共同基金监督机制研究
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摘要
借助公司或依托信托是两种不同的共同基金运作模式。当下,我国法律只允许设立后者,即“信托型”共同基金,而没有引入“公司型”共同基金。本文以监督为视角,首先证成信托的特性致使它不适于共同基金调整的观点,然后探析“信托型”共同基金中基金管理人与资产保管人之间在权利行使上存在的内在矛盾与对冲,并阐明这一根源性冲突在信托法的框架内无法根除,必须另谋出路。其次从法学、政治学、经济学的角度依次论证公司特性适于共同基金调整的基本观点,为我国引入“公司型”共同基金提供坚实的理论支撑。文章最后设计了我国构设“公司型”共同基金的基本法律框架。
“引言”部分涉及到论文的选题背景、研究目的与意义、国内外研究现状等内容；“引论”作为正文的引子,目的在于诱出文章主题；文章“正文”共分为五章,以下将分别就每章的主要内容作概括性的阐述。
论文第一章阐释监督在共同基金中的基础地位,并从监督的视角审视基金的运作机理。
首先通过厘定基金、投资公司、共同基金三者之间的关系,廓清了后者在基金业中的基本地位。本文认为,共同基金指募集资本并将其投资于股票市场、债权市场以及货币市场的一种投资公司。在考察共同基金发展的历史渊源之后,着重于其迅猛发展背后的原因探求。
其次,通过对主要国家共同基金的考察,发现存在着两种运作模式：“信托模式”与“公司模式”。前者所依托的是独具魅力的信托工具,它是英美法系国家所普遍采用的运作模式,同时,其在大陆法系国家的影响力也与日俱增；后者借助“公司”外壳运作共同基金,现今,愈来愈多的国家已经或将要采纳这一模式。而后,在理顺共同基金治理结构与监督机制之间关系的基础上,论证后者在共同基金治理中的正当性。
最后,从监督的视角详细阐述“信托型”共同基金与“公司型”共同基金的运作机理。现今社会,信托得到了空前的应用,萌生了“商事信托”现代勃兴的趋势。本文认为“商事信托”可分为两个发展阶段：“传统商事信托”阶段与“商业信托”阶段。前者的运作原理几乎等同于传统信托,只不过是将信托应用于投资者人数众多的商事活动而已；后者的出现使信托趋于“组织化”,在渐趋剥离与传统信托关系的同时,转入朝向公司靠拢的发展趋势。另一方面,在“公司型”共同基金中,最明显的特征是通过董事会特别是独立董事制度的构设凸显其监督功能,致力于共同基金的稳健发展。
论文第二章揭示“商事信托”勃兴之现象与根源,并深入剖析其不适宜于共同基金运作的内在原因。
首先,在传统信托中,由于当事人之间的利益冲突并不严重,加上详尽的受托人规范的约束,再配之以委托人或受益人的有效监督以及有力的司法裁判,完全可以顺利地实现对信托目的事业运作的监督。
其次,信托所具有的诸如契约等制度所无法比拟的优越性促生了“商事信托”的勃兴,这体现在其不断拓展的应用领域上。本文认为“商业信托”勃兴分为两个前后相继的发展阶段：第一阶段是“普通法商业信托”,第二个阶段是“法定商业信托”。“商业信托”的勃兴源于其资产保值的内在功能,即当事人之间并不存在尖锐的利益冲突。基于这一特征,借助于受托法的约束与规范,并辅以其他监督手段,也能如传统信托那样顺利地实现信托目的。现代社会多数商事活动的性质暗合了“商事信托”的这一特质,引致了“商事信托”的现代勃兴。
最后,纵然“商事信托”勃兴是一个不争的事实,但是,如果将它应用到共同基金的运作中来,却面临着制度的困境与性质的对冲。第一,将“传统商事信托”应用到共同基金运作时,新增的资产保管人这一层受托关系将会带来巨大的代理成本。成本的增加源于基金管理人与资产保管人之间权利配置的内在悖论,而且这一矛盾在信托法的范围内根本无法彻底根除。第二,将“商业信托”应用到共同基金运作时,基于追求资产保值的特性而设计的一揽子信托规范根本无法契合投资者追求利润最大化的强烈夙愿,与高风险商业活动意欲的目标相去甚远。这一特征通过与公司治理结构的横向对比更加一目了然。
论文第三章借助历史考证与理论论证的方式,阐明公司在商事交易中无可代替的霸主地位。
首先,对公司经营实业历史的回溯在感受到公司咄咄逼人的磅礴气势的同时,也揭示了公司对投资运作模式所起到的“样板”作用以及为“公司模式”进军投资领域奠定了有力根基的基本历史事实。本文认为,公司的发展历程考察使其由公共管理职能向经营实业获取利润,而后向投资领域延伸的发展轨迹昭然若揭。
其次,商事交易看公司,公司组织则要看董事会。董事会是公司发展的中流砥柱,在很大程度上,董事会的性质定位决定着公司运作的方向,本文认为,董事会是践行监督职能的工具。换句话说,公司治理的“方式”是通过赋予董事会为首的“科层机构”以权限保证公司组织的有序运作,“目的”则是将“股东利益最大化”作为指引规则,保证公司经营目标的实现。董事会要担当如此重任的原因,从法学的角度讲,它是克服监督缺位或无力,从而践履公平与正义的不二工具；从政治学的角度看,它满足了人类集体决策的政治诉求。
再次,公司运作要看董事会,董事会的运作则要看独立董事。独立董事系董事会制度构设的肯綮。在一定程度上,甚至可以这样讲,公司董事会演进史就是一部独立董事制度不断改善、臻于完备的历史。本文认为,监督是董事会的根本职能,也是公司设立所欲求达致的目标。
最后,共同基金的特性决定了其内部利益冲突的错综复杂性,亦不存在监督矛盾冲突的得力工具,这促使人们转而求助于董事会。美国法律中有关“公司型”共同基金董事会的制度设计以及新近改革颇值深思与借鉴价值。
论文第四章从制度经济学的视角论证“公司型”共同基金的正当性。本文认为公司的本质是基于股东利益的考虑,为履行监督职能而成立的“科层组织”
首先,通过两个维度的论述,奠定了论证“公司型”共同基金的经济学基础：强调“产权理论”的激励功能,为公司股东所有权的观点提供了经济学论据,也为“股东职权主义”找到了合理性根源；重视“不完全契约理论”对现实世界的真实描述,引出了“关系契约理论”,并借此阐释司法解决商事纠纷的蹩脚之处,而后,凭籍“交易成本经济学”论证“由司法干预转入私人治理”观点的确当性。
其次,面对“关系契约”纠纷,法院定纷止争的裁判功能大大折扣,借此证成了法院不能承受“信托型”共同基金纠纷之重的观点。秉承前述“私人自治代替司法干预”的观点,证明共同基金通过公司这一“外壳”将基金运作过程中潜在矛盾的化解方式由司法裁判转向内部治理做法的正当性。
最后,论证公司董事会存在的经济学基础。有关董事会的职权来源存在“股东职权主义”与“董事会职权主义”两种观点。依“委托-代理理论”这一媒介,架起了利用“团体生产理论”解释公众公司问题的桥梁。通过它证明公众公司中“股东职权主义”的合理性,进而推导出董事会系公司“代理人”的性质定位。异于封闭式公司,公众公司中参与人数众多,因此,有关董事会之职能的解释观点众说纷纭。本文认为,在公众公司中,虽然参与者不少,但是唯有股东的投资具有独特的资产专用性特征。根据“交易成本经济学”的观点,应当向它提供一定的“保障措施”,方可保证股东投资的积极性,基于此,董事会应运而生。同理,借助于该论证思路,本文认为“公司型”基金董事会是获得投资者的授权而对其资产进行监督的“代理人”。
论文第五章剖析我国“信托型”共同基金存在的积弊及其根源,并初步设计了构建我国“公司型”共同基金的基本法律框架。
首先,本文考察共同基金在我国的萌芽、发展,发现我国基金也走过了先封闭式基金后开放式基金,先投资基金后证券投资基金的演进轨迹。
其次,将“委托—代理理论”作为分析工具,揭露我国“信托型”共同基金发展中存在的弊病。本文认为,尽管有些弊病随着市场渐趋成熟和立法逐步完善能够得到明显改善,但是诸如监管不力、关联交易等问题,在我国现有的“信托型”共同基金框架下中根本无法彻底根除。
再次,利用前面论证得出的“在‘信托型’共同基金中存在的资产保管人与基金管理人之间在权利配置上存在悖论”的观点审视我国“信托型”共同基金,发现这一问题在我国同样存在。以澳大利亚修法为佐证,进一步证成这一悖论无法在信托法范围内得到根除的观点的正确性,这一困境召唤“公司型”共同基金的救赎!
最后,阐述我国在引入“公司型”共同基金过程中应当注意的几个问题,特别是董事会与监事会关系问题,紧接着构设了我国“公司型”基金立法的基本框架。
Through corporate or by virtue of trust is two different methods operating mutual fund. Currently, only "Trust Model"("TM") mutual fund is allowed by law in our country, the "Corporate Model"("CM") is not taken into consideration by the legislator. Above all, the article proves the opinion that the trust's characteristics make it un-suitable to regulate mutual fund from the monitor perspective, then analyzes the inner contradictions of right excise between the fund manager ("manager") and the property depositary("depositary"), at the same time, the conflicts between them can not dissolve in the trust law framework. Second, the article demonstrates the corporate is appropriate to operate mutual fund from the perspective of law, politics and economics, which provides solid theoretical foundation for intruding "CM" to our country. In the end, the article provides the basic legal framework about "CM" for our country.
"Introduction" includes the background, purpose etc of the article. "Preface", as the primer, is about to elicit the topic. The main body of the article is divided into five parts, its concise contents will be demonstrated below.
Chapter 1 articulates the fundamental role of monitor in mutual fund, and surveys the operation mechanism from the monitor angle.
First, the article determines the relationship among the fund, investment company and mutual fund, then clarifies the mutual fund's basic status in the fund. In the article, mutual fund means a sort of investment company, which puts capital into the stock market, bonds market or money market. After investigating the history, the article seeks the reasons making the mutual fund rapid development behind.
Second, the article finds that there are two operation models through examining the main countries:"TM" and "CM". The former is the popular model in Common Law country which is based on the trust, and its influence is increasing rapidly. The latter one regulates the mutual fund by virtue of corporate, and more and more countries have accepted or will accept this model. Then, the article demonstrates legitimacy of monitor mechanism in mutual fund on the basis of clarifying the relation between the governance structure and monitor mechanism of the mutual fund.
Last, the article describes the operational mechanism of the "TM" and "CM" mutual fund in detail from the perspective of monitor. Nowadays, the trust is applied to many aspects resulting in renaissance of "commercial trust". In the article's opinion, "commercial trust" is divided into two stages:"traditional commercial trust" and "business trust". The former is equivalent to traditional trust on the whole, the difference is only that it often used in business activities whole investors are numerous. The latter leads the trust becoming "organizational" and converts to corporate while departing the traditional trust. On the other hand, in "CM" mutual fund, the most conspicuous characteristic is to highlight the monitor mechanism by means of board of directors, especially the independent directors so as to steady development of the mutual fund.
Chapter 2 reveals the phenomenon and origin of renaissance of "commercial trust", and analyzes the inner reasons not suitable to regulate mutual fund deeply.
First, as we all known, Because the benefit conflicts between parties in traditional trust is not server, the trust purpose will be accomplished smoothly through the constriction of the fiduciary duty, the effective monitor and the predominant judicial judge.
Second, the advantage belonging to trust causes the renaissance of "commercial trust" which is embodied in expanding applying domain. The article thinks that the "business trust" is divided into two successive stages, that is, "common law business trust" stage and "statutory business trust" stage. The renaissance of "business trust" arises from the inner function of maintaining the value. By virtue of the nature, the trust purpose also can be accomplished smoothly through the constraint of fiduciary duty and other monitor methods. In modern society, most of commercial management activities'nature is consistent with the characteristic of trust which leads to the renaissance of "commercial trust".
In the end, although the renaissance of "commercial trust" is a fact, there will arise dilemma and contradictions if the commercial trust is applied to regulate mutual fund. On the first hand, the depositary will bring huge costs when the commercial trust is used to operate mutual fund. The costs arise from the internal paradox of right configuration between the manager and depositary, and the contradiction can not be settled in trust law scope. On the other hand, when puts the "business trust" into regulating mutual fund, we can find that the trust law is not in accordance with the aim of investors who hope acquire risk return.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the dominant role of company in commercial exchange activities by means of history research and theory argumentation.
First, By history research, the fact that the corporate affected the method of managing property. The article believes that the function of corporation convert from public management to operate enterprise, and extend to investment domain.
Second, commercial exchange depends on corporate, and corporate depends on the board of directors. It is the mainstay. To a large extent, the nature of the board decides the director of the corporate. The article considers the board as the tool of practicing the monitor function. In other words, the "means" of corporate governance is assured the operation of the corporation by empowering the board competency. The "end" ensures the achievement of the objective by the guide of "shareholders'benefit maximization"
Third, the operation of the corporate depends on the board, and the board is dependent on the independent directors, which is the critical part of the board. In part, the history of board is the history of completion of the independent director institutions. The article holds that the board's fundamental function is monitor, and it is the objective of forming corporate as well.
Finally, the complicated benefits conflicts in mutual fund, as well as lacking the competent tool of monitor induce people to resort to the board. The institutions of board of directors in U.S.A and its reform deserve consideration and reference.
Chapter 4 discusses the legitimacy of "CM" mutual fund from the institutional economics. The article deems that the nature of the corporate is about to fulfill the monitor function so as to forming the "hierarchy" for the sake of the shareholders.
First, the article establishes the economics foundation for "CM" mutual fund through two dimensions. Then, by virtue of "transaction cost economics", the article reveals the deficiency of the court handling the commercial disputes.
Second, when facing the disputes of "rational contract", the function of the court reduced greatly, the article holds the point that the court is not afford to handle the disputes of "CM" mutual fund. By the opinion of "private autonomy in place of judicial intervention", the article tries to approve that it is reasonable to adopt the corporate form to regulate mutual fund, which can puts the disputes into inner governance from judicial judgement.
In the end, the article provides the economics basis for approving the reasonableness of the board of directors. The nature of the board of the "CM" mutual fund is the "agent" who monitors the operation of the property with the empowerment of the investors.
Chapter 5 dissects the malpractice and the root in mutual fund in our country, and designs the basic legal framework preliminarily.
First, the article examines the flush, development of mutual fund in our country.
Second, the article reveals the abuses among the mutual funds in our country by way of "agency theory".
Third, from the perspective of our country, the article also finds question which arises from the paradox of right configuration between the manager and depository. Through the mutual fund reform of Australia, the former opinion is confirmed further.
Finally, the article set out the issues which may arise during the introducing the "CM" mutual fund in our country.
“引言”部分涉及到论文的选题背景、研究目的与意义、国内外研究现状等内容；“引论”作为正文的引子,目的在于诱出文章主题；文章“正文”共分为五章,以下将分别就每章的主要内容作概括性的阐述。
论文第一章阐释监督在共同基金中的基础地位,并从监督的视角审视基金的运作机理。
首先通过厘定基金、投资公司、共同基金三者之间的关系,廓清了后者在基金业中的基本地位。本文认为,共同基金指募集资本并将其投资于股票市场、债权市场以及货币市场的一种投资公司。在考察共同基金发展的历史渊源之后,着重于其迅猛发展背后的原因探求。
其次,通过对主要国家共同基金的考察,发现存在着两种运作模式：“信托模式”与“公司模式”。前者所依托的是独具魅力的信托工具,它是英美法系国家所普遍采用的运作模式,同时,其在大陆法系国家的影响力也与日俱增；后者借助“公司”外壳运作共同基金,现今,愈来愈多的国家已经或将要采纳这一模式。而后,在理顺共同基金治理结构与监督机制之间关系的基础上,论证后者在共同基金治理中的正当性。
最后,从监督的视角详细阐述“信托型”共同基金与“公司型”共同基金的运作机理。现今社会,信托得到了空前的应用,萌生了“商事信托”现代勃兴的趋势。本文认为“商事信托”可分为两个发展阶段：“传统商事信托”阶段与“商业信托”阶段。前者的运作原理几乎等同于传统信托,只不过是将信托应用于投资者人数众多的商事活动而已；后者的出现使信托趋于“组织化”,在渐趋剥离与传统信托关系的同时,转入朝向公司靠拢的发展趋势。另一方面,在“公司型”共同基金中,最明显的特征是通过董事会特别是独立董事制度的构设凸显其监督功能,致力于共同基金的稳健发展。
论文第二章揭示“商事信托”勃兴之现象与根源,并深入剖析其不适宜于共同基金运作的内在原因。
首先,在传统信托中,由于当事人之间的利益冲突并不严重,加上详尽的受托人规范的约束,再配之以委托人或受益人的有效监督以及有力的司法裁判,完全可以顺利地实现对信托目的事业运作的监督。
其次,信托所具有的诸如契约等制度所无法比拟的优越性促生了“商事信托”的勃兴,这体现在其不断拓展的应用领域上。本文认为“商业信托”勃兴分为两个前后相继的发展阶段：第一阶段是“普通法商业信托”,第二个阶段是“法定商业信托”。“商业信托”的勃兴源于其资产保值的内在功能,即当事人之间并不存在尖锐的利益冲突。基于这一特征,借助于受托法的约束与规范,并辅以其他监督手段,也能如传统信托那样顺利地实现信托目的。现代社会多数商事活动的性质暗合了“商事信托”的这一特质,引致了“商事信托”的现代勃兴。
最后,纵然“商事信托”勃兴是一个不争的事实,但是,如果将它应用到共同基金的运作中来,却面临着制度的困境与性质的对冲。第一,将“传统商事信托”应用到共同基金运作时,新增的资产保管人这一层受托关系将会带来巨大的代理成本。成本的增加源于基金管理人与资产保管人之间权利配置的内在悖论,而且这一矛盾在信托法的范围内根本无法彻底根除。第二,将“商业信托”应用到共同基金运作时,基于追求资产保值的特性而设计的一揽子信托规范根本无法契合投资者追求利润最大化的强烈夙愿,与高风险商业活动意欲的目标相去甚远。这一特征通过与公司治理结构的横向对比更加一目了然。
论文第三章借助历史考证与理论论证的方式,阐明公司在商事交易中无可代替的霸主地位。
首先,对公司经营实业历史的回溯在感受到公司咄咄逼人的磅礴气势的同时,也揭示了公司对投资运作模式所起到的“样板”作用以及为“公司模式”进军投资领域奠定了有力根基的基本历史事实。本文认为,公司的发展历程考察使其由公共管理职能向经营实业获取利润,而后向投资领域延伸的发展轨迹昭然若揭。
其次,商事交易看公司,公司组织则要看董事会。董事会是公司发展的中流砥柱,在很大程度上,董事会的性质定位决定着公司运作的方向,本文认为,董事会是践行监督职能的工具。换句话说,公司治理的“方式”是通过赋予董事会为首的“科层机构”以权限保证公司组织的有序运作,“目的”则是将“股东利益最大化”作为指引规则,保证公司经营目标的实现。董事会要担当如此重任的原因,从法学的角度讲,它是克服监督缺位或无力,从而践履公平与正义的不二工具；从政治学的角度看,它满足了人类集体决策的政治诉求。
再次,公司运作要看董事会,董事会的运作则要看独立董事。独立董事系董事会制度构设的肯綮。在一定程度上,甚至可以这样讲,公司董事会演进史就是一部独立董事制度不断改善、臻于完备的历史。本文认为,监督是董事会的根本职能,也是公司设立所欲求达致的目标。
最后,共同基金的特性决定了其内部利益冲突的错综复杂性,亦不存在监督矛盾冲突的得力工具,这促使人们转而求助于董事会。美国法律中有关“公司型”共同基金董事会的制度设计以及新近改革颇值深思与借鉴价值。
论文第四章从制度经济学的视角论证“公司型”共同基金的正当性。本文认为公司的本质是基于股东利益的考虑,为履行监督职能而成立的“科层组织”
首先,通过两个维度的论述,奠定了论证“公司型”共同基金的经济学基础：强调“产权理论”的激励功能,为公司股东所有权的观点提供了经济学论据,也为“股东职权主义”找到了合理性根源；重视“不完全契约理论”对现实世界的真实描述,引出了“关系契约理论”,并借此阐释司法解决商事纠纷的蹩脚之处,而后,凭籍“交易成本经济学”论证“由司法干预转入私人治理”观点的确当性。
其次,面对“关系契约”纠纷,法院定纷止争的裁判功能大大折扣,借此证成了法院不能承受“信托型”共同基金纠纷之重的观点。秉承前述“私人自治代替司法干预”的观点,证明共同基金通过公司这一“外壳”将基金运作过程中潜在矛盾的化解方式由司法裁判转向内部治理做法的正当性。
最后,论证公司董事会存在的经济学基础。有关董事会的职权来源存在“股东职权主义”与“董事会职权主义”两种观点。依“委托-代理理论”这一媒介,架起了利用“团体生产理论”解释公众公司问题的桥梁。通过它证明公众公司中“股东职权主义”的合理性,进而推导出董事会系公司“代理人”的性质定位。异于封闭式公司,公众公司中参与人数众多,因此,有关董事会之职能的解释观点众说纷纭。本文认为,在公众公司中,虽然参与者不少,但是唯有股东的投资具有独特的资产专用性特征。根据“交易成本经济学”的观点,应当向它提供一定的“保障措施”,方可保证股东投资的积极性,基于此,董事会应运而生。同理,借助于该论证思路,本文认为“公司型”基金董事会是获得投资者的授权而对其资产进行监督的“代理人”。
论文第五章剖析我国“信托型”共同基金存在的积弊及其根源,并初步设计了构建我国“公司型”共同基金的基本法律框架。
首先,本文考察共同基金在我国的萌芽、发展,发现我国基金也走过了先封闭式基金后开放式基金,先投资基金后证券投资基金的演进轨迹。
其次,将“委托—代理理论”作为分析工具,揭露我国“信托型”共同基金发展中存在的弊病。本文认为,尽管有些弊病随着市场渐趋成熟和立法逐步完善能够得到明显改善,但是诸如监管不力、关联交易等问题,在我国现有的“信托型”共同基金框架下中根本无法彻底根除。
再次,利用前面论证得出的“在‘信托型’共同基金中存在的资产保管人与基金管理人之间在权利配置上存在悖论”的观点审视我国“信托型”共同基金,发现这一问题在我国同样存在。以澳大利亚修法为佐证,进一步证成这一悖论无法在信托法范围内得到根除的观点的正确性,这一困境召唤“公司型”共同基金的救赎!
