身体意象与身体图式——具身认知研究
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摘要
如果说20世纪60年代的认知科学研究是以计算机科学为基础的话,那么到了20世纪80年代则转向了以心理学和生物学为基础的研究.进入21世纪,神经科学对认知科学研究的关键性和基础性作用越来越突显了出来。认知科学界对神经科学研究成果的重视带来的一个“效应”就是具身性在认知科学研究中的重要作用越来越引起学者们的关注。但是,如果对神经科学研究的重视走向了极端,就会将身体在人类体验和认知中的重要作用仅仅还原为神经生物学上的过程.这是我们所要避免的。
尽管“具身性”在认知科学的研究中已经成为一个新的热点,但是目前国内对具身认知的研究还主要是建立在现象学分析的基础上在概念层面对具身性进行探讨.可是,单凭哲学和现象学上的反思无法精确地告诉我们具身性到底是如何在我们的认知中发挥作用的以及我们对身体的觉知在何种程度上并且是以何种方式进入到我们的意识内容中去的,因为当现象学遭遇非现象过程的时候,就自然而然显现了其局限性。我认为想要深入探究身体是如何在我们的认知和行动中发挥重要作用的,我们就必须抛弃那种自下而上的用神经元机制来解释任何事物的过于简单的进路,同时也要抛弃那种自上而下的用认知状态来解释任何事物的过于复杂的进路,而诉诸于经验性研究的哲学进路。本文试图借助神经科学、生理学、行为科学、心理学等经验性学科的研究成果,考察身体意象和身体图式的不同功能,并进一步探讨具身性是如何通过身体意象和身体图式,以一种前意向性的方式对我们的行动和认知产生重要影响的。这是一种将哲学与经验性的科学成果融合在一起的全新的、大胆的尝试。
在这个方面,对一些具有代表性的病理学案例和经验科学实验的探讨将使我们受益匪浅。患有偏侧忽略病症的病人,尽管在身体意象上忽略了自己的半侧身体,但是由于身体图式系统仍完好无损,他们仍然能够运用那部分被他们“忽略”或“遗忘”的身体完成意向性的身体活动。患有传入神经阻滞病症的病人,尽管身体图式缺失了,但是在身体意象的帮助下,仍然能够通过视觉和认知上的努力来维持身体的平衡和基本运动。这两个案例有力地证明了,在心理学和哲学传统上认为是同一的“身体意象”和“身体图式”其实是两个完全不同的概念.尽管在具身的行为层面,两者共同发挥作用、密不可分,但是我们却有必要在概念层面对它们进行明确的区分,因为两者在我们的具身性的知觉和行动中发挥着不同的功能。身体意象不是一个心灵哲学范畴中的概念,它是一种精神建构、表征或关于身体的信念.它包括了我们对自己身体的知觉经验、信念、情感态度等三方面的内容.而身体图式则是一种知觉-运动系统能力,它通过对身体姿势和身体运动无意识的调适,使得世界中许多有意义的部分被整合到我们的经验中。但是,我们却不能将身体图式的功能简单地还原到神经生物学上的过程,因为身体运动的方式不但迎合了行动者的意图,而且能够支持或限制行动者在环境中的运动需要。
学术界普遍认为,身体意象和身体图式是后天习得的。也就是说,它们并不是先天就有的,而是建立在我们所具有的对自己身体长期的知觉体验之上的。这种传统的观点受到了经验性科学研究成果的挑战。一些先天性的缺肢患者也会出现幻肢以及新生婴儿从出生之时起就能够对他人的面部表情进行模仿的科学事实表明:从本质上来说,身体图式是先天的;尽管身体意象内容本身不是先天的(受到社会、教育、习俗、文化的很大影响),但是构成身体意象的元素以及身体意象的基本框架是先天的;并且不同的知觉模块之问先天地就能够进行交互。在新生婴儿对他人的面部表情进行模仿的实验中,我们发现新生婴几不但对自己的脸部有着本体感受的觉知,而且在对自我和他人进行区分的同时,能够意识到他人是和自己一样的人。这似乎有些不可思议,但是却因为它们先天的身体图式、本体感受器、模块交互能力、镜像神经元等的存在而成为可能。
本文通过对一些病理学案例和经验性科学实验的分析表明了具身性在人类体验和认知中的重要作用。其实,从人类语言的获得和创造到包括判断和隐喻在内的更高级认知能力的发展都离不开具身性的作用。而具身性对我们认知和体验的作用正是通过身体意象和身体图式系统的功能来实现的。因而,从某种程度上说,亚里士多德“人类的心灵是身体的一种表述”的观点,在当代认知科学的研究中得到了确证.尽管我们可能意识不到,但是身体所发挥的前意向性功能使得我们能够在周围的环境中从事意向性活动并且在与他人和世界的交互活动中体现我们的人类本质。
In the 60s of last century, the study of Cognitive Science was mostly based on Computer Since, and in 80s, the study turned to be on the basis of Psychology and Biology. However, when time comes to 21th century, the importance of Neuroscience becomes more and more obvious. One of the results is, the broad argument about the role of embodiment for understanding cognition has been made in numerous ways, and also there is a growing consensus across a variety of disciplines within which this basic fact is inescapable. But if we let neuroscience go to the other end, the importance of our body in human experience and cognition will be only reduced into the processes of neurobiology. This is the approach that I try my best to avoid.
"Embodiment" becomes one of the hottest topics in the study of cognition, but the research of embodied cognition in China is mostly based on the analysis of Phenomenology and discusses the usefulness of embodiment as a theoretical concept. In some sense, this poses that Philosophy and Phenomenology run into their natural limitations when it comes up against non-philosophical and non-phenomenology processes. They cannot tell us exactly how embodiment works in human cognition and to what extent and in what way awareness of body enters into the content of conscious experience. In my view, in order to explore how body plays the important role in our cognition and action, we should not work exclusively from either the bottom-up or the up-bottom approach, because the approach of bottom-up which tries to discuss everything from the neural mechanisms is too simple and the approach of up-bottom which tries to explain everything from the state of cognition is too complicated for our study of embodied cognition.
In my view, there is no one approach could provide a full picture of the setting that we intend to explore. We should resort to the philosophical ways that are informed by empirical studies. As a result, in this thesis, I try to borrow from already established insights and results provided by different empirical studies, such as Neuroscience, Physiology, Behavioral Science, Psychology, to explore the different functions of body image and body schema system and further our understanding of how embodiment play an prenoetic role in our action and cognition through them. This is a new as well as strategic danger to combine Philosophy and empirical studies together.
On this aspect, I work my way through specific issues by exploring into some specific problems and examples—case studies, experiments or some pathological symptoms. Some people who suffer from Unilateral Neglect fail to perceive or attend to one side of their body in their body images, but their body schemas may remain intact or operational. Thus, they are still able to use the neglected or forgotten side of their body to do intentional bodily activities. The patient who suffers from Deafferentation misses body schema, however, with the help of intact body schema he is still able to make the balance of his body by vision and cognition. These two cases strongly prove that body image and body schema which are regarded as one thing in psychological and philosophical traditions are different concepts. Body image and body schema refer to two different but closely related systems. In embodied behavioral level the two systems interact and are highly coordinated. It is nonetheless useful and precisely distinct them in conceptual level, since they have different functions in our embodied consciousness and actions. Body image cannot be relegated to the mentalistic side. It is, as we first defined it, a system of spiritual construction, representation or beliefs pertaining to one's own body. It at least contains contents in three aspects: (1) our perceptual experience of our own bodies; (2) our emotional attitude toward our own bodies; and (3) our conceptual understanding of our bodies in general. But body schema is a sensory-motor system. By the adjustment of our bodily gestures and bodily activities, it integrates the meaningful part of the world into our experiences. However, we cannot simplify the functions of body schema into neurobiological processes, because the ways of our bodily activities not only cater for our intentions, but also support and constrain the need of our actions in the environment.
A central tenet of empiricist philosophy is that experience, in the sense of relatively prolonged practice of the sense organs, educates perception. On this view, throughout most of the past century, the received doctrine had been that the body image and body schema were acquired phenomenon; built up in our perceptual experience of our own bodies. But this established scientific doctrine was directly challenged by the results of empirical studies. The facts that phantoms existing in the case of congenital absence of limb and invisible imitation do occur in newborns prove that body schema is innate, and it works non-consciously to allow the infant to control and coordinate his/her imitative movements. Body image may in fact develop its content over the course of childhood and be influenced a lot by the factors of social, education, custom, but its framework and basic elements has an innate status; and the intermodal translation is operative from the very beginning of human beings. From the experiments of neonate, we found that the new born baby has a proprioceptive awareness of his/her own body; and knows the differentiation between self and other and also has recognition that the other is the same sort as him/herself. It sounds incredible, but does become possible because of the existence of innate body schema, proprioception, intermodal system and mirror neuron.
In order to give a whole and better picture of the importance of embodiment in human experience and cognition, my approach herein involves the interpretation of a large amount empirical data and studies. It is the work of body schema and body image that make the importance of embodiment possible. Thus, to some extent, the Aristotelian insight that the human soul is an expression of the human body has found significant verification in contemporary studies of cognition. Before we know it, the prenoetic function of our body is setting us on a course in which our human nature is expressed in intentional action and in interaction with others.
