大卫·刘易斯模态哲学思想研究
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摘要
现代模态逻辑是克拉伦斯·欧文·刘易斯(Clarence Ivring Lewis)二十世纪初创立的。在他建立S1—S5五个模态系统之后,如何确立模态逻辑的语义学以及其合法性,一直是当代模态逻辑学家们力图解决的问题。二十世纪五、六十年代,克里普克等人创立可能世界语义学之后,模态逻辑的地位和价值才逐渐得到学界的认可。在这之后,模态哲学家们逐渐加入对可能世界这个概念的研究队伍,并提出了一些竞争性理论,大卫·刘易斯的模态实在论就是其中之一。在这些理论的竞争中,模态实在论因为不符合直观而被众多学者批评,处于不利的竞争地位,但迄今乃保持着顽强的生命力。本文试图表明,以往对刘易斯的模态实在论的批评,在很大程度上源于对其模态哲学思想的误视与错解,也与其理论表达上的特点与缺陷相关。通过正本清渊阳比较分析,系统而融贯地把握刘易斯的模态哲学思想,可以凸显出其优于其他模态哲学理论的合理之处,从而发挥其应有的解题功能。
刘易斯的模态哲学思想主要是其模态实在论。模态实在论主要由三个部分构成：可能世界理论、对应体理论和归结主义方法。此外,刘易斯的模态哲学思想还包含了其对反事实条件句的分析,是前者的应用理论。因而,本文主体部分分为以下五章：
第一章介绍模态逻辑的发展历史和研究背景,指出模态哲学研究的价值,并对刘易斯的模态哲学思想进行了简要评述,对本文的研究方法和创新给予说明。
第二章是对刘易斯的可能世界理论的研究。在可能世界理论中,刘易斯认为可能世界是实在的,是不可归结的,它们就如同现实世界一样是实在的。在实在性的种类上,可能世界与现实世界是没有区别的刘易斯认为可能世界具有四个特征：孤立性、具体性、充裕性和现实性。而正是因为这些特征,使得模态实在论被称为极端模态实在论,因而遭到了很多的批判。根据对刘易斯使用的这些概念的分析,本文表明刘易斯所理解的这些概念并不完全是通常意义上的使用,尤其是实在、现实与具体等概念。实在是一种存在,是相对于规律或事实的存在,主要可以分为三个层次：实际的存在,相对于现实规律的现实可能的实在以及相对于逻辑规律的逻辑可能的实在。这些层次的区分并不能否认实在的质上的共同性,可能世界与现实世界在实在的质上是没有差别的。“现实的”可以做两种理解,一种是逻辑可能意义上的实在,另一种是站在现实角度的可现实性,表达了一种相对于现实规律的现实可能性。而“具体的”并不以在现实世界中存在为前提,非现实存在也可以是具体的。而且,站在现实世界中的主体的立场上来理解,模态实在论所表示的就是一种现实可能性,而可能世界的实在性也是不可否认的。
第三章是对刘易斯的对应体理论的研究。在关于个体的跨界问题上,刘易斯认为不存在个体跨界的可能,更不存在跨界同一问题,他主张以对应体关系来代替跨界同一。对应体关系不是同一关系,也不是一一对应关系,而是一种相似关系,而且外在的相似性占有重要的权重。刘易斯主张对应体关系,是因为两个原因：一是与可能世界的特征相关。可能世界都是实在的,孤立的,因而,作为可能世界中的个体,都是限界个体,并且都是具体的。承认跨界同一,必定带来理论上的冲突。二是对莱布尼兹同一物不可辨别性原理的坚持。不同世界中的个体必定具有不同的属性,若主张跨界同一,必定违反同一物不可辨别性原理。在此基础上,刘易斯构建了对应体逻辑系统,并从解释力上对对应体理论的优势进行了论述。本文认为,关于这个问题的争辩双方都存在对同一物不可辨别性原理的误用,同一物不可辨别性原理本来就不适用于跨界个体。对应体关系取代跨界同一,是可能世界理论的要求。面对对应体关系所受到的批评,本文表明,从认识论和对模态命题的断定来看,对应体关系体现了一种对模态的认识。结合对应体关系的相似标准,尤其是外在的相似在确定对应体关系中的作用,对应体关系体现了一种情境的相似性。
第四章是对刘易斯的归结主义方法的研究。在唯名论思想的背景下,刘易斯主张如命题、属性等概念都可以通过可能世界与个体以及集合归结性地表示出来。在对这些概念归结性解释时,刘易斯提出了一个标准,那就是它们所发挥的作用,而不是它们的完全等同。本文认为,仅仅在它们所发挥的作用上,尤其是在模态论述上,把命题、属性等概念归结性地解释为个体的集合,从真的角度来看,是合理的。但如果把归结的双方完全等同,那么这种归结方法是难以接受的。
第五章是对刘易斯反事实理论的分析。反事实理论是刘易斯使用可能世界语义学以及模态实在论对反事实条件句进行分析的结果。刘易斯首先认为,反事实蕴涵是一个严格蕴涵,但不同于一般的是,反事实蕴涵在不同的前提下,它的严格性会发生变化。本文通过分析认为,反事实蕴涵作为一种可变的严格蕴涵,它的可变性体现在它所可及的世界的多少的变化。之所以有这种可及世界的多少的变化,在于反事实蕴涵的可及关系不仅仅与规律相关,也与前提条件与背景相关,而正是前提条件与背景的变化,导致了可及世界的变化,也使得反事实蕴涵的严格性发生了改变。对反事实条件句的判断,就在于对与之相似的可能世界或情境中命题的真假的判断。而对相似的可能世界与情境的考察正是对模态实在论及可能世界语义学的使用。刘易斯反事实分析的成功也体现了可能世界语义学与模态实在论在分析实际问题中的合理性。
通过对模态实在论以及反事实理论的研究,本文认为,刘易斯的模态实在论并不极端,也并非如同以往学界批判的那样荒谬。作为一个对可能世界的解释理论,模态实在论的价值主要体现在对模态问题的认识上。而且,在表达可能性的平权方面以及模态命题的断定上,模态实在论比温和实在论更有说服力。
Modern modal logic was founded by C. I. Lewis at the beginning of the 20th century. Ever since then, and especially since his thinking on the five model systems SI to S5, how to establish the semantics of modal logic and its legitimacy has always been an important issue for modern logicians. In the 1950's and 1960's, Kripke established the semantics of possible worlds. Afterwards, the status and value of modal logic gradually became recognized by scholars. More and more modal logicians joined in the research of the concept of possible worlds and brought forward some competing theories. The modal realism of David Lewis was one of