中国上市公司财务报告人为操控的实证研究
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摘要
高质量的会计信息是资本市场正常运行的基础,对资本市场的运行效率和资源配置效率产生直接影响。作为资本市场的参与者,投资者、债权人、管理层和监管当局,都异常关注会计信息的质量。然而,除了管理层之外,处于企业外部的投资者、债权人和监管当局都只能通过财务报告来获取会计信息。在现行的市场模式下,财务报告的形成过程不可避免地受到管理层的主观因素影响。通过各种合法(会计政策和估计的选择)或非法手段(虚构交易),管理层能够影响最终的财务报告结果,进而影响会计信息的质量。低质量的会计信息不能真实公允地反映企业财务状况和经营成果,动摇了资本市场的基础,损害了投资者的合法权益,增加了市场监管的难度,同时也加大了独立审计人员所面临的风险。为此,本文以上市公司财务报告作为研究对象,从其形成过程入手,探讨财务报告人为操控行为。
对于投资者而言,研究财务报告人为操控行为,有利于更为准确地判断上市公司经营情况,从而进行更为科学有效的投资；对于监管当局而言,发现财务报告人为操控行为,区分不同类型的财务报告人为操控行为,并分别制定治理措施,能够更好地保护投资者利益,提高市场运行效率；对于外部审计人员而言,如果能够预见财务报告人为操控行为,并且区分不同类型的财务报告人为操控行为,能够提高审计效率,降低审计风险。
作为资本市场研究的重要内容,现有研究已经对财务报告的人为操控进行了广泛的研究。但是,现有研究仍然存在较为明显的缺陷。从理论基础来看,缺少坚实而系统的理论基础作为支撑,大部分研究都是以机会主义的某类或某个因素作为切入点,而忽视了财务报告人为操控诱发因素更为深刻的根源。以机会主义的某类或某个因素作为研究起点,容易将研究局限于较小的视角内,难以从整体上对财务报告人为操控进行深入而系统的研究,从而混淆不同类型的财务报告人为操控,不重视财务报告人为操控的经济后果。特别是,在确定切入点时,现有研究选择的机会主义诱发因素具有较强的主观价值判断色彩,造成对财务报告人为操控的负面认识,导致研究结论的客观性不足。
理论基础的缺陷导致现有研究内容存在三方面不足。首先,现有研究缺少对财务报告人为操控的界定,没有将盈余管理和欺诈加以区分。虽然盈余管理和欺诈都属于财务报告人为操控行为,但是在方法、手段、影响和经济后果等方面都存在显著的差异,将两者等量齐观,得到的研究结论具有较大的局限性。其次,现有研究忽视了财务报告人为操控的经济后果检验。受到“动机—后果”的思维模式影响,多数研究在证实某些因素会诱发财务报告人为操控行为后,便推断其必定产生不良经济后果,但是却并没有提供相应的实证证据。最后,现有国内研究主要借助于国外的研究成果,忽视了我国资本市场的特殊性。我国资本市场具有“新兴”和“转轨”的双重特色,简单地引用国外研究成果,难以解释我国资本市场行为的特殊性。
为了弥补现有研究的缺陷,本文引入经济学的“显示原理”作为基础,按照显示原理的“3C”原则系统梳理现有财务报告人为操控理论研究,指出现有研究思路上存在的缺陷,并结合我国现阶段资本市场信息透明度较低的特点,选择“3C”原则中的“信息沟通障碍(Communication) "作为研究的切入点。根据信息不对称理论,通过分析上市公司环境的信息不对称因素,探讨信息沟通障碍是否诱发财务报告人为操控行为；根据对待信息沟通障碍的态度,甄别不同类型的人为操控行为；在此基础上,对不同类型财务报告人为操控的经济后果加以检验,并考察增加信息披露透明度、消除信息沟通障碍的行为,是否会影响人为操控的经济后果。
具体来说,本文主要研究目标有四方面：目标一,明确财务报告人为操控的界定范围,区分不同类型财务报告人为操控的特点,研究盈余管理和欺诈的关系；目标二,从“显示原理”出发,明确财务报告人为操控产生的根源,结合中国资本市场信息透明度较低的特点,从信息不对称角度建立分析的基本框架；目标三,从沟通障碍入手,探讨上市公司所处环境的信息不对称因素,确定财务报告人为操控行为的诱发因素,并根据对待沟通障碍的态度,寻找区分不同类型财务报告人为操控的方法；目标四,考察财务报告人为操控的经济后果性质,探索信息披露透明度对经济后果性质产生的影响。
根据上述研究目标,本文主要分为四个层次：第一层次是研究的概念界定,在全面回顾现有研究成果基础上,分析存在的不足和缺陷,对财务报告人为操控的内涵加以界定,并考察不同类型的财务报告人为操控之间的关系；第二层次是研究的理论分析,将“显示原理”作为理论基础框架,对现有研究进行系统梳理,并指出现有研究思路存在的漏洞；结合我国资本市场的现状,从“信息不对称”的角度出发,分析财务报告人为操控及其类型的甄别方法,以及财务报告人为操控可能产生的经济后果；第三层次是研究的实证检验,具体考察信息不对称因素能否用于甄别财务报告人为操控及其类型,以及财务报告人为操控产生的经济后果,并确定能够影响其经济后果性质的要素；第四层次是研究结论。
本文研究结论主要有三方面：第一,作为财务报告人为操控的不同类型,欺诈和盈余管理并不存在递进的关系,而是表现出不同的特点。第二,信息不对称因素能够诱发财务报告人为操控,对待沟通障碍的态度能用于甄别不同类型的财务报告人为操控。第三,从经济后果来看,盈余管理向市场传递私有信息,能够提高财务报告的价值相关性,具有积极作用。特别是,在较高的信息披露透明度环境下,盈余管理的积极作用得以增强；反之,其消极作用则被放大。欺诈行为利用信息沟通障碍误导投资者,降低了财务报告的价值相关性。
本文的研究内容共分为八个部分,各部分的基本内容如下：
第一部分为绪论。在这一部分中,主要针对本文研究的一些基本问题进行介绍,包括本文的研究背景和研究意义,研究目标和思路,具体研究内容,以及研究过程中使用的研究方法。
第二部分为文献回顾。本部分主要对国内外人为操控行为的现有研究进行全面的回顾和评述,分别从盈余管理和欺诈两个方向入手,对现有的主要研究结论和不足加以分析,从而明确本文的研究重点。从国外的研究来看,盈余管理的甄别和财务欺诈的甄别同时开展,但是没有形成交叉。从国内的研究来看,对于财务报告人为操控的界定尚不明确。无论国外研究还是国内研究都忽略了人为操控的经济后果。
