中国制度背景下的上市公司债务成本研究
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摘要
随着美国次贷危机与欧洲主权债务危机的爆发,金融安全成为学术界和实务界所关注的重要话题。我国商业银行在20世纪末,21世纪初出现的巨额不良资产以及2009年后开始显现的地方投融资平台债务危机表明,我国的金融安全也不容忽视,如何提高金融资源的配置效率,防范金融风险,成为本文所关注的重要问题。提高金融资源配置效率是金融市场的主要功能,作为市场机制的核心,价格机制在资源配置中起着重要的调节和引导作用,而信贷资金价格是公司债务成本的重要影响因素,因此,本文试图通过分析公司债务成本的决定因素,揭示我国信贷资金价格机制的资源配置效率。
此外,从现有债务成本的研究来看,基本的理论逻辑是债权代理冲突和违约风险的增加导致债务成本提高,Jensen和Meckling (1976)的研究成果构建了相关的理论模型,因此,国内外的学者使用债务成本度量债权代理冲突的程度,研究了各种影响债权代理冲突和债务违约风险的机制,这些机制包括各种公司治理机制,地区法律渊源,地区法规内容,地区执法效率以及地区政治制度等等,但是国内有关债务成本的研究相对较少。
我国关于转型经济制度背景下的公司债务研究,主要分析了地方政府行为在公司债务期限结构、资本结构、信用贷款的获取概率中所扮演的角色,但是较少从债务成本的角度进行探讨,因此,分析地方政府行为对债务成本的影响也成为本文的研究动机。
本文拟站在公司债务成本的视角,从微观层面分析我国信贷资金配置效率及其制度性的影响因素,并揭示出相关制度同金融风险间的关系。此外,国外对于债务成本的研究已经非常丰富,而我国的相关研究相对较少,本文基于我国特定制度背景下的债务成本研究将转型经济的制度因素引入到债务成本的分析中,从而丰富了现有公司债务成本的理论。西方债务成本的研究主要基于了债权代理冲突和债权人权益保护机制,而其基本理论逻辑是基于成熟市场经济条件下的制度假设,包括产权激励,即私有产权会促使债权人关注信贷资金的债务风险；以及资金价格管制制度,即基于代理冲突的债务成本理论的构建中,债权人和债务人可以在充分自主的条件下,确定债务资金的价格。但是,我国是否已经具备了上述制度条件值得研究。
本文的第一章是导论,对文章的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路、文章结构以及文章的创新进行了介绍。
本文的第二章是文献的回顾,本章主要回顾了两个领域的文献研究,第一部分是财务学中关于债务成本的研究综述,Jensen和Meckling (1976)最早提出和分析了债权代理冲突,并认为债权代理冲突的增加将提高公司的债务融资的成本,此后大量文献使用债务成本作为度量指标,研究了影响了债权代理冲突的各种机制,本部分对这些文献进行了综述和总结。第二部分是关于政府干预的研究综述,政府在经济运行中所扮演的角色,有掠夺之手假设和扶持之手假设,本部分综述了政府干预对企业投资、融资、购并、公司治理等各方面的影响的研究,在我国转型经济条件下,政府的行政影响力深入到了经济运行的多个方面,公司和银行的运营和决策也会受到政府行为的作用,相关文献的研究主要支持了政府干预的掠夺之手假设。
第三章是本文理论基础的阐述,第一部分阐述了契约观下的公司治理理论、债务契约、制度对经济契约影响等相关的制度经济学理论,阐述了债务契约、公司内部委托代理关系的制度性质,在制度经济学所定义的范畴中,制度的外延较大,习俗、法律、契约以及机构组织等可以包含于制度的范畴中,契约作为微观交易制度属于制度的范畴,而制度的共时关联,表明了在同一时期,地区的社会经济制度具有紧密的联系,债务契约必然会受到其他社会经济制度的影响。第二部分阐述了政府干预的相关理论,包括市场失灵理论,政府失灵理论在内政府干预的基本理论,包括“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”在内的政府行为的基本假设,政府与银行关系的基本理论研究,我国地方政府经济干预制度根源的相关理论,政府干预的动因及手段,这些理论为后面有关政府干预和公司债务成本间关系的分析构建了基础。
本文的第四章是对转型经济背景下,导致公司债务成本变动规律可能异于国外成熟市场经济条件下的债务成本理论的制度因素进行阐述,这些制度因素包括金融制度和地方政府行为,第一部分阐述了金融制度,包括公司的主要融资方式,商业银行的管理模式和所有权特征,资金价格的管制以及信用评价制度的发展,甚至是观念因素(信贷歧视)等等都可能影响债务成本对债权代理冲突的敏感性,而商业银行改革和利率市场化改革等推进中的市场化改革可能提高债务成本对债权代理冲突的敏感性。第二部分是地方政府行为对地方制度环境以及信贷资源配置的影响,随着我国分税制改革和地方包干的财政制度的建立,地方政府开始争夺金融资源,以满足地方经济增长的资金需要,而地方政府的干预行为对地方制度环境质量以及信贷资源配置效率有着重要的影响,本部分对相关制度背景进行了阐述。
本文在第五章使用大样本数据对我国制度背景下债务成本的影响因素进行了实证分析,第一部分实证主要检验了以下三个问题,(1)我国的制度背景下,公司利益侵占的水平是否对公司债务成本构成显著影响?(2)我国的制度背景下,地方法治和政府干预程度等制度环境是否对公司债务成本构成显著影响?(3)地方政府基于一定的动机而加强对银行信贷决策干预时,是否会削弱上述作用机制。第二部分实证检验了地方上市公司对地方经济的影响力的增加,是否导致地方政府通过影响信贷资金价格支持上市公司的发展。本章的实证研究的主要结果表明,公司利益侵占水平的增加,地区制度环境质量的下降,都将导致债务成本显著地上升。而当GDP增速减缓时,地方政府的干预削弱了公司利益侵占水平对债务成本的敏感度。地方上市公司数量越少时,地方经济发展对地方上市公司的依赖程度越高,因而地方政府对地方上市公司的支持越大,因而上市公司的债务成本越低。最后,本章检验了上述因素对公司财务危机发生概率的影响,发现利益侵占水平越高,地区制度环境质量越低,则财务危机发生概率越高,因此,这些因素对债务成本的影响反映了商业银行基于债务风险判断的合理决策,但是地区GDP增速放缓和地区上市公司数量对财务危机发生概率没有显著影响,因此,地方政府干预行为扭曲了债务资金的定价机制,降低了信贷资金配置的效率。
本文第六章是对全文的总结,阐述了文章的理论和政策启示,并指出了文章的局限性和未来研究的展望。
本文的主要研究结论：在我国制度背景下,公司的债务成本对公司治理状况和地区制度环境质量具有显著的反映。因此,我国转型经济制度背景下的债务契约具有市场化的特征,表明我国的商业银行改革以及利率市场化改革取得了一定的成果,优化了资源的配置效率,我国应进一步推进金融市场化改革,破除我国金融机构的预算软约束,建立完善的金融机构退出机制,增加金融机构的多样性和竞争性,从而使资金的价格机制能够更好地发挥资源配置功能。另一方面来看,不同于建立在成熟市场经济背景下的债务成本理论,我国的公司债务成本还受到地方政府干预的影响。由于我国地方政府的行政力量在经济运行中起着重要作用,使得我国债务成本形成机制具有了不同于成熟市场经济条件下的特征。地方政府干预扭曲了信贷资金的价格机制,降低了资源配置的效率,地方政府不合理的信贷干预行为成为导致我国金融风险的重要因素。因此,优化金融资源配置,不仅需要改革金融制度,还需改善其它社会经济制度,制度的设计和安排具有整体性,某领域的制度设计或变迁往往无法达到改革的既定目标,而需要其它领域的社会经济制度同时进行相应的改善。
