中国移动通信业价格竞争行为研究
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摘要
经济规律告诉我们,整个市场长期普遍存在某种经济特征的时候,问题肯定不是偶然发生的。市场作为一个过程,它是一个从一套错误价格到一套可相互调整的价格纠错过程。但任何事物的发展都有其合理的数量界限,价格竞争一旦越过这个合理界限,就会演变为过度价格竞争,甚至是低价倾销。那些经历了价格竞争的行业,其产品往往处于供求失衡的状况,行业中的大多数厂商处于亏损或亏损的边缘,某些行业甚至出现了全行业亏损。与此不同的是,中国移动通信行业价格竞争行为表现虽然异常激烈,但是该行业不仅需求依然旺盛而且利润率高昂,呈现出与其他行业价格竞争行为不同的特性。本文认为,作为众多专家、学者广泛关注的主要对象的中国移动通信业价格竞争行为,不能用简单的供给或需求约束或扩张理论进行解释,而是体现了多种不同因素综合作用的结果,蕴含着制度调节与市场选择并行的内在规律性,并不断地促进了有效市场秩序的形成。
根据Hayek理论,价格竞争是一个发现程序,是一种调整过程,竞争者根据自己的目标和所处的相关环境,在竞争中不断调整自己的行动计划,这种相互调整过程实现了竞争者之间以及竞争者和所处外部自然环境的协调。中国移动通信业中的价格竞争行为是在政府管制力量与市场经济主导条件下移动运营商之间不断博弈演化的产物,体现了行业去垄断化的具体实现路径,并揭示了其价格竞争行为成为一个由选择过程主导的内生性变化过程。在这一过程中各种不同因素共同作用的结果促进了中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的阶段性演化,并最终促进了行业的发展和有效竞争的形成。本文以中国移动通信业内的价格竞争行为作为主要研究对象,在相关文献梳理的基础上,提出了中国移动通信市场上价格竞争行为的阶段性演化和非合作博弈特性,进而提出了旨在分析中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的A(不对称管制)-R(经济租金)-T(转移成本)-D(产品差异化)分析框架,因而丰富和完善了中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的相关理论与实践研究。然后,在此框架的指导下,分别探讨了各个主要要素对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的作用机理。
本文首先通过实证与规范分析相结合的方法,证明了我国政府采取的不对称管制政策在一定条件下对中国移动通信市场中的价格竞争行为具有一定的促进作用,而这种促进作用机制则在于市场份额转移效应和效率增进效应。随着行业市场竞争的不断深化,这种不对称管制政策对价格竞争行为的影响还体现为产品的差异化效应。实践表明,我国政府采取的不对称管制政策在一定程度上达到了预期的目标,即促进了中国移动通信业市场结构的优化。由于不对称管制的非公允性,在中国移动与中国联通价格竞争的深入过程中,中国移动开始逐渐地绕开政府的不对称管制政策,因而该政策的有效性不断地弱化。这也表明,不对称管制作为一种非价格竞争机制,具有暂时性和动态性,应该随着市场环境的变化而做出相应的调整。同时本文认为,作为绕过不对称管制政策的小灵通的边缘性进入对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为也具有一定的促进作用。文中认为,小灵通的进入是对行业扩张需求中形成的超额利润的纠偏、是对行业中过高的资费价格的一种纠偏,因而促进了行业的价格资费水平向合理价格资费水平的回归,并认为小灵通的这种对行业价格竞争的促进机制是通过其进入纠错的功能得以实现的。
其次,采用规范分析和经验分析方法,建立了经济租金对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为影响的概念模型。研究认为,中国移动通信业起初积累的高额垄断租金在不对称管制政策的价格竞争触发机制作用下促进了行业价格博弈的形成。而这种降价博弈一经形成,它的既定方向又在以后的发展中得到了自我强化。但是,随着行业有效竞争程度的提高以及起初积累的高额垄断租金的耗散,移动通信运营商在随后的隐性价格和超价格竞争阶段中主要通过将熊彼特租金和李嘉图租金转化为新的市场力量所形成的垄断租金对中国移动通信业的价格竞争行为起着正向调节的作用,而且这种正向调整作用随着行业竞争程度的提高不断地弱化。研究表明,行业的技术创新及由其产生的熊彼特租金不是行业显性价格竞争阶段激烈价格竞争行为的主要原因；而在价格竞争的隐性阶段,行业的技术创新及其由创新所带来的熊彼特租金对中国移动通信市场上的价格竞争行为则具有一定的促进效应；而在超价格竞争阶段,价格竞争已经不是移动通信运营商之间竞争的主要手段,因而虽然熊彼特租金和李嘉图租金仍然会推动行业的均衡价格逐渐下降,但对行业价格竞争的正向调整作用开始弱化。
然后,基于博弈的分析方法,发现了转移成本的存在对中国移动通信业价格竞争不同发展阶段的价格竞争行为具有不同的作用机制：即转移成本对于显性价格竞争阶段的价格竞争行为表现为促进效应,而对隐性和超价格竞争阶段的价格竞争行为则表现为抑制效应。研究也发现,中国移动通信业中移动通信运营商的产品差异化行为具有缓和价格竞争的作用,而且转移成本和产品差异化结合在一起共同减弱了中国移动通信业的价格竞争行为的激烈程度。
最后,研究表明中国移动通信业运营商之间的价格竞争行为不仅促进了中国移动通信业市场结构优化,也提高了中国移动通信业的市场绩效。实证分析发现,中国移动通信业的市场结构优化对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的促进作用要大于中国移动通信业价格竞争行为对行业市场结构的优化作用。这也说明,我国政府对中国移动通信市场的强制性分拆与重组对于塑造有效竞争的中国移动通信市场结构具有积极的作用,而如果单纯地通过市场竞争机制的作用是不可能达到这样的效果的。文章最后的分析表明,随着中国电信市场的逐渐成熟,在全业务经营环境下,电信资费的价格水平最终会走向均衡,激烈的价格竞争行为不再是移动运营商之间竞争的主要手段,但是行业中的价格竞争行为不会消失,而会成为移动通信运营商之间的一种相机决择行为。因此,中国移动通信业未来的价格竞争模式将主要表现为以非价格竞争行为为主的长期性竞争行为,并主要表现为差异化服务创新机制中的价格竞争的一种相机抉择行为。然后在上述分析的基础上,总结了全文并给出了若干对策建议。
