中国制造业比较优势的制度性因素研究
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摘要
目前,国际和国内研究者都关注到了更广泛的比较优势来源,其中合理的制度安排是一种优质的无形要素,制度的动态调整发展成为了各国贸易增长和比较优势提升的重要来源。中国制造业正处在发展转型的战略机遇期,面临着外贸发展方式转变的现实压力,亟需以制度变革为突破口来促进各种要素的均衡增长与结构优化,并形成以最优方式持续提供制度变量的新的比较优势提升机制。根据新制度经济学的现有观点,理性的市场主体致力于维持现有产权并追求剩余权利,而好的制度应保护其对剩余权利的合理追求,规制不合理追求。企业是最基本的市场主体,制造业企业在内外部制度环境下进行生产经营活动,投入中间品、生产要素和公共产品,并由此获得收益。制度变量应分别从企业层面、市场层面和国家层面来影响企业对中间品、生产要素和公共产品的投入,包括投入的规模、结构与方式。企业层面、市场层面和国家层面的制度的提供者分别为上下游企业、要素市场和国家公共政策,而各种制度下的最终决策者和受益主体仍是企业。各种层面的制度通过对广义交易成本的影响,作用于企业的生产效率及其出口意愿和能力。一国制造业比较优势的提升应是建立在最大化节约广义交易成本的基础上,因此制度对制造业比较优势具有重要的影响。
在进行了文献回顾并构建了全文理论框架之后,本文重点对企业层面、市场层面和国家层面的制度影响制造业比较优势的机制和实效分别展开理论与实证分析,进而结合中国转变外贸发展方式的现实背景,综合研究如何通过制度安排的调整变革实现外贸要素结构、市场分布和贸易方式以及开放型经济收益分配格局的转变。
在第4章,本文研究了企业层面的制度对制造业比较优势的影响。本文分别构建了两种范式的理论模型来分析市场要素和组织要素的充裕度与密集度对制造业出口优势的影响,得出了“一国在密集使用其充裕要素的产品上具有比较优势”的理论命题,并利用中国的地区—行业交叉数据进行了实证分析,结果显示中国各地区制造业出口优势受市场要素的影响为正,受组织要素的影响为负。
在第5章,本文研究了市场层面的制度对制造业比较优势的影响。本文构建了一个“2×2×2”模型来分析要素价格扭曲及其纠正措施对比较优势的影响,得出了“一国规制要素价格扭曲的制度对比较优势的成效会随着扭曲程度不同而有所差异”的理论命题,并利用中国各地区的面板数据进行了实证分析,结果显示致力于纠正资本价格扭曲的金融市场化和致力于纠正劳动力价格扭曲的劳动者保护作为制度变量,越是充裕,就越不利于制造业比较优势的提高,且扭曲程度的加深会加剧这种负向作用。
在第6章,本文研究了国家层面的制度对制造业比较优势的影响。本文构建了一个中央—地方政府的博弈模型来分析国家层面的制度安排对比较优势的影响,得出了“地方政府预算内收入和基础税源的扩大有助于贸易利益和比较优势长远发展,而垄断和腐败会对冲这种促进作用”的理论命题,并利用中国的时间序列数据进行了实证分析,结果显示垄断和腐败会阻碍财政分权对比较优势的正向作用,加剧地方竞争对比较优势的负向作用。
在第7章,本文结合中国转变外贸发展方式的现实背景,综合分析了每章结论的政策含义,探究了如何调整和改进企业层面、市场层面和国家层面的制度,使其发挥出对外贸收益和比较优势的长远促进作用。最后给出了全文的结论和进一步研究的方向。
Currently, all researchers around the world have noticed broader scope of comparative advantages, in which, logical institutional arrangement is a superior intangible factor, and the dynamic adjustment of institution has become a significant source for all countries to promote their trade and comparative advantages. Facing the pressure from changing the way foreign trade develops, China's manufacturing industry is at a transition period, and it urgently needs to propel balanced growth and structure optimization of assorted factors by institutional reform and eventually finds a new way to strengthen its comparative advantages. According to new institutional economics, rational market participants focus on maintaining existing ownership and pursuing residual equity, and good institution should protect their reasonable pursuit while regulate unreasonable pursuit. Enterprises are the most basic market participants. Manufacturing enterprises undertake production and operation in both interior and exterior environments, by inputting intermediate goods, production factors and public goods, they earn profits. There are several ways such as enterprise level, market level and country level, in which institutional variable can have impact on how much enterprises would input intermediate goods, production factors and public goods. The institution supplier of the three levels are respectively upstream and downstream enterprises, factor market and national public policies, while enterprises remain the final decision-maker and benefited subject under all institution arrangements. Through the impact on generalized transaction cost, institution of all levels acts on the productivity and export will and capability. Further, the improvement of the comparative advantage of a country's manufacturing industry should be based on farthest reducing generalized transaction cost; thus institution is crucial for the comparative advantage of manufacturing industry.
