产业政策对代理冲突与家族企业资本配置效率关系的影响研究
|
摘要
从全球范围来看，家族企业的发展得到社会广泛关注。越来越多的研究认为家族企业存在巨大的生命力。目前，不仅大多数发展中国家，家族企业在社会经济中占据了重要地位，在一些发达国家和地区，家族企业也占不小的比例。中国的家族企业发展历程并不长，但其发展势头以及社会贡献力却不容小觑。
在家族企业强劲发展的势头下，同时也暴露出大量问题。例如：家族内讧、代际传承问题引发的企业“地震”，波及到企业正常运营，给企业带来不可弥补的损失。同时家族大股东通过违规担保、非法占用资金等方式掏空上市公司，侵占社会股东利益的事件频发，屡被媒体曝光。以上问题引起理论界对家族企业治理模式的诸多质疑和批评，相关研究也出现较大分歧。依据传统代理理论，大股东参与管理能够减轻第一重代理冲突，提高资源配置效率，增厚企业价值。但有学者提出，在家族管理模式下，家族内部亲情关系可能会加重代理冲突，带来效率低下问题。此外，家族企业普遍采用了金字塔控股结构，这既可能是家族缓解集团企业资金压力的一种做法，也可能是家族股东掏空上市公司的重要途径。
研究我国企业问题离不开外部特定的制度环境，其中政府强干预是我国重要的制度背景特征之一。产业政策是一项具有弹性的重要政策，也是常用的政府干预手段，对经济生活发挥了重大作用，深刻地影响着企业的融资与投资环境。那么长期受到融资歧视的家族企业，能否从产业政策鼓励中受益？融资约束改善对家族企业投资效率又产生何种影响？
面对以上研究分歧和问题，本文从家族企业代理问题分析入手，深入研究家族涉入影响公司财务行为的内在机理，主要从投资、融资视角上探讨家族涉入企业的经济后果。并进一步结合外部产业政策研究异质家族企业的投融资效率。论文研究内容及结论如下：
第一章绪论。提出研究问题，阐述研究目的，介绍本研究的理论价值与现实意义，以及论文的主要研究内容、研究思路，本论文的研究特色与贡献。
第二章文献综述。主要分为两个部分。其一是围绕国内外关于家族涉入企业的治理特征、家族企业投资和家族企业融资这几个方面进行文献阐述；其二是围绕政府干预、产业政策的微观效应进行文献阐述。
第三章理论基础与制度背景分析。首先介绍了与本研究密切相关的委托代理理论和管家理论以及桥接两者的利他主义理论。文章深入分析了家族企业的委托代理关系层级，并具体阐述管家理论的具体内容，进而分析了利他主义理论如何实现管家理论和代理理论的桥接。其次，论文基于公司治理视角，详细阐述了企业投资理论与融资理论。第三，在中国转轨经济制度背景下，分析我国家族企业的发展演进过程、资本配置状况和我国产业政策制定实施历程。最后，构建了产业政策对家族企业代理冲突与资源配置效率关系影响的理论分析框架
第四章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业的投资效率。本章首先根据家族涉入企业的程度，将家族企业划分为高涉入与低涉入两类家族企业。研究发现虽然创始人任职CEO削弱了第一重代理冲突，继而提高投资效率，但家族利他主义却增加了第一重代理冲突，显著降低了投资效率；总之，我国制度背景下，家族高涉入企业主要面对第一重代理冲突。另一方面，家族低涉入企业主要存在第二重代理冲突，而家族股东控制权和现金流权分离度加重了代理冲突，降低了投资效率。在我国当前制度背景下，相对于家族低涉入企业，家族高涉入企业总体上代理问题比较严重，投资效率较低。文章进一步研究了产业政策对高低涉入两类家族企业投资效率的影响。结果表明，产业政策鼓励显著改善了家族企业的融资环境，提高了低涉入家族公司投资效率，但却明显降低了高涉入家族公司的投资效率。
第五章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业研发投资效率。本章在深入细致地研究高低涉入两类家族公司不同代理问题基础上，从影响家族企业研发投资的两个基本因素：风险规避和长期投资视域出发展开研究。首先分别研究了利他主义、创始人效应以及控制权与现金流权分离对高低涉入两类家族企业研发投资强度影响。其次比较了两类家族企业研发投资强度差异。更进一步研究了企业外部国家产业政策与家族企业涉入程度如何对上市公司研发投资价值创造产生交互影响。研究认为，相对家族低涉入公司，家族高涉入公司的研发投资强度较小；国家产业政策鼓励放松了家族企业融资环境，却降低了家族企业研发投资的价值创造效应，并且对家族高涉入企业的影响更为显著。
第六章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业债务融资效率。在将家族企业划分为高涉入与低涉入两类家族企业基础上，本章研究了不同的代理问题特征下，家族涉入对企业负债融资效率的影响。本章进一步研究了企业外部国家产业政策与家族企业涉入程度如何对上市公司负债融资效率产生交互影响。结果发现家族高涉入公司负债融资效率较低；国家产业政策鼓励放松了家族企业融资环境，给家族企业带来更多资金，但降低了高涉入公司负债融资效率，提高家族低涉入公司负债融资效率。
第七章结论与启示。概括本文研究结论，提出启示建议，指出未来研究方向。
From a global perspective, the development of family firms has been widelyconcerned. More and more studies suggest that the family firm has great vitality. Atpresent, not only in the majority of developing countries, family firms occupy animportant position in the social economy；in some developed countries and regions,family firms also accounted for not a small proportion. Although the developmentprocess of family firms didn't last long in China, its development trend and socialcontribution cannot be ignored.
However, with the strong development of family firms, a lot of problems are alsoexposed, such as: internal contradictions and succession issues in enterprises likeearthquakes affect its normal operation, this may cause irreparable harm to the company.At the same time it is reported frequently that family shareholders encroach on socialshareholder interests through illegal guarantee and the illegal occupation of funds whichTunnel the listed company. The above problems caused many questions and criticismsfor corporation’s governance, related research also have big differences. On the basis ofthe traditional agency theory, it is the big shareholders who participate in themanagement could reduce the conflict of first kind of agency, improve the efficiency ofallocation of resources of enterprise, and enhance the enterprise value.But somescholars proposed that in the mode of family management, the internal relationship offamily may further aggravate the agency conflict and cause the problem of lowefficiency. In addition, the family business generally used the pyramidal ownershipstructure, which could relieve the financial pressure of family group enterprise, and alsomay be an important way of family shareholders to tunnel listed company.
In our country the research on enterprise problem cannot do without consideringexternal specific institutional environment. Strong government intervention is one of theimportant characteristics of China’s institutional background. Industrial policy is animportant flexible policy, is also a commonly used means of government intervention,which played a significant role in the economic life and has a profound impact oninvestment and financing environment of enterprises. Can the industrial policies benefitthe family firm which has long been in the financial crimination? What kind of impacton investment efficiency of family firm can the improvement of investment financingconstraints have?
In the face of the above differences and problems, this paper starts from analyzingthe problem of the family firm’s agency, deeply studies the internal mechanism offamily involvement which affect the behavior of financial companies, mainly from theinvestment, financing perspective discuss the enterprise economic consequences offamily involvement. Further, the thesis discusses investment and financing efficiency ofthe heterogeneity of family enterprise based on external industrial policy. The contentand conclusion of this paper includes the following sections:
The first chapter is introduction. In this chapter, it explains the research purpose,introduces the theoretical value and significance of this study, and the main researchcontents, research ideas, research characteristics and contributions of the dissertation.
The second chapter is the Literature review. It is divided into two parts，one isabout the literature on the governance characteristics, investment and financing of thefamily involvement business, the other is the literature about the microeffect ongovernment intervention, industrial policy.
The third chapter is the analysis of theoretical basis and the institutionalbackground. Firstly, it introduces the principal-agent theory, the stewardship theory andthe altruism theory which bridges two theories high closely related to our study. Thispaper analyzes each level of the principal-agent relationship of the family firms, andexpounds the contents of stewardship theory, then interprets how the altruism theoryimplements the connection between principal-agent theory and the stewardship theory.Secondly, based on the perspective of corporate governance, the paper details theinvestment and financing theory of the enterprise. Thirdly, under the Chinesetransitional economy background, the thesis analyses evolution of family business, theallocation of capital and reviews implementation process of industrial policy inChina.At last the chapter Constructs a theoretical framework of the influence ofindustrial policy on the family business agency conflict and resource allocationefficiency.
The fourth chapter studies the industrial policy, the agency conflict and investmentefficiency of the family firm. Firstly, according to the extent of the involvement offamily firm, this chapter divides the family firms into two types:family-high-involvement firm and family-low-involvement firm. The chapter finds thatalthough the founder of enterprises as CEO has weakened the conflict of first kindagency, then improved the efficiency of investment, the family altruism has increasedthe conflict of first kind agency, reduced the efficiency of investment significantly. Overall under the institutional background in China, the family-high-involvement firmmainly faces the first agency conflict. On the other hand, family-low-involvement firmmainly faces the second kind of agency problem, and the separation between controlrights and cash flow rights increases the agency conflicts and reduces the efficiency ofinvestment. This paper believes that, under the current institutional background, theagency problem of family-high-involvement firm is more serious thanfamily-low-involvement firms，and the efficiency of investment is lower. Further, theinfluence of industrial policy to investment efficiency on the level of involvementbetween two kinds of family firms has been studied. The results show that the industrialpolicy has improved the financing environment of the family firm significantly,increased the investment efficiency of low involvement family firm, but reduced theinvestment efficiency of high involvement family firm dramatically.