最后,阐述我国在引入“公司型”共同基金过程中应当注意的几个问题,特别是董事会与监事会关系问题,紧接着构设了我国“公司型”基金立法的基本框架。
Through corporate or by virtue of trust is two different methods operating mutual fund. Currently, only "Trust Model"("TM") mutual fund is allowed by law in our country, the "Corporate Model"("CM") is not taken into consideration by the legislator. Above all, the article proves the opinion that the trust's characteristics make it un-suitable to regulate mutual fund from the monitor perspective, then analyzes the inner contradictions of right excise between the fund manager ("manager") and the property depositary("depositary"), at the same time, the conflicts between them can not dissolve in the trust law framework. Second, the article demonstrates the corporate is appropriate to operate mutual fund from the perspective of law, politics and economics, which provides solid theoretical foundation for intruding "CM" to our country. In the end, the article provides the basic legal framework about "CM" for our country.
"Introduction" includes the background, purpose etc of the article. "Preface", as the primer, is about to elicit the topic. The main body of the article is divided into five parts, its concise contents will be demonstrated below.
Chapter 1 articulates the fundamental role of monitor in mutual fund, and surveys the operation mechanism from the monitor angle.
First, the article determines the relationship among the fund, investment company and mutual fund, then clarifies the mutual fund's basic status in the fund. In the article, mutual fund means a sort of investment company, which puts capital into the stock market, bonds market or money market. After investigating the history, the article seeks the reasons making the mutual fund rapid development behind.
Second, the article finds that there are two operation models through examining the main countries:"TM" and "CM". The former is the popular model in Common Law country which is based on the trust, and its influence is increasing rapidly. The latter one regulates the mutual fund by virtue of corporate, and more and more countries have accepted or will accept this model. Then, the article demonstrates legitimacy of monitor mechanism in mutual fund on the basis of clarifying the relation between the governance structure and monitor mechanism of the mutual fund.
Last, the article describes the operational mechanism of the "TM" and "CM" mutual fund in detail from the perspective of monitor. Nowadays, the trust is applied to many aspects resulting in renaissance of "commercial trust". In the article's opinion, "commercial trust" is divided into two stages:"traditional commercial trust" and "business trust". The former is equivalent to traditional trust on the whole, the difference is only that it often used in business activities whole investors are numerous. The latter leads the trust becoming "organizational" and converts to corporate while departing the traditional trust. On the other hand, in "CM" mutual fund, the most conspicuous characteristic is to highlight the monitor mechanism by means of board of directors, especially the independent directors so as to steady development of the mutual fund.
Chapter 2 reveals the phenomenon and origin of renaissance of "commercial trust", and analyzes the inner reasons not suitable to regulate mutual fund deeply.
First, as we all known, Because the benefit conflicts between parties in traditional trust is not server, the trust purpose will be accomplished smoothly through the constriction of the fiduciary duty, the effective monitor and the predominant judicial judge.
Second, the advantage belonging to trust causes the renaissance of "commercial trust" which is embodied in expanding applying domain. The article thinks that the "business trust" is divided into two successive stages, that is, "common law business trust" stage and "statutory business trust" stage. The renaissance of "business trust" arises from the inner function of maintaining the value. By virtue of the nature, the trust purpose also can be accomplished smoothly through the constraint of fiduciary duty and other monitor methods. In modern society, most of commercial management activities'nature is consistent with the characteristic of trust which leads to the renaissance of "commercial trust".
In the end, although the renaissance of "commercial trust" is a fact, there will arise dilemma and contradictions if the commercial trust is applied to regulate mutual fund. On the first hand, the depositary will bring huge costs when the commercial trust is used to operate mutual fund. The costs arise from the internal paradox of right configuration between the manager and depositary, and the contradiction can not be settled in trust law scope. On the other hand, when puts the "business trust" into regulating mutual fund, we can find that the trust law is not in accordance with the aim of investors who hope acquire risk return.
Chapter 3 demonstrates the dominant role of company in commercial exchange activities by means of history research and theory argumentation.
First, By history research, the fact that the corporate affected the method of managing property. The article believes that the function of corporation convert from public management to operate enterprise, and extend to investment domain.
Second, commercial exchange depends on corporate, and corporate depends on the board of directors. It is the mainstay. To a large extent, the nature of the board decides the director of the corporate. The article considers the board as the tool of practicing the monitor function. In other words, the "means" of corporate governance is assured the operation of the corporation by empowering the board competency. The "end" ensures the achievement of the objective by the guide of "shareholders'benefit maximization"
Third, the operation of the corporate depends on the board, and the board is dependent on the independent directors, which is the critical part of the board. In part, the history of board is the history of completion of the independent director institutions. The article holds that the board's fundamental function is monitor, and it is the objective of forming corporate as well.
Finally, the complicated benefits conflicts in mutual fund, as well as lacking the competent tool of monitor induce people to resort to the board. The institutions of board of directors in U.S.A and its reform deserve consideration and reference.
Chapter 4 discusses the legitimacy of "CM" mutual fund from the institutional economics. The article deems that the nature of the corporate is about to fulfill the monitor function so as to forming the "hierarchy" for the sake of the shareholders.
First, the article establishes the economics foundation for "CM" mutual fund through two dimensions. Then, by virtue of "transaction cost economics", the article reveals the deficiency of the court handling the commercial disputes.
Second, when facing the disputes of "rational contract", the function of the court reduced greatly, the article holds the point that the court is not afford to handle the disputes of "CM" mutual fund. By the opinion of "private autonomy in place of judicial intervention", the article tries to approve that it is reasonable to adopt the corporate form to regulate mutual fund, which can puts the disputes into inner governance from judicial judgement.
In the end, the article provides the economics basis for approving the reasonableness of the board of directors. The nature of the board of the "CM" mutual fund is the "agent" who monitors the operation of the property with the empowerment of the investors.
Chapter 5 dissects the malpractice and the root in mutual fund in our country, and designs the basic legal framework preliminarily.
First, the article examines the flush, development of mutual fund in our country.
Second, the article reveals the abuses among the mutual funds in our country by way of "agency theory".
Third, from the perspective of our country, the article also finds question which arises from the paradox of right configuration between the manager and depository. Through the mutual fund reform of Australia, the former opinion is confirmed further.
Finally, the article set out the issues which may arise during the introducing the "CM" mutual fund in our country.
引文
1 Charles E. Rounds, Jr.et al., Publicly-Traded Open End Mutual Funds in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions:a Comparsion of Legal Structures,3 N.Y.U. J. L.& Bus.473,501(2007).
2 The Investment Trusts Association, Investment Trusts in Japan,68(2008).
3 Kwang-Rok Kim, the New Arena for Investors in the Korean Securities Market:an Analysis of Mutual Funds form the Perspective of Investors Protection,23WTLR 95,104(2001).
4 A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? a Legal&Econometric Analysis,33 J. Corp. L. 745,765(2008).
5 Stephen I. Erlichman, Making it Mutual:Aligning the Interest of Investors and Managers Recommendations for a Mutual Fund Governance Regime for Canada (2000).
6有学者通过对英国两种运作模式的共同基金的实证研究发现：“公司型”共同基金在节省成本、增大效益方面都优于“信托型”共同基金。A. Joseph Warburton, supra note [4], at 745.
72000年10月,《财经》杂志发表了题为《基金黑幕—关于基金行为的研究报告解析》(简称《基金黑幕》)的文章,引发了不小的震动。该文作者通过对从1999年8月9日到2000年4月28日共9个月的证券投资基金在上海证券交易所证券买卖行为的分析,认为基金业存在着惊人的黑幕：“对倒”、“倒仓”、“关联交易”等问题比比皆是。此文一出,众人皆被震惊。无独有偶,时隔五年之,2005年《基金黑幕》“姊妹篇”—《再揭基金黑幕》,以振聋发聩的口吻提醒着人们：“按照目前现状看来,实际上当时所谓的‘基金黑幕’,其实质问题至今仍未真正触及更谈不上解决。我国基金存在的问题触目惊心、发人深省!
27[美]迈克尔·詹森等：“企业理论：管理行为、代理成本与所有权”,陈郁主编：《所有权、控制权与激励—代理经济学文选》,上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2006年版,第61页。
28 A. Joseph Warburton, supra note [25], at 745.
29 Stephen I. Erlichman, supra note [5]; Aviv Pichhadze:Mutual Fund Governance Reforms:A Commentary,17 B.F.L.R.67.
30K.wang-Rok Kim, supra note [3], at 104.
31黄仁宇：《资本主义与二十一世纪》,北京：三联出版社,2005年版,第31-32页。
32 Robert Charles Clark, the Four Stages of Capitalism:Reflections on Investment Management Treatises,94 Harv. L. Rev. 561,562-566(1981).
33 K. A. D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors,30 J. Corp. L.219,222(2005); Investment Company Institution,2009 Investment Company Fact Book(49th edition),100(2009).
34 Robert Charles Clark, supra note [32], at 568.
35 John H. Langbein, the Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,86 Mich. L. Rev.722,725(1988).
36 Id. at 723.
37 Id. at 725.
38 John H.Langbein, the Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,105 Yale L.J.625,638(1995).
39 Id.at 638-639.
40 Tamar Frankel et al, Investment Management Regulation,16-17(1998).
41 Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law,236 (1922).
42黄仁宇,前注[31],第493页。
43韦森：“经济增长与社会繁荣”,《读书》,2009年第4期,第10页。
44陈彩虹：“亚当·斯密与凯恩斯之争又起”,《读书》,2009年第4期,第4页。
45同上注,第5页；张维迎,“理解经济危机”,《读书》,2009年第5期,第37页。
46张维迎,同上注,第37页。
47邓正来：《哈耶克法律哲学的研究》,北京：法律出版社,2004年版,第43-44页。
48 Richard H.Farina et al., The Mutual Fund Industry:a Legal Survey, Notre Dame L.732,737(1969).
49 Investment Company Institute, supra note [33], at 9.
50 Id, at 72.
51 Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman et al., Forming, Organizing and Operating and Operating a Mutual Fund-Legal and Practical Considerations,19(2008).
52 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., Mutual Fund Regulation, Practising Law Institute, PLIREF-MFRs 1:1,1-2(2009).
53当然,本法也规定了一些例外情况。Victoria E. Schonfeld et al., Organization of a Mutual Fund,49 Bus.Law,107(1993).
54 Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman et al., supra note [51],at 19.
55本文将在同一意义上使用这两个术语。
56 Victoria E. Schonfeld et al., supra note [53], at 112.
57 Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman et al., supra note [51], at 25.
58 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 23:3. 1.
59 Id. at 23:3.2.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 23:4.
62 David Schneider, if at First You Don't Succeed:Why the SEC Should Try and Try again to Regulate Hedge Fund Adivsers,9J. Bus.& Sec. L.261(2009).
63 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 100.
64例如,2009年10月16日,美国司法部宣布拉贾拉特南和其他五人涉嫌操控多家公司股票的“对冲基金”内线交易,非法获利逾2000万美元,引起了基金市场的巨大震动。
65 David Schneider, supra note [62], at 261.
66 Jay B. Gould, Gerald T.Lins,Unit Investment Trusts:Structure and Regulation under the Federal Securities Laws,43 Bus. Law.1177,1188(1988).
67 Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, supra note [26], at 1026.
68 SEC, Report on Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No.2337,89th Cong.,2d Sess.102(1966).
691965年,前者为管理费用平均支出的费用为资产的0.31%；而后者支出则为0.57%；前者为费用中最为关键的部分—“管理费”的支出为0.25%,后者支出约为0.45%.Id.
70Id. at 148-149.
71 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52],at 1:1 (2009).
72 Investment Company Institute,2002 Investment Company Fact Book(42th),11(2002).
73 Clifford E. Kirsch et al.,supra note [52], at 1:1 (2009).
74 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(a)(1).
75 Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No.24082,10(1999).
76其一,在立法听证会议记录中保存着两个基金公司管理人员的陈述,他们将基金称作“相互投资公司”(Mutual Investment Company)。其中一个人被问及该词来源时,他说：“像我所开办的这样的公司一般都被称为‘相互投资公司’,但无法回答其来源为何。”其二,1940年基金行业发言人曾说过,财政部经常将开放式公司称作“共同基金”(MutualFund)。其三,另一个可能是,使用“共同”(Mutual)—语指称这类公司可能源于20世纪30年代SEC与基金经理的一段对话。当SEC官员问及：“这是个不错的词语……。”基金经理说：“是的。”Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 737.
77 K.Geert Rouwenhorst,The Orgins of Mutual Funds,Yale International Center for Finance Working Paper No. 04-48,1(2004), http://ssm.com/abstract=636146.
78 Id.
79 Wagner, Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S. Rep. No.76-1775,3(1940).
80[美]里·格雷米林：《美国开放式共同基金》,杨学宏等译,北京：中国金融出版社,2006年版,第16页。
81 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 79.
82 Barry P. Barbash, Director, Div. of Inv.Mgmt, SEC, Mutual Fund Consolidation and Globalization:Challenges for the Future, Remarks at the Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference(Mar.23,1998),http://www.sec.gov/ news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch208.htm.
83 Investment Company Institute, supra note [49], at 167.
84 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 737.
85 Investment Company Institute, supra note [49], at 9.
89[英]亚当·斯密：《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》,郭大力等译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第1页。
90 William F.Sharpe et al., Investments,134-193 (4th ed.1989).
91 Ronald J. Gilson et al., (Some of the) Essentials of Finance and Investment,95-97(1993).
92 Id.at 97.
93 Id. at 96.
94Only Perform:a Survey of Investment Management, Economist,8(1993).
95 Nora M. Jordan, United States Regulation of Funds, in Practising Law Inst., Int'l Sec. Markets 2004 Best Practices & Changing Requirements in Global Markets 633,636 (2004).
96尽管前面提及的“ETFs”也属于开放式投资公司的类型,但它明显区别于共同基金。'ETFs"严格限制赎回,并且公告当日交易份额,这些特征明显具有封闭式基金的特性。正如Gastineau教授说的那样,“ETFs”是开放式基金与封闭式基金的混合体,它们的交易颇像普通股票和封闭式基金,但另一方面,却如开放式基金一样,资产份额可以赎回。DanielJ.Grimm, A Process of Natural Corpection:Arbitrage and the Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds under the Investment Company Act,11 U. Pa. J. Bus.& Emp.L.95,102 (2008).
97 SEC,supra note [75]应当注意,为了行文上保持一致性,本文将美国《投资公司法》中所称的“投资咨询人”改称为“基金管理人”,“咨询费用”改称为“管理费用”,“投资咨询契约”改称为“基金管理契约”,“股东”改称为“投资者”,特此说明。
98 Stephen I. Erlichman, supra note [5], at 25.
121 John C. Coffee, Jr, Liquidity Versus Control:the Institutional Investor as Corporate monitor,91Colum. L. Rev.1277, 1302(1991).
122 Id. at 1303.
123 Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Corporate Governance:Which Model of Capitalism?,23 Brook.J.Int'l L.833,(1998).
124 Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners,188(1994).
125 Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,102 Yale L.J. 1927,1928(1993).
126 John C. Coffee, supra note [121], at 1294.
127 Janis Sarra, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Candadian and International Developments,76 Tul. L. Rev. 1691,1716(2002).
128 Angel R.Oquendo, Breaking on Through to the Other Side:Understanding Continental European Corporate Goverance, 22 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.975,981(2001).
129 Id. at 975.
130 Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets,1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.167,167(1998).
131 Id.
132 Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone of Insolvency:a Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan,26 Penn State Int'l L. Rev.139.153(2007).
133 Mark J. Roe, supra note [130], at 168.
134美国认识到德国双层管理体制的优点之后,从中吸取了合理的成分,不断加强本国独立董事制度改革。Angel R.Oquendo, supra note [128], at 1021.
135 Jeffrey N. Gordon et al., German Corporate Governance, and the Transition Costs of Capitalism,1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.185,201(1998).
136 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, the Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,118 Harv. L. Rev.833,848(2005).
137 Review of U.K. Governance Arrangements, Inv. Mgmt. Ass'n, Review of the Governance Arrangements of United Kingdom Authorized Collective Investment Schemes,21-22 (2005)这里的资产保管人就是指银行。Charles E. Rounds, supra note [1], at 483.