本文的创新点包括,首先原有关于债务成本的研究,基本是通过债务成本度量影响债权代理冲突和债务风险的各种机制,而并未突破传统理论和逻辑,进行分析。本文首先基于以往研究的基本理论逻辑,检验了利益侵占水平和地区制度环境对我国上市公司债务成本的影响,得到了与成熟市场经济的实证研究一致的结果,本文进一步地研究了转型经济条件下,我国上市公司债务成本的不同特征,即地方政府干预银行信达决策,成为影响公司债务成本的又一个重要因素,从而丰富了债务成本的研究。其次,不同于以往的研究,本文通过实证检验各种因素对债务危机发生概率的影响,揭示出不同因素对债务成本影响的内部作用机理。一方面,债务成本对公司内部人利益侵占水平和地方制度环境质量作出的反映,是基于债务风险的合理信贷决策,是债务资金市场化配置的反映。另一方面,地方政府的行为所导致的债务成本的变动与债务危机发生概率没有显著关系,从而可能是对债务资金配置效率的扭曲。最后,国内原有研究对债务成本的度量,部分文献采用了可获取的信贷合同中的利率水平,但是大量的上市公司信贷合同数据无法获取,可能会对样本量的局限性造成影响,其次是采用利息支出与债务水平的比率,经过当期基准利率水平的调整后得到,这样的方法可以避免信贷合同数据获取限制。本文采用了后一种方法,并且使用年度行业中位值进行调整,以避免产业政策对公司信贷的影响；根据我国会计准则,资本化的利息不会计入财务费用,因此,本文为减少偏误,引入在建工程控制变量；同时考虑到债务期限与债务利率水平存在的联系,引入了债务期限结构控制变量,从而改进了债务成本的研究模型。
As the break-out of subprime crisis in America and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, finance security became a hot topic around both of the academic circle and practice circle. Bad asset of financial bank of China between the end of20th century and the beginning of21st century and debt crisis of local investment and financing platform indicate that finance security of China cannot be neglected neither. So how to improve the efficiency of the allocation of financial resources and prevent the risk of financial risk is important issue of this article. Improving the efficiency of the allocation is the main function of financial market. As the core of the market mechanism, price guides the allocation of the resource and is import influencing factor of cost of debt. This article attempt to analyze determinants of debt cost to reveal the efficiency of loan allocation in China.
The basic logic of existing research is that conflicts of debt agency and default risk will increase the cost of debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) had established a related model, and the researchers in and out of China measured the debt agency by debt cost when analyzing the mechanism influencing debt agency and default risk. These mechanisms include certain aspects of corporate governance, origin of law, content of law, efficiency of law implement, political institution and so on.
Besides, existing research has analyzed debt in a context of transition economy, including how the local government influences the maturity of debt, debt structure, accesses of credit loan. But rare article had been written in the angle of debt cost under context of transition economy. So this article means to investigate this issue.
In micro level and by the research of debt cost, this article means to analyze the efficiency of allocation of the loan resources and the institution factor influencing it, and further reveal the relation between intuition and financial risk. Besides, there is already much western literature about debt cost, but there are relatively less in China research. So this article introduces institutional factor of transition economy to the analysis of debt cost to