新中国农村社会养老保险制度变迁与绩效评估
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摘要
随着计划生育政策的影响效应和人均预期寿命的不断延长,我国人口老龄化具有加速趋势,其中农村表现更为突出。据统计,2000年中国城乡65岁及以上老年人口比重分别是6.30%和7.35%,农村比城镇高出了1.05个百分点,到2003年底,全国65岁及以上的老年人口比例已升至8.16%,其中,半数以上为农村老年人,比重高达61.36%,并且这种人口老龄化的城乡倒置状况会一直持续到2040年。面对如此规模庞大的农村老年群体,建立和完善农村社会养老保险制度显得尤为重要。2009年中共中央推出了新型农村社会养老保险制度,该制度的创建是深入贯彻落实科学发展观、改变城乡二元结构、实现广大农村居民老有所养的重大惠农政策。对于该制度的可持续性、有效性以及发展路径等问题都是值得深入研究的课题。
基于现实背景,选取新中国农村社会养老保险制度变迁与绩效评估作为研究对象,是因为农村社会养老保险制度变迁是研究农村养老问题的学术起点,对于探索农村社会养老保险制度创新与发展具有基础性理论意义。制度变迁是对制度非均衡状态的一种反应,是一种效益更高的制度对另一种制度的替代过程。对此,本文着力解决两个问题：一是探求农村社会养老保险从一种制度形式向另一种制度形式演变的过程中,两种主要变迁动力——强制性制度变迁和诱致性制度变迁的作用方式如何,两种方式是独立起作用、还是相互交替起作用。二是要分析和测算不同发展阶段的制度绩效,并进行比较,新制度的效益是否比原制度有所提高,以此判断制度变迁过程是否属于“帕累托改进”。在此基础上,探求完善新型农村社会养老保险制度的对策并预测其可持续发展路径。
农村社会养老保险制度属于权益伦理型公共产品,基于公共财政的视角,并结合对等性原则,将农村社会养老保险制度变迁分为两个发展阶段：传统农村社会养老保险发展阶段(1956-2002年)和新型农村社会养老保险发展阶段(2002年一)。传统农村社会养老保险制度(简称“传统农保”)的主要特征是财政责任几乎完全缺位,它经历了三个发展阶段：萌芽阶段(1956-1986年)、探索阶段(1986-1992年)、曲折发展阶段(1992-2002年)。新型农村社会养老保险制度(简称“新农保”),相对于传统农保的突出变化是确立了财政责任的主体地位,制度构建符合公共财政理念。新农保经历了两个发展阶段：试点阶段(2002-2009年),即地方自行创新的阶段；中央政府统一政策的阶段(2009年-)。
1956年,五保制度建立以后,中国农村就形成了“以家庭保障为主、五保制度并行”的养老保障模式。在集体化时期,家庭保障是建立在集体经济的基础之上的,集体经济发挥了一种潜在的社会保障制度功能。改革开放以后,随着农村家庭联产承包责任制的实行,集体保障丧失了经济基础和组织载体,集体的潜在保障功能在弱化；加之,随着人口的流动、家庭结构的小型化,传统的家庭养老也面临一些挑战,农村养老问题变得日趋凸显和严重。这使得传统养老保障模式与变化的外部环境日益不相适应,导致了制度的非均衡,并成为制度创新的诱因。在城乡分割的二元社会保障体系下,农民无法从现有的保障体系中获得养老需求。为了实现农民在原制度下无法实现的养老保障这种潜在收益,中央政府于1992年根据出台的《县级农村社会养老保险基本方案(试行)》强制推出了传统农村社会养老保险制度。但是在制度产生以后的试点和推广过程中,中央政府一直没有明确的模式和时间表,也不承担任何财政责任,只是一些原则性的指导,地方政府在是否试点和制度设计上都具有较强的自主性,制度的持续发展主要依赖于农民的制度需求,是一种需求诱致性制度变迁。所以,传统农村社会养老保险制度的发展经历了由强制性到诱致性的转变。
但由于传统农保存在财政缺位的制度性缺陷,加之投资管理上的低效率,该制度能带给农民的净收益非常小甚至为负,这严重影响了农民的制度需求。农民对该制度的需求不足,使得诱致性制度变迁缺乏主要动力,从而出现制度运行困难甚至停滞,并锁定在低效率状态下。这成为下一阶段制度创新的重要诱致因素之一,加之,人口老龄化进程的加快和城市化的推进,导致了土地保障功能和家庭保障功能的弱化。而农民又存在巨大的潜在养老需求,有调查数据显示,57.75%的调查对象希望的主要养老方式是“按月领取养老金”。这些外在压力导致了制度的非均衡,成为制度创新的诱致因素,但不一定导致制度创新。因为制度创新的充分条件是一定的制度非均衡状态具有不可持续性,只有在有关经济主体具备了实际创新动机和能力时,一定的非均衡状态才具有不可持续性。要实现农民潜在的养老需求,即制度变迁的潜在收益,需要进行制度创新,增加新制度供给。但是作为需求主体的农民显然缺乏制度创新的能力,绝大多数地方政府的创新能力也极其有限,无法打破传统农保的低效率锁定状态。所以,要实现农民在原有制度下无法实现的潜在养老需求,就必须引进更高级、更权威的政府或集团行为,强制推行新的制度,增加新制度供给。2009年,中央政府正式出台了新型农村社会养老保险试点的指导意见,强制推出了新型农村社会养老保险制度。但是新农保仍然存在低效率和不公平状况,要保持新农保的可持续发展,必须充分发挥诱致性制度变迁的动力。可见,农村社会养老保险制度变迁是一个强制性制度变迁和诱致性制度变迁相耦合的过程。
