农村信用社治理机制及治理效率研究
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摘要
农村信用社在我国从20世纪50年代初诞生至今,历经半个多世纪的风雨,虽数经改革,但成效不大。目前农村信用社以股份合作制形式存在,虽然有些已改制为农村合作银行和农村商业银行,但产权不清、内部治理机制弱化、外部治理机制缺失的问题一直没有得到真正解决。尤其是“内部人控制”现象严重,权力缺乏制衡,由此而建立的社员大会、理事会、监事会形同虚设,管理层完全操控了农村信用社,无法形成有效的激励监督机制,单纯依靠形式上的内部治理结构的改善,无法解决其高昂的代理成本与治理机制的缺陷问题。
本文主要以委托代理理论为基础,从农村信用社制度变迁出发,剖析了农村信用社特殊的双重委托代理关系;从农村信用社双重委托代理的视角,揭示了农村信用社产权不够明晰、主体虚置和内部人控制严重等内部治理机制的缺陷,阐释了所有权和经营权分离条件下的信息不对称与合约不完全是农村信用社滋生“内部人控制”治理风险产生的根源。为了解决农村信用社公司治理机制的深层次问题,本文尝试使用“预先承诺制”,较好的解决了各利益相关者与农村信用社及信用社主任之间的目标冲突。
其次,从治理效率最优化过程分析入手,探索了建立在不完备产权契约理论基础上的农村信用社治理结构的动态均衡与优化,并系统研究了利益相关者共同治理模式下的农村信用社内部治理优化机制。在对农村信用社内部治理效益与治理成本重新界定的基础上,提出了基于成本与收益视角的农村信用社最优内部治理效率标准,为其合理配置股权结构和提高治理效率提供了有益的参考。同时,尝试以AHP法在构建农村信用社内部治理评价指标体系的基础上,运用InternalGovernance-Analytic Network Process(IG-ANP),对山东省各地区农村信用社内部治理能力进行了客观评价。
最后,从山东省农村信用社内部治理结构特征分析入手,揭示了农村信用社内部治理结构与经营业绩的内在联系。选取能够反映山东省农村信用社总体水平的主要指标,在对各市经营状况进行因子分析的基础上,采用统计分析软件SPSS,运用聚类分析方法对17个市的发展水平进行了综合评价,并从明晰产权归属、优化股权结构、完善制衡机制等方面,探索了在国家新的改革政策环境中,信用社内部治理机制优化和治理效率提高的可行途径,为解决信用社产权主体虚置和“内部人控制”问题提供了有力的支撑。
Born from the early 1950s,rural credit cooperatives in China have reached limited success,even though they have suffered a lot for more than half a century.Up to now,rural credit cooperatives set up in the form of joint-stock cooperative system. Although some have reformed into rural cooperative banks,the problems like unclear property rights,weaken the internal governance,external governance mechanisms for the issue of missing has not been solved at all.
Especially for the serious phenomenon of "internal control" and the lack of balance in power in rural credit cooperatives,the formerly established members of the General Assembly,the Council,and the board of supervisors exist in name only,and the managers of rural credit cooperatives have full control over the rural credit cooperatives,which can not stimulate the formation of an effective incentive mechanism.To rely solely on the improvement of the formal structure of internal governance can not solve the high agents cost and the defects of governance mechanisms in rural credit cooperatives.
Starting from the transition of system in rural credit cooperatives,the principle-agency theory has been mainly utilized,and the special double agency relationship of rural credit cooperatives was analyzed.Meanwhile,the serious deficiencies in internal control mechanisms such as the lack of clear property rights and the main and severe internal control have been fully revealed.That demonstrated that it is the asymmetric information and incomplete contract under the separation of ownership and the right to operate that is the root of the insider-control risk.To solve this deep rooted problem,this paper tries to use the term "pre-commitment approach" as a better solution for the conflict between all stakeholders and Rural Credit Cooperatives and all directors.
In addition,based on the process of governance efficiency optimization,the dynamic balance and optimization of the rural credit cooperatives based on incomplete contract theory has been explored and the optimizing mechanism of internal governance under model of co-governance of all stakeholders was systematically studied.Besides,on the basis of redefining internal governance efficiency and governance costs,this paper comes up with criteria for optimal internal governance efficiency from the perspective of cost and revenue,acting as helpful reference for rational allocation and the improvement of Rural Credit Cooperatives' governance efficiency.Meanwhile,trying to apply AHP to the construction of Rural Credit Cooperatives' internal governance criteria system,the paper aims at carrying out objective evaluation over the internal governance capability of all Rural Credit Cooperatives around Shandong Province based on the use of IG-ANP.
Finally,starting from analyzing the structure characteristics of Shandong Rural Credit Cooperatives' internal governance,the artical revealed the internal relationship between internal governance structure and business achievement,able to select the indicators which reflect the overall level of Shandong Rural Credit Cooperatives, and based on the analysis of all operation factors and the statistical analysis software SPSS,conducted a comprehensive evaluation for 17 city-level Rural Credit Cooperatives' developing condition using the method of cluster analysis,as well as explored possible channels for Rural Credit Cooperatives to enhance internal governance mechanism and governance efficiency under new national reforming environment,in terms of identifying the property rights,optimizing the equity structure,improving the balance mechanism and etc.which provides powerful support for the solution of virtual property and "insider control" in Rural Credit Cooperatives.
