电力市场均衡模型及其相关算法研究
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摘要
电力市场是一个寡头竞争市场,在这样的市场环境下,发电商面临着巨大的电价波动风险,因而他们迫切需要有效的市场仿真工具为其提供相应的决策依据以获取更大的市场收益；同时,市场监管者也需要合理的市场模拟工具为其监管市场提供科学依据。为此,许多基于博弈论的电力市场均衡模型被相继提出。本文在电力市场均衡模型及其相关算法领域做了以下几方面工作：
1.提出了求解计及输电约束的线性供给函数均衡模型的分支定界方法,该方法采用分支剪支操作处理互补松弛约束,仅需计算少量的子优化问题,就可以达到遍历所有系统松弛子模式的效果。算例表明,该算法具有较好的搜索效率,为求解大规模电力市场均衡问题提供了一条有效途径。
2.建立了一种考虑节能减排约束的多时段电力市场均衡模型。算例表明：在寡头市场环境下,高能耗率高排放率发电商往往通过降低报价方式来获取更大收益,而低能耗率低排放率发电商则往往通过抬高报价方式来获取更大收益,此外,还可能会有排放量(或煤耗量)由轻负荷时段向重负荷时段转移的现象出现。
3.建立了一种考虑抽水蓄能电站的电力市场均衡模型,该模型在蓄能和发电时段分别把抽水蓄能机组当作负荷和发电机来处理。算例表明,抽水蓄能机组的存在有助于市场效率的提高,还能对电价起到削峰填谷的作用；抽水蓄能商能否在寡头市场环境下获益是不确定的,这主要取决于其自身效率系数的提高。
4.建立了一种基于猜测供给函数的多时段水火电市场均衡模型,该模型同时考虑了网络安全、机组爬坡率及水电机组用水量等约束。算例表明,在寡头市场环境下,受放水量限制的水电商可以通过减少峰荷时段出力并增加其他时段出力的方式来获取更大利益。
5.建立了一种考虑分区备用的主能量-备用联合市场均衡模型,在该模型中,区域备用需求由本地发电资源和区域联络线的剩余传输容量来共同提供。算例表明,在寡头市场环境下,备用稀缺区域对应的区域备用价格往往较完全竞争市场环境有所下降,处于备用稀缺区域中的发电商则可能会通过提高自身出力的方式来增加其所获收益。
6.建立了一种基于猜测价格函数的混合输电权市场均衡模型,并将该均衡模型的求解转化为一个凸二次规划问题,这样不仅保证了均衡解的存在性和唯一性,也使得该均衡模型可以用于大规模混合输电权市场中的竞价策略分析。
7.详细介绍了基于复杂性网络理论的双边电力市场均衡分析方法,并从理论上证明了该方法的收敛性；另外,还得出了任何与完全竞争市场Pool模式下最优调度结果相同的双边交易网络都是均衡金融网络等重要结论。
The electricity market is an oligopolic market, and in this imperfect electricity market, GenCos, who face huge risk due to the fluctuation of electricity price, need the effective market simulation tool desperately to help them make correct decision to earn more profit; at the same time, the market regulator also need a reasonable market simulation tool to provide scientific basis for their regulation behaviors. Therefore, many equilibrium models for the oligopolistic electricity market, based on the game theory, are put forward successively. This dissertation does several research works in the field of electricity equilibrium model and its related algorithms.
1. A new approach, adopting the branch and bound technique, is proposed in this thesis to compute the equilibrium point of the linear supply function equilibrium model in presence of transmission constraints. This approach deals with the complementarity slack constraints by branching and pruning, and can verify all the slack sub-modes by computing a few sub-optimization problems. As illustrated by the test cases, the proposed method has good search performance, and provides an efficient way to compute the big-scale equilibrium models for oligopolistic electricity market.