them. However, among these competing theories, modal realism received much critique because of its non-consistence with intuition. But it still showed it's powerful vitality. This thesis tries to show that the criticisms on David Lewis'modal realism are due to the misunderstanding of his thought on modal philosophy to a great extent, and it is partly because of the character of Lewis'expression with the theory. By clarfying the original and by comparision, we can find that David Lewis' thought on modal philosophy is systematic and coherent. It just shows that modal realism is superior to other theories of modal philosophy, which makes it play an important role in sovling the questions.
The modal philosophy of David Lewis is mainly represented by modal realism, which consists of three main components:possible-world theory, counterpart theory, and reductionism. In addition, Lewis's modal philosophy includes the analysis of counterfactuals, which is the application of modal realism. Thus, the main body of this paper is divided into the following five chapters:
The first chapter describes the historical development of modal logic and its research background, points out the value of studying modal philosophy, introduces briefly Lewis' modal philosophy and provides an explanation of the methods of this innovative research.
The second chapter focuses on Lewis' possible-world theory. In the theory of possible worlds, Lewis claims that possible worlds are real and irreducible. These worlds are just like the actual world.In view of the species of reality, possible worlds and the actual world have no difference. According to Lewis, possible worlds have four characteristics:isolation, concreteness, plentitude and actuality. It is precisely because of these characteristics that modal realism has been called extreme modal realism and been much criticized. Based on the analysis of Lewis' use of these concepts, this thesis shows that Lewis did not use them in the normal sense, especially the concepts of "reality", "actuality" and "concreteness". Reality is an existence, relative to the existence of laws or fact. It can be divided into three levels:the actual existence, actual possible reality in relation to actual laws, and logical possible realty in relation to logical laws. The distinction between these levels cannot deny the commonality in respect to the quality of reality, that is, the real world and possible worlds have no difference in respect to the quality of reality. "Actuality" can have two kinds of understanding. One is reality in the sense of logical possibility, and the other is reality from the point of view of actuality, i.e. the expression of a real possibility in relation to actual laws. "Concreteness" does not necessarily have the actual world as its premise. Non-actuality can also be concrete. Understood by those who live in the actual world, modal realism represents an actual possibility. Thus, the reality of possible worlds is undeniable.
