基于所有权视角的上市公司盈余管理：程度、动机与制约因素研究
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摘要
盈余管理是上市公司中普遍存在的一种经济现象,是财务会计一个重要的研究领域,其直接会影响财务报告中会计盈余数字的准确性,进而会对资本市场资源配置效率产生影响,盈余管理现象有可能永远不会消失。关于盈余管理问题,国内外学术界进行了大量研究,但更多是围绕盈余管理的动机、手段和研究方法,较少从盈余管理程度这一角度进行研究。另外,我国特殊国情决定了国有上市公司与非国有上市公司并存,国有上市公司在资本市场上占主导地位,而已有研究往往忽视了不同所有权性质上市公司盈余管理程度间可能存在的系统性差异问题,正是在这一问题研究上的不足,吸引笔者以此作为研究对象,将盈余管理程度与上市公司所有权性质结合其来,考察不同所有权性质上市公司盈余管理程度间是否存在系统性差异及其影响因素。
在我国,盈余管理行为已经成为上市公司的普遍现象,而上市公司的所有权性质不同,会对公司治理机制、经营目标及决策产生深刻影响,进一步会影响到上市公司的盈余管理动机、盈余管理手段和盈余管理程度,甚至会造成系统性的差异。在对盈余管理程度及其影响因素问题进行研究时,应该考虑到国有上市公司与非国有上市公司并存的特殊国情,如果将不同所有权性质上市公司混为一谈进行研究,可能导致研究结论不准确甚至存在错误。而从所有权性质视角对上市公司盈余管理程度及其影响因素进行深入分析,对会计与证券监管政策的制定、加强对上市公司盈余管理行为的制约、提高会计盈余信息质量、改善公司治理效率有重要的理论价值和现实意义。
本文以代理理论和契约理论为基础,结合规范研究与实证研究的方法,对不同所有权性质上市公司盈余管理程度间是否存在系统性差异及差异的影响因素进行研究。为了重点考察2006年新会计准则颁布后的市场变化情况,以国泰安数据库和锐思数据库提供的2007年到2009年4000余个样本为基础,首先,对目前研究中最为常用的四种应计利润分离模型揭示盈余管理效力的能力进行了检验；然后,在此结论基础上利用修正Jones模型和盈余分布法进一步考察了不同所有权性质上市公司盈余管理间的系统性差异；再次,基于国有上市公司与非国有上市公司盈余管理程度间确实存在系统性差异的结论,分别使用因子分析法、多元回归法、逐步回归法进一步考察了两样本组盈余管理程度影响因素间存在哪些异同之处；最后,基于所有权性质视角对我国上市公司盈余管理程度研究提出相关建议。
本文主要研究结论如下：
1.修正Jones模型在我国设定较优。基于2006年《企业会计准则》颁布后的资本市场数据,对基本Jones模型、修正Jones模型、业绩匹配Jones模型和非线性Jones模型四种研究中最为常用的应计利润分离模型效力检验后发现：无论是综合样本估计还是分行业估计,四种模型的拟合性都较好,但业绩匹配Jones模型和非线性Jones模型的拟合性更高；分年度、分行业对模型估计的效果要优于综合样本估计；操控性应计利润的盈余持续性检验说明四种模型揭示盈余管理的能力都是有效的；二项检验结果显示,基本Jones模型、业绩匹配Jones模型和非线性Jones模型犯第一类错误的频率较高,容易夸大盈余管理。综合比较而言,在中国资本市场,修正Jones模型设定较优。
2.不同所有权性质上市公司间盈余管理程度存在系统性差异。均值比较、单变量回归和独立性T检验结果均显示：非国有上市公司与国有上市公司间盈余管理程度确实存在系统性差异,无论是正向盈余管理、负向盈余管理还是盈余管理的程度,非国有上市公司的操控性应计利润都显著高于国有上市公司的操控性应计利润。针对盈余管理微利动机的盈余分布法检验结果表明：非国有上市公司要比国有上市公司在净资产收益率微利区间出现的频率更高,非国有上市公司盈余管理程度要比国有上市公司盈余管理程度更为严重。因此,对我国上市公司盈余管理程度分析时应考虑所有权性质因素。
3.整体而言,作为制约因素的公司治理对上市公司盈余管理程度的制约作用不显著,而作为激励因素的各种盈余管理动机对盈余管理程度的激励作用非常显著。首先,将我国上市公司盈余管理程度的影响因素划分为激励因素和制约因素,并分别建立相应的指标体系；然后,基于因子分析法,对我国上市公司盈余管理程度的两大类影响因素指标体系进行量化处理：最后,建立多元线性回归模型,对盈余管理程度与这两大类影响因素的关系进行比较研究。分组研究结果表明：整体而言,无论是国有上市公司还是非国有上市公司,制约因素与盈余管理程度间关系均不显著,而激励因素对盈余管理程度的影响均显著。意味着在目前的制度环境和市场环境下,公司治理对盈余管理程度的制约作用仍然较弱,而各种常见盈余管理动机对盈余管理的激励作用非常显著。
4.多元回归模型和逐步回归法的具体分析表明,国有上市公司与非国有上市公司盈余管理程度影响因素间存在一定的差异。分组研究发现,两样本组盈余管理程度影响因素间存在一些相同之处：盈余管理动机对盈余管理程度的激励作用要比公司治理对盈余管理的制约作用更为显著；第一大股东持股比例与盈余管理程度间显著正相关；而注册会计师的审计意见与盈余管理程度间显著负向关。整体而言,无论公司内部治理机制还是公司外部治理机制都没有发挥对盈余管理程度的遏制作用,董事会没有发挥监督作用,而监事会流于形式。但国有上市公司与非国有上市公司二者间盈余管理程度影响因素也存在一些差异：非国有上市公司股权激励对经理人的盈余管理程度起到了制约作用,而国有上市公司却表现出为实现薪酬契约而进行盈余管理的动机；对于非国有上市公司盈余管理程度,IPO动机影响力最大,而国有上市公司的大清洗动机、平滑利润动机对盈余管理程度影响力最大,IPO动机与盈余管理程度间关系并不显著；与以往研究不同,国有上市公司出现了盈余管理的政治成本动机和债务契约动机,国有上市公司规模与盈余管理程度正相关,国有上市公司负债比例与盈余管理程度显著正相关,地方政府干预度越低,国有上市公司的盈余管理程度就越低,而对于非国有样本组,并没有得出这些结论。
针对本文的理论分析和实证研究结果,提出以下研究建议：第一,在我国,利用应计利润分离模型对盈余管理进行研究时建议使用修正Jones模型。第二,应继续完善会计准则的制定,在制定针对盈余管理的会计和证券监管政策时,要考虑到所有权性质的不同,有针对性的制定会计和证券监管政策,而不能搞“一刀切”。第三,面对我国公司治理对盈余管理制约作用弱化的问题,应继续完善公司治理机制的建设,改善公司内部治理机制和公司外部治理机制。