第三部分为财务报告人为操控的界定研究。本部分主要是对不同类型的财务报告人为操控进行比较,判断盈余管理和欺诈之间的关系。现有研究通常认为盈余管理和欺诈具有相同的属性,并且欺诈由盈余管理发展而来。但是,通过比较发现,无论是在首次欺诈前1年,还是在欺诈当年,欺诈公司都没有表现出更为明显的盈余管理特点。
第四部分为财务报告人为操控的理论基础。本部分主要引入“显示原理”作为理论基础框架,对财务报告人为操控进行系统梳理。根据“显示原理”,人为操控行为的出现是由于“沟通障碍”、“缔约形式”和“事先承诺”中的一项或几项没有成立。现有研究多从“缔约形式”入手对人为操控进行研究,忽略了“沟通障碍”的影响。作为转轨经济体制中的新兴市场,严重的信息不对称导致沟通障碍是我国资本市场的重要特点。因此,以“沟通障碍”为切入点能够更好地研究我国的人为操控行为。
第五部分为财务报告人为操控的理论分析。本部分主要遵循“沟通障碍”思路,从信息不对称入手,对财务报告人为操控进行研究。根据信息不对称原理,公司环境中的信息不对称因素会诱发财务报告人为操控行为,而对待信息不对称的态度可以区分不同类型的财务报告人为操控。从经济后果来看,在信息不对称的情况下,盈余管理和欺诈将产生截然不同的经济后果,并且公司信息披露透明度对于经济后果性质会产生影响。
第六部分是财务报告人为操控及其类型的甄别研究。通过选取欺诈公司样本、盈余管理公司样本和正常公司样本,考察信息不对称因素对于财务报告人为操控的影响,并关注对待沟通障碍的因素能否将盈余管理和欺诈区别开。研究结果表明,衡量公司报告环境的信息不对称因素,能够用于识别财务报告的人为操控行为。通过考察管理人员对待“沟通障碍”的态度,能够有效区分不同类型的人为操控行为。
第七部分为财务报告人为操控的经济后果研究。本部分采用长期市场反应,考察不同类型的财务报告人为操控行为所产生的经济后果。从整体上来看,市场能够识别出盈余管理行为,并进行正确的反应,并且管理人员信息披露的透明度能够提高盈余管理传递信息的效果。因此,市场监管机构应当增加信息披露透明的监管,通过市场手段来发挥盈余管理的积极作用,遏制其消极影响。相比之下,市场无法识别欺诈行为,监管机构应当将其作为重点加以治理。
第八部分为研究结论。在对全文的主要研究结果加以总结的基础上,得出结论及政策建议,指出本文的研究不足,并提出未来的研究方向。
本文的研究结论的主要贡献在于：第一,对不同类型的财务报告人为操控进行合理界定；现有国内研究多借鉴国外研究结论,认同盈余管理和欺诈之间存在“递进”关系,但是并没有提供相应实证证据；本文通过将两者进行系统比较发现欺诈并非由盈余管理发展而来,两者之间不存在递进关系。第二,以经济学的“显示原理”作为理论基础框架对现有研究进行分析,指出现有研究忽略了“沟通障碍”,并以此作为研究切入点,以克服现有研究选择机会主义动机的主观偏见,能够更为全面客观的认识财务报告人为操控行为。第三,考察了人为操控经济后果的性质,弥补此前研究仅考察诱发因素而忽略经济后果的不足,避免根据动机来推测后果的主观性,并探索了信息披露透明度对经济后果的影响,为治理不同的财务报告人为操控提供了理论支持。
Accounting information of high quality is the foundation of capital markets and affects market efficiency and resources allocation. Participants in the markets, e.g. investors, debt holders, management and regulatory authority are all very concerned on the quality of accounting information. However, except for inside management, all the outside investors, debt holders and regulatory authority can only get access to the accounting information by financial reports. The production of financial reports includes the subjective judgments from the management inevitably. Using legal (accounting choice) or illegal (frictional transactions) ways, management has impacts on the final outcome of financial reports so as to the quality of accounting information. Accounting information of low quality cannot reflect the financial status and operating results fairly and will shake the foundation of capital market which harms the investors, hinders regulatory authority and increases the risks for auditors. This paper focuses on the financial reports of listed companies and discusses the intended discretion by management from the perspective of production of financial reports.