尽管“具身性”在认知科学的研究中已经成为一个新的热点,但是目前国内对具身认知的研究还主要是建立在现象学分析的基础上在概念层面对具身性进行探讨.可是,单凭哲学和现象学上的反思无法精确地告诉我们具身性到底是如何在我们的认知中发挥作用的以及我们对身体的觉知在何种程度上并且是以何种方式进入到我们的意识内容中去的,因为当现象学遭遇非现象过程的时候,就自然而然显现了其局限性。我认为想要深入探究身体是如何在我们的认知和行动中发挥重要作用的,我们就必须抛弃那种自下而上的用神经元机制来解释任何事物的过于简单的进路,同时也要抛弃那种自上而下的用认知状态来解释任何事物的过于复杂的进路,而诉诸于经验性研究的哲学进路。本文试图借助神经科学、生理学、行为科学、心理学等经验性学科的研究成果,考察身体意象和身体图式的不同功能,并进一步探讨具身性是如何通过身体意象和身体图式,以一种前意向性的方式对我们的行动和认知产生重要影响的。这是一种将哲学与经验性的科学成果融合在一起的全新的、大胆的尝试。
在这个方面,对一些具有代表性的病理学案例和经验科学实验的探讨将使我们受益匪浅。患有偏侧忽略病症的病人,尽管在身体意象上忽略了自己的半侧身体,但是由于身体图式系统仍完好无损,他们仍然能够运用那部分被他们“忽略”或“遗忘”的身体完成意向性的身体活动。患有传入神经阻滞病症的病人,尽管身体图式缺失了,但是在身体意象的帮助下,仍然能够通过视觉和认知上的努力来维持身体的平衡和基本运动。这两个案例有力地证明了,在心理学和哲学传统上认为是同一的“身体意象”和“身体图式”其实是两个完全不同的概念.尽管在具身的行为层面,两者共同发挥作用、密不可分,但是我们却有必要在概念层面对它们进行明确的区分,因为两者在我们的具身性的知觉和行动中发挥着不同的功能。身体意象不是一个心灵哲学范畴中的概念,它是一种精神建构、表征或关于身体的信念.它包括了我们对自己身体的知觉经验、信念、情感态度等三方面的内容.而身体图式则是一种知觉-运动系统能力,它通过对身体姿势和身体运动无意识的调适,使得世界中许多有意义的部分被整合到我们的经验中。但是,我们却不能将身体图式的功能简单地还原到神经生物学上的过程,因为身体运动的方式不但迎合了行动者的意图,而且能够支持或限制行动者在环境中的运动需要。
学术界普遍认为,身体意象和身体图式是后天习得的。也就是说,它们并不是先天就有的,而是建立在我们所具有的对自己身体长期的知觉体验之上的。这种传统的观点受到了经验性科学研究成果的挑战。一些先天性的缺肢患者也会出现幻肢以及新生婴儿从出生之时起就能够对他人的面部表情进行模仿的科学事实表明:从本质上来说,身体图式是先天的;尽管身体意象内容本身不是先天的(受到社会、教育、习俗、文化的很大影响),但是构成身体意象的元素以及身体意象的基本框架是先天的;并且不同的知觉模块之问先天地就能够进行交互。在新生婴儿对他人的面部表情进行模仿的实验中,我们发现新生婴几不但对自己的脸部有着本体感受的觉知,而且在对自我和他人进行区分的同时,能够意识到他人是和自己一样的人。这似乎有些不可思议,但是却因为它们先天的身体图式、本体感受器、模块交互能力、镜像神经元等的存在而成为可能。
本文通过对一些病理学案例和经验性科学实验的分析表明了具身性在人类体验和认知中的重要作用。其实,从人类语言的获得和创造到包括判断和隐喻在内的更高级认知能力的发展都离不开具身性的作用。而具身性对我们认知和体验的作用正是通过身体意象和身体图式系统的功能来实现的。因而,从某种程度上说,亚里士多德“人类的心灵是身体的一种表述”的观点,在当代认知科学的研究中得到了确证.尽管我们可能意识不到,但是身体所发挥的前意向性功能使得我们能够在周围的环境中从事意向性活动并且在与他人和世界的交互活动中体现我们的人类本质。
In the 60s of last century, the study of Cognitive Science was mostly based on Computer Since, and in 80s, the study turned to be on the basis of Psychology and Biology. However, when time comes to 21th century, the importance of Neuroscience becomes more and more obvious. One of the results is, the broad argument about the role of embodiment for understanding cognition has been made in numerous ways, and also there is a growing consensus across a variety of disciplines within which this basic fact is inescapable. But if we let neuroscience go to the other end, the importance of our body in human experience and cognition will be only reduced into the processes of neurobiology. This is the approach that I try my best to avoid.
"Embodiment" becomes one of the hottest topics in the study of cognition, but the research of embodied cognition in China is mostly based on the analysis of Phenomenology and discusses the usefulness of embodiment as a theoretical concept. In some sense, this poses that Philosophy and Phenomenology run into their natural limitations when it comes up against non-philosophical and non-phenomenology processes. They cannot tell us exactly how embodiment works in human cognition and to what extent and in what way awareness of body enters into the content of conscious experience. In my view, in order to explore how body plays the important role in our cognition and action, we should not work exclusively from either the bottom-up or the up-bottom approach, because the approach of bottom-up which tries to discuss everything from the neural mechanisms is too simple and the approach of up-bottom which tries to explain everything from the state of cognition is too complicated for our study of embodied cognition.
In my view, there is no one approach could provide a full picture of the setting that we intend to explore. We should resort to the philosophical ways that are informed by empirical studies. As a result, in this thesis, I try to borrow from already established insights and results provided by different empirical studies, such as Neuroscience, Physiology, Behavioral Science, Psychology, to explore the different functions of body image and body schema system and further our understanding of how embodiment play an prenoetic role in our action and cognition through them. This is a new as well as strategic danger to combine Philosophy and empirical studies together.
On this aspect, I work my way through specific issues by exploring into some specific problems and examples—case studies, experiments or some pathological symptoms. Some people who suffer from Unilateral Neglect fail to perceive or attend to one side of their body in their body images, but their body schemas may remain intact or operational. Thus, they are still able to use the neglected or forgotten side of their body to do intentional bodily activities. The patient who suffers from Deafferentation misses body schema, however, with the help of intact body schema he is still able to make the balance of his body by vision and cognition. These two cases strongly prove that body image and body schema which are regarded as one thing in psychological and philosophical traditions are different concepts. Body image and body schema refer to two different but closely related systems. In embodied behavioral level the two systems interact and are highly coordinated. It is nonetheless useful and precisely distinct them in conceptual level, since they have different functions in our embodied consciousness and actions. Body image cannot be relegated to the mentalistic side. It is, as we first defined it, a system of spiritual construction, representation or beliefs pertaining to one's own body. It at least contains contents in three aspects: (1) our perceptual experience of our own bodies; (2) our emotional attitude toward our own bodies; and (3) our conceptual understanding of our bodies in general. But body schema is a sensory-motor system. By the adjustment of our bodily gestures and bodily activities, it integrates the meaningful part of the world into our experiences. However, we cannot simplify the functions of body schema into neurobiological processes, because the ways of our bodily activities not only cater for our intentions, but also support and constrain the need of our actions in the environment.
A central tenet of empiricist philosophy is that experience, in the sense of relatively prolonged practice of the sense organs, educates perception. On this view, throughout most of the past century, the received doctrine had been that the body image and body schema were acquired phenomenon; built up in our perceptual experience of our own bodies. But this established scientific doctrine was directly challenged by the results of empirical studies. The facts that phantoms existing in the case of congenital absence of limb and invisible imitation do occur in newborns prove that body schema is innate, and it works non-consciously to allow the infant to control and coordinate his/her imitative movements. Body image may in fact develop its content over the course of childhood and be influenced a lot by the factors of social, education, custom, but its framework and basic elements has an innate status; and the intermodal translation is operative from the very beginning of human beings. From the experiments of neonate, we found that the new born baby has a proprioceptive awareness of his/her own body; and knows the differentiation between self and other and also has recognition that the other is the same sort as him/herself. It sounds incredible, but does become possible because of the existence of innate body schema, proprioception, intermodal system and mirror neuron.
In order to give a whole and better picture of the importance of embodiment in human experience and cognition, my approach herein involves the interpretation of a large amount empirical data and studies. It is the work of body schema and body image that make the importance of embodiment possible. Thus, to some extent, the Aristotelian insight that the human soul is an expression of the human body has found significant verification in contemporary studies of cognition. Before we know it, the prenoetic function of our body is setting us on a course in which our human nature is expressed in intentional action and in interaction with others.
引文
[1]刘晓力,认知科学研究纲领的困境与走向,《中国社会科学》2003年第1期,第99-108页.
[1]刘晓力,认知科学研究纲领的困境与走向,《中国社会科学》2003年第1期,第101页.
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[2]感谢我的师兄徐献军老师,多次热情地与我分享他在人工智能与现象学方面研究的成果与心得.
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[1]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂:《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译.北京:商务印书馆,2001年版.第255-256页.
[1]H.Dreyfus,and S.Dreyfus,What Computer Still Cannot do,Harper and Row:MIT Press,1992,pp160-161.
[2]不过.具身认知并没有完全取代非具身认知.非具身认知仍然是主导的范式,因为它更具操作性.
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[1]S.Galllagher.,How Body Shapes the Mind,Clarendon Press:Oxford,2005,p38.
[1]S.Galllagher.,How Body Shapes the Mind,Clarendon Press:Oxford,2005,p38.
[1]偏侧忽略又称视觉忽略.表现为患者对侧空间的刺激失去反应,应答及定向力功能障碍.国内外关于偏卢忽略的报道多见于右侧大脑半球病变引起左侧忽略.关于后侧空间忽视国外仅有少数报道,目前国内尚未有报道.这样的例子可能涉及到身体意象的情感、知觉和表征的方面.例如一个中风患者会说那只手臂看上去或者感觉起来不是他自己的.但是当他渐渐对手臂有了意识的时候,他似乎有种抵触情绪:“我觉得这只手臂奇丑无比,我希望它离我远点”.
[2]并不是所有偏侧忽略的病例中身体图式都是完好无损的.考斯利特(H.B.Coslett)认为在一些案例中,身体图式的功能也会发生了混乱.这种混乱同时导致了身体意象的失常.在考斯利特的实验中.主体不仅忽视了自己的半侧身体,而且相应的身体部分也无法配合完成任何动作.参见H.B.Coslett,Evidence for a Disturbance of the Body Schema in Neglect,Brain and Cognition,1989(37):527-544.
[3]D.Denny-Brown,The significance of perceptual rivalry resulting from parietal lesion.Brain,1952(75):433-471.
[1]J.A.Ogden,Fractured Minds:A Case-Study Approach to Clinical Neuropsychology.Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996,pp109-120.
[2]H.K.Pribram,Brain and the composition of conscious experience,Journal of Comparative Neurology,1999(37):123.
[3]S.R.Jackson,Reaching movements may reveal the distorted topography of special representations after neglect.Neuropsychology,2000,38(4):507.
[1]S.Gallagher.How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p35.
[2]S.Gallagher,J.Cole,Body Image and Body Schema in a Deafferented Subject,Journal of Mind and Behavior,1995(16):369.
[3]这发生在1971年伊恩还只有19岁的时候.根据记载,他的急性神经系统疾病是由单核细胞增多症的感染而引起的.神经生理学的诊断确诊他颈部以下的大量神经纤维受损.
[1]前庭是人体平衡系统的主要末梢感受器官,长在头颅的颞骨岩部内.前庭器官有特殊的解剖结构和功能特征.前庭感受器感知身体在空间的位置及其位置变化,并将这些信息向中枢传递,主要产生两个方面的生理效应:一方面对身体变化了的位置和姿势进行调节,保持人体平衡;另一方面参与调节眼球运动,使人体在体位改交和运动中保持清晰的视觉,故它对保持我们的姿势平衡和清晰的视觉起重要作用.
[2]S.Gallagher,How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p46.
[1]但是也有认知科学研究者和神经科学家认为简单的运动程序在没有本体感受反馈的情况下仍能正常运行.为了支持这种观点,福欧普(B.T.volpe)曾经描述过一个案例.有一名患有传入神经阻滞的患者,因为大脑皮层的损伤,右手坏死.左手正常.如果你用东西刺激一下他的左手,我们会发现他的运动程序是正常的.其实,这个案例与伊恩的案例很不相同,因为这名病患是依赖触觉而维持运动程序的.但伊恩不是.在丧失了触觉后,伊恩只能借助视觉信息来维持运动程序.
[2]H.Head,Studies in Neurology,Oxford Univenity Press,1920,p183.
