小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制研究
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摘要
当前城乡低收入阶层和小微企业资金供求不足的矛盾非常突出。一方面是正规金融机构对低收入阶层和小微企业的供给不足,造成大量低收入阶层和小微企业面临信贷配给,不得不从民间金融市场融资；另一方面,由于民间金融市场资金供给具有一定垄断性,民间资金供给者借助自己的影响力,把资金利率抬到高出国家法律规定甚多,而低收入阶层和小微企业处于弱势地位,资金缺乏将会直接影响企业生存,而不得不从这些民间供给方高成本融资,从而造成信贷市场的扭曲。如何纾缓城乡低收入阶层和小微企业融资难困境,解决对此类金融弱势群体的信贷资金供给不足的问题一直是经济理论研究的重点。
一直以来,以信贷配给为核心的信贷市场均衡理论成为解释对低收入阶层和小微企业信贷资金供给不足的主流理论。这一理论认为,由于信息不对称导致的逆向选择和道德风险影响,使得利率上升至超过某一临界点后,银行贷款的预期收益不随利率上升反而下降,价格机制对信贷市场供给的调节作用不再有效,使得银行对信贷市场资金供给不足,特别是,对低收入阶层和小微企业的资金供给不足。论文认为,信贷配给论解释的只是信贷市场均衡表象——信贷供给不足,影响信贷供给的根本原因是市场上的风险,包括系统风险与个体风险。正是由于所承担风险与所获得收益不对称,所以即便利率上升,银行也不愿意增加供给。因此,信贷市场均衡是风险成本与风险收益(风险补偿)之间的均衡,信贷配给论没有抓住信贷市场均衡的特征,因而不能准确反映信贷市场均衡的本质。
论文一改传统的信贷配给范式,从小额信贷市场上风险因素入手,将信息不对称等因素引入到对信贷风险与收益均衡机制的分析中,对小额信贷供求经济特征、小额信贷准公共品属性、小额信贷市场上信息不对称的具体表现及由此产生的贷款违约风险进行深入研究,对小额信贷供求双方的行为特征作出假设,在此基础上,给出小额信贷风险与收益均衡的机制路径,并对这一均衡机制的运行状况进行深入分析,从而提出小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制理论,并将这一理论应用于中国小额信贷风险与收益均衡实证分析,从而对小额信贷供给不足作出解释。
论文的核心命题是：小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制是小额信贷交易各方基于市场信息不完备、金融市场体系和信用环境等制度缺失的约束下的信贷交易运行机制,具体包括：小额信贷风险与收益均衡的价格机制、小额信贷风险与收益均衡的抵押担保机制、小额信贷风险与收益均衡的关系型借贷机制和小额信贷风险与收益均衡的声誉机制。核心命题力求突破传统信贷配给理论的局限,将小额信贷市场信息不对称、市场不完善、制度不健全等因素纳入边际风险成本与边际风险收益分析框架,建立以价格机制调节为主,诸多非价格机制为辅的小额信贷市场供求调节体系,消除风险因素对市场信号和价格机制的扭曲,实现小额信贷风险与收益均衡。这一核心命题的论证对于小额信贷理论研究创新和实践,解决对低收入阶层和小微企业融资难问题具有重大意义。
论文主要依据逻辑演绎分析法、比较归纳法、微观和宏观相结合的方法,围绕核心命题展开研究。全文共6章,第一章为引论,主要向读者介绍论文研究的背景、选题依据、核心命题、研究方法、创新之处与不足；第二至第六章为正文,分为三大部分：第一部分为相关的理论研究述评,包括第二章；第二部分为基础理论创新,包括第三章和第四章：第三章对发展中国家和发达国家小额信贷风险与收益均衡状况进行了分析,对国际小额信贷典型模式的风险与收益均衡机制进行了比较；第四章创新提出了小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制理论。第三部分根据基础创新理论,对中国小额信贷风险与收益均衡进行实证分析,并给出了实现中国小额信贷风险与收益均衡的优化路径,包括第五章和第六章。各章主要的研究内容及重要观点如下：
第二章文献综述,对拟研究的问题进行了梳理和展开。对有关市场均衡机制、信贷市场均衡机制、风险与收益均衡机制以及小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制的研究文献进行了回顾。论文在分析信贷市场均衡特征的基础上,对前人有关信贷市场均衡的研究进行了总结,重点就信息不对称理论对信贷市场均衡状况的解释进行了归纳。由于信息不对称,信贷市场上风险因素会对信贷市场供求产生关键影响,信贷资金供给既取决于利率,也取决于给定利率条件下借款项目的风险水平。利率上升不总是带来收益增加,超过一定的利率水平后,项目风险上升导致违约概率提高,银行的预期收益水平反而降低。因此,信贷市场均衡是风险与收益均衡,信贷配给是其表现形式。笔者认为,前人的研究将信贷市场供给不足归结为信贷配给,其研究视角具有局限性。对信贷供给不足原因的研究重点应该是信贷风险与信贷收益及其均衡机制,对信贷市场均衡的分析不能仅局限于供给与需求的框架,还必须考虑影响风险的非价格因素。同时,对小额信贷风险与收益均衡的研究,还必须注意到小额信贷的准公共品、小额信贷市场上信息不对称的具体表现形式及由此产生违约风险。
第三章对小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制进行了国际比较。对目前国际上主要小额信贷模式进行了总结,从小额信贷机构性质、经营模式、风险状况、风险控制措施和风险与收益均衡状况等方面对主要模式进行了比较分析。在此基础上对国际小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制进行了评析。论文认为小额信贷产生于经济极为贫困的孟加拉,随后在南亚、东南亚、非洲、拉美等发展中国家得到发展,这一事实本身说明,小额信贷实质上是解决信贷市场失灵问题的一种方案。小额信贷市场失灵,更多是信贷供给调节失灵,是由于价格只反映了小额信贷市场供给者的名义收益,没有反映出信贷风险对供给者收益的影响。因此,要增加小额信贷供给,必须对小额信贷风险进行有效防控,有效增加小额信贷的风险溢价。从金融演化的角度来看,小额信贷本质上与普通信贷没有根本不同,如果能够有效创新贷款技术,正规金融机构同样能充当小额信贷的供给者,专门的小额信贷机构只能发挥补充作用。随着小额信贷借款者市场经验的增加和经营实力的提升,他们就能逐步进入正规金融市场进行融资。美欧等发达国家的小额信贷机构都采取与正规大银行合作的方式来发展,利用正规金融机构的信贷管理经验来管理小额信贷业务,当其小额信贷客户成长以后,就转为正规金融机构的客户,这一现象即是有力的证明。
第四章构建小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制理论。本章主要阐述路径如下：首先刻画了小额信贷市场环境和小额信贷的异质性。小额信贷借款人是经济体系中的低收入阶层,他们是金融市场的弱势群体,由于缺乏资金,他们的生产处于较低的等产量线上,生产无效率；如果能通过借款获得所需的资金投入,就能够极大提高生产效率；由于他们有较高的资本边际生产率,因而也愿意承受较高的贷款利率。其次对小额信贷借贷双方的行为进行了假设,即小额信贷借款入比大企业等普通借款人具有更明显的风险规避倾向。他们虽然有较强的贷款意愿,但往往不能转化为实际的贷款需求。小额信贷提供者可以是小额贷款公司等小额信贷机构,也可以是正规银行机构,此两类提供者在贷款决策时所依据的都是风险成本与风险收益的均衡,决策依据没有本质的区别。小额信贷市场具有与普通信贷市场明显不同特征。再次,对小额信贷风险影响因素进行了研究。小额信贷具有明显的准公共品属性；小额信贷市场上的信息不对称表现为信息获得渠道不足、信息不规范、信息可用性不够,因此,小额信贷市场上的信息不对称状况比普通信贷市场更为严重。由于上述风险因素,使得小额信贷违约与普通贷款违约具有不同特点,即小额信贷借款者有较高的市场风险和较低的个体风险。随后,论文对实现风险与收益均衡的利率确定机制、抵押担保机制、建立关系型借贷机制和声誉机制等制度安排进行了阐述。本章最后对小额信贷风险与收益均衡的运行机制进行了分析,认为银行将会在边际风险收益等于边际风险成本处确定贷款利率和贷款数量。小额信贷市场与普通信贷市场不同之处在于：小额信贷需求具有更强的刚性,利率弹性更小,银行将面临更陡的需求曲线；小额信贷风险水平更高,银行的边际风险成本曲线相对于普通信贷市场边际风险成本向左上方移动,从而使得小额信贷供给利率更高,数量更少。通过建立小额信贷的利率确定机制、抵押担保机制、关系型借贷机制和声誉机制,可以有效缓解小额信贷市场上信息不对称的状态,使得风险因素对小额信贷借款人的资金需求和贷款人的资金供给的影响缩小到最低限度,从而有效增加小额信贷资金供给,实现小额信贷风险与收益均衡,小额信贷市场均衡实际上是一种双利率均衡。
第五章对中国小额信贷市场现状及特点进行了分析,在此基础上,以中国邮政储蓄银行小额信贷发展实践为例,对小额信贷的风险与收益均衡进行了实证分析,创建了一个小额信贷违约风险Logistic回归分析模型,对导致小额信贷风险的主要因素及其与违约率的因果关系进行了初步检验,得出的基本结论是：借款人年龄、婚姻状况和个人声望等对贷款质量具有负向影响,借款人地域分布、家庭责任感、家庭财产、年收入和经营能力等指标对贷款质量影响不显著,借款人是否多次获得贷款与贷款质量负相关,说明小额贷款动态还款技术发挥了很大的作用。
第六章总结了本文主要研究结论,并提出了政策建议。
论文研究得出的基本结论是：小额信贷风险与收益均衡是边际风险成本和边际风险收益(风险补偿)的均衡,是价格因素和非价格因素共同起作用的结果。中国信贷市场同时存在对大企业的信贷集中和对低收入阶层及小微企业的信贷歧视,信贷供给不足主要表现为低收入阶层和小微企业遭遇信贷配给。由于信息不对称,银行无法获得有关小额信贷借款人的足够信息,从而对其风险类型作出准确判断,更不能有针对性地提出利率要求及制定相应的风险控制措施；由于缺乏足够的财产,低收入阶层和小微企业无法提供抵押担保以满足银行的要求,因此无法从银行获得贷款,这是小额信贷供给不足的根本原因。低收入阶层和小微企业并非天然就具有较大风险,由于低收入阶层承受风险和抵御风险的能力较低,他们就会更倾向于选择低风险借款项目,如果能够通过合理确定小额信贷利率,实现灵活的抵押担保替代机制,建立关系型借贷机制和有效的声誉机制,就能有效缓解小额信贷市场的信息不对称,增加银行对小额信贷供给,从而缓解低收入阶层和小微企业的融资困境。在这一结论基础上,本文从抵押和担保方式的创新、缓解信息不对称、增加多元化小额信贷供给主体、完善信用环境和建立征信体系、实现利率市场化等五个方面对如何优化小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制,增加小额信贷供给提出了建议。
At present, the contradiction of capital supply and demand deficiency is serious in low-income group of Urban and Rural and small and micro enterprises. On the one hand, the formal financial institutions is shortage of supply for small and micro enterprises, causing enterprises to face credit ration and finally to finance from informal financial markets. On the other hand, capital supply is monopolistic in informal financial markets; the providers improve capital interest rate higher than the national legislation by their influence. But the low-income group and small and micro enterprises are in a weak position, the fund scarcity could affects the survival and development of the enterprises, the enterprises have to finance from the folk supplier by high cost, which causing loan market distortion. How to solve the finance dilemma of the low-income group and small and micro enterprises, solve the problem of capital supply deficiency are the research emphasis in economic theory.