rich the existing literature. The western research of debt cost has concentrated to the debt agency. The basic logic has based on the institutional assumption of mature market. The first assumption is the private property incentive, i.e. private property makes the creditor to pay close attention to the default risk. The second assumption is absence of the regulation of price of capital, i.e. in the theory of debt cost based on debt agency, both of the creditors and debtors can establish the price on their own. It is worth investigating whether these assumptions can stand in China.
Chapter one is to introduce the context of this article, the researching significance, the researching method, the structure of this article and the value of the research.
Chapter two is the review of the literature. The first part of the chapter is about the review of literature of debt cost. Jensen and Meckling (1976) first mention debt agency, and they suggest that conflicts of debt agency will increase debt cost. Since then, much literature has investigated the mechanism influencing the debt agency by the measure of debt cost. This part also summarizes the view of these literatures. The second part of this chapter is about the review of the literatures of government intervention. There are two hypothesizes on the role governments play in the economy, i.e. the grabbing hand hypothesis and the support hand hypothesis. This part reviews the literature about how the government impact investment, financing, Mergers and acquisitions, governance of corporate.In the transition economy of China, Administrative implications go deep into every aspects of economy. Operate decisions of corporate and banks also are affected by the behavior of government. The main literature has supported the view of grabbing-hand hypothesis.
Chapter three is to elaborate the theoretical basis. The first part is about the corporate governance, debt contract, and effects of institution to the economic contracts, and all of these are under the theory of contract. This part also elaborates the institutional nature of the debt contract and agency relation within the corporation.In the category which the institutional economy defines, epitaxial of institution is very broad, including custom, law, contract and institution. Contracts belong to the category of micro institution. And the synchronic association of institution suggests that institutions of a region are interrelated to each other during the same period. So debt contract must be affected by other social and economic institution of other field. The second part of this chapter is to elaborate the theory of government intervention, including theory of market failure and theory of government failure, hypothesis of grabbing hand and hypothesis of support hand, theory on the relation of government and bank, the root cause of government intervention, motivation and means of the government intervention. These theory constitute the basis of the analysis of the relation between government and debt cost below.