For investors, detecting intended discretions in financial reports improves the investment efficiency with more accurate information on operating results. For regulatory authority, detecting intended discretions and discriminate the type of discretions are the basis for regulation rules which protect investors and improve the market efficiency. As for independent auditors, if they can predict the discretions from management and tell the type of discretions, the audit efficiency will be increased and audit risks will be decreased.
As an important part of capital market research, there has already been extensive research on the distorted financial reports. However there are still obvious defects in extant researches. From the perspective of fundamental theory, there is no solid theoretical framework; most researches just focus on certain opportunistic factors, which overlook the deeper source of intended discretion. From the opportunistic perspective, the researches are confined to narrow scope and hard to take intended discretion as a whole or build a systematic view. Extant research mixed different types of intended discretion and does not take the consequences into consideration. In particularly, the opportunistic perspective is always related to subjective judgments with negative attitudes, which cause the results lacking of objectivity.
The defects in fundamental theory cause three serious shortcomings. Firstly, extant papers mix earnings managements and frauds rather than put them into different categories. Earnings managements and frauds are both intended discretions, but they differ in methods, tactics, effects and economic consequences. So if they are treated equally, the results are limited. Secondly, there is little research on the economic consequences of intended discretion. Due to the "motive-consequence" module, after proof of factors related intended discretion, most researches infer negative consequence of intended discretion without providing any evidences. Finally, most domestic researches cite foreign results without consideration of the characters of China capital markets. China capital market is both "emerging" and "transitional" which causes the less powerful explanation by foreign researches.
In order to avoid precedential limitations, this paper takes revelation principle as theoretical framework and reviews the extant researches according to "3C". After the summary of extant researches, this paper takes the perspective of communication from "3C" with respect to the low transparency in China capital market. Based on information asymmetry, environmental factors are used to detect intended discretion. Different types of intended discretion are discriminated by attitudes towards information asymmetry. After these, the consequences of different types of intended discretion are tested separately to discuss the effects of transparency and attitudes towards information asymmetry.