本文的创新之处体现在以下几个方面：
1.使用2007年到2009年连续三年的大样本数据,首次对2006年《企业会计准则》颁布后应计利润分离模型在我国资本市场上的效力进行检验,并得到了修正Jones模型设定更优的结论。
2.在考察国有上市公司与非国有上市公司盈余管理程度间所存在的系统性差异时,不仅使用了传统的修正Jones模型针对应计利润进行了检验,还首次引入了盈余分布法从整体上进行了检验。
3.对盈余管理程度影响因素变量选取较为全面,选取制约因素变量时除了考虑到公司内部治理变量外,还引入了公司外部治理变量,选取激励因素变量时充分考虑中国特色的盈余管理动机。
4.对我国上市公司盈余管理程度影响因素研究时,已有研究选取的盈余管理程度影响因素变量较少,忽视了整体性研究,本文选择将盈余管理程度影响因素划分成制约因素和激励因素两大类,首次引入因子分析法分类对该问题进行了整体性研究。
5.对上市公司盈余管理程度影响因素作逐项、具体分析时,除了按传统研究思路构建多元回归模型外,还借鉴了逐步回归法的思想,试图找出对盈余管理程度影响更为重要的变量,并对各变量的相对重要性进行了排序。
Earnings management is a listed company generally exists in an economic phenomenon, financial accounting is an important research field, its directly affect financial report accountancy surplus digital accuracy, then will the resources allocation efficiency of capital market effect, earnings management phenomenon may never disappears. Of earnings management problems, academe has carried out extensive research, but more is around this surplus management motivation, means and research methods, less earnings management degree from this Angle is studied, in addition, China special reality determines the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies coexist, the state-owned listed companies in the capital market dominant, just have different research often ignored the proprietary nature of the listed company earnings management degree between the systematic differences may exist problems, it is in this problem in the study of insufficient, attract the author regards the research question, will earnings management level and a listed company, combining with its proprietary nature spectrums of the different proprietary nature of earnings management degree between the listed company whether systematic difference and its influencing factors.
In our country, the surplus management behavior has become a public company listed on the common phenomenon, the ownership of the listed companies of different nature, corporate governance, business objectives and decision may have a profound effect, and the impact on listed companies'earnings management motivation, surplus management means and earnings management at different levels, and even exist systematic differences. On earnings management level and its influencing factors was studied, should consider to state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies the special conditions, if coexisting will different proprietary nature of listed companies are studied, and may lead to confuse the research conclusion inaccurate or error, and from the perspective of the listed company proprietary nature of earnings management level and its influencing factors is analysed and targeted formulate policies, strengthen accounting supervision of listed company earnings management behavior of restriction, improving accounting information quality, improve corporate earnings management efficiency has important theoretic value and practical significance.