Economic principle tells us if some common and long-term economic features appear and exist in the whole market, it does not happen occasionally. Market, as a process, is an error-correcting process of the price from a set of wrong prices to a set of mutual adjusting prices. But the development of anything has its own reasonable limitation of quantity, the price competition will evolve into the over-price competition and even the price dumping if it transcends the reasonable limit. For those industries which have experienced the price competition, the most firms in these industries are at a loss or on the edge of loss and their products are often in the imbalance situation of supply and demand, especially, for some kind of industry, which even the whole industry appears to be in the condition of non-profit. However, although the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry is extremely fierce, the industry presents the complete different features characterized by the high demand and the great profit margin compared with those ones. So, the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry has always been the research project by most experts and scholars, for it cannot be simply explained by the theory of demand and supply. And the dissertation holds that it is the comprehensive result of many different factors, and it also embodies the inherent principle of both institutional adjustment and market selection which furthurly facilitates the effective market order.
According to the Hayek's theory that the price competition is a kind of seeking procedure and some sort of adjustment process where competitors will adjust their action plans continually by their own objectives and relevant environment in which the mutual adjustment process carries out the coordination among the competitors and between competitors and their outside natural environment. The price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry which is the game evolutive outcome between the governmental regulation force and the different firms under the condition of market economy, shows not only the practical path of de-monopolization but presents its endogenous changing process resulting from the domination of the selection process. During the whole process, all types of different factors function together to propel the stage evolution of the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication and finally to facilitate the industrial development and effective competition. Based on the relative literatures review, the dissertation considers the China's mobile communication industry as the main research objective and points out its characteristics of stage evolution and non-cooperative game, and then proposes the analytical framework of A (asymmetrical regulation)-R(rent)-T(transferable or switching costs)-D(product differentiation), which thereafter enriches and supplements the theoretical and practical study of the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry. Based on the analytical framework, then the dissertation delves into the influential mechanism of these fou rmain factors to the industrial price competition behavior respectively.