[1]这是还未公开发表的PET实验所得出的结论.伊恩在没有视觉的帮助下做了一个动作,他的小脑区域被激活了.伊恩的6个调节器官共同完成了按顺序弯曲手指的动作.PET对以下两种情形进行了扫描:第一种是通过视频记录在线视觉反馈的运动,第二种是没有运动视觉反馈的运动.在第一种情况下.伊恩的右前视觉和两侧小脑的区域被激活,这表明相对于控制器来说伊恩更加依赖于视觉反馈信息来引导运动.在第二种情形之下的运动是没有视觉反馈的.右前脑,右下顶骨大脑皮层和两侧小脑(视觉和运动神经区域)都被激活.这表明对运动至上而下的,认知地控制.在后一种情形中右下顶骨大脑皮层的激活表明从一定程度上说伊恩用局外人的角度看待自己的身体.
[2]J.Decety and T.Chaminade,A PET exploration of the mechanisms involved in imitation,NeuroImage,2002(15):265-272.
[1]对身体的关注或对身体的意识就是身体意象的一部分.
[2]M.Kinsbourne,Awareness of one's own body:An attentional theory of its nature,development,and brain basis.In Josea,J.Bermudez,(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT,1995,p217.
[1]A.J.Marcel,The sense of agency:Awareness of ownership of actions and intentions,in J.Roessler and N.Eilan(eds.),Agency and Self-Awareness,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003,p74.
[2]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译.北京:商务印书馆,2001年版,第383页.
[1]这并不意味着驾驶员是处于无意识状态之下驾车的.相反.对于一直工作着的高效的视觉-运动系统来说,这种体验不在长期记忆的范围内.“在驾车以及其他许多行为中,我们很快忘记了我们自己做过什么是有用的事情(并且减少了危险性),因为我们关注的总是当下以及马上要发生的事情”(S.Gallagher,"The Body Nature of Consciousness",Mind,2001,110(438):580.
[2]J.Cole,Still Lives:Narratives of Spinal Cord Injury,Cambridge,Mass:MIT,2005,pⅹⅲ.
[1]S.Gallagher,Body schema and intentionality,in Josea,L.Bermudez,(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press,1995,pp233-234.
[1]B.O'Shaughnessy,Perprioception and the body image,in Jose.a,L.Bermudez,(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press,1995,p179.
[2]M.Sheets-Johnstone,Consciousness:A Nature History,Journal of Consciousness Studies,1998,5(3):259-294.
[3]J.Cole,and D.MecNeill,Gesture following deafferentation:A phenomenologically informed experimental study,Phenomenology and the cognitive science,2002(1):54.
[1]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译,北京:商务印书馆,2001年版,第243页.
[2]J.Decety,Shared representations between self and others:A social cognitive neuroscience view,Trends in Cognitive Science,2005(7):530.
[1]W.James,The Principles of Psychology,New York:Dover,1950,p24.
[1]A.Meltzoff,and M.K.Moore,Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.Science,1977(198):75-78.
[2]M.L.Simmel,The conditions of occurrence of phantom limbs,Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,1958(74):499.
[3]M.L.Simmei,Developmental aspects of the body scheme,Child Development,1966(37):93.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p84.
[2]瓦龙是法国著名的哲学家、心理学家和神经心理学家.在他的著作“The Turbulent Child”中,瓦龙将儿童的发展分为三个阶段:动作发展阶段(0-3岁)、主观或个性发展阶段(3-6岁)、思想形成阶段(6-12岁).他的观点和论述当时的心理学和哲学界引起了极大的反响.
[3]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Phenomenon of Perception,London:Routledge & Kegan Paul,1962,pp101-121.
[4]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1964,p122.
[5]Ibid,p123.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,7he Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1964,pp 121 - 125.
[2]J.Piaget,Dreams and Imitation in Childhood,New York:Norton,1962,pp19-45.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and The Invisible,Northwestern University Press,1968,pp116-117.
[2]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p352.
[3]A.Meltzoff and M.K.Moore,Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.Science,1977(198):75-78.
[4]梅尔佐夫和摩尔的研究报告显示,16-21天大的婴儿能够模仿三种面部表情(噘嘴.张嘴和伸舌头),以及连续的手指运动(按照一定的手指运动顺序张手、合手).费尔德在1987年发表的实验报告表明2天大的婴儿能够模仿大人的面部表情如微笑、皱眉或者吃惊的表情等.
[1]此图的原始图片出自梅尔佐夫与摩尔在1977年在《科学》第187期上发表的著名论文“Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates".本图片下载自:http://www.runet.edu/～jaspelme/121/121%20video%20clips.htm
[1]洛克将莫利纽克斯提出的难题收入了《人类理智论》第二版,第二卷,第九章,第8节.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press.1962,p223.
[2]例如.触觉和视觉模块在时空上都是不同的.对这个问题的分析和探讨,详见梅洛-庞蒂的《知觉现象学》.
[1]梅尔佐夫也认为新生婴儿对他人的模仿问题与莫利纽克斯问题非常相似.由此,根据莫利纽克斯提出的难题,他提出了另一个假设性问题:假设一位先天的盲者可以完成一些基本的身体活动,如张嘴、穿农、吃饭等,并且他能对自己所完成的不同动作进行区分.那么,如果有一天,这位先天的盲者忽然恢复了视觉.在他睁开眼睛的一刺那,看到了他眼前的另一个人张着嘴巴.那么试问,这位刚刚恢复视觉的盲者能够在不用手触碰眼前这个人的嘴形的情况下.对张嘴的动作进行模仿吗?
[2]D.Diderot,Letter on the blind.In M.J.Morgan(trans.),Molyneux's Question:Vision,Touch and the Philosophy of Perception.Cambridge University Press.1749,p52.
[3]W.James,The Principles of Psychology,New York:Dover.1950,p24.
[4]在对婴儿的知觉发展的分析以及对莫利纽克斯难题的讨论中,梅洛-庞蒂曾多次批判过经验主义的知觉理论,但是最终他又因为经验性研究的结果而支持了经验主义者的论点.但是,很显然,他自己也在这些观点中挣扎,并最终用他的模块交互知觉的现象学理论来解释新生婴儿和莫利纽克斯患者的最初知觉体验.
[1]A.Meltzoff,and R.W.Borton,Intermodal matching by human neonates.Nature.1979(282):223
[2]A.Streri和E.Gentaz.在2003年发表的论文中也提出了类似结论.
[3]A.Meltzoff,Molyneux's babies:Cross-modal perception,imitation,and the mind of the preverbal infant.In N.Eilan.,R.McCarthy,and B.Brewer(eds.),Spatial Representation:Problems in Philosophy and Psychology.Oxford:Basil Blackwell.1993,p224.
[1]S.Gallgher,and A.Meltzoff,The earliest sense of self and others:Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental Studies.Philosophical Psychology.1996(9):223.
[2]有研究表明,尽管新生婴儿的视觉记忆不是很长,但是仅出生两天的娶儿至少在5分钟内仍能保留对母亲脸庞的记忆:并且在新生耍儿对他人的面部表情进行的模仿过程中.也涉及到短暂的视觉记忆.
[1]J.C.Crowley,Early development of ocular dominance columns.Science.2000,(Vol.17):1322.
[2]Ibid,p1325.
[1]C.J.Shatz,The developing brain.Scientific American(U.K.),1992(3):35-41.
[2]C.J.Birnholz,Observing the human fetus,in W.P.Smotherman(ed.),Behavior of Fetus.Caldwell,NJ:Telford,1998.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and The Invisible,Northwestern University Press,1968,p116.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and The Invisible,Northwestern University Press,1968,p118.
[2]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p352.
[3]在对前庭的处理过程的论述中,卓恩(F.Jouen)和盖瞢恩尼(O.Gapenne)也有类似的表述:“表征头部周转率的输入信息来自前庭系统,这些信息与表征视觉神经运动的视觉信号有着同样的编码”(F.Jouen,and O.Gapenne,Interactions between the vestibular and visual systems in the neonate.In P.Rochat(ed.),The Self in Infancy:Theory and Research.Amsterdam:Elsevier Science.1995,p288 ).
[1]E.Husserl,Cartesian Meditations,trans.D.Cairns,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff.1970,p50.
[2]Ibid,p54.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p119.
[2]对新生婴儿的前庭和视觉系统的研究中也得出这样的结论:新生婴儿所具有的一些全身反应主要特征使得人从出生起就能够将自己从环境中区分出来.
[1]D.Dennett,Brainstorms:Philosophic Essays on Mind and Psychology.Montgomery,Vt.:Bradford Books,1978,p207.S.Meuse,Phantoms,lost limbs,and the limits of the body-self.In M.O'Donovan-Anderson(ed.),The Incorporated Self:Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Embodiment,Lanham:Rowman & Littlefield,1996,pp47-64.
[1]我们又一次发现了传统认知文献中身体图武和身体意象这两个术语的混淆(见本文第一章).在对幻肢现象进行讨论的文献中,不少学者将身体意象和身体图式这两个术语混用在一起.这里.我用“身体图武(意象)”正是想表明传统认知对这些概念的混用.正如我在第一章中指出,斯莫尔是极少数意识到身体图武和意象之间存在区别的学者之一.他认为是身体图式出现的混乱导致了先天缺肢患者出现幻肢.但是.问题在于他们所谈到的身体图式或身体意象是否与我们在第一章中定义的身体意象和身体图式一致.
[2]M.L.Simmel,The conditions of occurrence of phantom limbs,Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,1958(74):499.
[3]M.Medeau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p86.
[1]S.Weinstein,snd E.A.Sersen,Phantoms in cases of congenital absence of limbs.Neurology,1961(11):910.
[1]M.L.Simmel,The absence of phantoms for congenitally missing limbs.Proceedings of American Philosophical Society,1961(102):72.
[2]K.Poeck,Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs,Cortex,1964(1):269-275.
[2]P.Scatena,Phantom representations of congenitally absent limbs,Perceptual and Motor Skills,1990(70):1227-1232.
[2]R.Melzack,Phantom limbs and the concept of neuromatrix,Trends in Neuoscience,1991(13):88-92.
[1]认知科学家通常认为幻肢现象是身体意象的一个部分,而且患者自身对幻肢的描述似乎已经成了支持这种观点最有力的证据.由此Halligan,Zeman,and Berger写道:“如果我们能够更亲近我们的病人生活,我们就能最大限度地理解这种幻肢现象”.
[2]K.Poeck,Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs,Cortex,1964(1):269-275.
[1]S.Gallagher,How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p91.
[1]K.Poeck,Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs,Cortex,1964(1):269-275.
[2]S.Weinstein,E.A.Sersen,and R.J.Vetter,Phantoms and somatic sensation in cases of congenital aplasia.Cortex,1964(1):276-290.
[3]E.S.M.Saadah and R.Melzack,Phantom limb experiences in congenital limb-deficient adults.Cortex,1994(30):479-485.
[4]M.L.Simmel,Phantoms-experiences following amputation in childhood.Journal of Neurology,Neurosurgery and Psychiatry,1962(102):292-550.