After reviewing literatures and establishing theoretical framework for the whole thesis, I chiefly focus on how and how well institution can influence the comparative advantages of manufacturing industry. By theoretical and empirical analysis, I discuss this from three aspects namely enterprise level, market level and country level. Then, combining transformation of trade development pattern of China, I comprehensively analyze how to accomplish the transformation of factor structure of foreign trade, market distribution and mode of trade by logically arranging institution.
In Chapter4,I research the impact institution have upon comparative advantage from an angel of enterprise. Respectively, I construct two kinds of theoretical frameworks to analyze how the adequacy and intensity of market factor and organization factor affect the export advantage of manufacturing industry. I draw a conclusion in this chapter that a country has comparative advantage on products that use its adequate factors. I conduct empirical analysis which suggests that market factor has a positive impact on the export advantage of all regions in China, while organization factor has a negative impact on it.
In Chapter5,I research the impact institution have upon comparative advantage from an angel of market. By building a2x2x2model, I analyze how factor prices distortion and its corrective measures can influence comparative advantage. I conclude in this chapter that a country's institution aiming at regulating factor prices distortion would have different effects on comparative advantage as the distortion is changing. By using panel data of all China's regions, I conduct empirical analysis which suggests that, as institutional variables, when financial marketization which aims at correcting capital prices distortion and labor protection which aims at correcting labor prices distortion are getting more and more adequate, they tend to have negative influence on the comparative advantage of manufacturing industry, and in addition, as the distortion is becoming serious, this negative influence will become evident.
In Chapter6,I research the impact institution have upon comparative advantage from an angel of country. I analyze how the country's institutional arrangement can affect comparative advantage through a central-local government game model, concluding that the expansion of revenue above the line and tax source of local government helps the development of trade benefits and comparative advantage, while monopoly and corruption will reduce this enhancement. By using time series data of all China, I conduct empirical analysis which suggests that, monopoly and corruption would hinder the positive effect fiscal decentralization has on comparative advantage, aggravating the negative effect local competition has on comparative advantage.
In Chapter7, taking transformation of trade development pattern of China in account, I comprehensively analyze the policy implication for every conclusion in all chapters and discuss how to adjust and improve the institutional arrangement from enterprise level, market level and country level to make it a support for enhancing trade benefits and comparative advantage. At last, I provide conclusion and orientation of further research for the whole thesis.
在进行了文献回顾并构建了全文理论框架之后,本文重点对企业层面、市场层面和国家层面的制度影响制造业比较优势的机制和实效分别展开理论与实证分析,进而结合中国转变外贸发展方式的现实背景,综合研究如何通过制度安排的调整变革实现外贸要素结构、市场分布和贸易方式以及开放型经济收益分配格局的转变。
在第4章,本文研究了企业层面的制度对制造业比较优势的影响。本文分别构建了两种范式的理论模型来分析市场要素和组织要素的充裕度与密集度对制造业出口优势的影响,得出了“一国在密集使用其充裕要素的产品上具有比较优势”的理论命题,并利用中国的地区—行业交叉数据进行了实证分析,结果显示中国各地区制造业出口优势受市场要素的影响为正,受组织要素的影响为负。
在第5章,本文研究了市场层面的制度对制造业比较优势的影响。本文构建了一个“2×2×2”模型来分析要素价格扭曲及其纠正措施对比较优势的影响,得出了“一国规制要素价格扭曲的制度对比较优势的成效会随着扭曲程度不同而有所差异”的理论命题,并利用中国各地区的面板数据进行了实证分析,结果显示致力于纠正资本价格扭曲的金融市场化和致力于纠正劳动力价格扭曲的劳动者保护作为制度变量,越是充裕,就越不利于制造业比较优势的提高,且扭曲程度的加深会加剧这种负向作用。
在第6章,本文研究了国家层面的制度对制造业比较优势的影响。本文构建了一个中央—地方政府的博弈模型来分析国家层面的制度安排对比较优势的影响,得出了“地方政府预算内收入和基础税源的扩大有助于贸易利益和比较优势长远发展,而垄断和腐败会对冲这种促进作用”的理论命题,并利用中国的时间序列数据进行了实证分析,结果显示垄断和腐败会阻碍财政分权对比较优势的正向作用,加剧地方竞争对比较优势的负向作用。
在第7章,本文结合中国转变外贸发展方式的现实背景,综合分析了每章结论的政策含义,探究了如何调整和改进企业层面、市场层面和国家层面的制度,使其发挥出对外贸收益和比较优势的长远促进作用。最后给出了全文的结论和进一步研究的方向。