Based on the agency theory and contract theory as the starting point, combined with standard and empirical method for different proprietary nature of earnings management degree between the listed company whether systematic difference and its influencing factors were studied. In order to emphasize new accounting standards promulgated after the variation during 2006, so CSMAR database and RESSET database can provide 4000 data samples based on the present research from 2007 to 2009, the first is the most commonly used four accruals separation model reveals earnings management effectiveness for inspection, and on this conclusion based on modified Jones model and surplus distribution method further investigated different proprietary nature of the listed company earnings management, based on the systematic differences between state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company earnings management level systematic difference between the conclusion based on factor analysis, respectively, using multiple regression method and stepwise regression method and further investigation of state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company earnings management degree between affecting factors exist what similarities and differences, finally, based on proprietary nature view of China's listed firms earnings management level research related Suggestions.
In this paper the main research conclusions are as follows:
1.The modified model set more optimal Jones. Based on the new guidelines promulgated after the capital market data during 2006, to basic Jones model, after correction Jones model, performance matching Jones models and nonlinear Jones model four study is most commonly used the accruals separation model validity after testing found:whether comprehensive sample estimate or chat estimates, four kinds of model fitting sex are better, but performance matching Jones models and nonlinear Jones show the performance of the model is more outstanding, Divide year, propose to model estimation superior to the effect of comprehensive sample estimate; Playability accruals surplus persistent inspection instruction four model reveals earnings management ability are effective, Test results showed that two items of basic Jones model, performance matching Jones models and nonlinear Jones model made the first kind of wrong frequency is higher, easy to exaggerate earnings management. Comprehensive comparison, in the Chinese capital market, fixed Jones model has a better set.