[5]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知覺現象學》姜志辉译,商务印书馆,2005年,第110、121页.
[6]J.Katz,The reality of phantom limbs.Motivation and Emotion,1993(17):156.
[1]尽管对新生婴儿模仿行为进行的研究已经为身体图式的先天性体统了很好的明证,但是这促使着我们对先天性缺肢患者的幻肢现象寻求更好的解释,一种可以与对新生婴儿模仿行为研究获得的结论相一致的解释.
[2]V.S.Ramachandran,end W.Hirstein,The perception of phantom limbs.Brain,1998(121):1603.
[1]M.J.Flower,Neuromaturation of the human fetus.Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,1985(10):237.
[2]M.Sheets-Johnstone,Consciousness:A Nature History,Journal of Consciousness Studies,1998(5):270.
[3]T.Humphrey,Some Correlations between the appearance of human fetal reflexes and the development of the nervous systems.Progress 1 Brain Research,1964(4):127.
[4]F.Jouen,and O.Gapenne,interactions between the vestibular and visual systems in the neonate.In P.Rochat(ed.),The Self in Infancy:Theory and Research.Amsterdam:Elsevier Science.1995,pp.277-301.
[5]M.Sheets-Johnstone,Consciousness:A Nature History,Journal of Consciousness Studies,1998(5):292.
[6]这种超声波扫描能够非常清楚地显示.胎儿下顎张开,打哈欠甚至是舌头的运动的细节.
[7]H.F.R.Prechtl,Continuity and change in early neural development.In H.R.R.Prechtl(ed.),Continuity of Neural Functions from Prenatal to Postnatal Life.Oxford:Blackwell Scientific/Spastics.International.1984,pp1-15.
[8]S.Gallagher,How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press.1995,p95.
[9]H.F.R.Prechtl,and B.Hopkins.Developmental transformations of spontaneous movements in early infancy.Early Human development.1986(14):254.
[1]G.Butterworth,Hang-mouth coordination in the newborn baby.British Journal of Developmental Psychology,1988(6):303-314.
[2]P.Casaer,Postural behavior in newborn infants.Clinics in Developmental Medicine.1979(72):56.
[3]Ibid,p61.
[4]G Rizzolatti,L.Fogassi,and V.Gallese,Cortical mechanisms subserving object grasping and action recognition:A new view on the cortical motor functions.In M.S.Gazzaniga(ed.),The New Neuroscience,Cambridge,Mass:MIT,2002,p550.
[5]T.M.Preuss,I.Stepniewska,and J.H.Kass,Movement representation in the dorsal and ventral premotor areas of owl monkeys:A micostimulation study.The Journal of Comparative Neurology,1996(371):649-676.
[1]这个假说最初是由巴特尔沃斯提出的.这种假说与梅尔扎克的“先天神经元基质”的概念是一致的.(R.Melzack,Phantom limbs and the concept ofa neuromatrix.Trends in Neuroscience,1990(13):82-92.
[1]V.S.Ramachandran,and W.Hirstein,The perception of phantom limbs.Brain,1998(121):1603.
[2]P.Rakic,Corticogenesis in human and nonhuman primates.In M.S.Gazzaniga(ed.),The Cognitive Neuroscience.Cambridge,Mass:MIT,1995,p132.
[3]E.G Jones,and T.P.Pons,Thalamic and brainstem contributions to large scale plasticity of primate somatoscnsory cortex.Science,1998(282):1121-1125.
[4]R.O'Rahilly,and F.Muller,The Embryonic Human Brain.New York:Wiley-Liss.1994,p324.
[1]J.H.Kaas,Plasticity of sensory and motor maps in adult mammals.Annual Review of Neuroscience,1991(14):65.
[2]H.B.Sarnat,Cerebral Dysgenesis:Embryology and Clinical Expression.Oxford:Oxford University Press,1992.
[1]V.S.Ramachandran,and S.Blakeslee,Phantoms in the Brain:Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind.New York:William Morrow,1998.
[1]本图片下戴自www.se.cersp.com/kxwh/hzsh/200709/12985.html.
[2]S.Aglioti,F.Cortese,and C.Franchini,Rapid sensory remapping in the adult brain as inferred from phantom breast perception.Neuropreport,1994(5):473-476.
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[3]J.Locke,An Essay Concerning Human(2~(nd),1694),A.C.Fraser(ed.),New York:Dover,1959,p27.
[1]S.Gallagher,The moral significance of primitive self-consciousness.Ethics,1996(107):134.
[1]R.Descartes,Meditations Concerning First Philosophy,trans.L.J.Lafleur,Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1960,Chap.6.Par.20.
[1]J.Searle,Intentionality:An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1983,p154.
[2]Ibid,p230.
[3]A.R.Damasio,Descartes 'Error:Emotion,Reason,and the Human Brain.New York:G.P.Putnam.1994,p118.
[4]Ibid.pl45.
[5]何静,“具身认知的两种进路”,《自然辩证法通讯》,2007年第3期,第30页.
[1]S.Shoemaker,Self,body,and coincidence.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Suppl(73):291.
[2]E.T.Olson,The Human Anitnal:Personal Identity without Psychology.Oxford:Oxford University Press.1997,p150.
[3]U.Neisser,Two perceptually given aspects of the self and their development.Developmental Review.1991(11):197-209.
[4]M.Johnson,The Body in the Mind:The Bodily Basis of Meaning,Imagination,and Reason.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1987,p5.
[5]A.Clerk,Being There:Putting Brain,Body,and World Together Again.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1997,pⅹⅱ.
[1]A.Gopnik,and A.Meltzoff,Words,Thoughts,and Theories.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1997.
[2]J.L.Bermudez,The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Cambridge,,Mass:MIT.1998.
[3]E.Marbach,Mental Representation and Consciousness:Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference.Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic.1997.
[4]A.R.Darnasio,Descartes 'Error:Emotion,Reason,and the Human Brain.New York:G P.Putnam.1994,p101.
[1]S.Gallagher,Phenomenology and experimental design.Journol of Consciousness Studies.2003(10):78.
[2]E.Husserl,On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time,trans.J.Brough,Collected Works,Dordrecht:Kluwet Academic,1991,p93.
[3]Bermudez指出:“与视觉,听力以及其他体觉形式相反.有一些空间概念似乎并不适用于身体的本体感受器”.对此,他特别提到了距离和方向.
[4]尽管我们有时候也会说,身体的痛觉A在痛觉B的左边,或者痛觉A到痛觉B要比痛觉C到痛觉B更远,但是这种空间性是无法还原到知觉的空间框架结构.左、右、中和距离完全是相对于知觉体验的空间参数.在我左边的东西可能就在你的右边.并且,如果我转身180度,那么现在在我右边的东西就会变成在我的左边.但是在本体感受墨中体内参数是绝对的.尽管我的左边.对你来说可能变成了右边;又或者我180度转身后左右方向发生了交化,但是无论如何本体感受地处于我身体右边的事物或感觉始终是处于右边的,它是保持一致的.如果我挪动我的左手去碰触我的右肩.那么左手也不会变成第二只右手.如果痛觉A到痛觉B的距离保持一致,即使我扭曲我的身体使得它们靠得更近,在本体感受的位置上也不能使得它们靠近.
[1]S.Gallagher,How the body shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p139.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception,London:Routledge.1962,p326.
[2]S.Gallagher,Body Schema and Intentionality.In L.J.Bermudez(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press.1995,p234.
[3]这里,由于论证篇幅的关系,我们仅讨论是身体.环境关系中的身体.环境同样也在身体图式的运作中发挥着重要的作用.已有证据表明知觉体验对身体图式的活动有着重要的影响.吉普森提出的“视觉知觉运动”概念表明:姿势的图式能够在一定程度上与周围的环境相调和,并能够用环境的变化来对身体运动进行说明.奈瑟尔也提出过类似的观点.
[1]U.Neisser,Cognition and Reality:Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology.New York:W.H.Freeman,1976,p76.
[1]R.M.Gardner,and C.Moncrieff,Body image distortion in anorexics as a non-sensory phenomenon:A signal detection approach.Journal of Clinical Psychology,1988(44):101-107.
[2]D.D.Adame,Physical fitness,body image,and locus of control in college women dancers and nondancers.Perceptual and Motor Skills,1991(72):91-95.
[1]J.J.Campos,B.I.Bertentha,and R.Kermoian,Early experience and emotional development:The emergence of wariness of heights.Psychological Science,1992(3):61-64.
[2]B.I.Bertenthal,and J.J.Campos,A systems approach to the organizing effects of self-produced locomotion during infancy.Advanced in Infancy Research,1990(6):1-60.
[3]M.H.McEwan,R.E.Dihoff,and G.M.Brosvic,Early infant crawling experience is reflected in later motor skill development.Perceptual and Motor Skills.2001(72):75.
[4]M.Bauermeister,The effect of body tilt on apparent body position and their relation.Journal of Experimental Psychology.2004(67):142-147.
[5]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press.1962,p250.
[6]C.S.Harris,Perceptual adaptation to inverted,reversed,and displaced vision.Psychological Review.1965(72):419.
[7]I.Rock,and C.S.Harris,Vision and touch.Scientific American.1967(5):96-104.
[8]F.C.Shontz,Perceptual and Cognitive Aspects of Body Experience.New York:Acadamic Press.1969,p 162.
[9]J-P.Roll,and R.Roll,From eye to foot:A propriocepfve chain involved in postural control.In G.Amblard,A.Berthoz,and F.Clarac(eds.),Posture and Gait:Development,Adaption,and Modulation.Amsterdam:Excepta Media.1988,p159.
[1]J-P.Roll,and R.Roll,From eye to foot:A proprioceptive chain involved in postural control.In G.Amblard,A.Berthoz,and F.Ciarac(eds.),Posture and Gait:Development,Adaption,and Modulation.Amsterdam:Excerpta Media.1988,p162.
[1]E.Straus,Philosophical Psychology.New York:Basic Books.1966,p138.
[2]J.Paillard,The neurobiological roots of rational thinking.In H.Cruse et al.(eds.),Prerational Intelligence:Adaptive Behavior and Intelligent System Without Symbols and Logic,Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic.2000,p355.
[1]关于站立姿势、性、大脑容量和语言发展之间关系的进一步探讨,见M.sheets-Johnstone,The Roots of Thinking.
[2]A.Clark,Being There:Putting Brain,Body and World Together Again.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1997,p45.
[3]H.J.Chiel,and R.D.Beer,The brain has a body:Adaptive behavior emerges from interactions of nervous system,body and environment.Trends in Neurosciences.1997,p554.
[1]C.A.Sandman,Cardiac afferent influences on consciousness.In R.J.Davison(ed.),Consciousnes and Self-Regulation:Advances in Research and Theory.New York:Plenum.2006,pp55-58.
[2]本表源自:C.A.Sandman,Cardiac afferent influences on consciousness.In R.J.Davidson,G E.Schwatz and D.Shapiro (eds.),Consciousness and Self-Regulation:Advances in Reasearch and Theory,New York:Plenum,1986,p55.