For a long time, credit ration is the core of the credit market equilibrium theory, which is the mainstream theory for interpreting the supply deficiency of the low-income group and small and micro enterprises. The theory holds that if the interest rate exceeded the critical point, owing to adverse selection and moral risk which are caused by information asymmetry, the banks' expected return would decrease instead., the regulation of price mechanism on loan market would be failure, so the banks is insufficient for the credit market, especially for the low-income group and small and micro enterprises. This paper thinks that the theory of credit market equilibrium only interprets the credit insufficient supply which is the representation of credit ration. The root cause for affecting credit supply is market risks including systematic risk and individual risk. Because of the asymmetric of risk and return, the banks reluctant to increase supply even though interest rate rose. Therefore, the credit market equilibrium is the equilibrium of risk cost and risk return (risk compensation). The theory of credit ration'fails to get the characteristics of loan market equilibrium, so it can't reflect the essence of loan market equilibrium accurately.
This paper researches the economic characteristics of micro-credit' supply and demand, quasi-public goods character of micro-credit, concrete manifestation of micro-credit market's information asymmetry, and the resulting loan default risk by introducing the information asymmetry into the analysis of credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism from the risk factors of micro-credit market, not by using traditional paradigm of credit ration. The paper makes hypothesis about the behavior characteristics of both supply and demand of micro-credit, puts forward the equilibrium mechanism of micro-credit risk and return, analyzes the operation status of this equilibrium mechanism, proposes the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return, and applies this theory in empirical analysis of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China, thus explains for the supply deficiency of loan market.
Here is the core proposition of this essay, the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return is a kind of credit transaction mechanism which is operating under the constraint of incomplete market information, Institutional deficiency of financial market system and credit environment, it comprises price mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship loan mechanism and reputation mechanism. The core proposition strives to break through the traditional credit ration theory, and brings factors such as information asymmetry, market imperfection, and regulation unsoundness into the framework for analyzing the cost and profit of marginal risk, and establishes a demand-supply regulation system for micro-credit market which is based on price mechanism, and supplemented by many other non-price mechanisms, eliminates risk factor's distortion on market signal and price mechanism, and realizes risk and return equilibrium of micro-credit market. The argumentation of this core proposition has great significance to the innovation and practice of micro-credit theory, and the financing difficulties of low-income group and small and micro enterprises.
The paper carries out research on the core proposition as the main basis of logical deduction analysis, comparative and induction, micro and macro analysis. The paper is consisted of six chapters, the chapter one is introduction, introduces the research background, the basis of choice the subject, core proposition, research methods, innovation and deficiency. The main text contains three parts. The fist part is the chapter Ⅱ, describes research review of correlation theory. The second part is foundation theory innovation containing chapter Ⅲ and chapter Ⅳ. Chapter Ⅲ analyzes status of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in developing and developed countries, and comparatively analyzes the risk and return equilibrium mechanism of intentional micro-credit's typical model. Chapter Ⅳ proposes the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return. The third part which is consisted of chapter Ⅴ and chapter Ⅵ makes empirical analysis for micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China by based innovation theory, and gives optimal path for the implementation of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China. The main research contents and important viewpoints of every chapter are as follows:
Chapter II is literature review, hackling and expanding research problems. It reviews research literature for market equilibrium mechanism, loan market equilibrium mechanism, and risk and return equilibrium mechanism, and micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. On the basis of loan market equilibrium characteristics, the paper summarizes related research of the loan market equilibrium, mainly inductive the interpretation of information asymmetric theory on the loan market equilibrium. Because of information asymmetric, the risk factors of loan market would influence loan market's supply and demand. The supply of credit funds not only depends on interest rate but also the risk level of loan projects with given interest rate. Rising of interest rate does not necessarily bring income increase. The expected income level would decrease because of high default probability caused by project'risk increased, when exceeding a certain interest rate. So, loan market equilibrium is the risk and return equilibrium, credit ration is the manifestation of loan market equilibrium. The author considers previous research perspective has limitation, which formulates loan market insufficient supply as credit ration. The research emphasis for credit insufficient supply should be credit risk and credit return and their equilibrium mechanism. The analysis for credit market equilibrium couldn't restricted to the supply and demand framework, must consider non-price factor influencing risk. In addition, the research for micro-credit risk and return equilibrium must pay attention to quasi-public goods character of micro-credit, concrete forms of information asymmetric and default risk in micro-credit market.
