我国涉农信贷与保险耦合模式研究
摘要
本文运用演化博弈理论对涉农信贷与保险耦合模式下政府、农户、农村信贷机构、保险公司四大利益群体及各群体之间的行为演化进行分析,得到了维持涉农信贷与保险耦合模式持续发展的方法途径。地方政府对参保借款农户实施较高比例的保费补贴,使得保费补贴额度满足相应的参数条件,是借款农户群体以积极参保为平稳策略的现实条件；地方政府对涉农保险机构进行业务补贴,为农业保险业务购买再保险,是保险机构群体形成以积极参与信贷业务合作为稳定策略的现实条件,并且止损再保险比比例再保险更能刺激保险机构合作的积极性；在政府有限补贴的条件下,农村信贷机构降低代理保险产品的成本以及保险公司控制涉农险种开发成本,也是维持涉农信贷与保险耦合模式可持续性的重要途径。
基于对涉农信贷与保险耦合模式各利益主体行为的演化结果,对现有的涉农信贷与保险耦合产品体系进行完善,提出了“涉农信贷+农业保险+再保险”、“综合保险+涉农贷款”等耦合产品的运作模式。由于借款农户的参保信息纳入其信用状况评价体系是涉农信贷与保险耦合模式下科学核定贷款利率和授信额度的前提,本文基于WU’s三维信用理论建立参保农户的信用综合评价方法。同时,在该借款农户信用评价方法的基础上,结合巴塞尔新资本协议内部评级法,提出了对“涉农信贷+保险”的一般定价方法。
对借款农户的家庭特征、诱致性需求、自然禀赋、兼业化程度及贷款规模五个方面影响借款农户保险偏好的13因素与借款农户的保险选择之间的关系进行实证分析,得到了对借款农户保险选择存在显著影响的因素。结合实证结果,提出了从加大宣传力度、提供保险服务效率、提高农户收入水平等方面提升借款农户参保的积极性,确保涉农信贷与保险耦合产品的需求动力。
分析了现有涉农信贷与保险耦合产品的发展现状和存在问题,对农村信贷机构与保险机构围绕信贷产品和保险产品耦合,提出了规范双方行为的原则和要求,确保涉农信贷机构、保险机构、借款农户在涉农信贷与保险耦合模式运行过程中的合法权益。分析了涉农信贷与保险耦合模式中信贷与保险发展不对称问题,构建了农业巨灾风险分散和控制机制以及保险资金长效补偿机制。分析了涉农信贷与保险耦合模式发展的环境,对其发展的信用环境、监管环境以及法律环境进行了完善。
This paper use evolutionary game theory to analyze the behavior evolutions in and between the interest groups of government, farmers, rural credit agency and insurance company in the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism. It finds the methods to maintain the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism's continuous operation. The local government provides higher percentages of premium subsidies to farmers insured. This makes the premium subsidies amount meet the corresponding parameter conditions and borrowing farmers groups' stationary policy be active insured. The local government's providing business subsides to agricultural insurance institutions and reinsurance for agricultural insurance business, is the practical requirement for insurance institution groups to make their stationary policy as active participation in the cooperation with credit business. And it's the stop-loss reinsurance rather than proportion reinsurance that will stimulate the insurance institutions'initiative to cooperate. With limited government subsides, rural credit agency reduces the agency cost of the participated insurance products while the insurance company may control developing costs of agriculture-related insurance. This is also a ignificant approach to maintain the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism's continuous operation. Based on the behavior evolution consequences of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism stakeholders, the dissertation will consummate the existing agricultural credit and insurance coupling product system, put forward some coupling product operating mode such as "agriculture-related credit+agricultural insurance+reinsurance",
"comprehensive insurance+agricultural loans", etc. Since bringing borrowing farmers' insurance information into credit evaluation system is the prediction to set loan rate and the line of credit for the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism, we employ the WU's3d credit theory to establish the insured farmers' comprehensive credit evaluation method. Simultaneously, we come up with the general pricing for "agriculture-related credit+insurance" combined Basel ⅡIRB, based on the evaluation method mentioned above.
We carry out empirical analysis to the relationship between borrowing farmers'insurance choice and twelve influence factors to their insurance preference in four aspects:household characteristics, induced demand, natural endowment and currently industry degree. Then, we find out the factors which have significant impact on farmers'insurance options. With the empirical results, we suggest to improve borrowing farmers'enthusiasm of the insured by intensifying propaganda, improving the insurance service efficiency, raising their income level etc. so as to ensure the demand drivers of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling products.
Next, the paper analyzes the development status and existing problems of agricultural credit and insurance coupling products, and comes up with cooperation principles to regulate the behavior between rural credit agencies and insurance institutions, ensuring the lawful rights and interests of agriculture credit agencies, insurance institutions and borrowing farmers during the operation of the coupling mechanism. Then, we analyze the asymmetry of the development of credit and insurance in the coupling mechanism, and build the risk diversification and control mechanisms for agricultural catastrophe, and long-term compensation mechanism for insurance funds. In the end, the paper analyzes the development environment of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism, and perfects its credit environment, regulatory environment and legal environment.
基于对涉农信贷与保险耦合模式各利益主体行为的演化结果,对现有的涉农信贷与保险耦合产品体系进行完善,提出了“涉农信贷+农业保险+再保险”、“综合保险+涉农贷款”等耦合产品的运作模式。由于借款农户的参保信息纳入其信用状况评价体系是涉农信贷与保险耦合模式下科学核定贷款利率和授信额度的前提,本文基于WU’s三维信用理论建立参保农户的信用综合评价方法。同时,在该借款农户信用评价方法的基础上,结合巴塞尔新资本协议内部评级法,提出了对“涉农信贷+保险”的一般定价方法。
对借款农户的家庭特征、诱致性需求、自然禀赋、兼业化程度及贷款规模五个方面影响借款农户保险偏好的13因素与借款农户的保险选择之间的关系进行实证分析,得到了对借款农户保险选择存在显著影响的因素。结合实证结果,提出了从加大宣传力度、提供保险服务效率、提高农户收入水平等方面提升借款农户参保的积极性,确保涉农信贷与保险耦合产品的需求动力。
分析了现有涉农信贷与保险耦合产品的发展现状和存在问题,对农村信贷机构与保险机构围绕信贷产品和保险产品耦合,提出了规范双方行为的原则和要求,确保涉农信贷机构、保险机构、借款农户在涉农信贷与保险耦合模式运行过程中的合法权益。分析了涉农信贷与保险耦合模式中信贷与保险发展不对称问题,构建了农业巨灾风险分散和控制机制以及保险资金长效补偿机制。分析了涉农信贷与保险耦合模式发展的环境,对其发展的信用环境、监管环境以及法律环境进行了完善。
This paper use evolutionary game theory to analyze the behavior evolutions in and between the interest groups of government, farmers, rural credit agency and insurance company in the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism. It finds the methods to maintain the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism's continuous operation. The local government provides higher percentages of premium subsidies to farmers insured. This makes the premium subsidies amount meet the corresponding parameter conditions and borrowing farmers groups' stationary policy be active insured. The local government's providing business subsides to agricultural insurance institutions and reinsurance for agricultural insurance business, is the practical requirement for insurance institution groups to make their stationary policy as active participation in the cooperation with credit business. And it's the stop-loss reinsurance rather than proportion reinsurance that will stimulate the insurance institutions'initiative to cooperate. With limited government subsides, rural credit agency reduces the agency cost of the participated insurance products while the insurance company may control developing costs of agriculture-related insurance. This is also a ignificant approach to maintain the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism's continuous operation. Based on the behavior evolution consequences of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism stakeholders, the dissertation will consummate the existing agricultural credit and insurance coupling product system, put forward some coupling product operating mode such as "agriculture-related credit+agricultural insurance+reinsurance",
"comprehensive insurance+agricultural loans", etc. Since bringing borrowing farmers' insurance information into credit evaluation system is the prediction to set loan rate and the line of credit for the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism, we employ the WU's3d credit theory to establish the insured farmers' comprehensive credit evaluation method. Simultaneously, we come up with the general pricing for "agriculture-related credit+insurance" combined Basel ⅡIRB, based on the evaluation method mentioned above.
