我国证券市场审计意见购买行为研究
|
摘要
审计意见购买直接影响证券市场会计信息的真实、有用性,关系到证券市场秩序的维护以及公司产权所有者利益的保护,对于审计意见购买在特定证券市场环境及其动态变迁下的行为特征与规律的深入研究,既能丰富审计理论,又为独立审计行业的监管和良好证券市场秩序的形成提供重要参考。
本文沿着审计意见购买的“诱因——动机——行为——治理”的逻辑展开论述,综合运用动机理论、新制度经济学理论、进化博弈论、协同演化理论等理论与方法,以2004年以来的证券市场环境作为研究背景,选取2004至2008年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用无序多项Logistic模型、有序多项Logistic模型对审计意见购买行为进行实证检验。
全文通过动机理论勾勒出整体框架,首先区分了我国证券市场环境中影响审计意见购买行为的制度与非制度因素,运用委托—代理理论、契约理论、交易费用理论、产权理论对制度诱因和非制度诱因加以分析。然后对审计意见购买需要及其引发的资本市场、非资本市场动机加以区分,实证检验发现资本市场、债务契约和管理层薪酬动机是我国上市公司审计意见购买的主要动机,可能的意见购买路径有变更审计师、审计收费和非年报审计收费。进一步的实证检验表明变更审计师、审计收费(包括相对高额审计收费和大幅异常增长的审计收费)和非年报审计收费这些单一路径以及变更审计师分别与审计收费、非年报审计收费结合形成的复合路径均可成功购买审计意见。
审计技术和审计委托制度都是审计意见购买行为的重要影响因素。对审计意见购买行为在审计技术变迁不同阶段的博弈分析和最新审计准则在实施前后意见购买行为结果的实证检验均表明新审计技术在采用初期并不必然带来意见购买行为的弱化。同时,博弈分析发现随着审计师对审计技术的掌握、熟稔,新审计技术追加成本和协调成本将逐渐减少,审计意见购买行为将得到一定程度的抑制。对产权所有者行权和经营管理者行权两种典型审计委托模式的进化博弈分析发现前者优于后者,对我国2004年以来中央企业审计委托权模式改革后意见购买行为结果的实证检验也支持这一结论。在此基础上,本文提出“选、聘”分离审计委托模式,运用进化博弈分析得出这一模式能够兼顾审计市场秩序与产权所有者利益,从成本与效益的角度来看,不失为一般企业折衷而现实的选择。
最后本文提出了“协同演化治理观”,已有关于审计意见购买治理观点从本质上来看均属于“制度治理观”,对审计技术于意见购买治理的作用有所忽视,独立审计系统具有协同演化系统的全部特征,并存在审计技术与制度、独立审计系统与社会环境、独立审计系统内组织与个体等多层级和多向协同演化关系,对审计意见购买的治理可以采用更为全面而系统的“协同演化治理观”,以提高治理的效率和效果。
Audit Opinion Shopping (AOS) directly influents the trueness, usefulness of accounting information, the protection of securities markets order and the interests of property owners, It has an important theoretical value and practical significance for the monitoring of independent audit industry as well as the formation of sound order in securities markets to explore the conduct characteristics and rules of AOS under specific environment and the dynamic transition of securities markets.
This dissertation follows the logic of "Incentives-Motivation-Behavior-Governance", combines theories and methodes of the new institutional economics, the co-evolution economics, the evolution game theory, it bases on the securities markets environment since 2004, selected China's A-share listed companies of year 2004 to 2008 as the research sample and made application of the multinomial logistic and ordinal logistic model in the process of empirical examination.
The whole framework of the dissertation bases on motivation theory, it makes distinction between the institution-related and institution-unrelated factors of securities markets in our country, and analyzes AOS incentives from the perspectives of principal-agent theory, contract theory, transaction cost theory, property rights theory. Then it turns to analyze the AOS needs and the capital markets related and unrelated motivations which are initiated from the AOS needs. The empirical examines show motivations derived from capital markets, debt contract and management salary are significant, changing auditors, audit fees and nonaudit fees are probable routes to shop audit opinion. Further empirical tests indicates listed companies could successfully shop audit opinion by changing auditors, paying higher audit (include relative high audit fees and abnormal greatly increased audit fees) or nonaudit fees, or combining changing auditors with the one of the other routes.
Audit techniques and audit commitment institutes are two significant factors influenting AOS. Both the game theory analysis and empirical examination show that the AOS motivation won't be weakened in the initial stage of techniques transition, the game theoretical analysis also suggests the AOS be suppressed to some extent as auditors get familiar with the new techniques. The pattern of the exertion of the right to audit commission has important influence on AOS. The analysis from the perspective of evolution game theory of two typical models as the property owners excising the right or the management levels excising it shows that the former is prior to the latter. The empirical examine focus on the central enterprises which have reformed the model from the latter to the former also supports the argument. A model of separating the selection right from the employment of auditor is put up, which is proved to be comprise as well as realistic choice of enterprises out of the central one as it takes into account the audit market order and protecting the interests of property owners, and is in line with the cost and benefits principle.
At last, a view of "co-evolutional governance" is suggested. The existing governance views related to AOS are essentially "institution related" and pay no attention to the effect of audit techniques on the AOS governance. The analysis of the independent audit system from the perspective of co-evolution theory shows it pocesses all characteristics of a co-evolutional system, and the co-evolutional relations between the audit techniques and institution, the independent audit system and the social environment, the organizations and individuals in this system, so that a view of co-evolutional governance which is more comprehensive and systematic could be applied in the governance of AOS, so as to improve the effciency and effectiveness of govenance.
本文沿着审计意见购买的“诱因——动机——行为——治理”的逻辑展开论述,综合运用动机理论、新制度经济学理论、进化博弈论、协同演化理论等理论与方法,以2004年以来的证券市场环境作为研究背景,选取2004至2008年我国A股上市公司作为研究样本,运用无序多项Logistic模型、有序多项Logistic模型对审计意见购买行为进行实证检验。
全文通过动机理论勾勒出整体框架,首先区分了我国证券市场环境中影响审计意见购买行为的制度与非制度因素,运用委托—代理理论、契约理论、交易费用理论、产权理论对制度诱因和非制度诱因加以分析。然后对审计意见购买需要及其引发的资本市场、非资本市场动机加以区分,实证检验发现资本市场、债务契约和管理层薪酬动机是我国上市公司审计意见购买的主要动机,可能的意见购买路径有变更审计师、审计收费和非年报审计收费。进一步的实证检验表明变更审计师、审计收费(包括相对高额审计收费和大幅异常增长的审计收费)和非年报审计收费这些单一路径以及变更审计师分别与审计收费、非年报审计收费结合形成的复合路径均可成功购买审计意见。
审计技术和审计委托制度都是审计意见购买行为的重要影响因素。对审计意见购买行为在审计技术变迁不同阶段的博弈分析和最新审计准则在实施前后意见购买行为结果的实证检验均表明新审计技术在采用初期并不必然带来意见购买行为的弱化。同时,博弈分析发现随着审计师对审计技术的掌握、熟稔,新审计技术追加成本和协调成本将逐渐减少,审计意见购买行为将得到一定程度的抑制。对产权所有者行权和经营管理者行权两种典型审计委托模式的进化博弈分析发现前者优于后者,对我国2004年以来中央企业审计委托权模式改革后意见购买行为结果的实证检验也支持这一结论。在此基础上,本文提出“选、聘”分离审计委托模式,运用进化博弈分析得出这一模式能够兼顾审计市场秩序与产权所有者利益,从成本与效益的角度来看,不失为一般企业折衷而现实的选择。
最后本文提出了“协同演化治理观”,已有关于审计意见购买治理观点从本质上来看均属于“制度治理观”,对审计技术于意见购买治理的作用有所忽视,独立审计系统具有协同演化系统的全部特征,并存在审计技术与制度、独立审计系统与社会环境、独立审计系统内组织与个体等多层级和多向协同演化关系,对审计意见购买的治理可以采用更为全面而系统的“协同演化治理观”,以提高治理的效率和效果。
Audit Opinion Shopping (AOS) directly influents the trueness, usefulness of accounting information, the protection of securities markets order and the interests of property owners, It has an important theoretical value and practical significance for the monitoring of independent audit industry as well as the formation of sound order in securities markets to explore the conduct characteristics and rules of AOS under specific environment and the dynamic transition of securities markets.
This dissertation follows the logic of "Incentives-Motivation-Behavior-Governance", combines theories and methodes of the new institutional economics, the co-evolution economics, the evolution game theory, it bases on the securities markets environment since 2004, selected China's A-share listed companies of year 2004 to 2008 as the research sample and made application of the multinomial logistic and ordinal logistic model in the process of empirical examination.