The fifth chapter studies the industrial policy, agency conflict and efficiency ofR&D investment in family firm. This chapter studies the different kinds of agencyproblems thoroughly between the high and low involvement of two family firms, fromthe perspective of two basic factors of family firm’s R&D Investment: risk aversion andlong-term investment. Firstly the chapter investigates the influence from the altruism,founder effect and separation effect between control rights and cash flow rights to R&Dinvestment intensity on the level of involvement of two kinds of family companies.Secondly, the chapter compares the difference of R&D investment intensity betweentwo types of family firms. Furthermore, the chapter studies the interact effect of externalnational industrial policy and family involvement on the value of R&D investment inlisted companies. we can infer that the R&D investment intensity of the highinvolvement family firm is smaller than the low involvement family firm; It is thenational industrial policy that encourages the relaxation of the financing environment offamily business, but lowers the value of the family firm’s R&D investment effect, andthe impact on the high involvement family firm is more significant.
The sixth chapter studies the industrial policy, the agency conflict and debtfinancing efficiency of the family firm. Based on dividing the family firms into twotypes: high involvement family firm and low involvement family firm, and from the twobasic motives of family capital structure choice: keep the right of control and riskaversion, the chapter analyses the impact of family involvement on the efficiency ofdebt financing under the influence of different agency problem. Further, this chapterstudies interaction effect of listed Company’s debt financing efficiency under the influence of the external industrial policies of the state and extent of family involvement.The findings indicate that in family firm of high involvement its debt financingefficiency is relatively lower; the national industrial policy encouraging the relaxationof financing environment of family firm, brings more money to the family firm, butreduces the efficiency of debt financing in high involvement family firm，andimproved the efficiency of debt financing in low involvement family firm
The seventh chapter is the conclusion and prospect.This chapter includes thepaper's research conclusion, suggestions, limitations and the prospect of future researchdirection.
在家族企业强劲发展的势头下，同时也暴露出大量问题。例如：家族内讧、代际传承问题引发的企业“地震”，波及到企业正常运营，给企业带来不可弥补的损失。同时家族大股东通过违规担保、非法占用资金等方式掏空上市公司，侵占社会股东利益的事件频发，屡被媒体曝光。以上问题引起理论界对家族企业治理模式的诸多质疑和批评，相关研究也出现较大分歧。依据传统代理理论，大股东参与管理能够减轻第一重代理冲突，提高资源配置效率，增厚企业价值。但有学者提出，在家族管理模式下，家族内部亲情关系可能会加重代理冲突，带来效率低下问题。此外，家族企业普遍采用了金字塔控股结构，这既可能是家族缓解集团企业资金压力的一种做法，也可能是家族股东掏空上市公司的重要途径。
研究我国企业问题离不开外部特定的制度环境，其中政府强干预是我国重要的制度背景特征之一。产业政策是一项具有弹性的重要政策，也是常用的政府干预手段，对经济生活发挥了重大作用，深刻地影响着企业的融资与投资环境。那么长期受到融资歧视的家族企业，能否从产业政策鼓励中受益？融资约束改善对家族企业投资效率又产生何种影响？
面对以上研究分歧和问题，本文从家族企业代理问题分析入手，深入研究家族涉入影响公司财务行为的内在机理，主要从投资、融资视角上探讨家族涉入企业的经济后果。并进一步结合外部产业政策研究异质家族企业的投融资效率。论文研究内容及结论如下：
第一章绪论。提出研究问题，阐述研究目的，介绍本研究的理论价值与现实意义，以及论文的主要研究内容、研究思路，本论文的研究特色与贡献。
第二章文献综述。主要分为两个部分。其一是围绕国内外关于家族涉入企业的治理特征、家族企业投资和家族企业融资这几个方面进行文献阐述；其二是围绕政府干预、产业政策的微观效应进行文献阐述。
第三章理论基础与制度背景分析。首先介绍了与本研究密切相关的委托代理理论和管家理论以及桥接两者的利他主义理论。文章深入分析了家族企业的委托代理关系层级，并具体阐述管家理论的具体内容，进而分析了利他主义理论如何实现管家理论和代理理论的桥接。其次，论文基于公司治理视角，详细阐述了企业投资理论与融资理论。第三，在中国转轨经济制度背景下，分析我国家族企业的发展演进过程、资本配置状况和我国产业政策制定实施历程。最后，构建了产业政策对家族企业代理冲突与资源配置效率关系影响的理论分析框架
第四章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业的投资效率。本章首先根据家族涉入企业的程度，将家族企业划分为高涉入与低涉入两类家族企业。研究发现虽然创始人任职CEO削弱了第一重代理冲突，继而提高投资效率，但家族利他主义却增加了第一重代理冲突，显著降低了投资效率；总之，我国制度背景下，家族高涉入企业主要面对第一重代理冲突。另一方面，家族低涉入企业主要存在第二重代理冲突，而家族股东控制权和现金流权分离度加重了代理冲突，降低了投资效率。在我国当前制度背景下，相对于家族低涉入企业，家族高涉入企业总体上代理问题比较严重，投资效率较低。文章进一步研究了产业政策对高低涉入两类家族企业投资效率的影响。结果表明，产业政策鼓励显著改善了家族企业的融资环境，提高了低涉入家族公司投资效率，但却明显降低了高涉入家族公司的投资效率。
第五章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业研发投资效率。本章在深入细致地研究高低涉入两类家族公司不同代理问题基础上，从影响家族企业研发投资的两个基本因素：风险规避和长期投资视域出发展开研究。首先分别研究了利他主义、创始人效应以及控制权与现金流权分离对高低涉入两类家族企业研发投资强度影响。其次比较了两类家族企业研发投资强度差异。更进一步研究了企业外部国家产业政策与家族企业涉入程度如何对上市公司研发投资价值创造产生交互影响。研究认为，相对家族低涉入公司，家族高涉入公司的研发投资强度较小；国家产业政策鼓励放松了家族企业融资环境，却降低了家族企业研发投资的价值创造效应，并且对家族高涉入企业的影响更为显著。
第六章研究了产业政策、代理冲突与家族企业债务融资效率。在将家族企业划分为高涉入与低涉入两类家族企业基础上，本章研究了不同的代理问题特征下，家族涉入对企业负债融资效率的影响。本章进一步研究了企业外部国家产业政策与家族企业涉入程度如何对上市公司负债融资效率产生交互影响。结果发现家族高涉入公司负债融资效率较低；国家产业政策鼓励放松了家族企业融资环境，给家族企业带来更多资金，但降低了高涉入公司负债融资效率，提高家族低涉入公司负债融资效率。
第七章结论与启示。概括本文研究结论，提出启示建议，指出未来研究方向。
From a global perspective, the development of family firms has been widelyconcerned. More and more studies suggest that the family firm has great vitality. Atpresent, not only in the majority of developing countries, family firms occupy animportant position in the social economy；in some developed countries and regions,family firms also accounted for not a small proportion. Although the developmentprocess of family firms didn't last long in China, its development trend and socialcontribution cannot be ignored.
However, with the strong development of family firms, a lot of problems are alsoexposed, such as: internal contradictions and succession issues in enterprises likeearthquakes affect its normal operation, this may cause irreparable harm to the company.At the same time it is reported frequently that family shareholders encroach on socialshareholder interests through illegal guarantee and the illegal occupation of funds whichTunnel the listed company. The above problems caused many questions and criticismsfor corporation’s governance, related research also have big differences. On the basis ofthe traditional agency theory, it is the big shareholders who participate in themanagement could reduce the conflict of first kind of agency, improve the efficiency ofallocation of resources of enterprise, and enhance the enterprise value.But somescholars proposed that in the mode of family management, the internal relationship offamily may further aggravate the agency conflict and cause the problem of lowefficiency. In addition, the family business generally used the pyramidal ownershipstructure, which could relieve the financial pressure of family group enterprise, and alsomay be an important way of family shareholders to tunnel listed company.
In our country the research on enterprise problem cannot do without consideringexternal specific institutional environment. Strong government intervention is one of theimportant characteristics of China’s institutional background. Industrial policy is animportant flexible policy, is also a commonly used means of government intervention,which played a significant role in the economic life and has a profound impact oninvestment and financing environment of enterprises. Can the industrial policies benefitthe family firm which has long been in the financial crimination? What kind of impacton investment efficiency of family firm can the improvement of investment financingconstraints have?
In the face of the above differences and problems, this paper starts from analyzingthe problem of the family firm’s agency, deeply studies the internal mechanism offamily involvement which affect the behavior of financial companies, mainly from theinvestment, financing perspective discuss the enterprise economic consequences offamily involvement. Further, the thesis discusses investment and financing efficiency ofthe heterogeneity of family enterprise based on external industrial policy. The contentand conclusion of this paper includes the following sections:
The first chapter is introduction. In this chapter, it explains the research purpose,introduces the theoretical value and significance of this study, and the main researchcontents, research ideas, research characteristics and contributions of the dissertation.
The second chapter is the Literature review. It is divided into two parts，one isabout the literature on the governance characteristics, investment and financing of thefamily involvement business, the other is the literature about the microeffect ongovernment intervention, industrial policy.
The third chapter is the analysis of theoretical basis and the institutionalbackground. Firstly, it introduces the principal-agent theory, the stewardship theory andthe altruism theory which bridges two theories high closely related to our study. Thispaper analyzes each level of the principal-agent relationship of the family firms, andexpounds the contents of stewardship theory, then interprets how the altruism theoryimplements the connection between principal-agent theory and the stewardship theory.Secondly, based on the perspective of corporate governance, the paper details theinvestment and financing theory of the enterprise. Thirdly, under the Chinesetransitional economy background, the thesis analyses evolution of family business, theallocation of capital and reviews implementation process of industrial policy inChina.At last the chapter Constructs a theoretical framework of the influence ofindustrial policy on the family business agency conflict and resource allocationefficiency.