Chapter Ⅲ makes international comparison to micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. It summarizes main micro-credit patterns in the world nowadays, makes comparative analysis from solving quasi-public goods supply, information asymmetric, mortgage guarantee deficiency and high risk of micro-credit, and comments intentional micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. The paper thinks micro-credit originates from Bangladesh and develops in developing countries of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This fact implies that micro-credit is the method for solving credit market failure. The micro-credit market failure mainly is supply regulation failure, which price only reflects nominal return of micro-credit market supplier but not the influence of credit risk on supplier return. Therefore, in order to increase supply for micro-credit market, it is should preventive and control micro-credit risk and Increases its risk premium. From the view of financial evolution, micro-credit is not different with common credit in essence. If it could effectively innovative loan technology, formal financial institutions also could serve as micro-credit suppliers, the special micro-credit institutions plays complementary function. By the increase of market experience and promotion business capacity, the micro-credit loaners have chances to finance in formal financial market. US-European micro-credit institutions adopt the development method of cooperating with normal banks, managing micro-credit business by the credit management experience of formal financial institutions. When the micro-credit customers develop mature, they turn to formal financial institutions'customers.
Chapter Ⅳ constructs the theory of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. Firstly, it describes market environment and heterogeneity of micro-credit. Micro-credit loaners are the low-income group in economic system and the vulnerable groups in finance market. Because of lacking funds, their production is with lower isoquanta curve. If they can obtain capital, their productivity would be improved. The micro-credit loaners are willing to bear the higher loan rate, as their marginal productivity of capital is improving. Secondly, it makes hypothesis for the behavior of micro-credit debtor and creditor, thus micro-credit borrowers have more risk aversion than common borrowers as big enterprises. Although the micro-credit borrowers have stronger loan demand, their demand often can't convert to actual loan demand. The micro-credit suppliers can be both micro-credit institutions such as small loan companies and normal banks. The two class providers make lending decision basis of equilibrium of risk compensation and risk return, not having essential difference. Compared with normal credit market, micro-credit market has obviously different characteristics. Thirdly, it analyzes the for influence factors of micro-credit risk. Micro-credit has obvious quasi-public goods attributes. The information asymmetry of micro-credit market presents as information channels deficiency, information distortion, and information unavailability. The information asymmetry is more serious in micro-credit market than normal credit market. On the basis of the above risk factors, the micro loan default has different characteristics compared with normal loan default, and the micro-credit borrowers have the higher market risk and lower individual risk. Fourthly, it describes the interest determined mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship lending mechanism, reputation mechanism which are help for realizing risk and return equilibrium. At last, it analyzes the result of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium. Banks determine loan interest rate and the size of loan when the marginal risk is equal to income marginal risk cost. The difference between micro-credit market and normal credit market is micro-credit requirement is more rigid and its interest rate elasticity is smaller, so the banks would face a steeper demand curve. The banks'marginal risk cost curve would move toward left upper compared with normal credit market, so the micro-credit market' supply interest is higher and its size is smaller. The information asymmetry would be relieved by constructing the interest determined mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship lending mechanism and reputation mechanism, then the influence of risk factors on micro-credit borrowers' capital demand and loaners' capital supply could be decreased to a minimum, so as to increase the micro-credit's capital supply and realize the equilibrium of micro-credit risk and return. In fact, micro-credit market is double interest equilibrium.
Chapter V analyzes the status and characteristics of micro-credit market. Taking postal savings bank of China for example, chapters V makes empirical analysis of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium, and constructs Logistic regression analysis model for micro-credit default risk and makes preliminary test for the main factors resulting in micro-credit risk and its causality with default rate. The paper reaching a conclusion that the borrowers' age, marital status and individual prestige have obvious negative effect on loan quality. The borrowers' regional distribution and responsibility for family, and family property, and annual income and management ability have no significant effect on loan quality. Whether the borrowers obtain loan many times have negative effect on loan quality. So, the dynamic repayment technology has played a very important role in micro-credit
Chapter VI summarizes the main research results of this paper and provides policy suggestions.
The conclusions of this paper is micro-credit market equilibrium is the equilibrium of risk cost and risk return (risk compensation), and the resulted from both price factor and non-price factor. The micro-credit supply deficiency is caused by the information asymmetry. The banks can't obtain sufficient information about micro-credit borrowers and make accurate judgments of their risk type, so as to provide interest requirements and makes the corresponding risk control measures. The low-income group and small and micro enterprises don't have enough estate to make mortgage guarantee and satisfy the banks, so they can't obtain loan from banks which is the basic reason for the insufficient supply of micro-credit. Small and micro enterprises and the low-income group haven't larger risk by nature. Because the low-income group has poor ability of enduring risk and resisting risk, they are apt to choose low risk loan projects. If it can reasonably determine micro-credit rate, realize flexible mortgage guarantee system, construct effective relationship lending mechanism and reputation mechanism, it could effectively solute information asymmetry of micro-credit market, increase banks' micro-credit supply, so as to relieve finance dilemma of small and micro enterprises and the low-income group. On the basis of this conclusion, the paper provides some suggestions for improving micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism from innovating mortgage guarantee system, relieving information asymmetry, increasing micro-credit suppliers, perfecting credit environment and constructing credit system, realizing interest rate liberalization.
