首先分析世界反倾销政策内生形成的两种机制,一种源于贸易政策参与人之间的利益博弈;另外一种则是出于贸易政策的保险和社会福利动机。尽管在现实中,这两种内生机制形成的反倾销贸易政策有时很难完全区分开,往往兼具这两种性质。在此基础上,分析反倾销政策的经济效率,发现从经济的角度考察,反倾销政策至多是一个“次优”的选择。这从侧面进一步验证了反倾销政策的内生性——它不是政府提高经济效率(或福利)的一种手段,而是政府、利益集团、民众各方博弈的结果。
在分析世界反倾销政策内生形成机制的基础上,本文考察中国反倾销政策需求和供应的决定因素,并选取适当的变量,对中国反倾销政策的内生性进行了实证分析。目前,贸易的政治经济学理论分析都是基于西方民主代议制的政治框架下,对中国这种民主集中制的发展中国家是否适用,还不得而知。在计划经济条件下中国制定贸易政策唯一遵循的是公共经济目标,贸易政策形成曲线与经济个体偏好曲线平行,政府出台的贸易政策不受经济个体偏好的影响。可以说在传统的计划经济体制下和改革开放以来的相当长时期内,中国的贸易政策是一个相对独立于标准的厂商和需求理论中的企业和消费者目标的外生变量。目前,中国的市场化变革使得中国社会发展发生了“四个深刻”变化:经济体制深刻变革,社会结构深刻变动,利益格局深刻调整,思想观念深刻变化。我国的利益诉求在不断地加大、增多和交叉,而且通过不断的利益分化,正在逐步结成众多、复杂且力量对比不一的利益团体或者利益集团。这些利益集团会抱着某些共同目标,努力去影响贸易政策。在这种情况下,我们想探求如下问题:中国贸易政策的决策是否受到社会多元化利益结构的影响而具有内生性?国内的利益集团对贸易政策的形成产生了怎样的影响?中国政府的目标函数中各经济个体的权重是否相等?
本文共包括九章内容。其基本结构和主要内容如下:第1章是导论,介绍本文的研究背景、研究目的、研究方法、主要内容和创新点以及其他需要说明的事项。第2章是关于贸易政策理论从外生性到内生性演进的文献综述,对已有的贸易理论按照其性质是具有外生性还是具有内生性这样一个标准进行分类,对贸易政策形成的主流理论进行了梳理和分析,并指出内生性贸易政策理论的产生和繁荣并不意味着外生性贸易政策理论的衰退和不合适宜,外生性贸易政策理论在现代经济社会依然具有强大的解释力。第3章对一般层面上反倾销政策的内生性进行分析,指出世界反倾销政策的内生形成有两种机制,一种源于贸易政策参与人之间的利益博弈;另外一种则是出于贸易政策的保险和社会福利动机。第4章对反倾销贸易政策的社会福利及作用进行分析和评价。分别基于大国模型和小国模型以及在多个产品市场和不完全竞争条件下反倾销政策的福利效应进行了分析,从侧面说明反倾销政策具有内生性。第5章和第6章分别对影响中国反倾销政策需求和供给的因素进行了分析,说明中国的反倾销政策同样是具有内生性的,但其内生形成机制又具有自己鲜明的特点。第7章分别就企业异质性对中国反倾销政策的需求影响和政府决策的有限理性对中国反倾销政策的供给影响进行分析。第8章运用计量经济学的方法对中国反倾销政策的内生性进行了经验检验。利用1997-2006这十年中国反倾销的实际数据建立模型,在盛斌(2002)的基础上,采用新的计量方法(盛斌(2002)运用的是普通OLS的计量方法,本文运用变截距面板模型的固定效应组内差分方法),进行实证分析,结果表明中国反倾销政策具有内生性,它的形成是不同利益集团和政府在权力资源基础上的利益表达和利益选择的结果。第9章在总结全文的基础上,得出简要的结论,并指出了未来的研究问题。
通过全面的分析和考察,本文得到以下主要结论:
(1)反倾销政策具有两种内生形成机制。一是其形成源于利益集团之间的利益博弈。在这种情形下,政府也是最大化自身利益的“经济人”,具有自己特殊的偏好。反倾销政策的供给是对竞争性利益集团需求的一种反应。反倾销政策的决定是供给和需求均衡的内生结果,其需求和供给分别来自于政策中受益者和受损者利益集团和政府更具自身偏好的利益最大化行为。任何一次反倾销政策不可能公平地满足和实现所有政策需求者的利益,这取决于利益集团和政府在讨价还价谈判中的可支配力量的大小。二是源于保险和社会福利动机,认为反倾销政策的提供是应公众要求为抵御未来收入水平因外国竞争而下降的风险以及政府出于追求社会和公共利益的反应而做出的。
(2)从经济效率上看,反倾销政策至多是“次佳”的。政府对反倾销政策的供给并不是出于提高经济效率的考虑,这从侧面反映出该政策是出于收入分配效应的考虑而内生形成。反倾销政策的作用(或者说对国内产业的保护程度)由本国产品和外国产品间的替代程度和国内市场竞争激烈程度决定。