We carry out empirical analysis to the relationship between borrowing farmers'insurance choice and twelve influence factors to their insurance preference in four aspects:household characteristics, induced demand, natural endowment and currently industry degree. Then, we find out the factors which have significant impact on farmers'insurance options. With the empirical results, we suggest to improve borrowing farmers'enthusiasm of the insured by intensifying propaganda, improving the insurance service efficiency, raising their income level etc. so as to ensure the demand drivers of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling products.
Next, the paper analyzes the development status and existing problems of agricultural credit and insurance coupling products, and comes up with cooperation principles to regulate the behavior between rural credit agencies and insurance institutions, ensuring the lawful rights and interests of agriculture credit agencies, insurance institutions and borrowing farmers during the operation of the coupling mechanism. Then, we analyze the asymmetry of the development of credit and insurance in the coupling mechanism, and build the risk diversification and control mechanisms for agricultural catastrophe, and long-term compensation mechanism for insurance funds. In the end, the paper analyzes the development environment of the agricultural credit and insurance coupling mechanism, and perfects its credit environment, regulatory environment and legal environment.
引文
[1]爱德华.S.肖著,经济发展中的金融深化[M].上海三联书店,1988,(10),P10-110.
[2]McKinnon.Money and Capital In Economic Development [M].Washington: Brookings Institute,1973:58-72.
[3]Shaw E.S.Financial Deepening in Economic Development[M].New York:Oxford University Press,1973:24-38.
[4]Admas Dale W.Filling the Deposit Gap in Miccrofinance.Paper for the Best Practices in Savings Mobilization Conference[R],Washington,DC,2002,(11):5-6.
[5]BeekT.,Levine R., and Loayza N.,2000 Finance and the Sourees of Growth[J].Journal of Financial Eeonomics,58(1):22-27.
[6]Easterly, W.Islam,R.and Stiglitz. Shaken and Stirred Explaining Growth Volat-Ility [R], Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics,World Bank D.C.:210-274.
[7]King Robert Ross Levine.Finance,Entrepeneurship,and Growth:Theory and Evid-Ence[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics,1993,32(3,12):513-532.
[8]Dehejia.R.and A.Lleras-Muney.2005.Financial Development and Pathways of Gro-Th[R]:State Branching and Deposit Insurance Laws in the United States from 1900 to 1940.NBER Working Paper,No.9951.
[9]BurgessR,RPandel.Do rural banks matter.Evidence from the India social banking Experiment[J].CMPO Working Paper Series,2003,(2):4-104.
[10]Craig McIntosh,BruceWydick.Competition and microfinance[J].Journal of Development Economics,2005,(78):271-298.
[11]Geda A A,Shimeles,D Zerfu.Finance and poverty in Ethiopia[J].Research Paper,United Nations University,2006,(3):51.
[12]Honohan P.Financial sector policy and the poor[J].New York:World Bank Working paper,2004(5):43.
[13]Hodgman,Donald R. Credit Risk and Credit Rationing[J],The Quarterly Journal of Economics,May,1960,75(2):258-278.
[14]Jaffee,Dwight M. Credit Rationing and Commercial Loan Market[M],New York:John Wiley and Sons,1991.
[15]Jaffee,Dwight M.and Russell,Thomas(1976),"Imperfect Information,Uncertainty and Credit Rationing,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Nov,90(40):651-666.
[16]J.E.Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss.Credit Rationing in Markets with ImPerfect Information, American Eeonomie Review,1981, 71 (4).
[17]Robert J.Barro.The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest[J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1976,8(4).
[18]Yuk-Shee Chan,George Kanatas.Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreement.Journal of Money[J],Credit and Banking,1985, 17(1).
[19]Becker T,R Levine.Industry Growth and Capital Allocation:Does Having a Marketor Bank-Based System Matter [J].Journal of Financial Economic,2002, (64):147-180.
[20]Allen N.Berger&David B.Humphrey,Bank scale economies, mergers, concentration,and Efficiency:the U.S. experience [R], Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers,1994.25-94.
[21]Yaron,Jacob, McDonald Benjamin,and Gerda Piprek.Rural Finance Issues,Design and Best Practices[R]."World Bank, Agriculture and Natural Resources Department, Washington, D.C.1997,v2,p15-21.
[22]Joel Bessis.Risk Management in Banking [M],John Wiley & Sons,Ltd,2004.
[23]Boot, A. W. A., and Thakor, A. V.. Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game[J], Int. Econ. Rev.1994,35,899-920.
[24]David M Dror, Eloer Soriano, Marilyn E.Lorenzo.Field based evidence of enhaneed Healtheare utilization among persons insured by micro health insurance units in Philippines[M].Universite d' Analyse de sante(LASS), Villeurbanne,1998.
[25]Jeffry M.Netter and Annette B.Poulsen,, Operational Risk in Financial Service Providers and the Pronposed Based Capital Accord:An Overview, http: //www.fs-xchange.Org.
[26]McCord, Health care micoringsurance-A synthesis of case studies from four health care financing programs in Uganda, Tanzania, india,and Cambodia, microsave,2000
[27]LimRoth, MiehaelJ.MeCord and Dominie Liber.The land seape of Micro insuranee In the world's 100 Poorest Countries[R].The Micro insurance Centre, LLC.2007,4(21).
[28]Jim Roth, Michael J.McCord, and Dominic Liber."The Landscape of Microinsurance in the World's 100 Poorest Countries".The Microinsrance Centre, LLC, April 2005.
[29]Ansan, S.M., A.Ali, and N.Kurian, Toward a Theory of Agriculture Insuranee [M], Ameriean Journal of Agrieultural Eeonomies,1982.
[30]Misha PK.Agheulture risk insurance and income:a study of the impact and design of India's Eomprehensive crop insurance seheme.Aldershot: Avebury,1996.