The fourth chapter studies the industrial policy, the agency conflict and investmentefficiency of the family firm. Firstly, according to the extent of the involvement offamily firm, this chapter divides the family firms into two types:family-high-involvement firm and family-low-involvement firm. The chapter finds thatalthough the founder of enterprises as CEO has weakened the conflict of first kindagency, then improved the efficiency of investment, the family altruism has increasedthe conflict of first kind agency, reduced the efficiency of investment significantly. Overall under the institutional background in China, the family-high-involvement firmmainly faces the first agency conflict. On the other hand, family-low-involvement firmmainly faces the second kind of agency problem, and the separation between controlrights and cash flow rights increases the agency conflicts and reduces the efficiency ofinvestment. This paper believes that, under the current institutional background, theagency problem of family-high-involvement firm is more serious thanfamily-low-involvement firms，and the efficiency of investment is lower. Further, theinfluence of industrial policy to investment efficiency on the level of involvementbetween two kinds of family firms has been studied. The results show that the industrialpolicy has improved the financing environment of the family firm significantly,increased the investment efficiency of low involvement family firm, but reduced theinvestment efficiency of high involvement family firm dramatically.
The fifth chapter studies the industrial policy, agency conflict and efficiency ofR&D investment in family firm. This chapter studies the different kinds of agencyproblems thoroughly between the high and low involvement of two family firms, fromthe perspective of two basic factors of family firm’s R&D Investment: risk aversion andlong-term investment. Firstly the chapter investigates the influence from the altruism,founder effect and separation effect between control rights and cash flow rights to R&Dinvestment intensity on the level of involvement of two kinds of family companies.Secondly, the chapter compares the difference of R&D investment intensity betweentwo types of family firms. Furthermore, the chapter studies the interact effect of externalnational industrial policy and family involvement on the value of R&D investment inlisted companies. we can infer that the R&D investment intensity of the highinvolvement family firm is smaller than the low involvement family firm; It is thenational industrial policy that encourages the relaxation of the financing environment offamily business, but lowers the value of the family firm’s R&D investment effect, andthe impact on the high involvement family firm is more significant.
The sixth chapter studies the industrial policy, the agency conflict and debtfinancing efficiency of the family firm. Based on dividing the family firms into twotypes: high involvement family firm and low involvement family firm, and from the twobasic motives of family capital structure choice: keep the right of control and riskaversion, the chapter analyses the impact of family involvement on the efficiency ofdebt financing under the influence of different agency problem. Further, this chapterstudies interaction effect of listed Company’s debt financing efficiency under the influence of the external industrial policies of the state and extent of family involvement.The findings indicate that in family firm of high involvement its debt financingefficiency is relatively lower; the national industrial policy encouraging the relaxationof financing environment of family firm, brings more money to the family firm, butreduces the efficiency of debt financing in high involvement family firm，andimproved the efficiency of debt financing in low involvement family firm
The seventh chapter is the conclusion and prospect.This chapter includes thepaper's research conclusion, suggestions, limitations and the prospect of future researchdirection.
引文
贝克尔.1993.人类行为的经济分析[M].上海.上海三联书店.
蔡地，万迪昉，罗进辉.2012.产权保护、融资约束与民营企业研发投入[J].研究与发展管理,24(2):85-93.
蔡地，万迪昉.2012.制度环境影响企业的研发投入吗[J].科学学与科学技术管理,33(4):121-128.
陈德球，李思飞，雷光勇.2012.政府治理、控制权结构与投资决策—基于家族上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,(3):124-138.
陈东华，李真，新夫.2010.产业政策与公司融资-来自中国的经验证据，The4thSymposium ofChina Journal of Accounting Research (CJAR),中国会计学刊研讨会.
陈建林.2012.上市家族企业管理模式对代理成本的影响——代理理论和利他主义理论的争论和整合[J].管理评论,(5):53-59
陈守明，冉毅，陶兴慧.2012. R&D强度与企业价值—股权性质和两职合一的调节作用[J].科学学研究,30(3)：441-448.
陈文婷，李新春.2008.上市家族企业股权集中度与风险倾向、市场价值研究——基于市场化程度分组的实证[J].中国工业经济,(10):139-149.
程宏伟，张永海，常勇.2006.公司R&D投入与业绩相关性的实证研究[J].科学管理研究，24(3):110-113.
程仲鸣，夏新平，余明桂.2008.政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资[J].管理世界,(9):43-53.
程仲鸣，夏银桂.2008.制度变迁、国家控股与股权激励[J].南开管理评论,(4):89-96.
储小平.2000.家族企业研究:一个具有现代意义的话题[J].中国社会科学,(5):51-58.
储小平.2004.华人家族企业的界定[J].经济理论与经济管理,(1):49-53.
杜宏宇.2010.股权结构、债务治理与“效率悖论”[J].经济管理,(9)：114-119.
杜文献，吴林海.2007.政府R＆D投入对企业R＆D投入的诱导效应——基于1991～2004年中国科技统计数据的实证分析[J].科技进步与对策,24(11):20-23.
范从来，叶宗伟.2004.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与公司绩效[J].经济理论与经济管理,(10):11-20.
樊纲.2000.论体制转轨的动态过程—非国有部门的成长与国有部门的改革[J].经济研究,(1):11-21.
冯旭南，李心愉，陈工孟.2011.家族控制、治理环境和公司价值[J].金融研究,(3):149-164.
冯旭南.2012.债务融资和掠夺—来自中国家族上市公司的证据[J].经济学（季刊），11(3)：943-968.
巩娜.2013.家族企业、股权激励与研发投入[J].证券市场导报,(8):44-49,55.
谷祺，邓德强，路倩.2006.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值[J].会计研究,(4):30-36.
顾昕.2013.产业政策的是是非非——林毅夫“新结构经济学”评论之三[M].读书,(12):27-36.
郝颖，刘星.2010.市场化进程与上市公司R&D投资：基于产权特征视角[J].科研管理，(4):81-90.
何轩，朱沆.2008.利他主义、亲情寻租与家族企业治理[J].外国经济与管理,30(9):28-33.
贺小刚，李新春，连燕玲，张远飞.2010.家族内部的权利偏离及其对治理效率的影响[J].中国工业经济,(10):96-106.
贺小刚，李新春，连燕玲.2007.家族权威与企业绩效:基于广东省中山市家族企业的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,(5):75-81.
贺小刚，连燕玲.2009.家族权威与企业价值：基于家族上市公司的实证研究[J].经济研究,(4):90-102.
贺小刚，燕琼琼，梅琳，李婧.2011.创始人离任中的权力交接模式与企业成长——基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,(10):98-108.
贺志峰.2004.论家族企业的定义[J].当代财经,(6)：57-60.
江飞涛，李晓萍.2010.直接干预市场与限制竞争：中国产业政策的取向与根本缺陷[J].中国工业经济,(9):26-36.
江金锁.2011.制度环境、审计意见与银行贷款——来自中国上市家族企业的经验证据[J].经济与管理,25(7):16-22.
姜付秀，黄继承.2011.经理激励、负债与企业价值[J].(5):46‐60.
靳庆鲁，孔祥，候青川.2012.货币政策、民营企业投资效率与公司期权价值[J].经济研究,(5):96-106.
卡洛克，沃德著，梁卿译.2002.家族企业战略计划,北京：中信出版社.
康华，王鲁平，杨柳青.2013.民营上市公司政治关系对研发活动的影响研究[J].(8):8-16.
克林盖尔西克.1998.家族企业的繁衍——家族企业的生命周期[J].北京：经济日报出版社.
孔鹏，张炜迪.2005.家族上市公司新财富100企业家[J].新财富，8：11-13.
郎咸平.2007.郎咸平学术文选[J].北京:人民文学出版社.
黎文靖，程敏英，黄琼宇.2012.地方政府竞争、企业上市方式与政企问利益输送——来自中国家族企业上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,38(9):27-36.
李倩.2010.我国投资强度与产出绩效的关系研究[D].西北大学.
李世辉，雷新途.2008.两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究—来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,(5):21-29.
李新春.1998.中国的家族制度与企业组织[J].中国社会科学季刊,(香港).
李新春，刘莉.2009.嵌入性-市场性关系网络与家族企业创新成长[J].中山大学学报：社会科学版,49(3):190-202.
李新春，檀宏斌.2010.家族企业内部两权分离：路径与治理——基于百年家族企业香港利丰的案例研究[J].中山大学学报：社会科学版,50(4):178-188.
李增泉，孙铮，王志伟.2004.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,(12):3-13.
连军，刘星，连翠珍.2011.民营企业政治联系的背后：扶持之手与掠夺之手？—基于资本投资视角的经验研究[J].财经研究,(6):133-144.
连军.2013.组织冗余、政治联系与民营企业R&D投资[J].科学学与科学技术管理,34(1):3-11.
廖义刚，张玲，谢盛纹.2009.杠杆治理、独立审计与代理成本——来自财务困境上市公司的实证发现[J].经济评论.(6):74-82.
刘学方,王重鸣,唐宁玉,朱健,倪宁.2006.家族企业接班人胜任力建模—一个实证研究[J].管理世界,(5):33-43.
吕长江，王克敏.2002.上市公司资本结构、股利分配及管理股权比例相互作用机制研究[J].(3)15‐24.
吕占峰.2009.我国家族企业治理结构研究[D].武汉理工大学.
罗婷，朱青，李丹.2009.解析R&D投入和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,(6):100-110.
潘必胜.1998.对企业集团政企不分内部化的分析[J].中国工业经济,(10):40-43.
潘必胜.1998.乡镇企业中的家族经营问题——兼论家族企业在中国的历史命运[J].中国农村观察,(1):83-93.
潘士远，史晋川.2001.知识吸收能力与内生经济增长—关于罗默模型的改进与扩展[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(11):82-85.