Firstly, by adopting the empirical method and canonical parse, the dissertation proves that the governmental policy of asymmetrical regulation has the promotion effect to the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry while this promotion mechanism lies in the effect of market share shifting and efficiency enhancement. Meanwhile, the policy of asymmetrical regulation also encourages the adoption of product differentiation strategy for the firmss in this industry. Therefore, the asymmetrical regulation adopted by our government has reached the expected aim to some degree, namely it promotes the optimization of the market structure of China's mobile communication industry. Owing to the unfair feature of the asymmetrical regulation, China Mobile begins to steer clear of this policy influence which leads to the weakness of the policy during the deepen competition of the price between China Mobile and China Unicom. It also shows that the asymmetrical regulation, as a sort of non-price competition mechanism, has the dynamic and short-term features and should be relatively adjusted with the changing of environment. Also included in this dissertation is the analysis of the fringe entry of "little smart" which scrubs round the face-to-face conflict with the policy of asymmetrical regulation and finally also promote the price competition behavior of this industry. The entry of "little smart" functions as the correction of over-profit and the higher price during the demand-enlarging in the industry which has resulted into the return of reasonable price. Therefore, the promotion mechanism of price competition behavior has carried out by the function of entry correction of the "little smart".
Next, the dissertation builds a conceptual modal about the influence of economic rent on the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry by adopting the method of canonical parse and experiential analysis. The research shows that the initial accumulated higher monopoly rent has enhanced the formation of price game in the industry under the function of the touching mechanism of asymmetrical regulation on the pricie competition behavior. Moreover, once this sort of price-lowering game has happened, its price-reducing orientation has self-enhanced in the later price competition. But, with the degree of effective competition improving and the dissipation of the initial accumulated higher monopoly rent, the firms'newly-generated monopoly rent has the positive adjustment function during the implicit and post-price competition stage which has transformed from the seeking of Schumpeter's and Richard's rent. And with the competition degree improving, this kind of positive function also continually weakens. In the implicit stage of price competition, the Schumpeter's rent generated by the technology innovation promotes the price competition, too. While in the stage of post-price competition, because the price competition has not become the main competitive means among firms, the promotion function of Schumpeter's and Richard's rent starts to be weaken, although it still brings the balance price going down in the industry.
Then, the dissertation expounds that the transferable or swiching costs in the industry have different functions in the different developmental stage of price competition based on the game method:transferable costs have enhanced the degree of price competition behavior in the explicit stage of price competition; while it holds down the degree of price competition in the stage of implicit and post-price competition. The behavior of product differentiation adopted by these two firms also has promoted the price competition of China's mobile communication industry. Moreover, the transferable costs and the product differentiation have combined to hold down the fierce degree of price competition of China's mobile communication industry.
Finally, the dissertation holds that the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry has not only promoted the optimization of market structure, but also has improved the market performance. Based on the empirical method, the dissertation proves that the promotion function of the market structure optimization to the price competition of the mobile communication industry is more than the one of the price competition to the market structure optimization of the mobile communication industry. It also proves that the policy of our governmental de-consolidation and re-organization has the positive function to build the effective competitive market structure of China's mobile communication industry because this kind of result has not come true by the simple market operational mechanism. Therefore, with the continual maturation of the telecommunication market, this dissertation discusses that the price level of telecommunication service will approach to the average balance and the price competition is not the main competitive way, but the price competition will not disappear and has become the contingent selection under the condition of the whole service operation. The competition of the mobile communication firms will mainly take the form of non-price competition behavior and differentiation competition will become the long-term competitive behavior among the China's mobile communication firms. Then the general conclusions are pointed out based on the above analysis and also some countermeasures or suggestions are made.