[31]Glauber, J.W.Deelaration in the US.District Court for the District of North Dakota, Southeastern Division[J] Paul Wileyetal.v. Daniel Gliekman.Civil Case No.A3-99-32.18 May 1999
[32]Bassos S, Casas M, et al. Multicenter double-blind trial on the efficacy andsafety of sertaconazole 2% cream in comparison with miconazole 2% cream on patients suffering from cutaneous mycoses. Arzneim-Forsch Drug Res.1992; 42(Ⅰ)5a: 767-773.
[33]Coble, K.H., T.O.Knight,R.D.Pope,and J.R.Williams.Modeling Farm-Level Crop Insurance Demand with Panel Data.[J]Ameriancan Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(1996):439-47.
[34]Rubinstein,A.and M.E.Yaar,1983,"Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard,"Journal of Econnomic Theory,30,74-97.
[35]Gardner, B. & Kramer, R.1986.Experience with Crop Insurance Programs in the United States in P. Hazell, C. Pomareda and A. Valdes (eds.),20,23-35.
[36]Goedwin, B.K.An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Multiple Peril CroP Insuranee[J].Amer.J.Agr.Eeon.1993,75:425-34.
[37]Appel D,R B Lord,S Harrington, Crop Insurance Study[M],1999.
[38]Vincent H. Smith; Alan E. Baquet, The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance:Evidence from Montana Wheat Farms[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1996,1(78) 189-201.
[39]Knight, T.O., & K.H. Coble. Survey of U.S. Multiple Peril Crop Insurace Literature Since 1980 [J], Review of Agricultural Economics,1997(17) 128-156.
[40]Peter Hazell.Crop insurance for agricultural development:Issues and experience [R] Johns Hopkins University Press for the international Food PCLICY research Institute,1986.
[41]Serra, T., B. K. Goodwin, and A. M. Featherstone. (2003), Modeling Changes in the U.S. Demand for Crop Insurance during the 1990s. Agricultural Finance Review,63(2):109-125.
[42]Bruce and Trejos, Sandra.Micro Credit in Chiapas, Mexico:Poverty Reduction through Group Lending, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol.88, Supplement 2 (2009), pp.283-299.
[43]Joseph W, Glauber, Keith J. Collins. Crop Insurance, Disaster Assistance, and the Role of the Federal Government in Providing Catastrophic Risk Protection [J]. Agricultural Finance Review, Fall 2002, p82-103.
[44]Wang.(2005), Modeling Changes in the U.S. Demand for Crop Insurance during the 1990s. Agricultural Finance Review,63(2):109-125.
[45]Saleem Shaik;Keith H.CobleThomas Knight.Revenue Crop Insurance Demand[J].2005,7:13-25.
[46]Binswanger P.Hans,Hazell Peter. Risk Aversion,Collat-eral Requirements,and the Markets for Credit and Insurance in Rural Areas.1996,21(2):15-20.
[47]Pomareda,Carlos.An Evaluation of Impact of Credit Insurance on Bank Performance in Panama.1986,15(5):45-48.
[48]Beck T., Levine R., and Loayza N. Finance and the Sources of Growth. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1):22-27.
[49]Easterly, W. Islam, and Stiglitz.2001, Shaken and Stirred:Explaining Growth Volatility[R], Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank D.C:210-274.
[50]H.Square L. and Zou. Explaining International and Intertemporal Vari-ations in Income Inequality, Economic Journal,1998,108:26-43.
[51]David P.Baron, David Besanko. Regulation,asymmetric information, and auditing[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1985,15:4-6.
[52]MICHAEL J. McCORD,SYLVIA OSINDE. The Supply of Health Microinsurance in East Africa[M],2005.
[53]Alston, L., Grove, A., Wheelock, D. Why do banks fail? Evidence from the 1920s[J]. Explorations Econ. Hist.1994,31,409-431.
[54]Grossman, R.. Deposit insurance, regulation, and moral hazard in the thrift industry:evidence from the 1930s[J]. Amer. Econ. Rev.,1992,82,800-821.
[55]Wheelock, D.. Deposit insurance and bank failures:new evidence from the 1920s[J]. Econ. Inquiry,1992,30,530-543.
[56]Karels, G., McClatchey, C.. Deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior in the credit union industry [J]. J. Banking Finance,1999,23,105-134.
[57]Vasso P. Ioannidou,Maria Fabiana Penas. Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:Evidence from internal loan ratings [J]. Finan. Intermediation, 2010,9.
[58]Demigurc-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E.. Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? [J].Monet. Econ.,2002,49,1373-1406.
[59]Hovakimian, A., Kane, E., Laeven, L.. How country and safetynet characteristics affect bank risk shifting [J]. Finan. Services Res.,2003,23,177-204.
[60]Vasso P, Ioannidou,Maria Fabiana Penas. Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:Evidence from internal loan ratings. J. Finan. Intermediation 2010, 9:5-115.
[61]Craig Churchill. Protecting the poor. A miroinsurance compendium.2006.
[62]Jim Roth,Michael [J].McCord, Dominic Liber. The landscape of Micoinsurance in the World's 100 poorest Countries. The Microinsurance Central,LLC,2007.
[63]Mosleh U Ahmed,Syed Khairul Islam, Md.Abul Quashem,and Nabil Ahmed. Health [39] Microinsurance:A Comparative Study of Three Examples in Bangladesh[R],CGAP Working [64] Group on Microinsurance Good and Bad Practices Case Study No.13,2005.09.
[65]James R. Booth, Lena Chua Booth. Deposit insurance and specialization in commercial bank lending[J]. Review of Financial Economics,2004,13.
[66]Cohen,M., and Sebstad,J.,,Reducing Vulnerability:The Demand for Microin-surance[J].Journal of International Development,2005,17:P397-474..
[67]Vasso P, Ioannidou,Maria Fabiana Penas. Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:Evidence from internal loan ratings[J]. J. Finan. Intermediation 2010, 9:5-115.