任海云.2010.企业R&D目标强度的权变分析及动态调整模型[J].研究与发展管理,22(6):97-102.
申明浩.2008.治理结构对家族股东隧道行为的影响分析[J].经济研究,(6):135-144.
申尊焕.2004.我国家族上市公司经营业绩的实证分析[J].企业经济,(4):188-191.
斯蒂格利茨.1998.政府为什么干预经济：政府在市场经济中的角色[M].北京:中国物资出版社.
苏启林，朱文.2003.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,(8):36-45.
苏启林.2005.创业投资与家族企业转型[J].当代经济管理,27(4):54-58.
苏启林.2007.基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择[J].外国经济与管理,29(2):51-56.
苏忠秦，黄登仕.2012.家族控制、两权分离与债务期限结构选择—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J],管理评论,24(7):132-142.
孙铮，刘凤委，李增泉.2005.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,(5):52-63.
唐松，杨勇，孙铮.2009.金融发展、债务治理与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据财经研究,(6):23‐29
田银华，邝嫦娥，张敏.2011.家族企业治理结构与经营绩效的实证研究———以中国上市家族企业为例[J].当代财经,(9):79-84.
田银华，周志强，廖和平.2012.动态三环模式与家族企业产权契约治理研究[J].商业经济与管理,(7):40-48.
王力军，童盼.2008.民营上市公司控制类型、多元化经营与企业绩效[J].南开管理评论,(5):31-39.
王满四.2005.负债融资的公司治理效应及其机制研究[M].中国社会科学出版社.
王明琳，陈凌，叶长兵.2010.中国民营上巿公司的家族治理与企业价值[J].南开管理评论,(2)：61-67.
王明琳，徐萌娜.2011.利他行为的治理机制及效率研究[J].经济学家,(12):23-31.
王明琳，陈凌.2013.代理人还是管家_基于双重嵌人视角的家族企业行为及绩效研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),(2):180-188.
王明琳，周生春.2006.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,(8):83-93.
王燕妮，张书菊.2011. R＆D投入的价值相关性实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,32(9):17-22.
汪辉.2003.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值[J].经济研究,(8):25-34.
韦革.2009.贫穷理论和政府扶贫实践的社会资本逻辑[J].中国行政管理,(9):100-102.
吴延兵，米增渝.2011.创新、模仿与企业效率——来自制造业非国有企业的经验证据[J].中国社会科学,(4):77-94.
夏杰长，尚铁力.2007.企业R＆D投入的税收激励研究——基于增值税的实证分析[J].涉外税务,(3):9-12.
小艾尔弗雷德钱德勒.1987.看的见的手--美国企业的管理革命[M].北京:商务印书馆.
肖作平，廖理.2007.大股东、债权人保护和公司债务期限结构选择—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理评论,(10):99-117.
肖作平，苏忠秦.2012.现金股利是“掏空”的工具还是掩饰“掏空”的面具？——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理工程学报,26(2):77-84.
谢小芳，李懿东，唐清泉.2009.市场认同企业的研发投入价值吗？来自沪深A股市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,(3):299-314.
辛清泉，郑国坚，杨德明.2007.企业集团、政府控制与投资效率[J].金融研究,(10):123-142.
徐欣，唐清泉.2010.财务分析师跟踪与企业R＆D活动——来自中国证券市场的研究[J].金融研究,(12):173-189.
许永斌，郑金芳.2007.中国民营上市公司家族控制权特征与公司绩效实证研究[J].会计研究,(11):50-57.
杨龙志，朱世平.2006.家族企业治理结构与经营绩效关系的实证研究——基于浙江非上市中小家族企业的调查数据[J].商业经济与管理,(10):17-21.
杨兴全.2004.上市公司融资效率问题研究[D].中南财经政法大学博士学位论文.
宋文兵.1997.对当前融资形势的理性思考[J].改革与战略,(6):1-6.
杨学儒，李新春.2009.家族涉入指数的构建与测量研究[J].中国工业经济,(5):97-107.
叶蓓，袁建国.2008.管理者信心、企业投资与企业价值:基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,(2):15-23.
叶航.2005.利他行为的经济学解释[J].经济学家,(3):22-29.
叶玲，李心合.2012.管理者投资羊群行为、产业政策与企业价值——基于我国A股上市公司的实证检验[J].江西财经大学学报,(5):24-32.
叶银华.1999.家族控股集团、核心企业与报酬互动之研究——台湾与香港证券市场之比较[J].管理评论（台湾）,18(2):22-34.
于立，马丽波.2003.家族企业治理结构的三环模式[J].经济管理,(2):4-11.
于东智.2003.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效:一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,(1):34‐41.
俞立平.2013.不同科研经费投入与产出互动关系的实证研究—基于面板数据及面板VAR模型的估计[J].科研管理,(10):94-102.
袁春生,杨淑娥.2006.经理管理防御与企业非效率投资[J].经济问题,6:40-42.
约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯，陆梦龙译.2009.就业、利息和货币通论，中国社会科学出版社.
张俊喜，张华，宋敏.2004.所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学（季刊）,3(B10):1-14.
张夏准.2009.富国的伪善——自由贸易的迷思与资本主义秘史[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社.
张兆国，何威风，闫炳乾.2008.资本结构与代理成本——来自中国国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论.(11):39‐47.
赵玉珍，张心灵.2011.债务治理与公司经营绩效关系的实证[J].统计与决策,(6):11-15.
曾康霖.1993.怎样看待直接融资与间接融资[J].金融研究,(10):20-24.
甄丽明，唐清泉.2012.R&D投资行为与价值创造机制研究—基于中国上市公司的实证检验[J].商业经济与管理，245(3)：66-74.
周淑莲，裴叔平，陈树勋.2007.中国产业政策研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社.
祝继高，韩非池，陆正飞.2012.银行关联能缓解产业政策带来的融资约束吗?—基于A股上市公司的实证研究.北京：第一届“宏观经济政策与微观企业行为”学术研讨会.
中国民（私）营经济研究会家族企业研究课题组.2011.中国家族企业发展报告[M].北京：中信出版社.
Aboody, D., Lev, B.2000. Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains [J].Journal of Finance,55(6):2747-2766.
Aiyesha, D., Nikolaev V., Wang X.2009. Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role ofDebt [J]. Working Paper, University of Chicago
Akerlof, George, A.1970. The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,84(3):488-500
Amit, R., Ding, Y., Villalonga, B., Zhang, H.2010. The Role of Institutional Development in thePrevalence and Value of Family Firms, Working Paper
Ampenberger, M., Schmid, T., Achleitner, A.K., Kaserer, C.2013.Capital structure decisions infamily firms–empirical evidence from a bank-based economy [J]. Review of ManagerialScience,7(3):247-275.
Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., Reeb, D.2012. Investment policy in family controlled firms [J]. Journalof Banking&Finance,36:1744-1758.
Anderson, R.C., Reeb, D.M.2003a. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidencefrom the S&P500[J]. Journal of Finance,(58):1301-1328.
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A. Reeb, D.M.2003b. Founding family ownership and the agency cost ofdebt [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(68):263–285
Andres, C.2008. Large shareholders and firm performance, an empirical examination offounding-family ownership [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(14):431-445
Astrachan, J. H., Klein, S., Smyrnios, K.2002. The F-PEC scale of family influence: a proposal forsolving the family business definition problem [J]. Family Business Review,15(1):45–57.
Baker, M.2000. Career Concerns and Staged Investment: Evidence from the Venture CapitalIndustry [J]. working paper, Harvard University.
Baldridge, K., Schulz.1999. Altruism and Agency Cost in Family Firms, Working Paper.
Berghe, Cachon.2001. Corporate Governance Practices in Flemish Family Business, SSRN WorkingPaper Series.
Biddle, G. C., Chen, P., Zhang, G.2001. When Capital follows Profitability: No-Liner ResidualIncome Dynamics [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,(6):229-265.
Berle, A., Means, G.1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. US：New York, NY:
Bertrand, Marianne, Antoinette, S.2006.The Role of Family in Family Firms [J]. Journal ofEconomic Perspectives,(20):73–96.
Bond, S., Meghir C.1994. Dynamic Investment Models and the firm's financial policy [J]. Reviewof Economic Studies,1994,61:197-222
Brandt, L.,Hongbin, L.2003. Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology, Informationor Incentives?[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,31(3):387-341.
Charles K. Whitehead.2009. The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and CorporateGovernance [J]. The Journal of Corporal ion Law,34(3):102-137
Caprio, L., Croci, E., del Giudice, A.2010. Ownership structure, family control and acquisitiondecisions, Unpublished working paper, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and Universitàdegli Studi di Milano-Bicocca.
Casson, M.1999. The economics of the family firm [J]. Scandinavian Economic History Review,(47):10–23.
Chami, R.1999. What’s different about family business? working paper, University of Notre Dameand the International Monetary Fund, Indiana and Washington DC.
Chami, R.1999. What’s different about family businesses? University of Notre Dame WorkingPaper.
Chan, L., Lakonishok J., Sougiannis T.2001. The stock market valuation of research anddevelopment expenditures [J]. Journal of Finance,(56):2,431-2,457.
Chang, S.C., Wu, W.Y., Wong, Y.J.2010. Family control and stock market reactions to innovationannouncements [J]. British Journal of Management,(21):152-170.
Chen D.H., Li O. Z., Xin F.2013. Five-Year Plans, China Finance and Their Consequences, WorkingPaper.
Chen, S.M, Sun, Z., Tang, S., Wu, D.H.2011.Government Intervention and investment efficiency:Evidence from China Original Research Article [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,17(2):259-271.
Chen, Y.P., Lin, T.J., Hou, C.P., Li, C., Hsieh, P.C.2012. The Relationship Among FamilyOwnership, Corporate Governance And Risk Taking [J]. Management Review,19(2):59-90.