一直以来,以信贷配给为核心的信贷市场均衡理论成为解释对低收入阶层和小微企业信贷资金供给不足的主流理论。这一理论认为,由于信息不对称导致的逆向选择和道德风险影响,使得利率上升至超过某一临界点后,银行贷款的预期收益不随利率上升反而下降,价格机制对信贷市场供给的调节作用不再有效,使得银行对信贷市场资金供给不足,特别是,对低收入阶层和小微企业的资金供给不足。论文认为,信贷配给论解释的只是信贷市场均衡表象——信贷供给不足,影响信贷供给的根本原因是市场上的风险,包括系统风险与个体风险。正是由于所承担风险与所获得收益不对称,所以即便利率上升,银行也不愿意增加供给。因此,信贷市场均衡是风险成本与风险收益(风险补偿)之间的均衡,信贷配给论没有抓住信贷市场均衡的特征,因而不能准确反映信贷市场均衡的本质。
论文一改传统的信贷配给范式,从小额信贷市场上风险因素入手,将信息不对称等因素引入到对信贷风险与收益均衡机制的分析中,对小额信贷供求经济特征、小额信贷准公共品属性、小额信贷市场上信息不对称的具体表现及由此产生的贷款违约风险进行深入研究,对小额信贷供求双方的行为特征作出假设,在此基础上,给出小额信贷风险与收益均衡的机制路径,并对这一均衡机制的运行状况进行深入分析,从而提出小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制理论,并将这一理论应用于中国小额信贷风险与收益均衡实证分析,从而对小额信贷供给不足作出解释。
论文的核心命题是：小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制是小额信贷交易各方基于市场信息不完备、金融市场体系和信用环境等制度缺失的约束下的信贷交易运行机制,具体包括：小额信贷风险与收益均衡的价格机制、小额信贷风险与收益均衡的抵押担保机制、小额信贷风险与收益均衡的关系型借贷机制和小额信贷风险与收益均衡的声誉机制。核心命题力求突破传统信贷配给理论的局限,将小额信贷市场信息不对称、市场不完善、制度不健全等因素纳入边际风险成本与边际风险收益分析框架,建立以价格机制调节为主,诸多非价格机制为辅的小额信贷市场供求调节体系,消除风险因素对市场信号和价格机制的扭曲,实现小额信贷风险与收益均衡。这一核心命题的论证对于小额信贷理论研究创新和实践,解决对低收入阶层和小微企业融资难问题具有重大意义。
论文主要依据逻辑演绎分析法、比较归纳法、微观和宏观相结合的方法,围绕核心命题展开研究。全文共6章,第一章为引论,主要向读者介绍论文研究的背景、选题依据、核心命题、研究方法、创新之处与不足；第二至第六章为正文,分为三大部分：第一部分为相关的理论研究述评,包括第二章；第二部分为基础理论创新,包括第三章和第四章：第三章对发展中国家和发达国家小额信贷风险与收益均衡状况进行了分析,对国际小额信贷典型模式的风险与收益均衡机制进行了比较；第四章创新提出了小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制理论。第三部分根据基础创新理论,对中国小额信贷风险与收益均衡进行实证分析,并给出了实现中国小额信贷风险与收益均衡的优化路径,包括第五章和第六章。各章主要的研究内容及重要观点如下：
第二章文献综述,对拟研究的问题进行了梳理和展开。对有关市场均衡机制、信贷市场均衡机制、风险与收益均衡机制以及小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制的研究文献进行了回顾。论文在分析信贷市场均衡特征的基础上,对前人有关信贷市场均衡的研究进行了总结,重点就信息不对称理论对信贷市场均衡状况的解释进行了归纳。由于信息不对称,信贷市场上风险因素会对信贷市场供求产生关键影响,信贷资金供给既取决于利率,也取决于给定利率条件下借款项目的风险水平。利率上升不总是带来收益增加,超过一定的利率水平后,项目风险上升导致违约概率提高,银行的预期收益水平反而降低。因此,信贷市场均衡是风险与收益均衡,信贷配给是其表现形式。笔者认为,前人的研究将信贷市场供给不足归结为信贷配给,其研究视角具有局限性。对信贷供给不足原因的研究重点应该是信贷风险与信贷收益及其均衡机制,对信贷市场均衡的分析不能仅局限于供给与需求的框架,还必须考虑影响风险的非价格因素。同时,对小额信贷风险与收益均衡的研究,还必须注意到小额信贷的准公共品、小额信贷市场上信息不对称的具体表现形式及由此产生违约风险。
第三章对小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制进行了国际比较。对目前国际上主要小额信贷模式进行了总结,从小额信贷机构性质、经营模式、风险状况、风险控制措施和风险与收益均衡状况等方面对主要模式进行了比较分析。在此基础上对国际小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制进行了评析。论文认为小额信贷产生于经济极为贫困的孟加拉,随后在南亚、东南亚、非洲、拉美等发展中国家得到发展,这一事实本身说明,小额信贷实质上是解决信贷市场失灵问题的一种方案。小额信贷市场失灵,更多是信贷供给调节失灵,是由于价格只反映了小额信贷市场供给者的名义收益,没有反映出信贷风险对供给者收益的影响。因此,要增加小额信贷供给,必须对小额信贷风险进行有效防控,有效增加小额信贷的风险溢价。从金融演化的角度来看,小额信贷本质上与普通信贷没有根本不同,如果能够有效创新贷款技术,正规金融机构同样能充当小额信贷的供给者,专门的小额信贷机构只能发挥补充作用。随着小额信贷借款者市场经验的增加和经营实力的提升,他们就能逐步进入正规金融市场进行融资。美欧等发达国家的小额信贷机构都采取与正规大银行合作的方式来发展,利用正规金融机构的信贷管理经验来管理小额信贷业务,当其小额信贷客户成长以后,就转为正规金融机构的客户,这一现象即是有力的证明。
第四章构建小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制理论。本章主要阐述路径如下：首先刻画了小额信贷市场环境和小额信贷的异质性。小额信贷借款人是经济体系中的低收入阶层,他们是金融市场的弱势群体,由于缺乏资金,他们的生产处于较低的等产量线上,生产无效率；如果能通过借款获得所需的资金投入,就能够极大提高生产效率；由于他们有较高的资本边际生产率,因而也愿意承受较高的贷款利率。其次对小额信贷借贷双方的行为进行了假设,即小额信贷借款入比大企业等普通借款人具有更明显的风险规避倾向。他们虽然有较强的贷款意愿,但往往不能转化为实际的贷款需求。小额信贷提供者可以是小额贷款公司等小额信贷机构,也可以是正规银行机构,此两类提供者在贷款决策时所依据的都是风险成本与风险收益的均衡,决策依据没有本质的区别。小额信贷市场具有与普通信贷市场明显不同特征。再次,对小额信贷风险影响因素进行了研究。小额信贷具有明显的准公共品属性；小额信贷市场上的信息不对称表现为信息获得渠道不足、信息不规范、信息可用性不够,因此,小额信贷市场上的信息不对称状况比普通信贷市场更为严重。由于上述风险因素,使得小额信贷违约与普通贷款违约具有不同特点,即小额信贷借款者有较高的市场风险和较低的个体风险。随后,论文对实现风险与收益均衡的利率确定机制、抵押担保机制、建立关系型借贷机制和声誉机制等制度安排进行了阐述。本章最后对小额信贷风险与收益均衡的运行机制进行了分析,认为银行将会在边际风险收益等于边际风险成本处确定贷款利率和贷款数量。小额信贷市场与普通信贷市场不同之处在于：小额信贷需求具有更强的刚性,利率弹性更小,银行将面临更陡的需求曲线；小额信贷风险水平更高,银行的边际风险成本曲线相对于普通信贷市场边际风险成本向左上方移动,从而使得小额信贷供给利率更高,数量更少。通过建立小额信贷的利率确定机制、抵押担保机制、关系型借贷机制和声誉机制,可以有效缓解小额信贷市场上信息不对称的状态,使得风险因素对小额信贷借款人的资金需求和贷款人的资金供给的影响缩小到最低限度,从而有效增加小额信贷资金供给,实现小额信贷风险与收益均衡,小额信贷市场均衡实际上是一种双利率均衡。
第五章对中国小额信贷市场现状及特点进行了分析,在此基础上,以中国邮政储蓄银行小额信贷发展实践为例,对小额信贷的风险与收益均衡进行了实证分析,创建了一个小额信贷违约风险Logistic回归分析模型,对导致小额信贷风险的主要因素及其与违约率的因果关系进行了初步检验,得出的基本结论是：借款人年龄、婚姻状况和个人声望等对贷款质量具有负向影响,借款人地域分布、家庭责任感、家庭财产、年收入和经营能力等指标对贷款质量影响不显著,借款人是否多次获得贷款与贷款质量负相关,说明小额贷款动态还款技术发挥了很大的作用。
第六章总结了本文主要研究结论,并提出了政策建议。
论文研究得出的基本结论是：小额信贷风险与收益均衡是边际风险成本和边际风险收益(风险补偿)的均衡,是价格因素和非价格因素共同起作用的结果。中国信贷市场同时存在对大企业的信贷集中和对低收入阶层及小微企业的信贷歧视,信贷供给不足主要表现为低收入阶层和小微企业遭遇信贷配给。由于信息不对称,银行无法获得有关小额信贷借款人的足够信息,从而对其风险类型作出准确判断,更不能有针对性地提出利率要求及制定相应的风险控制措施；由于缺乏足够的财产,低收入阶层和小微企业无法提供抵押担保以满足银行的要求,因此无法从银行获得贷款,这是小额信贷供给不足的根本原因。低收入阶层和小微企业并非天然就具有较大风险,由于低收入阶层承受风险和抵御风险的能力较低,他们就会更倾向于选择低风险借款项目,如果能够通过合理确定小额信贷利率,实现灵活的抵押担保替代机制,建立关系型借贷机制和有效的声誉机制,就能有效缓解小额信贷市场的信息不对称,增加银行对小额信贷供给,从而缓解低收入阶层和小微企业的融资困境。在这一结论基础上,本文从抵押和担保方式的创新、缓解信息不对称、增加多元化小额信贷供给主体、完善信用环境和建立征信体系、实现利率市场化等五个方面对如何优化小额信贷风险与收益均衡机制,增加小额信贷供给提出了建议。
At present, the contradiction of capital supply and demand deficiency is serious in low-income group of Urban and Rural and small and micro enterprises. On the one hand, the formal financial institutions is shortage of supply for small and micro enterprises, causing enterprises to face credit ration and finally to finance from informal financial markets. On the other hand, capital supply is monopolistic in informal financial markets; the providers improve capital interest rate higher than the national legislation by their influence. But the low-income group and small and micro enterprises are in a weak position, the fund scarcity could affects the survival and development of the enterprises, the enterprises have to finance from the folk supplier by high cost, which causing loan market distortion. How to solve the finance dilemma of the low-income group and small and micro enterprises, solve the problem of capital supply deficiency are the research emphasis in economic theory.
