政府主导下我国证券市场投资者保护水平的选择
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摘要
本文研究的核心问题是国家目标与产权保护之间的关系。试图回答以下问题:1、在存在自身利益的情况下,国家从攫取垄断租金向供给产权保护进行转换的动力是什么?2、政府主导的产权保护水平有着怎样的变化轨迹和特征?这种变化对资源配置效率产生了怎样的影响?3、在政府主导下,产权保护水平的提升是否能够自我实施、且具有可持续性?本文通过分析我国证券市场上中小股权投资者权利保护水平的变化事实,来回答上述问题。
投资者保护是指,通过法律保护中小投资者利益免受来自控股股东的侵害。既有的以发达国家资本市场为对象的研究发现:投资者保护水平与资源配置效率具有正相关关系,投资者保护水平高的国家资源配置效率也高。但是在我国,大多上市公司是由国有企业转化而来,投资者保护水平的选择在很大程度上是国家作为控股股东攫取控制权私人利益与供给产权保护扩大社会剩余之间权衡的结果,因此中国的投资者保护问题具有了一定的特殊性。研究这一具有特殊性的问题,既可以拓展投资者保护理论的研究范围,又可以通过提炼总结,以探求国家目标收益与产权保护之间的关系,扩展和丰富国家理论与产权保护理论。
本文的主要研究思路是:首先,对我国证券市场的投资者保护水平及其变化轨迹进行描述,实证分析变化轨迹对证券市场效率的影响,指出:中国证券市场上,投资者保护具有显著的政府主导性特征;然后,对中国证券市场投资者保护水平的变化过程进行理论解释,着重分析政府在投资者保护水平选择上的理论逻辑,精炼出国家追求目标与产权保护水平之间的理论关系。
本文的大致结构和内容如下:
引言部分提出了本文所要研究的问题,介绍了所使用的主要概念、研究方法等内容;
第二章从投资者保护与资源配置效率之间的关系、国家在产权保护中的角色两个角度进行了文献回顾,发现现有文献的研究主要集中在投资者保护的衡量指标、投资者保护水平对证券市场的影响、决定投资者保护水平的因素以及国家为什么要保护产权、国家保护产权的行为是如何影响经济效率等问题上;
第三章从一般意义上介绍了投资者保护制度的构成、投资者保护的实施方式以及影响投资者保护水平的因素,并着重分析了国家这一实施者在投资者保护中的双重角色;
第四章对我国证券市场的政府主导特征、以及这一特征所决定的投资者保护水平及其变化轨迹进行了分析,发现:我国证券市场上,政府是在根据自身利益相机调控投资者保护水平,投资者保护水平存在波动性,而不是持续地提升。而投资者权利保护水平的波动对证券市场效率产生了影响,即当投资者权利保护水平上升时,证券市场效率随之提升;当投资者权利保护水平下降时,效率也随之下降。
第五章对中国证券市场上投资者保护水平的变化规律进行理论分析。首先将国家的效用目标界定为:垄断租金收益与社会剩余形成的税收收入双重目标。前者与投资者保护水平负相关,后者与投资者保护水平正相关。强势政府的共容利益导致了证券市场的制度变迁,在证券市场发展初期,强势政府根据投资者的参与约束与自己的目标收益确定投资者保护水平,投资者保护水平处于政府控制下的较低水平;随着证券市场的发展在经济增长中的重要程度上升,以及证券市场各利益主体谈判能力的增加,政府调整自己的收益构成与实现收益的方式,投资者保护水平得到提升。同时,由于对政府获取垄断租金利益的行为缺乏制度化约束,当获取垄断租金利益的紧迫性增加时,国家依然因此会侵害投资者利益,所以我国证券市场上的投资者保护水平存在波动性。
第六章对全文进行了总结,并根据研究结论提出了一些完善中国投资者保护制度的政策建议。
贯穿全文的主要思想是:在政府主导的证券市场上,政府将根据自身利益、以及实现自身利益的方式相机调节投资者保护水平,投资者保护水平的变化特征呈现出在总体提升趋势中存在反复、波动,并引致证券市场效率总体提升中存在波动。
这一基本思想通过对中国证券市场上,投资者保护水平的变化轨迹进行分析而得到了验证。全文得出的主要研究结论是:政府所追求的两种收益之间存在着一定的统一性与可替代性。当政府攫取垄断租金收益的成本上升时,政府有动力通过行政手段推动自上而下的制度变迁,扩大对投资者权利的保护来实现资源配置效率的提升,从而实现国家目标收益不同构成部分之间的替代。强政府的共容利益使得从权力手中释放权利、从而提升产权保护水平成为可能。在强势政府的主导下利用行政手段启动和推进渐进式制度变迁,可以促进资源配置效率提高,这一提高又由于随着制度变迁过程成长起来的各个经济主体的谈判能力的提升而得到保障。不过此时政府的强势又反而成为产权保护水平持续提升的潜在障碍。这一两难冲突的解决,取决于能否实现经济制度变革与政治制度变革的互动。这一理论解释有助于重新理解国家目标利益与产权保护的关系,是对现有国家理论以及产权保护理论的延伸与扩展。
本文的主要创新之处是:1、分析视角上的创新。对于投资者保护,已有的研究主要是从微观层次的公司治理角度,将投资者保护视为保护中小投资者(外部投资者)免受公司内部人(控股股东、经理)的侵害的法律制度的界定与实施,而本文着重探讨了国家目标收益及其变化对投资者保护水平的影响,是一个更为宏观和制度变迁的角度;2、研究结论的创新。本文从纵向角度考察了我国证券市场上投资者保护水平的变化及其对证券市场效率的影响,认为我国的投资者保护水平在总体提升趋势中存在反复与波动,这一结论有别于现有研究所得出的结论;3、对现有理论的拓展。本文通过建立理论模型对投资者保护水平的变化进行分析,对国家目标利益与产权保护的关系的现有研究进行了梳理与再思考。一方面验证了新制度经济学关于政府产权保护水平选择理论的判断,另一方面,也更加细致化地指出:产权保护水平的确认和提高,一旦启动就具有了不断自我巩固的内在动力。
本研究的不足之处在于:受制于数据的可得性,本研究没有涉及投资者保护水平对实体经济的资源配置效率的影响;本研究的理论解释也有待于进行更为细致的计量检验。有待于进一步研究的问题是:在证券市场上,地方政府在投资者保护中扮演的角色以及不同利益集团的游说对投资者保护的影响。
This dissertation is on the relationship between the interests of state and property rights protection. The following questions are tried to be answered in this paper: First, when the state has its own interests, what is the motivation of the state's transfer from acquiring monopoly rent to suppling public goods, including property rights protection? Second,What are the characteristics of the change of property rights protection levels pushed by government? And what is the impact of this characteristic on efficiency? Will the improvement of property rights protection pushed by government be self-enforced and surstained? Those questions were answered by reseaching on the changes of outside investors protection levels in Chinese security market.