138 A. Joseph Warburton, supra note [4], at 766.
139 Charles E. Rounds, Jr.et al., supra note [1], at 501.
140 John K. Thompson et al., supra note [102], at 37.
141 Id.
142 Luigi Zingales, "Corporate Governance" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law(1998).
143 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 3.
144 Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices,108 Colum. L. Rev.1803,1810(2008).
145 Cal. Pub. Employees'Ret. Sys., Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance 8 (2008), http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/docs/2008-8-18-global-principles-accountable-corp-gov-final.pdfiMelvin A. Eisenberg, the Structure of the Corporation:a Legal Analysis (1976).
146 Sanjai Bhagat et al., supra note [444].
147 IOSOC,supra note [99], at 3. "OECD"和"IOSCO"使用的术语是"CIS" (Collective Investment Schemes,“集体投资计划”),而没有直接使用共同基金术语。“CIS”,按照他们的解释,包括多种开放式契约,例如共同基金、单位信托、投资信托等等。为了行为的一致,本文直接使用共同基金这一术语,特此说明。
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 4.
151 Stephen M.Bainbridge, Director Primacy:the Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547,599(2003).
152 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 5.
153 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 1:4.1(2009).
154 John K. Thompson et al., supra note [102], at 9.
155 Harold S.Bloomentha, Securities Law Handbook Database updated,1 SECLAW-HB § 20:1(2008).
156 National Instrument 81-107 Independent Review Committee for Investment Funds Supplement to the OSC Bulletin,4(2006).
157 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 5.
158“用益受封人”指为第三人用益而受让并持有土地的人。薛波主编：《元照英美法词典》,北京：法律出版社,2003年版,第544页。Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees:Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules,94 Geo. L.J.67, 73(2005).
159 R. H. Helmholz, the Early Enforcement of Uses,79 Colum. L. Rev.1503,1503(1979).
160 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 670.
161 Id. at 633.
162 Id. at 638.
163Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 73.
164 Id.
165 Frederic W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in Selected Essays141,175 (H.D. Hazeltine et al.eds.,1936).
166 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 639.
167 Id. at 642.
168我国学者一般认为“商事信托”是指委托人为自己和他人的利益,委托专门经营信托业务的商业机构为受托人从事商业活动而设立的信托,也即“营业信托”。“民事信托”是指委托人为自己或他人的利益,委托普通的自然人为受托人从事一般民事活动而设立的信托,亦称为“非营业信托”。“民事信托”与“营业信托”的区分,主要是根据受托人是否专门从事信托业务而定,而与委托人、信托目的等因索均无直接关系。彭插三：《信托受托人法律地位比较研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2008年版,第20-21页；谢哲胜：《财产法专题研究》(三),北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004年版,第233页。
169 Thomas E.Plank, the Bankruptcy Trsut as Legal Person,35 Wake Forest L. Rev.51,256(2000).
170应当注意的是,本文所阐述的“传统商事信托”并不包括那些民事信托,也就是说仅指那些商业受托人担任受托人的情形,即学者所说的“典型商业信托”,彭插三,前注[168],第109页。在这些“典型商业信托”中,就排除了那些能够作为“民事信托”而成立的各种“私意信托”,包括由商业受托人担任受托人的情形,即所谓的“非典型的商业信托”,彭插三,前注[168],第109页。因此,排除这些情形之后,这里的商事信托是那种只能由商事受托人担任受托人的信托,即有价证券、投资信托、贷款信托、带抵押公司债信托、养老金信托等。彭插三,前注[168],第109页。
171 John H. Langbein, the Secret Life of the Trsut:the Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,107 Yale L.J.165,166(1997).
172 Morrison v Lennett,616 N.E.2d 92,94 (Mass.1993).
173 George Gleason Bogert et al., Bogert's Trusts And Trustees,247(2009).
174 Hecht v.Malley,265 U.S.144 146-47 (1924).
175 Rosenbalm, Wheeler A, Massachusetts trust,31 Tenn.L.Rev.471,471(1964).
176彭插三,前注[168],第108页。
177 American Law Institute,Restatement(Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt. a, at 21 (Tentative Draft No.1, April 5,1996);Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Hague Convention of Trusts:Much A do About Very Little,3 J. Int'l Trust & Corp. Planning 5,14(1994).
178 Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trusts Act Failure as the New Corporate Law,23 Cardozo L. Rev.325,327(2001).
179 Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as "Uncorporation":a Research Agenda,2005 U.111. L. Rev.31,35-36(2005).
183 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173], at 7.
184 Charles E. Rounds, Jr.et al., supra note [11, at 483.
185 Restatment (Second) of Trusts, §2(1959).
186 Joseph W. Blackburn, Constitutional Limits on State Taxation of a Nonresident Trustee:Gavin Misinterppet and Misapplies Both Quill and Mcculloch,76 Miss. L.J.1,5(2006).
187 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173], at 555.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 557.
191 West's Fla.S.A.§660.011.
192 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173], at 555.
193 Id.
194 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 37.当然,也有相反的观点:John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at166.
195 Herbert B. Chermside,Jr., J.D., Annotation, Modem Status of the Massachusetts or Business Trust,88 A.L.R.3d 704 (1978 & Supp.2001).
196 88 A.L.R3d 704 §4[a].
197 Id. at 4[b].
198 Id.at6[a].
199 Id. at 7.
200 Id. at 10.
201Tamar Frankel, supra note [178], at 327.
202 Id.
203 Supra note[196],at 2.
204 1 Ltd. Liab. Co.:L, Prac. and Forms § 11:8 (2009).
205 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 479.
206 James E. McWhinney, A Brief History Of The Mutual Fund http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/ MFhistory.asp?Page=2 (last visited Nov.21,2009).
207 K. Geert Rouwenhorst, The Origins of Mutual Funds 17 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt, Int'l Center for Fin.,Working Paper No. 04-48,2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=636146 (last visited Mar.23,2009).
208 Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Trading at Stale Prices With Modern Technology:Policy Options for Mutual funds in the Internet Age,7 Va. J.L.& Tech 6,24(2002).
209 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 10; John K. Thompson et al., supra note [102], at 50.
210 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 14:5.2(2009).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1:2.
214 SEC, Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies,66FR3734,3735(2001).
2152 Model Bus.Corp Acct Ann.(3d ed),8-9.
250 Id. at 6.
251 Roger W. Andersen, Understanding Trusts and Estates,81(2003).
252 George Gleason Bogert et al.,supra note [173],at 7.
253 Id. at 8.
254 A. Watson, Legal Transplants, an Approach to Comparative Law (1974).
255 Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Leagal Transplants:an Eaasy in Comparative Law and Economics,14 Int'1 Rev. L.& Econ.3,8(1994).
256 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 446.
257 Id. at 447.
258 Restatement (Second) of Trusts §197-99 (1959).
259 N.H. Andrews, Does a Third Party Beneficiary Have a Right in English Law?,8 Legal Stud.14 (1988).
260 Anthony Jon Waters, the Property in the Promise:A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule,98 Harv. L. Rev.1109, 1111-1112(1985).
261 Hein Kotz, Rights of Third Parties, Third Party Beneficiaries and Assignment,7 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,7-11(1992).
273 1 Austin Wakeman Scott, the Law of Trusts §1.4,13(1939).
274 Id. at 1.4,5.
275 Id. at 1.4,13.
276 Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 74.
277 Edward Rock et al., Dangerous Liaisons:Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinallegal Transplants,96 Nw. U. L. Rev.651,653(2002).
278 Restatement of Trusts§170(1)(1935).
279 Restatement of Trusts §205 (1935).
280 Restatement of Trusts §170 (2) (1935).
281 Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 82.
282 Jeffrey N. Gordon, the Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule,62 N.Y.U. L. Rev.52,76-79(1987)按照经济学家奥尔森的观点,可以这样理解“集体行动”现象：集团规模大、成员多使得做到“赏罚分明”得花费高额的成本,它包括有关集体利益和个人利益的信息成本和度量成本以及奖惩制度的实施成本等。显然,不仅仅是收益分享问题阻碍了大集团实现其共同利益,而且组织成本随着集团规模的扩张而剧增也使之难以为继。[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森：《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁等译,上海：上海三联出版社、上海人民出版社,2006年版,第7页。
283 Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods,37 Emory L.J.295,319 (1988).
284 Daniel Fischel et al., ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:the Exclusive Benefit Rule,55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105,1114(1988).
285 Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 84; John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty:Sole Interest or Best Interest? 114YaleL.J.929,957(2005).
293 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 569.
294 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 166.
295 Id.
296 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 34.
297 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 188-189.
298 K. Geert Rouwenhorst, supra note [77].
299 J. Hawley and A. Williams, The Emergence of Fiduciary Capitalism 5 Corporate Governance:an International Review 4, 206-213(1997).
300 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 189.
307 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 186.
308王志诚：《信托之基本法理》,中国台湾：台湾元照出版公司,2005年版,第275页。
309 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 34.
310 George Gleason Bogert et al.,supra note [173], at 247.
311 Id.
312 E. WARREN, Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation,330(1929).
313 Sheldon A. Jones et al., the Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies,13 Del. J. Corp.L. 421,424(1988).
314 Id. at 425.
315 Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws,40 Hous. L. Rev.77 2003,77(2003).
316 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [3131, at 425.
317 Report of the Massachusetts Tax Commissioner on Voluntary Associations, Mass. House Rep. No.1646,21-23(1912).
318 Jennifer L. Berger et al.,Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §8227 (rev. ed.2003).
319 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 426.
320 Id.
321公司法之所以规定禁止公司从事不动产交易,其背后的原因在于：立法机构试图通过立法终结教会掌握的大宗土地所有权以及免于征税的做法。Id.
322 William C. Dunn, Trusts for Business Purposes (1922); John H. Sears, Trust Estates as Business Companies (2d ed.1921); Sydney R. Wrightington, the Law of Unincorporated Associations and Business Trusts (2d ed.1923); Guy A. Thompson, Business Trusts as Substitutes for Business Corporations (1920).
323 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 188-189.
324 Nicholas Karambelas,1 Ltd. Liab. Co.:L., Prac.and Forms §11:2 (2009).
331 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 428-429.
332 Id.at 429.
333 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 37.
334 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 166.
335例如,《特拉华州商业信托法》制定的目的就是为了消除这些不确定性因素。Tamar Frankel, supra note [178], at 326.
336 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 35.
337 Frank H. Easterbrook et al., the Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
338 John Armour et al., The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law,27 Oxford J. Legal Stud.429,431(2007).
339 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [339], at 5; Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm,119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333,(2006).
340 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 434.
341 RobertH.Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law,89 Cornell L. Rev.621,631(2004).
342 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 472.
343 Id. at 427.
344 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 184.
345 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109],at 672-673(1998).; Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 458.
346 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 640.
347 Id.
348 Id. at 641.
357 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, the Law of Trusts,§176, at 482 (4th ed.1987); David Hayton, English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law,32 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L.555,556 (1997); Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule)§227, at 20.
358 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note[114], at 330.
359 Id. at 331.
360 Id. at 330.
361 Sarah Worthington, Public Unit Trusts:Principles, Policy and Reform of theTrustee and Manager Roles.UNSW law Journal,265(1991).
362 Collective Investments:Other People's Money,133(1993), http://www.camac.gov.au.
363 Sarah Worthington, supra note [361], at 266.
376 Id. at 31.
377 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 566; Henry Hansmann et al.,supra note [109], at 442.; John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 166.
378 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. Fin. Econ.305,313(1976).
379 Henry Hansmann et al., the New Entities in Historical Perspective,2005 U.Ill. L.Rev.5,14(2005).
380 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 573.
391 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 565.
392例如在资产证券化领域中,委托人将资产通过信托方式转让给受托人,受托人通过发行证券的方式向投资者募集资金。在理论上,投资者与委托人之间存在着一定的利益冲突,因为资产用于满足投资者利益后留有的资产量必然减少。然而,在资产证券化中,不同于一般的公司,这种利益冲突实际上并不存在。也就是说,其设立不在于获取风险性回报,相反,委托人仅仅保留了剩余权利请求权,他/她希望信托财产价值不受贬损。因此,它根本不同于公司的营利性目的。
393 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 583.
394 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [114], at 333; Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [3131, at 453.
395 William Meade Fletcher,16A Fletcher Cyc. Corp.§ 8232.
396 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [114], at 335.
410Butler,Corporations and Express Trust as Business Organizations,13Mich.L.Rev.71,71(1914).
411Guy A.Thompson,supra note [322],at 5.
412Jesse H.Choper et al.,Case and Materials on Corporations,(5th edition),北京:中信出版社,2003年版,第12页.
431 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [339], at 5;Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm,119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333,1398(2006).
432 Id. at 1395.
433 Id. at 1395.
434 Jesse H. Choper et al., supra note [4121, at 21.
435 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [339], at 5; Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [431], at 1396.
436 Guy A.Thompson, supra note [322], at 6.
437 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [481, at 772.
438 Id. at 773.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 Id.
443 Id. at 774.
444 Jesse H. Choper et al., supra note [412], at 23.
445 Eric M. Fogel et al., Strangers in the house:Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors,32 Del. J. Corp. L.33,38(2007).
446 Christian C. Day, supra note [4231, at 526.
447 Id.
448 Id.
449Eric M. Fogel et al., supra note [4451, at 38.
450相反的观点可参见：Walter Werner,Corporation Law in Search of Its Future,81 Colum. L. Rev.1611,1637(1981).
454 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 547.
455 Milton Friedman, the Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept.13,1970, §6 (Magazine),32-33(1970).
456 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand:The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977).
457 Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation 92(rev. ed.1972).
458 Eric M. Fogel et al., supra note [445], at 38.
467 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,119 Harv. L. Rev.1735,1735 (2006); Margaret M. Blair et al., A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,85 Va. L. Rev.247,253-54 (1999).
468 George W. Dent, Jr, Academics in Wonderland:the Team Production and Director Primacy Modells of Corporate Governance,44 Hous. L. Rev.1213,1213(2008).
469 Matthew T. Bodie,Time Warner and the False Gop of Sharehoder Primacy,31 J. Corp. L.975,(2006).
470170 N.W.668,684 (Mich.1919).
471 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 575.
472 R. Edward Freeman et al., Stockholders and Stakeholders:a New Perspective on Corporate Governance,25 Cal. Mgmt. Rev.88,89(1983).
473 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism:a Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship,82 Cornell L. Rev.856,887(1997).
474 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors'Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency,1 J. Bus.& Tech. L.335,336(2007).
484 Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations 281 (3d ed.1992);Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm,24 J. Corp. L.819,825-26 (1999)经济学者也坚持同样的观点,例如,Sanford J. Grossman et al., the Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,94 J. Pol. Econ. 691,695 (1986);Oliver Hart, an Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,89 Colum. L. Rev.1757,1765-66 (1989); Oliver Hart et al., Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,98 J. Pol. Econ.1119,1119-20 (1990)当然,这一观点也遭到了不少的质疑和批评。Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:the Role of Shareholder Primacy,31 J. Corp. L. 637,649(2006); Stout教授认为：“股东所有权是论证‘股东取权主义’最糟糕的证据。”Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy,75 S. Cal. L. Rev.1189,1190 (2002); Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of its Future,81 Colum. L. Rev.1611,1629-44(1981).
485 Adolf A. Berle et al., the Modern Corporation and Private Property,6 (1932).
486 Id. at 7.
487 Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:an Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures,32 WM.& MARY L. REV.587,633-635(1991).
488 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note[378], at 308-310.
489[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,前注[282],第2页。
490 Arthur R. Pinto, the European Union's Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from an American Perspective:some Comparisons and Observations,32 Fordham lnt'l L.J.587,953(2009).
491 Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance:Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm,36 Loy. U.Chi.L.J.1111,1201(2005).
492 Robert Clark, Corporate Law,390-396 (1986).
493“优里赛斯”,希腊神话传说中的人物,又叫“尤利克塞斯”。希腊联军围攻特洛伊10年期间,“优里赛斯”英勇善战、足智多谋、屡建奇功。
494 Jonathan R. Macey, Fundamental Corporate Changes:Causes, Effects and Legal Responses:Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental and Corporate Changes,1989 DUKE L.J.173,180-81(1989).
495 Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Inveting:Will it Happen? Will it Work? 55 Ohio St. L.J.1009,1015(1994)
496 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, the Structure of the Corporation:A Legal Analysis 156-170(1976).
497 Lynn A. Stout, the Shareholder as Ulysses:Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Corporations Tolerate Board Governance,152 U. Pa. L. Rev.667,674(2003).
498 Kenneth J. Arrow, the Limits of Organization,68-70 (1974).
499 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 577.
500 Id. at 558.
501 Kenneth J. Arrow, supra note [498], at 68-69.
502 Stephen J. Margolis et al., Path Dependence, in 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics 17 (Peter Newman ed.,1998).
503 Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 Del. J. Corp. L.147,149(2001).
504 Id. at 147.
505 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,109 Harv. L. Rev.641,644 (1996).
506 Craig LaChance, Nature v. Nurture:Evolution, Path Dependence and Corporate Governance,18 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 279,288(2001).
507 Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers Weak Owners:the Political Roots of American Corporate Finance(1994); Mark J. Roe, Backlash,98 COLUM. L. REV.217 (1998); Mark J. Roe, German "Populism" and the Large Public Corporation,14 INT'L REV. L.& ECON.187 (1994); Roberta Romano, the Genius of American Corporate Law 52-85 (1993); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes,73 VA. L. REV.111 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law,65 TEX. L. REV.469 (1987).
508 Jeffrey N. Gordon, the Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,1950-2005:of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,59 Stan. L. Rev.1465,1469(2007).
509 Id. at 1477.
510 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,33 Hofstra L. Rev. 89,129(2004).
511本文之所以选取这一主体展开论述,其原因是相较于其他主体,15世纪之时,要建立城镇,必须从皇室获取特许状,其本身就非常类似于公司,具有较强的可比性。Id.at 144.
512 Id. at 141.
513Id.“验尸官”作为皇家官员,拥有郡内的管辖权,负责调查死因、主持验尸,并在必要时代替郡长行使职责。薛波,前注[158],第324页。
514Id.at 142."Borough"指享有自治特权或在议会中享有自己的代表的市镇。从安格鲁萨克逊时代起,那些筑堡设防的地方被称为自治市。尽管它受各郡行政管辖,但是有自己独特的习惯、特权和法庭。薛波,前注[158],第168页。
515 Id. at 144.
516按照Gevurtz教授的观点,伊普斯威奇可供选择的治理模式主要有：行政长官制、十二管理人委员会、市政议会。Id.at 148.
517 Id. at 151.
518 Id. at 144.
519Id. at 144-145.
520 Id. at 144.
521 Cyril O'Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive,26 Bull. Bus. Hist. Soc'y 55,61(1952).
522 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 115.
523 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 120.
524 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 112.
525 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 114-115.
526 Id. at 115.
533 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Federal Corporate Law:Lessons From History,106 Colum. L. Rev.1793,1801(2006).
534 Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea,22 J. L. Econ. & Org.366,400(2006).
535 Peter J. Wallison, All the Rage:Will Independent Directors Produce Good Corporate Governance?(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Jan 2006), online at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23648/pub_detail.asp; Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance,54 Bus.Law.921,954(1999).