Specifically, this paper targets at four goals:Goal 1, defining intended discretion and exploring the relation between earnings management and fraud to discriminate different types of intended discretion. Goal 2, seeking the roots of intended discretion from the perspective of revelation principles and setting up framework based on the low transparency of China capital market; Goal 3, detecting intended discretions by environmental factors and discriminating the type of intended discretions with attitudes towards communications; Goal 3 testing the economics consequence and seeking the influential factors related to disclosure transparency.
According to the goals, this paper can be divided into 4 levels:Level 1 is the definition of basic concepts. Based on the review of extant researches, level 1 presents the defects and shortcomings in current research, defines intended discretion and tests the relations between different types of intended discretions. Level 2 builds up theoretical analysis. Revelation principles are imported to review extant literature. After discussion the limitation of extant research, the detection and consequence of intended discretion are analyzed from information asymmetry. Level 3 is the empirical test. Information asymmetry is used to detect intended discretion and economic consequence are tested by the market reaction and affecting factors. Level 4 concludes.
This paper results in three dimensions. Firstly, frauds are not evolved from earnings managements but they are two different types of intended discretion. Secondly, information asymmetry can be used to detect intended discretion and different types of intended discretion diverge in the attitudes to communication. Thirdly, earnings management has positive consequences in general, which enhance value relevance of accounting numbers. The transparency of disclosure is vital to the consequences. If the transparency is good, the positive consequences of earnings management enhanced. If the transparency is bad, there would be negative consequences. Frauds take advantage of information asymmetry to mislead investor, which decrease the value relevance of accounting numbers.
Based on the above research logic, this dissertation consists of 8 chapters which proceed as follow:
The first chapter is the introduction. In this part, some basic issues in the dissertation are mainly discussed, including the research background, the theoretical value and practical application value of this dissertation, the basic ideas and method, and main research contents.
Chapter 2 reviews extant literature. The review of extant research on intended discretion provides defects in current conclusions from two perspectives:earnings management and fraud and reaches the emphasis of this paper. According to the foreign research, earnings management and fraud are in two different disciplines and there is no crossover. There is no clear definition of intended discretion. However, there are no full researches on economic consequence in neither China research nor foreign research.
Chapter 3 defines concept of intended discretion. Different types of intended discretions are compared to tell the relation between earnings management and frauds. Current researches take earnings management and fraud into the same category. And frauds are thought to be evolved from earnings management. However, there is no significant earnings management in the year prior to the fraud or in the year of fraud.
Chapter 4 provides theoretical building blocks. Revelation principle is imported as framework to evaluate extant research. Based on revelation principle, if communication, contracting and commitment do not hold simultaneously, there will be intended discretion. Current researches usually take the perspective of contracting and do not take communication into consideration. As emerging capital market in transitional economy, China capital market suffers a lot from information asymmetry.. So the communication perspective explains the intended discretion in China better.
Chapter 5 analyzes intended discretion. From the perspective of communication, intended discretion is analyzed with respect to information asymmetry. According to information asymmetry, factors related to communication are explored to detect intended discretion. And the types of intended discretion can be discriminated by attitude towards communication. Under information asymmetry, frauds and earnings management lead to different consequences and transparency of disclosure is vital factor.
Chapter 6 studies the detection of intended discretion and discriminates of types of intended discretion. Based on fraud earnings management and normal companies, information asymmetry is tested to detect intended discretion. And attitudes towards communication are used to discriminate types of intended discretion. Empirical results show that environment factors related to information asymmetry could, be used as tools to detect intended discretion. When there are frauds, management is inclined to increase information asymmetry to mislead investors. Management who convey private information takes measures to decrease information asymmetry. Attitudes toward communication can be used to discriminate the types of intended discretion.
Chapter 7 tests the economic consequences of intended discretion by long-term market reactions. Market can identify earnings management and react properly in general. The measures to improve transparency enhance the convey of private information by earnings management. So the regulatory authority should emphasize transparency of disclosure which improves the positive effects of earnings management by market force. In contrast, market could not detect fraud by itself. So that is the major task for regulatory authority.
Chapter 8 concludes. This part presents the major conclusions and the limitations as well as directs future research.