The whole framework of the dissertation bases on motivation theory, it makes distinction between the institution-related and institution-unrelated factors of securities markets in our country, and analyzes AOS incentives from the perspectives of principal-agent theory, contract theory, transaction cost theory, property rights theory. Then it turns to analyze the AOS needs and the capital markets related and unrelated motivations which are initiated from the AOS needs. The empirical examines show motivations derived from capital markets, debt contract and management salary are significant, changing auditors, audit fees and nonaudit fees are probable routes to shop audit opinion. Further empirical tests indicates listed companies could successfully shop audit opinion by changing auditors, paying higher audit (include relative high audit fees and abnormal greatly increased audit fees) or nonaudit fees, or combining changing auditors with the one of the other routes.
Audit techniques and audit commitment institutes are two significant factors influenting AOS. Both the game theory analysis and empirical examination show that the AOS motivation won't be weakened in the initial stage of techniques transition, the game theoretical analysis also suggests the AOS be suppressed to some extent as auditors get familiar with the new techniques. The pattern of the exertion of the right to audit commission has important influence on AOS. The analysis from the perspective of evolution game theory of two typical models as the property owners excising the right or the management levels excising it shows that the former is prior to the latter. The empirical examine focus on the central enterprises which have reformed the model from the latter to the former also supports the argument. A model of separating the selection right from the employment of auditor is put up, which is proved to be comprise as well as realistic choice of enterprises out of the central one as it takes into account the audit market order and protecting the interests of property owners, and is in line with the cost and benefits principle.
At last, a view of "co-evolutional governance" is suggested. The existing governance views related to AOS are essentially "institution related" and pay no attention to the effect of audit techniques on the AOS governance. The analysis of the independent audit system from the perspective of co-evolution theory shows it pocesses all characteristics of a co-evolutional system, and the co-evolutional relations between the audit techniques and institution, the independent audit system and the social environment, the organizations and individuals in this system, so that a view of co-evolutional governance which is more comprehensive and systematic could be applied in the governance of AOS, so as to improve the effciency and effectiveness of govenance.
引文
[1]阿兰斯密德(Allan A. Schmid)著.刘璨、吴水荣译.制度与行为经济学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2004
[2]程李梅.信息不对称与独立审计风险[J].商业研究,2003：36-38
[3]陈武朝,张泓.盈余管理、审计师变更与审计师独立性[J].会计研究,2004.8：81-86
[4]陈关亭,高晓明.审计意见及其变通行为分析——来自2001-2002年的经验证据.审计研究[J],.2004,3：27-33
[5]陈关亭.利用说明段变通审计意见的实证分析.审计与经济研究[J],2005,20(1)：14-22
[6]陈丽蓉.非审计服务对中国上市公司独立性的影响研究[D].重庆：重庆大学,2008
[7]陈志强.从审计模式及其思想的演进辨析风险导向审计应有的内涵[J].审计研究,2006,3：69-72
[8]陈祖华：基于委托代理的审计委员会分析[J].经济问题,2006,11：8-10
[9]陈劲,王焕详.演化经济学[M].北京：清华大学出版社,39
[10]陈俊,陈汉文.公司治理、会计准则执行与盈余价值相关性——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2007(2)：45-52
[11]陈梅花.审计意见信息含量研究[D].上海：上海财经大学.2001
[12]陈武朝,张泓.盈余管理审计师变更与审计师独立性[J].会计研究,2004(8)：81-86
[13]杜兴强,郭剑花.审计师变更与审计意见购买：一项经验研究.山西财经大学学报[J],2008,30(11)：101-102
[14]杜兴强,周泽,将会计信息质量与公司治理：基于中国资本市场的进一步经验证据[J].财经论丛,2007,(5)：71-79
[15]冯丽云.多分类Logistic回归分析在大学生神经症危险因素研究中的应用[J].数理医学杂志.2002,15(4)：317-319
[16]冯均科.审计关系契约论[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004
[17]弗雷德·鲁森斯等著.王垒等译.组织行为学(第9版)[M].北京：人民邮电出版社,2003
[18]龚启辉,刘桂良.审计合谋的治理：来自审计收费模型的风险博弈分析[J].审
计研究,2006,4：68-71
[19]忻榕,徐淑英,王辉,张志学,陈维正(作者),徐淑英,刘忠明主编.国有企业的企业文化：对其维度和影响的归纳性分析.中国企业管理的前沿研究[C].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,372-397
[20]郭志勇,陈龙春.上市公司非标准审计意见市场反应的差异性研究[J].审计与经济研究,2008,23(3)：38-43
[21]霍奇逊.制度与演化经济学现代文选：关键性概念.北京：高等教育出版社[M],2004
[22]郝树芹,王建琼.“政府招标”审计委托模式的博弈分析[J].2007,1：66-69
[23]黄一鸣.关于上市公司审计委托改革的设想[J].经济研究导刊,2006,4：68-70
[24]黄凯南.共同演化理论研究评述.中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)[J],2008,4：97-101
[25]黄凯南,程臻宇.认知理性与个体主义方法论的发展[J].经济研究,2008,7：142-160
[26]贺密柱.内部控制理论演进的中外比较及其思考[J].财会通讯(学术版),2008,2：101-103
[27]胡春元.审计风险研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,1997
[28]胡继荣.张晴.审计委托模式与审计质量——基于审计冲突理论的研究[J].福州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,2：36-40
[29]贾根良.理解演化经济学[M].中国社会科学,2004,2：33-42
[30]贾政,朱楚珠.审计合谋问题的分析模型[J].深圳大学学报(理工版),2002,19(4)：38-44
[31]阚京华.强调事项段、审计意见变通和投资者市场反应[J].中国流通经济,2008,7：52-55
[32]阚京华.虚假会计信息成因及其监管的理性思考[J].商业研究,2003,3：91-94
[33]李眺.审计市场：产业组织视角的分析[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2005
[34]李爽,吴溪.审计师变更研究——中国证券市场的初步证据[M].中国财政经济出版社,2002.3
[35]李爽,吴溪.审计定价研究：中国审计市场的初步证据[M],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004
[36]李爽,吴溪.审计意见变通及其监管[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005,6：1-28
[37]李爽,吴溪.后中天勤时代的中国证券审计市场[J].会计研究,2005,6：10-15
[38]李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[J].上海：三联书店,2000
[39]李学东.高学敏.审计意见的形成机制与市场传导效应分析[J].现代财经,2008,
8：45-48
[40]李海鹏.资本市场对审计意见反应的实证研究[J].商业经济,2008,313(11)：91-94
[41]李增泉.实证分析：审计意见的信息含量[J].会计研究,1999.8：17-22
[42]李霞,傅红梅,谢晋宇.London的职业动机理论及其对人力资源管理与开发的启示.科学学与科学技术管理[J],2008,(9)：192-195
[43]李青.注册会计师审计委托问题探讨[J].经济问题探索,2004,2：96-98
[44]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理与审计意见关系的实证研究[J].财经研究,2004,11：126-135
[45]刘峰,张立民,雷科罗.我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求[J].会计研究,2000,2：9-15
[46]刘峰,郭永祥.会计师事务所与上市公司审计合谋的经济分析[J].经济体制改革,2002.3：140-142
[47]刘国常,韩春生.上市公司审计合谋的博弈分析和治理策略[J].审计与经济研究,2005,3：32-35
[48]刘国常,赵兴楣,杨小锋.审计的契约安排与独立性的互动机制[J].会计研究,2007.9：90-96
[49]刘朝晖.香港保荐人制度的持续改革及对完善内地保荐制度的启示[J].特区经济,2006,5：145-146
[50]刘运宏.保荐制度的借鉴、问题与完善[J].法学杂志,2007,6：133-135
[51]刘志高,王缉慈.共同演化及其空间隐喻[J].中国地质大学学报(社会科学版),2008,8(4)：85-89
[52]林钟高,徐正刚.审计合谋的成因与治理对策[J].预测,2004,2：22-27
[53]卢现祥.西方新制度经济学[M].北京：中国发展发版社,2004
[54]陆正飞,童盼.审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究[J].审计研究,2003,3：45-56
[55]雷光勇,王立彦.投资秩序与利益相关者审计[J].审计研究,2006,1：71-77
[56]雷光勇,崔文娟.现代审计产权论[M].审计与经济研究,2001,7：18-21
[57]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊：共生与治理[J].管理世界,2004,2：97-116
[58]雷光勇.审计合谋的经济学分析[J].审计与经济研究,1999,2：23-25
[59]龙小海,余怒涛,黄登仕等.制度变迁、注册会计师选聘权配置与独立审计制度演变[J].会计研究.2007,11：82-96
[60]梁竹苑,许燕,蒋奖.决策中个体差异研究述评.心理科学进展[J],2007,15(4)：689-694
[61]马尔科姆·卢瑟福.经济学中的制度：老制度主义和新制度主义[M].中国社会科学出版社,1999,11
[62]诺思.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海：上海三联书店,1994,3-7
[63]彭兰香,张黎.注册会计师审计质量监控机制国际比较研究[J],审计与经济研究,200722(1)：52-57
[64]齐兴利,徐中华.试论我国审计委托模式的改良与转包[J].经济问题,2007,3：24-26
[65]青木昌彦,奥野正宽.经济体制的比较制度分析[M].中国发展出版社,2005