2. Different proprietary nature of the listed company earnings management degree between systematic difference. Mean comparison, single variable regression and independent T test results showed:non-state-owned listed companies and state-owned listed companies between earnings management really systematic difference, whether positive earnings management, negative earnings management or the degree of earnings management, non-state-owned listed company of manipulative accruals are significantly higher than that of state-owned listed companies of manipulative accruals, Aiming at the now-defunct earnings management motivation surplus distribution method inspection results show:non-state-owned listed companies than state-owned listed companies in the now-defunct interval appear net assets yield higher frequencies, non-state-owned listed company earnings management degree than state-owned listed companies is more serious. Therefore, listed companies on China's earnings management level research should be considered proprietary nature factor.
3. Overall, as restriction factors of corporate governance of listed company earnings management degree of restriction role was not significant, but as incentive factors of all sorts of earnings management motivation of earnings management degree of incentive effect is remarkable. First will be listed companies in China earnings management degree of influence factors differentiate for incentive factors and constraints, and established respectively corresponding indicators system, and then using factor analysis, listed companies on China's earnings management level two major types of the evaluation index system of influencing factors are measured, finally establishing linear multivariate regression models, listed companies on China's earnings management level and the two kinds of relationships and influence factors comparison group study results show that the overall, for state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company, restrictive factors and earnings management level relationship between are not significant, and incentive factors to influence of earnings management degree is remarkable, explains that the current system environment and market environment, corporate governance of earnings management degree of restriction role still weak, and all kinds of common earnings management motivation of earnings management incentive effect is very significant.
4.the multiple regression model and stepwise regression analysis of the specific show that state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company earnings management degree between affecting factors exist certain differences. State-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company has some common:earnings management motivation of earnings management incentive effect than corporate governance of earnings management is more significant role in the constraints, In addition to share ratio of the largest shareholder and earnings management degree is poured u-shaped relation, certified public accountants audit on earnings management degree can be an effective restriction role outside, overall, whether the internal management mechanism or exterior governance mechanism is not play on earnings management degree of restricting effects, the board did not develop supervisory role, and the board of supervisors formalism. But state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies between them, there exist some differences:non-state-owned listed company management equity incentives on earnings management played the restriction role, and the state-owned listed companies acted for realizing the compensation contracts and earnings management, Non-state-owned listed companies on earnings management IPO motivation in the effect of all variables of the most important, and the state-owned listed companies large cleaning motive and smooth profit motive of earnings management effect is more important, motivation of IPO earnings management influence is not large, The government in transforming the reform of the relationship between government and enterprises obtained some achievements, the government's intervention degrees lower, and the state-owned listed companies'earnings management degree will be lower, and the state-owned listed companies scale is bigger, avoid political supervision motive is stronger, Bank of state-owned listed companies the ability but also in debt constraint enhanced, and the state-owned listed companies asset-liability ratio, the higher the degree of earnings management test-drink.
According to the theoretical and empirical study results, put forward the following Suggestions:first, the research in our country, using separate accruals models of earnings management studies suggest using a modified Jones model. Second, shall continue to improve the accounting standards in developing the formulation of earnings management accounting supervision policy, to consider the proprietary nature of different, targeted developing accounting supervision policies, and cannot do "one size fits all". Third, facing the corporate governance of listed companies in the restriction role of the weakening of earnings management problems, we should continue to improve corporate governance mechanism of construction and improve the internal management mechanism and exterior governance mechanism.
The innovation of this paper place reflects in the following aspects:
1. Use three successive years of large sample data from 2007 to 2009, for the first time in 2006 new accounting standards promulgated after accruals separation model in China's capital market on the validity of the inspection, and has been fixed Jones model set more optimal conclusion.
2. In examining the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies between earnings management degree between the systematic differences exist not only use the traditional correction for accruals Jones model is verified, first introduced from overall surplus distribution method was verified.
3. On earnings management level influence factors variables selection, comprehensive selection factors restricting variables in addition to consider the internal management variable outside, also introduced exterior governance variables, the selection of incentive factors variable selection when fully consider Chinese characteristics of earnings management motivation.