[1]A.R.Damasio,The Feeling of What Happens:Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.New York:Harcourt Brace and Co.1999,p248.
[2]J.Panksepp,The periconscious substrates of consciousness:Affective states and the evolutionary origins of the self.Journal of Consciousness Studies.2006(5):566-582.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p181.
[2]M.Johnson,The Body in the Mind:The Bodily Basis of Meaning,Imagination,and Reason.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1987;G Lakoff,Women,Fire,and Dangerous Things:What Categories Reveal about the Mind.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1987;G.Lakoff,and M.Johnson,Metaphors We Live By.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1980;E.Thelen,Time-scale dynamics and the development of an embodied cognition,in R.F.Port,and T.van Gelder(eds.),Minds as Motion:Exploration in the Dynaraics of Cognition.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1995,pp69-100.
[3]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p114.
[1]在这里,需要澄清的是,半侧空间忽略患者通常并不会用左手(被忽略的那只手)来做手势,除非是一些必须用到双手才能完成的手势.例如.有的手势右手必须要穿到左手下面.在这些情形中,他们仍然能够使用左手和右手一起完成手势.
[2]U.Bellugi,and E.S.Klima,Language,special cognition,and the brain,in M.Ito,Y.Miyashita,and E.T.Rolls(eds.),Cognition,Computation,and Consciousness.Oxford:Oxford University Press.1997,p142.
[3]Ibid,pp142-147.
[1]A.Yamadori,Body awareness and its disorders.In M.Ito,Y.Miyashita,and E.T.Rolis(eds.),Cognition,Computation,and Consciousness.Oxford:Oxford University Press.1997,pp169-176.
[2]S.Kita,How representational gestures help speaking.In D.McNeill(ed.),Language and Gesture.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002,pp162-185.
[3]C.LeBaron,and J.Streeck,Gestures,knowledge,and the world.In D.McNeill(ed.),Language and Gesture.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002,p137.
[1]J.Cole,Pride and a Daily Marathon.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1995.
[1]J.Cole,and J.Paillard,Living without touch and peripheral information about body position and movement:Studies upon deafferented subjects.In J.Bermudez,A.Marce,and N.Eilan(eds.),The Body and The Self.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1995,p245.
[1]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992.
[1]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p351.
[2]在前文的叙述中,我们曾经提到过伊思在患病的最初几个月中无法运用手势.有几种途径可以对这个现象进行解释.在患病初期.伊恩最大的问题在于如何控制自己的行动,因此他对身体每一个部位的移动都保持着高度的警惕和十二分的关注.那个时候.在对周围环境不确定的情形中,他甚至连一个细微的动作都无法完成.在这种情形下。他不得不对自己手势的运用进行限制.另外,从某种程度上说.手势运动有赖于相对稳定的身体姿势.假设一个在铜丝上行走的人。为了保持身体平衡和减少不必要的危险就不可能会做什么手势.伊恩也一样。在使用手势之前.他首先必须重建立起对身体平衡和运动的控制.这是否意味着(1)他并不知道自己要如何做手势、如何重新使用手势?也就是说。尽管他知道什么是手势但是在他确保身体安全和平衡之前他无法这么做.或者说(2)他知道如何做手势.但是由于身体和姿势还处于失衡的状态.因此他不得不对如何做手势进行练习.例如,当他做手势的时候,他会有意识地调节自己的身体姿势以保持平衡.在第二种情形中,伊思似乎是重新掌握并不断练习如何使用手势(此时的手势是由意识控制的手势).但是从一定意义上说,他是在训练另外一种运动控制.但是有一点很明确,在伊恩患了神经性疾病以后.对使动性运动和工具性运动的控制就发生了变化,因此伊恩不得不在这种运动条件下对手势做出相应的调整.
[1]莫里斯·梅洛·庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译,商务印书馆,2005年版,第237页.
[2]对其他患有传入神经阻滞的病人来说也是一样.
[3]V.S.Ramahandran,and S.Blakeslee,Phantoms in the Brain:Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind.New York:William Morrow.1998.
[4]而事实上,在她行走的过程中,她的小半截手臂是凝固不动的.
[5]P.Bragger,Beyond re-membering:Phantom sensations of congenitally absent limbs.Proceedings of the National Academy of Science,USA,2002(97):6167-6172.
[1]J.M.Iverson,and S.Goldin-Meadow,Why people gestures when they speak,Nature,1998(19 Nov.):228.
[2]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译,商务印书馆,2005年版,第228页.
[3]当然,如果我们把认知(或者思维)看作是一个仅仅在大脑中完成的完全在非具身内部过程.那么就无法理解这种观点.传统认知科学家所谓的“大脑的某些功能”实质上就是我们所说的表达,也就是语言、手势、表述性运动等.
[1]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p105.
[1]J-L Vercher,G M.Ganthier,O.Blouin,J.Cole,and Y.Lamarre,Self-moved target eye tracking in control and deafferented subjects:Roles of arm command and proprioception in arm-eye coordination.Journal of Neurophvsiology,1996(76):1133-1144.
[2]来自神经科学的研究报告显示,在丧失了来自本体感受器的信息反馈以后,很多运动神经程序就很难再发挥作用.伊恩的案例就证实了这一结论.但是尽管如此,这些运动神经程序并不会消失,只是很难在丧失本本感受器的情况下正常运行.
[3]J.Blouin,The relative contribution of retinal and extraretinal signals in determining the accuracy of reaching movement in normal subjects and a deafferented patient.Experimental Brain Research,1996(109):148-153.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,trans.C.Smith,Phenomenology of perception,London:Routledge & Kegan Paul.1964,p162.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of perception,trans.C.Smith.London:Routledge & Kegan Paul,p194.
[2]手势超越了运动和身体.这与梅洛-庞蒂以下的观点是一致的:“人在对身体的使用中超越了仅仅将身体作为一个生物实体的身体……言语行为创造了意义,也超越了解剖学上的身体部分之间的关系.”(Ibid'189).
[3]R.Allot,The motor theory of language:Origin and function,ln J.Wind et al.(eds.),Language Origin:A Multidisciplinary Approach.Dordrecht:Kluwer.1992.
[4]法国神经解剖学家P.Broca通过对15例大脑病变患者的检查发现,大脑左半球额叶损伤是言语丧失的原因.其的《我们用大脑左半球说话》一书成为大脑皮层定位学说的宣言.自此,大脑左半球额下回后部被定名为具有言语运动功能的Broca区.Broca区损伤会导致病人言语变慢.吃力,Broca失语的主要特点是语言表达受到损伤.1874年,一个叫韦尼克的年轻德国人发现了左半球还有另一个重要的语言区域,有着控制语言理解的技能.现在该区城就叫做Wernicke 区.Wemicke区包括颞上回、顾中回后部.缘上回以及角回.大脑Wemicke区的受伤会产生严重的理解力缺失.
[5]G.A.Ojemann,Common cortical and thalamic mechanisms for language and motor functions.American Journal of Physiology.1984,p246.
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[1]唐氏综合症又称先天性愚型,是最常见的严重先天缺陷病之一.临床表现为:患者面容特殊.两外眼角上翘,鼻梁扁平.舌头外伸.肌无力及通贯手.患者绝大多数为严重智能障碍并伴有多种脏器的异常,如先天性心脏病、白血病,消化道畸形等.
[2]S.Baron-Cohen,The autistic child's theory of mind:A case of specific developmental delay.Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry.1998(30):285-298.
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[2]Ibid,p72.
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[1]刘晓力,认知科学研究纲领的困境与走向,《中国社会科学》2003年第1期,第101页.
[1]笛卡尔1646年6月28日致伊丽莎白公主的信,载于Descartes Philosophical letters,p142.
[1]徐献军,博士论文《具身认知--现象学在认知科学研究范式转型中的作用》,2007年1月.第44页.
[2]感谢我的师兄徐献军老师,多次热情地与我分享他在人工智能与现象学方面研究的成果与心得.
[3]H.Dreyfus,and S.Dreyfus,What Computer Still Cannot Do,Harper and Row:MIT Press,1992,pp238-241.
[4]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂:《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译,北京:商务印书馆.2001年版,第24页.
[1]参见H.Dreyfus,and S.Dreyfus,What Computer Still Cannot do,Harper and Row:MIT Press,1992,p156.
[2]胡塞尔,《现象学的观念》,上海:上海译文出版社,1986年版,第87页.
[1]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂:《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译.北京:商务印书馆,2001年版.第255-256页.
[1]H.Dreyfus,and S.Dreyfus,What Computer Still Cannot do,Harper and Row:MIT Press,1992,pp160-161.
[2]不过.具身认知并没有完全取代非具身认知.非具身认知仍然是主导的范式,因为它更具操作性.
[1]H.Head,Studies in Neurology,London:Oxford University Press.1920,p606.
[2]H.Head,G.Holmes,Sensory disturbance from cerebral lesions,Brain,1911(34):102.
[1]P.Schilder,The Image and Appearance of the Human Body.New York:Intentional University Press,1935,p11.
[2]S.Fisher,Body image.In D.Sills(ed.),International Encyclopedia of the Social Science,New York:Pantheon Books,1972,p113.
[3]S.Fisher,An approach to physiological reactivity in terms of a body-image schema.Psychological Review,195(64):7.
[4]R.M.Gardner and C.Moncrieff,Body image distortion in anorexics as a non-sensory phenomenon:A signal detection approach.Journal of Clinical Psychology,1988(44):101..
[5]L.C.Kolb,The Body Image in Schizophrenic Reaction.In A.Auerbach(ed.),Schizophrenia:An Integrate Approach.New York:Ronald 1959,p89.
[1]E.Straus,On anosognosia.In E.Straus,and D.Griffith(eds.),Phenomenology of Will and Action.Pittsburgh:Duquesne University Press,1967,p108.
[1]S.Bordo,Unbearable Weight:Feminism,Western Culture and the Body,Berkeley:University of California Press,1993.
[2]M.Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception,London:Routledge,1962,p326.
[3]S.Gallagher,Body Schema and Intentionality,in L.J.Bermudez(ed).,The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press,1955,pp233-234.
[1]G.E.M.Anscombe,Intention.Oxford:Blackwell,1957,p133.
[1]M.Jeannerod,and S.Gallagher,From Action to Interaction:An interview with Marc Jeannerod.Journal of Consciousness Studies,2002,9(1):23.
[1]M.Kinsbourne,The role of imitation in body ownership and mental growth.In A.N.Meltzoff and W.Prinz(eds.),The Imitative mind:Development,Evolution,and Brain Bases,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002,p301.
[2]J.R.Lackner,Some proprioceptive influences on the perceptual representation of body shape and orientation.Brain,1988,p293.
[1]S.Galllagher.,How Body Shapes the Mind,Clarendon Press:Oxford,2005,p38.
[1]S.Galllagher.,How Body Shapes the Mind,Clarendon Press:Oxford,2005,p38.