[66]秦荣生.我国证券业十大变化评述[J].当代财经,2004,233(4)：20-24
[67]任力.演化增长理论的演变、超越与贡献[J].烟台大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,4：203-206
[68]石绍炳.审计师变更与审计意见购买的关系研究[J].技术经济,2008,2：121-127
[69]盛洪主编.现代制度经济学[C].北京：北京大学出版社,2003,5
[70]唐跃军.审计收费、审计委员会与意见购买——来自2004-2005年中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2007,4
[71]汪洪涛.制度经济学——制度及制度变迁性质解释[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2003
[72]伍利娜,束晓辉.审计师更换时机对年报及时性和审计质量的影响[J].会计研究,2006,11：37-95
[73]伍利娜,揭开审计收费之迷——评上市公司审计收费影响因素研究.中国会计评论,2005,1：210-212
[74]吴联生.会计信息失真的分类治理——从会计域秩序到会计规则[M].北京大学出版社.2006.11-13
[75]王恩山.让外部股东掌握独立审计的委托权[J].审计与经济研究,2007,5：48-51
[76]王秋梅.论社会契约思想与宪政[J].哈尔滨学院学报,2008,6：27-31
[77]王善平,朱青.独立审计制度安排中的理性与博弈[J].中国注册会计师,2004,1：54-57
[78]王善平,赵国宇.防范审计合谋之奖惩措施的有效性[J].系统工程,2008,110-113
[79]王善平,李斌.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证分析——来自深市上市公司的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2004,128(25)：69-71
[80]王文宾.演化博弈论研究的现状与展望[J].统计与决策,2009(3)：159-161
[81]王振林.审计收费的决定与审计质量：中国上市公司的证据：[D].上海：上海财经大学,2002
[82]王金圣,王霞等.审计意见购买研究综述[J].财贸研究,2007,2：136-147
[83]王泽霞.论风险导向审计发展创新——管理舞弊导向审计[J].会计研究,2004,14：49-54
[84]王春飞.道德困境与审计意见购买[J].审计研究,2006,5：45-50
[85]汪俊秀.上市公司审计委托关系的重构——加强审计独立性的路径[J].审计与经济研究,2007,1：49-51
[86]吴清华,王平心,冯均科.审计委员会、董事会特征与财务呈报质量——一项基于中国证券市场的实证研究[J].管理评论,2006,7：51-55
[87]吴联生.审计意见购买：行为特征与监管策略[J].经济研究,2005,7：66-75
[88]吴联生.会计信息失真的“三分法”：理论框架与证据[J].会计研究,2003,1：26-30
[89]吴联生,利益协调与审计制度安排[J].审计研究,2003,2：16-21
[90]伍中信,曹越.产权保护,“三域”秩序与审计信息真实性[J].会计研究,2007,12：82-87
[91]沃尔德罗普.复杂：诞生于秩序与混沌边缘的科学[M].上海：三联书店,1997
[92]文硕,世界审计史[M],北京：企业管理出版社,1996
[93]辛金国.审计关系人的博弈行为分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2001,7：33-37
[94]谢荣.论审计风险的产生原因、模式演变和控制措施[J].审计研究,2003,4：24-29
[95]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006
[96]谢荣.市场经济中的民间审计责任[M].上海：上海社会科学出版社,1994
[97]谢荣,论审计风险的产生原因、模式演变和控制措施[J].审计研究,2003,4.23-29
[98]谢德仁,会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排[J].经济研究.5：47-51
[99]易宪容.交易行为与合约选择[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1998,6：9-14
[100]袁庆明.新制度经济学[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2005,41
[101]杨虎涛.共生演化系统的萌芽、发展与成熟——多元化战略的演化经济学解释[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版)[J],2006,62(2)：45-50
[102]杨臻黛.审计意见的决策有用性：基于银行信贷决策视角的研究[D].上海：复旦大学,2007
[103]姚小义,粟山.保荐人制度比较研究[J].投资研究,2004,8：39-42
[104]于颖.构建新的财务报表审计委托制度的思考[J].财经问题研究,2004,5：66-68
[105]余宇莹.公司治理与审计质量：经验证据[D].厦门：厦门大学,2008
[106]余玉苗,田娟,朱业明.审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架[J].管理科学学报,2007,10(4)：32-37
[107]杨忠莲,徐政旦.我国公司成立审计委员会动机的实证研究[J].审计研究,2004,1：19-24
[108]杨鹤,徐鹏.审计师更换对审计独立性影响的实证研究[J].审计研究,2004.1：83-88
[109]杨和雄.A股上市公司审计意见购买研究[J].审计与经济研究,2009.1：40-45
[110]约翰·梅纳德·史密斯,潘春阳译,王小卫校.演化与博弈论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2008.10
[111]朱小平,郭志英.不更换会计师事务所条件下审计费用增加的信息含量研究——不更换会计师事务所条件下审计意见购买的线索分析[J].审计研究,2006.2：64-68
[112]朱锦余.雷光勇.审计合谋的制度分析及对策[J].中南财经大学学报,2001,3：109-112
[113]朱锋.非对称信息下的审计委托代理理论——激励安排与外部监督机制[J].审计研究,2007,5：50-55
[114]朱建红,石绍炳.资本市场、独立审计与诚信奖励——基于三方博弈的模型分析[J].技术经济,2006,25(9)：90-94
[115]张立民,张阳,博弈解析：审计独立性威胁与制度环境约束[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2007,47(4)：88-94
[116]张阳.注册会计师监管：美国经验与我国制度的有效性[J].企业经济,2007,320(4)：166-168
[117]赵丽芳.公司治理与会计信息质量控制系统研究[J].当代财经,2007(12)：107-112
[118]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996
[119]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海：上海三联书店与上海人民出版社,1995
[120]张文彤主编.SPSS统计分析教程[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2004,188-199
[121]张立民.刘英来主编.中国审计改革与发展研究[M].北京：中国财政经济出版 社,2003,306-327
[122]张艳.基于审计风险理论的审计报告行为研究：来自中国证券市场的经验证据[D],广州：暨南大学,2007
[123]张龙平,王泽霞.国际审计风险准则的最新发展及其启示[J].会计研究,2004,12：76-81
[124]张薇.新制度经济学视角下审计意见购买动因与防治[J].财会通讯(学术版),2008.10,32-35
[125]张薇,刘冬荣,会计报表审计：福利博弈的阐释[J].财会月刊(理论版),2006,9：33-35
[126]章立军.上市公司盈余管理与审计质量的相关分析[J].财贸经济,2005,4：33-39
[127]周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996,6：71-80
[128]赵晋芳,范月玲,曾平等.多分类有序logit模型资料平行线假设及检验方法[J].中国卫生统计,2009,26(1)：11-14
[129]赵兴楣.基于审计契约安排的独立性互动机制研究[D].广州：暨南大学,2008
[130]赵新刚、关忠良.审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架[J].管理科学学报,2007,4：56-59
[131]Ariel Markelevich and Charles A. Barragato.Auditor fees and audit quality[J]. Managerial Auditing Journal.2007,22(8):761-786
[132]Arold. Schneider, Bryan K. Church, Kristan M. Ely, Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence:A Review of the Literature[J], Journal of Accounting Literature.2006,25:169-211
[133]Arthur W. B, Designing economic agents that act like human agents:a behavioral approach to bounded rationality[J]. American Economic Review. 1991,81:353-359.
[134]Arie Y. Lewin. Henk W. Volberda. Prolegomena on co-evolution:a framework for research on strategy and new organizational forms[J]. Organization Science. 1999,(5):245-267
[135]Ashbaugh. H. R. LaFond and B. W. Mayhew. Do non-audit services compromise auditor independence? Further evidence[J]. The Accounting Review.2003,78:611-639
[136]Barkess, L. and R. Simnett. The provision of other services by auditors: independece and pricing issues[J]. Accounting and Business Research.1994, Spring:96-106
[137]Bryan E. Denham. Advanced categorical statistics:issues and applications in communication research[J]. Journal of Communication.2002,52(1):161-176
[138]Barbara Ann Waddington. Auditor costs for issuing going concern reports to surviving firms:[D].Michigan State University.1997
[139]Baron, Besanko, David. Regulation, asymmetric information, and auditing band[J], Journal of Economics,1984,Winter (15):447-470
[140]Barry E. Cushing. Economic analysis of accountants'ethical standard:the case of audit opinion shopping[J], Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1999,18:339-363
[141]Baiman, S. J H. Evans, J. Nagarajan, Collusion in auditing[J], Journal of Accounting Research,1991,24(2):144-152
[142]Calori. R. M Lubatken. P. Very. J. F. Veiga. Modelling the origins of nationally bound administrative heritages:A historical institutional analysis of French and British firms[J]. Organization Science.1997,8(6):681-696
[143]Chow C. and S. Rice. Qualified audit opinions and auditor switching[J]. The Accounting Review.1982, April:326-335
[144]Claude M Steele. A Threat in the air:how stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance[J]. American Psychologist.1997,6:617
[145]Chung, H. and Kallapur, S. "Client importance, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals". Working paper.Purdue University.2003
[146]David Mcmclelland. The two faces of power[J]. Journal of International Affairs,1970,24(1):36-47
[147]DeFond. M. L., K. Raghunandan, and K. R. Subramanyam. Do non-audit service fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2002 (September):1247-1274
[148]Dopuch. N. M. Gupta. D. Simunic & M. Stein. Production efficiency and the pricing of audit services[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research.2003.20: 47-77.