绩效评估主要是对农村社会养老保险制度变迁的效率和制度本身的有效性进行评价。对此,根据相关理论构建了一个绩效评估体系：制度变迁的效率评估体系和制度有效性评估体系。对农村社会养老保险制度变迁的效率评价可以从宏观效率、微观效率及社会认同度三个方面,分别运用生产力标准、交易成本标准和合意一致性标准进行定性考评。关于制度有效性评估主要是从制度实施的覆盖面大小和保障水平的高低两个方面,并通过四个具体指标进行定量考评,其中重点是参保率和替代率两个指标。对此,本文主要采用经济理论与经济史相结合的研究方法,在经济史研究中引入经济理论与计量方法、保险精算法。根据制度变迁的三个效率评价标准,定性地考察制度变迁的效率；运用计量和保险精算方法测算了不同制度形式的参保率和替代率。从定性的三个标准来看,传统农村社会养老保险制度变迁的效率欠佳,而新农保表现相对好得多。从保障的有效性上来看,一是参保率。新农保推行一年之后,2010年的参保率达到26%,比传统农保参保率的最大值9.65%要高得多。二是替代率。在相同条件下,新农保的替代率要比传统农保大得多。
从各方面进行比较,新农保的制度绩效要高于传统农保。由此得出本文的核心结论：农村社会养老保险制度的变迁过程实质是强制性制度变迁与诱致性制度变迁交替推进的一种帕累托改进。但是新农保的替代率比城镇职工的目标替代率要小得多,而且绝大多数情况下,其替代率都没有达到农村养老保险替代率的警戒线30.4%,甚至大部分情况都没达到贫困线标准。新农保依然存在低效率和供给不足的情况,在新农保制度框架之内仍然存在继续修补、完善的一个持续变迁过程,以挖掘新农保制度框架所允许的潜在收益。对此,必须采取相应措施提升制度需求主体——农民对新农保制度的需求,同时充分发挥地方政府的主动创新能力。从而实现从强制性制度变迁到诱致性制度变迁的转变,充分发挥诱致型制度变迁的动力。主要途径有：强化中央政府的立法、规划、组织、协调等功能；明确财政分担责任,完善政府投入机制；加强个人账户资金的监管与运营；开拓筹资渠道、创新筹资机制；加快配套设施建设,突破制度服务瓶颈；发挥市场和社会的力量,构建农村社区养老。
With the effect of the family planning policy and the continuous extension of the average life expectancy, China's aging population trend has accelerated, and it is more prominent in rural areas. According to statistics, in 2000,China's urban and rural elderly population aged 65 and above proportion were 6.30% and 7.35% respectively, and rural was 1.05 percentage points higher than urban, by the end of 2003, the proportion of elderly population aged 65 and above in our country has risen to 8.16%.Among them, more than half are rural elderly, the proportion of which is up to 61.36%, and the inversion situation of the aging population of urban and rural will continue to 2040. Faced with such a large elderly population in rural areas, establishing and improving rural social endowment insurance system is very important. In 2009, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee launched a new type of rural social endowment insurance system, the creating of which is a significant preferential agricultural policy to apply the scientific outlook on development thoroughly, change the urban-rural dual structure, achieve a sense of security for the majority of rural residents. As for this system, the problems of which such as the sustainability, validity, development path and so on forth, are worthy of further study.