Investor protection refers to protecting outside investors against expropriation from controlling shareholders by law. Existed studies focusing on developed capital market found that, there is a positive relationship between investor protection level and resources distribution efficiency. Countries with a higher investor protection level are just the same with higher resources distribution efficiency. Most listed companies are former state-owned enterprises, and the choice of investor protection to a great extent is the tradeoff of state's private interest as a controlling shareholder and social surplus as public goods supplier. So investor protection is quite different from that in foreign countries. Research on this specific characteristics of investor protection is significant for extending the fields of property rights protection, and is also helpful for searching the relationship beween state's interests and property rights protection, enriching the current state theory and property rights theory.
The main clue of the papers is as follows: At first, the investor protection and its change path in government-pushed security market was described, and by an empirical research, the impact of investor protection level's change path on security market efficiency was analyzed. Meanwhile, a theoretical explanation for the change of investor protection level in Chinese security market was followed. And the theoretical logic of the state on selecting investor protection level was emphasized. At last, the theoretical relationship between the state's interests and property rights protection were refined.
The main contents are as follows:
Chapter 1 is intruduction, the main concepts were explained and research methods were introduced;
Chapter 2 is a literatures review: one part is about the relationship between investor protection level and resources distribution efficiency, the other is about literatures on the role of state in property rights protection. And relevant literatures are on the indexs of investor protection, the influence of investor protection level on various variables in security market and determinants of investor protection levels, and there are also some literatures on why the state protect property rights, how efficiency is influenced by the state's defination and enforcement of property rights.
In Chapter 3, a brief introduction about the composition of investor protection, the enforcement of investor rights and influence factors of investor protection were given, and the two roles of state in the investor protection was emphasized.