[68]吴斌.中国社会转型背景下农村金融发展研究：[D].武汉：武汉大学,2010
[69]吴彬.促进农村金融产品创新的建议[J].甘肃金融,2010,(11)：45-46
[70]胡小良.对农村金融产品创新缺位的调查与思考[J].金融与经济,2007,(4)：65-66
[71]丁涛.基于“第三方信用约束”的农村金融产品创新研究[J].金融理论与实践,2008,(10)：29-32
[72]吴盛光.农村金融产品创新：品类、特点、困境与可持续之策[J].南方农村,2010,(4)：76-80
[73]叶枫.农村信贷创新-发行涉农中小企业集合债券分析[J].中国商界,2008,(10)：14-15
[74]温惠昆.农村信贷投入的瓶颈因素分析及农发行信贷取向选择[J].广西金融 研究,2007,(11)：28-31
[75]易树菁.浅析制约农信社支农服务的几个因素[J].黑龙江金融,2002,(9)：28
[76]郑洵.中国农村信贷市场的主要问题和发展方向[J].北京农学院学报,2006,21(4)：113-114
[77]刘兆鹏.论保险资金投资：[D].北京：对外经济贸易大学,2003
[78]王小前.我国农业保险的中央财政支持体系研究.[D].苏州：苏州大学,2010
[79]肖文 路永光.保险资金投资资本市场的策略[J].保险研究,2002,(4)：19-21
[80]施红.农业保险财政补贴的激励机制[J].中国保险,2007,(12)：37-40
[81]段善雨.我国保险资金的运用渠道及其风险管理[J].经济经纬,2007,(4)：143-146
[82]王艳玲 欧阳令南.我国农业保险财政补贴的研究[J].安徽农业科学,2008,36(7)：2945-2947
[83]伍中信张娅.政策性农业保险中的内生最优财政补贴规模研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(2)：72-76
[84]张伟.中国农村银保合作研究：[D].北京：首都经济贸易大学,2010
[85]谢婕.我国银行保险若干法律问题研究：[D].大连：东北财经大学,2005
[86]赵彩丽.完善我国银保合作相关法律制度[J].合作经济与科技,2008,(8)：18-9
[87]杨松 闫海.银行代理保险业务的法律规范体系研析[J].法学评论,2010,(5)：132-38
[88]谭民俊.农村小额信贷效率改进的微观基础研究：[D].长沙：中南大学,2007
[89]崔杰.我国农村经济发展中的银保合作研究：[D].长沙：湖南大学,2007
[90]许丽华.我国银行保险的风险防范研究：[D].保定：河北大学,2007
[91]韦剑锋.农业再保险方案的选择——以湖北省兴山县烟叶保险为例：[D].武汉：华中农业大学,2010
[92]吕晓英 李先德.基于系统动力学模拟的政策性农业再保险运作方式比较[J].开发研究,2010,(5)：53-7
[93]李有祥 张国威.论我国农业再保险体系框架的构建[J].金融研究,2004,(7)：106-11
[94]龙文军.农业保险再保险的主要模式[J].经济研究参考,2007,(54)：26-27
[95]陈玲.我国农业再保险制度建立问题的相关研究[J].上海保险,2009,(5)：25-28
[96]左臣伟.我国农业巨灾风险基金数量问题研究：[D].山东：山东农业大学,2009
[97]谭中明 冯学峰.健全我国农业巨灾风险保险分散机制的探讨[J].金融与经济,2011,(3)：78-82
[98]沈蕾.农业巨灾风险的资本市场解决方案[J].山西财经大学学 报,2006,28(1)：69-72
[99]韩锦绵 马晓强.农业巨灾风险管理的国际经验及其借鉴[J].改革,2008,(8)：85-89
[100]杨雪美 冯文丽.试论构建我国农业巨灾风险管理策略——基于风险转嫁视角[J].金融与经济,2011,(2)：80-83
[101]曹锡林.改善农村信用环境是新农村建设的当务之急[J].现代金融,2006,(9)：9
[102]张峰.借鉴中外经验优化北京农村信用环境[J].全国商情(理论研究),2010,(1)：36-37
[103]张峰 杨宜.借鉴中外经验优化农村信用环境-北京市为例[J].特区经济,2010,(3)：57-59
[104]陈应雄.开展村组信用评级 营造良好的农村信用环境-栗坡县农村信用社试行村组信用评级的调查报告[J].西南金融,2002,(4)：48-50
[105]辛立秋.中国银保合作的研究：[D].哈尔滨：东北农业大学,2004
[106]孙浩.我国银行保险业务风险管理研究——以SN寿险公司为例：[D].天津：天津大学,2009
[107]隋聪.基于最优效率的贷款定价模型研究：[D].大连：大连理工大学,2009
[108]蒋东明.基于信用评级和违约概率的贷款定价研究：[D].天津：天津大学,2005
[109]杨继光 刘海龙 许友传.基于GCRM模型的信用经济资本测度和贷款定价研究[J].统计研究,2010,(7)：60-64
[110]么向华 蒋东明.基于简约型方法的商业银行信用贷款定价研究[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2007,6(3)：59-63
[111]庄新田 黄小原.基于信息不对称的银行贷款定价策略分析[J].系统工程,2002,20(3)：20-23
[112]王皓东 马勇 贾敏.利率市场化进程中的贷款定价模型[J].统计与决策,2007,(1)：98-100
[113]徐爱华.利率市场化条件下农村信用社贷款定价方法研究一湖南的现状考察与模式选择[J].财经理论与实践(双月刊),006,(5)：26-30
[114]李丽滢,刘钟钦.利率市场化条件下农村信用社的贷款定价研究[J].商业研究,2006,(23)：162-165
[115]詹原瑞 么向华.利率与违约过程相关的信用贷款定价[J].系统工程学报,2006,21(3)：254-259
[116]鲁爱民 林静姗 吴茜.小额贷款公司的利率定价问题研究[J].北方经济,2010,(9)：82-84
[117]李俊丽.我国个人征信体系的构建与应用研究：[D].泰安：山东农业大学,2007
[118]杨静.基于Logistic回归模型的农户信用等级研究：[D].西安：陕西师范大学,2008.