For a long time, credit ration is the core of the credit market equilibrium theory, which is the mainstream theory for interpreting the supply deficiency of the low-income group and small and micro enterprises. The theory holds that if the interest rate exceeded the critical point, owing to adverse selection and moral risk which are caused by information asymmetry, the banks' expected return would decrease instead., the regulation of price mechanism on loan market would be failure, so the banks is insufficient for the credit market, especially for the low-income group and small and micro enterprises. This paper thinks that the theory of credit market equilibrium only interprets the credit insufficient supply which is the representation of credit ration. The root cause for affecting credit supply is market risks including systematic risk and individual risk. Because of the asymmetric of risk and return, the banks reluctant to increase supply even though interest rate rose. Therefore, the credit market equilibrium is the equilibrium of risk cost and risk return (risk compensation). The theory of credit ration'fails to get the characteristics of loan market equilibrium, so it can't reflect the essence of loan market equilibrium accurately.
This paper researches the economic characteristics of micro-credit' supply and demand, quasi-public goods character of micro-credit, concrete manifestation of micro-credit market's information asymmetry, and the resulting loan default risk by introducing the information asymmetry into the analysis of credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism from the risk factors of micro-credit market, not by using traditional paradigm of credit ration. The paper makes hypothesis about the behavior characteristics of both supply and demand of micro-credit, puts forward the equilibrium mechanism of micro-credit risk and return, analyzes the operation status of this equilibrium mechanism, proposes the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return, and applies this theory in empirical analysis of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China, thus explains for the supply deficiency of loan market.
Here is the core proposition of this essay, the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return is a kind of credit transaction mechanism which is operating under the constraint of incomplete market information, Institutional deficiency of financial market system and credit environment, it comprises price mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship loan mechanism and reputation mechanism. The core proposition strives to break through the traditional credit ration theory, and brings factors such as information asymmetry, market imperfection, and regulation unsoundness into the framework for analyzing the cost and profit of marginal risk, and establishes a demand-supply regulation system for micro-credit market which is based on price mechanism, and supplemented by many other non-price mechanisms, eliminates risk factor's distortion on market signal and price mechanism, and realizes risk and return equilibrium of micro-credit market. The argumentation of this core proposition has great significance to the innovation and practice of micro-credit theory, and the financing difficulties of low-income group and small and micro enterprises.
The paper carries out research on the core proposition as the main basis of logical deduction analysis, comparative and induction, micro and macro analysis. The paper is consisted of six chapters, the chapter one is introduction, introduces the research background, the basis of choice the subject, core proposition, research methods, innovation and deficiency. The main text contains three parts. The fist part is the chapter Ⅱ, describes research review of correlation theory. The second part is foundation theory innovation containing chapter Ⅲ and chapter Ⅳ. Chapter Ⅲ analyzes status of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in developing and developed countries, and comparatively analyzes the risk and return equilibrium mechanism of intentional micro-credit's typical model. Chapter Ⅳ proposes the equilibrium mechanism theory of micro-credit risk and return. The third part which is consisted of chapter Ⅴ and chapter Ⅵ makes empirical analysis for micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China by based innovation theory, and gives optimal path for the implementation of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium in China. The main research contents and important viewpoints of every chapter are as follows:
Chapter II is literature review, hackling and expanding research problems. It reviews research literature for market equilibrium mechanism, loan market equilibrium mechanism, and risk and return equilibrium mechanism, and micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. On the basis of loan market equilibrium characteristics, the paper summarizes related research of the loan market equilibrium, mainly inductive the interpretation of information asymmetric theory on the loan market equilibrium. Because of information asymmetric, the risk factors of loan market would influence loan market's supply and demand. The supply of credit funds not only depends on interest rate but also the risk level of loan projects with given interest rate. Rising of interest rate does not necessarily bring income increase. The expected income level would decrease because of high default probability caused by project'risk increased, when exceeding a certain interest rate. So, loan market equilibrium is the risk and return equilibrium, credit ration is the manifestation of loan market equilibrium. The author considers previous research perspective has limitation, which formulates loan market insufficient supply as credit ration. The research emphasis for credit insufficient supply should be credit risk and credit return and their equilibrium mechanism. The analysis for credit market equilibrium couldn't restricted to the supply and demand framework, must consider non-price factor influencing risk. In addition, the research for micro-credit risk and return equilibrium must pay attention to quasi-public goods character of micro-credit, concrete forms of information asymmetric and default risk in micro-credit market.
Chapter Ⅲ makes international comparison to micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. It summarizes main micro-credit patterns in the world nowadays, makes comparative analysis from solving quasi-public goods supply, information asymmetric, mortgage guarantee deficiency and high risk of micro-credit, and comments intentional micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. The paper thinks micro-credit originates from Bangladesh and develops in developing countries of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This fact implies that micro-credit is the method for solving credit market failure. The micro-credit market failure mainly is supply regulation failure, which price only reflects nominal return of micro-credit market supplier but not the influence of credit risk on supplier return. Therefore, in order to increase supply for micro-credit market, it is should preventive and control micro-credit risk and Increases its risk premium. From the view of financial evolution, micro-credit is not different with common credit in essence. If it could effectively innovative loan technology, formal financial institutions also could serve as micro-credit suppliers, the special micro-credit institutions plays complementary function. By the increase of market experience and promotion business capacity, the micro-credit loaners have chances to finance in formal financial market. US-European micro-credit institutions adopt the development method of cooperating with normal banks, managing micro-credit business by the credit management experience of formal financial institutions. When the micro-credit customers develop mature, they turn to formal financial institutions'customers.