Currently, all researchers around the world have noticed broader scope of comparative advantages, in which, logical institutional arrangement is a superior intangible factor, and the dynamic adjustment of institution has become a significant source for all countries to promote their trade and comparative advantages. Facing the pressure from changing the way foreign trade develops, China's manufacturing industry is at a transition period, and it urgently needs to propel balanced growth and structure optimization of assorted factors by institutional reform and eventually finds a new way to strengthen its comparative advantages. According to new institutional economics, rational market participants focus on maintaining existing ownership and pursuing residual equity, and good institution should protect their reasonable pursuit while regulate unreasonable pursuit. Enterprises are the most basic market participants. Manufacturing enterprises undertake production and operation in both interior and exterior environments, by inputting intermediate goods, production factors and public goods, they earn profits. There are several ways such as enterprise level, market level and country level, in which institutional variable can have impact on how much enterprises would input intermediate goods, production factors and public goods. The institution supplier of the three levels are respectively upstream and downstream enterprises, factor market and national public policies, while enterprises remain the final decision-maker and benefited subject under all institution arrangements. Through the impact on generalized transaction cost, institution of all levels acts on the productivity and export will and capability. Further, the improvement of the comparative advantage of a country's manufacturing industry should be based on farthest reducing generalized transaction cost; thus institution is crucial for the comparative advantage of manufacturing industry.
After reviewing literatures and establishing theoretical framework for the whole thesis, I chiefly focus on how and how well institution can influence the comparative advantages of manufacturing industry. By theoretical and empirical analysis, I discuss this from three aspects namely enterprise level, market level and country level. Then, combining transformation of trade development pattern of China, I comprehensively analyze how to accomplish the transformation of factor structure of foreign trade, market distribution and mode of trade by logically arranging institution.
In Chapter4,I research the impact institution have upon comparative advantage from an angel of enterprise. Respectively, I construct two kinds of theoretical frameworks to analyze how the adequacy and intensity of market factor and organization factor affect the export advantage of manufacturing industry. I draw a conclusion in this chapter that a country has comparative advantage on products that use its adequate factors. I conduct empirical analysis which suggests that market factor has a positive impact on the export advantage of all regions in China, while organization factor has a negative impact on it.
In Chapter5,I research the impact institution have upon comparative advantage from an angel of market. By building a2x2x2model, I analyze how factor prices distortion and its corrective measures can influence comparative advantage. I conclude in this chapter that a country's institution aiming at regulating factor prices distortion would have different effects on comparative advantage as the distortion is changing. By using panel data of all China's regions, I conduct empirical analysis which suggests that, as institutional variables, when financial marketization which aims at correcting capital prices distortion and labor protection which aims at correcting labor prices distortion are getting more and more adequate, they tend to have negative influence on the comparative advantage of manufacturing industry, and in addition, as the distortion is becoming serious, this negative influence will become evident.
In Chapter6,I research the impact institution have upon comparative advantage from an angel of country. I analyze how the country's institutional arrangement can affect comparative advantage through a central-local government game model, concluding that the expansion of revenue above the line and tax source of local government helps the development of trade benefits and comparative advantage, while monopoly and corruption will reduce this enhancement. By using time series data of all China, I conduct empirical analysis which suggests that, monopoly and corruption would hinder the positive effect fiscal decentralization has on comparative advantage, aggravating the negative effect local competition has on comparative advantage.
In Chapter7, taking transformation of trade development pattern of China in account, I comprehensively analyze the policy implication for every conclusion in all chapters and discuss how to adjust and improve the institutional arrangement from enterprise level, market level and country level to make it a support for enhancing trade benefits and comparative advantage. At last, I provide conclusion and orientation of further research for the whole thesis.
引文
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