The third chapter studies the counterpart theory of Lewis. On trans-world issues, Lewis believes that there is no possibility for this, neither for trans-world identity. He proposes the counterpart relation to replace trans-world identity. Counterpart relationships are not identity relationships, neither are they one to one relationships. Rather, they are relationships of similarity, in which external similarity plays an important role. Lewis supports the theory of counterpart relations for two reasons. The first is associated with the characteristics of possible worlds. Possible worlds are real and isolated. Therefore, individuals in possible worlds are world-bound individuals and they are concrete. The recognition of trans-world identity would certainly lead to theoretical conflicts. The second reason is the insistence on Leibniz's principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. Individuals in different worlds must have different properties. If we claim trans-world identity, it will certainly violate the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. On this basis, Lewis builds the counterpart logical system, and discusses the advantages of counterpart theory from the view of its explanatory power.This paper argues that the two sides of the dispute both misuse the principle, as this principle cannot be applied to trans-world individuals. That counterpart relation replaces trans-world identity is necessary for the consistency of the possible-world theory. Facing the criticism of counterpart relations, this paper argues, from the point of view of epistemology and the judgment of modal propositions that the theory of counterpart relationships reflects an understanding of modality. In view of the standard of similarity of the counterpart relation theory, especially the role of external similarity in determining the counterpart relationship, the counterpart relation theory reflects a similarity of situation.
The fourth chapter researches Lewis'reductionism. With the back-ground of nominalism, Lewis advocates that concepts such as proposition and property can be expressed by the reduction to the possible worlds, individuals, and sets. When he interprets these concepts by method of reduction, Lewis proposes a standard based on the role they play, rather than their identity. This paper argues that from the point of view of truth, especially in modal discourse, it is reasonable to explain concepts, such as proposition and property by reducing them to a set of individuals. But if the two sides of reduction are identified, this method may be unacceptable.
The fifth chapter analyses Lewis's counterfactual theory. Counterfactual theory is a result of Lewis'use of possible world semantics and modal realism in the analysis of counterfactual conditionals. Firstly, Lewis thinks that counterfactual implication is a strict implication. Different from others, its strict implication changes according to different contexts. After analyzing, this paper thinks that the variability of counterfactual implication, as a variable and strict implication, is reflected in changes in the worlds within its reach. The reason why changes in the worlds within its reach happen, lies in the fact that the accessibility relation of counterfactual implication is not only associated with laws, but also with prerequisites and backgrounds. It is changes of prerequisites and backgrounds which lead to changes in the worlds within reach and the strictness of counterfactual implication. The judgment of counterfactual conditionals is the judgment of the truth or falsity of propositions belonging to similar possible worlds or situations. The study of similar possible worlds and situations is an application of modal realism and possible world semantics. The success of Lewis' counterfactual analysis also reflects the justifiability of possible world semantics and modal realism in the analysis of practical problems.
By studying modal realism and counterfactual theory, this paper claims that David Lewis' modal realism is not extreme and it is not as absurd as some scholars' criticisms claim it to be. As an explanation theory of possible worlds, the true value of modal realism lies in the understanding of modal problems. Moreover, in view of the equality of possibility and of the judgment of modal propositions, modal realism is more convincing than moderate realism.