Chapter Ⅳ constructs the theory of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism. Firstly, it describes market environment and heterogeneity of micro-credit. Micro-credit loaners are the low-income group in economic system and the vulnerable groups in finance market. Because of lacking funds, their production is with lower isoquanta curve. If they can obtain capital, their productivity would be improved. The micro-credit loaners are willing to bear the higher loan rate, as their marginal productivity of capital is improving. Secondly, it makes hypothesis for the behavior of micro-credit debtor and creditor, thus micro-credit borrowers have more risk aversion than common borrowers as big enterprises. Although the micro-credit borrowers have stronger loan demand, their demand often can't convert to actual loan demand. The micro-credit suppliers can be both micro-credit institutions such as small loan companies and normal banks. The two class providers make lending decision basis of equilibrium of risk compensation and risk return, not having essential difference. Compared with normal credit market, micro-credit market has obviously different characteristics. Thirdly, it analyzes the for influence factors of micro-credit risk. Micro-credit has obvious quasi-public goods attributes. The information asymmetry of micro-credit market presents as information channels deficiency, information distortion, and information unavailability. The information asymmetry is more serious in micro-credit market than normal credit market. On the basis of the above risk factors, the micro loan default has different characteristics compared with normal loan default, and the micro-credit borrowers have the higher market risk and lower individual risk. Fourthly, it describes the interest determined mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship lending mechanism, reputation mechanism which are help for realizing risk and return equilibrium. At last, it analyzes the result of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium. Banks determine loan interest rate and the size of loan when the marginal risk is equal to income marginal risk cost. The difference between micro-credit market and normal credit market is micro-credit requirement is more rigid and its interest rate elasticity is smaller, so the banks would face a steeper demand curve. The banks'marginal risk cost curve would move toward left upper compared with normal credit market, so the micro-credit market' supply interest is higher and its size is smaller. The information asymmetry would be relieved by constructing the interest determined mechanism, mortgage guarantee mechanism, relationship lending mechanism and reputation mechanism, then the influence of risk factors on micro-credit borrowers' capital demand and loaners' capital supply could be decreased to a minimum, so as to increase the micro-credit's capital supply and realize the equilibrium of micro-credit risk and return. In fact, micro-credit market is double interest equilibrium.
Chapter V analyzes the status and characteristics of micro-credit market. Taking postal savings bank of China for example, chapters V makes empirical analysis of micro-credit risk and return equilibrium, and constructs Logistic regression analysis model for micro-credit default risk and makes preliminary test for the main factors resulting in micro-credit risk and its causality with default rate. The paper reaching a conclusion that the borrowers' age, marital status and individual prestige have obvious negative effect on loan quality. The borrowers' regional distribution and responsibility for family, and family property, and annual income and management ability have no significant effect on loan quality. Whether the borrowers obtain loan many times have negative effect on loan quality. So, the dynamic repayment technology has played a very important role in micro-credit
Chapter VI summarizes the main research results of this paper and provides policy suggestions.
The conclusions of this paper is micro-credit market equilibrium is the equilibrium of risk cost and risk return (risk compensation), and the resulted from both price factor and non-price factor. The micro-credit supply deficiency is caused by the information asymmetry. The banks can't obtain sufficient information about micro-credit borrowers and make accurate judgments of their risk type, so as to provide interest requirements and makes the corresponding risk control measures. The low-income group and small and micro enterprises don't have enough estate to make mortgage guarantee and satisfy the banks, so they can't obtain loan from banks which is the basic reason for the insufficient supply of micro-credit. Small and micro enterprises and the low-income group haven't larger risk by nature. Because the low-income group has poor ability of enduring risk and resisting risk, they are apt to choose low risk loan projects. If it can reasonably determine micro-credit rate, realize flexible mortgage guarantee system, construct effective relationship lending mechanism and reputation mechanism, it could effectively solute information asymmetry of micro-credit market, increase banks' micro-credit supply, so as to relieve finance dilemma of small and micro enterprises and the low-income group. On the basis of this conclusion, the paper provides some suggestions for improving micro-credit risk and return equilibrium mechanism from innovating mortgage guarantee system, relieving information asymmetry, increasing micro-credit suppliers, perfecting credit environment and constructing credit system, realizing interest rate liberalization.
引文
①北京大学国家发展研究院、阿里巴巴集团,2011年沿海三地区小微企业经营与融资现状调研报告,2012(02)
②薛娟,成本、订单、资金：小微企业“三座大山”,中国经济时报,2012-02-1009:17:30
③http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2011/10-08/3370316.shtml
③徐忠、张雪春、沈明高、程恩江,中国贫困地区农村金融发展研究——构造政府与市场之间的平衡,中国金融出版社,2009,P52,P54
①易行健、张德常,不对称信息、简单分类、信贷约束和信贷集中共存——解释我国信贷资源配置不协调的一种新思路,财贸经济,2007(11)
②宋文昌、童士清,关于信贷拥挤的理论探讨,金融研究,2009(06)
③易行健、张德常,不对称信息、简单分类、信贷约束和信贷集中共存——解释我国信贷资源配置不协调的一种新思路,财贸经济,2007(11)
①徐忠、张雪春、沈明高和程恩江,中国贫困地区农村金融发展研究——构造政府与市场之间的平衡,中国金融出版社,2009
②徐忠、张雪春、沈明高和程恩江,中国贫困地区农村金融发展研究——构造政府与市场之间的平衡,中国金融出版社,2009
①刁莉、黄孝武、程承坪,拉美地区小额信贷覆盖深度变化及对我国的启示,国际金融研究2009(10)
①江曙霞、江口初、谢杰斌,贫困农户金融服务：研究综述与展望,财经理论与实践,vol.28No.150,2007
①童清,我国股票市场的风险与收益分析,湘潭大学硕士论文,2002
①转引自贺向明,商业银行信贷行为研究,西南财经大学博士论文,2007,P11
①杨再平、屠志强：经济学中的均衡与失衡概念刍议,经济评论,1994(01)
①王万山：软件产品价格机制研究,江西财经大学博士论文,2003,P47
①熊彼特：经济分析史,商务印书馆,2008,p152
②同上,P162-P172
⑨同上,P275-P276
④Stiglitz著,纪沫、陈工文、李飞跃译,信息经济学：基本原因,中国金融出版社,2009,P33-P34
⑤熊彼特：经济分析史,商务印书馆,2008, P489-P494
⑥Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet. Microeconomics of Banking. Second Edition, The MIT Press,2008.
①参见：廖肇辉,关于信贷配给理论的若干争论,经济学动态,2005(10)
①参见：Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet. Microeconomics of Banking.Second Edition, The MIT Press,2008.
