市场化运营环境下电信产业市场结构演化分析
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摘要
随着我国经济改革的不断深入与国民经济的不断发展,我国电信产业也不断的发展与壮大,其产值在国家GDP中所占比例也越来越大,至2008年底我国电话用户达9.82亿户,互联网用户达2.98亿户。虽然近年我国电信产业总体在迅速发展,但其内部发展是不平衡的：2008年电信产业重组前,中国移动公司一家独大,其市场份额持续上升,中国电信和中国联通、中国网通的市场份额逐渐趋同,中国铁通和中国卫通的市场份额几乎可忽略不计,电信产业的竞争性不断降低,垄断程度不断上升,市场结构失衡。电信产业重组后,新成立的三大电信企业在技术、资产、用户等方面也是不对称,但其竞争性较重组前有所改善,在固定电话、移动电话、互联网等电信业务内初步形成了寡头竞争态势。
本文在对我国电信产业改革历程进行实证性分析基础上,针对寡头电信竞争市场,运用动态调整、不完全信息博弈、微分博弈、混沌滞后控制等方法,分别就线性需求下、需求信息不完全条件下、随机需求信息下的寡头电信价格调整及其市场结构演化进行模型刻画与数值仿真分析,分析结论为市场化营运环境下寡头电信企业的定价策略与移动电信产业市场结构的演化动态提供理论支撑,具体来说,主要有以下研究内容：
第二章在充分考察我国电信产业的改革和发展历程基础上,分别对电信产业的进退壁垒、产品差异、市场集中度进行了分析和实证测算,分析结果表明：1)电信产业的进退壁垒很高,主要有政府特许经营、沉淀成本大、技术要求高等方面；但随着市场改革的深入与电信企业之间的重组,市场进退壁垒在逐步降低,从而导致形成寡头垄断市场结构。2)不同的电信产品之间有替代性,同一电信产品之间的产品差异不明显。3)政策性电信产业重组降低了电信产业的垄断程度,但电信企业的策略性市场行为在一定程度内加剧了电信产业的垄断度。在此基础上,分析了影响市场结构的因素,分析表明：如不考虑政策和技术因素,寡头企业的价格策略是影响电信产业市场结构的重要因素之一,随着电信产业市场化改革的深入,这种影响将越来越大。
第三章构建了线性需求下的电信企业寡头价格竞争伯川德模型,在此基础上构建寡头电信企业价格动态调整模型,分析了价格调整动态模型的Nash均衡、分岔和混沌等过程,通过对寡头电信企业价格调整过程中平均利润的分析表明：1)均衡状态下电信企业获得的平均利润最大,因此维持均衡是重要的,为此对混沌过程进行分析并运用滞后控制方法对其进行控制分析；2)通过分析替代系数对企业价格策略的影响可知,电信企业通过提高自身产品对竞争对手产品的可替代性,可提高企业自身利润。最后分析了电信产业的市场结构演化过程。
第四章在第三章基础上考虑了需求不完全信息的情况,即引进了需求噪音项,并分别考虑了需求噪音服从均匀分布与正态分布情况下,寡头电信企业的价格调整动态以及该动态经历均衡、分叉与混沌过程中,电信企业的平均收益；在此基础上分析了需求噪音项、企业风险系数等对企业价格策略的影响,分析表明：1)需求噪音越大,电信企业定价越高,但利润也就越小；2)风险偏好越大,企业利润也可能越低；3)当竞争对手的价格调整速度增大情况下,为维持自身的市场份额,电信企业的最优选择是维持自身价格策略不变。
第五章将寡头电信企业之间的价格竞争博弈刻画为微分博弈模型,分别从利润和考虑决策者不同目标效用函数角度构建寡头电信企业的动态优化模型,然后将上述模型拓展到二次成本函数情况,并度模型进行了数值模拟,分析表明：1)企业的决策目标对市场份额的影响很明显：企业以收益最大为定价目标,市场垄断程度就会降低；而当以利润为决策目标时,将导致市场垄断程度的加剧：2)要降低市场的垄断程度的话,增加企业产品的替代性是一条重要途径,而增加产品的差异性,则会提高市场的垄断程度。
总体而言,本文结合博弈理论建模和实证研究方法,研究寡头电信企业的价格调整策略与市场结构演化动态,以期为电信产业的改革提供决策依据及措施建议。研究结果对我国电信产业的市场化运营的健康发展具有一定的理论价值和实际借鉴意义。
With the constant deepening of China's economic reform and the continuous development of the national economy, China's telecom industry has also continued the development and strengthening and its value shared of the national GDP is also growing, at the end of 2008 China's phone users reached 982 million and Internet users reached 298 million. Although in recent years, China's telecommunications industry in general rapidly developing, but its internal development has been uneven: before the reorganization of the telecommunications industry in 2008, China Mobile company is an overwhelming majority, its market share continued to rise, China Telecom and China Unicom, China Netcom's market share the gradual convergence, China Railcom and China Satcom's market share is almost negligible, the competitition of telecommunications industry reducing, levels of monopoly rising and market structure loss its balance. After telecom industry reorganization, the newly established three major telecom companies are also asymmetrical in technology, assets, users, etc., but the competition has improved compared to before the reorganization, oligopoly situation initially formed in the fixed-line telephone, mobile phone, the Internet and other telecommunications services.