Based on the realistic background, the change and the performance evaluation of new China rural society endowment insurance system are selected as the research object, the reason of which is that the change of rural social endowment insurance system is a academic starting point to study the raising problem of the rural old-ages, also it has the basic theoretical significance in exploring rural society endowment insurance system innovation and the development. The institutional change is one kind of reaction to the unbalanced state of system, which is a substitution process of a more effective system for another system. Regarding this, this article tries to solve two problems:The first, in the course that the rural social endowment insurance develops in another system form from a kind of system form, whether two kinds of main changes motive force --How is the function way of mandatory institutional change and induced institutional change, and the two ways work independently or work alternatively each other. The second, to analyze and calculate the system performance of different stages of development, and carry on the comparison that whether the effectiveness of the new system improved than original system or not, then to judge whether the process of institutional change is a " pareto improvement ". On this basis, the countermeasure of improving the new rural social endowment insurance system can be sought and its route of sustainable development can be predicted.
Rural social endowment insurance system is public products of rights and interests of ethics, based on the perspective of public finance, and combined with the principle of reciprocity, the change in rural social endowment insurance system is divided into two stages of development:traditional stages of development of rural social endowment insurance (1956-2002) and new stage of development of rural social pension insurance (2002—). Traditional rural social endowment insurance system(short title "traditional agricultural insurance") is mostly characterized by the complete absence of financial responsibility, it has gone through three stages of development:Embryonic stage (1956-1986)、Exploration stage (1986-1992)、Tortuous stages of development (1992-2002).The new rural social pension insurance system(short title" new agricultural insurance"), compared with the traditional agricultural insurance,the prominent change is to establish the dominant position of financial responsibility, and the system construction which is consistent with the concept of public finance. New agricultural insurance has gone through two stages of development:Pilot phase (2002-2009), the stage of local self-innovation; The stage of harmonization of policies from the Communist Party of China Central Committee (2009--)
In 1965, following the establishment of the five-guarantee system, the china's rural areas had formed an elder security mode " mainly relied on family supporting, paralleled with five-guarantee system". In the collectivization period, family security is built on the basis of the collective economy which plays a potential function of social security system. After the reform and opening up, along with the implementation of the rural family-contract responsibility system, the collective security lost the economic base and the organizational carrier, at the same time, the collective potential security function was weakening. In addition, as the movement of population, the miniaturization of the family structure, the traditional family supporting for the elderly is also facing some challenges, the raising problem of the rural old-ages has become increasingly prominent and serious. This makes the traditional old-age security model and changing external environment become increasingly incompatible, resulting in a system of non-equilibrium, and become the inducement of system innovation. In the social security system of rural-urban divide, farmers cannot get pension requirements from the existing security system. In order to achieve the potential benefits of old-age security which is unable under the original system, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China introduced the rural social basic old-age pension system of the tradition by force in 1992 according to " rural basic scheme of social endowment insurance (tried) at county level" issuing. But in pilot project and the promotion process after the system is produced, the central government still has no definite pattern and schedule, not bearing any financial responsibility either, just giving out some sense of principle instructs.All local government have strong autonomy on whether launching a pilot project and system design, and the sustainable development of the system mainly depends on peasants' system demand, which is the induced institutional change of a kind of demand. And therefore, the development of traditional rural social endowment insurance system has gone through the transition from mandatory to inductive.
However, due to lack of the traditional agriculture insurance in the financial institutional defects, coupled with the low efficiency of investment management, the system can take very small or even negative net income for farmers, which seriously affected the system requirements of farmers. Peasants do not have ample demand for this system, which make induced institutional change lack main motive force, thus the system is difficult to operate and even stay cool, locked under the inefficient state. This becomes one of the important factors that lead to the system innovation in the next stage, in addition, the quickening of the process of aging population and promotion of urbanization, resulting in the weakening of security function of land and security function of family.But there is huge potential pension demand in peasants, and a survey data showed that 57.75% of the respondents expressed the hope that the main retirement way should be "receive the pension monthly". These external pressures has led to non-equilibrium systems and become induced factors of system innovation, but not necessarily lead to system innovation. Because the sufficient condition for system innovation is a certain system of non-equilibrium state that is not sustainable, only when relevant economic entities have possessed real innovative motive and the ability can the certain non-equilibrium state has the non-sustainability. To implement the pension demands of the peasants' potential, the potential benefits of institutional change, it is needed to carry the institutional innovation to increase the supply of the new system. But it is obvious that the peasants who are the subject of the demand are lack the ability of system innovation, also most local government innovation ability are extremely limited, so it is unable to break the low efficiency of traditional agricultural insurance which is under locked state. Therefore, to realize the potential of farmers within the existing system unable to implement pension demands, it is necessary to introduce more advanced and more authoritative government or group activities to force the implementation of the new system so as to increase new system supply. In 2009, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the instruction of the new rural pilot project of social endowment insurance formally, and launched a new type of rural social endowment insurance system mandatorily. However, new agricultural insurance still exist low efficiency and unfair situation, to keep sustainable development of the new agricultural insurance, we must give full play to the motive force of induced institutional change. Obviously, the change in rural social endowment insurance system is a coupling process of a mandatory system change and induced institutional change.