4. On the listed company earnings management degree study factors, taking into account the existing research often only for one or a few items listed company earnings management level influence factors of study, will influence factors into the restricting factors and incentive factors two categories, first introduced factor analysis classification about this problem entire study.
5. On the listed company earnings management impact factors for item by item, specific analysis, besides the traditional research approach build multivariate regression model outside, still using for reference the stepwise regression thoughts, for the first time to the degree of earnings management specific influence factors of the relative importance of put in order.
在我国,盈余管理行为已经成为上市公司的普遍现象,而上市公司的所有权性质不同,会对公司治理机制、经营目标及决策产生深刻影响,进一步会影响到上市公司的盈余管理动机、盈余管理手段和盈余管理程度,甚至会造成系统性的差异。在对盈余管理程度及其影响因素问题进行研究时,应该考虑到国有上市公司与非国有上市公司并存的特殊国情,如果将不同所有权性质上市公司混为一谈进行研究,可能导致研究结论不准确甚至存在错误。而从所有权性质视角对上市公司盈余管理程度及其影响因素进行深入分析,对会计与证券监管政策的制定、加强对上市公司盈余管理行为的制约、提高会计盈余信息质量、改善公司治理效率有重要的理论价值和现实意义。
本文以代理理论和契约理论为基础,结合规范研究与实证研究的方法,对不同所有权性质上市公司盈余管理程度间是否存在系统性差异及差异的影响因素进行研究。为了重点考察2006年新会计准则颁布后的市场变化情况,以国泰安数据库和锐思数据库提供的2007年到2009年4000余个样本为基础,首先,对目前研究中最为常用的四种应计利润分离模型揭示盈余管理效力的能力进行了检验；然后,在此结论基础上利用修正Jones模型和盈余分布法进一步考察了不同所有权性质上市公司盈余管理间的系统性差异；再次,基于国有上市公司与非国有上市公司盈余管理程度间确实存在系统性差异的结论,分别使用因子分析法、多元回归法、逐步回归法进一步考察了两样本组盈余管理程度影响因素间存在哪些异同之处；最后,基于所有权性质视角对我国上市公司盈余管理程度研究提出相关建议。
本文主要研究结论如下：
1.修正Jones模型在我国设定较优。基于2006年《企业会计准则》颁布后的资本市场数据,对基本Jones模型、修正Jones模型、业绩匹配Jones模型和非线性Jones模型四种研究中最为常用的应计利润分离模型效力检验后发现：无论是综合样本估计还是分行业估计,四种模型的拟合性都较好,但业绩匹配Jones模型和非线性Jones模型的拟合性更高；分年度、分行业对模型估计的效果要优于综合样本估计；操控性应计利润的盈余持续性检验说明四种模型揭示盈余管理的能力都是有效的；二项检验结果显示,基本Jones模型、业绩匹配Jones模型和非线性Jones模型犯第一类错误的频率较高,容易夸大盈余管理。综合比较而言,在中国资本市场,修正Jones模型设定较优。
2.不同所有权性质上市公司间盈余管理程度存在系统性差异。均值比较、单变量回归和独立性T检验结果均显示：非国有上市公司与国有上市公司间盈余管理程度确实存在系统性差异,无论是正向盈余管理、负向盈余管理还是盈余管理的程度,非国有上市公司的操控性应计利润都显著高于国有上市公司的操控性应计利润。针对盈余管理微利动机的盈余分布法检验结果表明：非国有上市公司要比国有上市公司在净资产收益率微利区间出现的频率更高,非国有上市公司盈余管理程度要比国有上市公司盈余管理程度更为严重。因此,对我国上市公司盈余管理程度分析时应考虑所有权性质因素。
3.整体而言,作为制约因素的公司治理对上市公司盈余管理程度的制约作用不显著,而作为激励因素的各种盈余管理动机对盈余管理程度的激励作用非常显著。首先,将我国上市公司盈余管理程度的影响因素划分为激励因素和制约因素,并分别建立相应的指标体系；然后,基于因子分析法,对我国上市公司盈余管理程度的两大类影响因素指标体系进行量化处理：最后,建立多元线性回归模型,对盈余管理程度与这两大类影响因素的关系进行比较研究。分组研究结果表明：整体而言,无论是国有上市公司还是非国有上市公司,制约因素与盈余管理程度间关系均不显著,而激励因素对盈余管理程度的影响均显著。意味着在目前的制度环境和市场环境下,公司治理对盈余管理程度的制约作用仍然较弱,而各种常见盈余管理动机对盈余管理的激励作用非常显著。