本文主要以委托代理理论为基础,从农村信用社制度变迁出发,剖析了农村信用社特殊的双重委托代理关系;从农村信用社双重委托代理的视角,揭示了农村信用社产权不够明晰、主体虚置和内部人控制严重等内部治理机制的缺陷,阐释了所有权和经营权分离条件下的信息不对称与合约不完全是农村信用社滋生“内部人控制”治理风险产生的根源。为了解决农村信用社公司治理机制的深层次问题,本文尝试使用“预先承诺制”,较好的解决了各利益相关者与农村信用社及信用社主任之间的目标冲突。
其次,从治理效率最优化过程分析入手,探索了建立在不完备产权契约理论基础上的农村信用社治理结构的动态均衡与优化,并系统研究了利益相关者共同治理模式下的农村信用社内部治理优化机制。在对农村信用社内部治理效益与治理成本重新界定的基础上,提出了基于成本与收益视角的农村信用社最优内部治理效率标准,为其合理配置股权结构和提高治理效率提供了有益的参考。同时,尝试以AHP法在构建农村信用社内部治理评价指标体系的基础上,运用InternalGovernance-Analytic Network Process(IG-ANP),对山东省各地区农村信用社内部治理能力进行了客观评价。
最后,从山东省农村信用社内部治理结构特征分析入手,揭示了农村信用社内部治理结构与经营业绩的内在联系。选取能够反映山东省农村信用社总体水平的主要指标,在对各市经营状况进行因子分析的基础上,采用统计分析软件SPSS,运用聚类分析方法对17个市的发展水平进行了综合评价,并从明晰产权归属、优化股权结构、完善制衡机制等方面,探索了在国家新的改革政策环境中,信用社内部治理机制优化和治理效率提高的可行途径,为解决信用社产权主体虚置和“内部人控制”问题提供了有力的支撑。
Born from the early 1950s,rural credit cooperatives in China have reached limited success,even though they have suffered a lot for more than half a century.Up to now,rural credit cooperatives set up in the form of joint-stock cooperative system. Although some have reformed into rural cooperative banks,the problems like unclear property rights,weaken the internal governance,external governance mechanisms for the issue of missing has not been solved at all.
Especially for the serious phenomenon of "internal control" and the lack of balance in power in rural credit cooperatives,the formerly established members of the General Assembly,the Council,and the board of supervisors exist in name only,and the managers of rural credit cooperatives have full control over the rural credit cooperatives,which can not stimulate the formation of an effective incentive mechanism.To rely solely on the improvement of the formal structure of internal governance can not solve the high agents cost and the defects of governance mechanisms in rural credit cooperatives.
Starting from the transition of system in rural credit cooperatives,the principle-agency theory has been mainly utilized,and the special double agency relationship of rural credit cooperatives was analyzed.Meanwhile,the serious deficiencies in internal control mechanisms such as the lack of clear property rights and the main and severe internal control have been fully revealed.That demonstrated that it is the asymmetric information and incomplete contract under the separation of ownership and the right to operate that is the root of the insider-control risk.To solve this deep rooted problem,this paper tries to use the term "pre-commitment approach" as a better solution for the conflict between all stakeholders and Rural Credit Cooperatives and all directors.
In addition,based on the process of governance efficiency optimization,the dynamic balance and optimization of the rural credit cooperatives based on incomplete contract theory has been explored and the optimizing mechanism of internal governance under model of co-governance of all stakeholders was systematically studied.Besides,on the basis of redefining internal governance efficiency and governance costs,this paper comes up with criteria for optimal internal governance efficiency from the perspective of cost and revenue,acting as helpful reference for rational allocation and the improvement of Rural Credit Cooperatives' governance efficiency.Meanwhile,trying to apply AHP to the construction of Rural Credit Cooperatives' internal governance criteria system,the paper aims at carrying out objective evaluation over the internal governance capability of all Rural Credit Cooperatives around Shandong Province based on the use of IG-ANP.
Finally,starting from analyzing the structure characteristics of Shandong Rural Credit Cooperatives' internal governance,the artical revealed the internal relationship between internal governance structure and business achievement,able to select the indicators which reflect the overall level of Shandong Rural Credit Cooperatives, and based on the analysis of all operation factors and the statistical analysis software SPSS,conducted a comprehensive evaluation for 17 city-level Rural Credit Cooperatives' developing condition using the method of cluster analysis,as well as explored possible channels for Rural Credit Cooperatives to enhance internal governance mechanism and governance efficiency under new national reforming environment,in terms of identifying the property rights,optimizing the equity structure,improving the balance mechanism and etc.which provides powerful support for the solution of virtual property and "insider control" in Rural Credit Cooperatives.
引文
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