In this paper, on the basis of empirical anglicizing the reform process of China's telecom industry, for the oligopolistic competitive telecommunications market, telecommunications oligopoly price adjustment and its market structure evolution is described the model and numerical simulation analysis respectively under the linear demand, the incompletely demand information and the stochastic demand information using of dynamic adjustment, incomplete information game, differential game, time-delay feedback chaos control methods, analysis conclusion provides theoretical support for the pricing strategies of oligopolistic telecommunications enterprise in the market-oriented operating environment and the evolution dynamics of mobile telecommunications industry market structure, specifically, the main research contents are as follows:
The second chapter base on full investigation of China's telecom industry reform and development process, barriers to advance and retreat of the telecom industry, differentiation of products, market concentration are analyzed and empirical estimates, analysis showed that:1) barriers to advance and retreat of the telecommunications industry is very high, the mainly because government franchise, the higher sunk costs and the higher technological demands etc.; However, with the deepening of market reforms and restructuring among telecommunications enterprises, barriers to advance and retreat of the market is gradually reduced and resulting in the formation of an oligopoly market structure.2) Alternative is between the different telecom products, the same telecommunications products was not significantly different.3) The policy-oriented restructuring of the telecommunications industry reduce the degree of monopoly, but the telecommunications company's strategic market behavior exacerbated the its degree of monopoly in some extent. On this basis, anglicizing the factors of affect the market structure, analysis shows that:without taking into account policy and technical factors, pricing strategies of oligopolistic enterprises is one of the important factors affecting market structure of the telecommunications industry, with the deepening of market-oriented reform of the telecommunications industry, this impact will grow.
The third chapter constructs telecommunications companies oligopoly price competition Bertrand model under the linear demand, on the basis this, built the oligopoly telecommunication enterprises prices dynamic adjustment model, anglicizing the process of Nash equilibrium, bifurcation and chaotic of prices dynamic adjustment model, through anglicizing the average profit of the oligopoly telecommunication enterprises price adjustment process, it is showed that:the average profit of telecommunications enterprises is most at the Nash equilibrium, thus keeping Nash equilibrium is important, so anglicizing the chaotic process and useing time-delay feedback chaos control methods to control chaos, in order to restore its Nash equilibrium, and enhance the enterprise's own profit that reduced in the process of the chaos; by analyzing the alternative coefficient impact on the enterprise's pricing policies, we can see the profits of telecommunications enterprises can be improve by improve the product substitutability form their own products to competitors'. The process of the telecom industry market structure evolution is analyses at the end.
On the basis of the third chapter, the fourth chapter considers the incompletely demand information, via. demand the introduction of noise items, and analyses oligopoly telecommunications companies price adjustment dynamic process and the average earnings of telecommunications companies at the process of Nash equilibrium, bifurcation and chaotic, considering separately the demand noise obey uniform distribution and normal distribution case; On this basis, anglicizing of the demand noise items and the risk coefficient impact to the pricing strategy, analysis showed that reducing the demand noise items and the risk coefficient can effectively prevent the company's products lower prices in order to prevent companies to reduce their own profits; by anglicizing the evolution process of telecommunications industry market structure showed that enterprise If you want to occupy a larger market share, will strive to maintain their price adjustments equilibrium, but hopes to rival the price adjustment rate.
Chapter V characterize oligopolistic telecom enterprises price competition process as a differential game model, and build oligopoly telecom companies dynamic optimization model from the profits and utility function of decision-makers different target respectively, and then expand the model to quadratic cost function and numerical simulation, analysis shows that:1) corporate decision-making objectives impacts obviously market share:when the income maximum is the enterprise'price target, level of market dominance will be reduced; and when the profit is the decision-making target, levels of monopolization of the market will increased:2) To reduce the degree of market dominance, increasing the enterprise product differentiation is an important way.