[119]于兆吉 胡祥培 毛强.电子商务环境下信用评级的一种新方法[J].控制与决策,2009,24(11)：1668-1672
[120]周振.构建农村信用社的农户信用评估体系.现代农业[J],009,(6)：177-179
[121]王树娟 霍学喜 何学松.构建农村信用社农户信用评级体系初探[J].金融理论与实践,2005,(17)：38-40
[122]高世原 彭灿.基于模糊综合评判法的中小信用担保机构评级研究[J].技术经济与与管理研究,2008,(6)：13-16
[123]吴晶妹 张颖 唐勤伟.基于农户信用特征的三维信用评价模型研究[J].财贸经济,2010,(9)：22-29
[124]杨继光.商业银行经济资本测度方法及其应用研究：[D].上海：上海交通大学,2009
[125]张子良.积极发展农业保险探索建立“信贷+保险”农村金融服务新模式[J].中国经贸导刊,2009,(9)：39
[126]方晓燕.贷款定价理论与实践探讨[J].价值工程,2006,(4)：123-126
[127]汪办兴.对Shibor基础的票据定价建模问题的思考[J].中国货币市场,2009,(3)：34-39
[128]刘彦文 管玲芳.基于期权博弈的商业银行贷款定价模型[J].统计与决策,2009,(2)：62-63
[128]朱志强 杨红员.建立以Shibor为基准的贴现利率定价机制研究[J].华北金融,2008,(6)：13-15
[129]曹霞 常玉春.利率市场化条件下贷款定价模式分析兼论贷款定价中的利率期限结构问题[J].湖南大学学报(社会科学版),2002,16(3)：117-120
[130]李学文.农村信用社贷款定价问题研究：[D].长沙：湖南农业大学,2008
[131]刘进宝 何广文.农村信用社贷款利率定价方法探析[J].调研世界,2006,(12)：9-11
[132]陈可辉.农信社贷款利率定价问题探讨：基于肇庆市的实践与思考[J].南方金融,2007,(7)：29-31
[133]鲁爱民 林静姗 吴茜.小额贷款公司的利率定价问题研究[J].北方经济,2010,(9)：82-84
[134]徐芳芳.我国农村金融服务体系的缺陷及完善：[D].长沙：中南大学,2007
[135]高忆红.金融支持新农村经济建设的思考与对策[J].金融理论与实 践,2010,(3)：119-120
[136]项继权操家齐.困局与突围：我国农户金融供需现状及政策建议—基于全国28个省市(自治区)抽样调查的分析[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2011,(3)：1-10
[137]吴盛光.农村金融产品创新：品类、特点、困境与可持续之策[J].南方金融,2010,(4)：76-80
[138]李筠.农村金融产品和服务方式创新：实践经验与发展思路[J].南方金融,2010,(11)：8-11
[139]李延刚.我国农村金融产品和服务创新的现状与对策研究[J].中国乡镇企业会计,2009,(7)：58-59
[140]范子辰.我国农村金融需求与供给问题浅析[J].改革与开放,2009,(8)：49
[150]严璐.对开拓农村保险市场、促进农村保险事业发展的探讨[J].特区经济,2006,(8)：127-128
[160]李霄震.农村保险存在的弊端及建议[J].浙江金融,2007,(12)：50-51
[161]田吉生.农村保险市场发展策略研究—兼谈浙江农村保险[J].中国保险,2007,(12)：41-44
[147]管公明.培育农村保险消费群体[J].中国金融,2006,(11)：54-55
[148]彭石普.论农村保险市场的开拓[J].商业研究,2005,(7)：145-146
[149]丁霞颜鹏飞.农村保险市场创新发展探析[J].福建论坛,2010,(9)：16-20
[150]吴思王长征.农村保险市场营销模式创新—基于水平营销的视角[J].保险研究,2010,(4)：72-76
[151]李金安.我国农村保险发展问题探索[J].科技资讯,2007,(18)：239
[152]赵利梅.新形势下中国农村保险业的发展及其创新[J].农村经济,2006,(10)：60-61
[153]赵庆栋.山东省农村信用社中间业务流程再造研究：[D].济南：山东大学,2008
[154]张蕾.河北省农村信用社中间业务营销研究：[D].河北：河北大学,2010
[155]潘志刚.农村信用社中间业务：特点、制约因素及发展战略选择[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(1)：28-32
[156]康赟德 徐亨章.农村信用社中间业务发展的困难与对策[J].中国科技信息,2005,(23)：49-50
[157]杨代平龚卫东.农村信用社中间业务发展的障碍与策略[J].南方金融,2004,(1)：38-40
[158]田璐.农村信用社中间业务发展问题探析[J].企业导报,2010,(1)：168-169
[159]房小蔚.谈谈加快发展国有商业银行中间业务的必要性及对策[J].中华女子 学院山东分院学报,2001,(4)：50-53
[160]黄平恨.对农村信用社信贷风险管理的理性分析[J].金融与经济,2006,(12)：53-54
[161]雷春晓.论农村信用社信贷风险的控制[J].科技信息,2009,(29)：1188-1189
[162]宋魁.农村合作银行贷款风险控制研究[J].商场现代化,2010,(9)：186-187
[163]俞建新章明华.农村信用社信贷风险管理探讨[J].浙江金融,1998,(4)：38-39
[164]谢承恒.农村信用社信贷风险管理探析[J].当代经济,2010,(3)：28-29
[165]李文文.我国农村金融机构信贷风险管理的对策[J].山西财经大学学报,2010,32(2)：102
[166]钟声张坤.新形势下农村信用社信贷风险分析及对策[J].经济理论研究,2009,(6)：64
[167]孔荣.涉农小企业融资问题研究：[D].杨凌：西北农林科技大学,2002
[168]刘轶.县域中小企业融资与金融结构优化：以湖南为例：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2008
[169]宋晓静.农户融资特征及其影响因素分析—以江苏省宏图村为例：[D].南京：南京农业大学,2008
[170]聂国强.金融抑制下的农户信贷行为分析—以四川省邓昧市农村地区为例：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2009
[171]刘莉亚胡乃红李基礼柳永明骆玉鼎.农户融资现状及其成因分析—基于中国东部、中部、西部千社万户的调查[J].中国农村观察2009,(3)：2-11
[172]熊建国.中国农户融资的现状分析与民间金融一来自江西省上饶市的个案调查与思考[J].中国农村经济,2006,(3)：59-63
[173]刘刚.解决农业产业化龙头企业融资困难的思考[J].新西部,2009,(8)：28
[174]郑竑.论农村小额保险与农户小额信贷的结合[J].福建金融,2009,(6)：1 7-18
[175]年艳.浅析我国农业产业化发展现状[J].农业科技与信息,2009,(19)：10-11
[176]李文中.住房贷款研究：[D].北京：首都经贸大学,2004
[177]谢国.汽车消费贷款保证保险运行机制及风险防范研究：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2007
[178]王晓燕.我国银行保险发展模式的探讨：[D].大连：东北财经大学,2007
[179]孙浩.我国银行保险业务风险管理研究——以SN寿险公司为例：[D].天津：天津大学,2009
[180]王东胜.农村信贷+保险模式的可行性分析[J].新疆金融2009,(1)：39-42
[181]陈荣邦.农业保险与农村小额信贷协同发展问题研究[J].2009,(10)：39-42
[182]李喜梅.小额信贷与小额保险合作发展研究[J].经济问题.2010,(5)：95-97
[183]胡梦雅.中国银行保险业务的现状及发展对策：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2003
[184]独孤昌慧.银行保险及其效应分析：[D].吉林：吉林大学,2005
[185]邹新克.论银行保险的发展模式：[D].四川：四川大学,2005
[186]吴文星.延边银行保险业务发展现状及对策：[D].延吉：延边大学,2005
[187]张明珠.我国银行保险产品创新研究：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2009
[188]叶扬.“农村小额信贷,农村保险”模式的可行性分析[J].金融与经济,2008,(3)：75-76
[189]郑吉凯.中国农业政策性金融体系构建研究：[D].北京：北京工商大学,2007
[190]谭中明冯学峰.健全我国农业巨灾风险保险分散机制的探讨[J].金融与经济,2011,(3)：78-82
[191]唐婷婷.促进我国小额保险发展的政策思路探索：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2009
[192]黄华盈.西藏地区农牧业信贷与农业保险相连接的可行性分析[J].时代经贸,2007,5(82)：115-116
[193]周健.保险市场与农村信贷市场的对接模式研究[J].改革与战略,2009,25(189)：38-42
[194]吕萍孙琰华.国外农地转用价格的确定方法[J].中国土地科学,2004,18(3)：54-59
[195]徐琼英.我国银行保险的深层次发展：模式选择及风险防范：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2007
[196]曹青董战鲲.促进与完善银保合作[J].金融理论与实践,2004,(10)：44-45
[197]吴占权刘莎.反向抵押贷款：银保合作的新业务[J].河北金融,2006,(4)：20-22
[198]刘江林.加强银保合作促进共同发展——关于推进银行保险业合作发展的思考.2007,(10)：63-64
[199]叶扬.“农村小额信贷+农村保险”模式的可行性分析[J].金融与经济,2008,3.