Chapter four is to about the institutional context of transaction economy which may cause the theory of cost of debt to be different from the one under the mature-market condition. These institution factors include financial institution and the institution related to the behavior of local governments. The first part elaborates the financial institution, including the main financing methods of corporation, the management and the property of banks, regulation of capital price, development of credit rating, and even conceptual factors (Credit discrimination) can be affects the sensitivity of debt cost to the debt agency. In the other hand, Market-oriented reform of commercial bank and interest rates can improve the sensitivity of debt cost to the debt agency. The second part is about the effects of the local governments to the local institution environment and allocation of loan resources. As reform of the tax and fiscal system, the local governments begin to vie for financial resource to meet the needs of funds for local economic growth, and the intervention of government plays an important role on the quality of local institution environment and efficiency of loan allocation. So this chapter is to elaborate these institutions behind the interventional behavior.
Chapter five is the empirical analysis of the debt cost under the institutional context of China, using data of large sample. First part of the empirical analysis is to answer three questions,(1) Whether the expropriation of corporation can affect the debt cost significantly?(2) Whether quality of local institution environment determined by the law and intervention of local government affect debt cost significantly?(3) Whether the intervention behavior of local governments weakens the mechanism through which expropriation affects debt cost. The second part of the empirical analysis is to find out whether the increase of influence of local listed corporation leads to the local governments'support through affecting the price of loan capital. The main results of the empirical analysis suggest that debt cost increases when the expropriation becomes serious and the quality of local institution environment is low. When GDP growth slows down, intervention of local government reduces the sensitivity of debt cost to the expropriation. The smaller the number of local listed corporations is, then the greater the influence of the listed corporations to the local economy, the lower the debt cost of these listed corporations is. Finally this chapter tests the influence of these factors to the probability of financial crisis, and fine that when expropriation become serious and quality of local institutional environment is low, the probability of financial crisis becomes high. So effects of theses factor to debt cost reflects rational judgments of banks to the loan risk. But the slowdown of economic growth and local number of listed corporation has no effects to the probability of financial crisis, and so these factors reflect the distortion of loan allocation by the intervention of local government.
Chapter six is summary of the article which elaborates theoretical and political implication, and indicates the limitation of this article and prospect of the forward research.
Conclusions of the article are as follows:
In one hand, under institutional context of China, debt cost is significantly affected by corporate governance and quality of local institutional environment. So, debt contract has market characteristic in transaction economy of China, suggesting that market-oriented reform of commercial bank and interest has achieved some goals and efficiency of loan-resources allocation has been improved. Market-oriented reform in financial market should be pushed on further, including getting rid of Soft budget constraint of financial institutions, increasing diversity of financial institutions, so that resource-allocating function of capital price can be improved. In the other hand, debt cost is affected by the intervention of local governanment, which is different from debt cost theory under context of mature market. Because executive power of local government plays an import role in economy, determination of debt cost is partly different from mature market conditions. Intervention of local government distorted the formation mechanism of loan price, and reduces efficiency of resource allocation. Unreasonable intervention of local government comes into important influencing factors of financial risk in China. So to improve the allocation of financial resources, not only the reform in financial institution is needed, but also institution reform in other area must be pulled on together. Integrity of social and economic institution suggest that institutional changing in certain area must be complemented by institutional changing of other area to achieve the goals.
Innovations of the article are as follows:
Firstly, early papers investigating debt cost is basically to analyze mechanism influencing debt agency and default risk by measure of debt cost, and do not break through the classical theory framework. This article test the influence of expropriation and quality of local institution environment to debt cost, and get the same phenomenon as the one in mature market. This article further test institutional factors influencing debt cost that are characteristic in the transition economy, and finds out that intervention of local government to the loan resources allocation is another influencing factor of debt cost. So this research riches the literature around debt cost. Secondly, this article investigates how these factors influence the default risk, and reveal the internal mechanism of how the debt cost is affected. In one hand, debt cost is significantly affected by expropriation and quality of local institutional environment, which is rational decision of bank, based on default risk and is characteristic of market mechanism. In the other hand, debt cost is affected by the government intervention, and these factors are not related to the default risk, which is distortion of loan resources allocation. Finally, part of early research in China on debt cost measuring debt cost by the interest data obtained in the loan contracts. But most of the loan contracts are not accessible and so leads to limitation on the size of sample. Some literatures use ratio of interest expense and debt, adjusted by current benchmark interest rate. This article adoptes the later measure, and this measure further adjusted by industry-year mean to avoid effects of industry policy to the corporate loan. To reduce the bias, this article introduces constructions in process as a controlling variable in the model to reduce the effects of capitalizing of interest according to the accounting standards of China. Besides, debt maturity is introduced to the model to controlling the bias caused by the tight relation between debt maturity and debt interest. So this article has improved the researching model of debt cost.