This paper makes three contributions to extant literature. Firstly, different types of intended discretion are well defined. Without local empirical results, current domestic researches speculate frauds go further than earnings management by borrowing the international results. Frauds and earnings management are compared carefully to find out that they are two different types of intended discretion. Secondly, Framework is built on revelation principle to review extant research. Communication is not considered in current research. In order to reach more objective results, this paper takes the view of communication to avoid bias from opportunistic perspective. Thirdly, economic consequences of intended discretion are tested to avoid subjective bias, which also provide theoretical evidence for regulatory authority.
对于投资者而言,研究财务报告人为操控行为,有利于更为准确地判断上市公司经营情况,从而进行更为科学有效的投资；对于监管当局而言,发现财务报告人为操控行为,区分不同类型的财务报告人为操控行为,并分别制定治理措施,能够更好地保护投资者利益,提高市场运行效率；对于外部审计人员而言,如果能够预见财务报告人为操控行为,并且区分不同类型的财务报告人为操控行为,能够提高审计效率,降低审计风险。
作为资本市场研究的重要内容,现有研究已经对财务报告的人为操控进行了广泛的研究。但是,现有研究仍然存在较为明显的缺陷。从理论基础来看,缺少坚实而系统的理论基础作为支撑,大部分研究都是以机会主义的某类或某个因素作为切入点,而忽视了财务报告人为操控诱发因素更为深刻的根源。以机会主义的某类或某个因素作为研究起点,容易将研究局限于较小的视角内,难以从整体上对财务报告人为操控进行深入而系统的研究,从而混淆不同类型的财务报告人为操控,不重视财务报告人为操控的经济后果。特别是,在确定切入点时,现有研究选择的机会主义诱发因素具有较强的主观价值判断色彩,造成对财务报告人为操控的负面认识,导致研究结论的客观性不足。
理论基础的缺陷导致现有研究内容存在三方面不足。首先,现有研究缺少对财务报告人为操控的界定,没有将盈余管理和欺诈加以区分。虽然盈余管理和欺诈都属于财务报告人为操控行为,但是在方法、手段、影响和经济后果等方面都存在显著的差异,将两者等量齐观,得到的研究结论具有较大的局限性。其次,现有研究忽视了财务报告人为操控的经济后果检验。受到“动机—后果”的思维模式影响,多数研究在证实某些因素会诱发财务报告人为操控行为后,便推断其必定产生不良经济后果,但是却并没有提供相应的实证证据。最后,现有国内研究主要借助于国外的研究成果,忽视了我国资本市场的特殊性。我国资本市场具有“新兴”和“转轨”的双重特色,简单地引用国外研究成果,难以解释我国资本市场行为的特殊性。
为了弥补现有研究的缺陷,本文引入经济学的“显示原理”作为基础,按照显示原理的“3C”原则系统梳理现有财务报告人为操控理论研究,指出现有研究思路上存在的缺陷,并结合我国现阶段资本市场信息透明度较低的特点,选择“3C”原则中的“信息沟通障碍(Communication) "作为研究的切入点。根据信息不对称理论,通过分析上市公司环境的信息不对称因素,探讨信息沟通障碍是否诱发财务报告人为操控行为；根据对待信息沟通障碍的态度,甄别不同类型的人为操控行为；在此基础上,对不同类型财务报告人为操控的经济后果加以检验,并考察增加信息披露透明度、消除信息沟通障碍的行为,是否会影响人为操控的经济后果。
具体来说,本文主要研究目标有四方面：目标一,明确财务报告人为操控的界定范围,区分不同类型财务报告人为操控的特点,研究盈余管理和欺诈的关系；目标二,从“显示原理”出发,明确财务报告人为操控产生的根源,结合中国资本市场信息透明度较低的特点,从信息不对称角度建立分析的基本框架；目标三,从沟通障碍入手,探讨上市公司所处环境的信息不对称因素,确定财务报告人为操控行为的诱发因素,并根据对待沟通障碍的态度,寻找区分不同类型财务报告人为操控的方法；目标四,考察财务报告人为操控的经济后果性质,探索信息披露透明度对经济后果性质产生的影响。
根据上述研究目标,本文主要分为四个层次：第一层次是研究的概念界定,在全面回顾现有研究成果基础上,分析存在的不足和缺陷,对财务报告人为操控的内涵加以界定,并考察不同类型的财务报告人为操控之间的关系；第二层次是研究的理论分析,将“显示原理”作为理论基础框架,对现有研究进行系统梳理,并指出现有研究思路存在的漏洞；结合我国资本市场的现状,从“信息不对称”的角度出发,分析财务报告人为操控及其类型的甄别方法,以及财务报告人为操控可能产生的经济后果；第三层次是研究的实证检验,具体考察信息不对称因素能否用于甄别财务报告人为操控及其类型,以及财务报告人为操控产生的经济后果,并确定能够影响其经济后果性质的要素；第四层次是研究结论。
本文研究结论主要有三方面：第一,作为财务报告人为操控的不同类型,欺诈和盈余管理并不存在递进的关系,而是表现出不同的特点。第二,信息不对称因素能够诱发财务报告人为操控,对待沟通障碍的态度能用于甄别不同类型的财务报告人为操控。第三,从经济后果来看,盈余管理向市场传递私有信息,能够提高财务报告的价值相关性,具有积极作用。特别是,在较高的信息披露透明度环境下,盈余管理的积极作用得以增强；反之,其消极作用则被放大。欺诈行为利用信息沟通障碍误导投资者,降低了财务报告的价值相关性。
本文的研究内容共分为八个部分,各部分的基本内容如下：
第一部分为绪论。在这一部分中,主要针对本文研究的一些基本问题进行介绍,包括本文的研究背景和研究意义,研究目标和思路,具体研究内容,以及研究过程中使用的研究方法。
第二部分为文献回顾。本部分主要对国内外人为操控行为的现有研究进行全面的回顾和评述,分别从盈余管理和欺诈两个方向入手,对现有的主要研究结论和不足加以分析,从而明确本文的研究重点。从国外的研究来看,盈余管理的甄别和财务欺诈的甄别同时开展,但是没有形成交叉。从国内的研究来看,对于财务报告人为操控的界定尚不明确。无论国外研究还是国内研究都忽略了人为操控的经济后果。