[200]林杰.保险与农业信贷供求的“帕累托改进”[J].福建金融,2008,6.
[201]杨宜,杨泽云.农户信贷保证保险：解决农村信贷担保的新机制[J].改革与战略,2009,9.
[202]张丽霞.小额信贷可持续发展的思考-探析“小额信贷+保险”模式[J].科技创新月刊,2008,5.
[203]张子良.积极发展农业保险探索建立“信贷+保险”农村金融服务新模式[J].中国经贸导刊,2009,9.
[204]祁金星,杨煦.北海市银行业金融机构“信贷+保险”业务情况调查[J].区域金融研究,2009,3.
[205]潘石金.建立农村信贷资产保险保障机制初探[J].浙江金融,2004,1 0.
[206]郑竑.论农村小额保险与农户小额信贷的结合[J].福建金融,2009,9.
[207]吕秀萍,杨兆廷.农村保险拓展农村信贷抵押物研究[J].农村金融研究,2009,6.
[208]尹成远,任鹏充,陈伟华.农村小额保险与小额信贷结合发展及其模式探讨[J].现代财经,2010,3.
[209]中国人民银行肇庆市中心支行课题组.农户小额信贷保险实践[J].银行家,2006,10.
[210]卢成,王雅超.农业保险引入相互保险形式的可行性研究——基于已有案例的总结[J].安徽农业科学,2006,34.
[211]陈荣邦.农业保险与农村小额信贷协同发展问题研究[J].上海金融,2009,10.
[212]张浩,李前进,吴莹.农业保险与农村信贷互动机制研究[J].上海金融,2010,3.
[213]张森.浅析安徽省农村“信贷+保险”模式[J].经济研究导刊,2010,12.
[214]俞爱平,张军璞.浅析中国农村小额信贷保险[J].考试周刊,2008,22.
[215]郭永利,潘志恒.上海信贷保险直通农民合作社[J].中国保险,2010,4.
[216]喻晓.我国信贷保险制度建设的设想[J].湖南税务高等专科学校学报,2009,6.
[217]周健.保险市场与农村信贷市场的对接模式研究[J].改革与战略,2009,5.
[218]周慧.小额信贷保险初探[J].企业导报,2009,3.
[219]胡惊鸿.小额信贷保险的可行性分析[J].中国电子商务,2009,11.
[220]李喜.小额信贷与小额保险合作发展研究[J].经济问题,2010,5.
[221]石骏,魏灿秋.信合保险在信用社小额信贷及农村金融中的作用[J].中国农学通报,2006,1.
[222]陈泰名,孙强,张译文.小额信贷保险由乡村走向城镇的若干思考-从风险管理视角出发[J].中国集体经济.2010,1.
[223]王东胜.农村信贷+保险模式的可行性分析[J].新疆金融,2009,1.
[224]杨青坪.对汉中市涉农保险发展的分析[J].西安金融,2006,11.
[225]杜庆鑫.发展农村小额保险支持农村小额信贷持续健康发展[J].成人高教学刊,2008,5.
[2]McKinnon.Money and Capital In Economic Development [M].Washington: Brookings Institute,1973:58-72.
[3]Shaw E.S.Financial Deepening in Economic Development[M].New York:Oxford University Press,1973:24-38.
[4]Admas Dale W.Filling the Deposit Gap in Miccrofinance.Paper for the Best Practices in Savings Mobilization Conference[R],Washington,DC,2002,(11):5-6.
[5]BeekT.,Levine R., and Loayza N.,2000 Finance and the Sourees of Growth[J].Journal of Financial Eeonomics,58(1):22-27.
[6]Easterly, W.Islam,R.and Stiglitz. Shaken and Stirred Explaining Growth Volat-Ility [R], Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics,World Bank D.C.:210-274.
[7]King Robert Ross Levine.Finance,Entrepeneurship,and Growth:Theory and Evid-Ence[J]. Journal of Monetary Economics,1993,32(3,12):513-532.
[8]Dehejia.R.and A.Lleras-Muney.2005.Financial Development and Pathways of Gro-Th[R]:State Branching and Deposit Insurance Laws in the United States from 1900 to 1940.NBER Working Paper,No.9951.
[9]BurgessR,RPandel.Do rural banks matter.Evidence from the India social banking Experiment[J].CMPO Working Paper Series,2003,(2):4-104.
[10]Craig McIntosh,BruceWydick.Competition and microfinance[J].Journal of Development Economics,2005,(78):271-298.
[11]Geda A A,Shimeles,D Zerfu.Finance and poverty in Ethiopia[J].Research Paper,United Nations University,2006,(3):51.
[12]Honohan P.Financial sector policy and the poor[J].New York:World Bank Working paper,2004(5):43.
[13]Hodgman,Donald R. Credit Risk and Credit Rationing[J],The Quarterly Journal of Economics,May,1960,75(2):258-278.
[14]Jaffee,Dwight M. Credit Rationing and Commercial Loan Market[M],New York:John Wiley and Sons,1991.
[15]Jaffee,Dwight M.and Russell,Thomas(1976),"Imperfect Information,Uncertainty and Credit Rationing,The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Nov,90(40):651-666.
[16]J.E.Stiglitz, Andrew Weiss.Credit Rationing in Markets with ImPerfect Information, American Eeonomie Review,1981, 71 (4).
[17]Robert J.Barro.The Loan Market, Collateral, and Rates of Interest[J].Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,1976,8(4).
[18]Yuk-Shee Chan,George Kanatas.Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreement.Journal of Money[J],Credit and Banking,1985, 17(1).
[19]Becker T,R Levine.Industry Growth and Capital Allocation:Does Having a Marketor Bank-Based System Matter [J].Journal of Financial Economic,2002, (64):147-180.
[20]Allen N.Berger&David B.Humphrey,Bank scale economies, mergers, concentration,and Efficiency:the U.S. experience [R], Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers,1994.25-94.
[21]Yaron,Jacob, McDonald Benjamin,and Gerda Piprek.Rural Finance Issues,Design and Best Practices[R]."World Bank, Agriculture and Natural Resources Department, Washington, D.C.1997,v2,p15-21.
[22]Joel Bessis.Risk Management in Banking [M],John Wiley & Sons,Ltd,2004.
[23]Boot, A. W. A., and Thakor, A. V.. Moral hazard and secured lending in an infinitely repeated credit market game[J], Int. Econ. Rev.1994,35,899-920.
[24]David M Dror, Eloer Soriano, Marilyn E.Lorenzo.Field based evidence of enhaneed Healtheare utilization among persons insured by micro health insurance units in Philippines[M].Universite d' Analyse de sante(LASS), Villeurbanne,1998.