(3)中国国内厂商对反倾销政策需求的主要动机来自于国内厂商与国外厂商之间的市场竞争。除此之外,对自身条件的审视,也是国内厂商提起反倾销申请的另外一个重要因素。部门投入要素的流动性、部门利益表达能力等要素对进口竞争部门的反倾销需求会产生很大影响。
中国政府对反倾销政策的供给与西方国家有很大的不同。它不取决于各利益集团的政治捐献和专业化的政治游说。中国政府对反倾销政策的供给是由政府对特定企业利益集团福利状况的关注所决定的,在这个过程中,由于信息的不对称,政府对反倾销政策的供给有可能受到企业信息的牵引。同时,政府对特定企业利益集团福利状况的关注又是由政府的政策偏好以及中国企业的寻租和游说活动所共同决定的。
(4)行业内企业的异质性(或者说行业的集中度)对中国反倾销政策的需求具有重要影响。只有行业内企业的异质性程度足够大,该行业中的领先企业才有可能提起反倾销申请。如果行业内企业的异质性程度很小,行业的集中度低,即使该行业受到国外产品的倾销冲击,受公平相容约束的影响,单个企业也不可能自行通过提起反倾销申请向政府寻求帮助,这在很大程度上影响了中国反倾销政策的需求,行业协会可以在这方面发挥一定的协调作用。
中国反倾销贸易政策的供给面,也受政府有限理性认知的影响。政府的贸易政策归根到底,是由人作出的,受认知能力、信息和环境的不确定性影响,很可能导致政府在反倾销贸易保护政策的决策过程中放弃一部分对该决策有重要影响的因素,因而使政府对反倾销政策的供给偏离了“最优”。
The western democracy representative nation's trade policy is the result of balancing beween the government,the different interest groups and the citizens.So the trade policy made by the government is not possibly maximizing social warefare.It is usually affected by some particular interest groups.It is endogenously determined.For China,in the past command economy,China's trade policy is only aimed to achieve public economy goals.But now China is in the stage of transforming period,the political and economical enviroment have changed greatly.How is its trade policy determination machanism changed? What's the differences between China's trade policy determination machanism and that in the western country? In China there is no political donation,so how the interest groups influence the trade policy determination? With China's entry into WTO,anti-dumping is more frequently implemented by China. As one of important part of trade policy,we would like to analyze the characteristics of China's trade policy in the perspective of anti-dumping,And try to answer the following questions:Is China's anti-dumping trade policy endogenously determined? Is it influenced by some specific interest groups? If the answer is yes,then in what way? What kind of factors affected China's anti-dumping trade policy?