Overall, this paper combination game theory modeling with empirical research methods, study the oligopolistic telecommunications companies price adjustment strategy and the evolution dynamics of market structure, provide basis for decision making and initiatives for the reform of the telecommunications industry. The results have some theoretical value and actual significance for the healthy development of market-oriented operations of China's telecom industry.
本文在对我国电信产业改革历程进行实证性分析基础上,针对寡头电信竞争市场,运用动态调整、不完全信息博弈、微分博弈、混沌滞后控制等方法,分别就线性需求下、需求信息不完全条件下、随机需求信息下的寡头电信价格调整及其市场结构演化进行模型刻画与数值仿真分析,分析结论为市场化营运环境下寡头电信企业的定价策略与移动电信产业市场结构的演化动态提供理论支撑,具体来说,主要有以下研究内容：
第二章在充分考察我国电信产业的改革和发展历程基础上,分别对电信产业的进退壁垒、产品差异、市场集中度进行了分析和实证测算,分析结果表明：1)电信产业的进退壁垒很高,主要有政府特许经营、沉淀成本大、技术要求高等方面；但随着市场改革的深入与电信企业之间的重组,市场进退壁垒在逐步降低,从而导致形成寡头垄断市场结构。2)不同的电信产品之间有替代性,同一电信产品之间的产品差异不明显。3)政策性电信产业重组降低了电信产业的垄断程度,但电信企业的策略性市场行为在一定程度内加剧了电信产业的垄断度。在此基础上,分析了影响市场结构的因素,分析表明：如不考虑政策和技术因素,寡头企业的价格策略是影响电信产业市场结构的重要因素之一,随着电信产业市场化改革的深入,这种影响将越来越大。
第三章构建了线性需求下的电信企业寡头价格竞争伯川德模型,在此基础上构建寡头电信企业价格动态调整模型,分析了价格调整动态模型的Nash均衡、分岔和混沌等过程,通过对寡头电信企业价格调整过程中平均利润的分析表明：1)均衡状态下电信企业获得的平均利润最大,因此维持均衡是重要的,为此对混沌过程进行分析并运用滞后控制方法对其进行控制分析；2)通过分析替代系数对企业价格策略的影响可知,电信企业通过提高自身产品对竞争对手产品的可替代性,可提高企业自身利润。最后分析了电信产业的市场结构演化过程。
第四章在第三章基础上考虑了需求不完全信息的情况,即引进了需求噪音项,并分别考虑了需求噪音服从均匀分布与正态分布情况下,寡头电信企业的价格调整动态以及该动态经历均衡、分叉与混沌过程中,电信企业的平均收益；在此基础上分析了需求噪音项、企业风险系数等对企业价格策略的影响,分析表明：1)需求噪音越大,电信企业定价越高,但利润也就越小；2)风险偏好越大,企业利润也可能越低；3)当竞争对手的价格调整速度增大情况下,为维持自身的市场份额,电信企业的最优选择是维持自身价格策略不变。
第五章将寡头电信企业之间的价格竞争博弈刻画为微分博弈模型,分别从利润和考虑决策者不同目标效用函数角度构建寡头电信企业的动态优化模型,然后将上述模型拓展到二次成本函数情况,并度模型进行了数值模拟,分析表明：1)企业的决策目标对市场份额的影响很明显：企业以收益最大为定价目标,市场垄断程度就会降低；而当以利润为决策目标时,将导致市场垄断程度的加剧：2)要降低市场的垄断程度的话,增加企业产品的替代性是一条重要途径,而增加产品的差异性,则会提高市场的垄断程度。
总体而言,本文结合博弈理论建模和实证研究方法,研究寡头电信企业的价格调整策略与市场结构演化动态,以期为电信产业的改革提供决策依据及措施建议。研究结果对我国电信产业的市场化运营的健康发展具有一定的理论价值和实际借鉴意义。
With the constant deepening of China's economic reform and the continuous development of the national economy, China's telecom industry has also continued the development and strengthening and its value shared of the national GDP is also growing, at the end of 2008 China's phone users reached 982 million and Internet users reached 298 million. Although in recent years, China's telecommunications industry in general rapidly developing, but its internal development has been uneven: before the reorganization of the telecommunications industry in 2008, China Mobile company is an overwhelming majority, its market share continued to rise, China Telecom and China Unicom, China Netcom's market share the gradual convergence, China Railcom and China Satcom's market share is almost negligible, the competitition of telecommunications industry reducing, levels of monopoly rising and market structure loss its balance. After telecom industry reorganization, the newly established three major telecom companies are also asymmetrical in technology, assets, users, etc., but the competition has improved compared to before the reorganization, oligopoly situation initially formed in the fixed-line telephone, mobile phone, the Internet and other telecommunications services.