[1]偏侧忽略又称视觉忽略.表现为患者对侧空间的刺激失去反应,应答及定向力功能障碍.国内外关于偏卢忽略的报道多见于右侧大脑半球病变引起左侧忽略.关于后侧空间忽视国外仅有少数报道,目前国内尚未有报道.这样的例子可能涉及到身体意象的情感、知觉和表征的方面.例如一个中风患者会说那只手臂看上去或者感觉起来不是他自己的.但是当他渐渐对手臂有了意识的时候,他似乎有种抵触情绪:“我觉得这只手臂奇丑无比,我希望它离我远点”.
[2]并不是所有偏侧忽略的病例中身体图式都是完好无损的.考斯利特(H.B.Coslett)认为在一些案例中,身体图式的功能也会发生了混乱.这种混乱同时导致了身体意象的失常.在考斯利特的实验中.主体不仅忽视了自己的半侧身体,而且相应的身体部分也无法配合完成任何动作.参见H.B.Coslett,Evidence for a Disturbance of the Body Schema in Neglect,Brain and Cognition,1989(37):527-544.
[3]D.Denny-Brown,The significance of perceptual rivalry resulting from parietal lesion.Brain,1952(75):433-471.
[1]J.A.Ogden,Fractured Minds:A Case-Study Approach to Clinical Neuropsychology.Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996,pp109-120.
[2]H.K.Pribram,Brain and the composition of conscious experience,Journal of Comparative Neurology,1999(37):123.
[3]S.R.Jackson,Reaching movements may reveal the distorted topography of special representations after neglect.Neuropsychology,2000,38(4):507.
[1]S.Gallagher.How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p35.
[2]S.Gallagher,J.Cole,Body Image and Body Schema in a Deafferented Subject,Journal of Mind and Behavior,1995(16):369.
[3]这发生在1971年伊恩还只有19岁的时候.根据记载,他的急性神经系统疾病是由单核细胞增多症的感染而引起的.神经生理学的诊断确诊他颈部以下的大量神经纤维受损.
[1]前庭是人体平衡系统的主要末梢感受器官,长在头颅的颞骨岩部内.前庭器官有特殊的解剖结构和功能特征.前庭感受器感知身体在空间的位置及其位置变化,并将这些信息向中枢传递,主要产生两个方面的生理效应:一方面对身体变化了的位置和姿势进行调节,保持人体平衡;另一方面参与调节眼球运动,使人体在体位改交和运动中保持清晰的视觉,故它对保持我们的姿势平衡和清晰的视觉起重要作用.
[2]S.Gallagher,How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p46.
[1]但是也有认知科学研究者和神经科学家认为简单的运动程序在没有本体感受反馈的情况下仍能正常运行.为了支持这种观点,福欧普(B.T.volpe)曾经描述过一个案例.有一名患有传入神经阻滞的患者,因为大脑皮层的损伤,右手坏死.左手正常.如果你用东西刺激一下他的左手,我们会发现他的运动程序是正常的.其实,这个案例与伊恩的案例很不相同,因为这名病患是依赖触觉而维持运动程序的.但伊恩不是.在丧失了触觉后,伊恩只能借助视觉信息来维持运动程序.
[2]H.Head,Studies in Neurology,Oxford Univenity Press,1920,p183.
[1]这是还未公开发表的PET实验所得出的结论.伊恩在没有视觉的帮助下做了一个动作,他的小脑区域被激活了.伊恩的6个调节器官共同完成了按顺序弯曲手指的动作.PET对以下两种情形进行了扫描:第一种是通过视频记录在线视觉反馈的运动,第二种是没有运动视觉反馈的运动.在第一种情况下.伊恩的右前视觉和两侧小脑的区域被激活,这表明相对于控制器来说伊恩更加依赖于视觉反馈信息来引导运动.在第二种情形之下的运动是没有视觉反馈的.右前脑,右下顶骨大脑皮层和两侧小脑(视觉和运动神经区域)都被激活.这表明对运动至上而下的,认知地控制.在后一种情形中右下顶骨大脑皮层的激活表明从一定程度上说伊恩用局外人的角度看待自己的身体.
[2]J.Decety and T.Chaminade,A PET exploration of the mechanisms involved in imitation,NeuroImage,2002(15):265-272.
[1]对身体的关注或对身体的意识就是身体意象的一部分.
[2]M.Kinsbourne,Awareness of one's own body:An attentional theory of its nature,development,and brain basis.In Josea,J.Bermudez,(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT,1995,p217.
[1]A.J.Marcel,The sense of agency:Awareness of ownership of actions and intentions,in J.Roessler and N.Eilan(eds.),Agency and Self-Awareness,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2003,p74.
[2]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译.北京:商务印书馆,2001年版,第383页.
[1]这并不意味着驾驶员是处于无意识状态之下驾车的.相反.对于一直工作着的高效的视觉-运动系统来说,这种体验不在长期记忆的范围内.“在驾车以及其他许多行为中,我们很快忘记了我们自己做过什么是有用的事情(并且减少了危险性),因为我们关注的总是当下以及马上要发生的事情”(S.Gallagher,"The Body Nature of Consciousness",Mind,2001,110(438):580.
[2]J.Cole,Still Lives:Narratives of Spinal Cord Injury,Cambridge,Mass:MIT,2005,pⅹⅲ.
[1]S.Gallagher,Body schema and intentionality,in Josea,L.Bermudez,(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press,1995,pp233-234.
[1]B.O'Shaughnessy,Perprioception and the body image,in Jose.a,L.Bermudez,(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press,1995,p179.
[2]M.Sheets-Johnstone,Consciousness:A Nature History,Journal of Consciousness Studies,1998,5(3):259-294.
[3]J.Cole,and D.MecNeill,Gesture following deafferentation:A phenomenologically informed experimental study,Phenomenology and the cognitive science,2002(1):54.
[1]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译,北京:商务印书馆,2001年版,第243页.
[2]J.Decety,Shared representations between self and others:A social cognitive neuroscience view,Trends in Cognitive Science,2005(7):530.
[1]W.James,The Principles of Psychology,New York:Dover,1950,p24.
[1]A.Meltzoff,and M.K.Moore,Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.Science,1977(198):75-78.
[2]M.L.Simmel,The conditions of occurrence of phantom limbs,Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,1958(74):499.
[3]M.L.Simmei,Developmental aspects of the body scheme,Child Development,1966(37):93.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p84.
[2]瓦龙是法国著名的哲学家、心理学家和神经心理学家.在他的著作“The Turbulent Child”中,瓦龙将儿童的发展分为三个阶段:动作发展阶段(0-3岁)、主观或个性发展阶段(3-6岁)、思想形成阶段(6-12岁).他的观点和论述当时的心理学和哲学界引起了极大的反响.
[3]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Phenomenon of Perception,London:Routledge & Kegan Paul,1962,pp101-121.
[4]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1964,p122.
[5]Ibid,p123.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,7he Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1964,pp 121 - 125.
[2]J.Piaget,Dreams and Imitation in Childhood,New York:Norton,1962,pp19-45.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and The Invisible,Northwestern University Press,1968,pp116-117.
[2]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p352.
[3]A.Meltzoff and M.K.Moore,Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates.Science,1977(198):75-78.
[4]梅尔佐夫和摩尔的研究报告显示,16-21天大的婴儿能够模仿三种面部表情(噘嘴.张嘴和伸舌头),以及连续的手指运动(按照一定的手指运动顺序张手、合手).费尔德在1987年发表的实验报告表明2天大的婴儿能够模仿大人的面部表情如微笑、皱眉或者吃惊的表情等.
[1]此图的原始图片出自梅尔佐夫与摩尔在1977年在《科学》第187期上发表的著名论文“Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates".本图片下载自:http://www.runet.edu/～jaspelme/121/121%20video%20clips.htm
[1]洛克将莫利纽克斯提出的难题收入了《人类理智论》第二版,第二卷,第九章,第8节.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press.1962,p223.
[2]例如.触觉和视觉模块在时空上都是不同的.对这个问题的分析和探讨,详见梅洛-庞蒂的《知觉现象学》.
[1]梅尔佐夫也认为新生婴儿对他人的模仿问题与莫利纽克斯问题非常相似.由此,根据莫利纽克斯提出的难题,他提出了另一个假设性问题:假设一位先天的盲者可以完成一些基本的身体活动,如张嘴、穿农、吃饭等,并且他能对自己所完成的不同动作进行区分.那么,如果有一天,这位先天的盲者忽然恢复了视觉.在他睁开眼睛的一刺那,看到了他眼前的另一个人张着嘴巴.那么试问,这位刚刚恢复视觉的盲者能够在不用手触碰眼前这个人的嘴形的情况下.对张嘴的动作进行模仿吗?
[2]D.Diderot,Letter on the blind.In M.J.Morgan(trans.),Molyneux's Question:Vision,Touch and the Philosophy of Perception.Cambridge University Press.1749,p52.
[3]W.James,The Principles of Psychology,New York:Dover.1950,p24.
[4]在对婴儿的知觉发展的分析以及对莫利纽克斯难题的讨论中,梅洛-庞蒂曾多次批判过经验主义的知觉理论,但是最终他又因为经验性研究的结果而支持了经验主义者的论点.但是,很显然,他自己也在这些观点中挣扎,并最终用他的模块交互知觉的现象学理论来解释新生婴儿和莫利纽克斯患者的最初知觉体验.
[1]A.Meltzoff,and R.W.Borton,Intermodal matching by human neonates.Nature.1979(282):223
[2]A.Streri和E.Gentaz.在2003年发表的论文中也提出了类似结论.
[3]A.Meltzoff,Molyneux's babies:Cross-modal perception,imitation,and the mind of the preverbal infant.In N.Eilan.,R.McCarthy,and B.Brewer(eds.),Spatial Representation:Problems in Philosophy and Psychology.Oxford:Basil Blackwell.1993,p224.
[1]S.Gallgher,and A.Meltzoff,The earliest sense of self and others:Merleau-Ponty and recent developmental Studies.Philosophical Psychology.1996(9):223.
[2]有研究表明,尽管新生婴儿的视觉记忆不是很长,但是仅出生两天的娶儿至少在5分钟内仍能保留对母亲脸庞的记忆:并且在新生耍儿对他人的面部表情进行的模仿过程中.也涉及到短暂的视觉记忆.
[1]J.C.Crowley,Early development of ocular dominance columns.Science.2000,(Vol.17):1322.
[2]Ibid,p1325.
[1]C.J.Shatz,The developing brain.Scientific American(U.K.),1992(3):35-41.
[2]C.J.Birnholz,Observing the human fetus,in W.P.Smotherman(ed.),Behavior of Fetus.Caldwell,NJ:Telford,1998.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and The Invisible,Northwestern University Press,1968,p116.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and The Invisible,Northwestern University Press,1968,p118.
[2]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p352.
[3]在对前庭的处理过程的论述中,卓恩(F.Jouen)和盖瞢恩尼(O.Gapenne)也有类似的表述:“表征头部周转率的输入信息来自前庭系统,这些信息与表征视觉神经运动的视觉信号有着同样的编码”(F.Jouen,and O.Gapenne,Interactions between the vestibular and visual systems in the neonate.In P.Rochat(ed.),The Self in Infancy:Theory and Research.Amsterdam:Elsevier Science.1995,p288 ).