4.多元回归模型和逐步回归法的具体分析表明,国有上市公司与非国有上市公司盈余管理程度影响因素间存在一定的差异。分组研究发现,两样本组盈余管理程度影响因素间存在一些相同之处：盈余管理动机对盈余管理程度的激励作用要比公司治理对盈余管理的制约作用更为显著；第一大股东持股比例与盈余管理程度间显著正相关；而注册会计师的审计意见与盈余管理程度间显著负向关。整体而言,无论公司内部治理机制还是公司外部治理机制都没有发挥对盈余管理程度的遏制作用,董事会没有发挥监督作用,而监事会流于形式。但国有上市公司与非国有上市公司二者间盈余管理程度影响因素也存在一些差异：非国有上市公司股权激励对经理人的盈余管理程度起到了制约作用,而国有上市公司却表现出为实现薪酬契约而进行盈余管理的动机；对于非国有上市公司盈余管理程度,IPO动机影响力最大,而国有上市公司的大清洗动机、平滑利润动机对盈余管理程度影响力最大,IPO动机与盈余管理程度间关系并不显著；与以往研究不同,国有上市公司出现了盈余管理的政治成本动机和债务契约动机,国有上市公司规模与盈余管理程度正相关,国有上市公司负债比例与盈余管理程度显著正相关,地方政府干预度越低,国有上市公司的盈余管理程度就越低,而对于非国有样本组,并没有得出这些结论。
针对本文的理论分析和实证研究结果,提出以下研究建议：第一,在我国,利用应计利润分离模型对盈余管理进行研究时建议使用修正Jones模型。第二,应继续完善会计准则的制定,在制定针对盈余管理的会计和证券监管政策时,要考虑到所有权性质的不同,有针对性的制定会计和证券监管政策,而不能搞“一刀切”。第三,面对我国公司治理对盈余管理制约作用弱化的问题,应继续完善公司治理机制的建设,改善公司内部治理机制和公司外部治理机制。
本文的创新之处体现在以下几个方面：
1.使用2007年到2009年连续三年的大样本数据,首次对2006年《企业会计准则》颁布后应计利润分离模型在我国资本市场上的效力进行检验,并得到了修正Jones模型设定更优的结论。
2.在考察国有上市公司与非国有上市公司盈余管理程度间所存在的系统性差异时,不仅使用了传统的修正Jones模型针对应计利润进行了检验,还首次引入了盈余分布法从整体上进行了检验。
3.对盈余管理程度影响因素变量选取较为全面,选取制约因素变量时除了考虑到公司内部治理变量外,还引入了公司外部治理变量,选取激励因素变量时充分考虑中国特色的盈余管理动机。
4.对我国上市公司盈余管理程度影响因素研究时,已有研究选取的盈余管理程度影响因素变量较少,忽视了整体性研究,本文选择将盈余管理程度影响因素划分成制约因素和激励因素两大类,首次引入因子分析法分类对该问题进行了整体性研究。
5.对上市公司盈余管理程度影响因素作逐项、具体分析时,除了按传统研究思路构建多元回归模型外,还借鉴了逐步回归法的思想,试图找出对盈余管理程度影响更为重要的变量,并对各变量的相对重要性进行了排序。
Earnings management is a listed company generally exists in an economic phenomenon, financial accounting is an important research field, its directly affect financial report accountancy surplus digital accuracy, then will the resources allocation efficiency of capital market effect, earnings management phenomenon may never disappears. Of earnings management problems, academe has carried out extensive research, but more is around this surplus management motivation, means and research methods, less earnings management degree from this Angle is studied, in addition, China special reality determines the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies coexist, the state-owned listed companies in the capital market dominant, just have different research often ignored the proprietary nature of the listed company earnings management degree between the systematic differences may exist problems, it is in this problem in the study of insufficient, attract the author regards the research question, will earnings management level and a listed company, combining with its proprietary nature spectrums of the different proprietary nature of earnings management degree between the listed company whether systematic difference and its influencing factors.