[149]Doupuch N. R Holthausen, R Lefwich Abnormal stock returns associated with media disclosures of "subject to" qualified audit opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1984,1:3-38
[150]Dorothy A. Mcmullen. K. Raghunandan. Enhancing audit committee effectiveness [J]. Journal of Accountancy.1996,182:56-68
[151]DeAngelo. L E. Auditor size and audit quality[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1981,3:183-199
[152]DeFond. M. L. K. Raghunandan and K. R. Subramanyam. Do non-audit service fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern Audit Opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2002,40:1247-1274.
[153]DeChow. P. R. Sloan & A. Sweeney. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review.70(2).1995,193-225.
[154]Dye. R. Auditing standards, legal liability, and auditor wealth[J]. The Journal of Political Economy.1993,101 (October):887-914
[155]Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. Agency problems and residual claim[J]. Journal of Law & Economics,1983,VOL ⅩⅩⅥ June:327-349
[156]Firth. M A. The provision of nonaudit services by accounting firms to their audit clients[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research.1997,14.1-21.
[157]Firth. Qualified opinions:Their impact on investment decisions[J]. The Accounting Review,1978, (6):23-34
[158]Francis. J. The effect of audit firm size on audit prices:A Study of the Australian market[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1984,133-151
[159]Francis. J. D, Philbrick and K. Schipper. Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1994,32 (Autumn):137-164
[160]Frankel R. Johnson M. Nelson K. The relation between auditor's fees for non-audit services and earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review.2002, 77(Supplement).71-105
[161]Geoffrey M. Hodgson. Thorbjorn Knudsen. The firm as an interactor:firm as vehicles for habits and routines[J]. Evolutionary Economics.2004, (14): 281-307
[162]Gunther, J. W. and Robert R. M. Auditing the auditors:oversight or overkill[J], Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic and Finance Policy Review,2000, 1(5):1-19
[163]Hayek F. The pretence of knowledge[J]. Swedish Journal of Economics.1975, 77(4):417-449
[164]Hamilton W D. Extraordinary sex ratio[J], Science,1967,156:477-488
[165]Heninger. W. The association between auditor litigation and abnormal accruals quality[J]. Journal of Accounting Review.2001.76(1):111-126
[166]Hirshleifer J. Evolutionary models in economics and law:cooperative versus conflict strategies [J]. Research in Law and Economics,1982, (4):15-23
[167]Holthausen and R Watts. "The relevance of value relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting" [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics.2001,31:37-51
[168]Hull D L. Individuality and selection[J]. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics.1980,11:311-332
[169]Hull D L. Langman R E. Glenn S S. Ageneral account of selection:biology, immunology and behavior[J]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.2001,24(3): 511-528
[170]Janice M. Beyer, Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, Elizabeth Geodge, William H. Glick.dt ogilvie and Dulce Pugliese. The selective perception of managers revised[J]. Academy of Management Journal.1997,40(3).716-737
[171]Jere R. Francis, Bin Ke. Disclosure of fees paid to auditors and the market valuation of earnings surprises[J], Review Accounting Study (2006) 11:495-523
[172]Jensen. M. C., Meckling w. Theory of the Firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3: 305-360
[173]Jenkins, G J. and K. Krawczyk. Nonaudit services and perceptions of auditor independenc[J]e. Journal of Applied Business Research 2003, (17)3:73-78
[174]J. Grepory Jenkins, Donald R. Deis, Jean C Bedard, Mary B. Curtis. Accounting Firm Culture and Governance:A Research Synthesis[J]. Behavioral Research in Accounting.2008,20(1).45-74
[175]Joseph P. Weber, Michael Willenborg, Ramgopal Venkataraman. Litigation risk, audit quality and audit fees:evidence from initial public offerings[J]. American Accounting Association.2008,83(5):1315-1345
[176]Joseph V. Carcello, Terry L. Neal. Audit committee composition and auditor reporting[J]. The Accounting Review.2000,75(4):453-467
[177]Jouhtio M. Co-evolution of Industry and Its Institutional Environment[J]. Working Paper of Strategy and International Business in Helsinki University of Technology.2006
[178]Kennedy. Duane B. Classification techniques in accounting research: empirical[J]. Contemporary Accounting Reseach. Spring 1992,8(2):4-19
[179]Kieser. A. Organizational. Institutional and societal evolution:medieval craft guilds and the genesis of formal organizations [J]. Administration Science Quart. 1996,34(4)540-564
[180]Krishnan. J, K. J. Krishnan and R.G. Stephens. The simultaneous relation between auditor switching and auditor opinion:an empirical analysis[J]. Accounting and Business Research. Summer 1996,224-236
[181]Krishnan. J.K. and J. Krishnan. Litigation and auditor resignations[J]. The Journal of Accounting Research. Spring 1998,143-156
[182]Krishnan. J.K and R.G. Stephens. Evidence on opinion shopping form audit opinion conservatism[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 1995,14:179-201
[183]Kofman & Lawarree, Collusion in Hierarchical Agency[J]. Econometrica, 1993,61(3):45-54
[184]Kornish, L. J. and C. B. Levine. Discipline with common agency:The case of audit and nonaudit services[J]. The Accounting Review 2004 (January): 173-200
[185]Larcker. D. Richardson S. Fees paid to audit firms, accrual choices, and corporate governance[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.2004,42:625-658
[186]Lavin, D. Perceptions of the independence of the auditor[J]. The Accounting Review 1976 January:41-50
[187]Lawrence R. Lawlor & J. Maynard Smith. The co-evolution and stability of competing species[J]. The American Naturalist.1976,110:79-99
[188]Lennox. C. S. Non-audit fees, disclosure and audit quality[J]. The European Accounting Review.1999 (2):239-252
[189]Lennox. C. Do companies successful engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.2000(29):321-337
[190]Lesod. Are evolutionary games another way of thinking about game theory? Some historical considerations[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2004, 14:249-262
[191]Lewontin R C. Evolution and the theory of games[J], Journal of Theoretical Biology,1961,1:382-403
[192]Linda A. Jackson.Linda A. Sullivan and Carole N. Hodge. Stereotype effects on attributions, predictions and evaluations:no two social judgments are quite alike[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.1993,6:69-84
[193]Loasby. B.J Time. Knowledge and evolutionary:why connections matter[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics.2001,11:75-82
[194]Lys T. and Watts. R. L. Lawsuits against auditors[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1994,(32):65-93
[195]Mahoney. J. Path dependence in historical sociology[J]. Theory and Society 29. 2000,507-548
[196]Mary E. Stocken. Audit conservatism and opinion shopping:influence of client switching expectations on audit opinion decisions [D].The Graduate School. The Pennsylvanian State University. Dec 2000
[197]Mary J. Walker. George P. Huber and William H. Glick. Functional background as a determinant of excutives selective perception[J]. Academy of Management Journal. August 1996,943-974
[198]Mangold, N. R., Changing Auditors and the Effect on Earnings[M], Auditors' Opinions, and Stock Prices, UMI Research Press,1988
[199]Maynard Smith J and Price G R, The logic of animal conflicts[J], Nature,1973, 246:15-18
[200]Maynard Smith J. The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts[J], Journal of Theoretical Biology,1982,47:209-221
[201]Mekelvey. B. Quasi-natural organization science[J]. Organization Science.1997, 8 (4):352-380
[202]Merry. U. Organizational strategy on different landscapes:a new science approach[J]. Systemic Practice and Action Research.1999,12(3):257-278:
[203]Nelson R. S. Winter. An evolutionary theory of economic change[M], Harvard University. Cambridge. MA:Belknap Press.1982
[204]Norris F. Will big four audit firms survive in a world of unlimited liability? The New York Times.2004, September 10:85-93
[205]North D. C. E Economic performance through time[J], American Economic Review,1994,84(3):359-368
[206]Padgett M. K. P. Gjerde S. B. Hughes and C. J. Born. The relationship between pre-employment expectations. Experiences and length of stay in public accounting[J]. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies.2005,12(1): 82-102
[207]Page S E. Path dependence[J]. Quarterly Journal of Political Science.2006,1: 87-115
[208]Pany. K. and P.M. J. Reckers. Auditor Independence and Nonaudit Services: Director Views and Their Policy implications[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.1983,1:243-62.