In Chapter 4 the characteristics of government-pushed security market and the natures of investor protection in this market were analyzed, and found that the state adjusts investor protection levels according to its own interests, which induced a fluctuation of the investor protection level during its wholly upward trend. Furthermore, the fluctuation of investor protection level had an impact on the security market efficinecy: when the investor protection was improved, so as the efficiency; and when investor protection was adverse, the efficency deteriorated.
In Chapter 5 I tried to give a theoritical explanation for the change of investor protection level in Chinese security market. At first, the state's interests was defined as the composition of monopoly rent interests and tax revenue induced by social surplus, and the former is negatively related with the level of investor protection, and tha later is positively related with the level of investor protection. The institutional change of security market was pushed by the encompassing interests of the strong government, and when the interests group in the security market is not strong enough to match with the state, the state decide the level of investor protection according to its interests and the investors' participate constrains, so there is a low level of investor protection controlled by government during the initial period of security market. With the development of security market, it played a more and more important role in the economy growth and so, the state can benefit more from the resources distribution function of security market. Simultaneouly there is a resistance from the interests groups when the government expropriated the investors' rights, so investor protection was improved. But because of the absence of institutional constrains on the state's acquiring of monopoly rent, the government will expropriate investors' rights when it is urgent, so there is a fluctuation of investor protection levels.
By research on the change of investor protection level, we can re-think the interests of the state and its relationship with property rights protection. There is a tradeoff beteween the two parts of state interests. When the cost of occupying monopoly rent interests was upward, the state has a motivation of make a substitution. And whether the state will replace monopoly rent with social surplus induced by improved property right or not, depends on the state's capacity of aquiring resources after its release of rights. So a strong government is necessary for the release of rights from tha hand of power, but it is also an abstacle for the sustaining improvement of property rights. The change of investor protection level proved that, it can be self-enforced for investors acquire more rights from the hand of power because the state has an encompassing interests. The gradual transition pushed by the government with administrative method can improve efficiency to some extent, which was supported by the improvement of investors' negotiation capacity. But the formal rules for constraining the power of state is necessary for the sustaining improvement of efficinecy. Those conclusions is a extending of the relationship between state theory and property rights theory.
In chapter 6 there is a conclusion, and some suggestions were put forward on improvement of investor protection.
The core idea of this paper are as follows: In the security market pushed by government, investor protection levels was adjusted by government according to its own interests, there is a fluctuations of investor protection level during its improvement process, which induced the fluctuation of security market efficiency.
The core idea was verified by analysis on the change process of investor protection level in Chinese security market. The main conclusions of this papers is that, one part of state's interests is to some extent conformed to the other, and can be substituted each other. When the cost of benefit from monopoly rent is upward, the state will be motivated to bagin an institutional change, so that property protection level will be improved, and resources distribution improved, which means there will be a substitution of different parts of the state's interests. It is the encompassing interests of the strong government that make it possible for the rights to be released from the power, and the improvemet of property rights will be strengened by the incresing negotiation capacity of interest groups during the institutional change. But it is just the same power of state that prevents the surstained improvement of property rights protection level. A surstaining improvement of property protection level depends on the interaction between economic institution and political institution. This theoretical explanation is helpful for re-understanding the relationship between the state's interests and property rights protection, and it ia a extending and enrichment of state theory and property rights protection theory.
The major contributions of this paper is: Firstly, there is a innovation in study angle. As far as the current studies are concerned, investor protection were researched from the corporate governance point of view, and investor protection was viewed as defination and enforcement of law to protect outside invesors against expropriation of controlling shareholders. In this dissertation, the influence of state's interests on investor protection was emphasized in a macro and institutional change view; Secondly, the current conclusion was renewed. By searching the relationship between investor protection level and security market efficiency in China's security market, I get a different conclusion from that of current studies. Furthermore, the current theory is extended. A theoretical model was constructed for explanation of investor protection level and its change. Based on this, state interests and its relationship with property rights protection was re-explained. By this, the judgment of new institutional economy on state's selecting property rights protection level was verifed. Furthermore, it was indicated exquisitely that, once the confirmation and improvement of property rights bagins, it can be self-strengened.
The shortages of this research is that, the impact of investor protection level on the resources distribution efficiency in the real economy was not studied for the reason of data availability; and the theoritical explanation of this research still need to be further empirically tested.
This research can be deepened in the fields such as, the impact of the local governments' interests on investor protection and the impact of interest groups' lobby on investor protection.