刘易斯的模态哲学思想主要是其模态实在论。模态实在论主要由三个部分构成：可能世界理论、对应体理论和归结主义方法。此外,刘易斯的模态哲学思想还包含了其对反事实条件句的分析,是前者的应用理论。因而,本文主体部分分为以下五章：
第一章介绍模态逻辑的发展历史和研究背景,指出模态哲学研究的价值,并对刘易斯的模态哲学思想进行了简要评述,对本文的研究方法和创新给予说明。
第二章是对刘易斯的可能世界理论的研究。在可能世界理论中,刘易斯认为可能世界是实在的,是不可归结的,它们就如同现实世界一样是实在的。在实在性的种类上,可能世界与现实世界是没有区别的刘易斯认为可能世界具有四个特征：孤立性、具体性、充裕性和现实性。而正是因为这些特征,使得模态实在论被称为极端模态实在论,因而遭到了很多的批判。根据对刘易斯使用的这些概念的分析,本文表明刘易斯所理解的这些概念并不完全是通常意义上的使用,尤其是实在、现实与具体等概念。实在是一种存在,是相对于规律或事实的存在,主要可以分为三个层次：实际的存在,相对于现实规律的现实可能的实在以及相对于逻辑规律的逻辑可能的实在。这些层次的区分并不能否认实在的质上的共同性,可能世界与现实世界在实在的质上是没有差别的。“现实的”可以做两种理解,一种是逻辑可能意义上的实在,另一种是站在现实角度的可现实性,表达了一种相对于现实规律的现实可能性。而“具体的”并不以在现实世界中存在为前提,非现实存在也可以是具体的。而且,站在现实世界中的主体的立场上来理解,模态实在论所表示的就是一种现实可能性,而可能世界的实在性也是不可否认的。
第三章是对刘易斯的对应体理论的研究。在关于个体的跨界问题上,刘易斯认为不存在个体跨界的可能,更不存在跨界同一问题,他主张以对应体关系来代替跨界同一。对应体关系不是同一关系,也不是一一对应关系,而是一种相似关系,而且外在的相似性占有重要的权重。刘易斯主张对应体关系,是因为两个原因：一是与可能世界的特征相关。可能世界都是实在的,孤立的,因而,作为可能世界中的个体,都是限界个体,并且都是具体的。承认跨界同一,必定带来理论上的冲突。二是对莱布尼兹同一物不可辨别性原理的坚持。不同世界中的个体必定具有不同的属性,若主张跨界同一,必定违反同一物不可辨别性原理。在此基础上,刘易斯构建了对应体逻辑系统,并从解释力上对对应体理论的优势进行了论述。本文认为,关于这个问题的争辩双方都存在对同一物不可辨别性原理的误用,同一物不可辨别性原理本来就不适用于跨界个体。对应体关系取代跨界同一,是可能世界理论的要求。面对对应体关系所受到的批评,本文表明,从认识论和对模态命题的断定来看,对应体关系体现了一种对模态的认识。结合对应体关系的相似标准,尤其是外在的相似在确定对应体关系中的作用,对应体关系体现了一种情境的相似性。
第四章是对刘易斯的归结主义方法的研究。在唯名论思想的背景下,刘易斯主张如命题、属性等概念都可以通过可能世界与个体以及集合归结性地表示出来。在对这些概念归结性解释时,刘易斯提出了一个标准,那就是它们所发挥的作用,而不是它们的完全等同。本文认为,仅仅在它们所发挥的作用上,尤其是在模态论述上,把命题、属性等概念归结性地解释为个体的集合,从真的角度来看,是合理的。但如果把归结的双方完全等同,那么这种归结方法是难以接受的。
第五章是对刘易斯反事实理论的分析。反事实理论是刘易斯使用可能世界语义学以及模态实在论对反事实条件句进行分析的结果。刘易斯首先认为,反事实蕴涵是一个严格蕴涵,但不同于一般的是,反事实蕴涵在不同的前提下,它的严格性会发生变化。本文通过分析认为,反事实蕴涵作为一种可变的严格蕴涵,它的可变性体现在它所可及的世界的多少的变化。之所以有这种可及世界的多少的变化,在于反事实蕴涵的可及关系不仅仅与规律相关,也与前提条件与背景相关,而正是前提条件与背景的变化,导致了可及世界的变化,也使得反事实蕴涵的严格性发生了改变。对反事实条件句的判断,就在于对与之相似的可能世界或情境中命题的真假的判断。而对相似的可能世界与情境的考察正是对模态实在论及可能世界语义学的使用。刘易斯反事实分析的成功也体现了可能世界语义学与模态实在论在分析实际问题中的合理性。
通过对模态实在论以及反事实理论的研究,本文认为,刘易斯的模态实在论并不极端,也并非如同以往学界批判的那样荒谬。作为一个对可能世界的解释理论,模态实在论的价值主要体现在对模态问题的认识上。而且,在表达可能性的平权方面以及模态命题的断定上,模态实在论比温和实在论更有说服力。
Modern modal logic was founded by C. I. Lewis at the beginning of the 20th century. Ever since then, and especially since his thinking on the five model systems SI to S5, how to establish the semantics of modal logic and its legitimacy has always been an important issue for modern logicians. In the 1950's and 1960's, Kripke established the semantics of possible worlds. Afterwards, the status and value of modal logic gradually became recognized by scholars. More and more modal logicians joined in the research of the concept of possible worlds and brought forward some competing theories. The modal realism of David Lewis was one of them. However, among these competing theories, modal realism received much critique because of its non-consistence with intuition. But it still showed it's powerful vitality. This thesis tries to show that the criticisms on David Lewis'modal realism are due to the misunderstanding of his thought on modal philosophy to a great extent, and it is partly because of the character of Lewis'expression with the theory. By clarfying the original and by comparision, we can find that David Lewis' thought on modal philosophy is systematic and coherent. It just shows that modal realism is superior to other theories of modal philosophy, which makes it play an important role in sovling the questions.