Chen, Y.R., Ho, C.Y.2009.The impact of family control and board characteristics on corporatepolicies [J]. Journal Manage,26(1):1-16.
Cheng, S.J.2004. R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation [J].The Accounting Review,79(2):305-328.
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Steier, L.2005. Sources and consequences of distinctive familiness: Anintroduction [J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,(29):237-247.
Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J., Sharma, P.1999. Defining the family business by behavior[J].Entrepreneurship: Theory&Practice [J].23(4):19-39.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P.2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in EastAsian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,58(1-2):81-112
Coase, R.1937.The nature of the firm [M]. Economica,(16):386-405.
Croci, E., Doukas, J., Gonenc, H.2011. Family control and financing decisions [J].EuropeanFinancial Management,17(5):860-897.
Dagenais, M.G., Therrien, P.1997. Do Canadian Firms Respond to Fiscal Incentives To Researchand Development?[J]. Tilburg University Mime,(7):45-49.
Davis, J.A., Tagiuri R.1989.The influence of life stage on father son work relationships in familycompanies [J]. Family Business Review,2(1):47-74.
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K.1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences [J].Journal of Political Economy,(61):1155–1177.
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B.,2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance [J]. Journal ofCorporate Finance,(7):209–233.
Eberhart, A.C., Maxwell, W.F., Siddique, A.R.2008. A Re-examination of the Tradeoff between theFuture Benefit and Riskiness of R&D Increases [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,46(3):27-52.
Edmans, A.2009. Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia [J]. Journal ofFinance,(64):2481–513.
Ellul, A.2009. Control Motivations and Capital Structure Decision [J]. Working Paper, IndianaUniversity.
Faccio M., Lang L.H.P.2002.The ultimate ownership of western European corporations[J]. Journalof Financial Economics,65(3):365-395.
Fama, E., Jensen, M.1985. Organizational forms and investment decisions [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,(14):101-119.
Fan, J.P.H., Jian, M., Yeh, Y.H.2008. Succession: The Roles of Specialized Assets and TransferCosts, Working paper.
Filatotchev, I., Kepelyushnikov R., Dyomina N, Aukusionek S.2001. The effects of ownershipconcentration on investment and performance in privatised firms in Russia [J]. Managerial andDecision Economics22:299-313.
Franks, J.R., Mayer, C., Volpin, P.F., Wagner, H.F.2010. The life cycle of family ownership:international evidence, working paper, London Business School, University of Oxford andBocconi University.
Franzen, L., Radhakrishnan S.2009. The value relevance of R&D across profit and loss firms [J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,(28):16–32.
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Haynes, K.T., Nunez Nickel, M., Jacobson, K.J.L., Moyano-Fuentes, J.2007.Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family controlled Firms: Evidence fromSpanish Olive Oil Mills [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,52(1):106-137.
González, M., Guzmán, A., Pombo C., Trujillo M.2013. Family firms and debt: Risk aversionversus risk of losing control [J]. Journal of Business Research,(6):2308–2320.
Grossman, S. J, Hart, O.D.1988. One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2):175-202.
Guellec, D., van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B.2003. The impact of public R&D expenditure onbusiness R&D [J].Economics of Innovation and New Technology,12(3):225-244.
Habbershon, T.G., Williams, M.L., MacMillan, I.C.2003. A unified systems perspective of familyfirm performance [J]. Journal of Business Venturing,(18):451-465.
Habbershon, T.G., Williams, M.L.1999. A resource-based framework for assessing the strategicadvantages of family firms [J]. Family Business Review,(12):1-15.
Hall, B., Lerner, J.2010.The Financing of R&D and Innovation [J]. Handbook of the Economics ofInnovation,(1):609–639.
Han, B.H., Manry, D.2004. The value relawence of R&D Advertising expenditures Evidence fromKorea [J]. International Joural of accounting,(39):155-179.
Hanel P., St-Pierre A.2002. Effects of R&D Spillovers on the Profitability of Firms [J]. Review ofIndustrial Organization,(20):305-322.
Harris M., Raviv A.1991. The theory of capital structure [J]. Journal of Finance,(46):297-355.
Holderness, C.,2009. The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States [J]. Review of FinancialStudies22,1377-1408.
Holmstrom, B., Ricard, I., Costa, J.1986. Managerial Incentives and Capital Management [J]. TheQuarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press,101(4):835-60.
Ittner, C., Lambert, R., Larcker, D.2003. The Structure and Performance Consequences of EquityGrants to Employees of New Economy Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,(34):89-127.·
Jayati S. Subrata S.2008. Debt and corporate governance in emerging economies Evidence fromIndia [J]. Economics of Transition,16(2):293-334.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W.1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs andownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,3(4):305-360.
Jin L., Myers S.2006. R-square around the world: New theory and tests [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,79(2):257-292.
Johnson, B., Magee, R., Nagarajan, N., Newman, H.1985. An Analysis of the Stock Price Reactionto Sudden Executive Deaths [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,(7):151-174.
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.2000. Tunnelling [J].AmericanEconomic Review,90(2):22-27.
Jorgenson, D.1963. Capital Theory and Investment Behavior [J]. American Economic Review53(2):247-259.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K.2000. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis ofDiversified Indian Business Groups [J]. Journal of Finance,(55):867-891.
King, M.R., Santor, E.2008. Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital structureof Canadian firms [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,32:2423-2432.
Klein, S., Astrachan, J.H., Smyrnios, K.2005. The F-PEC scale of family influence: a proposal forsolving the family business definition problem [J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,29(3):321-339.
Kothari, S.P., Laguerre, T.E., Leone, A. J.2002. Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on theUncertainty of Future Earnings from Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays [J]. Review ofAccounting Studies,7(4):355-382.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1999. Corporate ownership around theworld[J]. Journal of Finance,(54):471-518.
Laeven L., Levine., R.2008. Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations [J]. Reviewof Financial Studies,21(2):579-604.
Lin, C., Lin, P., Song, F.2010. Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Development Economics,(93):49-62.
Margaritis, D., Psillaki, M.2010. Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,34(3):621-632.
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer A., Vishny R. W.1989, Industrialization and the Big Push[J]. Journal ofPolitical Economics,97(5):1003—1026
Maury, B.2006. Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from WesternEuropean corporations [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,12(2):321-341.
Miller，D., Le, B.M，Lester, R.H., Cannella, J.A.2007. Are Family Firms Really SuperiorPerformers?[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(13):829-858．
Modigliani, F., Merton, H.M.1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction[J]. The American Economic Review,53(3):433-443.
Morck, R., Daniel, W., Bernard, Y.2005. Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, andGrowth [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,(43):655-720.
Morck, R.K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1988. Management ownership and market valuation: Anempirical analysis [J].Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2):293-315.
Morgado, A., Pindado, J.2003. The underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses: an analysisusing panel data [J]. European Financial Management,(9):163-177.
Mueller, H., Inderst,R.2001. Ownership concentration, monitoring, and the agency cost of debt,working paper,University of Mannheim, Germany.
Munari, F., Oriani, R., Sobrero M.2010. The effects of owner identity and external governancesystems on R&D investments: a study of Western European firms [J]. Research Policy,39(8):1093-1104.
Munoz-Bullon F., Sanchez-Bueno M.J.2011. The impact of family involvement on the R&Dintensity of publicly traded firms [J]. Family Business Review24(1):62-70.
Myers, S.C.1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(5):147-175.
Myers, S.C.1984. The capital structure puzzle [J]. Journal of Finance,39(3):575-592.
Narayanan, M.P.1985. Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results [J]. Journal of Finance,(40):1469-1484.
Neubauer, F., Lank, A.G.1998. The family business: Its governance for sustainability [J].MacMillan Business.
Pindado, J., Ignacio, R., De la Torre, C.2011.Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity:Empirical evidence from the Euro zone Original Research Article [J].Journal of CorporateFinance,17(5):1389-1409.
Riyanto E. Toolsema A.2005. Tunneling and Popping: a Justification for Pyramidal Ownership,Working Paper.
Ross, S.A.1977.The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach [J].The Bell Journal of Economics,8(1):23-40.
Sara, H., Robicheaux E.2008. Lease Financing and Corporate Governance[J]. The Financial Review,(43):403-437,
Scherer F. M., Harhoff D. and Kukies J.2000.Uncertainty and the Size Distribution of Rewardsfrom Technological Innovation [J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics,(10):175-200.
Schmid, T.2013. Control considerations, creditor monitoring, and the capital structure of familyfirms [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,(37):257-272.
Schmid, T. Achleitner, A., Ampenberger, M, Kaserer, C.2014. Family firms and R&D behaviorNew evidence from a large-scale survey [J]. Research Policy,(43):233-244.
Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M.H., Ling, Y., Dino, R.N., Buchholtz, A.K.2001. Agency Relationships inFamily Firms: Theory and Evidence [J]. Organization Science,(12):99-116.
Setia-Atmaja, L., Tanewski, G., Skully, M.2009. The role of dividends, debt and board structure inthe governance of family controlled firms [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,36(7/8):863-898.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1989. Management Entrenchment-the Case of Manager SpecificInvestments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(25):123-139.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1998. The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures [M].Harvard University Press.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,(94):461-489.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1997. A survey of corporate governance [J]. Journal of Finance,(52):737-783.
Sirmon D. G., Hitt M.A.2003. Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, andwealth creation in family firms [J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,27(4):339–358.
Stein J.C.1997. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J].TheJournal of Finance,(52):111-133.
Stein, J.2003. Agency, information and corporate investment [J]. Handbook of the Economics ofFinance,1(1):111-165.
Stulz, R.1988. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporatecontrol [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2):25-54.
