企业股权结构与企业价值
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摘要
股权结构与公司价值的相关性一直是公司治理的重要论题，国内外已有大量的理论与实证研究，其结论也大不相同。本文对此进行了文献综述，并指出其在样本选择、分析方法、指标选取等方面的不足，对其结果进行置疑，指出国内的研究方向应该深入公司内部股权结构中股东价值驱动的动态演变，而不是东施效颦式的所谓大样本实证研究。
本文针对我国家电行业上市公司1994年至2000年数据进行小样本实证分析，选取市净率作为衡量企业价值的指标，采用随机影响的变截距平行数据模型进行实证分析。结论表明，在竞争比较激烈的家电行业，无论是国家股、法人股或者散户投资者对上市公司的治理与监督都是缺乏足够影响的，无法通过显著性检验。股权结构中，单纯从数字来判断股权集中度以及股权构成与企业价值的相关性是毫无意义的，而应该看数字的背后由谁来行驶这部分股权，改股东能否驱动公司价值的增长。法人股比例及其平方与企业价值均无显著相关，说明法人股东并没有很好的发挥治理和监管作用。
资产定价技术的发展，使投资者组合投资技术环境大为改善，指数化的投资策略，消极治理和投资的倾向更显著。公司治理模式在参与主体的评价下，自由选择，多种利益主体合约的均衡、动态演变。此时股权结构置身于股票市场正确的评价标准之中。产品市场竞争结构、资本市场投资者机构变化，企业发展的不同阶段，会选择不同或多样化的股权结构资产组合战略。
股权结构的集中或分散度是企业在产品市场竞争和资本市场有效性环境下，为实现持续经营而进行的一种市场化选择，很难也不应该人为规定。集中度或分散度本身应该与企业价值并没有显著的相关性，关键在于股权结构中的股东价值驱动结构。
本文针对我国家电行业上市公司1994年至2000年数据进行小样本实证分析，选取市净率作为衡量企业价值的指标，采用随机影响的变截距平行数据模型进行实证分析。结论表明，在竞争比较激烈的家电行业，无论是国家股、法人股或者散户投资者对上市公司的治理与监督都是缺乏足够影响的，无法通过显著性检验。股权结构中，单纯从数字来判断股权集中度以及股权构成与企业价值的相关性是毫无意义的，而应该看数字的背后由谁来行驶这部分股权，改股东能否驱动公司价值的增长。法人股比例及其平方与企业价值均无显著相关，说明法人股东并没有很好的发挥治理和监管作用。
资产定价技术的发展，使投资者组合投资技术环境大为改善，指数化的投资策略，消极治理和投资的倾向更显著。公司治理模式在参与主体的评价下，自由选择，多种利益主体合约的均衡、动态演变。此时股权结构置身于股票市场正确的评价标准之中。产品市场竞争结构、资本市场投资者机构变化，企业发展的不同阶段，会选择不同或多样化的股权结构资产组合战略。
股权结构的集中或分散度是企业在产品市场竞争和资本市场有效性环境下，为实现持续经营而进行的一种市场化选择，很难也不应该人为规定。集中度或分散度本身应该与企业价值并没有显著的相关性，关键在于股权结构中的股东价值驱动结构。
引文
[1] Arthur J. Keown,Kavid F.Scott , John D.Martin,etal.现代财务管理基础(第七版)，朱武祥.北京：清华大学出版社 Prentice-Hall International Inc.，1997.
[2] 陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性.经济研究,2000年第8期：28～35
[3] 陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵.经济研究，2000年第1期：30～36
[4] 刘芍佳,李骥.超产权理论与公司业绩.北京：北京大学中国经济研究中心，1998年7月
[5] 青目昌彦，钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构:内部人控制和银行的作用.北京：中国经济出版社，1995
[6] 上海证券交易所.上市公司治理问卷调查结果与分析.上市公司，2000年第12期：11～25
[7] 孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效.经济研究,1999年第12期：23～39
[8] 谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排.经济研究，2000年第5期：47～51
[9] 谢德仁.论会计信息严重失真成因及解决对策.四川会计，1997年第2期：3～7
[10] 周业安.金融抑制对中国企业融资能力影响的实证研究.经济研究，1999年第2期：13～20
[11] 朱武祥，郭志江.股票市场对非流通股比例的价格反应——兼析释放非流通股对股市冲击效应及策略.经济研究，1999年第5期:32～38
[12] Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. VishnyLarge,1996. Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 1996, June, page461-488.
[13] Anil K. Makhija and Michael Spiro, 2000, Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czech Firms, The Financial Review.
[14] Berle, Adolf, and Gardiner Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, MacMillan,New York, NY.
[15] Charles Kahn and Andrew Winton, 1998. Ownership Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Intervention, Journal of Finance,February.
[16] Demsetz, Harold, Lehn and Kenneth,1985, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, The Journal of Political Economy,Chicago,Dec.
[17] Fama, Eugene, and Michael C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 26:301-325.
[18] Fama and Eugene, 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 88:288-307.
[19] Friday, H Swint, Sirmans, G Stacy, Conover, C. Mitchell, 1999, Ownership structure and the value of the firm: The case of REITs, Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol: 17, page71-90.
[20] Griffith, John M., 1999, CEO ownership and firm value, Managerial and Decision Economics, Chichester, Feb., Volume:20, Page1-8.