[209]Parkash. M. and C.F. Venable. Auditee incentives for auditor independence:the case of non-audit services[J]. The Accounting Review.1993,68:113-133
[210]Pelikan. P. Bringing institutions into evolutionary economics:another view with links to changes in physical and social technologies[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics.2003,13:149-156
[211]Pelitoniemi M. J. Co-evolution in an organization population of which knowledge-intensive service organizations form a part[C]. Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Conference on Services Systems.2005
[212]Pierson.P. Increasing Returns, Path dependence and the study of politics[J]. American Political Science Review 2000,94:252-267
[213]Pratt J.L. C. Mohrwe is and P. Beaulieu. The interaction between national and organizational culture in accounting firms:An extension[J]. Accounting. organizations and Society.1993,18 (7/8):621-628
[214]Qiu A. Audit auality and earnings nanagement:empirical evidence from China's stock market[D]. The Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2004
[215]Reynolds. J. K. and J. R. Francis. Does size matter? The influence of larger clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.2001,30:375-400
[216]Rod Bond and Peter B. Smith. Culture and Conformity:A meta-analysis of studies using Asch's line judgment task[J]. Psychological Bulletin.1996,119(1): 111-137
[217]Robert Aumann, What is game theory trying to accomplish? In Kenneth J. Arrow and Seppo Honkappohia (ed), Frontiers of Economics, Basil Blackwell Ltd.1985,35-45
[218]Sarhan, M. H., G. B. Frank, & S. A. Fisher. Switching independent auditors:an empirical investigation[J]. Akron Business and Economic Review.1991, (Summer),173-183
[219]Shatter. W. E.D J. Lowe. & T. J. Fogarty. The effects of corporate ownership on public accountants'Professionalism and ethics[J]. Accounting Horizons.2002, 16(2):109-124
[220]Shafer. W. E. R. E. Morris. & A. A. Ketchand. The effects of formal sanctions on auditor independence[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Preactive & Theory.1999, 18(Supplement):85-101
[221]Sheldon S. Zalkind and Timothy W. Costello. Perception:some resent research and implications for administration[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly. September 1962,227-229
[222]Simunic. D. A. The pricing of audit services:theory and evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1980,18:161-190.
[223]Simunic D.A. Auditing. Consulting and auditor independence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1984,22(Autumn):679-702
[224]Talley E. L. Sarbanes-Oxley accounting issues:cataclysmic liability risk among Big four auditors[J]. Columbia Law Review.2006.106(11):1641-1697
[225]Teoh S. H. Auditor Independence. Dismissal threats and the market reaction to auditor switches[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1992.30(1).1-23
[226]Teoh. S. I. Welch. and T. J Wong. Earnings management and the long run performance of initial public offerings[J]. The Journal of Finance.1998,53 (December):1935-1974
[227]Tiebout, C. M. A pure theory of local government expenditures [J], Journal of Political Economy,1956,64:416-424
[228]T. J. Wong. and G. Rao. Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic? [J]. Review of Accounting Studies.1998.3:175-208
[229]Thornbury J. KPMG:Revitalizing culture through values[J]. Business Strategy Review.1999.10(4):1-15
[230]Thornton. J. A. Reinstein and C. Miller. Non-audit services and perceived auditor independence[J]. Paper presented at Auditing Section 2004 Mide-year Confernce
[231]Tuntiwongpiboon. An investigation of client attributes and audit structure[D]. The University of Alabama.1990
[232]U. Witt. Evolutionary Economics[M]. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.1993
[233]Wallach E. J. Individuals and organizations:the cultural match[J]. Training and Development Journal.1983,37(3):29-36
[234]Wallance N. Davidson; Pornsit Jiraporn. Peter DaDalt. Causes and consequences of audit shopping:an analysis of auditor opinions, earnings management, and auditor changes [J]. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics; Winter,2006,78(1):95-117
[235]Warth.R. J. Ethics in the accounting profession:a study[J]. The CPA Journal, 2000,70 (10):69-70
[236]Watts R. L., J. L Zimmerman. Agency problems, auditing and the theory of the firm:some evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics.1983, (26):613-633
[237]Whisenant, S., Sankaraguruswamy, S. and Raghunandan, K. "Evidence on the joint determination of audit and non-audit fees" [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.2003,41 (4):721-744
[238]Willenborg M. Empirical analysis of the economic demand for auditing in the initial public offerings market[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1999,37 (Spring):225-238
[239]Williamson, O. E. The economic institutions of capitalism:firms, markets, relational contracting[M]. New York, Free Press,1985
[240]Wines G. Auditor independence, audit qualifications and the provision of non-audit services:A note[J]. Accounting and Finance 34(1):75-86
[241]Wong Man Kong. Raymond. An empirical study of audit quality in China from the perspectives of regulators and the accounting profession[D]. School of Accounting and Finance of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2005
[242]Yandong Qiang. Incidence and Severity dual modeling in vaccine evaluatio[D]. Baltimore Maryland,2006
[243]Zoe-Vonna Palmrose. Audit fees and auditor size:further evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1986.24(1):97-120
[2]程李梅.信息不对称与独立审计风险[J].商业研究,2003：36-38
[3]陈武朝,张泓.盈余管理、审计师变更与审计师独立性[J].会计研究,2004.8：81-86
[4]陈关亭,高晓明.审计意见及其变通行为分析——来自2001-2002年的经验证据.审计研究[J],.2004,3：27-33
[5]陈关亭.利用说明段变通审计意见的实证分析.审计与经济研究[J],2005,20(1)：14-22
[6]陈丽蓉.非审计服务对中国上市公司独立性的影响研究[D].重庆：重庆大学,2008
[7]陈志强.从审计模式及其思想的演进辨析风险导向审计应有的内涵[J].审计研究,2006,3：69-72
[8]陈祖华：基于委托代理的审计委员会分析[J].经济问题,2006,11：8-10
[9]陈劲,王焕详.演化经济学[M].北京：清华大学出版社,39
[10]陈俊,陈汉文.公司治理、会计准则执行与盈余价值相关性——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2007(2)：45-52
[11]陈梅花.审计意见信息含量研究[D].上海：上海财经大学.2001
[12]陈武朝,张泓.盈余管理审计师变更与审计师独立性[J].会计研究,2004(8)：81-86
[13]杜兴强,郭剑花.审计师变更与审计意见购买：一项经验研究.山西财经大学学报[J],2008,30(11)：101-102
[14]杜兴强,周泽,将会计信息质量与公司治理：基于中国资本市场的进一步经验证据[J].财经论丛,2007,(5)：71-79
[15]冯丽云.多分类Logistic回归分析在大学生神经症危险因素研究中的应用[J].数理医学杂志.2002,15(4)：317-319
[16]冯均科.审计关系契约论[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004
[17]弗雷德·鲁森斯等著.王垒等译.组织行为学(第9版)[M].北京：人民邮电出版社,2003
[18]龚启辉,刘桂良.审计合谋的治理：来自审计收费模型的风险博弈分析[J].审
计研究,2006,4：68-71
[19]忻榕,徐淑英,王辉,张志学,陈维正(作者),徐淑英,刘忠明主编.国有企业的企业文化：对其维度和影响的归纳性分析.中国企业管理的前沿研究[C].北京：北京大学出版社,2005,372-397
[20]郭志勇,陈龙春.上市公司非标准审计意见市场反应的差异性研究[J].审计与经济研究,2008,23(3)：38-43