[25]Jeffry M.Netter and Annette B.Poulsen,, Operational Risk in Financial Service Providers and the Pronposed Based Capital Accord:An Overview, http: //www.fs-xchange.Org.
[26]McCord, Health care micoringsurance-A synthesis of case studies from four health care financing programs in Uganda, Tanzania, india,and Cambodia, microsave,2000
[27]LimRoth, MiehaelJ.MeCord and Dominie Liber.The land seape of Micro insuranee In the world's 100 Poorest Countries[R].The Micro insurance Centre, LLC.2007,4(21).
[28]Jim Roth, Michael J.McCord, and Dominic Liber."The Landscape of Microinsurance in the World's 100 Poorest Countries".The Microinsrance Centre, LLC, April 2005.
[29]Ansan, S.M., A.Ali, and N.Kurian, Toward a Theory of Agriculture Insuranee [M], Ameriean Journal of Agrieultural Eeonomies,1982.
[30]Misha PK.Agheulture risk insurance and income:a study of the impact and design of India's Eomprehensive crop insurance seheme.Aldershot: Avebury,1996.
[31]Glauber, J.W.Deelaration in the US.District Court for the District of North Dakota, Southeastern Division[J] Paul Wileyetal.v. Daniel Gliekman.Civil Case No.A3-99-32.18 May 1999
[32]Bassos S, Casas M, et al. Multicenter double-blind trial on the efficacy andsafety of sertaconazole 2% cream in comparison with miconazole 2% cream on patients suffering from cutaneous mycoses. Arzneim-Forsch Drug Res.1992; 42(Ⅰ)5a: 767-773.
[33]Coble, K.H., T.O.Knight,R.D.Pope,and J.R.Williams.Modeling Farm-Level Crop Insurance Demand with Panel Data.[J]Ameriancan Journal of Agricultural Economics 78(1996):439-47.
[34]Rubinstein,A.and M.E.Yaar,1983,"Repeated Insurance Contracts and Moral Hazard,"Journal of Econnomic Theory,30,74-97.
[35]Gardner, B. & Kramer, R.1986.Experience with Crop Insurance Programs in the United States in P. Hazell, C. Pomareda and A. Valdes (eds.),20,23-35.
[36]Goedwin, B.K.An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Multiple Peril CroP Insuranee[J].Amer.J.Agr.Eeon.1993,75:425-34.
[37]Appel D,R B Lord,S Harrington, Crop Insurance Study[M],1999.
[38]Vincent H. Smith; Alan E. Baquet, The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance:Evidence from Montana Wheat Farms[J], American Journal of Agricultural Economics,1996,1(78) 189-201.
[39]Knight, T.O., & K.H. Coble. Survey of U.S. Multiple Peril Crop Insurace Literature Since 1980 [J], Review of Agricultural Economics,1997(17) 128-156.
[40]Peter Hazell.Crop insurance for agricultural development:Issues and experience [R] Johns Hopkins University Press for the international Food PCLICY research Institute,1986.
[41]Serra, T., B. K. Goodwin, and A. M. Featherstone. (2003), Modeling Changes in the U.S. Demand for Crop Insurance during the 1990s. Agricultural Finance Review,63(2):109-125.
[42]Bruce and Trejos, Sandra.Micro Credit in Chiapas, Mexico:Poverty Reduction through Group Lending, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol.88, Supplement 2 (2009), pp.283-299.
[43]Joseph W, Glauber, Keith J. Collins. Crop Insurance, Disaster Assistance, and the Role of the Federal Government in Providing Catastrophic Risk Protection [J]. Agricultural Finance Review, Fall 2002, p82-103.
[44]Wang.(2005), Modeling Changes in the U.S. Demand for Crop Insurance during the 1990s. Agricultural Finance Review,63(2):109-125.
[45]Saleem Shaik;Keith H.CobleThomas Knight.Revenue Crop Insurance Demand[J].2005,7:13-25.
[46]Binswanger P.Hans,Hazell Peter. Risk Aversion,Collat-eral Requirements,and the Markets for Credit and Insurance in Rural Areas.1996,21(2):15-20.
[47]Pomareda,Carlos.An Evaluation of Impact of Credit Insurance on Bank Performance in Panama.1986,15(5):45-48.
[48]Beck T., Levine R., and Loayza N. Finance and the Sources of Growth. Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1):22-27.
[49]Easterly, W. Islam, and Stiglitz.2001, Shaken and Stirred:Explaining Growth Volatility[R], Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, World Bank D.C:210-274.
[50]H.Square L. and Zou. Explaining International and Intertemporal Vari-ations in Income Inequality, Economic Journal,1998,108:26-43.
[51]David P.Baron, David Besanko. Regulation,asymmetric information, and auditing[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1985,15:4-6.
[52]MICHAEL J. McCORD,SYLVIA OSINDE. The Supply of Health Microinsurance in East Africa[M],2005.
[53]Alston, L., Grove, A., Wheelock, D. Why do banks fail? Evidence from the 1920s[J]. Explorations Econ. Hist.1994,31,409-431.
[54]Grossman, R.. Deposit insurance, regulation, and moral hazard in the thrift industry:evidence from the 1930s[J]. Amer. Econ. Rev.,1992,82,800-821.
[55]Wheelock, D.. Deposit insurance and bank failures:new evidence from the 1920s[J]. Econ. Inquiry,1992,30,530-543.
[56]Karels, G., McClatchey, C.. Deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior in the credit union industry [J]. J. Banking Finance,1999,23,105-134.
[57]Vasso P. Ioannidou,Maria Fabiana Penas. Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:Evidence from internal loan ratings [J]. Finan. Intermediation, 2010,9.
[58]Demigurc-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E.. Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? [J].Monet. Econ.,2002,49,1373-1406.
[59]Hovakimian, A., Kane, E., Laeven, L.. How country and safetynet characteristics affect bank risk shifting [J]. Finan. Services Res.,2003,23,177-204.
[60]Vasso P, Ioannidou,Maria Fabiana Penas. Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:Evidence from internal loan ratings. J. Finan. Intermediation 2010, 9:5-115.
[61]Craig Churchill. Protecting the poor. A miroinsurance compendium.2006.
[62]Jim Roth,Michael [J].McCord, Dominic Liber. The landscape of Micoinsurance in the World's 100 poorest Countries. The Microinsurance Central,LLC,2007.
[63]Mosleh U Ahmed,Syed Khairul Islam, Md.Abul Quashem,and Nabil Ahmed. Health [39] Microinsurance:A Comparative Study of Three Examples in Bangladesh[R],CGAP Working [64] Group on Microinsurance Good and Bad Practices Case Study No.13,2005.09.
[65]James R. Booth, Lena Chua Booth. Deposit insurance and specialization in commercial bank lending[J]. Review of Financial Economics,2004,13.
[66]Cohen,M., and Sebstad,J.,,Reducing Vulnerability:The Demand for Microin-surance[J].Journal of International Development,2005,17:P397-474..