此外,从现有债务成本的研究来看,基本的理论逻辑是债权代理冲突和违约风险的增加导致债务成本提高,Jensen和Meckling (1976)的研究成果构建了相关的理论模型,因此,国内外的学者使用债务成本度量债权代理冲突的程度,研究了各种影响债权代理冲突和债务违约风险的机制,这些机制包括各种公司治理机制,地区法律渊源,地区法规内容,地区执法效率以及地区政治制度等等,但是国内有关债务成本的研究相对较少。
我国关于转型经济制度背景下的公司债务研究,主要分析了地方政府行为在公司债务期限结构、资本结构、信用贷款的获取概率中所扮演的角色,但是较少从债务成本的角度进行探讨,因此,分析地方政府行为对债务成本的影响也成为本文的研究动机。
本文拟站在公司债务成本的视角,从微观层面分析我国信贷资金配置效率及其制度性的影响因素,并揭示出相关制度同金融风险间的关系。此外,国外对于债务成本的研究已经非常丰富,而我国的相关研究相对较少,本文基于我国特定制度背景下的债务成本研究将转型经济的制度因素引入到债务成本的分析中,从而丰富了现有公司债务成本的理论。西方债务成本的研究主要基于了债权代理冲突和债权人权益保护机制,而其基本理论逻辑是基于成熟市场经济条件下的制度假设,包括产权激励,即私有产权会促使债权人关注信贷资金的债务风险；以及资金价格管制制度,即基于代理冲突的债务成本理论的构建中,债权人和债务人可以在充分自主的条件下,确定债务资金的价格。但是,我国是否已经具备了上述制度条件值得研究。
本文的第一章是导论,对文章的研究背景、研究意义、研究思路、文章结构以及文章的创新进行了介绍。
本文的第二章是文献的回顾,本章主要回顾了两个领域的文献研究,第一部分是财务学中关于债务成本的研究综述,Jensen和Meckling (1976)最早提出和分析了债权代理冲突,并认为债权代理冲突的增加将提高公司的债务融资的成本,此后大量文献使用债务成本作为度量指标,研究了影响了债权代理冲突的各种机制,本部分对这些文献进行了综述和总结。第二部分是关于政府干预的研究综述,政府在经济运行中所扮演的角色,有掠夺之手假设和扶持之手假设,本部分综述了政府干预对企业投资、融资、购并、公司治理等各方面的影响的研究,在我国转型经济条件下,政府的行政影响力深入到了经济运行的多个方面,公司和银行的运营和决策也会受到政府行为的作用,相关文献的研究主要支持了政府干预的掠夺之手假设。
第三章是本文理论基础的阐述,第一部分阐述了契约观下的公司治理理论、债务契约、制度对经济契约影响等相关的制度经济学理论,阐述了债务契约、公司内部委托代理关系的制度性质,在制度经济学所定义的范畴中,制度的外延较大,习俗、法律、契约以及机构组织等可以包含于制度的范畴中,契约作为微观交易制度属于制度的范畴,而制度的共时关联,表明了在同一时期,地区的社会经济制度具有紧密的联系,债务契约必然会受到其他社会经济制度的影响。第二部分阐述了政府干预的相关理论,包括市场失灵理论,政府失灵理论在内政府干预的基本理论,包括“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”在内的政府行为的基本假设,政府与银行关系的基本理论研究,我国地方政府经济干预制度根源的相关理论,政府干预的动因及手段,这些理论为后面有关政府干预和公司债务成本间关系的分析构建了基础。
本文的第四章是对转型经济背景下,导致公司债务成本变动规律可能异于国外成熟市场经济条件下的债务成本理论的制度因素进行阐述,这些制度因素包括金融制度和地方政府行为,第一部分阐述了金融制度,包括公司的主要融资方式,商业银行的管理模式和所有权特征,资金价格的管制以及信用评价制度的发展,甚至是观念因素(信贷歧视)等等都可能影响债务成本对债权代理冲突的敏感性,而商业银行改革和利率市场化改革等推进中的市场化改革可能提高债务成本对债权代理冲突的敏感性。第二部分是地方政府行为对地方制度环境以及信贷资源配置的影响,随着我国分税制改革和地方包干的财政制度的建立,地方政府开始争夺金融资源,以满足地方经济增长的资金需要,而地方政府的干预行为对地方制度环境质量以及信贷资源配置效率有着重要的影响,本部分对相关制度背景进行了阐述。
本文在第五章使用大样本数据对我国制度背景下债务成本的影响因素进行了实证分析,第一部分实证主要检验了以下三个问题,(1)我国的制度背景下,公司利益侵占的水平是否对公司债务成本构成显著影响?(2)我国的制度背景下,地方法治和政府干预程度等制度环境是否对公司债务成本构成显著影响?(3)地方政府基于一定的动机而加强对银行信贷决策干预时,是否会削弱上述作用机制。第二部分实证检验了地方上市公司对地方经济的影响力的增加,是否导致地方政府通过影响信贷资金价格支持上市公司的发展。本章的实证研究的主要结果表明,公司利益侵占水平的增加,地区制度环境质量的下降,都将导致债务成本显著地上升。而当GDP增速减缓时,地方政府的干预削弱了公司利益侵占水平对债务成本的敏感度。地方上市公司数量越少时,地方经济发展对地方上市公司的依赖程度越高,因而地方政府对地方上市公司的支持越大,因而上市公司的债务成本越低。最后,本章检验了上述因素对公司财务危机发生概率的影响,发现利益侵占水平越高,地区制度环境质量越低,则财务危机发生概率越高,因此,这些因素对债务成本的影响反映了商业银行基于债务风险判断的合理决策,但是地区GDP增速放缓和地区上市公司数量对财务危机发生概率没有显著影响,因此,地方政府干预行为扭曲了债务资金的定价机制,降低了信贷资金配置的效率。