[21]霍奇逊.制度与演化经济学现代文选：关键性概念.北京：高等教育出版社[M],2004
[22]郝树芹,王建琼.“政府招标”审计委托模式的博弈分析[J].2007,1：66-69
[23]黄一鸣.关于上市公司审计委托改革的设想[J].经济研究导刊,2006,4：68-70
[24]黄凯南.共同演化理论研究评述.中国地质大学学报(社会科学版)[J],2008,4：97-101
[25]黄凯南,程臻宇.认知理性与个体主义方法论的发展[J].经济研究,2008,7：142-160
[26]贺密柱.内部控制理论演进的中外比较及其思考[J].财会通讯(学术版),2008,2：101-103
[27]胡春元.审计风险研究[M].大连：东北财经大学出版社,1997
[28]胡继荣.张晴.审计委托模式与审计质量——基于审计冲突理论的研究[J].福州大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,2：36-40
[29]贾根良.理解演化经济学[M].中国社会科学,2004,2：33-42
[30]贾政,朱楚珠.审计合谋问题的分析模型[J].深圳大学学报(理工版),2002,19(4)：38-44
[31]阚京华.强调事项段、审计意见变通和投资者市场反应[J].中国流通经济,2008,7：52-55
[32]阚京华.虚假会计信息成因及其监管的理性思考[J].商业研究,2003,3：91-94
[33]李眺.审计市场：产业组织视角的分析[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2005
[34]李爽,吴溪.审计师变更研究——中国证券市场的初步证据[M].中国财政经济出版社,2002.3
[35]李爽,吴溪.审计定价研究：中国审计市场的初步证据[M],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2004
[36]李爽,吴溪.审计意见变通及其监管[J].中国会计与财务研究,2005,6：1-28
[37]李爽,吴溪.后中天勤时代的中国证券审计市场[J].会计研究,2005,6：10-15
[38]李树华.审计独立性的提高与审计市场的背离[J].上海：三联书店,2000
[39]李学东.高学敏.审计意见的形成机制与市场传导效应分析[J].现代财经,2008,
8：45-48
[40]李海鹏.资本市场对审计意见反应的实证研究[J].商业经济,2008,313(11)：91-94
[41]李增泉.实证分析：审计意见的信息含量[J].会计研究,1999.8：17-22
[42]李霞,傅红梅,谢晋宇.London的职业动机理论及其对人力资源管理与开发的启示.科学学与科学技术管理[J],2008,(9)：192-195
[43]李青.注册会计师审计委托问题探讨[J].经济问题探索,2004,2：96-98
[44]李维安,王新汉,王威.盈余管理与审计意见关系的实证研究[J].财经研究,2004,11：126-135
[45]刘峰,张立民,雷科罗.我国审计市场制度安排与审计质量需求[J].会计研究,2000,2：9-15
[46]刘峰,郭永祥.会计师事务所与上市公司审计合谋的经济分析[J].经济体制改革,2002.3：140-142
[47]刘国常,韩春生.上市公司审计合谋的博弈分析和治理策略[J].审计与经济研究,2005,3：32-35
[48]刘国常,赵兴楣,杨小锋.审计的契约安排与独立性的互动机制[J].会计研究,2007.9：90-96
[49]刘朝晖.香港保荐人制度的持续改革及对完善内地保荐制度的启示[J].特区经济,2006,5：145-146
[50]刘运宏.保荐制度的借鉴、问题与完善[J].法学杂志,2007,6：133-135
[51]刘志高,王缉慈.共同演化及其空间隐喻[J].中国地质大学学报(社会科学版),2008,8(4)：85-89
[52]林钟高,徐正刚.审计合谋的成因与治理对策[J].预测,2004,2：22-27
[53]卢现祥.西方新制度经济学[M].北京：中国发展发版社,2004
[54]陆正飞,童盼.审计意见、审计师变更与监管政策——一项以14号规则为例的经验研究[J].审计研究,2003,3：45-56
[55]雷光勇,王立彦.投资秩序与利益相关者审计[J].审计研究,2006,1：71-77
[56]雷光勇,崔文娟.现代审计产权论[M].审计与经济研究,2001,7：18-21
[57]雷光勇.审计合谋与财务报告舞弊：共生与治理[J].管理世界,2004,2：97-116
[58]雷光勇.审计合谋的经济学分析[J].审计与经济研究,1999,2：23-25
[59]龙小海,余怒涛,黄登仕等.制度变迁、注册会计师选聘权配置与独立审计制度演变[J].会计研究.2007,11：82-96
[60]梁竹苑,许燕,蒋奖.决策中个体差异研究述评.心理科学进展[J],2007,15(4)：689-694
[61]马尔科姆·卢瑟福.经济学中的制度：老制度主义和新制度主义[M].中国社会科学出版社,1999,11
[62]诺思.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海：上海三联书店,1994,3-7
[63]彭兰香,张黎.注册会计师审计质量监控机制国际比较研究[J],审计与经济研究,200722(1)：52-57
[64]齐兴利,徐中华.试论我国审计委托模式的改良与转包[J].经济问题,2007,3：24-26
[65]青木昌彦,奥野正宽.经济体制的比较制度分析[M].中国发展出版社,2005
[66]秦荣生.我国证券业十大变化评述[J].当代财经,2004,233(4)：20-24
[67]任力.演化增长理论的演变、超越与贡献[J].烟台大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,4：203-206
[68]石绍炳.审计师变更与审计意见购买的关系研究[J].技术经济,2008,2：121-127
[69]盛洪主编.现代制度经济学[C].北京：北京大学出版社,2003,5
[70]唐跃军.审计收费、审计委员会与意见购买——来自2004-2005年中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2007,4
[71]汪洪涛.制度经济学——制度及制度变迁性质解释[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2003
[72]伍利娜,束晓辉.审计师更换时机对年报及时性和审计质量的影响[J].会计研究,2006,11：37-95
[73]伍利娜,揭开审计收费之迷——评上市公司审计收费影响因素研究.中国会计评论,2005,1：210-212
[74]吴联生.会计信息失真的分类治理——从会计域秩序到会计规则[M].北京大学出版社.2006.11-13
[75]王恩山.让外部股东掌握独立审计的委托权[J].审计与经济研究,2007,5：48-51
[76]王秋梅.论社会契约思想与宪政[J].哈尔滨学院学报,2008,6：27-31
[77]王善平,朱青.独立审计制度安排中的理性与博弈[J].中国注册会计师,2004,1：54-57
[78]王善平,赵国宇.防范审计合谋之奖惩措施的有效性[J].系统工程,2008,110-113
[79]王善平,李斌.我国上市公司审计收费影响因素的实证分析——来自深市上市公司的经验证据[J].财经理论与实践,2004,128(25)：69-71
[80]王文宾.演化博弈论研究的现状与展望[J].统计与决策,2009(3)：159-161
[81]王振林.审计收费的决定与审计质量：中国上市公司的证据：[D].上海：上海财经大学,2002
[82]王金圣,王霞等.审计意见购买研究综述[J].财贸研究,2007,2：136-147
[83]王泽霞.论风险导向审计发展创新——管理舞弊导向审计[J].会计研究,2004,14：49-54
[84]王春飞.道德困境与审计意见购买[J].审计研究,2006,5：45-50
[85]汪俊秀.上市公司审计委托关系的重构——加强审计独立性的路径[J].审计与经济研究,2007,1：49-51
[86]吴清华,王平心,冯均科.审计委员会、董事会特征与财务呈报质量——一项基于中国证券市场的实证研究[J].管理评论,2006,7：51-55
[87]吴联生.审计意见购买：行为特征与监管策略[J].经济研究,2005,7：66-75
[88]吴联生.会计信息失真的“三分法”：理论框架与证据[J].会计研究,2003,1：26-30
[89]吴联生,利益协调与审计制度安排[J].审计研究,2003,2：16-21
[90]伍中信,曹越.产权保护,“三域”秩序与审计信息真实性[J].会计研究,2007,12：82-87
[91]沃尔德罗普.复杂：诞生于秩序与混沌边缘的科学[M].上海：三联书店,1997
[92]文硕,世界审计史[M],北京：企业管理出版社,1996
[93]辛金国.审计关系人的博弈行为分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2001,7：33-37
[94]谢荣.论审计风险的产生原因、模式演变和控制措施[J].审计研究,2003,4：24-29
[95]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2006
[96]谢荣.市场经济中的民间审计责任[M].上海：上海社会科学出版社,1994
[97]谢荣,论审计风险的产生原因、模式演变和控制措施[J].审计研究,2003,4.23-29
[98]谢德仁,会计信息的真实性与会计规则制定权合约安排[J].经济研究.5：47-51
[99]易宪容.交易行为与合约选择[M].北京：经济科学出版社.1998,6：9-14
[100]袁庆明.新制度经济学[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2005,41
[101]杨虎涛.共生演化系统的萌芽、发展与成熟——多元化战略的演化经济学解释[J].华中农业大学学报(社会科学版)[J],2006,62(2)：45-50
[102]杨臻黛.审计意见的决策有用性：基于银行信贷决策视角的研究[D].上海：复旦大学,2007
[103]姚小义,粟山.保荐人制度比较研究[J].投资研究,2004,8：39-42
[104]于颖.构建新的财务报表审计委托制度的思考[J].财经问题研究,2004,5：66-68
[105]余宇莹.公司治理与审计质量：经验证据[D].厦门：厦门大学,2008
[106]余玉苗,田娟,朱业明.审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架[J].管理科学学报,2007,10(4)：32-37
[107]杨忠莲,徐政旦.我国公司成立审计委员会动机的实证研究[J].审计研究,2004,1：19-24
[108]杨鹤,徐鹏.审计师更换对审计独立性影响的实证研究[J].审计研究,2004.1：83-88
[109]杨和雄.A股上市公司审计意见购买研究[J].审计与经济研究,2009.1：40-45
[110]约翰·梅纳德·史密斯,潘春阳译,王小卫校.演化与博弈论[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2008.10
[111]朱小平,郭志英.不更换会计师事务所条件下审计费用增加的信息含量研究——不更换会计师事务所条件下审计意见购买的线索分析[J].审计研究,2006.2：64-68
[112]朱锦余.雷光勇.审计合谋的制度分析及对策[J].中南财经大学学报,2001,3：109-112
[113]朱锋.非对称信息下的审计委托代理理论——激励安排与外部监督机制[J].审计研究,2007,5：50-55
[114]朱建红,石绍炳.资本市场、独立审计与诚信奖励——基于三方博弈的模型分析[J].技术经济,2006,25(9)：90-94
[115]张立民,张阳,博弈解析：审计独立性威胁与制度环境约束[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2007,47(4)：88-94
[116]张阳.注册会计师监管：美国经验与我国制度的有效性[J].企业经济,2007,320(4)：166-168
[117]赵丽芳.公司治理与会计信息质量控制系统研究[J].当代财经,2007(12)：107-112
[118]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996
[119]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海：上海三联书店与上海人民出版社,1995
[120]张文彤主编.SPSS统计分析教程[M].北京：高等教育出版社,2004,188-199
[121]张立民.刘英来主编.中国审计改革与发展研究[M].北京：中国财政经济出版 社,2003,306-327
[122]张艳.基于审计风险理论的审计报告行为研究：来自中国证券市场的经验证据[D],广州：暨南大学,2007
[123]张龙平,王泽霞.国际审计风险准则的最新发展及其启示[J].会计研究,2004,12：76-81
[124]张薇.新制度经济学视角下审计意见购买动因与防治[J].财会通讯(学术版),2008.10,32-35
[125]张薇,刘冬荣,会计报表审计：福利博弈的阐释[J].财会月刊(理论版),2006,9：33-35
[126]章立军.上市公司盈余管理与审计质量的相关分析[J].财贸经济,2005,4：33-39
[127]周其仁.市场里的企业：一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究,1996,6：71-80
[128]赵晋芳,范月玲,曾平等.多分类有序logit模型资料平行线假设及检验方法[J].中国卫生统计,2009,26(1)：11-14
[129]赵兴楣.基于审计契约安排的独立性互动机制研究[D].广州：暨南大学,2008
[130]赵新刚、关忠良.审计合谋的一个博弈均衡分析框架[J].管理科学学报,2007,4：56-59
[131]Ariel Markelevich and Charles A. Barragato.Auditor fees and audit quality[J]. Managerial Auditing Journal.2007,22(8):761-786
[132]Arold. Schneider, Bryan K. Church, Kristan M. Ely, Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence:A Review of the Literature[J], Journal of Accounting Literature.2006,25:169-211
[133]Arthur W. B, Designing economic agents that act like human agents:a behavioral approach to bounded rationality[J]. American Economic Review. 1991,81:353-359.