In this paper, on the basis of empirical anglicizing the reform process of China's telecom industry, for the oligopolistic competitive telecommunications market, telecommunications oligopoly price adjustment and its market structure evolution is described the model and numerical simulation analysis respectively under the linear demand, the incompletely demand information and the stochastic demand information using of dynamic adjustment, incomplete information game, differential game, time-delay feedback chaos control methods, analysis conclusion provides theoretical support for the pricing strategies of oligopolistic telecommunications enterprise in the market-oriented operating environment and the evolution dynamics of mobile telecommunications industry market structure, specifically, the main research contents are as follows:
The second chapter base on full investigation of China's telecom industry reform and development process, barriers to advance and retreat of the telecom industry, differentiation of products, market concentration are analyzed and empirical estimates, analysis showed that:1) barriers to advance and retreat of the telecommunications industry is very high, the mainly because government franchise, the higher sunk costs and the higher technological demands etc.; However, with the deepening of market reforms and restructuring among telecommunications enterprises, barriers to advance and retreat of the market is gradually reduced and resulting in the formation of an oligopoly market structure.2) Alternative is between the different telecom products, the same telecommunications products was not significantly different.3) The policy-oriented restructuring of the telecommunications industry reduce the degree of monopoly, but the telecommunications company's strategic market behavior exacerbated the its degree of monopoly in some extent. On this basis, anglicizing the factors of affect the market structure, analysis shows that:without taking into account policy and technical factors, pricing strategies of oligopolistic enterprises is one of the important factors affecting market structure of the telecommunications industry, with the deepening of market-oriented reform of the telecommunications industry, this impact will grow.
The third chapter constructs telecommunications companies oligopoly price competition Bertrand model under the linear demand, on the basis this, built the oligopoly telecommunication enterprises prices dynamic adjustment model, anglicizing the process of Nash equilibrium, bifurcation and chaotic of prices dynamic adjustment model, through anglicizing the average profit of the oligopoly telecommunication enterprises price adjustment process, it is showed that:the average profit of telecommunications enterprises is most at the Nash equilibrium, thus keeping Nash equilibrium is important, so anglicizing the chaotic process and useing time-delay feedback chaos control methods to control chaos, in order to restore its Nash equilibrium, and enhance the enterprise's own profit that reduced in the process of the chaos; by analyzing the alternative coefficient impact on the enterprise's pricing policies, we can see the profits of telecommunications enterprises can be improve by improve the product substitutability form their own products to competitors'. The process of the telecom industry market structure evolution is analyses at the end.
On the basis of the third chapter, the fourth chapter considers the incompletely demand information, via. demand the introduction of noise items, and analyses oligopoly telecommunications companies price adjustment dynamic process and the average earnings of telecommunications companies at the process of Nash equilibrium, bifurcation and chaotic, considering separately the demand noise obey uniform distribution and normal distribution case; On this basis, anglicizing of the demand noise items and the risk coefficient impact to the pricing strategy, analysis showed that reducing the demand noise items and the risk coefficient can effectively prevent the company's products lower prices in order to prevent companies to reduce their own profits; by anglicizing the evolution process of telecommunications industry market structure showed that enterprise If you want to occupy a larger market share, will strive to maintain their price adjustments equilibrium, but hopes to rival the price adjustment rate.
Chapter V characterize oligopolistic telecom enterprises price competition process as a differential game model, and build oligopoly telecom companies dynamic optimization model from the profits and utility function of decision-makers different target respectively, and then expand the model to quadratic cost function and numerical simulation, analysis shows that:1) corporate decision-making objectives impacts obviously market share:when the income maximum is the enterprise'price target, level of market dominance will be reduced; and when the profit is the decision-making target, levels of monopolization of the market will increased:2) To reduce the degree of market dominance, increasing the enterprise product differentiation is an important way.
Overall, this paper combination game theory modeling with empirical research methods, study the oligopolistic telecommunications companies price adjustment strategy and the evolution dynamics of market structure, provide basis for decision making and initiatives for the reform of the telecommunications industry. The results have some theoretical value and actual significance for the healthy development of market-oriented operations of China's telecom industry.
引文
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