In our country, the surplus management behavior has become a public company listed on the common phenomenon, the ownership of the listed companies of different nature, corporate governance, business objectives and decision may have a profound effect, and the impact on listed companies'earnings management motivation, surplus management means and earnings management at different levels, and even exist systematic differences. On earnings management level and its influencing factors was studied, should consider to state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies the special conditions, if coexisting will different proprietary nature of listed companies are studied, and may lead to confuse the research conclusion inaccurate or error, and from the perspective of the listed company proprietary nature of earnings management level and its influencing factors is analysed and targeted formulate policies, strengthen accounting supervision of listed company earnings management behavior of restriction, improving accounting information quality, improve corporate earnings management efficiency has important theoretic value and practical significance.
Based on the agency theory and contract theory as the starting point, combined with standard and empirical method for different proprietary nature of earnings management degree between the listed company whether systematic difference and its influencing factors were studied. In order to emphasize new accounting standards promulgated after the variation during 2006, so CSMAR database and RESSET database can provide 4000 data samples based on the present research from 2007 to 2009, the first is the most commonly used four accruals separation model reveals earnings management effectiveness for inspection, and on this conclusion based on modified Jones model and surplus distribution method further investigated different proprietary nature of the listed company earnings management, based on the systematic differences between state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company earnings management level systematic difference between the conclusion based on factor analysis, respectively, using multiple regression method and stepwise regression method and further investigation of state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company earnings management degree between affecting factors exist what similarities and differences, finally, based on proprietary nature view of China's listed firms earnings management level research related Suggestions.
In this paper the main research conclusions are as follows:
1.The modified model set more optimal Jones. Based on the new guidelines promulgated after the capital market data during 2006, to basic Jones model, after correction Jones model, performance matching Jones models and nonlinear Jones model four study is most commonly used the accruals separation model validity after testing found:whether comprehensive sample estimate or chat estimates, four kinds of model fitting sex are better, but performance matching Jones models and nonlinear Jones show the performance of the model is more outstanding, Divide year, propose to model estimation superior to the effect of comprehensive sample estimate; Playability accruals surplus persistent inspection instruction four model reveals earnings management ability are effective, Test results showed that two items of basic Jones model, performance matching Jones models and nonlinear Jones model made the first kind of wrong frequency is higher, easy to exaggerate earnings management. Comprehensive comparison, in the Chinese capital market, fixed Jones model has a better set.
2. Different proprietary nature of the listed company earnings management degree between systematic difference. Mean comparison, single variable regression and independent T test results showed:non-state-owned listed companies and state-owned listed companies between earnings management really systematic difference, whether positive earnings management, negative earnings management or the degree of earnings management, non-state-owned listed company of manipulative accruals are significantly higher than that of state-owned listed companies of manipulative accruals, Aiming at the now-defunct earnings management motivation surplus distribution method inspection results show:non-state-owned listed companies than state-owned listed companies in the now-defunct interval appear net assets yield higher frequencies, non-state-owned listed company earnings management degree than state-owned listed companies is more serious. Therefore, listed companies on China's earnings management level research should be considered proprietary nature factor.