[134]Arie Y. Lewin. Henk W. Volberda. Prolegomena on co-evolution:a framework for research on strategy and new organizational forms[J]. Organization Science. 1999,(5):245-267
[135]Ashbaugh. H. R. LaFond and B. W. Mayhew. Do non-audit services compromise auditor independence? Further evidence[J]. The Accounting Review.2003,78:611-639
[136]Barkess, L. and R. Simnett. The provision of other services by auditors: independece and pricing issues[J]. Accounting and Business Research.1994, Spring:96-106
[137]Bryan E. Denham. Advanced categorical statistics:issues and applications in communication research[J]. Journal of Communication.2002,52(1):161-176
[138]Barbara Ann Waddington. Auditor costs for issuing going concern reports to surviving firms:[D].Michigan State University.1997
[139]Baron, Besanko, David. Regulation, asymmetric information, and auditing band[J], Journal of Economics,1984,Winter (15):447-470
[140]Barry E. Cushing. Economic analysis of accountants'ethical standard:the case of audit opinion shopping[J], Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 1999,18:339-363
[141]Baiman, S. J H. Evans, J. Nagarajan, Collusion in auditing[J], Journal of Accounting Research,1991,24(2):144-152
[142]Calori. R. M Lubatken. P. Very. J. F. Veiga. Modelling the origins of nationally bound administrative heritages:A historical institutional analysis of French and British firms[J]. Organization Science.1997,8(6):681-696
[143]Chow C. and S. Rice. Qualified audit opinions and auditor switching[J]. The Accounting Review.1982, April:326-335
[144]Claude M Steele. A Threat in the air:how stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance[J]. American Psychologist.1997,6:617
[145]Chung, H. and Kallapur, S. "Client importance, non-audit fees, and abnormal accruals". Working paper.Purdue University.2003
[146]David Mcmclelland. The two faces of power[J]. Journal of International Affairs,1970,24(1):36-47
[147]DeFond. M. L., K. Raghunandan, and K. R. Subramanyam. Do non-audit service fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern audit opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2002 (September):1247-1274
[148]Dopuch. N. M. Gupta. D. Simunic & M. Stein. Production efficiency and the pricing of audit services[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research.2003.20: 47-77.
[149]Doupuch N. R Holthausen, R Lefwich Abnormal stock returns associated with media disclosures of "subject to" qualified audit opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1984,1:3-38
[150]Dorothy A. Mcmullen. K. Raghunandan. Enhancing audit committee effectiveness [J]. Journal of Accountancy.1996,182:56-68
[151]DeAngelo. L E. Auditor size and audit quality[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1981,3:183-199
[152]DeFond. M. L. K. Raghunandan and K. R. Subramanyam. Do non-audit service fees impair auditor independence? Evidence from going concern Audit Opinions[J]. Journal of Accounting Research 2002,40:1247-1274.
[153]DeChow. P. R. Sloan & A. Sweeney. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review.70(2).1995,193-225.
[154]Dye. R. Auditing standards, legal liability, and auditor wealth[J]. The Journal of Political Economy.1993,101 (October):887-914
[155]Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen. Agency problems and residual claim[J]. Journal of Law & Economics,1983,VOL ⅩⅩⅥ June:327-349
[156]Firth. M A. The provision of nonaudit services by accounting firms to their audit clients[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research.1997,14.1-21.
[157]Firth. Qualified opinions:Their impact on investment decisions[J]. The Accounting Review,1978, (6):23-34
[158]Francis. J. The effect of audit firm size on audit prices:A Study of the Australian market[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.1984,133-151
[159]Francis. J. D, Philbrick and K. Schipper. Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1994,32 (Autumn):137-164
[160]Frankel R. Johnson M. Nelson K. The relation between auditor's fees for non-audit services and earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review.2002, 77(Supplement).71-105
[161]Geoffrey M. Hodgson. Thorbjorn Knudsen. The firm as an interactor:firm as vehicles for habits and routines[J]. Evolutionary Economics.2004, (14): 281-307
[162]Gunther, J. W. and Robert R. M. Auditing the auditors:oversight or overkill[J], Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic and Finance Policy Review,2000, 1(5):1-19
[163]Hayek F. The pretence of knowledge[J]. Swedish Journal of Economics.1975, 77(4):417-449
[164]Hamilton W D. Extraordinary sex ratio[J], Science,1967,156:477-488
[165]Heninger. W. The association between auditor litigation and abnormal accruals quality[J]. Journal of Accounting Review.2001.76(1):111-126
[166]Hirshleifer J. Evolutionary models in economics and law:cooperative versus conflict strategies [J]. Research in Law and Economics,1982, (4):15-23
[167]Holthausen and R Watts. "The relevance of value relevance literature for financial accounting standard setting" [J], Journal of Accounting and Economics.2001,31:37-51
[168]Hull D L. Individuality and selection[J]. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics.1980,11:311-332
[169]Hull D L. Langman R E. Glenn S S. Ageneral account of selection:biology, immunology and behavior[J]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.2001,24(3): 511-528
[170]Janice M. Beyer, Prithviraj Chattopadhyay, Elizabeth Geodge, William H. Glick.dt ogilvie and Dulce Pugliese. The selective perception of managers revised[J]. Academy of Management Journal.1997,40(3).716-737
[171]Jere R. Francis, Bin Ke. Disclosure of fees paid to auditors and the market valuation of earnings surprises[J], Review Accounting Study (2006) 11:495-523
[172]Jensen. M. C., Meckling w. Theory of the Firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3: 305-360
[173]Jenkins, G J. and K. Krawczyk. Nonaudit services and perceptions of auditor independenc[J]e. Journal of Applied Business Research 2003, (17)3:73-78
[174]J. Grepory Jenkins, Donald R. Deis, Jean C Bedard, Mary B. Curtis. Accounting Firm Culture and Governance:A Research Synthesis[J]. Behavioral Research in Accounting.2008,20(1).45-74
[175]Joseph P. Weber, Michael Willenborg, Ramgopal Venkataraman. Litigation risk, audit quality and audit fees:evidence from initial public offerings[J]. American Accounting Association.2008,83(5):1315-1345
[176]Joseph V. Carcello, Terry L. Neal. Audit committee composition and auditor reporting[J]. The Accounting Review.2000,75(4):453-467
[177]Jouhtio M. Co-evolution of Industry and Its Institutional Environment[J]. Working Paper of Strategy and International Business in Helsinki University of Technology.2006
[178]Kennedy. Duane B. Classification techniques in accounting research: empirical[J]. Contemporary Accounting Reseach. Spring 1992,8(2):4-19
[179]Kieser. A. Organizational. Institutional and societal evolution:medieval craft guilds and the genesis of formal organizations [J]. Administration Science Quart. 1996,34(4)540-564
[180]Krishnan. J, K. J. Krishnan and R.G. Stephens. The simultaneous relation between auditor switching and auditor opinion:an empirical analysis[J]. Accounting and Business Research. Summer 1996,224-236
[181]Krishnan. J.K. and J. Krishnan. Litigation and auditor resignations[J]. The Journal of Accounting Research. Spring 1998,143-156
[182]Krishnan. J.K and R.G. Stephens. Evidence on opinion shopping form audit opinion conservatism[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 1995,14:179-201
[183]Kofman & Lawarree, Collusion in Hierarchical Agency[J]. Econometrica, 1993,61(3):45-54
[184]Kornish, L. J. and C. B. Levine. Discipline with common agency:The case of audit and nonaudit services[J]. The Accounting Review 2004 (January): 173-200
[185]Larcker. D. Richardson S. Fees paid to audit firms, accrual choices, and corporate governance[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.2004,42:625-658
[186]Lavin, D. Perceptions of the independence of the auditor[J]. The Accounting Review 1976 January:41-50
[187]Lawrence R. Lawlor & J. Maynard Smith. The co-evolution and stability of competing species[J]. The American Naturalist.1976,110:79-99
[188]Lennox. C. S. Non-audit fees, disclosure and audit quality[J]. The European Accounting Review.1999 (2):239-252
[189]Lennox. C. Do companies successful engage in opinion-shopping? Evidence from the UK[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.2000(29):321-337