第三部分为财务报告人为操控的界定研究。本部分主要是对不同类型的财务报告人为操控进行比较,判断盈余管理和欺诈之间的关系。现有研究通常认为盈余管理和欺诈具有相同的属性,并且欺诈由盈余管理发展而来。但是,通过比较发现,无论是在首次欺诈前1年,还是在欺诈当年,欺诈公司都没有表现出更为明显的盈余管理特点。
第四部分为财务报告人为操控的理论基础。本部分主要引入“显示原理”作为理论基础框架,对财务报告人为操控进行系统梳理。根据“显示原理”,人为操控行为的出现是由于“沟通障碍”、“缔约形式”和“事先承诺”中的一项或几项没有成立。现有研究多从“缔约形式”入手对人为操控进行研究,忽略了“沟通障碍”的影响。作为转轨经济体制中的新兴市场,严重的信息不对称导致沟通障碍是我国资本市场的重要特点。因此,以“沟通障碍”为切入点能够更好地研究我国的人为操控行为。
第五部分为财务报告人为操控的理论分析。本部分主要遵循“沟通障碍”思路,从信息不对称入手,对财务报告人为操控进行研究。根据信息不对称原理,公司环境中的信息不对称因素会诱发财务报告人为操控行为,而对待信息不对称的态度可以区分不同类型的财务报告人为操控。从经济后果来看,在信息不对称的情况下,盈余管理和欺诈将产生截然不同的经济后果,并且公司信息披露透明度对于经济后果性质会产生影响。
第六部分是财务报告人为操控及其类型的甄别研究。通过选取欺诈公司样本、盈余管理公司样本和正常公司样本,考察信息不对称因素对于财务报告人为操控的影响,并关注对待沟通障碍的因素能否将盈余管理和欺诈区别开。研究结果表明,衡量公司报告环境的信息不对称因素,能够用于识别财务报告的人为操控行为。通过考察管理人员对待“沟通障碍”的态度,能够有效区分不同类型的人为操控行为。
第七部分为财务报告人为操控的经济后果研究。本部分采用长期市场反应,考察不同类型的财务报告人为操控行为所产生的经济后果。从整体上来看,市场能够识别出盈余管理行为,并进行正确的反应,并且管理人员信息披露的透明度能够提高盈余管理传递信息的效果。因此,市场监管机构应当增加信息披露透明的监管,通过市场手段来发挥盈余管理的积极作用,遏制其消极影响。相比之下,市场无法识别欺诈行为,监管机构应当将其作为重点加以治理。
第八部分为研究结论。在对全文的主要研究结果加以总结的基础上,得出结论及政策建议,指出本文的研究不足,并提出未来的研究方向。
本文的研究结论的主要贡献在于：第一,对不同类型的财务报告人为操控进行合理界定；现有国内研究多借鉴国外研究结论,认同盈余管理和欺诈之间存在“递进”关系,但是并没有提供相应实证证据；本文通过将两者进行系统比较发现欺诈并非由盈余管理发展而来,两者之间不存在递进关系。第二,以经济学的“显示原理”作为理论基础框架对现有研究进行分析,指出现有研究忽略了“沟通障碍”,并以此作为研究切入点,以克服现有研究选择机会主义动机的主观偏见,能够更为全面客观的认识财务报告人为操控行为。第三,考察了人为操控经济后果的性质,弥补此前研究仅考察诱发因素而忽略经济后果的不足,避免根据动机来推测后果的主观性,并探索了信息披露透明度对经济后果的影响,为治理不同的财务报告人为操控提供了理论支持。
Accounting information of high quality is the foundation of capital markets and affects market efficiency and resources allocation. Participants in the markets, e.g. investors, debt holders, management and regulatory authority are all very concerned on the quality of accounting information. However, except for inside management, all the outside investors, debt holders and regulatory authority can only get access to the accounting information by financial reports. The production of financial reports includes the subjective judgments from the management inevitably. Using legal (accounting choice) or illegal (frictional transactions) ways, management has impacts on the final outcome of financial reports so as to the quality of accounting information. Accounting information of low quality cannot reflect the financial status and operating results fairly and will shake the foundation of capital market which harms the investors, hinders regulatory authority and increases the risks for auditors. This paper focuses on the financial reports of listed companies and discusses the intended discretion by management from the perspective of production of financial reports.
For investors, detecting intended discretions in financial reports improves the investment efficiency with more accurate information on operating results. For regulatory authority, detecting intended discretions and discriminate the type of discretions are the basis for regulation rules which protect investors and improve the market efficiency. As for independent auditors, if they can predict the discretions from management and tell the type of discretions, the audit efficiency will be increased and audit risks will be decreased.