3. Overall, as restriction factors of corporate governance of listed company earnings management degree of restriction role was not significant, but as incentive factors of all sorts of earnings management motivation of earnings management degree of incentive effect is remarkable. First will be listed companies in China earnings management degree of influence factors differentiate for incentive factors and constraints, and established respectively corresponding indicators system, and then using factor analysis, listed companies on China's earnings management level two major types of the evaluation index system of influencing factors are measured, finally establishing linear multivariate regression models, listed companies on China's earnings management level and the two kinds of relationships and influence factors comparison group study results show that the overall, for state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company, restrictive factors and earnings management level relationship between are not significant, and incentive factors to influence of earnings management degree is remarkable, explains that the current system environment and market environment, corporate governance of earnings management degree of restriction role still weak, and all kinds of common earnings management motivation of earnings management incentive effect is very significant.
4.the multiple regression model and stepwise regression analysis of the specific show that state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company earnings management degree between affecting factors exist certain differences. State-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed company has some common:earnings management motivation of earnings management incentive effect than corporate governance of earnings management is more significant role in the constraints, In addition to share ratio of the largest shareholder and earnings management degree is poured u-shaped relation, certified public accountants audit on earnings management degree can be an effective restriction role outside, overall, whether the internal management mechanism or exterior governance mechanism is not play on earnings management degree of restricting effects, the board did not develop supervisory role, and the board of supervisors formalism. But state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies between them, there exist some differences:non-state-owned listed company management equity incentives on earnings management played the restriction role, and the state-owned listed companies acted for realizing the compensation contracts and earnings management, Non-state-owned listed companies on earnings management IPO motivation in the effect of all variables of the most important, and the state-owned listed companies large cleaning motive and smooth profit motive of earnings management effect is more important, motivation of IPO earnings management influence is not large, The government in transforming the reform of the relationship between government and enterprises obtained some achievements, the government's intervention degrees lower, and the state-owned listed companies'earnings management degree will be lower, and the state-owned listed companies scale is bigger, avoid political supervision motive is stronger, Bank of state-owned listed companies the ability but also in debt constraint enhanced, and the state-owned listed companies asset-liability ratio, the higher the degree of earnings management test-drink.
According to the theoretical and empirical study results, put forward the following Suggestions:first, the research in our country, using separate accruals models of earnings management studies suggest using a modified Jones model. Second, shall continue to improve the accounting standards in developing the formulation of earnings management accounting supervision policy, to consider the proprietary nature of different, targeted developing accounting supervision policies, and cannot do "one size fits all". Third, facing the corporate governance of listed companies in the restriction role of the weakening of earnings management problems, we should continue to improve corporate governance mechanism of construction and improve the internal management mechanism and exterior governance mechanism.
The innovation of this paper place reflects in the following aspects:
1. Use three successive years of large sample data from 2007 to 2009, for the first time in 2006 new accounting standards promulgated after accruals separation model in China's capital market on the validity of the inspection, and has been fixed Jones model set more optimal conclusion.
2. In examining the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies between earnings management degree between the systematic differences exist not only use the traditional correction for accruals Jones model is verified, first introduced from overall surplus distribution method was verified.
3. On earnings management level influence factors variables selection, comprehensive selection factors restricting variables in addition to consider the internal management variable outside, also introduced exterior governance variables, the selection of incentive factors variable selection when fully consider Chinese characteristics of earnings management motivation.
4. On the listed company earnings management degree study factors, taking into account the existing research often only for one or a few items listed company earnings management level influence factors of study, will influence factors into the restricting factors and incentive factors two categories, first introduced factor analysis classification about this problem entire study.
5. On the listed company earnings management impact factors for item by item, specific analysis, besides the traditional research approach build multivariate regression model outside, still using for reference the stepwise regression thoughts, for the first time to the degree of earnings management specific influence factors of the relative importance of put in order.
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