本文第六章是对全文的总结,阐述了文章的理论和政策启示,并指出了文章的局限性和未来研究的展望。
本文的主要研究结论：在我国制度背景下,公司的债务成本对公司治理状况和地区制度环境质量具有显著的反映。因此,我国转型经济制度背景下的债务契约具有市场化的特征,表明我国的商业银行改革以及利率市场化改革取得了一定的成果,优化了资源的配置效率,我国应进一步推进金融市场化改革,破除我国金融机构的预算软约束,建立完善的金融机构退出机制,增加金融机构的多样性和竞争性,从而使资金的价格机制能够更好地发挥资源配置功能。另一方面来看,不同于建立在成熟市场经济背景下的债务成本理论,我国的公司债务成本还受到地方政府干预的影响。由于我国地方政府的行政力量在经济运行中起着重要作用,使得我国债务成本形成机制具有了不同于成熟市场经济条件下的特征。地方政府干预扭曲了信贷资金的价格机制,降低了资源配置的效率,地方政府不合理的信贷干预行为成为导致我国金融风险的重要因素。因此,优化金融资源配置,不仅需要改革金融制度,还需改善其它社会经济制度,制度的设计和安排具有整体性,某领域的制度设计或变迁往往无法达到改革的既定目标,而需要其它领域的社会经济制度同时进行相应的改善。
本文的创新点包括,首先原有关于债务成本的研究,基本是通过债务成本度量影响债权代理冲突和债务风险的各种机制,而并未突破传统理论和逻辑,进行分析。本文首先基于以往研究的基本理论逻辑,检验了利益侵占水平和地区制度环境对我国上市公司债务成本的影响,得到了与成熟市场经济的实证研究一致的结果,本文进一步地研究了转型经济条件下,我国上市公司债务成本的不同特征,即地方政府干预银行信达决策,成为影响公司债务成本的又一个重要因素,从而丰富了债务成本的研究。其次,不同于以往的研究,本文通过实证检验各种因素对债务危机发生概率的影响,揭示出不同因素对债务成本影响的内部作用机理。一方面,债务成本对公司内部人利益侵占水平和地方制度环境质量作出的反映,是基于债务风险的合理信贷决策,是债务资金市场化配置的反映。另一方面,地方政府的行为所导致的债务成本的变动与债务危机发生概率没有显著关系,从而可能是对债务资金配置效率的扭曲。最后,国内原有研究对债务成本的度量,部分文献采用了可获取的信贷合同中的利率水平,但是大量的上市公司信贷合同数据无法获取,可能会对样本量的局限性造成影响,其次是采用利息支出与债务水平的比率,经过当期基准利率水平的调整后得到,这样的方法可以避免信贷合同数据获取限制。本文采用了后一种方法,并且使用年度行业中位值进行调整,以避免产业政策对公司信贷的影响；根据我国会计准则,资本化的利息不会计入财务费用,因此,本文为减少偏误,引入在建工程控制变量；同时考虑到债务期限与债务利率水平存在的联系,引入了债务期限结构控制变量,从而改进了债务成本的研究模型。
As the break-out of subprime crisis in America and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, finance security became a hot topic around both of the academic circle and practice circle. Bad asset of financial bank of China between the end of20th century and the beginning of21st century and debt crisis of local investment and financing platform indicate that finance security of China cannot be neglected neither. So how to improve the efficiency of the allocation of financial resources and prevent the risk of financial risk is important issue of this article. Improving the efficiency of the allocation is the main function of financial market. As the core of the market mechanism, price guides the allocation of the resource and is import influencing factor of cost of debt. This article attempt to analyze determinants of debt cost to reveal the efficiency of loan allocation in China.