[21] Holderness, Clifford G. and Dennis P. Sheehan, 1988, The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 317-346.
[22] Jensen and Michael C., 1993, The modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, Journal of Finance 48:831-880.
[23] Karl V. Lins,1999, Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, March.
[24] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of Finance.
[25] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,and Robert W. Vishny, 1998b, Agency problems and dividend policies around the world, Working Paper Harvard University and University of Chicago.
[26] McConnell, John and Henri Servaes, 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612.
[27] Michel A. Habib, and Alexander P. Ljungqvist, 2000, Firm Value and Managerial Incentives, Nov. 30.
[28] Mukesh Bajaj, Yuk-Shee Chan and Sudipto Dasgupta, 1998, The Relationship Between Ownership, Financing Decisions and Firm Performance: A Signaling Model, International Economic Review, Vol.39, NO.3, August.
[29] Randall Morck, Masao Nakamura and Anil Shivdasani, 2000, Banks, ownership structure, and firm value in Japan, The Journal of Business, Chicago, Oct.
[30] Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy, 461-488.
[31] Simeon Djankov, 1999, Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states, Comparative Economic Studies, Flushing, Vol: 41.
[32] Stulz, René M., 1988, Managerial control of voting rights, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-59.
[33] Torben Pedersen, Steen Thomsen, 1999, Economic and systemic explanations of ownership concentration among Europe's largest companies International, Journal of the Economics of Business, Nov., volume: 6, 367-381.
[34] Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, 1997, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance, Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, Economic Development Institute, Office of the Director, June.
[35] Victoria B. Mcwilliams and Nilanjan Sen, 1997, Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.32, 491-505.
[2] 陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性.经济研究,2000年第8期：28～35
[3] 陈小悦,肖星,过晓艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵.经济研究，2000年第1期：30～36
[4] 刘芍佳,李骥.超产权理论与公司业绩.北京：北京大学中国经济研究中心，1998年7月
[5] 青目昌彦，钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构:内部人控制和银行的作用.北京：中国经济出版社，1995
[6] 上海证券交易所.上市公司治理问卷调查结果与分析.上市公司，2000年第12期：11～25
[7] 孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效.经济研究,1999年第12期：23～39
[8] 谢德仁.会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排.经济研究，2000年第5期：47～51
[9] 谢德仁.论会计信息严重失真成因及解决对策.四川会计，1997年第2期：3～7
[10] 周业安.金融抑制对中国企业融资能力影响的实证研究.经济研究，1999年第2期：13～20
[11] 朱武祥，郭志江.股票市场对非流通股比例的价格反应——兼析释放非流通股对股市冲击效应及策略.经济研究，1999年第5期:32～38
[12] Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. VishnyLarge,1996. Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 1996, June, page461-488.
[13] Anil K. Makhija and Michael Spiro, 2000, Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Firm Value: Evidence from Newly Privatized Czech Firms, The Financial Review.
[14] Berle, Adolf, and Gardiner Means, 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, MacMillan,New York, NY.
[15] Charles Kahn and Andrew Winton, 1998. Ownership Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Intervention, Journal of Finance,February.
[16] Demsetz, Harold, Lehn and Kenneth,1985, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, The Journal of Political Economy,Chicago,Dec.
[17] Fama, Eugene, and Michael C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 26:301-325.
[18] Fama and Eugene, 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 88:288-307.
[19] Friday, H Swint, Sirmans, G Stacy, Conover, C. Mitchell, 1999, Ownership structure and the value of the firm: The case of REITs, Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol: 17, page71-90.
[20] Griffith, John M., 1999, CEO ownership and firm value, Managerial and Decision Economics, Chichester, Feb., Volume:20, Page1-8.
[21] Holderness, Clifford G. and Dennis P. Sheehan, 1988, The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 317-346.
[22] Jensen and Michael C., 1993, The modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, Journal of Finance 48:831-880.
[23] Karl V. Lins,1999, Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, March.
[24] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 1999, Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of Finance.
[25] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,and Robert W. Vishny, 1998b, Agency problems and dividend policies around the world, Working Paper Harvard University and University of Chicago.
[26] McConnell, John and Henri Servaes, 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612.
[27] Michel A. Habib, and Alexander P. Ljungqvist, 2000, Firm Value and Managerial Incentives, Nov. 30.
[28] Mukesh Bajaj, Yuk-Shee Chan and Sudipto Dasgupta, 1998, The Relationship Between Ownership, Financing Decisions and Firm Performance: A Signaling Model, International Economic Review, Vol.39, NO.3, August.
[29] Randall Morck, Masao Nakamura and Anil Shivdasani, 2000, Banks, ownership structure, and firm value in Japan, The Journal of Business, Chicago, Oct.
[30] Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, 1986, Large shareholders and corporate control, Journal of Political Economy, 461-488.
[31] Simeon Djankov, 1999, Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly independent states, Comparative Economic Studies, Flushing, Vol: 41.
[32] Stulz, René M., 1988, Managerial control of voting rights, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-59.
[33] Torben Pedersen, Steen Thomsen, 1999, Economic and systemic explanations of ownership concentration among Europe's largest companies International, Journal of the Economics of Business, Nov., volume: 6, 367-381.
[34] Xiaonian Xu and Yan Wang, 1997, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance, Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, Economic Development Institute, Office of the Director, June.
[35] Victoria B. Mcwilliams and Nilanjan Sen, 1997, Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.32, 491-505.