根据Hayek理论,价格竞争是一个发现程序,是一种调整过程,竞争者根据自己的目标和所处的相关环境,在竞争中不断调整自己的行动计划,这种相互调整过程实现了竞争者之间以及竞争者和所处外部自然环境的协调。中国移动通信业中的价格竞争行为是在政府管制力量与市场经济主导条件下移动运营商之间不断博弈演化的产物,体现了行业去垄断化的具体实现路径,并揭示了其价格竞争行为成为一个由选择过程主导的内生性变化过程。在这一过程中各种不同因素共同作用的结果促进了中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的阶段性演化,并最终促进了行业的发展和有效竞争的形成。本文以中国移动通信业内的价格竞争行为作为主要研究对象,在相关文献梳理的基础上,提出了中国移动通信市场上价格竞争行为的阶段性演化和非合作博弈特性,进而提出了旨在分析中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的A(不对称管制)-R(经济租金)-T(转移成本)-D(产品差异化)分析框架,因而丰富和完善了中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的相关理论与实践研究。然后,在此框架的指导下,分别探讨了各个主要要素对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的作用机理。
本文首先通过实证与规范分析相结合的方法,证明了我国政府采取的不对称管制政策在一定条件下对中国移动通信市场中的价格竞争行为具有一定的促进作用,而这种促进作用机制则在于市场份额转移效应和效率增进效应。随着行业市场竞争的不断深化,这种不对称管制政策对价格竞争行为的影响还体现为产品的差异化效应。实践表明,我国政府采取的不对称管制政策在一定程度上达到了预期的目标,即促进了中国移动通信业市场结构的优化。由于不对称管制的非公允性,在中国移动与中国联通价格竞争的深入过程中,中国移动开始逐渐地绕开政府的不对称管制政策,因而该政策的有效性不断地弱化。这也表明,不对称管制作为一种非价格竞争机制,具有暂时性和动态性,应该随着市场环境的变化而做出相应的调整。同时本文认为,作为绕过不对称管制政策的小灵通的边缘性进入对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为也具有一定的促进作用。文中认为,小灵通的进入是对行业扩张需求中形成的超额利润的纠偏、是对行业中过高的资费价格的一种纠偏,因而促进了行业的价格资费水平向合理价格资费水平的回归,并认为小灵通的这种对行业价格竞争的促进机制是通过其进入纠错的功能得以实现的。
其次,采用规范分析和经验分析方法,建立了经济租金对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为影响的概念模型。研究认为,中国移动通信业起初积累的高额垄断租金在不对称管制政策的价格竞争触发机制作用下促进了行业价格博弈的形成。而这种降价博弈一经形成,它的既定方向又在以后的发展中得到了自我强化。但是,随着行业有效竞争程度的提高以及起初积累的高额垄断租金的耗散,移动通信运营商在随后的隐性价格和超价格竞争阶段中主要通过将熊彼特租金和李嘉图租金转化为新的市场力量所形成的垄断租金对中国移动通信业的价格竞争行为起着正向调节的作用,而且这种正向调整作用随着行业竞争程度的提高不断地弱化。研究表明,行业的技术创新及由其产生的熊彼特租金不是行业显性价格竞争阶段激烈价格竞争行为的主要原因；而在价格竞争的隐性阶段,行业的技术创新及其由创新所带来的熊彼特租金对中国移动通信市场上的价格竞争行为则具有一定的促进效应；而在超价格竞争阶段,价格竞争已经不是移动通信运营商之间竞争的主要手段,因而虽然熊彼特租金和李嘉图租金仍然会推动行业的均衡价格逐渐下降,但对行业价格竞争的正向调整作用开始弱化。
然后,基于博弈的分析方法,发现了转移成本的存在对中国移动通信业价格竞争不同发展阶段的价格竞争行为具有不同的作用机制：即转移成本对于显性价格竞争阶段的价格竞争行为表现为促进效应,而对隐性和超价格竞争阶段的价格竞争行为则表现为抑制效应。研究也发现,中国移动通信业中移动通信运营商的产品差异化行为具有缓和价格竞争的作用,而且转移成本和产品差异化结合在一起共同减弱了中国移动通信业的价格竞争行为的激烈程度。
最后,研究表明中国移动通信业运营商之间的价格竞争行为不仅促进了中国移动通信业市场结构优化,也提高了中国移动通信业的市场绩效。实证分析发现,中国移动通信业的市场结构优化对中国移动通信业价格竞争行为的促进作用要大于中国移动通信业价格竞争行为对行业市场结构的优化作用。这也说明,我国政府对中国移动通信市场的强制性分拆与重组对于塑造有效竞争的中国移动通信市场结构具有积极的作用,而如果单纯地通过市场竞争机制的作用是不可能达到这样的效果的。文章最后的分析表明,随着中国电信市场的逐渐成熟,在全业务经营环境下,电信资费的价格水平最终会走向均衡,激烈的价格竞争行为不再是移动运营商之间竞争的主要手段,但是行业中的价格竞争行为不会消失,而会成为移动通信运营商之间的一种相机决择行为。因此,中国移动通信业未来的价格竞争模式将主要表现为以非价格竞争行为为主的长期性竞争行为,并主要表现为差异化服务创新机制中的价格竞争的一种相机抉择行为。然后在上述分析的基础上,总结了全文并给出了若干对策建议。
Economic principle tells us if some common and long-term economic features appear and exist in the whole market, it does not happen occasionally. Market, as a process, is an error-correcting process of the price from a set of wrong prices to a set of mutual adjusting prices. But the development of anything has its own reasonable limitation of quantity, the price competition will evolve into the over-price competition and even the price dumping if it transcends the reasonable limit. For those industries which have experienced the price competition, the most firms in these industries are at a loss or on the edge of loss and their products are often in the imbalance situation of supply and demand, especially, for some kind of industry, which even the whole industry appears to be in the condition of non-profit. However, although the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry is extremely fierce, the industry presents the complete different features characterized by the high demand and the great profit margin compared with those ones. So, the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry has always been the research project by most experts and scholars, for it cannot be simply explained by the theory of demand and supply. And the dissertation holds that it is the comprehensive result of many different factors, and it also embodies the inherent principle of both institutional adjustment and market selection which furthurly facilitates the effective market order.