①邹亚宝、徐世长,小额信贷、分离均衡与弱势市场信贷机制研究,广东外语外贸大学学报,2010(03)
②杨琳,农村小额信贷：国际比较和中国实践,厦门大学硕士论文,2007
①刘婷,我国非政府组织(NGO)小额信贷发展研究,西北农村科技大学硕士论文,2008
①何剑伟,中国农村小额信贷发展研究,西北农林科技大学博士论文,2008
②何剑伟,中国农村小额信贷发展研究,西北农林科技大学博士论文,2008
①张亚维,农户信贷市场的信息不对称与风险规避,农村金融研究2004(5)
②刘伟林,阮红新,供给、制度与风险：观察湖北省农村信贷资金的三重视角,湖北经济学院学报,Vol.5,No.3,2006
③陈雨露、马勇,关于农户信用和风险偏好的几个注释,财贸经济,2009(01)
①Nimal A.Fernando,理解和解决小额信贷的高利率问题,2008/2009小额信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2009,P22
②何光辉、杨咸月,从印度危机反思小额贷款的高利率盈利模式,经济理论与经济管理,2011(09)
③Nimal A.Fernando,理解和解决小额信贷的高利率问题,2008/2009小额信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2009,P23-29
①中国银行业监督管理委员会文件,关于小额贷款公司试点的指导意见,银监发[2008]23号
②陈志武在其著作《金融的逻辑》中对中国民间亲朋之间的借贷关系有深入的研究,请参阅陈志武.金融的逻辑,国际文化出版公司,2009。
①根据各行2010年报估计,由于统计口径的原因,准确的小额信贷发放数据很难到。
②http://www.hysec.com/hyzq/public/Infodetail.jsp?infold=5459954
②中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信,中国金融出版社,2010年,P9
①中国人民银行调查统计司,2008年中小企业贷款调查报告,中国金融年鉴,2009
②中国人民银行调查统计司,2008年我国涉农贷款统计分析,中国金融年鉴,2009,P630P-631
①中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信,中国金融出版社,2010年,P359
②中国人民银行调查统计司,2008年我国小额贷款公司的试点与发展,中国金融年鉴,2009,P633-P636
③中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信,中国金融出版社,2010年,P359 ①Yunus,社会企业家的作用——在牛津大学商学院斯科尔论坛上的演讲,中国人民银行2009、2010年小额
信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2010年,P13
①范香梅、彭建刚,国际小额信贷模式运作机制比较研究,国际经贸探索,2007(06)
②朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2010,P69
③中国邮政储蓄银行赴印度尼西亚小额信贷考察报告,2009
④席琼玉,印度小额信贷问题研究,中国人民银行2008/2009年小额信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2009年,P174
⑤赵光远、杜尚明、秦静,印度“小贷危机”对我国小额信贷可持续发展的借鉴与启示,金融参考,2011(09))
①朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2010
②李志辉、国娇,非洲国家的微型金融,中国金融,2009(13)
①杜晓山,商业化、可持续小额信贷的新发展——德国、阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰小额信贷的研讨和考察,中国农村经济,2003(10)
②杜晓山,商业化、可持续小额信贷的新发展——德国、阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰小额信贷的研讨和考察,中国农村经济,2003(10)
①杨伟坤、王立杰、张秀倩、张永升,小额信贷的国际成功经验在中国的实践及启示,世界农业,2009(12)
① Bernanke, speech at the ACCIoN Texas Summit on Microfinance in the United States, San Antonio, Texas,6 November 2007
② Mark Schreiner、Jonathan Morduch, Replcating microfinance in the United State::opportunities and challenges, Washington, D.C, Fannie Mae Foundation,2001.
① LucianoBonomo and Paolo Vitali, Microfinance in Europe, Working Paper, Giordano Dell'Amore Foundation,2004
② Bernanke, speech at the ACCI6N Texas Summit on Microfinance in the United States, San Antonio,Texas,6 November 2007
③ Mark Schreiner、Jonathan Morduch, Replcating microfinance in the United State::opportuntities and challenges, Washington, D.C, Fannie Mae Foundation,2001.
①具体分类可参见：朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2010
①刘其先, 孟加拉、印度尼西亚小额信贷发展探析,吉林大学硕士学位论文,2010
②刘其先, 孟加拉、印度尼西亚小额信贷发展探析,吉林大学硕士学位论文,2010
①武翔宇、高凌云,印度的小额信贷：自助小组——银行联结,农业经济问题,2009(01)
①朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2009,P75-P76
①杜晓山,印度小额信贷的发展及借鉴,现代经济探讨,2005(05)
②赵光远、杜尚明、秦静,印度“小贷危机”对我国小额信贷可持续发展的借鉴与启示,金融参考,2011(09))
④杜晓山,印度小额信贷的发展及借鉴,现代经济探讨,2005(05)
①王秋石,微观经济学原理(第三版修订本),经济管理出版社,2001年
①更进一步的论述请参见Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet,Microeconomics of banking, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,2008, P70-79
①宋文昌、童士清,关于信贷拥挤的理论探讨,金融研究,2009(06)
②票据融资是我国中小金融机构,特别是城商行、股份制银行的重要利润来源。
③陶军,我国中小银行贷款集中的羊群行为分析,当代经济科学,2006(03)
①刘其先：孟加拉、印度尼西亚小额信贷发展探析,吉林大学硕士学位论文,2010
②王松奇：改善中小企业融资的制度设计,银行家,2007(10)
③郭田勇：中小企业融资的国际比较与借鉴,国际金融研究,2003(11)
①参见作者文章：我国小额信贷利率确定机制研究——基于准公共品的视角,江西社会科学,2012(03)
① Jaclyn D. Kropp、Calum G. Turvey、David R. Just等, Are the poor really more trustworthy? Agricultural Finance Review Vol.69 No.1,2009, pp.67-87
①原型参见Nicholson, Theory and Application of intermediate Microeconomics(Tenth Edition),中国人民大学出版社,2009
①这意味着银行有足够的手段和信息来源,可以识别欺诈者提供的虚假信息,防止欺诈行为。
①参见作者文章：我国小额信贷利率机制研究—基于准公共产品视角,江西社会科学,2012(03)
①王万山,软件产品价格机制研究,江西财经大学博士论文,2003年
①徐忠、张雪春、沈明高和程恩江,中国贫困地区农村金融发展研究——构造政府与市场之间的平衡,中国金融出版社,2009,P133
①此处分析参照了Aghion和Morduch, The Economics of Microfinance, The MIT Press,2005
①关于道德风险的相关模型,参见Freixas, Rochet著,刘锡良主译,微观银行学,西南财经大学出版社,2000
②银行提出的抵押要求实际上还具有反向激励作用,即愿意提供更多资产用于抵押的富有的借款者往往愿冒更大的风险,也就是说,如果绝对风险偏好系数递减,越富有的人越倾向于进行风险高的项目投资。详见Stiglitz和Weiss:Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,American Economic Review, LXXI (1981):383 ——410.