The dissertation is arranged for nine chapters.Chapter 1 is introduction, introducing the research background,purpose of the study,research methodology,the main content and innovation,as well as other explanations.
Chapter 2 is literature review on the development of trade policy theory from exogeneity to endogeity.We devidied the existing theoretical research of trade policy into two parts:exogeneity trade policy and endogeity trade policy.At the same time the thesis point out that the emergence of endogeity trade policy theory does not mean that exogeneity trade policy theory is not fit for explaining the current economic phenomen.
Chapter 3 analyse the endogeity of anti-dumping trade policy on the general level.The dissertation point out that there are two formation mechanisms of anti-dumping policy,one of which stem from the interest game of different participants in trade policy,another of which stem from the motive of social welfare.Even though in reality,government trade policies often take into account personal interests and public interests,the two natures of anti-dumping trade policy are difficult to distinguish completely.
Chapter 4 evaluate the economic efficiency of anti-dumping trade policy.The efficiency of anti-dumping policies is analyzed separately under the large country model and the small country model,as well as in the conditions of multi- product markets and imperfect competition.
Chapter 5,6 and 7 analyze the factors that influence the demand and supply of China's anti-dumping policy.
Chapter 8 make an empirical test of China's data on anti -dumping cases in 1997-2006 to prove that China's anti-dumping policy is endogenously determined.But it's different from that in democracy representative system which is influenced by political donation,China's anti-dumping policy is formed by the government's specific attention to some specific interest groups.
Chapter 9 summarize the whole thesis and draw some conclusions briefly.On the basis of this,points out the outline of future reseach.
According to its research field and characteristics,the thesis integrates normative analysis with positive analysis,integrates theoretical analysis with empirical analysis.
With a complete reseach and analysis,we draw the following conclusions:
First,anti-dumping policy has two endogenous formation mechanism,one of which stems from the interest game of different participants in trade policy,another of which stems from the motive of social welfare.Under such circumstances,as an "Economic Man",the Government also maximize its own interests,the supply of anti-dumping policies is a response to domestic competitive interest groups' demand. Anti-dumping policy is the endogenous result of the balance bewteen the supply and demand from the policy winners and losers and the government's own preference.
Second,from an economic efficiency point of view,the anti-dumping policy is "second best".The aim of government's supply of anti-dumping policy is not to improve economic efficiency,but for the purpose of income distribution effects.The role of anti-dumping policy(or of the degree of protection for domestic industries)depends on the degree of substitution between their products and foreign ones and the degree of competition in the domestic market.
Third,the main demand of China's anti-dumping policy stem from the market competiton between the domestic the import-competing anti-dumping department and the foreign producers.Besides,the liquidity of input elements and the mobility of market transfer as well as the ability to express their interest will also have a significant impact on demand.
The supply of China's anti-dumping policy is also different from that in the western countries.It does not depend on the political donation and professional lobbying.Instead,it depends on the Chinese government's attention to the welfare of some specific interest groups.Because of information asymmetry,the Government's supply of anti-dumping policy may be tracted by some information the domestic producers offered.
Fourth,the enterprise differences in the specific industry affect the demand of China's anti-dumping policy.Only the difference among the enterprises is big enough, can it be possible for the large enterprises to lodge a anti-dumping application.At the same time,the government's limited rational judgements also affect the supply of China's anti-dumping policy.
Compared to the existing literature,the thesis has several exploratory studies:
First,using China's data on anti -dumping cases in 1997-2006,the thesis make an empirical test of China's anti -dumping policy and get some important conclusions.
Second,based on the analysis,the thesis prove that China's anti-dumping policy is endogenously determined.But it's different from democracy representative system which is influenced by political donation.China's anti-dumping policy is formed by the government's specific attention to the welfare of some specific interest groups.
Third,the government's anti-dumping trade policy is affected by its nonrationality. Restricted by information and the complex enviroment,the government can not make the optimal decision,so the government's anti-dumping trade policy decision is inevitably combined with something of non- rationality.
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