The basic logic of existing research is that conflicts of debt agency and default risk will increase the cost of debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) had established a related model, and the researchers in and out of China measured the debt agency by debt cost when analyzing the mechanism influencing debt agency and default risk. These mechanisms include certain aspects of corporate governance, origin of law, content of law, efficiency of law implement, political institution and so on.
Besides, existing research has analyzed debt in a context of transition economy, including how the local government influences the maturity of debt, debt structure, accesses of credit loan. But rare article had been written in the angle of debt cost under context of transition economy. So this article means to investigate this issue.
In micro level and by the research of debt cost, this article means to analyze the efficiency of allocation of the loan resources and the institution factor influencing it, and further reveal the relation between intuition and financial risk. Besides, there is already much western literature about debt cost, but there are relatively less in China research. So this article introduces institutional factor of transition economy to the analysis of debt cost to rich the existing literature. The western research of debt cost has concentrated to the debt agency. The basic logic has based on the institutional assumption of mature market. The first assumption is the private property incentive, i.e. private property makes the creditor to pay close attention to the default risk. The second assumption is absence of the regulation of price of capital, i.e. in the theory of debt cost based on debt agency, both of the creditors and debtors can establish the price on their own. It is worth investigating whether these assumptions can stand in China.
Chapter one is to introduce the context of this article, the researching significance, the researching method, the structure of this article and the value of the research.
Chapter two is the review of the literature. The first part of the chapter is about the review of literature of debt cost. Jensen and Meckling (1976) first mention debt agency, and they suggest that conflicts of debt agency will increase debt cost. Since then, much literature has investigated the mechanism influencing the debt agency by the measure of debt cost. This part also summarizes the view of these literatures. The second part of this chapter is about the review of the literatures of government intervention. There are two hypothesizes on the role governments play in the economy, i.e. the grabbing hand hypothesis and the support hand hypothesis. This part reviews the literature about how the government impact investment, financing, Mergers and acquisitions, governance of corporate.In the transition economy of China, Administrative implications go deep into every aspects of economy. Operate decisions of corporate and banks also are affected by the behavior of government. The main literature has supported the view of grabbing-hand hypothesis.
Chapter three is to elaborate the theoretical basis. The first part is about the corporate governance, debt contract, and effects of institution to the economic contracts, and all of these are under the theory of contract. This part also elaborates the institutional nature of the debt contract and agency relation within the corporation.In the category which the institutional economy defines, epitaxial of institution is very broad, including custom, law, contract and institution. Contracts belong to the category of micro institution. And the synchronic association of institution suggests that institutions of a region are interrelated to each other during the same period. So debt contract must be affected by other social and economic institution of other field. The second part of this chapter is to elaborate the theory of government intervention, including theory of market failure and theory of government failure, hypothesis of grabbing hand and hypothesis of support hand, theory on the relation of government and bank, the root cause of government intervention, motivation and means of the government intervention. These theory constitute the basis of the analysis of the relation between government and debt cost below.
