基于博弈论框架的国际碳减排机制研究
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摘要
当前,全球气候谈判存在着区域差异、利益取向、减排量和时机选择等方面的不同,在减排博弈中逐渐形成几个重要的利益集团,衍生出相互制衡的多方激烈竞争的博弈格局。欧盟集团是全球气候变化谈判的积极推动者;美国为首的“伞形国家集团”的态度则摇摆不定;“77国集团+中国”为代表的发展中国家则不承担强制性减排量目标。合作减排机制的形成直接取决于发达国家—发展中国家“两大阵营”博弈的均衡结果。在国际碳减排机制博弈中两大阵营各自以自身利益的最大化为目标,陷入“囚徒困境”非合作博弈,不能达成合作性协议。本文把发达国家和发展中国家之间可能产生的碳减排合作机制作为重点研究内容,运用博弈分析方法对多重碳减排机制的演化进行分析,并提出无限重复博弈解决国际气候问题,形成帕累托最优的国际碳减排机制的思路。同时阐述了国际博弈格局下形成南北碳减排合作机制的现实路径,以期将世界各主要减排利益集团统一在共同维护地球环境的框架之下。最后,试图从现实层面通过设计可行的制度安排、建设包容低碳模式的市场环境、推动社区建设、向低碳经济发展模式转型等,为我国实现碳减排找到可行的路径,推动我国低碳经济发展。
At present, the global climate negotiations have differences in region difference, benefits orientation, and timing of emissions reductions and other aspects. And a number of important interest groups evolved in the emissions game, and multiple checks and balances derived from the highly competitive game situation. The European Union is an active promoter of global climate change negotiations; but the US leading "umbrella group of countries" swing the attitude; "Group of 77 + China" leading developing countries not assume responsibility for emissions reductions. Co-reduction mechanism of the formation depends directly on the balanced result of developed countries - developing countries "two camps". In the international Carbon reduction mechanisms game, two camps in order to maximize their own interests, trapped in a "prisoner's dilemma" non-cooperative game, and can not reach a cooperative agreement. Between the developed and developing countries, this may produce carbon emission reduction as key research content, and by game analysis the evolution of multiple carbon emission reduction mechanism. Infinitely repeated games proposed to solve the international climate, and the formation of Pareto optimal international carbon emission reduction mechanism of thought. International Game also described patterns of carbon emissions under the North-South cooperation mechanisms for the formation of the reality of the path to emissions reduction that would be the world's major interest groups united in a common framework of safeguarding the global environment. Finally, try to design feasible from a practical level, through institutional arrangements, building an inclusive environment for low-carbon model of the market, and to promote community building, to the transformation of other low-carbon economic development model for China to achieve a viable path to find the carbon emissions and promote low carbon economic development.
At present, the global climate negotiations have differences in region difference, benefits orientation, and timing of emissions reductions and other aspects. And a number of important interest groups evolved in the emissions game, and multiple checks and balances derived from the highly competitive game situation. The European Union is an active promoter of global climate change negotiations; but the US leading "umbrella group of countries" swing the attitude; "Group of 77 + China" leading developing countries not assume responsibility for emissions reductions. Co-reduction mechanism of the formation depends directly on the balanced result of developed countries - developing countries "two camps". In the international Carbon reduction mechanisms game, two camps in order to maximize their own interests, trapped in a "prisoner's dilemma" non-cooperative game, and can not reach a cooperative agreement. Between the developed and developing countries, this may produce carbon emission reduction as key research content, and by game analysis the evolution of multiple carbon emission reduction mechanism. Infinitely repeated games proposed to solve the international climate, and the formation of Pareto optimal international carbon emission reduction mechanism of thought. International Game also described patterns of carbon emissions under the North-South cooperation mechanisms for the formation of the reality of the path to emissions reduction that would be the world's major interest groups united in a common framework of safeguarding the global environment. Finally, try to design feasible from a practical level, through institutional arrangements, building an inclusive environment for low-carbon model of the market, and to promote community building, to the transformation of other low-carbon economic development model for China to achieve a viable path to find the carbon emissions and promote low carbon economic development.
引文
①[美]菲尔德:《利他主义倾向——行为科学、进化理论与互惠的起源》,赵培、杨思磊、杨联明译,P26,长春出版社,2005,5。
①王俊峰,《论发达国家在温室气体减排问题伤的国际负债与国际责任》,国际技术经济研究,第10卷,第3期。
①详见[日]青木昌彦:比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社,2001.
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[11]庄贵阳.《京都议定书》的前途及其国际经济和政治影响[J].世界经济与政治,2001气候变化
[13]董晓.论包容循环经济的市场体系建设[D].博士学位论文,2007
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[17]靳涛.双层次互动进化博弈制度变迁模型[J].经济评论,2003(3)
[18]柯武刚、史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策[M] .商务印刷馆出版
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[28]施锡铨.博弈论[M].上海财经大学出版社,2002
[29]盛洪主编.现代制度经济学下卷[C].北京大学出版社,2003
[30]涂瑞和.《联合国气候变化框架公约》与《京都议定书》及其谈判进程[J].环境保护,2005年(3)
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[32]王俊峰.论发达国家在温室气体减排问题上的国际负债与国际责任[J].国际技术经济研究,2007(3)
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[34]朱江玲等.1850—2008年中国及世界主要国家的碳排放[J].北京大学学报,第46卷,第4期,2010(7)
[35]曾鸣、何深和杨玲玲.CDM与配额交易机制投资效果比较[J].华东电力2010年(3)
[36]庄贵阳.气候变化背景下的中国低碳经济发展之路[J].绿叶,2007(8)
[37]周宏春.中国低碳经济的发展重心[J].绿叶,2009(1)
[38]朱乐平.国际贸易视角下环境标准的进化博弈分析[D].暨南大学硕士学位论文,2007
[39]臧传琴,刘岩和王凌.信息不对称条件下政府环境规制政策设计——基于博弈论的视角[J].财经科学,2010(5)
[40]张丽妍.发展循环经济的制度障碍与制度创新[J].理论探索,2009(5)
[41]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海人民出版社,2007
[42]张发树,何建和刘滨坤.低碳技术国际转移的双重博弈研究[J].中国人口资源与环境,2010(4)
[43]张志强等.温室气体排放评价指标及其定量分析[J].地理学报,第63卷第7期。
[44]仲伟周.发达国家循环经济发展模式的比较分析及对我国的启示[J].资源开发与市场,2009(4)
①王俊峰,《论发达国家在温室气体减排问题伤的国际负债与国际责任》,国际技术经济研究,第10卷,第3期。
①详见[日]青木昌彦:比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社,2001.