2. An oligopolistic electricity market equilibrium model, considering the energy saving and emission cutting constraints, is established in this thesis. As illustrated by the test cases, in the oligopolistic environment, the GenCos with high energy-consumption rate and high emission rate often reduce their bidding prices to obtain more revenues, while the GenCos with low energy rates and low emission rates often increase the bidding prices. Besides, in the multi-periods scenario, the energy consumption amount (or emission amount) often shift from the valley load periods to the peak load periods.
3. A new equilibrium model for the electricity market, which includes the pumped storage units, is established in this thesis. This model models the pumped storage units as loads and generators in the storage period and generation period, respectively. The study shows that the PSU can reduce the energy prices during the peak load periods and improve the market performance. In the oligopolistic environment, it is indefinite whether pumped storage GenCo's profit will be larger than that in the competitive environment, which mostly depends on the increasement of its own effciciency.
4. An equilibrium model for the multi-periods hydro-thermal electricity market, in which the strategic behaviors are simulated by the conjectured supply function, is proposed in this thesis. This model simulately takes account of the transmission limit constraints, the ramp rate constraints and the water consumption constraints of the hydro unit. As illustrated by the test cases, in the oligopolistic environment, the hydro GenCo can obtain more profit in the manner of increasing the outputs in off-peak periods and decreasing the outputs in peak periods.
5. An equilibrium model for the integrated energy-reserve electricity market with regional SR constraints is proposed in this thesis. In this model, the regional spinning reserve requirement is met with both the locational generation resources and the unused transmission capacity of the corresponding tie line interface. As illustrated by the test cases, the reginonal reserve price of reserve-shortage region is usually lower than that in the perfect environment, and the GenCos loacated in the re serve-shortage area can obtain more profits by increasing their energy outputs.
6. An equilibrium model for the hybrid transmission right market, adopting the conjectured price function, is proposed in this thesis. This model is converted into a convex quadratic programming problem, which can not only ensure the existence and the uniqueness of the solution but also make the proposed model applicable for the study of the bidding strategy in a large scale transmission right market.
7. This thesis introduces the complex-network-theory based simulation method for the bilateral electricity market, and proves the covergency property of this method; in addition, some other important conclusions are also derived in this thesis, such as that any financial network owing the same market clearing result as the Pool model is an equilibrium financial network.
1.提出了求解计及输电约束的线性供给函数均衡模型的分支定界方法,该方法采用分支剪支操作处理互补松弛约束,仅需计算少量的子优化问题,就可以达到遍历所有系统松弛子模式的效果。算例表明,该算法具有较好的搜索效率,为求解大规模电力市场均衡问题提供了一条有效途径。
2.建立了一种考虑节能减排约束的多时段电力市场均衡模型。算例表明：在寡头市场环境下,高能耗率高排放率发电商往往通过降低报价方式来获取更大收益,而低能耗率低排放率发电商则往往通过抬高报价方式来获取更大收益,此外,还可能会有排放量(或煤耗量)由轻负荷时段向重负荷时段转移的现象出现。
3.建立了一种考虑抽水蓄能电站的电力市场均衡模型,该模型在蓄能和发电时段分别把抽水蓄能机组当作负荷和发电机来处理。算例表明,抽水蓄能机组的存在有助于市场效率的提高,还能对电价起到削峰填谷的作用；抽水蓄能商能否在寡头市场环境下获益是不确定的,这主要取决于其自身效率系数的提高。
4.建立了一种基于猜测供给函数的多时段水火电市场均衡模型,该模型同时考虑了网络安全、机组爬坡率及水电机组用水量等约束。算例表明,在寡头市场环境下,受放水量限制的水电商可以通过减少峰荷时段出力并增加其他时段出力的方式来获取更大利益。
5.建立了一种考虑分区备用的主能量-备用联合市场均衡模型,在该模型中,区域备用需求由本地发电资源和区域联络线的剩余传输容量来共同提供。算例表明,在寡头市场环境下,备用稀缺区域对应的区域备用价格往往较完全竞争市场环境有所下降,处于备用稀缺区域中的发电商则可能会通过提高自身出力的方式来增加其所获收益。
6.建立了一种基于猜测价格函数的混合输电权市场均衡模型,并将该均衡模型的求解转化为一个凸二次规划问题,这样不仅保证了均衡解的存在性和唯一性,也使得该均衡模型可以用于大规模混合输电权市场中的竞价策略分析。
7.详细介绍了基于复杂性网络理论的双边电力市场均衡分析方法,并从理论上证明了该方法的收敛性；另外,还得出了任何与完全竞争市场Pool模式下最优调度结果相同的双边交易网络都是均衡金融网络等重要结论。
The electricity market is an oligopolic market, and in this imperfect electricity market, GenCos, who face huge risk due to the fluctuation of electricity price, need the effective market simulation tool desperately to help them make correct decision to earn more profit; at the same time, the market regulator also need a reasonable market simulation tool to provide scientific basis for their regulation behaviors. Therefore, many equilibrium models for the oligopolistic electricity market, based on the game theory, are put forward successively. This dissertation does several research works in the field of electricity equilibrium model and its related algorithms.