Chapter four is to about the institutional context of transaction economy which may cause the theory of cost of debt to be different from the one under the mature-market condition. These institution factors include financial institution and the institution related to the behavior of local governments. The first part elaborates the financial institution, including the main financing methods of corporation, the management and the property of banks, regulation of capital price, development of credit rating, and even conceptual factors (Credit discrimination) can be affects the sensitivity of debt cost to the debt agency. In the other hand, Market-oriented reform of commercial bank and interest rates can improve the sensitivity of debt cost to the debt agency. The second part is about the effects of the local governments to the local institution environment and allocation of loan resources. As reform of the tax and fiscal system, the local governments begin to vie for financial resource to meet the needs of funds for local economic growth, and the intervention of government plays an important role on the quality of local institution environment and efficiency of loan allocation. So this chapter is to elaborate these institutions behind the interventional behavior.
Chapter five is the empirical analysis of the debt cost under the institutional context of China, using data of large sample. First part of the empirical analysis is to answer three questions,(1) Whether the expropriation of corporation can affect the debt cost significantly?(2) Whether quality of local institution environment determined by the law and intervention of local government affect debt cost significantly?(3) Whether the intervention behavior of local governments weakens the mechanism through which expropriation affects debt cost. The second part of the empirical analysis is to find out whether the increase of influence of local listed corporation leads to the local governments'support through affecting the price of loan capital. The main results of the empirical analysis suggest that debt cost increases when the expropriation becomes serious and the quality of local institution environment is low. When GDP growth slows down, intervention of local government reduces the sensitivity of debt cost to the expropriation. The smaller the number of local listed corporations is, then the greater the influence of the listed corporations to the local economy, the lower the debt cost of these listed corporations is. Finally this chapter tests the influence of these factors to the probability of financial crisis, and fine that when expropriation become serious and quality of local institutional environment is low, the probability of financial crisis becomes high. So effects of theses factor to debt cost reflects rational judgments of banks to the loan risk. But the slowdown of economic growth and local number of listed corporation has no effects to the probability of financial crisis, and so these factors reflect the distortion of loan allocation by the intervention of local government.
Chapter six is summary of the article which elaborates theoretical and political implication, and indicates the limitation of this article and prospect of the forward research.
Conclusions of the article are as follows:
In one hand, under institutional context of China, debt cost is significantly affected by corporate governance and quality of local institutional environment. So, debt contract has market characteristic in transaction economy of China, suggesting that market-oriented reform of commercial bank and interest has achieved some goals and efficiency of loan-resources allocation has been improved. Market-oriented reform in financial market should be pushed on further, including getting rid of Soft budget constraint of financial institutions, increasing diversity of financial institutions, so that resource-allocating function of capital price can be improved. In the other hand, debt cost is affected by the intervention of local governanment, which is different from debt cost theory under context of mature market. Because executive power of local government plays an import role in economy, determination of debt cost is partly different from mature market conditions. Intervention of local government distorted the formation mechanism of loan price, and reduces efficiency of resource allocation. Unreasonable intervention of local government comes into important influencing factors of financial risk in China. So to improve the allocation of financial resources, not only the reform in financial institution is needed, but also institution reform in other area must be pulled on together. Integrity of social and economic institution suggest that institutional changing in certain area must be complemented by institutional changing of other area to achieve the goals.
Innovations of the article are as follows:
Firstly, early papers investigating debt cost is basically to analyze mechanism influencing debt agency and default risk by measure of debt cost, and do not break through the classical theory framework. This article test the influence of expropriation and quality of local institution environment to debt cost, and get the same phenomenon as the one in mature market. This article further test institutional factors influencing debt cost that are characteristic in the transition economy, and finds out that intervention of local government to the loan resources allocation is another influencing factor of debt cost. So this research riches the literature around debt cost. Secondly, this article investigates how these factors influence the default risk, and reveal the internal mechanism of how the debt cost is affected. In one hand, debt cost is significantly affected by expropriation and quality of local institutional environment, which is rational decision of bank, based on default risk and is characteristic of market mechanism. In the other hand, debt cost is affected by the government intervention, and these factors are not related to the default risk, which is distortion of loan resources allocation. Finally, part of early research in China on debt cost measuring debt cost by the interest data obtained in the loan contracts. But most of the loan contracts are not accessible and so leads to limitation on the size of sample. Some literatures use ratio of interest expense and debt, adjusted by current benchmark interest rate. This article adoptes the later measure, and this measure further adjusted by industry-year mean to avoid effects of industry policy to the corporate loan. To reduce the bias, this article introduces constructions in process as a controlling variable in the model to reduce the effects of capitalizing of interest according to the accounting standards of China. Besides, debt maturity is introduced to the model to controlling the bias caused by the tight relation between debt maturity and debt interest. So this article has improved the researching model of debt cost.
引文
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