The modal philosophy of David Lewis is mainly represented by modal realism, which consists of three main components:possible-world theory, counterpart theory, and reductionism. In addition, Lewis's modal philosophy includes the analysis of counterfactuals, which is the application of modal realism. Thus, the main body of this paper is divided into the following five chapters:
The first chapter describes the historical development of modal logic and its research background, points out the value of studying modal philosophy, introduces briefly Lewis' modal philosophy and provides an explanation of the methods of this innovative research.
The second chapter focuses on Lewis' possible-world theory. In the theory of possible worlds, Lewis claims that possible worlds are real and irreducible. These worlds are just like the actual world.In view of the species of reality, possible worlds and the actual world have no difference. According to Lewis, possible worlds have four characteristics:isolation, concreteness, plentitude and actuality. It is precisely because of these characteristics that modal realism has been called extreme modal realism and been much criticized. Based on the analysis of Lewis' use of these concepts, this thesis shows that Lewis did not use them in the normal sense, especially the concepts of "reality", "actuality" and "concreteness". Reality is an existence, relative to the existence of laws or fact. It can be divided into three levels:the actual existence, actual possible reality in relation to actual laws, and logical possible realty in relation to logical laws. The distinction between these levels cannot deny the commonality in respect to the quality of reality, that is, the real world and possible worlds have no difference in respect to the quality of reality. "Actuality" can have two kinds of understanding. One is reality in the sense of logical possibility, and the other is reality from the point of view of actuality, i.e. the expression of a real possibility in relation to actual laws. "Concreteness" does not necessarily have the actual world as its premise. Non-actuality can also be concrete. Understood by those who live in the actual world, modal realism represents an actual possibility. Thus, the reality of possible worlds is undeniable.
The third chapter studies the counterpart theory of Lewis. On trans-world issues, Lewis believes that there is no possibility for this, neither for trans-world identity. He proposes the counterpart relation to replace trans-world identity. Counterpart relationships are not identity relationships, neither are they one to one relationships. Rather, they are relationships of similarity, in which external similarity plays an important role. Lewis supports the theory of counterpart relations for two reasons. The first is associated with the characteristics of possible worlds. Possible worlds are real and isolated. Therefore, individuals in possible worlds are world-bound individuals and they are concrete. The recognition of trans-world identity would certainly lead to theoretical conflicts. The second reason is the insistence on Leibniz's principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. Individuals in different worlds must have different properties. If we claim trans-world identity, it will certainly violate the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. On this basis, Lewis builds the counterpart logical system, and discusses the advantages of counterpart theory from the view of its explanatory power.This paper argues that the two sides of the dispute both misuse the principle, as this principle cannot be applied to trans-world individuals. That counterpart relation replaces trans-world identity is necessary for the consistency of the possible-world theory. Facing the criticism of counterpart relations, this paper argues, from the point of view of epistemology and the judgment of modal propositions that the theory of counterpart relationships reflects an understanding of modality. In view of the standard of similarity of the counterpart relation theory, especially the role of external similarity in determining the counterpart relationship, the counterpart relation theory reflects a similarity of situation.