Performance evaluation mainly carries on the appraisal to the efficiency of rural social endowment insurance system and the validity of system itself. In this regard, a performance evaluation system was constructed according to the related theories:the efficiency of the evaluation system of the institutional change and the institutional validity evaluation system. By using the productivity standard, the transaction cost standards and the consistent standard respectively from the three aspects of macro-efficiency, micro-efficiency and sustainability of the system, the efficiency of the evaluation of rural social endowment insurance system change can be carried on the qualitative examination. Evaluation on validity of the system is mainly from two aspects in the coverage of implementation of the system and the validity of security, and quantitative evaluation by four specific indexes, among them the focal point is the two indexes of joining insurance rate and substitution rate. As to this, this text mainly adopted the research methods of the economic theory combined with economic history, and introduced economic theory, metering method, precise algorithm of insurance in economic history research. It made a qualitative study on the efficiency of institutional change by according to the three efficiency evaluation standards of institutional change, and calculated the joining insurance rate and the substitution rate of the different institutional forms by the methods of metering method and precise algorithm of insurance. From three qualitative standards, it is known that the efficiency of traditional rural social endowment insurance system change is not good enough, and the new agricultural insurance is relatively much better. From the validity of the security, the first is the rate of joining insurance. After implementing the new agricultural insurance for one year, the rate of joining insurance is up to 26% in 2010,which is much higher than the maximum value of 9.65% of the traditional agricultural insurance; The second is the substitution rate. Under the same condition, the new agricultural substitution rate is much greater than the traditional.
Compared from all aspects, the achievements of the new agricultural insurance system are higher than the traditional. The core conclusion of this article come to this: the change process of the rural social endowment insurance system is essentially one kind of Pareto improvement promoted by the mandatory institutional change and the induced institutional change alternately. But the substitution rate of new agricultural insurance system is much smaller than the urban worker's target substitute rate, and under most situations, their substituting rate is 30.4%, which has not reached the warning line of the rural substituting rate of endowment insurance or even failed to reach the poverty line in most situations. The situation of poor efficiency and supply insufficient still exits in new agricultural insurance system, and there is still an on-going process of change for continued repairing and improving within the framework of the system, so as to tap the potential benefits allowed by the new framework of the new agricultural insurance system. As to this, the corresponding measure must be taken to promote the demand subject of the system——peasants' demand for the new agricultural insurance system, at the same time, the initiative of local government innovation should be exploited fully. Thus the transition from mandatory institutional change to induced institutional change can be realized, and the power of induced institutional change also can be brought into full play. The main ways:strengthen the central government's legislation, planning, organizing, coordinating and other functions; Define the finance shares responsibility, improve the mechanism of investing of the government; Strengthen supervision and operation of individual account funds; Explore funding sources and innovative financing mechanisms; Accelerate the construction of auxiliary facility, break through the service bottleneck of the system; Give play to the strength of market and the society, build rural community endowment.
基于现实背景,选取新中国农村社会养老保险制度变迁与绩效评估作为研究对象,是因为农村社会养老保险制度变迁是研究农村养老问题的学术起点,对于探索农村社会养老保险制度创新与发展具有基础性理论意义。制度变迁是对制度非均衡状态的一种反应,是一种效益更高的制度对另一种制度的替代过程。对此,本文着力解决两个问题：一是探求农村社会养老保险从一种制度形式向另一种制度形式演变的过程中,两种主要变迁动力——强制性制度变迁和诱致性制度变迁的作用方式如何,两种方式是独立起作用、还是相互交替起作用。二是要分析和测算不同发展阶段的制度绩效,并进行比较,新制度的效益是否比原制度有所提高,以此判断制度变迁过程是否属于“帕累托改进”。在此基础上,探求完善新型农村社会养老保险制度的对策并预测其可持续发展路径。
农村社会养老保险制度属于权益伦理型公共产品,基于公共财政的视角,并结合对等性原则,将农村社会养老保险制度变迁分为两个发展阶段：传统农村社会养老保险发展阶段(1956-2002年)和新型农村社会养老保险发展阶段(2002年一)。传统农村社会养老保险制度(简称“传统农保”)的主要特征是财政责任几乎完全缺位,它经历了三个发展阶段：萌芽阶段(1956-1986年)、探索阶段(1986-1992年)、曲折发展阶段(1992-2002年)。新型农村社会养老保险制度(简称“新农保”),相对于传统农保的突出变化是确立了财政责任的主体地位,制度构建符合公共财政理念。新农保经历了两个发展阶段：试点阶段(2002-2009年),即地方自行创新的阶段；中央政府统一政策的阶段(2009年-)。
1956年,五保制度建立以后,中国农村就形成了“以家庭保障为主、五保制度并行”的养老保障模式。在集体化时期,家庭保障是建立在集体经济的基础之上的,集体经济发挥了一种潜在的社会保障制度功能。改革开放以后,随着农村家庭联产承包责任制的实行,集体保障丧失了经济基础和组织载体,集体的潜在保障功能在弱化；加之,随着人口的流动、家庭结构的小型化,传统的家庭养老也面临一些挑战,农村养老问题变得日趋凸显和严重。这使得传统养老保障模式与变化的外部环境日益不相适应,导致了制度的非均衡,并成为制度创新的诱因。在城乡分割的二元社会保障体系下,农民无法从现有的保障体系中获得养老需求。为了实现农民在原制度下无法实现的养老保障这种潜在收益,中央政府于1992年根据出台的《县级农村社会养老保险基本方案(试行)》强制推出了传统农村社会养老保险制度。但是在制度产生以后的试点和推广过程中,中央政府一直没有明确的模式和时间表,也不承担任何财政责任,只是一些原则性的指导,地方政府在是否试点和制度设计上都具有较强的自主性,制度的持续发展主要依赖于农民的制度需求,是一种需求诱致性制度变迁。所以,传统农村社会养老保险制度的发展经历了由强制性到诱致性的转变。
但由于传统农保存在财政缺位的制度性缺陷,加之投资管理上的低效率,该制度能带给农民的净收益非常小甚至为负,这严重影响了农民的制度需求。农民对该制度的需求不足,使得诱致性制度变迁缺乏主要动力,从而出现制度运行困难甚至停滞,并锁定在低效率状态下。这成为下一阶段制度创新的重要诱致因素之一,加之,人口老龄化进程的加快和城市化的推进,导致了土地保障功能和家庭保障功能的弱化。而农民又存在巨大的潜在养老需求,有调查数据显示,57.75%的调查对象希望的主要养老方式是“按月领取养老金”。这些外在压力导致了制度的非均衡,成为制度创新的诱致因素,但不一定导致制度创新。因为制度创新的充分条件是一定的制度非均衡状态具有不可持续性,只有在有关经济主体具备了实际创新动机和能力时,一定的非均衡状态才具有不可持续性。要实现农民潜在的养老需求,即制度变迁的潜在收益,需要进行制度创新,增加新制度供给。但是作为需求主体的农民显然缺乏制度创新的能力,绝大多数地方政府的创新能力也极其有限,无法打破传统农保的低效率锁定状态。所以,要实现农民在原有制度下无法实现的潜在养老需求,就必须引进更高级、更权威的政府或集团行为,强制推行新的制度,增加新制度供给。2009年,中央政府正式出台了新型农村社会养老保险试点的指导意见,强制推出了新型农村社会养老保险制度。但是新农保仍然存在低效率和不公平状况,要保持新农保的可持续发展,必须充分发挥诱致性制度变迁的动力。可见,农村社会养老保险制度变迁是一个强制性制度变迁和诱致性制度变迁相耦合的过程。
绩效评估主要是对农村社会养老保险制度变迁的效率和制度本身的有效性进行评价。对此,根据相关理论构建了一个绩效评估体系：制度变迁的效率评估体系和制度有效性评估体系。对农村社会养老保险制度变迁的效率评价可以从宏观效率、微观效率及社会认同度三个方面,分别运用生产力标准、交易成本标准和合意一致性标准进行定性考评。关于制度有效性评估主要是从制度实施的覆盖面大小和保障水平的高低两个方面,并通过四个具体指标进行定量考评,其中重点是参保率和替代率两个指标。对此,本文主要采用经济理论与经济史相结合的研究方法,在经济史研究中引入经济理论与计量方法、保险精算法。根据制度变迁的三个效率评价标准,定性地考察制度变迁的效率；运用计量和保险精算方法测算了不同制度形式的参保率和替代率。从定性的三个标准来看,传统农村社会养老保险制度变迁的效率欠佳,而新农保表现相对好得多。从保障的有效性上来看,一是参保率。新农保推行一年之后,2010年的参保率达到26%,比传统农保参保率的最大值9.65%要高得多。二是替代率。在相同条件下,新农保的替代率要比传统农保大得多。
从各方面进行比较,新农保的制度绩效要高于传统农保。由此得出本文的核心结论：农村社会养老保险制度的变迁过程实质是强制性制度变迁与诱致性制度变迁交替推进的一种帕累托改进。但是新农保的替代率比城镇职工的目标替代率要小得多,而且绝大多数情况下,其替代率都没有达到农村养老保险替代率的警戒线30.4%,甚至大部分情况都没达到贫困线标准。新农保依然存在低效率和供给不足的情况,在新农保制度框架之内仍然存在继续修补、完善的一个持续变迁过程,以挖掘新农保制度框架所允许的潜在收益。对此,必须采取相应措施提升制度需求主体——农民对新农保制度的需求,同时充分发挥地方政府的主动创新能力。从而实现从强制性制度变迁到诱致性制度变迁的转变,充分发挥诱致型制度变迁的动力。主要途径有：强化中央政府的立法、规划、组织、协调等功能；明确财政分担责任,完善政府投入机制；加强个人账户资金的监管与运营；开拓筹资渠道、创新筹资机制；加快配套设施建设,突破制度服务瓶颈；发挥市场和社会的力量,构建农村社区养老。
With the effect of the family planning policy and the continuous extension of the average life expectancy, China's aging population trend has accelerated, and it is more prominent in rural areas. According to statistics, in 2000,China's urban and rural elderly population aged 65 and above proportion were 6.30% and 7.35% respectively, and rural was 1.05 percentage points higher than urban, by the end of 2003, the proportion of elderly population aged 65 and above in our country has risen to 8.16%.Among them, more than half are rural elderly, the proportion of which is up to 61.36%, and the inversion situation of the aging population of urban and rural will continue to 2040. Faced with such a large elderly population in rural areas, establishing and improving rural social endowment insurance system is very important. In 2009, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee launched a new type of rural social endowment insurance system, the creating of which is a significant preferential agricultural policy to apply the scientific outlook on development thoroughly, change the urban-rural dual structure, achieve a sense of security for the majority of rural residents. As for this system, the problems of which such as the sustainability, validity, development path and so on forth, are worthy of further study.
Based on the realistic background, the change and the performance evaluation of new China rural society endowment insurance system are selected as the research object, the reason of which is that the change of rural social endowment insurance system is a academic starting point to study the raising problem of the rural old-ages, also it has the basic theoretical significance in exploring rural society endowment insurance system innovation and the development. The institutional change is one kind of reaction to the unbalanced state of system, which is a substitution process of a more effective system for another system. Regarding this, this article tries to solve two problems:The first, in the course that the rural social endowment insurance develops in another system form from a kind of system form, whether two kinds of main changes motive force --How is the function way of mandatory institutional change and induced institutional change, and the two ways work independently or work alternatively each other. The second, to analyze and calculate the system performance of different stages of development, and carry on the comparison that whether the effectiveness of the new system improved than original system or not, then to judge whether the process of institutional change is a " pareto improvement ". On this basis, the countermeasure of improving the new rural social endowment insurance system can be sought and its route of sustainable development can be predicted.