[1] Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks[R]. Report prepared for:The terrestrial Carbon Group and UN-R EDD, May, 2009
[2] Bosetti, J. Frankel: Global Climate Policy Architecture and Political Feasibility--Specific Formulas and Emission Targets to Attain 460ppm CO2 Concentrations [R]. NBER Working Paper No.15516, 2009
[3]Baranzin, J. Goldemberg: A future for carbon taxes, Ecological Economics 32(2000):395-412
[4]David G. Ockwell, Ruediger Haum, Alexandra Mallett, Jim Watson: Intellectual property rights and low carbon technology transfer: Conflicting discourses of diffusion and development Global Environmental Change, Energy Policy, Volume 36,Issue 11, November 2008,Pages 4104-4115
[6] Nicolas Stern: The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change[R].2006
[7] Press Release of 16th March Zool, George Bush: "I oppose the Kyoto protoeol".http://www.cseindiao.org/html/au/au4-20010317.htm
[8]UK Government Energy White Paper, Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon Economy[R]. 2003
[9] UNFCCC. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on climate Change (UNFCCC) [R].FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1.Bonn.1997
[10]陈迎.国际气候制度的演进及对中国谈判立场的分析[J].中国与国际组织,2007
[11]庄贵阳.《京都议定书》的前途及其国际经济和政治影响[J].世界经济与政治,2001气候变化
[13]董晓.论包容循环经济的市场体系建设[D].博士学位论文,2007
[11]高鹏飞,陈文颖.二氧化碳减排对中国未来GDP增长的影响[J]清华大学学报,2004(6)
[14]郭熙保.经济发展理论与政策[M].中国社会科学出版社,2005
[15] [日]宫本宪一.环境经济学[M].北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2004
[16]黄桐城,武邦涛.基于治理成本和排污收益的排污权交易定价模型[J].上海管理科学,2004(6)
[17]靳涛.双层次互动进化博弈制度变迁模型[J].经济评论,2003(3)
[18]柯武刚、史漫飞.制度经济学:社会秩序与公共政策[M] .商务印刷馆出版
[19]林云华.排污权影子价格模型的分析及启示[J].环境科学与管理,2009(2)
[20]联合国.联合国气候变化框架公约[R].1992
[21]联合国.《联合国气候变化框架公约》京都议定书[R].1998
[22]李克国.排污许可证交易的理论与实践[J].重庆环境科学,2000(4)
[23] R.S.平狄克,D.L.鲁宾费尔德.微观经济学[M].中国人民大学出版社,2007
[24]欧训民,张希良和王若水.低碳环境友好技术国际转移博弈论研究[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2009
[25]【日】青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].远东出版社,2001
[26]【日】速水佑次郎.发展经济学——从贫困到富裕[M].社会科学文献出版社,2003
[27]【比】热若尔·罗兰.转型与经济学[M].北京大学出版社,2002
[28]施锡铨.博弈论[M].上海财经大学出版社,2002
[29]盛洪主编.现代制度经济学下卷[C].北京大学出版社,2003
[30]涂瑞和.《联合国气候变化框架公约》与《京都议定书》及其谈判进程[J].环境保护,2005年(3)
[31]王江,隋伟涛.碳排放权交易问题的博弈研究[J].理论研讨,2010
[32]王俊峰.论发达国家在温室气体减排问题上的国际负债与国际责任[J].国际技术经济研究,2007(3)
[33]余耀军.排污权交易的经济分析[J].财贸研究,2004(1)
[34]朱江玲等.1850—2008年中国及世界主要国家的碳排放[J].北京大学学报,第46卷,第4期,2010(7)
[35]曾鸣、何深和杨玲玲.CDM与配额交易机制投资效果比较[J].华东电力2010年(3)
[36]庄贵阳.气候变化背景下的中国低碳经济发展之路[J].绿叶,2007(8)
[37]周宏春.中国低碳经济的发展重心[J].绿叶,2009(1)
[38]朱乐平.国际贸易视角下环境标准的进化博弈分析[D].暨南大学硕士学位论文,2007
[39]臧传琴,刘岩和王凌.信息不对称条件下政府环境规制政策设计——基于博弈论的视角[J].财经科学,2010(5)
[40]张丽妍.发展循环经济的制度障碍与制度创新[J].理论探索,2009(5)
[41]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海人民出版社,2007
[42]张发树,何建和刘滨坤.低碳技术国际转移的双重博弈研究[J].中国人口资源与环境,2010(4)
[43]张志强等.温室气体排放评价指标及其定量分析[J].地理学报,第63卷第7期。
[44]仲伟周.发达国家循环经济发展模式的比较分析及对我国的启示[J].资源开发与市场,2009(4)