投资者保护是指,通过法律保护中小投资者利益免受来自控股股东的侵害。既有的以发达国家资本市场为对象的研究发现:投资者保护水平与资源配置效率具有正相关关系,投资者保护水平高的国家资源配置效率也高。但是在我国,大多上市公司是由国有企业转化而来,投资者保护水平的选择在很大程度上是国家作为控股股东攫取控制权私人利益与供给产权保护扩大社会剩余之间权衡的结果,因此中国的投资者保护问题具有了一定的特殊性。研究这一具有特殊性的问题,既可以拓展投资者保护理论的研究范围,又可以通过提炼总结,以探求国家目标收益与产权保护之间的关系,扩展和丰富国家理论与产权保护理论。
本文的主要研究思路是:首先,对我国证券市场的投资者保护水平及其变化轨迹进行描述,实证分析变化轨迹对证券市场效率的影响,指出:中国证券市场上,投资者保护具有显著的政府主导性特征;然后,对中国证券市场投资者保护水平的变化过程进行理论解释,着重分析政府在投资者保护水平选择上的理论逻辑,精炼出国家追求目标与产权保护水平之间的理论关系。
本文的大致结构和内容如下:
引言部分提出了本文所要研究的问题,介绍了所使用的主要概念、研究方法等内容;
第二章从投资者保护与资源配置效率之间的关系、国家在产权保护中的角色两个角度进行了文献回顾,发现现有文献的研究主要集中在投资者保护的衡量指标、投资者保护水平对证券市场的影响、决定投资者保护水平的因素以及国家为什么要保护产权、国家保护产权的行为是如何影响经济效率等问题上;
第三章从一般意义上介绍了投资者保护制度的构成、投资者保护的实施方式以及影响投资者保护水平的因素,并着重分析了国家这一实施者在投资者保护中的双重角色;
第四章对我国证券市场的政府主导特征、以及这一特征所决定的投资者保护水平及其变化轨迹进行了分析,发现:我国证券市场上,政府是在根据自身利益相机调控投资者保护水平,投资者保护水平存在波动性,而不是持续地提升。而投资者权利保护水平的波动对证券市场效率产生了影响,即当投资者权利保护水平上升时,证券市场效率随之提升;当投资者权利保护水平下降时,效率也随之下降。
第五章对中国证券市场上投资者保护水平的变化规律进行理论分析。首先将国家的效用目标界定为:垄断租金收益与社会剩余形成的税收收入双重目标。前者与投资者保护水平负相关,后者与投资者保护水平正相关。强势政府的共容利益导致了证券市场的制度变迁,在证券市场发展初期,强势政府根据投资者的参与约束与自己的目标收益确定投资者保护水平,投资者保护水平处于政府控制下的较低水平;随着证券市场的发展在经济增长中的重要程度上升,以及证券市场各利益主体谈判能力的增加,政府调整自己的收益构成与实现收益的方式,投资者保护水平得到提升。同时,由于对政府获取垄断租金利益的行为缺乏制度化约束,当获取垄断租金利益的紧迫性增加时,国家依然因此会侵害投资者利益,所以我国证券市场上的投资者保护水平存在波动性。
第六章对全文进行了总结,并根据研究结论提出了一些完善中国投资者保护制度的政策建议。
贯穿全文的主要思想是:在政府主导的证券市场上,政府将根据自身利益、以及实现自身利益的方式相机调节投资者保护水平,投资者保护水平的变化特征呈现出在总体提升趋势中存在反复、波动,并引致证券市场效率总体提升中存在波动。
这一基本思想通过对中国证券市场上,投资者保护水平的变化轨迹进行分析而得到了验证。全文得出的主要研究结论是:政府所追求的两种收益之间存在着一定的统一性与可替代性。当政府攫取垄断租金收益的成本上升时,政府有动力通过行政手段推动自上而下的制度变迁,扩大对投资者权利的保护来实现资源配置效率的提升,从而实现国家目标收益不同构成部分之间的替代。强政府的共容利益使得从权力手中释放权利、从而提升产权保护水平成为可能。在强势政府的主导下利用行政手段启动和推进渐进式制度变迁,可以促进资源配置效率提高,这一提高又由于随着制度变迁过程成长起来的各个经济主体的谈判能力的提升而得到保障。不过此时政府的强势又反而成为产权保护水平持续提升的潜在障碍。这一两难冲突的解决,取决于能否实现经济制度变革与政治制度变革的互动。这一理论解释有助于重新理解国家目标利益与产权保护的关系,是对现有国家理论以及产权保护理论的延伸与扩展。
本文的主要创新之处是:1、分析视角上的创新。对于投资者保护,已有的研究主要是从微观层次的公司治理角度,将投资者保护视为保护中小投资者(外部投资者)免受公司内部人(控股股东、经理)的侵害的法律制度的界定与实施,而本文着重探讨了国家目标收益及其变化对投资者保护水平的影响,是一个更为宏观和制度变迁的角度;2、研究结论的创新。本文从纵向角度考察了我国证券市场上投资者保护水平的变化及其对证券市场效率的影响,认为我国的投资者保护水平在总体提升趋势中存在反复与波动,这一结论有别于现有研究所得出的结论;3、对现有理论的拓展。本文通过建立理论模型对投资者保护水平的变化进行分析,对国家目标利益与产权保护的关系的现有研究进行了梳理与再思考。一方面验证了新制度经济学关于政府产权保护水平选择理论的判断,另一方面,也更加细致化地指出:产权保护水平的确认和提高,一旦启动就具有了不断自我巩固的内在动力。
本研究的不足之处在于:受制于数据的可得性,本研究没有涉及投资者保护水平对实体经济的资源配置效率的影响;本研究的理论解释也有待于进行更为细致的计量检验。有待于进一步研究的问题是:在证券市场上,地方政府在投资者保护中扮演的角色以及不同利益集团的游说对投资者保护的影响。
This dissertation is on the relationship between the interests of state and property rights protection. The following questions are tried to be answered in this paper: First, when the state has its own interests, what is the motivation of the state's transfer from acquiring monopoly rent to suppling public goods, including property rights protection? Second,What are the characteristics of the change of property rights protection levels pushed by government? And what is the impact of this characteristic on efficiency? Will the improvement of property rights protection pushed by government be self-enforced and surstained? Those questions were answered by reseaching on the changes of outside investors protection levels in Chinese security market.
Investor protection refers to protecting outside investors against expropriation from controlling shareholders by law. Existed studies focusing on developed capital market found that, there is a positive relationship between investor protection level and resources distribution efficiency. Countries with a higher investor protection level are just the same with higher resources distribution efficiency. Most listed companies are former state-owned enterprises, and the choice of investor protection to a great extent is the tradeoff of state's private interest as a controlling shareholder and social surplus as public goods supplier. So investor protection is quite different from that in foreign countries. Research on this specific characteristics of investor protection is significant for extending the fields of property rights protection, and is also helpful for searching the relationship beween state's interests and property rights protection, enriching the current state theory and property rights theory.