[190]Lesod. Are evolutionary games another way of thinking about game theory? Some historical considerations[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics,2004, 14:249-262
[191]Lewontin R C. Evolution and the theory of games[J], Journal of Theoretical Biology,1961,1:382-403
[192]Linda A. Jackson.Linda A. Sullivan and Carole N. Hodge. Stereotype effects on attributions, predictions and evaluations:no two social judgments are quite alike[J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.1993,6:69-84
[193]Loasby. B.J Time. Knowledge and evolutionary:why connections matter[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics.2001,11:75-82
[194]Lys T. and Watts. R. L. Lawsuits against auditors[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1994,(32):65-93
[195]Mahoney. J. Path dependence in historical sociology[J]. Theory and Society 29. 2000,507-548
[196]Mary E. Stocken. Audit conservatism and opinion shopping:influence of client switching expectations on audit opinion decisions [D].The Graduate School. The Pennsylvanian State University. Dec 2000
[197]Mary J. Walker. George P. Huber and William H. Glick. Functional background as a determinant of excutives selective perception[J]. Academy of Management Journal. August 1996,943-974
[198]Mangold, N. R., Changing Auditors and the Effect on Earnings[M], Auditors' Opinions, and Stock Prices, UMI Research Press,1988
[199]Maynard Smith J and Price G R, The logic of animal conflicts[J], Nature,1973, 246:15-18
[200]Maynard Smith J. The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts[J], Journal of Theoretical Biology,1982,47:209-221
[201]Mekelvey. B. Quasi-natural organization science[J]. Organization Science.1997, 8 (4):352-380
[202]Merry. U. Organizational strategy on different landscapes:a new science approach[J]. Systemic Practice and Action Research.1999,12(3):257-278:
[203]Nelson R. S. Winter. An evolutionary theory of economic change[M], Harvard University. Cambridge. MA:Belknap Press.1982
[204]Norris F. Will big four audit firms survive in a world of unlimited liability? The New York Times.2004, September 10:85-93
[205]North D. C. E Economic performance through time[J], American Economic Review,1994,84(3):359-368
[206]Padgett M. K. P. Gjerde S. B. Hughes and C. J. Born. The relationship between pre-employment expectations. Experiences and length of stay in public accounting[J]. Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies.2005,12(1): 82-102
[207]Page S E. Path dependence[J]. Quarterly Journal of Political Science.2006,1: 87-115
[208]Pany. K. and P.M. J. Reckers. Auditor Independence and Nonaudit Services: Director Views and Their Policy implications[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.1983,1:243-62.
[209]Parkash. M. and C.F. Venable. Auditee incentives for auditor independence:the case of non-audit services[J]. The Accounting Review.1993,68:113-133
[210]Pelikan. P. Bringing institutions into evolutionary economics:another view with links to changes in physical and social technologies[J]. Journal of Evolutionary Economics.2003,13:149-156
[211]Pelitoniemi M. J. Co-evolution in an organization population of which knowledge-intensive service organizations form a part[C]. Proceedings of the Second IEEE International Conference on Services Systems.2005
[212]Pierson.P. Increasing Returns, Path dependence and the study of politics[J]. American Political Science Review 2000,94:252-267
[213]Pratt J.L. C. Mohrwe is and P. Beaulieu. The interaction between national and organizational culture in accounting firms:An extension[J]. Accounting. organizations and Society.1993,18 (7/8):621-628
[214]Qiu A. Audit auality and earnings nanagement:empirical evidence from China's stock market[D]. The Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2004
[215]Reynolds. J. K. and J. R. Francis. Does size matter? The influence of larger clients on office-level auditor reporting decisions[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics.2001,30:375-400
[216]Rod Bond and Peter B. Smith. Culture and Conformity:A meta-analysis of studies using Asch's line judgment task[J]. Psychological Bulletin.1996,119(1): 111-137
[217]Robert Aumann, What is game theory trying to accomplish? In Kenneth J. Arrow and Seppo Honkappohia (ed), Frontiers of Economics, Basil Blackwell Ltd.1985,35-45
[218]Sarhan, M. H., G. B. Frank, & S. A. Fisher. Switching independent auditors:an empirical investigation[J]. Akron Business and Economic Review.1991, (Summer),173-183
[219]Shatter. W. E.D J. Lowe. & T. J. Fogarty. The effects of corporate ownership on public accountants'Professionalism and ethics[J]. Accounting Horizons.2002, 16(2):109-124
[220]Shafer. W. E. R. E. Morris. & A. A. Ketchand. The effects of formal sanctions on auditor independence[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Preactive & Theory.1999, 18(Supplement):85-101
[221]Sheldon S. Zalkind and Timothy W. Costello. Perception:some resent research and implications for administration[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly. September 1962,227-229
[222]Simunic. D. A. The pricing of audit services:theory and evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1980,18:161-190.
[223]Simunic D.A. Auditing. Consulting and auditor independence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research 1984,22(Autumn):679-702
[224]Talley E. L. Sarbanes-Oxley accounting issues:cataclysmic liability risk among Big four auditors[J]. Columbia Law Review.2006.106(11):1641-1697
[225]Teoh S. H. Auditor Independence. Dismissal threats and the market reaction to auditor switches[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1992.30(1).1-23
[226]Teoh. S. I. Welch. and T. J Wong. Earnings management and the long run performance of initial public offerings[J]. The Journal of Finance.1998,53 (December):1935-1974
[227]Tiebout, C. M. A pure theory of local government expenditures [J], Journal of Political Economy,1956,64:416-424
[228]T. J. Wong. and G. Rao. Are accruals during initial public offerings opportunistic? [J]. Review of Accounting Studies.1998.3:175-208
[229]Thornbury J. KPMG:Revitalizing culture through values[J]. Business Strategy Review.1999.10(4):1-15
[230]Thornton. J. A. Reinstein and C. Miller. Non-audit services and perceived auditor independence[J]. Paper presented at Auditing Section 2004 Mide-year Confernce
[231]Tuntiwongpiboon. An investigation of client attributes and audit structure[D]. The University of Alabama.1990
[232]U. Witt. Evolutionary Economics[M]. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.1993
[233]Wallach E. J. Individuals and organizations:the cultural match[J]. Training and Development Journal.1983,37(3):29-36
[234]Wallance N. Davidson; Pornsit Jiraporn. Peter DaDalt. Causes and consequences of audit shopping:an analysis of auditor opinions, earnings management, and auditor changes [J]. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics; Winter,2006,78(1):95-117
[235]Warth.R. J. Ethics in the accounting profession:a study[J]. The CPA Journal, 2000,70 (10):69-70
[236]Watts R. L., J. L Zimmerman. Agency problems, auditing and the theory of the firm:some evidence[J]. Journal of Law and Economics.1983, (26):613-633
[237]Whisenant, S., Sankaraguruswamy, S. and Raghunandan, K. "Evidence on the joint determination of audit and non-audit fees" [J]. Journal of Accounting Research.2003,41 (4):721-744
[238]Willenborg M. Empirical analysis of the economic demand for auditing in the initial public offerings market[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1999,37 (Spring):225-238
[239]Williamson, O. E. The economic institutions of capitalism:firms, markets, relational contracting[M]. New York, Free Press,1985
[240]Wines G. Auditor independence, audit qualifications and the provision of non-audit services:A note[J]. Accounting and Finance 34(1):75-86
[241]Wong Man Kong. Raymond. An empirical study of audit quality in China from the perspectives of regulators and the accounting profession[D]. School of Accounting and Finance of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University,2005
[242]Yandong Qiang. Incidence and Severity dual modeling in vaccine evaluatio[D]. Baltimore Maryland,2006
[243]Zoe-Vonna Palmrose. Audit fees and auditor size:further evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research.1986.24(1):97-120
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |