开放系统下企业产品博弈定价的理论与实证研究
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摘要
产品定价是经济理论与市场学研究的核心问题之,它不仅涉及到买卖双方的利益,还是配置社会资源的重要手段,在市场竞争中起着十分关键的作用。随着市场环境的日趋复杂,产品定价涉及的因素越来越多。本文以市场经济条件下的产品定价为研究对象,运用博弈论的方法探索了开放系统不同成本、费用企业的产品定价问题,以期形成较为完整的产品定价理论体系和方法体系,并通过实证的方法来分析理论定价与实际价格的差异。
本文主要研究了以下几个方面的内容：
(1)对产品定价有关的理论和文献进行综述。得出了不存在统一的经济规模、企业的生产成本难以相同、营销费用影响产品定价等结论,以及博弈定价研究的不足之处,如：①企业具有相同产品成本的假设条件限制了对不同成本企业的定价分析；②未考虑营销费用等对定价的影响,是生产观念的体现；③末考虑潜在竞争对产品定价的影响,是对现代市场开放性特征的忽视。
(2)相同成本企业博弈定价研究。重点研究了合作博弈定价和开放系统博弈定价问题,给出了对应的博弈定价模型。得出：①合作博弈比竞争博弈的产量低、价格高、利润大；②在封闭系统中价格信息可以化解合作策略的风险；③在开放系统中合作博弈的风险源于高价格吸引新投资者的进入；④按临界价格模型制定价格,能使原企业保持相对较高的利润水平等结论。
(3)不同成本企业博弈定价研究。重点研究了主从竞争博弈定价和合作博弈的产量分配问题,建立了两类企业、三类企业主从竞争博弈等定价模型,证明了不同成本企业合作博弈的利润大于竞争博弈的利润。得出了：①低成本大型企业在多企业竞争中具有非常大的产量优势；②临界价格与新进入企业的目标利润、固定费用和市场进入成本有关等结论。
(4)考虑营销费用的博弈定价研究。分别研究了营销费用对上述一种博弈定价的影响,给出了企业新的总成本函数和考虑营销费用的对应定价模型,得出了：①营销费用系数通过放大单位变动成本的作用影响最优价格,与最优价格成正向变化关系；②营销费用系数通过对目标利润、固定费用、市场进入成本的放大作用正向影响临界价格,通过对产品分配系数的变化反向影响临界价格等结论。
(5)实证研究。分析了空调行业的市场结构及数家代表企业的产品成本和营销费用；运用EVIEWS5软件建立了空调产品1998-2005年的市场需求函数；计算了空调企业竞争、合作博弈等理论价格,并与实际价格进行了比较分析。得出了：①空调行业已呈现寡头垄断的市场特征；②空调企业在2000年前处于合作博弈状态,2000年后处于竞争博弈状态；③2000年前空调产品的实际价格远高于临界价格,它应是2000年后空调市场价格大战的主要原因之一等结论。
最后,总结了本文的研究结论和主要贡献,同时指出了可进一步研究的方向。
Product pricing has long been one of the core issues in economic theory and marketing researches. Not only does it involve both buyers and sellers' interests, but also it is an important mean to allocate social resources. Market environment being increasingly complicated, more and more factors are involved in product pricing. Targeting at product pricing in market economy environment, this paper applies game theory on product pricing problem of open system enterprises that are different in cost and expense. This paper aims to establish complete product pricing theory system and method system, and it also uses empirical study to analyze the difference between theoretic pricing and practical pricing.
This dissertation mainly studies the following issues:
(1) This thesis reviews the related theories and literatures of product pricing. It draws conclusions as there is no unified economic scale, enterprises' production costs are different, marketing expense could influence pricing and etc. it also sums up deficiencies of game theory pricing research as below:①the hypothesis that all enterprises have the same product cost has restricted the pricing analysis of enterprises with different cost;②it hasn't consider marketing expense's influence on pricing, and it's the embodiment of production concept;③it hasn't considered potential competition's influence on pricing, and it reflects the neglect of current market's open characteristic.
(2) This thesis studies the game theory pricing of the enterprises with same cost. It mainly studies cooperative game theory pricing and open system game theory pricing and gives the corresponding game theory pricing model. It draws conclusions as below:①comparing with competitive game, cooperative game has characteristics as low yield, high price and fat profit;②price information could reduce cooperative strategy risk in a closed system;③making price according to critical price model could help enterprise maintain a comparatively high profit level.
(3) This thesis studies the game theory pricing of the enterprises with different cost. It mainly studies master-slave competitive game theory pricing and cooperative game's output distribution problem. This paper establishes master-slave competitive game theory pricing model for two and three kinds of enterprise, and it also proves that the cooperative game's profit of enterprises with different cost is more than the competitive game's profit. It draws conclusions as below:①low-cost large enterprise has the yield advantage in multi-enterprises competition;②critical price is related to new entrant enterprise's target profit, fixed cost and entering cost.
(4) This thesis studies the game theory pricing while considering marketing expense. It respectively studies the marketing expense's influence on the three kinds of game theory pricing introduced above. This paper also gives out enterprise's new total cost function and the corresponding pricing model which considers marketing expense. It draws conclusions as below:①the marketing expense coefficient influences the optimal price by amplifying the unit variable cost's effect and it has a positive relationship with the optimal price;②the marketing expense coefficient influences the critical price by amplifying target profit, fixed cost and entering cost's effect. It also reversely influences critical price by changing product distribution coefficient.
(5) This thesis carries out empirical study. It analyzes air conditioner industry's market structure and several enterprises'production cost and marketing expense. It uses EVIEWS5 software to establish air conditioner's market demand function during 1998 to 2005。It also calculates theoretical prices of competitive game and cooperative game in air conditioner industry and compares them with practical price. It draws conclusions as below:①the air conditioner industry shows oligopoly market character;②the air conditioner enterprise is in status of cooperative game before 2000 and in status of competitive game after it;③the air conditioner's practical price is much higher than critical price, and it's one of the main causes that initiated price war of air conditioner industry in late 2000.
At last, this thesis gives the research conclusions and the main contributions, and it also points out research's deficiencies and further research direction.
本文主要研究了以下几个方面的内容：
(1)对产品定价有关的理论和文献进行综述。得出了不存在统一的经济规模、企业的生产成本难以相同、营销费用影响产品定价等结论,以及博弈定价研究的不足之处,如：①企业具有相同产品成本的假设条件限制了对不同成本企业的定价分析；②未考虑营销费用等对定价的影响,是生产观念的体现；③末考虑潜在竞争对产品定价的影响,是对现代市场开放性特征的忽视。
(2)相同成本企业博弈定价研究。重点研究了合作博弈定价和开放系统博弈定价问题,给出了对应的博弈定价模型。得出：①合作博弈比竞争博弈的产量低、价格高、利润大；②在封闭系统中价格信息可以化解合作策略的风险；③在开放系统中合作博弈的风险源于高价格吸引新投资者的进入；④按临界价格模型制定价格,能使原企业保持相对较高的利润水平等结论。
(3)不同成本企业博弈定价研究。重点研究了主从竞争博弈定价和合作博弈的产量分配问题,建立了两类企业、三类企业主从竞争博弈等定价模型,证明了不同成本企业合作博弈的利润大于竞争博弈的利润。得出了：①低成本大型企业在多企业竞争中具有非常大的产量优势；②临界价格与新进入企业的目标利润、固定费用和市场进入成本有关等结论。
(4)考虑营销费用的博弈定价研究。分别研究了营销费用对上述一种博弈定价的影响,给出了企业新的总成本函数和考虑营销费用的对应定价模型,得出了：①营销费用系数通过放大单位变动成本的作用影响最优价格,与最优价格成正向变化关系；②营销费用系数通过对目标利润、固定费用、市场进入成本的放大作用正向影响临界价格,通过对产品分配系数的变化反向影响临界价格等结论。
(5)实证研究。分析了空调行业的市场结构及数家代表企业的产品成本和营销费用；运用EVIEWS5软件建立了空调产品1998-2005年的市场需求函数；计算了空调企业竞争、合作博弈等理论价格,并与实际价格进行了比较分析。得出了：①空调行业已呈现寡头垄断的市场特征；②空调企业在2000年前处于合作博弈状态,2000年后处于竞争博弈状态；③2000年前空调产品的实际价格远高于临界价格,它应是2000年后空调市场价格大战的主要原因之一等结论。
最后,总结了本文的研究结论和主要贡献,同时指出了可进一步研究的方向。
Product pricing has long been one of the core issues in economic theory and marketing researches. Not only does it involve both buyers and sellers' interests, but also it is an important mean to allocate social resources. Market environment being increasingly complicated, more and more factors are involved in product pricing. Targeting at product pricing in market economy environment, this paper applies game theory on product pricing problem of open system enterprises that are different in cost and expense. This paper aims to establish complete product pricing theory system and method system, and it also uses empirical study to analyze the difference between theoretic pricing and practical pricing.
This dissertation mainly studies the following issues:
(1) This thesis reviews the related theories and literatures of product pricing. It draws conclusions as there is no unified economic scale, enterprises' production costs are different, marketing expense could influence pricing and etc. it also sums up deficiencies of game theory pricing research as below:①the hypothesis that all enterprises have the same product cost has restricted the pricing analysis of enterprises with different cost;②it hasn't consider marketing expense's influence on pricing, and it's the embodiment of production concept;③it hasn't considered potential competition's influence on pricing, and it reflects the neglect of current market's open characteristic.
(2) This thesis studies the game theory pricing of the enterprises with same cost. It mainly studies cooperative game theory pricing and open system game theory pricing and gives the corresponding game theory pricing model. It draws conclusions as below:①comparing with competitive game, cooperative game has characteristics as low yield, high price and fat profit;②price information could reduce cooperative strategy risk in a closed system;③making price according to critical price model could help enterprise maintain a comparatively high profit level.
(3) This thesis studies the game theory pricing of the enterprises with different cost. It mainly studies master-slave competitive game theory pricing and cooperative game's output distribution problem. This paper establishes master-slave competitive game theory pricing model for two and three kinds of enterprise, and it also proves that the cooperative game's profit of enterprises with different cost is more than the competitive game's profit. It draws conclusions as below:①low-cost large enterprise has the yield advantage in multi-enterprises competition;②critical price is related to new entrant enterprise's target profit, fixed cost and entering cost.
(4) This thesis studies the game theory pricing while considering marketing expense. It respectively studies the marketing expense's influence on the three kinds of game theory pricing introduced above. This paper also gives out enterprise's new total cost function and the corresponding pricing model which considers marketing expense. It draws conclusions as below:①the marketing expense coefficient influences the optimal price by amplifying the unit variable cost's effect and it has a positive relationship with the optimal price;②the marketing expense coefficient influences the critical price by amplifying target profit, fixed cost and entering cost's effect. It also reversely influences critical price by changing product distribution coefficient.
(5) This thesis carries out empirical study. It analyzes air conditioner industry's market structure and several enterprises'production cost and marketing expense. It uses EVIEWS5 software to establish air conditioner's market demand function during 1998 to 2005。It also calculates theoretical prices of competitive game and cooperative game in air conditioner industry and compares them with practical price. It draws conclusions as below:①the air conditioner industry shows oligopoly market character;②the air conditioner enterprise is in status of cooperative game before 2000 and in status of competitive game after it;③the air conditioner's practical price is much higher than critical price, and it's one of the main causes that initiated price war of air conditioner industry in late 2000.
At last, this thesis gives the research conclusions and the main contributions, and it also points out research's deficiencies and further research direction.
引文
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