As an important part of capital market research, there has already been extensive research on the distorted financial reports. However there are still obvious defects in extant researches. From the perspective of fundamental theory, there is no solid theoretical framework; most researches just focus on certain opportunistic factors, which overlook the deeper source of intended discretion. From the opportunistic perspective, the researches are confined to narrow scope and hard to take intended discretion as a whole or build a systematic view. Extant research mixed different types of intended discretion and does not take the consequences into consideration. In particularly, the opportunistic perspective is always related to subjective judgments with negative attitudes, which cause the results lacking of objectivity.
The defects in fundamental theory cause three serious shortcomings. Firstly, extant papers mix earnings managements and frauds rather than put them into different categories. Earnings managements and frauds are both intended discretions, but they differ in methods, tactics, effects and economic consequences. So if they are treated equally, the results are limited. Secondly, there is little research on the economic consequences of intended discretion. Due to the "motive-consequence" module, after proof of factors related intended discretion, most researches infer negative consequence of intended discretion without providing any evidences. Finally, most domestic researches cite foreign results without consideration of the characters of China capital markets. China capital market is both "emerging" and "transitional" which causes the less powerful explanation by foreign researches.
In order to avoid precedential limitations, this paper takes revelation principle as theoretical framework and reviews the extant researches according to "3C". After the summary of extant researches, this paper takes the perspective of communication from "3C" with respect to the low transparency in China capital market. Based on information asymmetry, environmental factors are used to detect intended discretion. Different types of intended discretion are discriminated by attitudes towards information asymmetry. After these, the consequences of different types of intended discretion are tested separately to discuss the effects of transparency and attitudes towards information asymmetry.
Specifically, this paper targets at four goals:Goal 1, defining intended discretion and exploring the relation between earnings management and fraud to discriminate different types of intended discretion. Goal 2, seeking the roots of intended discretion from the perspective of revelation principles and setting up framework based on the low transparency of China capital market; Goal 3, detecting intended discretions by environmental factors and discriminating the type of intended discretions with attitudes towards communications; Goal 3 testing the economics consequence and seeking the influential factors related to disclosure transparency.