According to the Hayek's theory that the price competition is a kind of seeking procedure and some sort of adjustment process where competitors will adjust their action plans continually by their own objectives and relevant environment in which the mutual adjustment process carries out the coordination among the competitors and between competitors and their outside natural environment. The price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry which is the game evolutive outcome between the governmental regulation force and the different firms under the condition of market economy, shows not only the practical path of de-monopolization but presents its endogenous changing process resulting from the domination of the selection process. During the whole process, all types of different factors function together to propel the stage evolution of the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication and finally to facilitate the industrial development and effective competition. Based on the relative literatures review, the dissertation considers the China's mobile communication industry as the main research objective and points out its characteristics of stage evolution and non-cooperative game, and then proposes the analytical framework of A (asymmetrical regulation)-R(rent)-T(transferable or switching costs)-D(product differentiation), which thereafter enriches and supplements the theoretical and practical study of the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry. Based on the analytical framework, then the dissertation delves into the influential mechanism of these fou rmain factors to the industrial price competition behavior respectively.
Firstly, by adopting the empirical method and canonical parse, the dissertation proves that the governmental policy of asymmetrical regulation has the promotion effect to the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry while this promotion mechanism lies in the effect of market share shifting and efficiency enhancement. Meanwhile, the policy of asymmetrical regulation also encourages the adoption of product differentiation strategy for the firmss in this industry. Therefore, the asymmetrical regulation adopted by our government has reached the expected aim to some degree, namely it promotes the optimization of the market structure of China's mobile communication industry. Owing to the unfair feature of the asymmetrical regulation, China Mobile begins to steer clear of this policy influence which leads to the weakness of the policy during the deepen competition of the price between China Mobile and China Unicom. It also shows that the asymmetrical regulation, as a sort of non-price competition mechanism, has the dynamic and short-term features and should be relatively adjusted with the changing of environment. Also included in this dissertation is the analysis of the fringe entry of "little smart" which scrubs round the face-to-face conflict with the policy of asymmetrical regulation and finally also promote the price competition behavior of this industry. The entry of "little smart" functions as the correction of over-profit and the higher price during the demand-enlarging in the industry which has resulted into the return of reasonable price. Therefore, the promotion mechanism of price competition behavior has carried out by the function of entry correction of the "little smart".