[1]E.Husserl,Cartesian Meditations,trans.D.Cairns,The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff.1970,p50.
[2]Ibid,p54.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p119.
[2]对新生婴儿的前庭和视觉系统的研究中也得出这样的结论:新生婴儿所具有的一些全身反应主要特征使得人从出生起就能够将自己从环境中区分出来.
[1]D.Dennett,Brainstorms:Philosophic Essays on Mind and Psychology.Montgomery,Vt.:Bradford Books,1978,p207.S.Meuse,Phantoms,lost limbs,and the limits of the body-self.In M.O'Donovan-Anderson(ed.),The Incorporated Self:Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Embodiment,Lanham:Rowman & Littlefield,1996,pp47-64.
[1]我们又一次发现了传统认知文献中身体图武和身体意象这两个术语的混淆(见本文第一章).在对幻肢现象进行讨论的文献中,不少学者将身体意象和身体图式这两个术语混用在一起.这里.我用“身体图武(意象)”正是想表明传统认知对这些概念的混用.正如我在第一章中指出,斯莫尔是极少数意识到身体图武和意象之间存在区别的学者之一.他认为是身体图式出现的混乱导致了先天缺肢患者出现幻肢.但是.问题在于他们所谈到的身体图式或身体意象是否与我们在第一章中定义的身体意象和身体图式一致.
[2]M.L.Simmel,The conditions of occurrence of phantom limbs,Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,1958(74):499.
[3]M.Medeau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p86.
[1]S.Weinstein,snd E.A.Sersen,Phantoms in cases of congenital absence of limbs.Neurology,1961(11):910.
[1]M.L.Simmel,The absence of phantoms for congenitally missing limbs.Proceedings of American Philosophical Society,1961(102):72.
[2]K.Poeck,Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs,Cortex,1964(1):269-275.
[2]P.Scatena,Phantom representations of congenitally absent limbs,Perceptual and Motor Skills,1990(70):1227-1232.
[2]R.Melzack,Phantom limbs and the concept of neuromatrix,Trends in Neuoscience,1991(13):88-92.
[1]认知科学家通常认为幻肢现象是身体意象的一个部分,而且患者自身对幻肢的描述似乎已经成了支持这种观点最有力的证据.由此Halligan,Zeman,and Berger写道:“如果我们能够更亲近我们的病人生活,我们就能最大限度地理解这种幻肢现象”.
[2]K.Poeck,Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs,Cortex,1964(1):269-275.
[1]S.Gallagher,How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p91.
[1]K.Poeck,Phantoms following amputation in early childhood and in congenital absence of limbs,Cortex,1964(1):269-275.
[2]S.Weinstein,E.A.Sersen,and R.J.Vetter,Phantoms and somatic sensation in cases of congenital aplasia.Cortex,1964(1):276-290.
[3]E.S.M.Saadah and R.Melzack,Phantom limb experiences in congenital limb-deficient adults.Cortex,1994(30):479-485.
[4]M.L.Simmel,Phantoms-experiences following amputation in childhood.Journal of Neurology,Neurosurgery and Psychiatry,1962(102):292-550.
[5]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知覺現象學》姜志辉译,商务印书馆,2005年,第110、121页.
[6]J.Katz,The reality of phantom limbs.Motivation and Emotion,1993(17):156.
[1]尽管对新生婴儿模仿行为进行的研究已经为身体图式的先天性体统了很好的明证,但是这促使着我们对先天性缺肢患者的幻肢现象寻求更好的解释,一种可以与对新生婴儿模仿行为研究获得的结论相一致的解释.
[2]V.S.Ramachandran,end W.Hirstein,The perception of phantom limbs.Brain,1998(121):1603.
[1]M.J.Flower,Neuromaturation of the human fetus.Journal of Medicine and Philosophy,1985(10):237.
[2]M.Sheets-Johnstone,Consciousness:A Nature History,Journal of Consciousness Studies,1998(5):270.
[3]T.Humphrey,Some Correlations between the appearance of human fetal reflexes and the development of the nervous systems.Progress 1 Brain Research,1964(4):127.
[4]F.Jouen,and O.Gapenne,interactions between the vestibular and visual systems in the neonate.In P.Rochat(ed.),The Self in Infancy:Theory and Research.Amsterdam:Elsevier Science.1995,pp.277-301.
[5]M.Sheets-Johnstone,Consciousness:A Nature History,Journal of Consciousness Studies,1998(5):292.
[6]这种超声波扫描能够非常清楚地显示.胎儿下顎张开,打哈欠甚至是舌头的运动的细节.
[7]H.F.R.Prechtl,Continuity and change in early neural development.In H.R.R.Prechtl(ed.),Continuity of Neural Functions from Prenatal to Postnatal Life.Oxford:Blackwell Scientific/Spastics.International.1984,pp1-15.
[8]S.Gallagher,How the Body Shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press.1995,p95.
[9]H.F.R.Prechtl,and B.Hopkins.Developmental transformations of spontaneous movements in early infancy.Early Human development.1986(14):254.
[1]G.Butterworth,Hang-mouth coordination in the newborn baby.British Journal of Developmental Psychology,1988(6):303-314.
[2]P.Casaer,Postural behavior in newborn infants.Clinics in Developmental Medicine.1979(72):56.
[3]Ibid,p61.
[4]G Rizzolatti,L.Fogassi,and V.Gallese,Cortical mechanisms subserving object grasping and action recognition:A new view on the cortical motor functions.In M.S.Gazzaniga(ed.),The New Neuroscience,Cambridge,Mass:MIT,2002,p550.
[5]T.M.Preuss,I.Stepniewska,and J.H.Kass,Movement representation in the dorsal and ventral premotor areas of owl monkeys:A micostimulation study.The Journal of Comparative Neurology,1996(371):649-676.
[1]这个假说最初是由巴特尔沃斯提出的.这种假说与梅尔扎克的“先天神经元基质”的概念是一致的.(R.Melzack,Phantom limbs and the concept ofa neuromatrix.Trends in Neuroscience,1990(13):82-92.
[1]V.S.Ramachandran,and W.Hirstein,The perception of phantom limbs.Brain,1998(121):1603.
[2]P.Rakic,Corticogenesis in human and nonhuman primates.In M.S.Gazzaniga(ed.),The Cognitive Neuroscience.Cambridge,Mass:MIT,1995,p132.
[3]E.G Jones,and T.P.Pons,Thalamic and brainstem contributions to large scale plasticity of primate somatoscnsory cortex.Science,1998(282):1121-1125.
[4]R.O'Rahilly,and F.Muller,The Embryonic Human Brain.New York:Wiley-Liss.1994,p324.
[1]J.H.Kaas,Plasticity of sensory and motor maps in adult mammals.Annual Review of Neuroscience,1991(14):65.
[2]H.B.Sarnat,Cerebral Dysgenesis:Embryology and Clinical Expression.Oxford:Oxford University Press,1992.
[1]V.S.Ramachandran,and S.Blakeslee,Phantoms in the Brain:Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind.New York:William Morrow,1998.
[1]本图片下戴自www.se.cersp.com/kxwh/hzsh/200709/12985.html.
[2]S.Aglioti,F.Cortese,and C.Franchini,Rapid sensory remapping in the adult brain as inferred from phantom breast perception.Neuropreport,1994(5):473-476.
[1]D.Lohmar,Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity,Phenomenology and the Cognitive Science.2006(5):67.
[2]G.Butterworth,An ecological perspective on the origins of self.In J.Bermudze.,A.Marcel.,and N.Eilan(eds.),The Body and the Self.Cambridge,Mass:MIT,1995,pp87-107.
[3]J.Locke,An Essay Concerning Human(2~(nd),1694),A.C.Fraser(ed.),New York:Dover,1959,p27.
[1]S.Gallagher,The moral significance of primitive self-consciousness.Ethics,1996(107):134.
[1]R.Descartes,Meditations Concerning First Philosophy,trans.L.J.Lafleur,Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill,1960,Chap.6.Par.20.
[1]J.Searle,Intentionality:An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.1983,p154.
[2]Ibid,p230.
[3]A.R.Damasio,Descartes 'Error:Emotion,Reason,and the Human Brain.New York:G.P.Putnam.1994,p118.
[4]Ibid.pl45.
[5]何静,“具身认知的两种进路”,《自然辩证法通讯》,2007年第3期,第30页.
[1]S.Shoemaker,Self,body,and coincidence.Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,Suppl(73):291.
[2]E.T.Olson,The Human Anitnal:Personal Identity without Psychology.Oxford:Oxford University Press.1997,p150.
[3]U.Neisser,Two perceptually given aspects of the self and their development.Developmental Review.1991(11):197-209.
[4]M.Johnson,The Body in the Mind:The Bodily Basis of Meaning,Imagination,and Reason.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1987,p5.
[5]A.Clerk,Being There:Putting Brain,Body,and World Together Again.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1997,pⅹⅱ.
[1]A.Gopnik,and A.Meltzoff,Words,Thoughts,and Theories.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1997.
[2]J.L.Bermudez,The Paradox of Self-Consciousness.Cambridge,,Mass:MIT.1998.
[3]E.Marbach,Mental Representation and Consciousness:Toward a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference.Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic.1997.
[4]A.R.Darnasio,Descartes 'Error:Emotion,Reason,and the Human Brain.New York:G P.Putnam.1994,p101.
[1]S.Gallagher,Phenomenology and experimental design.Journol of Consciousness Studies.2003(10):78.
[2]E.Husserl,On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time,trans.J.Brough,Collected Works,Dordrecht:Kluwet Academic,1991,p93.
[3]Bermudez指出:“与视觉,听力以及其他体觉形式相反.有一些空间概念似乎并不适用于身体的本体感受器”.对此,他特别提到了距离和方向.
[4]尽管我们有时候也会说,身体的痛觉A在痛觉B的左边,或者痛觉A到痛觉B要比痛觉C到痛觉B更远,但是这种空间性是无法还原到知觉的空间框架结构.左、右、中和距离完全是相对于知觉体验的空间参数.在我左边的东西可能就在你的右边.并且,如果我转身180度,那么现在在我右边的东西就会变成在我的左边.但是在本体感受墨中体内参数是绝对的.尽管我的左边.对你来说可能变成了右边;又或者我180度转身后左右方向发生了交化,但是无论如何本体感受地处于我身体右边的事物或感觉始终是处于右边的,它是保持一致的.如果我挪动我的左手去碰触我的右肩.那么左手也不会变成第二只右手.如果痛觉A到痛觉B的距离保持一致,即使我扭曲我的身体使得它们靠得更近,在本体感受的位置上也不能使得它们靠近.
[1]S.Gallagher,How the body shapes the Mind,Oxford University Press,2005,p139.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception,London:Routledge.1962,p326.
[2]S.Gallagher,Body Schema and Intentionality.In L.J.Bermudez(ed.),The Body and the Self,Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press.1995,p234.