Tobin, J.A.1969. general equilibrium approach to monetary theory [J]. J Money Credit Bank,(1):15-29.
Tosi H., Gomez-Mejia L.R.1989. The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An Agency theoryPerspective[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,(34):169-189.
Villalonga, B. Amit, R.2010. Family Control of Firms and Industries [J]. Financial Management,(10):863-904.
Villalonga, B., Amit, R.2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,80(2):385-417.
Wei, K.C.J., Zhang, Y.2008. Ownership structure, cash flow, and capital investment: Evidence fromEast Asian economies before the financial crisis [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(14):95-118.
Williamson, Oliver.1985. The Economics Institutions of Capitalism, New York, FreePress.Williamson, S.D.
Finance and Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance,(43):567-91.
Wiwattanakantang, Y.1999. An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thaifirms[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,7(3/4):371-403.
Zellweger, T., Eddleston, K.H., Kellermanns, F.W.2010. Exploring the Concept of Familiness:Introducing Family Firm Identity [J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy,1(1):1-10.
蔡地，万迪昉，罗进辉.2012.产权保护、融资约束与民营企业研发投入[J].研究与发展管理,24(2):85-93.
蔡地，万迪昉.2012.制度环境影响企业的研发投入吗[J].科学学与科学技术管理,33(4):121-128.
陈德球，李思飞，雷光勇.2012.政府治理、控制权结构与投资决策—基于家族上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,(3):124-138.
陈东华，李真，新夫.2010.产业政策与公司融资-来自中国的经验证据，The4thSymposium ofChina Journal of Accounting Research (CJAR),中国会计学刊研讨会.
陈建林.2012.上市家族企业管理模式对代理成本的影响——代理理论和利他主义理论的争论和整合[J].管理评论,(5):53-59
陈守明，冉毅，陶兴慧.2012. R&D强度与企业价值—股权性质和两职合一的调节作用[J].科学学研究,30(3)：441-448.
陈文婷，李新春.2008.上市家族企业股权集中度与风险倾向、市场价值研究——基于市场化程度分组的实证[J].中国工业经济,(10):139-149.
程宏伟，张永海，常勇.2006.公司R&D投入与业绩相关性的实证研究[J].科学管理研究，24(3):110-113.
程仲鸣，夏新平，余明桂.2008.政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资[J].管理世界,(9):43-53.
程仲鸣，夏银桂.2008.制度变迁、国家控股与股权激励[J].南开管理评论,(4):89-96.
储小平.2000.家族企业研究:一个具有现代意义的话题[J].中国社会科学,(5):51-58.
储小平.2004.华人家族企业的界定[J].经济理论与经济管理,(1):49-53.
杜宏宇.2010.股权结构、债务治理与“效率悖论”[J].经济管理,(9)：114-119.
杜文献，吴林海.2007.政府R＆D投入对企业R＆D投入的诱导效应——基于1991～2004年中国科技统计数据的实证分析[J].科技进步与对策,24(11):20-23.
范从来，叶宗伟.2004.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与公司绩效[J].经济理论与经济管理,(10):11-20.
樊纲.2000.论体制转轨的动态过程—非国有部门的成长与国有部门的改革[J].经济研究,(1):11-21.
冯旭南，李心愉，陈工孟.2011.家族控制、治理环境和公司价值[J].金融研究,(3):149-164.
冯旭南.2012.债务融资和掠夺—来自中国家族上市公司的证据[J].经济学（季刊），11(3)：943-968.
巩娜.2013.家族企业、股权激励与研发投入[J].证券市场导报,(8):44-49,55.
谷祺，邓德强，路倩.2006.现金流权与控制权分离下的公司价值[J].会计研究,(4):30-36.
顾昕.2013.产业政策的是是非非——林毅夫“新结构经济学”评论之三[M].读书,(12):27-36.
郝颖，刘星.2010.市场化进程与上市公司R&D投资：基于产权特征视角[J].科研管理，(4):81-90.
何轩，朱沆.2008.利他主义、亲情寻租与家族企业治理[J].外国经济与管理,30(9):28-33.
贺小刚，李新春，连燕玲，张远飞.2010.家族内部的权利偏离及其对治理效率的影响[J].中国工业经济,(10):96-106.
贺小刚，李新春，连燕玲.2007.家族权威与企业绩效:基于广东省中山市家族企业的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,(5):75-81.
贺小刚，连燕玲.2009.家族权威与企业价值：基于家族上市公司的实证研究[J].经济研究,(4):90-102.
贺小刚，燕琼琼，梅琳，李婧.2011.创始人离任中的权力交接模式与企业成长——基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,(10):98-108.
贺志峰.2004.论家族企业的定义[J].当代财经,(6)：57-60.
江飞涛，李晓萍.2010.直接干预市场与限制竞争：中国产业政策的取向与根本缺陷[J].中国工业经济,(9):26-36.
江金锁.2011.制度环境、审计意见与银行贷款——来自中国上市家族企业的经验证据[J].经济与管理,25(7):16-22.
姜付秀，黄继承.2011.经理激励、负债与企业价值[J].(5):46‐60.
靳庆鲁，孔祥，候青川.2012.货币政策、民营企业投资效率与公司期权价值[J].经济研究,(5):96-106.
卡洛克，沃德著，梁卿译.2002.家族企业战略计划,北京：中信出版社.
康华，王鲁平，杨柳青.2013.民营上市公司政治关系对研发活动的影响研究[J].(8):8-16.
克林盖尔西克.1998.家族企业的繁衍——家族企业的生命周期[J].北京：经济日报出版社.
孔鹏，张炜迪.2005.家族上市公司新财富100企业家[J].新财富，8：11-13.
郎咸平.2007.郎咸平学术文选[J].北京:人民文学出版社.
黎文靖，程敏英，黄琼宇.2012.地方政府竞争、企业上市方式与政企问利益输送——来自中国家族企业上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,38(9):27-36.
李倩.2010.我国投资强度与产出绩效的关系研究[D].西北大学.
李世辉，雷新途.2008.两类代理成本、债务治理及其可观测绩效的研究—来自我国中小上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,(5):21-29.
李新春.1998.中国的家族制度与企业组织[J].中国社会科学季刊,(香港).
李新春，刘莉.2009.嵌入性-市场性关系网络与家族企业创新成长[J].中山大学学报：社会科学版,49(3):190-202.
李新春，檀宏斌.2010.家族企业内部两权分离：路径与治理——基于百年家族企业香港利丰的案例研究[J].中山大学学报：社会科学版,50(4):178-188.
李增泉，孙铮，王志伟.2004.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,(12):3-13.
连军，刘星，连翠珍.2011.民营企业政治联系的背后：扶持之手与掠夺之手？—基于资本投资视角的经验研究[J].财经研究,(6):133-144.
连军.2013.组织冗余、政治联系与民营企业R&D投资[J].科学学与科学技术管理,34(1):3-11.
廖义刚，张玲，谢盛纹.2009.杠杆治理、独立审计与代理成本——来自财务困境上市公司的实证发现[J].经济评论.(6):74-82.
刘学方,王重鸣,唐宁玉,朱健,倪宁.2006.家族企业接班人胜任力建模—一个实证研究[J].管理世界,(5):33-43.
吕长江，王克敏.2002.上市公司资本结构、股利分配及管理股权比例相互作用机制研究[J].(3)15‐24.
吕占峰.2009.我国家族企业治理结构研究[D].武汉理工大学.
罗婷，朱青，李丹.2009.解析R&D投入和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,(6):100-110.
潘必胜.1998.对企业集团政企不分内部化的分析[J].中国工业经济,(10):40-43.
潘必胜.1998.乡镇企业中的家族经营问题——兼论家族企业在中国的历史命运[J].中国农村观察,(1):83-93.
潘士远，史晋川.2001.知识吸收能力与内生经济增长—关于罗默模型的改进与扩展[J].数量经济技术经济研究,(11):82-85.
任海云.2010.企业R&D目标强度的权变分析及动态调整模型[J].研究与发展管理,22(6):97-102.
申明浩.2008.治理结构对家族股东隧道行为的影响分析[J].经济研究,(6):135-144.
申尊焕.2004.我国家族上市公司经营业绩的实证分析[J].企业经济,(4):188-191.
斯蒂格利茨.1998.政府为什么干预经济：政府在市场经济中的角色[M].北京:中国物资出版社.
苏启林，朱文.2003.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究,(8):36-45.
苏启林.2005.创业投资与家族企业转型[J].当代经济管理,27(4):54-58.
苏启林.2007.基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业经理人行为选择[J].外国经济与管理,29(2):51-56.
苏忠秦，黄登仕.2012.家族控制、两权分离与债务期限结构选择—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J],管理评论,24(7):132-142.
孙铮，刘凤委，李增泉.2005.市场化程度、政府干预与企业债务期限结构——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,(5):52-63.
唐松，杨勇，孙铮.2009.金融发展、债务治理与公司价值——来自中国上市公司的经验证据财经研究,(6):23‐29
田银华，邝嫦娥，张敏.2011.家族企业治理结构与经营绩效的实证研究———以中国上市家族企业为例[J].当代财经,(9):79-84.
田银华，周志强，廖和平.2012.动态三环模式与家族企业产权契约治理研究[J].商业经济与管理,(7):40-48.
王力军，童盼.2008.民营上市公司控制类型、多元化经营与企业绩效[J].南开管理评论,(5):31-39.
王满四.2005.负债融资的公司治理效应及其机制研究[M].中国社会科学出版社.
王明琳，陈凌，叶长兵.2010.中国民营上巿公司的家族治理与企业价值[J].南开管理评论,(2)：61-67.
王明琳，徐萌娜.2011.利他行为的治理机制及效率研究[J].经济学家,(12):23-31.
王明琳，陈凌.2013.代理人还是管家_基于双重嵌人视角的家族企业行为及绩效研究[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),(2):180-188.
王明琳，周生春.2006.控制性家族类型、双重三层委托代理问题与企业价值[J].管理世界,(8):83-93.
王燕妮，张书菊.2011. R＆D投入的价值相关性实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,32(9):17-22.
汪辉.2003.上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值[J].经济研究,(8):25-34.
韦革.2009.贫穷理论和政府扶贫实践的社会资本逻辑[J].中国行政管理,(9):100-102.
吴延兵，米增渝.2011.创新、模仿与企业效率——来自制造业非国有企业的经验证据[J].中国社会科学,(4):77-94.
夏杰长，尚铁力.2007.企业R＆D投入的税收激励研究——基于增值税的实证分析[J].涉外税务,(3):9-12.
小艾尔弗雷德钱德勒.1987.看的见的手--美国企业的管理革命[M].北京:商务印书馆.
肖作平，廖理.2007.大股东、债权人保护和公司债务期限结构选择—来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理评论,(10):99-117.
肖作平，苏忠秦.2012.现金股利是“掏空”的工具还是掩饰“掏空”的面具？——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理工程学报,26(2):77-84.
谢小芳，李懿东，唐清泉.2009.市场认同企业的研发投入价值吗？来自沪深A股市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论,(3):299-314.
辛清泉，郑国坚，杨德明.2007.企业集团、政府控制与投资效率[J].金融研究,(10):123-142.
徐欣，唐清泉.2010.财务分析师跟踪与企业R＆D活动——来自中国证券市场的研究[J].金融研究,(12):173-189.
许永斌，郑金芳.2007.中国民营上市公司家族控制权特征与公司绩效实证研究[J].会计研究,(11):50-57.
杨龙志，朱世平.2006.家族企业治理结构与经营绩效关系的实证研究——基于浙江非上市中小家族企业的调查数据[J].商业经济与管理,(10):17-21.
杨兴全.2004.上市公司融资效率问题研究[D].中南财经政法大学博士学位论文.
宋文兵.1997.对当前融资形势的理性思考[J].改革与战略,(6):1-6.
杨学儒，李新春.2009.家族涉入指数的构建与测量研究[J].中国工业经济,(5):97-107.
叶蓓，袁建国.2008.管理者信心、企业投资与企业价值:基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,(2):15-23.
叶航.2005.利他行为的经济学解释[J].经济学家,(3):22-29.
叶玲，李心合.2012.管理者投资羊群行为、产业政策与企业价值——基于我国A股上市公司的实证检验[J].江西财经大学学报,(5):24-32.
叶银华.1999.家族控股集团、核心企业与报酬互动之研究——台湾与香港证券市场之比较[J].管理评论（台湾）,18(2):22-34.
于立，马丽波.2003.家族企业治理结构的三环模式[J].经济管理,(2):4-11.
于东智.2003.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效:一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,(1):34‐41.
俞立平.2013.不同科研经费投入与产出互动关系的实证研究—基于面板数据及面板VAR模型的估计[J].科研管理,(10):94-102.
袁春生,杨淑娥.2006.经理管理防御与企业非效率投资[J].经济问题,6:40-42.
约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯，陆梦龙译.2009.就业、利息和货币通论，中国社会科学出版社.
张俊喜，张华，宋敏.2004.所有权和控制权分离对企业价值的影响——我国民营上市企业的实证研究[J].经济学（季刊）,3(B10):1-14.
张夏准.2009.富国的伪善——自由贸易的迷思与资本主义秘史[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社.
张兆国，何威风，闫炳乾.2008.资本结构与代理成本——来自中国国有控股上市公司和民营上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论.(11):39‐47.
赵玉珍，张心灵.2011.债务治理与公司经营绩效关系的实证[J].统计与决策,(6):11-15.
曾康霖.1993.怎样看待直接融资与间接融资[J].金融研究,(10):20-24.
甄丽明，唐清泉.2012.R&D投资行为与价值创造机制研究—基于中国上市公司的实证检验[J].商业经济与管理，245(3)：66-74.
周淑莲，裴叔平，陈树勋.2007.中国产业政策研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社.
祝继高，韩非池，陆正飞.2012.银行关联能缓解产业政策带来的融资约束吗?—基于A股上市公司的实证研究.北京：第一届“宏观经济政策与微观企业行为”学术研讨会.
中国民（私）营经济研究会家族企业研究课题组.2011.中国家族企业发展报告[M].北京：中信出版社.
Aboody, D., Lev, B.2000. Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains [J].Journal of Finance,55(6):2747-2766.
Aiyesha, D., Nikolaev V., Wang X.2009. Disproportional Control Rights and the Bonding Role ofDebt [J]. Working Paper, University of Chicago
Akerlof, George, A.1970. The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,84(3):488-500
Amit, R., Ding, Y., Villalonga, B., Zhang, H.2010. The Role of Institutional Development in thePrevalence and Value of Family Firms, Working Paper
Ampenberger, M., Schmid, T., Achleitner, A.K., Kaserer, C.2013.Capital structure decisions infamily firms–empirical evidence from a bank-based economy [J]. Review of ManagerialScience,7(3):247-275.
Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., Reeb, D.2012. Investment policy in family controlled firms [J]. Journalof Banking&Finance,36:1744-1758.
Anderson, R.C., Reeb, D.M.2003a. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidencefrom the S&P500[J]. Journal of Finance,(58):1301-1328.
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A. Reeb, D.M.2003b. Founding family ownership and the agency cost ofdebt [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(68):263–285
Andres, C.2008. Large shareholders and firm performance, an empirical examination offounding-family ownership [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(14):431-445
Astrachan, J. H., Klein, S., Smyrnios, K.2002. The F-PEC scale of family influence: a proposal forsolving the family business definition problem [J]. Family Business Review,15(1):45–57.
Baker, M.2000. Career Concerns and Staged Investment: Evidence from the Venture CapitalIndustry [J]. working paper, Harvard University.
Baldridge, K., Schulz.1999. Altruism and Agency Cost in Family Firms, Working Paper.
Berghe, Cachon.2001. Corporate Governance Practices in Flemish Family Business, SSRN WorkingPaper Series.
Biddle, G. C., Chen, P., Zhang, G.2001. When Capital follows Profitability: No-Liner ResidualIncome Dynamics [J]. Review of Accounting Studies,(6):229-265.
Berle, A., Means, G.1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property [M]. US：New York, NY:
Bertrand, Marianne, Antoinette, S.2006.The Role of Family in Family Firms [J]. Journal ofEconomic Perspectives,(20):73–96.
Bond, S., Meghir C.1994. Dynamic Investment Models and the firm's financial policy [J]. Reviewof Economic Studies,1994,61:197-222
Brandt, L.,Hongbin, L.2003. Bank Discrimination in Transition Economies: Ideology, Informationor Incentives?[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,31(3):387-341.
Charles K. Whitehead.2009. The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and CorporateGovernance [J]. The Journal of Corporal ion Law,34(3):102-137
Caprio, L., Croci, E., del Giudice, A.2010. Ownership structure, family control and acquisitiondecisions, Unpublished working paper, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore and Universitàdegli Studi di Milano-Bicocca.
Casson, M.1999. The economics of the family firm [J]. Scandinavian Economic History Review,(47):10–23.
Chami, R.1999. What’s different about family business? working paper, University of Notre Dameand the International Monetary Fund, Indiana and Washington DC.
Chami, R.1999. What’s different about family businesses? University of Notre Dame WorkingPaper.
Chan, L., Lakonishok J., Sougiannis T.2001. The stock market valuation of research anddevelopment expenditures [J]. Journal of Finance,(56):2,431-2,457.
Chang, S.C., Wu, W.Y., Wong, Y.J.2010. Family control and stock market reactions to innovationannouncements [J]. British Journal of Management,(21):152-170.
Chen D.H., Li O. Z., Xin F.2013. Five-Year Plans, China Finance and Their Consequences, WorkingPaper.
Chen, S.M, Sun, Z., Tang, S., Wu, D.H.2011.Government Intervention and investment efficiency:Evidence from China Original Research Article [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,17(2):259-271.
Chen, Y.P., Lin, T.J., Hou, C.P., Li, C., Hsieh, P.C.2012. The Relationship Among FamilyOwnership, Corporate Governance And Risk Taking [J]. Management Review,19(2):59-90.
Chen, Y.R., Ho, C.Y.2009.The impact of family control and board characteristics on corporatepolicies [J]. Journal Manage,26(1):1-16.
Cheng, S.J.2004. R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation [J].The Accounting Review,79(2):305-328.
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Steier, L.2005. Sources and consequences of distinctive familiness: Anintroduction [J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,(29):237-247.
Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J., Sharma, P.1999. Defining the family business by behavior[J].Entrepreneurship: Theory&Practice [J].23(4):19-39.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P.2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in EastAsian Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,58(1-2):81-112
Coase, R.1937.The nature of the firm [M]. Economica,(16):386-405.
Croci, E., Doukas, J., Gonenc, H.2011. Family control and financing decisions [J].EuropeanFinancial Management,17(5):860-897.
Dagenais, M.G., Therrien, P.1997. Do Canadian Firms Respond to Fiscal Incentives To Researchand Development?[J]. Tilburg University Mime,(7):45-49.
Davis, J.A., Tagiuri R.1989.The influence of life stage on father son work relationships in familycompanies [J]. Family Business Review,2(1):47-74.
Demsetz, H., Lehn, K.1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences [J].Journal of Political Economy,(61):1155–1177.
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B.,2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance [J]. Journal ofCorporate Finance,(7):209–233.
Eberhart, A.C., Maxwell, W.F., Siddique, A.R.2008. A Re-examination of the Tradeoff between theFuture Benefit and Riskiness of R&D Increases [J]. Journal of Accounting Research,46(3):27-52.
Edmans, A.2009. Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia [J]. Journal ofFinance,(64):2481–513.
Ellul, A.2009. Control Motivations and Capital Structure Decision [J]. Working Paper, IndianaUniversity.
Faccio M., Lang L.H.P.2002.The ultimate ownership of western European corporations[J]. Journalof Financial Economics,65(3):365-395.
Fama, E., Jensen, M.1985. Organizational forms and investment decisions [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,(14):101-119.
Fan, J.P.H., Jian, M., Yeh, Y.H.2008. Succession: The Roles of Specialized Assets and TransferCosts, Working paper.
Filatotchev, I., Kepelyushnikov R., Dyomina N, Aukusionek S.2001. The effects of ownershipconcentration on investment and performance in privatised firms in Russia [J]. Managerial andDecision Economics22:299-313.
Franks, J.R., Mayer, C., Volpin, P.F., Wagner, H.F.2010. The life cycle of family ownership:international evidence, working paper, London Business School, University of Oxford andBocconi University.
Franzen, L., Radhakrishnan S.2009. The value relevance of R&D across profit and loss firms [J].Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,(28):16–32.
Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Haynes, K.T., Nunez Nickel, M., Jacobson, K.J.L., Moyano-Fuentes, J.2007.Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family controlled Firms: Evidence fromSpanish Olive Oil Mills [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,52(1):106-137.
González, M., Guzmán, A., Pombo C., Trujillo M.2013. Family firms and debt: Risk aversionversus risk of losing control [J]. Journal of Business Research,(6):2308–2320.
Grossman, S. J, Hart, O.D.1988. One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control[J].Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2):175-202.
Guellec, D., van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B.2003. The impact of public R&D expenditure onbusiness R&D [J].Economics of Innovation and New Technology,12(3):225-244.
Habbershon, T.G., Williams, M.L., MacMillan, I.C.2003. A unified systems perspective of familyfirm performance [J]. Journal of Business Venturing,(18):451-465.
Habbershon, T.G., Williams, M.L.1999. A resource-based framework for assessing the strategicadvantages of family firms [J]. Family Business Review,(12):1-15.
Hall, B., Lerner, J.2010.The Financing of R&D and Innovation [J]. Handbook of the Economics ofInnovation,(1):609–639.
Han, B.H., Manry, D.2004. The value relawence of R&D Advertising expenditures Evidence fromKorea [J]. International Joural of accounting,(39):155-179.
Hanel P., St-Pierre A.2002. Effects of R&D Spillovers on the Profitability of Firms [J]. Review ofIndustrial Organization,(20):305-322.
Harris M., Raviv A.1991. The theory of capital structure [J]. Journal of Finance,(46):297-355.
Holderness, C.,2009. The myth of diffuse ownership in the United States [J]. Review of FinancialStudies22,1377-1408.
Holmstrom, B., Ricard, I., Costa, J.1986. Managerial Incentives and Capital Management [J]. TheQuarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press,101(4):835-60.
Ittner, C., Lambert, R., Larcker, D.2003. The Structure and Performance Consequences of EquityGrants to Employees of New Economy Firms [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,(34):89-127.·
Jayati S. Subrata S.2008. Debt and corporate governance in emerging economies Evidence fromIndia [J]. Economics of Transition,16(2):293-334.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W.1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs andownership structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,3(4):305-360.
Jin L., Myers S.2006. R-square around the world: New theory and tests [J]. Journal of FinancialEconomics,79(2):257-292.
Johnson, B., Magee, R., Nagarajan, N., Newman, H.1985. An Analysis of the Stock Price Reactionto Sudden Executive Deaths [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,(7):151-174.
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A.2000. Tunnelling [J].AmericanEconomic Review,90(2):22-27.
Jorgenson, D.1963. Capital Theory and Investment Behavior [J]. American Economic Review53(2):247-259.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K.2000. Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis ofDiversified Indian Business Groups [J]. Journal of Finance,(55):867-891.
King, M.R., Santor, E.2008. Family values: Ownership structure, performance and capital structureof Canadian firms [J]. Journal of Banking&Finance,32:2423-2432.
Klein, S., Astrachan, J.H., Smyrnios, K.2005. The F-PEC scale of family influence: a proposal forsolving the family business definition problem [J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,29(3):321-339.
Kothari, S.P., Laguerre, T.E., Leone, A. J.2002. Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on theUncertainty of Future Earnings from Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays [J]. Review ofAccounting Studies,7(4):355-382.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1999. Corporate ownership around theworld[J]. Journal of Finance,(54):471-518.
Laeven L., Levine., R.2008. Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations [J]. Reviewof Financial Studies,21(2):579-604.
Lin, C., Lin, P., Song, F.2010. Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Development Economics,(93):49-62.
Margaritis, D., Psillaki, M.2010. Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performance [J].Journal of Banking and Finance,34(3):621-632.
Murphy, K. M., Shleifer A., Vishny R. W.1989, Industrialization and the Big Push[J]. Journal ofPolitical Economics,97(5):1003—1026
Maury, B.2006. Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from WesternEuropean corporations [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,12(2):321-341.
Miller，D., Le, B.M，Lester, R.H., Cannella, J.A.2007. Are Family Firms Really SuperiorPerformers?[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(13):829-858．
Modigliani, F., Merton, H.M.1963. Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction[J]. The American Economic Review,53(3):433-443.
Morck, R., Daniel, W., Bernard, Y.2005. Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, andGrowth [J]. Journal of Economic Literature,(43):655-720.
Morck, R.K., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1988. Management ownership and market valuation: Anempirical analysis [J].Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2):293-315.
Morgado, A., Pindado, J.2003. The underinvestment and overinvestment hypotheses: an analysisusing panel data [J]. European Financial Management,(9):163-177.
Mueller, H., Inderst,R.2001. Ownership concentration, monitoring, and the agency cost of debt,working paper,University of Mannheim, Germany.
Munari, F., Oriani, R., Sobrero M.2010. The effects of owner identity and external governancesystems on R&D investments: a study of Western European firms [J]. Research Policy,39(8):1093-1104.
Munoz-Bullon F., Sanchez-Bueno M.J.2011. The impact of family involvement on the R&Dintensity of publicly traded firms [J]. Family Business Review24(1):62-70.
Myers, S.C.1977. Determinants of Corporate Borrowing [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(5):147-175.
Myers, S.C.1984. The capital structure puzzle [J]. Journal of Finance,39(3):575-592.
Narayanan, M.P.1985. Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results [J]. Journal of Finance,(40):1469-1484.
Neubauer, F., Lank, A.G.1998. The family business: Its governance for sustainability [J].MacMillan Business.
Pindado, J., Ignacio, R., De la Torre, C.2011.Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity:Empirical evidence from the Euro zone Original Research Article [J].Journal of CorporateFinance,17(5):1389-1409.
Riyanto E. Toolsema A.2005. Tunneling and Popping: a Justification for Pyramidal Ownership,Working Paper.
Ross, S.A.1977.The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach [J].The Bell Journal of Economics,8(1):23-40.
Sara, H., Robicheaux E.2008. Lease Financing and Corporate Governance[J]. The Financial Review,(43):403-437,
Scherer F. M., Harhoff D. and Kukies J.2000.Uncertainty and the Size Distribution of Rewardsfrom Technological Innovation [J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics,(10):175-200.
Schmid, T.2013. Control considerations, creditor monitoring, and the capital structure of familyfirms [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance,(37):257-272.
Schmid, T. Achleitner, A., Ampenberger, M, Kaserer, C.2014. Family firms and R&D behaviorNew evidence from a large-scale survey [J]. Research Policy,(43):233-244.
Schulze, W., Lubatkin, M.H., Ling, Y., Dino, R.N., Buchholtz, A.K.2001. Agency Relationships inFamily Firms: Theory and Evidence [J]. Organization Science,(12):99-116.
Setia-Atmaja, L., Tanewski, G., Skully, M.2009. The role of dividends, debt and board structure inthe governance of family controlled firms [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,36(7/8):863-898.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1989. Management Entrenchment-the Case of Manager SpecificInvestments [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,(25):123-139.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1998. The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures [M].Harvard University Press.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control [J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,(94):461-489.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.1997. A survey of corporate governance [J]. Journal of Finance,(52):737-783.
Sirmon D. G., Hitt M.A.2003. Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, andwealth creation in family firms [J].Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,27(4):339–358.
Stein J.C.1997. Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources [J].TheJournal of Finance,(52):111-133.
Stein, J.2003. Agency, information and corporate investment [J]. Handbook of the Economics ofFinance,1(1):111-165.
Stulz, R.1988. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporatecontrol [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,20(1/2):25-54.
Tobin, J.A.1969. general equilibrium approach to monetary theory [J]. J Money Credit Bank,(1):15-29.
Tosi H., Gomez-Mejia L.R.1989. The Decoupling of CEO Pay and Performance: An Agency theoryPerspective[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,(34):169-189.
Villalonga, B. Amit, R.2010. Family Control of Firms and Industries [J]. Financial Management,(10):863-904.
Villalonga, B., Amit, R.2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,80(2):385-417.
Wei, K.C.J., Zhang, Y.2008. Ownership structure, cash flow, and capital investment: Evidence fromEast Asian economies before the financial crisis [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,(14):95-118.
Williamson, Oliver.1985. The Economics Institutions of Capitalism, New York, FreePress.Williamson, S.D.
Finance and Corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance,(43):567-91.
Wiwattanakantang, Y.1999. An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thaifirms[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,7(3/4):371-403.
Zellweger, T., Eddleston, K.H., Kellermanns, F.W.2010. Exploring the Concept of Familiness:Introducing Family Firm Identity [J]. Journal of Family Business Strategy,1(1):1-10.