The main clue of the papers is as follows: At first, the investor protection and its change path in government-pushed security market was described, and by an empirical research, the impact of investor protection level's change path on security market efficiency was analyzed. Meanwhile, a theoretical explanation for the change of investor protection level in Chinese security market was followed. And the theoretical logic of the state on selecting investor protection level was emphasized. At last, the theoretical relationship between the state's interests and property rights protection were refined.
The main contents are as follows:
Chapter 1 is intruduction, the main concepts were explained and research methods were introduced;
Chapter 2 is a literatures review: one part is about the relationship between investor protection level and resources distribution efficiency, the other is about literatures on the role of state in property rights protection. And relevant literatures are on the indexs of investor protection, the influence of investor protection level on various variables in security market and determinants of investor protection levels, and there are also some literatures on why the state protect property rights, how efficiency is influenced by the state's defination and enforcement of property rights.
In Chapter 3, a brief introduction about the composition of investor protection, the enforcement of investor rights and influence factors of investor protection were given, and the two roles of state in the investor protection was emphasized.
In Chapter 4 the characteristics of government-pushed security market and the natures of investor protection in this market were analyzed, and found that the state adjusts investor protection levels according to its own interests, which induced a fluctuation of the investor protection level during its wholly upward trend. Furthermore, the fluctuation of investor protection level had an impact on the security market efficinecy: when the investor protection was improved, so as the efficiency; and when investor protection was adverse, the efficency deteriorated.
In Chapter 5 I tried to give a theoritical explanation for the change of investor protection level in Chinese security market. At first, the state's interests was defined as the composition of monopoly rent interests and tax revenue induced by social surplus, and the former is negatively related with the level of investor protection, and tha later is positively related with the level of investor protection. The institutional change of security market was pushed by the encompassing interests of the strong government, and when the interests group in the security market is not strong enough to match with the state, the state decide the level of investor protection according to its interests and the investors' participate constrains, so there is a low level of investor protection controlled by government during the initial period of security market. With the development of security market, it played a more and more important role in the economy growth and so, the state can benefit more from the resources distribution function of security market. Simultaneouly there is a resistance from the interests groups when the government expropriated the investors' rights, so investor protection was improved. But because of the absence of institutional constrains on the state's acquiring of monopoly rent, the government will expropriate investors' rights when it is urgent, so there is a fluctuation of investor protection levels.