The fourth chapter researches Lewis'reductionism. With the back-ground of nominalism, Lewis advocates that concepts such as proposition and property can be expressed by the reduction to the possible worlds, individuals, and sets. When he interprets these concepts by method of reduction, Lewis proposes a standard based on the role they play, rather than their identity. This paper argues that from the point of view of truth, especially in modal discourse, it is reasonable to explain concepts, such as proposition and property by reducing them to a set of individuals. But if the two sides of reduction are identified, this method may be unacceptable.
The fifth chapter analyses Lewis's counterfactual theory. Counterfactual theory is a result of Lewis'use of possible world semantics and modal realism in the analysis of counterfactual conditionals. Firstly, Lewis thinks that counterfactual implication is a strict implication. Different from others, its strict implication changes according to different contexts. After analyzing, this paper thinks that the variability of counterfactual implication, as a variable and strict implication, is reflected in changes in the worlds within its reach. The reason why changes in the worlds within its reach happen, lies in the fact that the accessibility relation of counterfactual implication is not only associated with laws, but also with prerequisites and backgrounds. It is changes of prerequisites and backgrounds which lead to changes in the worlds within reach and the strictness of counterfactual implication. The judgment of counterfactual conditionals is the judgment of the truth or falsity of propositions belonging to similar possible worlds or situations. The study of similar possible worlds and situations is an application of modal realism and possible world semantics. The success of Lewis' counterfactual analysis also reflects the justifiability of possible world semantics and modal realism in the analysis of practical problems.
By studying modal realism and counterfactual theory, this paper claims that David Lewis' modal realism is not extreme and it is not as absurd as some scholars' criticisms claim it to be. As an explanation theory of possible worlds, the true value of modal realism lies in the understanding of modal problems. Moreover, in view of the equality of possibility and of the judgment of modal propositions, modal realism is more convincing than moderate realism.
引文
①在本文中,如果没有特别说明,刘易斯均指称大卫·刘易斯(David Lewis)。
①陈波,逻辑哲学导论[M],北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000,p168.
①张力锋,论模态柏拉图主义[J],科学技术与辩证法,2006年第6期,p39.
②Yagisawa,T., "Possible Worlds as Shifting Domains", Erkenntnis (1975-), Vol.36, No.1, pp.83-101,Springer, 1992.p83.
①[美]麦克尔·路克斯,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],朱新民译,上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p206.
②同上,p204.
③同上,p205.
①周礼全,模态逻辑导论[M]，上海：上海人民出版社,1986,p379.
①[美]索尔·克里普克,命名与必然性[M],梅文译,上海：上海译文出版社,2001,绪言p17.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p84.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p85.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p88.
②北京大学哲学系外国哲学史教研室.西方哲学原著选读[C].北京：商务印书馆,1983,p476.
②Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p69-70.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p69.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p81.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd.1986.D82.
②Ibid,p83.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlda,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p84.85.
②Ibid,p86.
③Ibid.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p86.
②Ibid,p87.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p88.
②Ibid.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
⑤Ibid.
⑥Ibid.
⑦Lewis,David K.,"Anselm and Actuality".Philosophical Papers Volume I,New York:Oxford University Press, 1983. P18.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p89.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p85-86.
③Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p93.
①[美]麦克尔.路克斯著,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p205-206.
②Yagisawa,T. " Beyond possible worlds." Philosophical Studies.53,1988, p183.
③Naylor, M. B. "A Note on David Lewis's Realism About Possible Worlds ", Analysis 46(January 1986),p29.
①Cf. Sharlow, M. F. "Lewis's Modal Realism:A Reply to Naylor."Analysis,Vol.48,No.1(Jan.,1988),p13.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p87, note57.
②Yagisawa,T. " Beyond possible worlds." Philosophical Studies 53,1988, p176.
①Richards,T. "The Worlds of David Lewis'", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1975, p53.
②Lewis,David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p111.
③Lewis,David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p112.
①Ibid,p113-114.
①Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals,Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p10.
①Stalnaker.Robert C., "Possible Worlds", Nous, Vol.10, No.1.1976. p68.
②Ibid, p68.
③Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p86.
①[美]索尔·克里普克,命名与必然性[M],梅文译,上海：上海译文出版社,2001,绪言p17.
②同上,p15.
③[美]麦克尔·路克斯著,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p205-206.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p93.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p82.
②Ibid, p83.
③Ibid.
④Ibid, p84-85.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p26.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic". Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p27.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlda,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p69.
②Ibid,p71.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p28.
②Ibid, p28-29.
Lewis, David K., "Survival and Identity", Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p67.
③Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p28.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic",Philosophical Papers volume I. Oxford University Press,1983,p42.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume 1, Oxford University Press,1983,p26.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p85.
②Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p93.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume Ⅰ, Oxford University Press,1983,p30.
①Cf.Lewis, David K., " Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983, p30-31,在参考中本文略作改动。
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic" Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p32.
②Ibid.
③Ibid, p29.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p192-193.
①[美]麦克尔·路克斯著,朱新民译,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社2008,p201.
②Plantinga,A.,The Nature of Necessity.Oxford,1974,p116.
③Kripke,S.,Naming and Necessity,Harvard,1980,p45,note 13.
①Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity, Oxford,1974, p116.
②Kripke, S., Naming and Necessity, Harvard,1980,p45, note 13.
①注：刘易斯因为对现实世界采取索引性解释,因此,他所说的现实世界不是一个绝对概念,而在这里所说的现实世界是根据日常理解来说的,即这里的现实世界就是指我们这个世界。
②麦克尔·路克斯著,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p205-206.
③Melia,J.,"A Note on Lewis's Ontology".Analysis,(52)1992,p 191～192.
①Lycan, W., "The Trouble with Possible Worlds", in Michael. J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, Cornell University Press,1979,p.290.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p87.
③Ibid
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p55.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p55.
②Ibid, p51.
③Ibid.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p50.
②Ibid, p52.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Pluralith of worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p52-53.
②Ibid,p53.
③Ibid.
①麦克尔·路克斯著,朱新民译,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p207-208.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p55.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p51.
②Ibid,p55.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
⑤Ibid,p55.56.
⑥Ibid,p56.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p56.
②Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", Philosophical Papers Volume I, New York: Oxford University Press,1983, p35.
①李小五,条件句逻辑[M],北京：人民出版社,2003,p12.
②亨佩尔,自然科学的哲学[M],上海：上海科学技术出版社,1986,p63.
①Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals,Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p26.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals. Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p65.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p1.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p8.
②Ibid, p8-9.
①刘易斯认为,对于每个世界i的可及球系都是环绕i的一系列同心圆。但是,可能存在一些可及球系,在该球系的最中间部分是空的,即该可及球系的中间不存在唯一一个和世界i最相似的前件为真世界,这些中间为空的可及球系,也称为非居中的,它们也适合一些反事实条件句,并且这种非居中的球系,只满足条件(1)(2)(3),而不满足条件(C)。
②Cf.Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p14.
①Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals,Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p84.
②Ibid,p91.
③Ibid.
①Nelson Goodman, "Seven Strictures on Similarity", in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, Experience and Theory, University of Massachusetts Press,1970, p27.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p92.
③Ibid, p1.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p8-9
②Ibid, p65.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p65
②Ibid, p66
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p84
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p42.
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②同上,p204.
③同上,p205.
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①[美]索尔·克里普克,命名与必然性[M],梅文译,上海：上海译文出版社,2001,绪言p17.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p84.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p85.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p88.
②北京大学哲学系外国哲学史教研室.西方哲学原著选读[C].北京：商务印书馆,1983,p476.
②Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p69-70.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p69.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p81.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd.1986.D82.
②Ibid,p83.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlda,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p84.85.
②Ibid,p86.
③Ibid.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p86.
②Ibid,p87.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p88.
②Ibid.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
⑤Ibid.
⑥Ibid.
⑦Lewis,David K.,"Anselm and Actuality".Philosophical Papers Volume I,New York:Oxford University Press, 1983. P18.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p89.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p85-86.
③Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p93.
①[美]麦克尔.路克斯著,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p205-206.
②Yagisawa,T. " Beyond possible worlds." Philosophical Studies.53,1988, p183.
③Naylor, M. B. "A Note on David Lewis's Realism About Possible Worlds ", Analysis 46(January 1986),p29.
①Cf. Sharlow, M. F. "Lewis's Modal Realism:A Reply to Naylor."Analysis,Vol.48,No.1(Jan.,1988),p13.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p87, note57.
②Yagisawa,T. " Beyond possible worlds." Philosophical Studies 53,1988, p176.
①Richards,T. "The Worlds of David Lewis'", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1975, p53.
②Lewis,David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p111.
③Lewis,David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p112.
①Ibid,p113-114.
①Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals,Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p10.
①Stalnaker.Robert C., "Possible Worlds", Nous, Vol.10, No.1.1976. p68.
②Ibid, p68.
③Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p86.
①[美]索尔·克里普克,命名与必然性[M],梅文译,上海：上海译文出版社,2001,绪言p17.
②同上,p15.
③[美]麦克尔·路克斯著,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p205-206.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p93.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p82.
②Ibid, p83.
③Ibid.
④Ibid, p84-85.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p26.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic". Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p27.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlda,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p69.
②Ibid,p71.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p28.
②Ibid, p28-29.
Lewis, David K., "Survival and Identity", Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p67.
③Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p28.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic",Philosophical Papers volume I. Oxford University Press,1983,p42.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume 1, Oxford University Press,1983,p26.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p85.
②Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p93.
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume Ⅰ, Oxford University Press,1983,p30.
①Cf.Lewis, David K., " Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983, p30-31,在参考中本文略作改动。
①Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic" Philosophical Papers volume I, Oxford University Press,1983,p32.
②Ibid.
③Ibid, p29.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p192-193.
①[美]麦克尔·路克斯著,朱新民译,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社2008,p201.
②Plantinga,A.,The Nature of Necessity.Oxford,1974,p116.
③Kripke,S.,Naming and Necessity,Harvard,1980,p45,note 13.
①Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity, Oxford,1974, p116.
②Kripke, S., Naming and Necessity, Harvard,1980,p45, note 13.
①注：刘易斯因为对现实世界采取索引性解释,因此,他所说的现实世界不是一个绝对概念,而在这里所说的现实世界是根据日常理解来说的,即这里的现实世界就是指我们这个世界。
②麦克尔·路克斯著,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p205-206.
③Melia,J.,"A Note on Lewis's Ontology".Analysis,(52)1992,p 191～192.
①Lycan, W., "The Trouble with Possible Worlds", in Michael. J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, Cornell University Press,1979,p.290.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p87.
③Ibid
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p55.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p55.
②Ibid, p51.
③Ibid.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p50.
②Ibid, p52.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Pluralith of worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p52-53.
②Ibid,p53.
③Ibid.
①麦克尔·路克斯著,朱新民译,当代形而上学导论(第二版)[M],上海：复旦大学出版社,2008,p207-208.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p55.
①Lewis,David K.,On the Plurality of Worlds,Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986,p51.
②Ibid,p55.
③Ibid.
④Ibid.
⑤Ibid,p55.56.
⑥Ibid,p56.
①Lewis, David K., On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers Ltd,1986, p56.
②Lewis, David K., "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", Philosophical Papers Volume I, New York: Oxford University Press,1983, p35.
①李小五,条件句逻辑[M],北京：人民出版社,2003,p12.
②亨佩尔,自然科学的哲学[M],上海：上海科学技术出版社,1986,p63.
①Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals,Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p26.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals. Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p65.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p1.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p8.
②Ibid, p8-9.
①刘易斯认为,对于每个世界i的可及球系都是环绕i的一系列同心圆。但是,可能存在一些可及球系,在该球系的最中间部分是空的,即该可及球系的中间不存在唯一一个和世界i最相似的前件为真世界,这些中间为空的可及球系,也称为非居中的,它们也适合一些反事实条件句,并且这种非居中的球系,只满足条件(1)(2)(3),而不满足条件(C)。
②Cf.Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973,p14.
①Lewis,David K.,Counterfactuals,Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p84.
②Ibid,p91.
③Ibid.
①Nelson Goodman, "Seven Strictures on Similarity", in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, Experience and Theory, University of Massachusetts Press,1970, p27.
②Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p92.
③Ibid, p1.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p8-9
②Ibid, p65.
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p65
②Ibid, p66
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Malden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p84
①Lewis, David K., Counterfactuals, Maiden:Basil Blackwell Ltd,1973, p42.
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