①朱博、张媛媛,关系型借贷：金融危机下银行与小企业共赢之路,现代经济信息,2009(08)
①严谷军,关系型贷款与美国社区银行自生能力：一个文献综述,浙江社会科学,2006(04)
①皮天雷,国外声誉理论：文献综述、研究展望及对中国的启示,首都经济贸易大学学报,2009(03)
②皮天雷,国外声誉理论：文献综述、研究展望及对中国的启示,首都经济贸易大学学报,2009(03)
①董志勇、黄迈、刘文忻,农村小额信贷的激励理论述评,经济理论与经济管理,2008(10)
②赵岩青、何广文,声誉机制、信任机制与小额信贷,金融论坛,2008(01)
①中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信合集,经济科学出版社,P123
②此处参照了乔华兵：中国邮政储蓄银行小额信贷可持续发展研究,北京邮电大学工商管理硕士学位论文,2009
①中国人民银行余杭支行课题组,邮政储蓄银行信贷业务经营困境及对策建议——对杭州市余杭区的调查,浙江金融,2009(11)
①钟春平、孙焕民、徐长生：信贷约束、信贷需求与农户借贷行为：安徽的经验证据,金融研究,2010(11)
②本实证分析的数据来源于系统内部,不便公开。
①中国银行业监督管理委员会,小企业融资理论、政策与实践,中国金融出版社,P39,2011
①巴曙松,利率市场化对银行资产负债结构的影响,中国经济时报,2012-04-05
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②何剑伟,中国农村小额信贷发展研究,西北农林科技大学博士论文,2008
①张亚维,农户信贷市场的信息不对称与风险规避,农村金融研究2004(5)
②刘伟林,阮红新,供给、制度与风险：观察湖北省农村信贷资金的三重视角,湖北经济学院学报,Vol.5,No.3,2006
③陈雨露、马勇,关于农户信用和风险偏好的几个注释,财贸经济,2009(01)
①Nimal A.Fernando,理解和解决小额信贷的高利率问题,2008/2009小额信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2009,P22
②何光辉、杨咸月,从印度危机反思小额贷款的高利率盈利模式,经济理论与经济管理,2011(09)
③Nimal A.Fernando,理解和解决小额信贷的高利率问题,2008/2009小额信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2009,P23-29
①中国银行业监督管理委员会文件,关于小额贷款公司试点的指导意见,银监发[2008]23号
②陈志武在其著作《金融的逻辑》中对中国民间亲朋之间的借贷关系有深入的研究,请参阅陈志武.金融的逻辑,国际文化出版公司,2009。
①根据各行2010年报估计,由于统计口径的原因,准确的小额信贷发放数据很难到。
②http://www.hysec.com/hyzq/public/Infodetail.jsp?infold=5459954
②中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信,中国金融出版社,2010年,P9
①中国人民银行调查统计司,2008年中小企业贷款调查报告,中国金融年鉴,2009
②中国人民银行调查统计司,2008年我国涉农贷款统计分析,中国金融年鉴,2009,P630P-631
①中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信,中国金融出版社,2010年,P359
②中国人民银行调查统计司,2008年我国小额贷款公司的试点与发展,中国金融年鉴,2009,P633-P636
③中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信,中国金融出版社,2010年,P359 ①Yunus,社会企业家的作用——在牛津大学商学院斯科尔论坛上的演讲,中国人民银行2009、2010年小额
信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2010年,P13
①范香梅、彭建刚,国际小额信贷模式运作机制比较研究,国际经贸探索,2007(06)
②朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2010,P69
③中国邮政储蓄银行赴印度尼西亚小额信贷考察报告,2009
④席琼玉,印度小额信贷问题研究,中国人民银行2008/2009年小额信贷通讯合集,经济科学出版社,2009年,P174
⑤赵光远、杜尚明、秦静,印度“小贷危机”对我国小额信贷可持续发展的借鉴与启示,金融参考,2011(09))
①朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2010
②李志辉、国娇,非洲国家的微型金融,中国金融,2009(13)
①杜晓山,商业化、可持续小额信贷的新发展——德国、阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰小额信贷的研讨和考察,中国农村经济,2003(10)
②杜晓山,商业化、可持续小额信贷的新发展——德国、阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰小额信贷的研讨和考察,中国农村经济,2003(10)
①杨伟坤、王立杰、张秀倩、张永升,小额信贷的国际成功经验在中国的实践及启示,世界农业,2009(12)
① Bernanke, speech at the ACCIoN Texas Summit on Microfinance in the United States, San Antonio, Texas,6 November 2007
② Mark Schreiner、Jonathan Morduch, Replcating microfinance in the United State::opportunities and challenges, Washington, D.C, Fannie Mae Foundation,2001.
① LucianoBonomo and Paolo Vitali, Microfinance in Europe, Working Paper, Giordano Dell'Amore Foundation,2004
② Bernanke, speech at the ACCI6N Texas Summit on Microfinance in the United States, San Antonio,Texas,6 November 2007
③ Mark Schreiner、Jonathan Morduch, Replcating microfinance in the United State::opportuntities and challenges, Washington, D.C, Fannie Mae Foundation,2001.
①具体分类可参见：朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2010
①刘其先, 孟加拉、印度尼西亚小额信贷发展探析,吉林大学硕士学位论文,2010
②刘其先, 孟加拉、印度尼西亚小额信贷发展探析,吉林大学硕士学位论文,2010
①武翔宇、高凌云,印度的小额信贷：自助小组——银行联结,农业经济问题,2009(01)
①朱乾宇,中国农户小额信贷影响研究,人民出版社,2009,P75-P76
①杜晓山,印度小额信贷的发展及借鉴,现代经济探讨,2005(05)
②赵光远、杜尚明、秦静,印度“小贷危机”对我国小额信贷可持续发展的借鉴与启示,金融参考,2011(09))
④杜晓山,印度小额信贷的发展及借鉴,现代经济探讨,2005(05)
①王秋石,微观经济学原理(第三版修订本),经济管理出版社,2001年
①更进一步的论述请参见Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet,Microeconomics of banking, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,2008, P70-79
①宋文昌、童士清,关于信贷拥挤的理论探讨,金融研究,2009(06)
②票据融资是我国中小金融机构,特别是城商行、股份制银行的重要利润来源。
③陶军,我国中小银行贷款集中的羊群行为分析,当代经济科学,2006(03)
①刘其先：孟加拉、印度尼西亚小额信贷发展探析,吉林大学硕士学位论文,2010
②王松奇：改善中小企业融资的制度设计,银行家,2007(10)
③郭田勇：中小企业融资的国际比较与借鉴,国际金融研究,2003(11)
①参见作者文章：我国小额信贷利率确定机制研究——基于准公共品的视角,江西社会科学,2012(03)
① Jaclyn D. Kropp、Calum G. Turvey、David R. Just等, Are the poor really more trustworthy? Agricultural Finance Review Vol.69 No.1,2009, pp.67-87
①原型参见Nicholson, Theory and Application of intermediate Microeconomics(Tenth Edition),中国人民大学出版社,2009
①这意味着银行有足够的手段和信息来源,可以识别欺诈者提供的虚假信息,防止欺诈行为。
①参见作者文章：我国小额信贷利率机制研究—基于准公共产品视角,江西社会科学,2012(03)
①王万山,软件产品价格机制研究,江西财经大学博士论文,2003年
①徐忠、张雪春、沈明高和程恩江,中国贫困地区农村金融发展研究——构造政府与市场之间的平衡,中国金融出版社,2009,P133
①此处分析参照了Aghion和Morduch, The Economics of Microfinance, The MIT Press,2005
①关于道德风险的相关模型,参见Freixas, Rochet著,刘锡良主译,微观银行学,西南财经大学出版社,2000
②银行提出的抵押要求实际上还具有反向激励作用,即愿意提供更多资产用于抵押的富有的借款者往往愿冒更大的风险,也就是说,如果绝对风险偏好系数递减,越富有的人越倾向于进行风险高的项目投资。详见Stiglitz和Weiss:Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,American Economic Review, LXXI (1981):383 ——410.
①朱博、张媛媛,关系型借贷：金融危机下银行与小企业共赢之路,现代经济信息,2009(08)
①严谷军,关系型贷款与美国社区银行自生能力：一个文献综述,浙江社会科学,2006(04)
①皮天雷,国外声誉理论：文献综述、研究展望及对中国的启示,首都经济贸易大学学报,2009(03)
②皮天雷,国外声誉理论：文献综述、研究展望及对中国的启示,首都经济贸易大学学报,2009(03)
①董志勇、黄迈、刘文忻,农村小额信贷的激励理论述评,经济理论与经济管理,2008(10)
②赵岩青、何广文,声誉机制、信任机制与小额信贷,金融论坛,2008(01)
①中国人民银行小额信贷专题组,2009/2010小额信贷通信合集,经济科学出版社,P123
②此处参照了乔华兵：中国邮政储蓄银行小额信贷可持续发展研究,北京邮电大学工商管理硕士学位论文,2009
①中国人民银行余杭支行课题组,邮政储蓄银行信贷业务经营困境及对策建议——对杭州市余杭区的调查,浙江金融,2009(11)
①钟春平、孙焕民、徐长生：信贷约束、信贷需求与农户借贷行为：安徽的经验证据,金融研究,2010(11)
②本实证分析的数据来源于系统内部,不便公开。
①中国银行业监督管理委员会,小企业融资理论、政策与实践,中国金融出版社,P39,2011
①巴曙松,利率市场化对银行资产负债结构的影响,中国经济时报,2012-04-05
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