Rural social endowment insurance system is public products of rights and interests of ethics, based on the perspective of public finance, and combined with the principle of reciprocity, the change in rural social endowment insurance system is divided into two stages of development:traditional stages of development of rural social endowment insurance (1956-2002) and new stage of development of rural social pension insurance (2002—). Traditional rural social endowment insurance system(short title "traditional agricultural insurance") is mostly characterized by the complete absence of financial responsibility, it has gone through three stages of development:Embryonic stage (1956-1986)、Exploration stage (1986-1992)、Tortuous stages of development (1992-2002).The new rural social pension insurance system(short title" new agricultural insurance"), compared with the traditional agricultural insurance,the prominent change is to establish the dominant position of financial responsibility, and the system construction which is consistent with the concept of public finance. New agricultural insurance has gone through two stages of development:Pilot phase (2002-2009), the stage of local self-innovation; The stage of harmonization of policies from the Communist Party of China Central Committee (2009--)
In 1965, following the establishment of the five-guarantee system, the china's rural areas had formed an elder security mode " mainly relied on family supporting, paralleled with five-guarantee system". In the collectivization period, family security is built on the basis of the collective economy which plays a potential function of social security system. After the reform and opening up, along with the implementation of the rural family-contract responsibility system, the collective security lost the economic base and the organizational carrier, at the same time, the collective potential security function was weakening. In addition, as the movement of population, the miniaturization of the family structure, the traditional family supporting for the elderly is also facing some challenges, the raising problem of the rural old-ages has become increasingly prominent and serious. This makes the traditional old-age security model and changing external environment become increasingly incompatible, resulting in a system of non-equilibrium, and become the inducement of system innovation. In the social security system of rural-urban divide, farmers cannot get pension requirements from the existing security system. In order to achieve the potential benefits of old-age security which is unable under the original system, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China introduced the rural social basic old-age pension system of the tradition by force in 1992 according to " rural basic scheme of social endowment insurance (tried) at county level" issuing. But in pilot project and the promotion process after the system is produced, the central government still has no definite pattern and schedule, not bearing any financial responsibility either, just giving out some sense of principle instructs.All local government have strong autonomy on whether launching a pilot project and system design, and the sustainable development of the system mainly depends on peasants' system demand, which is the induced institutional change of a kind of demand. And therefore, the development of traditional rural social endowment insurance system has gone through the transition from mandatory to inductive.
However, due to lack of the traditional agriculture insurance in the financial institutional defects, coupled with the low efficiency of investment management, the system can take very small or even negative net income for farmers, which seriously affected the system requirements of farmers. Peasants do not have ample demand for this system, which make induced institutional change lack main motive force, thus the system is difficult to operate and even stay cool, locked under the inefficient state. This becomes one of the important factors that lead to the system innovation in the next stage, in addition, the quickening of the process of aging population and promotion of urbanization, resulting in the weakening of security function of land and security function of family.But there is huge potential pension demand in peasants, and a survey data showed that 57.75% of the respondents expressed the hope that the main retirement way should be "receive the pension monthly". These external pressures has led to non-equilibrium systems and become induced factors of system innovation, but not necessarily lead to system innovation. Because the sufficient condition for system innovation is a certain system of non-equilibrium state that is not sustainable, only when relevant economic entities have possessed real innovative motive and the ability can the certain non-equilibrium state has the non-sustainability. To implement the pension demands of the peasants' potential, the potential benefits of institutional change, it is needed to carry the institutional innovation to increase the supply of the new system. But it is obvious that the peasants who are the subject of the demand are lack the ability of system innovation, also most local government innovation ability are extremely limited, so it is unable to break the low efficiency of traditional agricultural insurance which is under locked state. Therefore, to realize the potential of farmers within the existing system unable to implement pension demands, it is necessary to introduce more advanced and more authoritative government or group activities to force the implementation of the new system so as to increase new system supply. In 2009, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the instruction of the new rural pilot project of social endowment insurance formally, and launched a new type of rural social endowment insurance system mandatorily. However, new agricultural insurance still exist low efficiency and unfair situation, to keep sustainable development of the new agricultural insurance, we must give full play to the motive force of induced institutional change. Obviously, the change in rural social endowment insurance system is a coupling process of a mandatory system change and induced institutional change.
Performance evaluation mainly carries on the appraisal to the efficiency of rural social endowment insurance system and the validity of system itself. In this regard, a performance evaluation system was constructed according to the related theories:the efficiency of the evaluation system of the institutional change and the institutional validity evaluation system. By using the productivity standard, the transaction cost standards and the consistent standard respectively from the three aspects of macro-efficiency, micro-efficiency and sustainability of the system, the efficiency of the evaluation of rural social endowment insurance system change can be carried on the qualitative examination. Evaluation on validity of the system is mainly from two aspects in the coverage of implementation of the system and the validity of security, and quantitative evaluation by four specific indexes, among them the focal point is the two indexes of joining insurance rate and substitution rate. As to this, this text mainly adopted the research methods of the economic theory combined with economic history, and introduced economic theory, metering method, precise algorithm of insurance in economic history research. It made a qualitative study on the efficiency of institutional change by according to the three efficiency evaluation standards of institutional change, and calculated the joining insurance rate and the substitution rate of the different institutional forms by the methods of metering method and precise algorithm of insurance. From three qualitative standards, it is known that the efficiency of traditional rural social endowment insurance system change is not good enough, and the new agricultural insurance is relatively much better. From the validity of the security, the first is the rate of joining insurance. After implementing the new agricultural insurance for one year, the rate of joining insurance is up to 26% in 2010,which is much higher than the maximum value of 9.65% of the traditional agricultural insurance; The second is the substitution rate. Under the same condition, the new agricultural substitution rate is much greater than the traditional.