According to the goals, this paper can be divided into 4 levels:Level 1 is the definition of basic concepts. Based on the review of extant researches, level 1 presents the defects and shortcomings in current research, defines intended discretion and tests the relations between different types of intended discretions. Level 2 builds up theoretical analysis. Revelation principles are imported to review extant literature. After discussion the limitation of extant research, the detection and consequence of intended discretion are analyzed from information asymmetry. Level 3 is the empirical test. Information asymmetry is used to detect intended discretion and economic consequence are tested by the market reaction and affecting factors. Level 4 concludes.
This paper results in three dimensions. Firstly, frauds are not evolved from earnings managements but they are two different types of intended discretion. Secondly, information asymmetry can be used to detect intended discretion and different types of intended discretion diverge in the attitudes to communication. Thirdly, earnings management has positive consequences in general, which enhance value relevance of accounting numbers. The transparency of disclosure is vital to the consequences. If the transparency is good, the positive consequences of earnings management enhanced. If the transparency is bad, there would be negative consequences. Frauds take advantage of information asymmetry to mislead investor, which decrease the value relevance of accounting numbers.
Based on the above research logic, this dissertation consists of 8 chapters which proceed as follow:
The first chapter is the introduction. In this part, some basic issues in the dissertation are mainly discussed, including the research background, the theoretical value and practical application value of this dissertation, the basic ideas and method, and main research contents.
Chapter 2 reviews extant literature. The review of extant research on intended discretion provides defects in current conclusions from two perspectives:earnings management and fraud and reaches the emphasis of this paper. According to the foreign research, earnings management and fraud are in two different disciplines and there is no crossover. There is no clear definition of intended discretion. However, there are no full researches on economic consequence in neither China research nor foreign research.
Chapter 3 defines concept of intended discretion. Different types of intended discretions are compared to tell the relation between earnings management and frauds. Current researches take earnings management and fraud into the same category. And frauds are thought to be evolved from earnings management. However, there is no significant earnings management in the year prior to the fraud or in the year of fraud.
Chapter 4 provides theoretical building blocks. Revelation principle is imported as framework to evaluate extant research. Based on revelation principle, if communication, contracting and commitment do not hold simultaneously, there will be intended discretion. Current researches usually take the perspective of contracting and do not take communication into consideration. As emerging capital market in transitional economy, China capital market suffers a lot from information asymmetry.. So the communication perspective explains the intended discretion in China better.
Chapter 5 analyzes intended discretion. From the perspective of communication, intended discretion is analyzed with respect to information asymmetry. According to information asymmetry, factors related to communication are explored to detect intended discretion. And the types of intended discretion can be discriminated by attitude towards communication. Under information asymmetry, frauds and earnings management lead to different consequences and transparency of disclosure is vital factor.
Chapter 6 studies the detection of intended discretion and discriminates of types of intended discretion. Based on fraud earnings management and normal companies, information asymmetry is tested to detect intended discretion. And attitudes towards communication are used to discriminate types of intended discretion. Empirical results show that environment factors related to information asymmetry could, be used as tools to detect intended discretion. When there are frauds, management is inclined to increase information asymmetry to mislead investors. Management who convey private information takes measures to decrease information asymmetry. Attitudes toward communication can be used to discriminate the types of intended discretion.
Chapter 7 tests the economic consequences of intended discretion by long-term market reactions. Market can identify earnings management and react properly in general. The measures to improve transparency enhance the convey of private information by earnings management. So the regulatory authority should emphasize transparency of disclosure which improves the positive effects of earnings management by market force. In contrast, market could not detect fraud by itself. So that is the major task for regulatory authority.
Chapter 8 concludes. This part presents the major conclusions and the limitations as well as directs future research.
This paper makes three contributions to extant literature. Firstly, different types of intended discretion are well defined. Without local empirical results, current domestic researches speculate frauds go further than earnings management by borrowing the international results. Frauds and earnings management are compared carefully to find out that they are two different types of intended discretion. Secondly, Framework is built on revelation principle to review extant research. Communication is not considered in current research. In order to reach more objective results, this paper takes the view of communication to avoid bias from opportunistic perspective. Thirdly, economic consequences of intended discretion are tested to avoid subjective bias, which also provide theoretical evidence for regulatory authority.
引文
①证监会《关于进一步提高上市公司财务信息披露质量的通知》2004.1.8
②刘峰(2001)以四川红光实业的案例作为分析对象,从我国现行制度安排的角度进行了分析,发现现有的制度安排本身排斥高质量的会计信息,并会诱发财务报告人为操控行为的发生。
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