By research on the change of investor protection level, we can re-think the interests of the state and its relationship with property rights protection. There is a tradeoff beteween the two parts of state interests. When the cost of occupying monopoly rent interests was upward, the state has a motivation of make a substitution. And whether the state will replace monopoly rent with social surplus induced by improved property right or not, depends on the state's capacity of aquiring resources after its release of rights. So a strong government is necessary for the release of rights from tha hand of power, but it is also an abstacle for the sustaining improvement of property rights. The change of investor protection level proved that, it can be self-enforced for investors acquire more rights from the hand of power because the state has an encompassing interests. The gradual transition pushed by the government with administrative method can improve efficiency to some extent, which was supported by the improvement of investors' negotiation capacity. But the formal rules for constraining the power of state is necessary for the sustaining improvement of efficinecy. Those conclusions is a extending of the relationship between state theory and property rights theory.
In chapter 6 there is a conclusion, and some suggestions were put forward on improvement of investor protection.
The core idea of this paper are as follows: In the security market pushed by government, investor protection levels was adjusted by government according to its own interests, there is a fluctuations of investor protection level during its improvement process, which induced the fluctuation of security market efficiency.
The core idea was verified by analysis on the change process of investor protection level in Chinese security market. The main conclusions of this papers is that, one part of state's interests is to some extent conformed to the other, and can be substituted each other. When the cost of benefit from monopoly rent is upward, the state will be motivated to bagin an institutional change, so that property protection level will be improved, and resources distribution improved, which means there will be a substitution of different parts of the state's interests. It is the encompassing interests of the strong government that make it possible for the rights to be released from the power, and the improvemet of property rights will be strengened by the incresing negotiation capacity of interest groups during the institutional change. But it is just the same power of state that prevents the surstained improvement of property rights protection level. A surstaining improvement of property protection level depends on the interaction between economic institution and political institution. This theoretical explanation is helpful for re-understanding the relationship between the state's interests and property rights protection, and it ia a extending and enrichment of state theory and property rights protection theory.
The major contributions of this paper is: Firstly, there is a innovation in study angle. As far as the current studies are concerned, investor protection were researched from the corporate governance point of view, and investor protection was viewed as defination and enforcement of law to protect outside invesors against expropriation of controlling shareholders. In this dissertation, the influence of state's interests on investor protection was emphasized in a macro and institutional change view; Secondly, the current conclusion was renewed. By searching the relationship between investor protection level and security market efficiency in China's security market, I get a different conclusion from that of current studies. Furthermore, the current theory is extended. A theoretical model was constructed for explanation of investor protection level and its change. Based on this, state interests and its relationship with property rights protection was re-explained. By this, the judgment of new institutional economy on state's selecting property rights protection level was verifed. Furthermore, it was indicated exquisitely that, once the confirmation and improvement of property rights bagins, it can be self-strengened.
The shortages of this research is that, the impact of investor protection level on the resources distribution efficiency in the real economy was not studied for the reason of data availability; and the theoritical explanation of this research still need to be further empirically tested.
This research can be deepened in the fields such as, the impact of the local governments' interests on investor protection and the impact of interest groups' lobby on investor protection.
引文
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[1]原文是:“[t]he rights of individuals to the use of resources...supported by the force of etiquette,social custom,ostracism,and formal legally enacted laws supported by the states' power of violence or punishment”.本处译文参考了盛洪(2003)。
[2]本处阿尔奇安对产权的定义、Kreps对该定义的评论以及巴泽尔(1997)的观点均转引自Jongwook Kim and Joseph T.Mahoney(2005)。
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[1]原文是:“[t]he rights of individuals to the use of resources...supported by the force of etiquette,social custom,ostracism,and formal legally enacted laws supported by the states' power of violence or punishment”.本处译文参考了盛洪(2003)。
[2]本处阿尔奇安对产权的定义、Kreps对该定义的评论以及巴泽尔(1997)的观点均转引自Jongwook Kim and Joseph T.Mahoney(2005)。
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