536高明华等：“独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析—兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境”,《南开经济研究》,2002年第2期。
537 Sanjai Bhagat et al., the Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices,108 Colum. L. Rev.1803(2008).
538 Id.
539 Jeffrey N. Gordon, supra note [508], at 1500.
540 Jay W. Lorsch et al., Pawns or Potentates:The Reality of America's Corporate Boards (1989).
541 Jeffrey N. Gordon, supra note [5081, at 1511.
542 Id. at 1477.
543 Id. at 1527.
544Id. at 1476.
545 Id. at 1510.
546 Id. at 1469.
547 Id. at 1541.
548 Walter P. North, a Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation,44 Notre Dame L. Rev.677(1969).
549 Alan R. Palmiter, supra note [24], at 168-169.
550 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 768.
551 Id.
552 Id.
553 Investment Trust Study, Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, H.R. Rep. No.76-2639, at 10(3d Sess.1940).
554 Id.
555 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 769.
556 Harold S.Bloomenthal, supra note [155].
557 James M. Storey et al., The Uneasy Chaperone34(2000).
558 Burks v. Lasker,441 U.S.471,484(1979).
559 John Nuveen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov.18,1986).
560 Supra note [233], at 4902-4903.
561 Id.
562服务提供者主要包括：(1)基金管理人(The Investment Adviser)其主要功能在于对基金资产进行日常管理,包括进行基金组合交易活动；(2)行政管理人(The Administrator)其主要功能在于向基金提供管理的、行政的服务,以及提供文书人员、办公设施等资源协助实现基金的日常运作;(3)承销商(The Underwriter or Distributor)它从共同基金中购买基金份额并将其销售至公众投资者或其它次级承销商；(4)资产保管人(The Custodian)主要功能是对基金资产(包括现金和证券在内)进行保管：(5)过户代理人(The Transfer Agent)主要是帮助基金公司做好基金的发行、回购的纪录工作;(6)独立审计(The Independent Auditor)至少每年一次向股东报告一次基金的财务状况。)
563尽管1940年《投资公司法》并不要求要经过董事会通过,但是各州法律一般都有这样的规定。实践中,一般也这样做。Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 6:2,2(2009).
564 SEC, Task Force on the Fund Director's Guidebook, Fund Director's Guidebook (3d ed)(2006).
565 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 2:4,3.
566 Id. at 14:3.
567 Id.
568 Id.
569 Id. at 2:4,5.
578 Section 10(e)of the 1940 Act.
579 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 14:5,6.
580 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 68.Victor Brudney, the Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village? 95Harv.L. Rev.597(1982).
581 Alan R. Palmiter,supra note [24], at 166
582 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 68.
583例如,王文宇教授在其博士论文中提到："UFIC" ("Unified Fee Investment Company",“统一费用投资公司”)可以兼顾“公司型”共同基金与“契约型”共同基金的优势,值得提倡。Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, supra note [261, at 956-958.
584 William J.Nutt, a Study of Mutual Fund Independent Diercetors,120U.Pa.L.Rev.179,185(1971).
585 Id. at 183.
586 Wharton School of Finance & Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. REP. NO.2274,87th Cong.,2d Sess,490-491,(1962).
601 Martin Gelter, the Dark Side of Shareholder Influence:Managerial Auotnomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Corporate Governance,50 Harv. Int'1 L.J.129,135(2009).
602 Regina F.Burch, the Myth of the Unbiased Director,41 Akron L. Rev.509,536(2008).
603 Stephen M.Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics 18-19(2002).
604 Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law,55 J. Legal Educ.342,343(2005).
605 Bayless Manning, the Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy:an Essay for Frank Coker,72 Yale L.J.223,245 n.37(1962).
606 Roberta Romano, supra note [604], at 345.
616 Oliver Hart, supra note [484], at 1759.
617杨瑞龙,前注[614],第79页。当然,有学者也指出该理论并不具有人们所想象的那样的基础性地位。例如Rock教授曾指出“自Berle教授与Means教授以来,公司法的主要问题就是代理成本,这一点是人所共知的,而且阐释这个观点的经济学模型以及词汇也随即产生。”Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609],at 1624.
618 Armen A. Alchian et al., Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 Am. Econ. Rev.777(1972).
619杨瑞龙,前注[611],第40页。
620聂辉华：“企业的本质：一个前沿综述”,《产业经济评论》,2003年第2期,第4页。另外,有学者提出该理论存在两个重大缺陷：第一,名为“契约”理论,却仅仅集中于几个重要的财产关系的研究上,对其他契约关系避而不谈,从而使得“契约理论”大打折扣；第二,该理论建立在完全契约的基础上也是成问题的。Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1629.
621杨瑞龙,前注[6]4],第79页。
622 Bengt Holmstrom, the Firm as a Subeconomy,15 J.L. Econ.& Org.74,80(1999).
623 Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1630.
624 Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) and Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (1974); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618]; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk, and Information:Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy,6 Bell J. Econ.552 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation:The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange,6 Bell J. Econ.250 (1975).
625 Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1632.
626 Id.
627[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森：《资本主义经济制度》,段毅才等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第31-32页。
628 Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1630.
629 Id. at 1634.
630 Id.
631Oliver Hart et al., supra note [4841, at 1120.
632例如,根据交易成本经济学,如果两个企业之间存在高度专用性的投资,那么通过“一体化”就可以减少潜在的“敲竹杠”或者机会主义行为的危害。但是,新产权学派批评道,为什么一个独立的企业主变成另一个企业的雇员之后,他的机会主义行为就会减少呢?或者说,一个独立的企业主与一个雇员之间究竟有什么本质的差别呢?此外,交易费用经济学业没有具体考察“一体化”的产权结构,如果两个企业都具有专用性资产,那么一体化后谁又拥有企业的所有权呢?杨瑞龙,前注[611],第112页。
633杨瑞龙,前注[611],第135页。
634[美]哈特：《企业、合同与财务结构》,费方域译,上海：格致出版社、上海三联出版、上海人民出版社,2008年版,第2页。
635[美]科斯等：《财产权利与制度变迁—产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,胡庄君等译,上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2003年版,第3页。
636同上注,第9页。
637 Robert B. Thompson, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:"Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers,80 Tex. L. Rev.261,FN 18(2001).
638 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618]当两个以上的人共同劳作时,他们各自的产出不易测查,“团体生产”问题就会出现。换言之,由于直接测查每一团队成员的业绩要么不现实,要么要付出高昂的成本,或者每一成员的产出与其他成员的产出无法区分开来,因此使得基于成员的产出的质量与数量进行奖励的办法不可能实现。Robert B. Thompson, supra note [637].
639 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618], at 781-782.
640[美]科斯等,前注[635],第9页。
641 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note[378], at 311.
642 Id.
643陈郁主编,前注[27],第9页。
644 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law,39 B.C. L. Rev.283,295 (1998);Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation,84 Cornell L. Rev.1195,1213 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence:Lessons from Kmart,74 N.C. L. Rev.1037, 1059(1996).
645按照詹森、梅克林的观点,委托人的监督支出、代理人的保证支出以及剩余损失共同构成了代理成本。Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note[378], at 308.
646 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 565.
647 EugeneF.Fama et al., Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions,14 J.Fin.Econ.101,102-103(1985).
648 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 565.
649[美]哈特,前注[634],第8页。
650同上注,第10页。
651同上注,第7页。为了行文的一致,本文将所有“合同”术语称为“契约”。
652[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第5页。“‘交易成本经济学’’像‘产权理论’一样,也承认所有权的作用非常重要；它进一步认识到,绝不可忽略签订合同以前激励组合机制所起的作用。”[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前
注[627],第46页。
653同上注,第35页。
654同上注,第20页。
655同上注,第46页。
658[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第78页。
659康芒斯提出了这样的命题：“应当正确地把交易作为分析的基本单位。”同上注,第11页。
660同上注,第593页。
661同上注,第36页。
662同上注,第78页。所谓的资产专用性,是指一种专用性投资一旦做出,不能转为其他用途,除非付出生产性价值的损失,它包括地点专用、物质专用、人力专用、专项用途、品牌专用以及临时专用等。杨瑞龙,前注[614],第86页。
663同上注,第83页。
671如阿连·施瓦茨所说的那样：“契约学者渐趋关注一种被称作关系契约的契约类型；而经济学家渐趋关注一种被称作不完全契约的契约类型。对法学学者来说,关系契约往往就是不完全契约。”本文将在同一意义上使用这两个术语。Alan Schwartz, Relational contracts in the Courts:an Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies,21 J.legal Stud.271,271 (1992)
672 Eric A. Posner, a theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error,94 Nw. U. L. Rev.749,749(2000).
673 Id. at 759.
674 James W. Fox Jr, Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship,54Case W. Res. L. Rev.1,3-4(2003).
675 Macneil, the New Social Contract:An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven:Yale University Press,10(1980).
676 Ian R.Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology:A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos,143 J. Inst.& Theoretical Econ.272,274 (1987).
677 Id.
678 Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,72 Nw. U. L. Rev.854 (1978).
679 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is no Law Relational Contracts,94 Nw. U. L. Rev.805,816(2000).
680 Id. at 808.
681 Id. at 811.
682 Charles J. Goetz et al., the Mitigation Principle:Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation,69 Va. L. Rev.967, 1091 (1983).
683 Eric A. Posner, supra note [672], at 751.
684 Id. at 758.
685 Id. at 751.
686 Id.
687 Id. at 753
688 Charles Goetz et al., Principles of Relational Contracts,67 Va. L. Rev.1089 (1981)
689 Eric A. Posner, supra note [672], at 753.
690 Id. at 759.
691 Id.
692 Id. at 753.
693 Id.
694 Id.
695 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 45-46.
696 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 23.
697 Stephen M. Bainbridge, the Business judgement Rule as Stention Doctrine,57 Vand. L. Rev.83,118(2004).
698 Id.
699 Id.
700 Id.at 118-119.
701杨瑞龙、聂辉华,前注[656],第108页。
702 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 119(2004).
703 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 176-177.
704 Robert B. Thompson, supra note [637].
705麦克尼尔认为公司是最大的关系契约之一。Ian R. MacNeil,supra note [743],at 492; Ian R. Macneil,supra note [678],at 890,NF114; Frank H. Easterbrook et al.,supra note [337],at 90; John C. Coffee, Jr., the Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:an Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L. Rev.1618,1622-27,1625(1989);Roberta Romano,Empowering Investors:a Market Approach to Securities Regulation,107 Yale L.J.2359, (2391)1998.
706 Stephen M.Bainbridge,supra note[697],at 118.
707 170 N.W.668,684(Mich.1919).
708 Stephen M.Bainbridge,supra note[697],at 119.
709 Eric A.Posner,supra note[672],at 754.关于法院不能胜任的论证还可参阅以下论文:Melanie B.Leslie,supra note [158],at 97;Lucien J.Dhooge,Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Llien Tort Statute,22 Emory Int'1 L.Rev.455,494(2008).
710 Melanie B.Leslie,supra note[158],at 97.98.
711Frank H.Easterbrook et al.,supra note [337].
712 Melanie B.Leslie,supra note[158],at 97-98.
713 Lucien J.Dhooge,supra note[709],at 494.
714Stephen M.Bainbridge,supra note[697],at 118.Bainbridge认为“商事判断规则”属于捷径的一种,本文通过对其性质的分析,认为这一观点不足采信。
715 Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability,24 Wake Forest L. Rev.97,97 (1989).
716 Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law,274(2000).
717 Joy v. North,692 F.2d 880,885 (2d Cir.1982)
718 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 88-89.
719 Corporate Director's Guidebook (3th Edition),56 Bus.Law.1571,1586 (2001).
720 William L.Cary et al., Corporations:Cases and Materials (7th ed),603(1995).
721 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 90.
722 Edward Rock et al., supra note [277], at 652.
723 Id. at 651.
724 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 246.
725 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 125.
726 Id.
727 Id.
728 Leslie v. Lorillard,18 N.E.363,365 (N.Y.1888).
729在该案中,原告Shlensky质疑被告Wrigley拒绝在芝加哥Wrigley Field棒球体育馆安装电灯的做法。当时,被告Wrigley是大股东,并且是芝加哥National League棒球俱乐部公司的董事会主席,这个在特拉华州注册的公司拥有一支美国专业棒球队Chicago Cubs,并负责Wrigley Field棒球体育馆的运作,原告Shlensky是该公司的一个小股东。在1961年至1965年之间,原告Shlensky抱怨Chicago Cubs的运作一直处于亏损状态,他将亏损归因于少的可怜的观众。他认为不高的出席率是因为被告Wrigley拒绝在Wrigley Field棒球体育馆安装电灯,从而可以安排晚上的比赛,通过增加观看比赛人数增加公司收益。原告Shlensky主张被告Wrigley拒绝安装电灯的两个因素没有一个与股东利益最大化相关。第一,被告Wrigley认为棒球是一个白天进行的运动；第二,被告Wrigley担心晚上组织比赛将会影响到周边邻近地区。237 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. Ct.1968).
730 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 96-97.
731在该案中,原告Kamin质疑被告American Express Co董事会作出的分红决定,特别是将被告所拥有的另一个公司的股份分红的决定。原告Kamin认为,将股份配发而不是转让,公司将损失将近800万美元的税收优惠383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup.Ct.1976).
732 Kamin,383 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
733 488 A.2d 858(Del.1985).
734 Edward Rock et al., supra note [277], at 651.
735 Id. at 659.
736 Id. at 651.
737 746 A.2d 244,264 (Del.2000).
738 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 625.
739 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 650.
740 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 471例如,Langbein教授认为信托法严格禁止委托人试图将与其在信托交易中存在利益冲突的人作为受托人。John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 665-667并且,信托法不恰当地禁止委托人执行某一信托,如果他们不属于受托人。John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 664.
741 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 631.
742 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 653-654.
743 Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract:What We Do and Do not Know,1985 Wis. L. Rev.483,513(1985).
744 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 654.
745 Alex M.Johnson Jr. et al., Revolutionizing Judicaial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts:Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's CupLitigations,74 Iowa L. Rev.545,572(1989).
746 John H.Langbein, supra note [381, at 641.
747 Id. at 654.
748 Id.
749 Id. at 642.
750 Id.
759 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 6:2,2.
760 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc.,528 F. Supp.1038 (S.D.N.Y.1981), affd,694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.1982), cert, denied,461 U.S.906 (1983).
761 Id. at 928.
762 Id. at 928-930.
763 John C. Bogle, Do Mutual Funds Charge You Too Much?, Mutual Funds, Oct.1998.
764在]970年之前,投资者只能通过提起诉讼的方式解决管理费用过高的纠纷与争议。提起诉讼之前,投资者必须证明管理费用高的离谱或使人惊讶。Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 7:2,1而自1970年修订《投资公司法》后,明确了董事会在管理费用审核中的作用。Id.
765 Lipper Analytical Services, Inc., The Third White Paper:Are Mutual Fund Fees Reasonable? (Sept.1997); John D. Rea et al, Investment Company Institute Perspective, Trends in the Ownership Costs of Equity Mutual Funds (Nov.1998); Sean Collins, The Expenses of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Mutual Funds, Investment Company Institute Perspective (Dec.2003), available at http://www.ici.org/statements/res/lper09-06.pdf
766 Arthur Levitt, remarks before an Investment Company Institute meeting, Washington, D.C May 15,1998.
767 715 F. Supp.472(S.D.N.Y.1987), aff d,875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.1989), cert, denied,493 U.S.919 (1989).
768 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [521, at 7:2,3.
769 715 F. Supp.472 (S.D.N.Y.1987), affd,875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.1989), cert, denied,493 U.S.919 (1989).
770 Id.
771 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [521, at 16A:3,1.
772 Id.
788[美]科斯等,前注[635],第63页。按照学者的理解,当具备以下三个条件的时候,“团体生产”问题就会产生。第一,经济性生产需要团队合作,也就是说,生产需要联合性的投入(时间、资金以及其他有价值的资源)；第二,团体成员投入的资源中,部分或全部具有专用性投资的特点：第三,产出具有共同性以及不可分性,将特定产出归因于某一成员的功劳的不可能性。Margaret M. Blair et al., Team Production in Business Organizations:an Introduction,24 J.Corp.L.743,745(1999).
789 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 266经常被讲述的例子是“搬沙发”。假设搬动一个沙发需要两个搬运工,每个搬运工的劳动都是必须的。如果他们事先同意按照一定的比例来分配收入的话,每个搬运工都会试图偷懒,而希望对方负载更大的重量。这是因为尽管每个搬运工偷懒,但是仍会一毫不差地获取全部收益。相反,如果他们同意按照工作的辛苦程度事后分配,他们的投入将变成专用性的投入：除非分配利润,否则谁也无法补偿他们的付出。结果,每个搬运工都有主张超出自己合理份额而试图“寻租”的倾向,因为他们知道对方是无法收回其付出。Lynn A. Stout, supra note [497], at 681.
790 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 266.
791 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 780.
792 Id.
793 Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics,18 J. Corp. L.301,312(1993).
794例如,Ulen教授认为：“‘团体生产理论’是否能恰如其分地描述公众公司的情况,对于这一点,人们丝毫不清楚。”Id.
795 Bainbridge教授认为这一理论无法说明以“所有权与控制权分离”为特征的公众公司。他认为在公众公司中,股东享有剩余请求权,理应作为公司的“监督人”。但实际匕,股东根本没有这些权利,它们根本没有实际能力,同时也没有欲望去行使这些权利。Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 568.
796 Margaret M. Blair, a Contractarian Defense of Copporate Philanthropy,28 Stetson L. Rev.27,36(1998).
797 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618].
798 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note [378], at 309.
799 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 568.
800 Alan J. Meese, the Team Production Theory of Corporate Law:a Critical Assessment,43 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 1629,1641(2002).
801 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,supra note [618];Ronald Coase, the Problem of Social Cost,3 J.L.& Econ.1 (1960); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities and the Single Owner:One More Salute to Ronald Coase,36 J.L.& Econ. 553,556-557(1993).
802 Raghuram G. Rajan et al., Power in the Theory of a Firm,113 Q.J. Econ.387(1998)
803 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 272.
804 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 595.
805 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 272.
806 Lynn A. Stout, supra note [497],at 685; David Millon,New Game Plan or Business as Usual? a Critique of the Team Prodcution Model of Corporate Law,86 Va. L. Rev.1001,1007(2000).
807[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第335页。
808 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 278.
809 David Millon, supra note [806], at 1007 FN 15.
810 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 595 FN229.
811Id.at 586-587.例如,他认为大多公司的员工完全可以通过其他途径寻求利益保护。Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees:Participatory Management and Natural Law,43 Vill. L. Rev.741,817-18(1998)..另外,债权人的投资,同样可以通过其他方法加以保护,特别是在出现大额重复交易的长期关系的情况下更是如此。Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance,5 Indus.& Corp.Change 277,280(1996).
812 Id. at 590.
813 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management:an Organizational Failures Analysis,23 Del. J. Corp. L.979,1073-1074(1998).
814[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第421-4222页。
815 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 588.
816[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第423页。
817柳志伟：《基金业立法和发展：比较与借鉴》,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第117页。
818该基金上市公告书发布的当天,上海股市猛涨76点,上证指数重返1000点大关。它的成交份数在短短的一个交易日里已达到2933万份,其换手率高达29%,成交额达到1.58亿,占当天整个上海股市大盘总成交量的比例高达24.88%。王连洲、董华春：《“证券投资基金法”条文释义与法理精析》,北京：中国方正出版社,2004年版,第5页。
819不少业内人士认为,基金将成为中国证券市场的“定海神针”、“稳压器”。中国股市的“投机市行将结束”,“熨平证券市场波动”指日可待。同上注,第5页。
820例如,1992年底,国务院发布了关于进一步加强证券市场宏观管理的通知,在该通知中指出：“在加强统一管理的基础上,积极组织投资基金证券、可转换证券、信托受益凭证等新品种的试点,丰富、活跃证券市场。”
821张路等编：《美英基金法比较与实务》,北京：法律出版社,2007年版,第288页。
822同上注。
823同上注。
824尹中立：“我国证券投资基金的发展历程回顾”,《银行家》,2008年第10期。
825同上注。
844Charles E. Rounds, Jr.et al., supra note [1], at 482.
845贺万忠,前注[14],第94页。
846陈春山：《证券投资信托专论》,中国台湾：台湾五南图书出版有限公司,1997年版,第257页。
847乔棣：“中国内地证券投资基金法律性质的探讨”,《中外法学》,1999年第2期,第115。
848周恭泉：《投资基金组织治理研究》,北京：中国金融出版社,2008年版,第201页。
849贺万忠,前注[14],第93页。
850同上注。
851同上注。
852同上注。
853同上注,第94页。
854胡伟,前注[14],第79页；黎四奇,前注[11],第210页。
855汤欣：“我国契约型投资基金当事人法律关系模式的选择”,中国证券业协会基金公会主编：《证券投资基金法规体系研究》,北京：中国法制出版社,2002年版,第304页。
856郭峰、陈夏：《证券投资基金法导论》,北京：法律出版社,2008年版,第206页。
857朱少平：《“证券投资基金法”解读》,北京：中国金融出版社,2004年版,第138页。
858朱小川：《营业信托法律制度比较研究》,北京：法律出版社,2007年版,第378页。
859碧元：“再揭基金黑幕”,《中国改革》,2005年第10期,第18页。
860张国清,前注[21],第120页。
861Lucian Arye Bebchuk, supra note [136], at 908.
862张国清,前注[21],第120页。
863王连洲、董华春,前注[818],第265页。
864朱少平,前注[857],第117页。
865同上注,第117页。
866中国人民大学信托与基金研究所：《中国基金业发展报告》(1991-2003),北京：中国经济出版社,2004年版,第5页。
867 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 35.
868 Morton Horwitz et al., When and How the Supreme Court Found Democracy--A Computer Study,14 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1,28(1994).
869 Lisa M. Fairfax, the future of Shareholder Democray,84 Ind. L.J.1259,1260(2009).
870 K. A. D. Camara, supra note [33], at 221.
871第一,股东缺乏足够的激励去审查公司决策好坏。Henry G Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting,64 Colum. L. Rev.1427,1440-41 (1964)第二,外部性的存在影响了股东行使投票权。Frank H.Easterbrook et al., Voting in Corporate Law,26 J.L.& Econ.395,413-415(1983)第三,“有限理性”决定了股东无法做出最佳的决策。Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality, in 1 the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 266-268第四,获得数量较大的股东投票权需要付出巨大的成本。Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise,39-42 (1996)第五,随着人数的增加,做出有效的决策需要
877 Edward S. Adams, Using Evaluations to Break Down the Male Corporate Hierarchy:a Full-circle Approach,73 U. Colo. L. Rev.117,129(2002).
878 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, supra note [136], at 715.
879 Id.
880 Id.
881 Stephen M. Bainbridge, the Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,53 UCLA L. Rev.601,619 (2006).
882 Jensen et al., Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market,7 J. ACCT.& ECON.3,4-5(1985).
883 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note [136],at 715; Jonathan R. Macey,supra note [283],at 3!5;Melvin Avon Eisenberg,1989 the Structure of Corporation Law,89 Colum. L. Rev.1461(1989).
884 Carl W. Mills, Breach of Fiduciary Duty as Securities Fraud:SEC v. Hancellor Corp,10 Fordham J. Corp.& Fin. L. 439,443(2005).
885 Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:the Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,33 Stan. L. Rev.819,840 (1981); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Coporate Law:the Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,102 Harv. L. Rev.1820,(1989)第一,公司控制权市场的“失灵”。尽管公司控制权市场能够起到一定的制约作用,但是,代理人(董事会)有权阻止敌意收购,从而失去了其应有的制约作用。Lucian Arye Bebchuk,supra note [136],at 715第二,资本市场的“失灵”。在公司上市或者公开发行股票之后的很长一段时间里,都不会募集新的股份,从而使资本市场的作用大为减低。Id而且,根据学者的考察,即使委托人不依股东利益为中心,也不能阻碍公司获取新的资金支持。Id.况且,它还可以通过贷款的方式获取资金。Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Coporate Law:the Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,102 Harv. L. Rev.1845,(1989)第三,产品市场的“失灵”。代理人不以股东利益为中心并不一定导致市场份额的减少,尽管会导致利润的减少,但却不会影响公司的产品市场业绩。Lucian Arye Bebchuk,supra note [136],at 715第四,股票市场的“失灵”。在股东不满意公司治理之时,会将其股份转让并不能在实质上影响到代理人。Lucian Arye Bebchuk,supra note [136],at 716第五,经理劳动市场的“失灵”。事实证明,平均而言,公司业绩的变化对委托人薪金影响并不如想象中的那样大。数据表明,公司业绩提高时,CEO的薪金以及奖金按照供公司资产增加额的2‰计算；CEO的所有收入的增加则按照资产增加额的3.72‰计算,Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Coporate Law:the Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,102 Harv.
889同上注。
890中国人民大学信托与基金研究所,前注[866],第69页。
891刘志远、姚颐：“开放式基金的‘赎回困惑’现象研究”,《证券市场导报》,2005年2月号,第40页。作者考察的范围是2002年12月31日到2004年3月31日之间我国共同基金的赎回情况。随着基金业绩增长,赎回率不降反升,而且基金的净中购并不是出现在基金业绩增长最高时,而恰恰是出现在业绩增长最低时。另外,即便业绩增长达到最高时,赎回率只是趋近于0,但仍然没有出现净申购。
892同上注。
893杨晓兰、满臻：“我国开放式和封闭式基金绩效比较的实证研究”,《证券市场导报》,2006年1月号,第50页。作者考察对象的时间范围是2004年1月至2005年4月。
894周恭泉：《投资基金组织治理研究》,北京：中国金融出版社,2008年版,第77页。
912胡光志、方桂荣,前注[906],第52页。
913例如,陈斌彬：“美国对基金关联交易的法律监管及其对我国的启示”,《江西财经大学学报》,2005年第6期,第25页；王苏生,前注[10]：张国清,前注[21]；胡家夫、骆红艳：“证券投资基金关联交易监管研究”,《证券市场导报》,2005年第4期,第6页；胡家夫、骆红艳：“基金关联交易监管—海外经验与对策建议”,http://finance.sina.com.cn.:陈星德：“证券投资基金利益冲突的法律研究”,中国政法大学博士论文(经济法方向),20078
914胡光志、方桂荣,前注[906],第57页。
915张国清：“美国共同基金的独立董事制度及启示”,《证券市场导报》,2004年7月号,第9页。
916 Restatement (Second) of Trusts§2 (1959); Restatement (Third) of Trusts §2 (2003).
917 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173],at 122.
918 Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the express trust,36 Alta.L.Rev.630,637(1998).
919何宝玉：《英国信托法原理与判例》,北京：法律出版社,2001年版,第381-2页。
920 Warner V.Rogers(1924).
921 Mark Blair et al., Collective Investment Schemes:the Role Of the Trust,Australian accounting review,15.
922 Id. at 13.
923谢哲胜：前注[168],第229页。
924谢哲胜：前注[168],第230页。
925同上注。
926苏聪儒：“证券投资信托基金经理公司之法律义务”,《全国律师》,1998年1月第1期,第96页；同上注。
927王连洲、董华春,前注[818],第33页。
928在传统信托中,之所以规定让受托人之间承担连带责任,其理据在于共同受托人处理信托事务坚持共同行动原则,共同受托人对违反信托义务的行为承担连带责任是逻辑的必然结果。胡伟,前注[14],第83页。但是,在共同基金中,显然无法采取共同行动的原则,所以让其承担连带责任也失去了理论上的根据。
929 Supra note [362].
930 Supra note [362], at 132.
931 Sarah Worthington, Public unit trusts:principles, policy and reform of the trustee and manager roles,UNSW law Journal,258(1991).
932 Supra note [362], at 132.
933 Id. at 131.
934周玉华：《信托法学》,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2001年版,第154页。
935Sarah Worthington, supra note [931], at 256.
936 Id.
937 Supra note [362], at 134.
938 Id. at 133.
939汤欣：前注[855],第304页。
940郭峰、陈夏：前注[856],第206页；胡伟,前注[14],第80页。按照学者的观点,这种差异性主要体现在财产归属、受托人处理信托事务的方式以及责任承担方式上。胡伟,前注[14],第80-83页。
941实际上,立法者并没有对受托人在监督基金运作方面寄予厚望。如有学者说的那样：“在实务环节上,对托管人能否有效监督管理人的投资运作不能抱太大的期望。……因此,托管人的监督作用主要体现在保管权上,在监督权上可以发挥的空间不大。”王连洲、董华春,前注[818],第311页。
942朱少平,前注[857],第337-338页。
943Supra note [362], at 132.
944 Report on the review of the managed investment act 1998, proposals for change, Chapter 9,87(2002).
945 Moodie and Ian Malcolm Ramsay, supra note [896], at 47.
946 Id. at 59.
947 Id.
948 Id. at 50.
949 Australian Securities Commission v. AS Nominees Ltd(1995).
950 Moodie and Ian Malcolm Ramsay, supra note [896], at 50-51.
963 Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern"Corporation:Perspectives form the German,80 Harv. L. Rev.23,50(1966).
964Donald C.Clarke, the Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance,31 Del. J. Corp. L.125,174(2006).
965 Id.
966 Thomas J. Andre, Jr, Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance:a Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards,70 Tul. L. Rev.1819,1820(1996).
967 Id. at 1823-1824.
968 Id. at 1824.
969 Detlev F. Vagts, supra note [963], at 50.
970 Id.
971 Cherie J. Owen,Board Games:Germany's Monopoly on the Two-Tier System of Corporate Governance and Why the Post-Enron United States Would Benefit from its Adoption,22 Penn St. Int'1 L. Rev.167,168(2003).
972 Donald C.Clarke, supra note [9641, at 128.
973 Id.
974 Id.
975例如,德国法律规定,如果公司员工的规模超过2000人,那么在公司的监事会中,员工代表的数额要等同于股东代表的数额。Thomas J. Andre, supra note [966],at 1839而且,银行以及其他一小撮个人都有可能加入到监事会组成人员之列。这一做法被称之为“共同决策”。“共同决策”的理念根植于德国公司治理当中,起根源可以追溯到19世纪的德国。“共同决策”是作为一种缓解强势的企业家与弱势的员工之间的不平衡关系而创设的一种制度。Detlev F.Vagts,supra note[963],at 65.例如,1993年德国银行协会的一份调查报告显示：德国100强公司的中1480位监事会职位中,有36%属于员工代表、13%属于贸易协会代表、26%属于股东代表、10%来自行业和股东协会代表、7%属于私人银行代表、5%属于政客和公务人员代表、3%来自其他银行和保险公司的代表。Thomas J. Andre, supra note [966],at 1839.
976 Detlev F. Vagts, supra note [963], at 50
977 Thomas J. Andre, supra note [966], at 1821.
978 Chao Xi, in Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model:Board Reforms and the Politicla Economy of Corporate Law in China,22CTJILT 1,43(2006).
979 Id. at 12.
980 Barry D. Baysinger et al., Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporate Law:the ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.557,563-64 (1984).
981 Jie Yuan, Formal Convergence or Substantial Divergence? Evidence from Adoption of the Independent Director System in China? 9 Asian-Pac. L.& Pol'y J.71,72(2007).
982 Id. at 102.
983 Id.
984 Chao Xi, supra note [978], at 7.
985 Id. at 43.
986 Amir N. Licht, the Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 Del. J. Corp. L.147(2001)
989 Joseph R. Fleming, Regulation of Series Investment Companies Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,44 Bus. Law.1179(1989).
990Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 2:2,3.
995 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc.,528 F. Supp.1038 (S.D. N.Y.1981), affd,694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.1982), cert, denied,461 U.S.906(1983).
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[20]孟东晓：“证券投资基金治理结构研究”,复旦大学博士学位论文(国际金融),2003年。
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[25]孙杨、尚震宇：“中国证券投资基金的治理机制缺陷与改进策略”,《财经科学》,2008年第2期。
[26]汪世虎：“论破产程序对担保物权优先性的限制”,《河北法学》2006年第8期。
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[30]叶俊英：“证券投资基金的经济学与法学分析”,西南财经大学博士学位论文(国民经济学),2005。
[31]张国清：“基金持有人大会法律制度研究”,《证券市场导报》,2003年10月号
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[33]张国清：“证券投资基金关联交易的法律规制”,《证券市场导报》,2006年1月号。
[34]赵万一：“关于修改我国公司法的几个基本问题”,《中南财经政法大学学报》,2003年第6期。
[35]赵旭东：“公司法人财产权与公司治理”,《北方法学》,2008年第1期。
[36]赵旭东：“论我国公司法的调整对象”,《中国社会科学》,1986年第6期。
[37]赵学清、王衡：“论我国投资基金模式的选择”,《法律适用》,2002年第3期。
[38]朱成刚：“证券投资基金持有人利益保护法律机制研究”,中国政法大学博士学位论文(经济法学),2006年。
[39]朱慈蕴：“公司章程两分法论—公司章程自治与他治理念的融合”,《当代法学》,2006年第5期。
[40]朱慈蕴：“资本多数决原则与控制股东的诚信义务”,《法学研究》,2004年第4期。
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2 The Investment Trusts Association, Investment Trusts in Japan,68(2008).
3 Kwang-Rok Kim, the New Arena for Investors in the Korean Securities Market:an Analysis of Mutual Funds form the Perspective of Investors Protection,23WTLR 95,104(2001).
4 A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? a Legal&Econometric Analysis,33 J. Corp. L. 745,765(2008).
5 Stephen I. Erlichman, Making it Mutual:Aligning the Interest of Investors and Managers Recommendations for a Mutual Fund Governance Regime for Canada (2000).
6有学者通过对英国两种运作模式的共同基金的实证研究发现：“公司型”共同基金在节省成本、增大效益方面都优于“信托型”共同基金。A. Joseph Warburton, supra note [4], at 745.
72000年10月,《财经》杂志发表了题为《基金黑幕—关于基金行为的研究报告解析》(简称《基金黑幕》)的文章,引发了不小的震动。该文作者通过对从1999年8月9日到2000年4月28日共9个月的证券投资基金在上海证券交易所证券买卖行为的分析,认为基金业存在着惊人的黑幕：“对倒”、“倒仓”、“关联交易”等问题比比皆是。此文一出,众人皆被震惊。无独有偶,时隔五年之,2005年《基金黑幕》“姊妹篇”—《再揭基金黑幕》,以振聋发聩的口吻提醒着人们：“按照目前现状看来,实际上当时所谓的‘基金黑幕’,其实质问题至今仍未真正触及更谈不上解决。我国基金存在的问题触目惊心、发人深省!
27[美]迈克尔·詹森等：“企业理论：管理行为、代理成本与所有权”,陈郁主编：《所有权、控制权与激励—代理经济学文选》,上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2006年版,第61页。
28 A. Joseph Warburton, supra note [25], at 745.
29 Stephen I. Erlichman, supra note [5]; Aviv Pichhadze:Mutual Fund Governance Reforms:A Commentary,17 B.F.L.R.67.
30K.wang-Rok Kim, supra note [3], at 104.
31黄仁宇：《资本主义与二十一世纪》,北京：三联出版社,2005年版,第31-32页。
32 Robert Charles Clark, the Four Stages of Capitalism:Reflections on Investment Management Treatises,94 Harv. L. Rev. 561,562-566(1981).
33 K. A. D. Camara, Classifying Institutional Investors,30 J. Corp. L.219,222(2005); Investment Company Institution,2009 Investment Company Fact Book(49th edition),100(2009).
34 Robert Charles Clark, supra note [32], at 568.
35 John H. Langbein, the Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,86 Mich. L. Rev.722,725(1988).
36 Id. at 723.
37 Id. at 725.
38 John H.Langbein, the Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts,105 Yale L.J.625,638(1995).
39 Id.at 638-639.
40 Tamar Frankel et al, Investment Management Regulation,16-17(1998).
41 Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law,236 (1922).
42黄仁宇,前注[31],第493页。
43韦森：“经济增长与社会繁荣”,《读书》,2009年第4期,第10页。
44陈彩虹：“亚当·斯密与凯恩斯之争又起”,《读书》,2009年第4期,第4页。
45同上注,第5页；张维迎,“理解经济危机”,《读书》,2009年第5期,第37页。
46张维迎,同上注,第37页。
47邓正来：《哈耶克法律哲学的研究》,北京：法律出版社,2004年版,第43-44页。
48 Richard H.Farina et al., The Mutual Fund Industry:a Legal Survey, Notre Dame L.732,737(1969).
49 Investment Company Institute, supra note [33], at 9.
50 Id, at 72.
51 Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman et al., Forming, Organizing and Operating and Operating a Mutual Fund-Legal and Practical Considerations,19(2008).
52 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., Mutual Fund Regulation, Practising Law Institute, PLIREF-MFRs 1:1,1-2(2009).
53当然,本法也规定了一些例外情况。Victoria E. Schonfeld et al., Organization of a Mutual Fund,49 Bus.Law,107(1993).
54 Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman et al., supra note [51],at 19.
55本文将在同一意义上使用这两个术语。
56 Victoria E. Schonfeld et al., supra note [53], at 112.
57 Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman et al., supra note [51], at 25.
58 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 23:3. 1.
59 Id. at 23:3.2.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 23:4.
62 David Schneider, if at First You Don't Succeed:Why the SEC Should Try and Try again to Regulate Hedge Fund Adivsers,9J. Bus.& Sec. L.261(2009).
63 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 100.
64例如,2009年10月16日,美国司法部宣布拉贾拉特南和其他五人涉嫌操控多家公司股票的“对冲基金”内线交易,非法获利逾2000万美元,引起了基金市场的巨大震动。
65 David Schneider, supra note [62], at 261.
66 Jay B. Gould, Gerald T.Lins,Unit Investment Trusts:Structure and Regulation under the Federal Securities Laws,43 Bus. Law.1177,1188(1988).
67 Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, supra note [26], at 1026.
68 SEC, Report on Public Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No.2337,89th Cong.,2d Sess.102(1966).
691965年,前者为管理费用平均支出的费用为资产的0.31%；而后者支出则为0.57%；前者为费用中最为关键的部分—“管理费”的支出为0.25%,后者支出约为0.45%.Id.
70Id. at 148-149.
71 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52],at 1:1 (2009).
72 Investment Company Institute,2002 Investment Company Fact Book(42th),11(2002).
73 Clifford E. Kirsch et al.,supra note [52], at 1:1 (2009).
74 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(a)(1).
75 Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No.24082,10(1999).
76其一,在立法听证会议记录中保存着两个基金公司管理人员的陈述,他们将基金称作“相互投资公司”(Mutual Investment Company)。其中一个人被问及该词来源时,他说：“像我所开办的这样的公司一般都被称为‘相互投资公司’,但无法回答其来源为何。”其二,1940年基金行业发言人曾说过,财政部经常将开放式公司称作“共同基金”(MutualFund)。其三,另一个可能是,使用“共同”(Mutual)—语指称这类公司可能源于20世纪30年代SEC与基金经理的一段对话。当SEC官员问及：“这是个不错的词语……。”基金经理说：“是的。”Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 737.
77 K.Geert Rouwenhorst,The Orgins of Mutual Funds,Yale International Center for Finance Working Paper No. 04-48,1(2004), http://ssm.com/abstract=636146.
78 Id.
79 Wagner, Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S. Rep. No.76-1775,3(1940).
80[美]里·格雷米林：《美国开放式共同基金》,杨学宏等译,北京：中国金融出版社,2006年版,第16页。
81 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 79.
82 Barry P. Barbash, Director, Div. of Inv.Mgmt, SEC, Mutual Fund Consolidation and Globalization:Challenges for the Future, Remarks at the Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference(Mar.23,1998),http://www.sec.gov/ news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch208.htm.
83 Investment Company Institute, supra note [49], at 167.
84 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 737.
85 Investment Company Institute, supra note [49], at 9.
89[英]亚当·斯密：《国民财富的性质和原因的研究》,郭大力等译,北京：商务印书馆,1997年版,第1页。
90 William F.Sharpe et al., Investments,134-193 (4th ed.1989).
91 Ronald J. Gilson et al., (Some of the) Essentials of Finance and Investment,95-97(1993).
92 Id.at 97.
93 Id. at 96.
94Only Perform:a Survey of Investment Management, Economist,8(1993).
95 Nora M. Jordan, United States Regulation of Funds, in Practising Law Inst., Int'l Sec. Markets 2004 Best Practices & Changing Requirements in Global Markets 633,636 (2004).
96尽管前面提及的“ETFs”也属于开放式投资公司的类型,但它明显区别于共同基金。'ETFs"严格限制赎回,并且公告当日交易份额,这些特征明显具有封闭式基金的特性。正如Gastineau教授说的那样,“ETFs”是开放式基金与封闭式基金的混合体,它们的交易颇像普通股票和封闭式基金,但另一方面,却如开放式基金一样,资产份额可以赎回。DanielJ.Grimm, A Process of Natural Corpection:Arbitrage and the Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds under the Investment Company Act,11 U. Pa. J. Bus.& Emp.L.95,102 (2008).
97 SEC,supra note [75]应当注意,为了行文上保持一致性,本文将美国《投资公司法》中所称的“投资咨询人”改称为“基金管理人”,“咨询费用”改称为“管理费用”,“投资咨询契约”改称为“基金管理契约”,“股东”改称为“投资者”,特此说明。
98 Stephen I. Erlichman, supra note [5], at 25.
121 John C. Coffee, Jr, Liquidity Versus Control:the Institutional Investor as Corporate monitor,91Colum. L. Rev.1277, 1302(1991).
122 Id. at 1303.
123 Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility and Competition Between European and American Corporate Governance:Which Model of Capitalism?,23 Brook.J.Int'l L.833,(1998).
124 Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners,188(1994).
125 Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,102 Yale L.J. 1927,1928(1993).
126 John C. Coffee, supra note [121], at 1294.
127 Janis Sarra, Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets, Candadian and International Developments,76 Tul. L. Rev. 1691,1716(2002).
128 Angel R.Oquendo, Breaking on Through to the Other Side:Understanding Continental European Corporate Goverance, 22 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.975,981(2001).
129 Id. at 975.
130 Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets,1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.167,167(1998).
131 Id.
132 Justin Wood, Director Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone of Insolvency:a Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Japan,26 Penn State Int'l L. Rev.139.153(2007).
133 Mark J. Roe, supra note [130], at 168.
134美国认识到德国双层管理体制的优点之后,从中吸取了合理的成分,不断加强本国独立董事制度改革。Angel R.Oquendo, supra note [128], at 1021.
135 Jeffrey N. Gordon et al., German Corporate Governance, and the Transition Costs of Capitalism,1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.185,201(1998).
136 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, the Case for Increasing Shareholder Power,118 Harv. L. Rev.833,848(2005).
137 Review of U.K. Governance Arrangements, Inv. Mgmt. Ass'n, Review of the Governance Arrangements of United Kingdom Authorized Collective Investment Schemes,21-22 (2005)这里的资产保管人就是指银行。Charles E. Rounds, supra note [1], at 483.
138 A. Joseph Warburton, supra note [4], at 766.
139 Charles E. Rounds, Jr.et al., supra note [1], at 501.
140 John K. Thompson et al., supra note [102], at 37.
141 Id.
142 Luigi Zingales, "Corporate Governance" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law(1998).
143 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 3.
144 Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices,108 Colum. L. Rev.1803,1810(2008).
145 Cal. Pub. Employees'Ret. Sys., Global Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance 8 (2008), http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/docs/2008-8-18-global-principles-accountable-corp-gov-final.pdfiMelvin A. Eisenberg, the Structure of the Corporation:a Legal Analysis (1976).
146 Sanjai Bhagat et al., supra note [444].
147 IOSOC,supra note [99], at 3. "OECD"和"IOSCO"使用的术语是"CIS" (Collective Investment Schemes,“集体投资计划”),而没有直接使用共同基金术语。“CIS”,按照他们的解释,包括多种开放式契约,例如共同基金、单位信托、投资信托等等。为了行为的一致,本文直接使用共同基金这一术语,特此说明。
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 4.
151 Stephen M.Bainbridge, Director Primacy:the Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547,599(2003).
152 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 5.
153 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 1:4.1(2009).
154 John K. Thompson et al., supra note [102], at 9.
155 Harold S.Bloomentha, Securities Law Handbook Database updated,1 SECLAW-HB § 20:1(2008).
156 National Instrument 81-107 Independent Review Committee for Investment Funds Supplement to the OSC Bulletin,4(2006).
157 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 5.
158“用益受封人”指为第三人用益而受让并持有土地的人。薛波主编：《元照英美法词典》,北京：法律出版社,2003年版,第544页。Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees:Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules,94 Geo. L.J.67, 73(2005).
159 R. H. Helmholz, the Early Enforcement of Uses,79 Colum. L. Rev.1503,1503(1979).
160 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 670.
161 Id. at 633.
162 Id. at 638.
163Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 73.
164 Id.
165 Frederic W. Maitland, Trust and Corporation, in Selected Essays141,175 (H.D. Hazeltine et al.eds.,1936).
166 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 639.
167 Id. at 642.
168我国学者一般认为“商事信托”是指委托人为自己和他人的利益,委托专门经营信托业务的商业机构为受托人从事商业活动而设立的信托,也即“营业信托”。“民事信托”是指委托人为自己或他人的利益,委托普通的自然人为受托人从事一般民事活动而设立的信托,亦称为“非营业信托”。“民事信托”与“营业信托”的区分,主要是根据受托人是否专门从事信托业务而定,而与委托人、信托目的等因索均无直接关系。彭插三：《信托受托人法律地位比较研究》,北京：北京大学出版社,2008年版,第20-21页；谢哲胜：《财产法专题研究》(三),北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004年版,第233页。
169 Thomas E.Plank, the Bankruptcy Trsut as Legal Person,35 Wake Forest L. Rev.51,256(2000).
170应当注意的是,本文所阐述的“传统商事信托”并不包括那些民事信托,也就是说仅指那些商业受托人担任受托人的情形,即学者所说的“典型商业信托”,彭插三,前注[168],第109页。在这些“典型商业信托”中,就排除了那些能够作为“民事信托”而成立的各种“私意信托”,包括由商业受托人担任受托人的情形,即所谓的“非典型的商业信托”,彭插三,前注[168],第109页。因此,排除这些情形之后,这里的商事信托是那种只能由商事受托人担任受托人的信托,即有价证券、投资信托、贷款信托、带抵押公司债信托、养老金信托等。彭插三,前注[168],第109页。
171 John H. Langbein, the Secret Life of the Trsut:the Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,107 Yale L.J.165,166(1997).
172 Morrison v Lennett,616 N.E.2d 92,94 (Mass.1993).
173 George Gleason Bogert et al., Bogert's Trusts And Trustees,247(2009).
174 Hecht v.Malley,265 U.S.144 146-47 (1924).
175 Rosenbalm, Wheeler A, Massachusetts trust,31 Tenn.L.Rev.471,471(1964).
176彭插三,前注[168],第108页。
177 American Law Institute,Restatement(Third) of Trusts § 2 cmt. a, at 21 (Tentative Draft No.1, April 5,1996);Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, The Hague Convention of Trusts:Much A do About Very Little,3 J. Int'l Trust & Corp. Planning 5,14(1994).
178 Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trusts Act Failure as the New Corporate Law,23 Cardozo L. Rev.325,327(2001).
179 Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust as "Uncorporation":a Research Agenda,2005 U.111. L. Rev.31,35-36(2005).
183 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173], at 7.
184 Charles E. Rounds, Jr.et al., supra note [11, at 483.
185 Restatment (Second) of Trusts, §2(1959).
186 Joseph W. Blackburn, Constitutional Limits on State Taxation of a Nonresident Trustee:Gavin Misinterppet and Misapplies Both Quill and Mcculloch,76 Miss. L.J.1,5(2006).
187 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173], at 555.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 557.
191 West's Fla.S.A.§660.011.
192 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173], at 555.
193 Id.
194 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 37.当然,也有相反的观点:John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at166.
195 Herbert B. Chermside,Jr., J.D., Annotation, Modem Status of the Massachusetts or Business Trust,88 A.L.R.3d 704 (1978 & Supp.2001).
196 88 A.L.R3d 704 §4[a].
197 Id. at 4[b].
198 Id.at6[a].
199 Id. at 7.
200 Id. at 10.
201Tamar Frankel, supra note [178], at 327.
202 Id.
203 Supra note[196],at 2.
204 1 Ltd. Liab. Co.:L, Prac. and Forms § 11:8 (2009).
205 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 479.
206 James E. McWhinney, A Brief History Of The Mutual Fund http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/ MFhistory.asp?Page=2 (last visited Nov.21,2009).
207 K. Geert Rouwenhorst, The Origins of Mutual Funds 17 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt, Int'l Center for Fin.,Working Paper No. 04-48,2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=636146 (last visited Mar.23,2009).
208 Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Trading at Stale Prices With Modern Technology:Policy Options for Mutual funds in the Internet Age,7 Va. J.L.& Tech 6,24(2002).
209 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 10; John K. Thompson et al., supra note [102], at 50.
210 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 14:5.2(2009).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1:2.
214 SEC, Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies,66FR3734,3735(2001).
2152 Model Bus.Corp Acct Ann.(3d ed),8-9.
250 Id. at 6.
251 Roger W. Andersen, Understanding Trusts and Estates,81(2003).
252 George Gleason Bogert et al.,supra note [173],at 7.
253 Id. at 8.
254 A. Watson, Legal Transplants, an Approach to Comparative Law (1974).
255 Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Leagal Transplants:an Eaasy in Comparative Law and Economics,14 Int'1 Rev. L.& Econ.3,8(1994).
256 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 446.
257 Id. at 447.
258 Restatement (Second) of Trusts §197-99 (1959).
259 N.H. Andrews, Does a Third Party Beneficiary Have a Right in English Law?,8 Legal Stud.14 (1988).
260 Anthony Jon Waters, the Property in the Promise:A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule,98 Harv. L. Rev.1109, 1111-1112(1985).
261 Hein Kotz, Rights of Third Parties, Third Party Beneficiaries and Assignment,7 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,7-11(1992).
273 1 Austin Wakeman Scott, the Law of Trusts §1.4,13(1939).
274 Id. at 1.4,5.
275 Id. at 1.4,13.
276 Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 74.
277 Edward Rock et al., Dangerous Liaisons:Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinallegal Transplants,96 Nw. U. L. Rev.651,653(2002).
278 Restatement of Trusts§170(1)(1935).
279 Restatement of Trusts §205 (1935).
280 Restatement of Trusts §170 (2) (1935).
281 Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 82.
282 Jeffrey N. Gordon, the Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule,62 N.Y.U. L. Rev.52,76-79(1987)按照经济学家奥尔森的观点,可以这样理解“集体行动”现象：集团规模大、成员多使得做到“赏罚分明”得花费高额的成本,它包括有关集体利益和个人利益的信息成本和度量成本以及奖惩制度的实施成本等。显然,不仅仅是收益分享问题阻碍了大集团实现其共同利益,而且组织成本随着集团规模的扩张而剧增也使之难以为继。[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森：《集体行动的逻辑》,陈郁等译,上海：上海三联出版社、上海人民出版社,2006年版,第7页。
283 Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods,37 Emory L.J.295,319 (1988).
284 Daniel Fischel et al., ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:the Exclusive Benefit Rule,55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105,1114(1988).
285 Melanie B. Leslie, supra note [158], at 84; John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty:Sole Interest or Best Interest? 114YaleL.J.929,957(2005).
293 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 569.
294 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 166.
295 Id.
296 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 34.
297 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 188-189.
298 K. Geert Rouwenhorst, supra note [77].
299 J. Hawley and A. Williams, The Emergence of Fiduciary Capitalism 5 Corporate Governance:an International Review 4, 206-213(1997).
300 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 189.
307 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 186.
308王志诚：《信托之基本法理》,中国台湾：台湾元照出版公司,2005年版,第275页。
309 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 34.
310 George Gleason Bogert et al.,supra note [173], at 247.
311 Id.
312 E. WARREN, Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation,330(1929).
313 Sheldon A. Jones et al., the Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies,13 Del. J. Corp.L. 421,424(1988).
314 Id. at 425.
315 Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws,40 Hous. L. Rev.77 2003,77(2003).
316 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [3131, at 425.
317 Report of the Massachusetts Tax Commissioner on Voluntary Associations, Mass. House Rep. No.1646,21-23(1912).
318 Jennifer L. Berger et al.,Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §8227 (rev. ed.2003).
319 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 426.
320 Id.
321公司法之所以规定禁止公司从事不动产交易,其背后的原因在于：立法机构试图通过立法终结教会掌握的大宗土地所有权以及免于征税的做法。Id.
322 William C. Dunn, Trusts for Business Purposes (1922); John H. Sears, Trust Estates as Business Companies (2d ed.1921); Sydney R. Wrightington, the Law of Unincorporated Associations and Business Trusts (2d ed.1923); Guy A. Thompson, Business Trusts as Substitutes for Business Corporations (1920).
323 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 188-189.
324 Nicholas Karambelas,1 Ltd. Liab. Co.:L., Prac.and Forms §11:2 (2009).
331 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 428-429.
332 Id.at 429.
333 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 37.
334 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 166.
335例如,《特拉华州商业信托法》制定的目的就是为了消除这些不确定性因素。Tamar Frankel, supra note [178], at 326.
336 Robert H. Sitkoff, supra note [179], at 35.
337 Frank H. Easterbrook et al., the Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
338 John Armour et al., The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law,27 Oxford J. Legal Stud.429,431(2007).
339 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [339], at 5; Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm,119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333,(2006).
340 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 434.
341 RobertH.Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law,89 Cornell L. Rev.621,631(2004).
342 Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 472.
343 Id. at 427.
344 John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 184.
345 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109],at 672-673(1998).; Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [313], at 458.
346 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 640.
347 Id.
348 Id. at 641.
357 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, the Law of Trusts,§176, at 482 (4th ed.1987); David Hayton, English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law,32 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L.555,556 (1997); Restatement (Third) of Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule)§227, at 20.
358 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note[114], at 330.
359 Id. at 331.
360 Id. at 330.
361 Sarah Worthington, Public Unit Trusts:Principles, Policy and Reform of theTrustee and Manager Roles.UNSW law Journal,265(1991).
362 Collective Investments:Other People's Money,133(1993), http://www.camac.gov.au.
363 Sarah Worthington, supra note [361], at 266.
376 Id. at 31.
377 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 566; Henry Hansmann et al.,supra note [109], at 442.; John H. Langbein, supra note at [171], at 166.
378 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J. Fin. Econ.305,313(1976).
379 Henry Hansmann et al., the New Entities in Historical Perspective,2005 U.Ill. L.Rev.5,14(2005).
380 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 573.
391 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 565.
392例如在资产证券化领域中,委托人将资产通过信托方式转让给受托人,受托人通过发行证券的方式向投资者募集资金。在理论上,投资者与委托人之间存在着一定的利益冲突,因为资产用于满足投资者利益后留有的资产量必然减少。然而,在资产证券化中,不同于一般的公司,这种利益冲突实际上并不存在。也就是说,其设立不在于获取风险性回报,相反,委托人仅仅保留了剩余权利请求权,他/她希望信托财产价值不受贬损。因此,它根本不同于公司的营利性目的。
393 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [182], at 583.
394 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [114], at 333; Sheldon A. Jones et al., supra note [3131, at 453.
395 William Meade Fletcher,16A Fletcher Cyc. Corp.§ 8232.
396 Steven L. Schwarcz, supra note [114], at 335.
410Butler,Corporations and Express Trust as Business Organizations,13Mich.L.Rev.71,71(1914).
411Guy A.Thompson,supra note [322],at 5.
412Jesse H.Choper et al.,Case and Materials on Corporations,(5th edition),北京:中信出版社,2003年版,第12页.
431 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [339], at 5;Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm,119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333,1398(2006).
432 Id. at 1395.
433 Id. at 1395.
434 Jesse H. Choper et al., supra note [4121, at 21.
435 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [339], at 5; Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [431], at 1396.
436 Guy A.Thompson, supra note [322], at 6.
437 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [481, at 772.
438 Id. at 773.
439 Id.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 Id.
443 Id. at 774.
444 Jesse H. Choper et al., supra note [412], at 23.
445 Eric M. Fogel et al., Strangers in the house:Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors,32 Del. J. Corp. L.33,38(2007).
446 Christian C. Day, supra note [4231, at 526.
447 Id.
448 Id.
449Eric M. Fogel et al., supra note [4451, at 38.
450相反的观点可参见：Walter Werner,Corporation Law in Search of Its Future,81 Colum. L. Rev.1611,1637(1981).
454 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 547.
455 Milton Friedman, the Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept.13,1970, §6 (Magazine),32-33(1970).
456 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand:The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977).
457 Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation 92(rev. ed.1972).
458 Eric M. Fogel et al., supra note [445], at 38.
467 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment,119 Harv. L. Rev.1735,1735 (2006); Margaret M. Blair et al., A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,85 Va. L. Rev.247,253-54 (1999).
468 George W. Dent, Jr, Academics in Wonderland:the Team Production and Director Primacy Modells of Corporate Governance,44 Hous. L. Rev.1213,1213(2008).
469 Matthew T. Bodie,Time Warner and the False Gop of Sharehoder Primacy,31 J. Corp. L.975,(2006).
470170 N.W.668,684 (Mich.1919).
471 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 575.
472 R. Edward Freeman et al., Stockholders and Stakeholders:a New Perspective on Corporate Governance,25 Cal. Mgmt. Rev.88,89(1983).
473 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism:a Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship,82 Cornell L. Rev.856,887(1997).
474 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors'Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency,1 J. Bus.& Tech. L.335,336(2007).
484 Robert W. Hamilton, Corporations 281 (3d ed.1992);Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm,24 J. Corp. L.819,825-26 (1999)经济学者也坚持同样的观点,例如,Sanford J. Grossman et al., the Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,94 J. Pol. Econ. 691,695 (1986);Oliver Hart, an Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm,89 Colum. L. Rev.1757,1765-66 (1989); Oliver Hart et al., Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,98 J. Pol. Econ.1119,1119-20 (1990)当然,这一观点也遭到了不少的质疑和批评。Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law:the Role of Shareholder Primacy,31 J. Corp. L. 637,649(2006); Stout教授认为：“股东所有权是论证‘股东取权主义’最糟糕的证据。”Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy,75 S. Cal. L. Rev.1189,1190 (2002); Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of its Future,81 Colum. L. Rev.1611,1629-44(1981).
485 Adolf A. Berle et al., the Modern Corporation and Private Property,6 (1932).
486 Id. at 7.
487 Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail:an Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures,32 WM.& MARY L. REV.587,633-635(1991).
488 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note[378], at 308-310.
489[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,前注[282],第2页。
490 Arthur R. Pinto, the European Union's Shareholder Voting Rights Directive from an American Perspective:some Comparisons and Observations,32 Fordham lnt'l L.J.587,953(2009).
491 Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance:Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm,36 Loy. U.Chi.L.J.1111,1201(2005).
492 Robert Clark, Corporate Law,390-396 (1986).
493“优里赛斯”,希腊神话传说中的人物,又叫“尤利克塞斯”。希腊联军围攻特洛伊10年期间,“优里赛斯”英勇善战、足智多谋、屡建奇功。
494 Jonathan R. Macey, Fundamental Corporate Changes:Causes, Effects and Legal Responses:Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental and Corporate Changes,1989 DUKE L.J.173,180-81(1989).
495 Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Inveting:Will it Happen? Will it Work? 55 Ohio St. L.J.1009,1015(1994)
496 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, the Structure of the Corporation:A Legal Analysis 156-170(1976).
497 Lynn A. Stout, the Shareholder as Ulysses:Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public Corporations Corporations Tolerate Board Governance,152 U. Pa. L. Rev.667,674(2003).
498 Kenneth J. Arrow, the Limits of Organization,68-70 (1974).
499 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 577.
500 Id. at 558.
501 Kenneth J. Arrow, supra note [498], at 68-69.
502 Stephen J. Margolis et al., Path Dependence, in 3 New Palgrave Dictionary of Law and Economics 17 (Peter Newman ed.,1998).
503 Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 Del. J. Corp. L.147,149(2001).
504 Id. at 147.
505 Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics,109 Harv. L. Rev.641,644 (1996).
506 Craig LaChance, Nature v. Nurture:Evolution, Path Dependence and Corporate Governance,18 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 279,288(2001).
507 Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers Weak Owners:the Political Roots of American Corporate Finance(1994); Mark J. Roe, Backlash,98 COLUM. L. REV.217 (1998); Mark J. Roe, German "Populism" and the Large Public Corporation,14 INT'L REV. L.& ECON.187 (1994); Roberta Romano, the Genius of American Corporate Law 52-85 (1993); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes,73 VA. L. REV.111 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law,65 TEX. L. REV.469 (1987).
508 Jeffrey N. Gordon, the Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,1950-2005:of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,59 Stan. L. Rev.1465,1469(2007).
509 Id. at 1477.
510 Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors,33 Hofstra L. Rev. 89,129(2004).
511本文之所以选取这一主体展开论述,其原因是相较于其他主体,15世纪之时,要建立城镇,必须从皇室获取特许状,其本身就非常类似于公司,具有较强的可比性。Id.at 144.
512 Id. at 141.
513Id.“验尸官”作为皇家官员,拥有郡内的管辖权,负责调查死因、主持验尸,并在必要时代替郡长行使职责。薛波,前注[158],第324页。
514Id.at 142."Borough"指享有自治特权或在议会中享有自己的代表的市镇。从安格鲁萨克逊时代起,那些筑堡设防的地方被称为自治市。尽管它受各郡行政管辖,但是有自己独特的习惯、特权和法庭。薛波,前注[158],第168页。
515 Id. at 144.
516按照Gevurtz教授的观点,伊普斯威奇可供选择的治理模式主要有：行政长官制、十二管理人委员会、市政议会。Id.at 148.
517 Id. at 151.
518 Id. at 144.
519Id. at 144-145.
520 Id. at 144.
521 Cyril O'Donnell, Origins of the Corporate Executive,26 Bull. Bus. Hist. Soc'y 55,61(1952).
522 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 115.
523 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 120.
524 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 112.
525 Franklin A. Gevurtz, supra note [510], at 114-115.
526 Id. at 115.
533 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Federal Corporate Law:Lessons From History,106 Colum. L. Rev.1793,1801(2006).
534 Bernard S. Black et al., Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea,22 J. L. Econ. & Org.366,400(2006).
535 Peter J. Wallison, All the Rage:Will Independent Directors Produce Good Corporate Governance?(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Jan 2006), online at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23648/pub_detail.asp; Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance,54 Bus.Law.921,954(1999).
536高明华等：“独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析—兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境”,《南开经济研究》,2002年第2期。
537 Sanjai Bhagat et al., the Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices,108 Colum. L. Rev.1803(2008).
538 Id.
539 Jeffrey N. Gordon, supra note [508], at 1500.
540 Jay W. Lorsch et al., Pawns or Potentates:The Reality of America's Corporate Boards (1989).
541 Jeffrey N. Gordon, supra note [5081, at 1511.
542 Id. at 1477.
543 Id. at 1527.
544Id. at 1476.
545 Id. at 1510.
546 Id. at 1469.
547 Id. at 1541.
548 Walter P. North, a Brief History of Federal Investment Company Legislation,44 Notre Dame L. Rev.677(1969).
549 Alan R. Palmiter, supra note [24], at 168-169.
550 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 768.
551 Id.
552 Id.
553 Investment Trust Study, Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940, H.R. Rep. No.76-2639, at 10(3d Sess.1940).
554 Id.
555 Richard H.Farina et al., supra note [48], at 769.
556 Harold S.Bloomenthal, supra note [155].
557 James M. Storey et al., The Uneasy Chaperone34(2000).
558 Burks v. Lasker,441 U.S.471,484(1979).
559 John Nuveen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov.18,1986).
560 Supra note [233], at 4902-4903.
561 Id.
562服务提供者主要包括：(1)基金管理人(The Investment Adviser)其主要功能在于对基金资产进行日常管理,包括进行基金组合交易活动；(2)行政管理人(The Administrator)其主要功能在于向基金提供管理的、行政的服务,以及提供文书人员、办公设施等资源协助实现基金的日常运作;(3)承销商(The Underwriter or Distributor)它从共同基金中购买基金份额并将其销售至公众投资者或其它次级承销商；(4)资产保管人(The Custodian)主要功能是对基金资产(包括现金和证券在内)进行保管：(5)过户代理人(The Transfer Agent)主要是帮助基金公司做好基金的发行、回购的纪录工作;(6)独立审计(The Independent Auditor)至少每年一次向股东报告一次基金的财务状况。)
563尽管1940年《投资公司法》并不要求要经过董事会通过,但是各州法律一般都有这样的规定。实践中,一般也这样做。Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 6:2,2(2009).
564 SEC, Task Force on the Fund Director's Guidebook, Fund Director's Guidebook (3d ed)(2006).
565 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 2:4,3.
566 Id. at 14:3.
567 Id.
568 Id.
569 Id. at 2:4,5.
578 Section 10(e)of the 1940 Act.
579 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 14:5,6.
580 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 68.Victor Brudney, the Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village? 95Harv.L. Rev.597(1982).
581 Alan R. Palmiter,supra note [24], at 166
582 Jerry W. Markham, supra note [26], at 68.
583例如,王文宇教授在其博士论文中提到："UFIC" ("Unified Fee Investment Company",“统一费用投资公司”)可以兼顾“公司型”共同基金与“契约型”共同基金的优势,值得提倡。Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, supra note [261, at 956-958.
584 William J.Nutt, a Study of Mutual Fund Independent Diercetors,120U.Pa.L.Rev.179,185(1971).
585 Id. at 183.
586 Wharton School of Finance & Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R. REP. NO.2274,87th Cong.,2d Sess,490-491,(1962).
601 Martin Gelter, the Dark Side of Shareholder Influence:Managerial Auotnomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Corporate Governance,50 Harv. Int'1 L.J.129,135(2009).
602 Regina F.Burch, the Myth of the Unbiased Director,41 Akron L. Rev.509,536(2008).
603 Stephen M.Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics 18-19(2002).
604 Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law,55 J. Legal Educ.342,343(2005).
605 Bayless Manning, the Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy:an Essay for Frank Coker,72 Yale L.J.223,245 n.37(1962).
606 Roberta Romano, supra note [604], at 345.
616 Oliver Hart, supra note [484], at 1759.
617杨瑞龙,前注[614],第79页。当然,有学者也指出该理论并不具有人们所想象的那样的基础性地位。例如Rock教授曾指出“自Berle教授与Means教授以来,公司法的主要问题就是代理成本,这一点是人所共知的,而且阐释这个观点的经济学模型以及词汇也随即产生。”Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609],at 1624.
618 Armen A. Alchian et al., Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,62 Am. Econ. Rev.777(1972).
619杨瑞龙,前注[611],第40页。
620聂辉华：“企业的本质：一个前沿综述”,《产业经济评论》,2003年第2期,第4页。另外,有学者提出该理论存在两个重大缺陷：第一,名为“契约”理论,却仅仅集中于几个重要的财产关系的研究上,对其他契约关系避而不谈,从而使得“契约理论”大打折扣；第二,该理论建立在完全契约的基础上也是成问题的。Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1629.
621杨瑞龙,前注[6]4],第79页。
622 Bengt Holmstrom, the Firm as a Subeconomy,15 J.L. Econ.& Org.74,80(1999).
623 Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1630.
624 Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies:Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) and Oliver E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (1974); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618]; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives, Risk, and Information:Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy,6 Bell J. Econ.552 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation:The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange,6 Bell J. Econ.250 (1975).
625 Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1632.
626 Id.
627[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森：《资本主义经济制度》,段毅才等译,北京：商务印书馆,2004年版,第31-32页。
628 Edward B. Rock et al., supra note [609], at 1630.
629 Id. at 1634.
630 Id.
631Oliver Hart et al., supra note [4841, at 1120.
632例如,根据交易成本经济学,如果两个企业之间存在高度专用性的投资,那么通过“一体化”就可以减少潜在的“敲竹杠”或者机会主义行为的危害。但是,新产权学派批评道,为什么一个独立的企业主变成另一个企业的雇员之后,他的机会主义行为就会减少呢?或者说,一个独立的企业主与一个雇员之间究竟有什么本质的差别呢?此外,交易费用经济学业没有具体考察“一体化”的产权结构,如果两个企业都具有专用性资产,那么一体化后谁又拥有企业的所有权呢?杨瑞龙,前注[611],第112页。
633杨瑞龙,前注[611],第135页。
634[美]哈特：《企业、合同与财务结构》,费方域译,上海：格致出版社、上海三联出版、上海人民出版社,2008年版,第2页。
635[美]科斯等：《财产权利与制度变迁—产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,胡庄君等译,上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2003年版,第3页。
636同上注,第9页。
637 Robert B. Thompson, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:"Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers,80 Tex. L. Rev.261,FN 18(2001).
638 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618]当两个以上的人共同劳作时,他们各自的产出不易测查,“团体生产”问题就会出现。换言之,由于直接测查每一团队成员的业绩要么不现实,要么要付出高昂的成本,或者每一成员的产出与其他成员的产出无法区分开来,因此使得基于成员的产出的质量与数量进行奖励的办法不可能实现。Robert B. Thompson, supra note [637].
639 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618], at 781-782.
640[美]科斯等,前注[635],第9页。
641 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note[378], at 311.
642 Id.
643陈郁主编,前注[27],第9页。
644 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law,39 B.C. L. Rev.283,295 (1998);Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation,84 Cornell L. Rev.1195,1213 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence:Lessons from Kmart,74 N.C. L. Rev.1037, 1059(1996).
645按照詹森、梅克林的观点,委托人的监督支出、代理人的保证支出以及剩余损失共同构成了代理成本。Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note[378], at 308.
646 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 565.
647 EugeneF.Fama et al., Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions,14 J.Fin.Econ.101,102-103(1985).
648 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 565.
649[美]哈特,前注[634],第8页。
650同上注,第10页。
651同上注,第7页。为了行文的一致,本文将所有“合同”术语称为“契约”。
652[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第5页。“‘交易成本经济学’’像‘产权理论’一样,也承认所有权的作用非常重要；它进一步认识到,绝不可忽略签订合同以前激励组合机制所起的作用。”[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前
注[627],第46页。
653同上注,第35页。
654同上注,第20页。
655同上注,第46页。
658[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第78页。
659康芒斯提出了这样的命题：“应当正确地把交易作为分析的基本单位。”同上注,第11页。
660同上注,第593页。
661同上注,第36页。
662同上注,第78页。所谓的资产专用性,是指一种专用性投资一旦做出,不能转为其他用途,除非付出生产性价值的损失,它包括地点专用、物质专用、人力专用、专项用途、品牌专用以及临时专用等。杨瑞龙,前注[614],第86页。
663同上注,第83页。
671如阿连·施瓦茨所说的那样：“契约学者渐趋关注一种被称作关系契约的契约类型；而经济学家渐趋关注一种被称作不完全契约的契约类型。对法学学者来说,关系契约往往就是不完全契约。”本文将在同一意义上使用这两个术语。Alan Schwartz, Relational contracts in the Courts:an Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies,21 J.legal Stud.271,271 (1992)
672 Eric A. Posner, a theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error,94 Nw. U. L. Rev.749,749(2000).
673 Id. at 759.
674 James W. Fox Jr, Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship,54Case W. Res. L. Rev.1,3-4(2003).
675 Macneil, the New Social Contract:An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (New Haven:Yale University Press,10(1980).
676 Ian R.Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology:A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and de Vos,143 J. Inst.& Theoretical Econ.272,274 (1987).
677 Id.
678 Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,72 Nw. U. L. Rev.854 (1978).
679 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is no Law Relational Contracts,94 Nw. U. L. Rev.805,816(2000).
680 Id. at 808.
681 Id. at 811.
682 Charles J. Goetz et al., the Mitigation Principle:Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation,69 Va. L. Rev.967, 1091 (1983).
683 Eric A. Posner, supra note [672], at 751.
684 Id. at 758.
685 Id. at 751.
686 Id.
687 Id. at 753
688 Charles Goetz et al., Principles of Relational Contracts,67 Va. L. Rev.1089 (1981)
689 Eric A. Posner, supra note [672], at 753.
690 Id. at 759.
691 Id.
692 Id. at 753.
693 Id.
694 Id.
695 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 45-46.
696 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 23.
697 Stephen M. Bainbridge, the Business judgement Rule as Stention Doctrine,57 Vand. L. Rev.83,118(2004).
698 Id.
699 Id.
700 Id.at 118-119.
701杨瑞龙、聂辉华,前注[656],第108页。
702 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 119(2004).
703 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 176-177.
704 Robert B. Thompson, supra note [637].
705麦克尼尔认为公司是最大的关系契约之一。Ian R. MacNeil,supra note [743],at 492; Ian R. Macneil,supra note [678],at 890,NF114; Frank H. Easterbrook et al.,supra note [337],at 90; John C. Coffee, Jr., the Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law:an Essay on the Judicial Role,89 Colum.L. Rev.1618,1622-27,1625(1989);Roberta Romano,Empowering Investors:a Market Approach to Securities Regulation,107 Yale L.J.2359, (2391)1998.
706 Stephen M.Bainbridge,supra note[697],at 118.
707 170 N.W.668,684(Mich.1919).
708 Stephen M.Bainbridge,supra note[697],at 119.
709 Eric A.Posner,supra note[672],at 754.关于法院不能胜任的论证还可参阅以下论文:Melanie B.Leslie,supra note [158],at 97;Lucien J.Dhooge,Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the Llien Tort Statute,22 Emory Int'1 L.Rev.455,494(2008).
710 Melanie B.Leslie,supra note[158],at 97.98.
711Frank H.Easterbrook et al.,supra note [337].
712 Melanie B.Leslie,supra note[158],at 97-98.
713 Lucien J.Dhooge,supra note[709],at 494.
714Stephen M.Bainbridge,supra note[697],at 118.Bainbridge认为“商事判断规则”属于捷径的一种,本文通过对其性质的分析,认为这一观点不足采信。
715 Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability,24 Wake Forest L. Rev.97,97 (1989).
716 Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law,274(2000).
717 Joy v. North,692 F.2d 880,885 (2d Cir.1982)
718 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 88-89.
719 Corporate Director's Guidebook (3th Edition),56 Bus.Law.1571,1586 (2001).
720 William L.Cary et al., Corporations:Cases and Materials (7th ed),603(1995).
721 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 90.
722 Edward Rock et al., supra note [277], at 652.
723 Id. at 651.
724 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note [624], at 246.
725 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 125.
726 Id.
727 Id.
728 Leslie v. Lorillard,18 N.E.363,365 (N.Y.1888).
729在该案中,原告Shlensky质疑被告Wrigley拒绝在芝加哥Wrigley Field棒球体育馆安装电灯的做法。当时,被告Wrigley是大股东,并且是芝加哥National League棒球俱乐部公司的董事会主席,这个在特拉华州注册的公司拥有一支美国专业棒球队Chicago Cubs,并负责Wrigley Field棒球体育馆的运作,原告Shlensky是该公司的一个小股东。在1961年至1965年之间,原告Shlensky抱怨Chicago Cubs的运作一直处于亏损状态,他将亏损归因于少的可怜的观众。他认为不高的出席率是因为被告Wrigley拒绝在Wrigley Field棒球体育馆安装电灯,从而可以安排晚上的比赛,通过增加观看比赛人数增加公司收益。原告Shlensky主张被告Wrigley拒绝安装电灯的两个因素没有一个与股东利益最大化相关。第一,被告Wrigley认为棒球是一个白天进行的运动；第二,被告Wrigley担心晚上组织比赛将会影响到周边邻近地区。237 N.E.2d 776 (111. App. Ct.1968).
730 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note [697], at 96-97.
731在该案中,原告Kamin质疑被告American Express Co董事会作出的分红决定,特别是将被告所拥有的另一个公司的股份分红的决定。原告Kamin认为,将股份配发而不是转让,公司将损失将近800万美元的税收优惠383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup.Ct.1976).
732 Kamin,383 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11.
733 488 A.2d 858(Del.1985).
734 Edward Rock et al., supra note [277], at 651.
735 Id. at 659.
736 Id. at 651.
737 746 A.2d 244,264 (Del.2000).
738 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 625.
739 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 650.
740 Henry Hansmann et al., supra note [109], at 471例如,Langbein教授认为信托法严格禁止委托人试图将与其在信托交易中存在利益冲突的人作为受托人。John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 665-667并且,信托法不恰当地禁止委托人执行某一信托,如果他们不属于受托人。John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 664.
741 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 631.
742 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 653-654.
743 Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract:What We Do and Do not Know,1985 Wis. L. Rev.483,513(1985).
744 John H.Langbein, supra note [38], at 654.
745 Alex M.Johnson Jr. et al., Revolutionizing Judicaial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts:Applying Relational Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's CupLitigations,74 Iowa L. Rev.545,572(1989).
746 John H.Langbein, supra note [381, at 641.
747 Id. at 654.
748 Id.
749 Id. at 642.
750 Id.
759 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 6:2,2.
760 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc.,528 F. Supp.1038 (S.D.N.Y.1981), affd,694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.1982), cert, denied,461 U.S.906 (1983).
761 Id. at 928.
762 Id. at 928-930.
763 John C. Bogle, Do Mutual Funds Charge You Too Much?, Mutual Funds, Oct.1998.
764在]970年之前,投资者只能通过提起诉讼的方式解决管理费用过高的纠纷与争议。提起诉讼之前,投资者必须证明管理费用高的离谱或使人惊讶。Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 7:2,1而自1970年修订《投资公司法》后,明确了董事会在管理费用审核中的作用。Id.
765 Lipper Analytical Services, Inc., The Third White Paper:Are Mutual Fund Fees Reasonable? (Sept.1997); John D. Rea et al, Investment Company Institute Perspective, Trends in the Ownership Costs of Equity Mutual Funds (Nov.1998); Sean Collins, The Expenses of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Mutual Funds, Investment Company Institute Perspective (Dec.2003), available at http://www.ici.org/statements/res/lper09-06.pdf
766 Arthur Levitt, remarks before an Investment Company Institute meeting, Washington, D.C May 15,1998.
767 715 F. Supp.472(S.D.N.Y.1987), aff d,875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.1989), cert, denied,493 U.S.919 (1989).
768 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [521, at 7:2,3.
769 715 F. Supp.472 (S.D.N.Y.1987), affd,875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.1989), cert, denied,493 U.S.919 (1989).
770 Id.
771 Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [521, at 16A:3,1.
772 Id.
788[美]科斯等,前注[635],第63页。按照学者的理解,当具备以下三个条件的时候,“团体生产”问题就会产生。第一,经济性生产需要团队合作,也就是说,生产需要联合性的投入(时间、资金以及其他有价值的资源)；第二,团体成员投入的资源中,部分或全部具有专用性投资的特点：第三,产出具有共同性以及不可分性,将特定产出归因于某一成员的功劳的不可能性。Margaret M. Blair et al., Team Production in Business Organizations:an Introduction,24 J.Corp.L.743,745(1999).
789 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 266经常被讲述的例子是“搬沙发”。假设搬动一个沙发需要两个搬运工,每个搬运工的劳动都是必须的。如果他们事先同意按照一定的比例来分配收入的话,每个搬运工都会试图偷懒,而希望对方负载更大的重量。这是因为尽管每个搬运工偷懒,但是仍会一毫不差地获取全部收益。相反,如果他们同意按照工作的辛苦程度事后分配,他们的投入将变成专用性的投入：除非分配利润,否则谁也无法补偿他们的付出。结果,每个搬运工都有主张超出自己合理份额而试图“寻租”的倾向,因为他们知道对方是无法收回其付出。Lynn A. Stout, supra note [497], at 681.
790 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 266.
791 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 780.
792 Id.
793 Thomas S. Ulen, The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics,18 J. Corp. L.301,312(1993).
794例如,Ulen教授认为：“‘团体生产理论’是否能恰如其分地描述公众公司的情况,对于这一点,人们丝毫不清楚。”Id.
795 Bainbridge教授认为这一理论无法说明以“所有权与控制权分离”为特征的公众公司。他认为在公众公司中,股东享有剩余请求权,理应作为公司的“监督人”。但实际匕,股东根本没有这些权利,它们根本没有实际能力,同时也没有欲望去行使这些权利。Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 568.
796 Margaret M. Blair, a Contractarian Defense of Copporate Philanthropy,28 Stetson L. Rev.27,36(1998).
797 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, supra note [618].
798 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, supra note [378], at 309.
799 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 568.
800 Alan J. Meese, the Team Production Theory of Corporate Law:a Critical Assessment,43 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 1629,1641(2002).
801 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,supra note [618];Ronald Coase, the Problem of Social Cost,3 J.L.& Econ.1 (1960); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities and the Single Owner:One More Salute to Ronald Coase,36 J.L.& Econ. 553,556-557(1993).
802 Raghuram G. Rajan et al., Power in the Theory of a Firm,113 Q.J. Econ.387(1998)
803 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 272.
804 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 595.
805 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 272.
806 Lynn A. Stout, supra note [497],at 685; David Millon,New Game Plan or Business as Usual? a Critique of the Team Prodcution Model of Corporate Law,86 Va. L. Rev.1001,1007(2000).
807[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第335页。
808 Margaret M. Blair et al., supra note [467], at 278.
809 David Millon, supra note [806], at 1007 FN 15.
810 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 595 FN229.
811Id.at 586-587.例如,他认为大多公司的员工完全可以通过其他途径寻求利益保护。Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Employees:Participatory Management and Natural Law,43 Vill. L. Rev.741,817-18(1998)..另外,债权人的投资,同样可以通过其他方法加以保护,特别是在出现大额重复交易的长期关系的情况下更是如此。Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance,5 Indus.& Corp.Change 277,280(1996).
812 Id. at 590.
813 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management:an Organizational Failures Analysis,23 Del. J. Corp. L.979,1073-1074(1998).
814[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第421-4222页。
815 Stephen M.Bainbridge, supra note [151], at 588.
816[美]奥利弗·E.威廉姆森,前注[627],第423页。
817柳志伟：《基金业立法和发展：比较与借鉴》,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第117页。
818该基金上市公告书发布的当天,上海股市猛涨76点,上证指数重返1000点大关。它的成交份数在短短的一个交易日里已达到2933万份,其换手率高达29%,成交额达到1.58亿,占当天整个上海股市大盘总成交量的比例高达24.88%。王连洲、董华春：《“证券投资基金法”条文释义与法理精析》,北京：中国方正出版社,2004年版,第5页。
819不少业内人士认为,基金将成为中国证券市场的“定海神针”、“稳压器”。中国股市的“投机市行将结束”,“熨平证券市场波动”指日可待。同上注,第5页。
820例如,1992年底,国务院发布了关于进一步加强证券市场宏观管理的通知,在该通知中指出：“在加强统一管理的基础上,积极组织投资基金证券、可转换证券、信托受益凭证等新品种的试点,丰富、活跃证券市场。”
821张路等编：《美英基金法比较与实务》,北京：法律出版社,2007年版,第288页。
822同上注。
823同上注。
824尹中立：“我国证券投资基金的发展历程回顾”,《银行家》,2008年第10期。
825同上注。
844Charles E. Rounds, Jr.et al., supra note [1], at 482.
845贺万忠,前注[14],第94页。
846陈春山：《证券投资信托专论》,中国台湾：台湾五南图书出版有限公司,1997年版,第257页。
847乔棣：“中国内地证券投资基金法律性质的探讨”,《中外法学》,1999年第2期,第115。
848周恭泉：《投资基金组织治理研究》,北京：中国金融出版社,2008年版,第201页。
849贺万忠,前注[14],第93页。
850同上注。
851同上注。
852同上注。
853同上注,第94页。
854胡伟,前注[14],第79页；黎四奇,前注[11],第210页。
855汤欣：“我国契约型投资基金当事人法律关系模式的选择”,中国证券业协会基金公会主编：《证券投资基金法规体系研究》,北京：中国法制出版社,2002年版,第304页。
856郭峰、陈夏：《证券投资基金法导论》,北京：法律出版社,2008年版,第206页。
857朱少平：《“证券投资基金法”解读》,北京：中国金融出版社,2004年版,第138页。
858朱小川：《营业信托法律制度比较研究》,北京：法律出版社,2007年版,第378页。
859碧元：“再揭基金黑幕”,《中国改革》,2005年第10期,第18页。
860张国清,前注[21],第120页。
861Lucian Arye Bebchuk, supra note [136], at 908.
862张国清,前注[21],第120页。
863王连洲、董华春,前注[818],第265页。
864朱少平,前注[857],第117页。
865同上注,第117页。
866中国人民大学信托与基金研究所：《中国基金业发展报告》(1991-2003),北京：中国经济出版社,2004年版,第5页。
867 IOSOC, supra note [99], at 35.
868 Morton Horwitz et al., When and How the Supreme Court Found Democracy--A Computer Study,14 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1,28(1994).
869 Lisa M. Fairfax, the future of Shareholder Democray,84 Ind. L.J.1259,1260(2009).
870 K. A. D. Camara, supra note [33], at 221.
871第一,股东缺乏足够的激励去审查公司决策好坏。Henry G Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting,64 Colum. L. Rev.1427,1440-41 (1964)第二,外部性的存在影响了股东行使投票权。Frank H.Easterbrook et al., Voting in Corporate Law,26 J.L.& Econ.395,413-415(1983)第三,“有限理性”决定了股东无法做出最佳的决策。Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality, in 1 the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 266-268第四,获得数量较大的股东投票权需要付出巨大的成本。Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise,39-42 (1996)第五,随着人数的增加,做出有效的决策需要
877 Edward S. Adams, Using Evaluations to Break Down the Male Corporate Hierarchy:a Full-circle Approach,73 U. Colo. L. Rev.117,129(2002).
878 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, supra note [136], at 715.
879 Id.
880 Id.
881 Stephen M. Bainbridge, the Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights,53 UCLA L. Rev.601,619 (2006).
882 Jensen et al., Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market,7 J. ACCT.& ECON.3,4-5(1985).
883 Lucian A. Bebchuk, supra note [136],at 715; Jonathan R. Macey,supra note [283],at 3!5;Melvin Avon Eisenberg,1989 the Structure of Corporation Law,89 Colum. L. Rev.1461(1989).
884 Carl W. Mills, Breach of Fiduciary Duty as Securities Fraud:SEC v. Hancellor Corp,10 Fordham J. Corp.& Fin. L. 439,443(2005).
885 Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:the Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers,33 Stan. L. Rev.819,840 (1981); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Coporate Law:the Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,102 Harv. L. Rev.1820,(1989)第一,公司控制权市场的“失灵”。尽管公司控制权市场能够起到一定的制约作用,但是,代理人(董事会)有权阻止敌意收购,从而失去了其应有的制约作用。Lucian Arye Bebchuk,supra note [136],at 715第二,资本市场的“失灵”。在公司上市或者公开发行股票之后的很长一段时间里,都不会募集新的股份,从而使资本市场的作用大为减低。Id而且,根据学者的考察,即使委托人不依股东利益为中心,也不能阻碍公司获取新的资金支持。Id.况且,它还可以通过贷款的方式获取资金。Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Coporate Law:the Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,102 Harv. L. Rev.1845,(1989)第三,产品市场的“失灵”。代理人不以股东利益为中心并不一定导致市场份额的减少,尽管会导致利润的减少,但却不会影响公司的产品市场业绩。Lucian Arye Bebchuk,supra note [136],at 715第四,股票市场的“失灵”。在股东不满意公司治理之时,会将其股份转让并不能在实质上影响到代理人。Lucian Arye Bebchuk,supra note [136],at 716第五,经理劳动市场的“失灵”。事实证明,平均而言,公司业绩的变化对委托人薪金影响并不如想象中的那样大。数据表明,公司业绩提高时,CEO的薪金以及奖金按照供公司资产增加额的2‰计算；CEO的所有收入的增加则按照资产增加额的3.72‰计算,Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Coporate Law:the Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments,102 Harv.
889同上注。
890中国人民大学信托与基金研究所,前注[866],第69页。
891刘志远、姚颐：“开放式基金的‘赎回困惑’现象研究”,《证券市场导报》,2005年2月号,第40页。作者考察的范围是2002年12月31日到2004年3月31日之间我国共同基金的赎回情况。随着基金业绩增长,赎回率不降反升,而且基金的净中购并不是出现在基金业绩增长最高时,而恰恰是出现在业绩增长最低时。另外,即便业绩增长达到最高时,赎回率只是趋近于0,但仍然没有出现净申购。
892同上注。
893杨晓兰、满臻：“我国开放式和封闭式基金绩效比较的实证研究”,《证券市场导报》,2006年1月号,第50页。作者考察对象的时间范围是2004年1月至2005年4月。
894周恭泉：《投资基金组织治理研究》,北京：中国金融出版社,2008年版,第77页。
912胡光志、方桂荣,前注[906],第52页。
913例如,陈斌彬：“美国对基金关联交易的法律监管及其对我国的启示”,《江西财经大学学报》,2005年第6期,第25页；王苏生,前注[10]：张国清,前注[21]；胡家夫、骆红艳：“证券投资基金关联交易监管研究”,《证券市场导报》,2005年第4期,第6页；胡家夫、骆红艳：“基金关联交易监管—海外经验与对策建议”,http://finance.sina.com.cn.:陈星德：“证券投资基金利益冲突的法律研究”,中国政法大学博士论文(经济法方向),20078
914胡光志、方桂荣,前注[906],第57页。
915张国清：“美国共同基金的独立董事制度及启示”,《证券市场导报》,2004年7月号,第9页。
916 Restatement (Second) of Trusts§2 (1959); Restatement (Third) of Trusts §2 (2003).
917 George Gleason Bogert et al., supra note [173],at 122.
918 Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the express trust,36 Alta.L.Rev.630,637(1998).
919何宝玉：《英国信托法原理与判例》,北京：法律出版社,2001年版,第381-2页。
920 Warner V.Rogers(1924).
921 Mark Blair et al., Collective Investment Schemes:the Role Of the Trust,Australian accounting review,15.
922 Id. at 13.
923谢哲胜：前注[168],第229页。
924谢哲胜：前注[168],第230页。
925同上注。
926苏聪儒：“证券投资信托基金经理公司之法律义务”,《全国律师》,1998年1月第1期,第96页；同上注。
927王连洲、董华春,前注[818],第33页。
928在传统信托中,之所以规定让受托人之间承担连带责任,其理据在于共同受托人处理信托事务坚持共同行动原则,共同受托人对违反信托义务的行为承担连带责任是逻辑的必然结果。胡伟,前注[14],第83页。但是,在共同基金中,显然无法采取共同行动的原则,所以让其承担连带责任也失去了理论上的根据。
929 Supra note [362].
930 Supra note [362], at 132.
931 Sarah Worthington, Public unit trusts:principles, policy and reform of the trustee and manager roles,UNSW law Journal,258(1991).
932 Supra note [362], at 132.
933 Id. at 131.
934周玉华：《信托法学》,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2001年版,第154页。
935Sarah Worthington, supra note [931], at 256.
936 Id.
937 Supra note [362], at 134.
938 Id. at 133.
939汤欣：前注[855],第304页。
940郭峰、陈夏：前注[856],第206页；胡伟,前注[14],第80页。按照学者的观点,这种差异性主要体现在财产归属、受托人处理信托事务的方式以及责任承担方式上。胡伟,前注[14],第80-83页。
941实际上,立法者并没有对受托人在监督基金运作方面寄予厚望。如有学者说的那样：“在实务环节上,对托管人能否有效监督管理人的投资运作不能抱太大的期望。……因此,托管人的监督作用主要体现在保管权上,在监督权上可以发挥的空间不大。”王连洲、董华春,前注[818],第311页。
942朱少平,前注[857],第337-338页。
943Supra note [362], at 132.
944 Report on the review of the managed investment act 1998, proposals for change, Chapter 9,87(2002).
945 Moodie and Ian Malcolm Ramsay, supra note [896], at 47.
946 Id. at 59.
947 Id.
948 Id. at 50.
949 Australian Securities Commission v. AS Nominees Ltd(1995).
950 Moodie and Ian Malcolm Ramsay, supra note [896], at 50-51.
963 Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern"Corporation:Perspectives form the German,80 Harv. L. Rev.23,50(1966).
964Donald C.Clarke, the Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance,31 Del. J. Corp. L.125,174(2006).
965 Id.
966 Thomas J. Andre, Jr, Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance:a Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards,70 Tul. L. Rev.1819,1820(1996).
967 Id. at 1823-1824.
968 Id. at 1824.
969 Detlev F. Vagts, supra note [963], at 50.
970 Id.
971 Cherie J. Owen,Board Games:Germany's Monopoly on the Two-Tier System of Corporate Governance and Why the Post-Enron United States Would Benefit from its Adoption,22 Penn St. Int'1 L. Rev.167,168(2003).
972 Donald C.Clarke, supra note [9641, at 128.
973 Id.
974 Id.
975例如,德国法律规定,如果公司员工的规模超过2000人,那么在公司的监事会中,员工代表的数额要等同于股东代表的数额。Thomas J. Andre, supra note [966],at 1839而且,银行以及其他一小撮个人都有可能加入到监事会组成人员之列。这一做法被称之为“共同决策”。“共同决策”的理念根植于德国公司治理当中,起根源可以追溯到19世纪的德国。“共同决策”是作为一种缓解强势的企业家与弱势的员工之间的不平衡关系而创设的一种制度。Detlev F.Vagts,supra note[963],at 65.例如,1993年德国银行协会的一份调查报告显示：德国100强公司的中1480位监事会职位中,有36%属于员工代表、13%属于贸易协会代表、26%属于股东代表、10%来自行业和股东协会代表、7%属于私人银行代表、5%属于政客和公务人员代表、3%来自其他银行和保险公司的代表。Thomas J. Andre, supra note [966],at 1839.
976 Detlev F. Vagts, supra note [963], at 50
977 Thomas J. Andre, supra note [966], at 1821.
978 Chao Xi, in Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model:Board Reforms and the Politicla Economy of Corporate Law in China,22CTJILT 1,43(2006).
979 Id. at 12.
980 Barry D. Baysinger et al., Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporate Law:the ALI's Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.557,563-64 (1984).
981 Jie Yuan, Formal Convergence or Substantial Divergence? Evidence from Adoption of the Independent Director System in China? 9 Asian-Pac. L.& Pol'y J.71,72(2007).
982 Id. at 102.
983 Id.
984 Chao Xi, supra note [978], at 7.
985 Id. at 43.
986 Amir N. Licht, the Mother of All Path Dependencies Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 Del. J. Corp. L.147(2001)
989 Joseph R. Fleming, Regulation of Series Investment Companies Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,44 Bus. Law.1179(1989).
990Clifford E. Kirsch et al., supra note [52], at 2:2,3.
995 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc.,528 F. Supp.1038 (S.D. N.Y.1981), affd,694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.1982), cert, denied,461 U.S.906(1983).
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[20]孟东晓：“证券投资基金治理结构研究”,复旦大学博士学位论文(国际金融),2003年。
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[25]孙杨、尚震宇：“中国证券投资基金的治理机制缺陷与改进策略”,《财经科学》,2008年第2期。
[26]汪世虎：“论破产程序对担保物权优先性的限制”,《河北法学》2006年第8期。
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[30]叶俊英：“证券投资基金的经济学与法学分析”,西南财经大学博士学位论文(国民经济学),2005。
[31]张国清：“基金持有人大会法律制度研究”,《证券市场导报》,2003年10月号
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[33]张国清：“证券投资基金关联交易的法律规制”,《证券市场导报》,2006年1月号。
[34]赵万一：“关于修改我国公司法的几个基本问题”,《中南财经政法大学学报》,2003年第6期。
[35]赵旭东：“公司法人财产权与公司治理”,《北方法学》,2008年第1期。
[36]赵旭东：“论我国公司法的调整对象”,《中国社会科学》,1986年第6期。
[37]赵学清、王衡：“论我国投资基金模式的选择”,《法律适用》,2002年第3期。
[38]朱成刚：“证券投资基金持有人利益保护法律机制研究”,中国政法大学博士学位论文(经济法学),2006年。
[39]朱慈蕴：“公司章程两分法论—公司章程自治与他治理念的融合”,《当代法学》,2006年第5期。
[40]朱慈蕴：“资本多数决原则与控制股东的诚信义务”,《法学研究》,2004年第4期。
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