Next, the dissertation builds a conceptual modal about the influence of economic rent on the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry by adopting the method of canonical parse and experiential analysis. The research shows that the initial accumulated higher monopoly rent has enhanced the formation of price game in the industry under the function of the touching mechanism of asymmetrical regulation on the pricie competition behavior. Moreover, once this sort of price-lowering game has happened, its price-reducing orientation has self-enhanced in the later price competition. But, with the degree of effective competition improving and the dissipation of the initial accumulated higher monopoly rent, the firms'newly-generated monopoly rent has the positive adjustment function during the implicit and post-price competition stage which has transformed from the seeking of Schumpeter's and Richard's rent. And with the competition degree improving, this kind of positive function also continually weakens. In the implicit stage of price competition, the Schumpeter's rent generated by the technology innovation promotes the price competition, too. While in the stage of post-price competition, because the price competition has not become the main competitive means among firms, the promotion function of Schumpeter's and Richard's rent starts to be weaken, although it still brings the balance price going down in the industry.
Then, the dissertation expounds that the transferable or swiching costs in the industry have different functions in the different developmental stage of price competition based on the game method:transferable costs have enhanced the degree of price competition behavior in the explicit stage of price competition; while it holds down the degree of price competition in the stage of implicit and post-price competition. The behavior of product differentiation adopted by these two firms also has promoted the price competition of China's mobile communication industry. Moreover, the transferable costs and the product differentiation have combined to hold down the fierce degree of price competition of China's mobile communication industry.
Finally, the dissertation holds that the price competition behavior of China's mobile communication industry has not only promoted the optimization of market structure, but also has improved the market performance. Based on the empirical method, the dissertation proves that the promotion function of the market structure optimization to the price competition of the mobile communication industry is more than the one of the price competition to the market structure optimization of the mobile communication industry. It also proves that the policy of our governmental de-consolidation and re-organization has the positive function to build the effective competitive market structure of China's mobile communication industry because this kind of result has not come true by the simple market operational mechanism. Therefore, with the continual maturation of the telecommunication market, this dissertation discusses that the price level of telecommunication service will approach to the average balance and the price competition is not the main competitive way, but the price competition will not disappear and has become the contingent selection under the condition of the whole service operation. The competition of the mobile communication firms will mainly take the form of non-price competition behavior and differentiation competition will become the long-term competitive behavior among the China's mobile communication firms. Then the general conclusions are pointed out based on the above analysis and also some countermeasures or suggestions are made.
引文
①有许多专家、学者秉持对中国移动通信业双寡头市场结构的判断：如唐晓华,苏梅梅(2003)；林琨,陈昌伟(2005)；李华威,杨舟(2005)；等等。
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①李何(2009)也认为我国电信业中的价格竞争行为主要是一种非合作的策略性行为。
Labs.chianamobile.com/mblog/m_575_201103;filiang.blog.hexum.com/44136020_d.html
①关于HHI和移动资费价格水平之间关系的研究结果不尽相同：如Lyons(2005)估计了一个固定效应模型,发现HHI对移动电话服务的价格没有显著的影响;而Hazlett和Munoz(2004)同样采用每分钟的平均收入作为价格的代理变量,得出的结论是HHI对电信服务价格有显著的影响。
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①叶泽,周真,常彩虹.我国移动通信业竞争模型及其策略[J].中国工业经济,2008,11：45-55.
①李何(2009)也认为我国电信业中的价格竞争行为主要是一种非合作的策略性行为。
Labs.chianamobile.com/mblog/m_575_201103;filiang.blog.hexum.com/44136020_d.html
①关于HHI和移动资费价格水平之间关系的研究结果不尽相同：如Lyons(2005)估计了一个固定效应模型,发现HHI对移动电话服务的价格没有显著的影响;而Hazlett和Munoz(2004)同样采用每分钟的平均收入作为价格的代理变量,得出的结论是HHI对电信服务价格有显著的影响。
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