[3]这里,由于论证篇幅的关系,我们仅讨论是身体.环境关系中的身体.环境同样也在身体图式的运作中发挥着重要的作用.已有证据表明知觉体验对身体图式的活动有着重要的影响.吉普森提出的“视觉知觉运动”概念表明:姿势的图式能够在一定程度上与周围的环境相调和,并能够用环境的变化来对身体运动进行说明.奈瑟尔也提出过类似的观点.
[1]U.Neisser,Cognition and Reality:Principles and Implications of Cognitive Psychology.New York:W.H.Freeman,1976,p76.
[1]R.M.Gardner,and C.Moncrieff,Body image distortion in anorexics as a non-sensory phenomenon:A signal detection approach.Journal of Clinical Psychology,1988(44):101-107.
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[5]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press.1962,p250.
[6]C.S.Harris,Perceptual adaptation to inverted,reversed,and displaced vision.Psychological Review.1965(72):419.
[7]I.Rock,and C.S.Harris,Vision and touch.Scientific American.1967(5):96-104.
[8]F.C.Shontz,Perceptual and Cognitive Aspects of Body Experience.New York:Acadamic Press.1969,p 162.
[9]J-P.Roll,and R.Roll,From eye to foot:A propriocepfve chain involved in postural control.In G.Amblard,A.Berthoz,and F.Clarac(eds.),Posture and Gait:Development,Adaption,and Modulation.Amsterdam:Excepta Media.1988,p159.
[1]J-P.Roll,and R.Roll,From eye to foot:A proprioceptive chain involved in postural control.In G.Amblard,A.Berthoz,and F.Ciarac(eds.),Posture and Gait:Development,Adaption,and Modulation.Amsterdam:Excerpta Media.1988,p162.
[1]E.Straus,Philosophical Psychology.New York:Basic Books.1966,p138.
[2]J.Paillard,The neurobiological roots of rational thinking.In H.Cruse et al.(eds.),Prerational Intelligence:Adaptive Behavior and Intelligent System Without Symbols and Logic,Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic.2000,p355.
[1]关于站立姿势、性、大脑容量和语言发展之间关系的进一步探讨,见M.sheets-Johnstone,The Roots of Thinking.
[2]A.Clark,Being There:Putting Brain,Body and World Together Again.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1997,p45.
[3]H.J.Chiel,and R.D.Beer,The brain has a body:Adaptive behavior emerges from interactions of nervous system,body and environment.Trends in Neurosciences.1997,p554.
[1]C.A.Sandman,Cardiac afferent influences on consciousness.In R.J.Davison(ed.),Consciousnes and Self-Regulation:Advances in Research and Theory.New York:Plenum.2006,pp55-58.
[2]本表源自:C.A.Sandman,Cardiac afferent influences on consciousness.In R.J.Davidson,G E.Schwatz and D.Shapiro (eds.),Consciousness and Self-Regulation:Advances in Reasearch and Theory,New York:Plenum,1986,p55.
[1]A.R.Damasio,The Feeling of What Happens:Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.New York:Harcourt Brace and Co.1999,p248.
[2]J.Panksepp,The periconscious substrates of consciousness:Affective states and the evolutionary origins of the self.Journal of Consciousness Studies.2006(5):566-582.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,The Primacy of Perception,Northwest University Press,1962,p181.
[2]M.Johnson,The Body in the Mind:The Bodily Basis of Meaning,Imagination,and Reason.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1987;G Lakoff,Women,Fire,and Dangerous Things:What Categories Reveal about the Mind.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1987;G.Lakoff,and M.Johnson,Metaphors We Live By.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.1980;E.Thelen,Time-scale dynamics and the development of an embodied cognition,in R.F.Port,and T.van Gelder(eds.),Minds as Motion:Exploration in the Dynaraics of Cognition.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1995,pp69-100.
[3]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p114.
[1]在这里,需要澄清的是,半侧空间忽略患者通常并不会用左手(被忽略的那只手)来做手势,除非是一些必须用到双手才能完成的手势.例如.有的手势右手必须要穿到左手下面.在这些情形中,他们仍然能够使用左手和右手一起完成手势.
[2]U.Bellugi,and E.S.Klima,Language,special cognition,and the brain,in M.Ito,Y.Miyashita,and E.T.Rolls(eds.),Cognition,Computation,and Consciousness.Oxford:Oxford University Press.1997,p142.
[3]Ibid,pp142-147.
[1]A.Yamadori,Body awareness and its disorders.In M.Ito,Y.Miyashita,and E.T.Rolis(eds.),Cognition,Computation,and Consciousness.Oxford:Oxford University Press.1997,pp169-176.
[2]S.Kita,How representational gestures help speaking.In D.McNeill(ed.),Language and Gesture.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002,pp162-185.
[3]C.LeBaron,and J.Streeck,Gestures,knowledge,and the world.In D.McNeill(ed.),Language and Gesture.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2002,p137.
[1]J.Cole,Pride and a Daily Marathon.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1995.
[1]J.Cole,and J.Paillard,Living without touch and peripheral information about body position and movement:Studies upon deafferented subjects.In J.Bermudez,A.Marce,and N.Eilan(eds.),The Body and The Self.Cambridge,Mass:MIT.1995,p245.
[1]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992.
[1]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p351.
[2]在前文的叙述中,我们曾经提到过伊思在患病的最初几个月中无法运用手势.有几种途径可以对这个现象进行解释.在患病初期.伊恩最大的问题在于如何控制自己的行动,因此他对身体每一个部位的移动都保持着高度的警惕和十二分的关注.那个时候.在对周围环境不确定的情形中,他甚至连一个细微的动作都无法完成.在这种情形下。他不得不对自己手势的运用进行限制.另外,从某种程度上说.手势运动有赖于相对稳定的身体姿势.假设一个在铜丝上行走的人。为了保持身体平衡和减少不必要的危险就不可能会做什么手势.伊恩也一样。在使用手势之前.他首先必须重建立起对身体平衡和运动的控制.这是否意味着(1)他并不知道自己要如何做手势、如何重新使用手势?也就是说。尽管他知道什么是手势但是在他确保身体安全和平衡之前他无法这么做.或者说(2)他知道如何做手势.但是由于身体和姿势还处于失衡的状态.因此他不得不对如何做手势进行练习.例如,当他做手势的时候,他会有意识地调节自己的身体姿势以保持平衡.在第二种情形中,伊思似乎是重新掌握并不断练习如何使用手势(此时的手势是由意识控制的手势).但是从一定意义上说,他是在训练另外一种运动控制.但是有一点很明确,在伊恩患了神经性疾病以后.对使动性运动和工具性运动的控制就发生了变化,因此伊恩不得不在这种运动条件下对手势做出相应的调整.
[1]莫里斯·梅洛·庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译,商务印书馆,2005年版,第237页.
[2]对其他患有传入神经阻滞的病人来说也是一样.
[3]V.S.Ramahandran,and S.Blakeslee,Phantoms in the Brain:Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind.New York:William Morrow.1998.
[4]而事实上,在她行走的过程中,她的小半截手臂是凝固不动的.
[5]P.Bragger,Beyond re-membering:Phantom sensations of congenitally absent limbs.Proceedings of the National Academy of Science,USA,2002(97):6167-6172.
[1]J.M.Iverson,and S.Goldin-Meadow,Why people gestures when they speak,Nature,1998(19 Nov.):228.
[2]莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂,《知觉现象学》,姜志辉译,商务印书馆,2005年版,第228页.
[3]当然,如果我们把认知(或者思维)看作是一个仅仅在大脑中完成的完全在非具身内部过程.那么就无法理解这种观点.传统认知科学家所谓的“大脑的某些功能”实质上就是我们所说的表达,也就是语言、手势、表述性运动等.
[1]D.McNeill,Hand and Mind:What Gestures Reveal about thought.Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1992,p105.
[1]J-L Vercher,G M.Ganthier,O.Blouin,J.Cole,and Y.Lamarre,Self-moved target eye tracking in control and deafferented subjects:Roles of arm command and proprioception in arm-eye coordination.Journal of Neurophvsiology,1996(76):1133-1144.
[2]来自神经科学的研究报告显示,在丧失了来自本体感受器的信息反馈以后,很多运动神经程序就很难再发挥作用.伊恩的案例就证实了这一结论.但是尽管如此,这些运动神经程序并不会消失,只是很难在丧失本本感受器的情况下正常运行.
[3]J.Blouin,The relative contribution of retinal and extraretinal signals in determining the accuracy of reaching movement in normal subjects and a deafferented patient.Experimental Brain Research,1996(109):148-153.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,trans.C.Smith,Phenomenology of perception,London:Routledge & Kegan Paul.1964,p162.
[1]M.Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of perception,trans.C.Smith.London:Routledge & Kegan Paul,p194.
[2]手势超越了运动和身体.这与梅洛-庞蒂以下的观点是一致的:“人在对身体的使用中超越了仅仅将身体作为一个生物实体的身体……言语行为创造了意义,也超越了解剖学上的身体部分之间的关系.”(Ibid'189).
[3]R.Allot,The motor theory of language:Origin and function,ln J.Wind et al.(eds.),Language Origin:A Multidisciplinary Approach.Dordrecht:Kluwer.1992.
[4]法国神经解剖学家P.Broca通过对15例大脑病变患者的检查发现,大脑左半球额叶损伤是言语丧失的原因.其的《我们用大脑左半球说话》一书成为大脑皮层定位学说的宣言.自此,大脑左半球额下回后部被定名为具有言语运动功能的Broca区.Broca区损伤会导致病人言语变慢.吃力,Broca失语的主要特点是语言表达受到损伤.1874年,一个叫韦尼克的年轻德国人发现了左半球还有另一个重要的语言区域,有着控制语言理解的技能.现在该区城就叫做Wernicke 区.Wemicke区包括颞上回、顾中回后部.缘上回以及角回.大脑Wemicke区的受伤会产生严重的理解力缺失.
[5]G.A.Ojemann,Common cortical and thalamic mechanisms for language and motor functions.American Journal of Physiology.1984,p246.
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[4]S.Gallgher,and D.Hutto,Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice.In J.Zlatev.,T.Racine,C.Sinha,and E.Itkonen(eds.),The Shared Mind:Perapectivea on Intersubjectivity.Amsterdam:John Benjamins.2008,p62.
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[1]唐氏综合症又称先天性愚型,是最常见的严重先天缺陷病之一.临床表现为:患者面容特殊.两外眼角上翘,鼻梁扁平.舌头外伸.肌无力及通贯手.患者绝大多数为严重智能障碍并伴有多种脏器的异常,如先天性心脏病、白血病,消化道畸形等.
[2]S.Baron-Cohen,The autistic child's theory of mind:A case of specific developmental delay.Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry.1998(30):285-298.
[1]D.Zahavi,end J.Parnas,Conceptual problem in infantile autism research:Why cognitive science needs phenomenology.Journal of Consciousness Studies.2003(10):67.
[2]Ibid,p72.
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