Compared from all aspects, the achievements of the new agricultural insurance system are higher than the traditional. The core conclusion of this article come to this: the change process of the rural social endowment insurance system is essentially one kind of Pareto improvement promoted by the mandatory institutional change and the induced institutional change alternately. But the substitution rate of new agricultural insurance system is much smaller than the urban worker's target substitute rate, and under most situations, their substituting rate is 30.4%, which has not reached the warning line of the rural substituting rate of endowment insurance or even failed to reach the poverty line in most situations. The situation of poor efficiency and supply insufficient still exits in new agricultural insurance system, and there is still an on-going process of change for continued repairing and improving within the framework of the system, so as to tap the potential benefits allowed by the new framework of the new agricultural insurance system. As to this, the corresponding measure must be taken to promote the demand subject of the system——peasants' demand for the new agricultural insurance system, at the same time, the initiative of local government innovation should be exploited fully. Thus the transition from mandatory institutional change to induced institutional change can be realized, and the power of induced institutional change also can be brought into full play. The main ways:strengthen the central government's legislation, planning, organizing, coordinating and other functions; Define the finance shares responsibility, improve the mechanism of investing of the government; Strengthen supervision and operation of individual account funds; Explore funding sources and innovative financing mechanisms; Accelerate the construction of auxiliary facility, break through the service bottleneck of the system; Give play to the strength of market and the society, build rural community endowment.
引文
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②数据来源：十一届全国人大常委会第四次会议上,农业部部长孙政才所作的《国务院关于促进农民稳定增收情况的报告》.中国政府网,2008-08-29
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④国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司.中国人口统计年鉴：2003[Z].北京：中国统计出版社,2003.其中第7页显示65岁及以上的老年人口中,农村老人占到61.36%
①公式借鉴：邓大松,薛惠元.新型农村社会养老保险制度推行中的难点分析[J].经济体制改革,2010(1)：89
②参考王晓军主编.社会保障精算原理[M].中国人民大学出版社,2000：180
①刘子操,杜能.人身保险[M].中国金融出版社,2004：201
①5.41%是根据表3-4的相关数据推算出的
②杨翠迎.农村基本养老保险制度理论与政策研究[M].杭州：浙江大学出版社,2007：111
①杨翠迎.农村基本养老保险制度理论与政策研究[M].杭州：浙江大学出版社,2007：106
①杨翠迎.农村基本养老保险制度理论与政策研究[M].杭州：浙江大学出版社,2007：106
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①“三沙经验”促发展土地增值农民多收[N].中山日报,2006-0110
②“农村工作坊”乐了农民[N].中山日报,2007-0121
①陕西省劳动和社会保障厅.宝鸡新农保实验[J].中国社会保障,2009(2)：34
②为了农民老有所养[N].宝鸡市人民政府网,2009-11-19
①王拉田.116万多人参加新农保[N].宝鸡日报,2009-12-28,A2版
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①数据来源：2007年度劳动和社会保障事业发展统计公报
②数据来源：十一届全国人大常委会第四次会议上,农业部部长孙政才所作的《国务院关于促进农民稳定增收情况的报告》.中国政府网,2008-08-29
③中华人民共和国国家统计局.《2010年第六次全国人口普查主要数据公报(第1号)》.20114-28.注：本公报中数据均为初步汇总数
④国家统计局人口和社会科技统计司.中国人口统计年鉴：2003[Z].北京：中国统计出版社,2003.其中第7页显示65岁及以上的老年人口中,农村老人占到61.36%
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②参考王晓军主编.社会保障精算原理[M].中国人民大学出版社,2000：180
①刘子操,杜能.人身保险[M].中国金融出版社,2004：201
①5.41%是根据表3-4的相关数据推算出的
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①杨翠迎.农村基本养老保险制度理论与政策研究[M].杭州：浙江大学出版社,2007：106
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