1. A new approach, adopting the branch and bound technique, is proposed in this thesis to compute the equilibrium point of the linear supply function equilibrium model in presence of transmission constraints. This approach deals with the complementarity slack constraints by branching and pruning, and can verify all the slack sub-modes by computing a few sub-optimization problems. As illustrated by the test cases, the proposed method has good search performance, and provides an efficient way to compute the big-scale equilibrium models for oligopolistic electricity market.
2. An oligopolistic electricity market equilibrium model, considering the energy saving and emission cutting constraints, is established in this thesis. As illustrated by the test cases, in the oligopolistic environment, the GenCos with high energy-consumption rate and high emission rate often reduce their bidding prices to obtain more revenues, while the GenCos with low energy rates and low emission rates often increase the bidding prices. Besides, in the multi-periods scenario, the energy consumption amount (or emission amount) often shift from the valley load periods to the peak load periods.
3. A new equilibrium model for the electricity market, which includes the pumped storage units, is established in this thesis. This model models the pumped storage units as loads and generators in the storage period and generation period, respectively. The study shows that the PSU can reduce the energy prices during the peak load periods and improve the market performance. In the oligopolistic environment, it is indefinite whether pumped storage GenCo's profit will be larger than that in the competitive environment, which mostly depends on the increasement of its own effciciency.
4. An equilibrium model for the multi-periods hydro-thermal electricity market, in which the strategic behaviors are simulated by the conjectured supply function, is proposed in this thesis. This model simulately takes account of the transmission limit constraints, the ramp rate constraints and the water consumption constraints of the hydro unit. As illustrated by the test cases, in the oligopolistic environment, the hydro GenCo can obtain more profit in the manner of increasing the outputs in off-peak periods and decreasing the outputs in peak periods.
5. An equilibrium model for the integrated energy-reserve electricity market with regional SR constraints is proposed in this thesis. In this model, the regional spinning reserve requirement is met with both the locational generation resources and the unused transmission capacity of the corresponding tie line interface. As illustrated by the test cases, the reginonal reserve price of reserve-shortage region is usually lower than that in the perfect environment, and the GenCos loacated in the re serve-shortage area can obtain more profits by increasing their energy outputs.
6. An equilibrium model for the hybrid transmission right market, adopting the conjectured price function, is proposed in this thesis. This model is converted into a convex quadratic programming problem, which can not only ensure the existence and the uniqueness of the solution but also make the proposed model applicable for the study of the bidding strategy in a large scale transmission right market.
7. This thesis introduces the complex-network-theory based simulation method for the bilateral electricity market, and proves the covergency property of this method; in addition, some other important conclusions are also derived in this thesis, such as that any financial network owing the same market clearing result as the Pool model is an equilibrium financial network.
引文
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