[67]Vasso P, Ioannidou,Maria Fabiana Penas. Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking:Evidence from internal loan ratings[J]. J. Finan. Intermediation 2010, 9:5-115.
[68]吴斌.中国社会转型背景下农村金融发展研究：[D].武汉：武汉大学,2010
[69]吴彬.促进农村金融产品创新的建议[J].甘肃金融,2010,(11)：45-46
[70]胡小良.对农村金融产品创新缺位的调查与思考[J].金融与经济,2007,(4)：65-66
[71]丁涛.基于“第三方信用约束”的农村金融产品创新研究[J].金融理论与实践,2008,(10)：29-32
[72]吴盛光.农村金融产品创新：品类、特点、困境与可持续之策[J].南方农村,2010,(4)：76-80
[73]叶枫.农村信贷创新-发行涉农中小企业集合债券分析[J].中国商界,2008,(10)：14-15
[74]温惠昆.农村信贷投入的瓶颈因素分析及农发行信贷取向选择[J].广西金融 研究,2007,(11)：28-31
[75]易树菁.浅析制约农信社支农服务的几个因素[J].黑龙江金融,2002,(9)：28
[76]郑洵.中国农村信贷市场的主要问题和发展方向[J].北京农学院学报,2006,21(4)：113-114
[77]刘兆鹏.论保险资金投资：[D].北京：对外经济贸易大学,2003
[78]王小前.我国农业保险的中央财政支持体系研究.[D].苏州：苏州大学,2010
[79]肖文 路永光.保险资金投资资本市场的策略[J].保险研究,2002,(4)：19-21
[80]施红.农业保险财政补贴的激励机制[J].中国保险,2007,(12)：37-40
[81]段善雨.我国保险资金的运用渠道及其风险管理[J].经济经纬,2007,(4)：143-146
[82]王艳玲 欧阳令南.我国农业保险财政补贴的研究[J].安徽农业科学,2008,36(7)：2945-2947
[83]伍中信张娅.政策性农业保险中的内生最优财政补贴规模研究[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008,(2)：72-76
[84]张伟.中国农村银保合作研究：[D].北京：首都经济贸易大学,2010
[85]谢婕.我国银行保险若干法律问题研究：[D].大连：东北财经大学,2005
[86]赵彩丽.完善我国银保合作相关法律制度[J].合作经济与科技,2008,(8)：18-9
[87]杨松 闫海.银行代理保险业务的法律规范体系研析[J].法学评论,2010,(5)：132-38
[88]谭民俊.农村小额信贷效率改进的微观基础研究：[D].长沙：中南大学,2007
[89]崔杰.我国农村经济发展中的银保合作研究：[D].长沙：湖南大学,2007
[90]许丽华.我国银行保险的风险防范研究：[D].保定：河北大学,2007
[91]韦剑锋.农业再保险方案的选择——以湖北省兴山县烟叶保险为例：[D].武汉：华中农业大学,2010
[92]吕晓英 李先德.基于系统动力学模拟的政策性农业再保险运作方式比较[J].开发研究,2010,(5)：53-7
[93]李有祥 张国威.论我国农业再保险体系框架的构建[J].金融研究,2004,(7)：106-11
[94]龙文军.农业保险再保险的主要模式[J].经济研究参考,2007,(54)：26-27
[95]陈玲.我国农业再保险制度建立问题的相关研究[J].上海保险,2009,(5)：25-28
[96]左臣伟.我国农业巨灾风险基金数量问题研究：[D].山东：山东农业大学,2009
[97]谭中明 冯学峰.健全我国农业巨灾风险保险分散机制的探讨[J].金融与经济,2011,(3)：78-82
[98]沈蕾.农业巨灾风险的资本市场解决方案[J].山西财经大学学 报,2006,28(1)：69-72
[99]韩锦绵 马晓强.农业巨灾风险管理的国际经验及其借鉴[J].改革,2008,(8)：85-89
[100]杨雪美 冯文丽.试论构建我国农业巨灾风险管理策略——基于风险转嫁视角[J].金融与经济,2011,(2)：80-83
[101]曹锡林.改善农村信用环境是新农村建设的当务之急[J].现代金融,2006,(9)：9
[102]张峰.借鉴中外经验优化北京农村信用环境[J].全国商情(理论研究),2010,(1)：36-37
[103]张峰 杨宜.借鉴中外经验优化农村信用环境-北京市为例[J].特区经济,2010,(3)：57-59
[104]陈应雄.开展村组信用评级 营造良好的农村信用环境-栗坡县农村信用社试行村组信用评级的调查报告[J].西南金融,2002,(4)：48-50
[105]辛立秋.中国银保合作的研究：[D].哈尔滨：东北农业大学,2004
[106]孙浩.我国银行保险业务风险管理研究——以SN寿险公司为例：[D].天津：天津大学,2009
[107]隋聪.基于最优效率的贷款定价模型研究：[D].大连：大连理工大学,2009
[108]蒋东明.基于信用评级和违约概率的贷款定价研究：[D].天津：天津大学,2005
[109]杨继光 刘海龙 许友传.基于GCRM模型的信用经济资本测度和贷款定价研究[J].统计研究,2010,(7)：60-64
[110]么向华 蒋东明.基于简约型方法的商业银行信用贷款定价研究[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2007,6(3)：59-63
[111]庄新田 黄小原.基于信息不对称的银行贷款定价策略分析[J].系统工程,2002,20(3)：20-23
[112]王皓东 马勇 贾敏.利率市场化进程中的贷款定价模型[J].统计与决策,2007,(1)：98-100
[113]徐爱华.利率市场化条件下农村信用社贷款定价方法研究一湖南的现状考察与模式选择[J].财经理论与实践(双月刊),006,(5)：26-30
[114]李丽滢,刘钟钦.利率市场化条件下农村信用社的贷款定价研究[J].商业研究,2006,(23)：162-165
[115]詹原瑞 么向华.利率与违约过程相关的信用贷款定价[J].系统工程学报,2006,21(3)：254-259
[116]鲁爱民 林静姗 吴茜.小额贷款公司的利率定价问题研究[J].北方经济,2010,(9)：82-84
[117]李俊丽.我国个人征信体系的构建与应用研究：[D].泰安：山东农业大学,2007
[118]杨静.基于Logistic回归模型的农户信用等级研究：[D].西安：陕西师范大学,2008.
[119]于兆吉 胡祥培 毛强.电子商务环境下信用评级的一种新方法[J].控制与决策,2009,24(11)：1668-1672
[120]周振.构建农村信用社的农户信用评估体系.现代农业[J],009,(6)：177-179
[121]王树娟 霍学喜 何学松.构建农村信用社农户信用评级体系初探[J].金融理论与实践,2005,(17)：38-40
[122]高世原 彭灿.基于模糊综合评判法的中小信用担保机构评级研究[J].技术经济与与管理研究,2008,(6)：13-16
[123]吴晶妹 张颖 唐勤伟.基于农户信用特征的三维信用评价模型研究[J].财贸经济,2010,(9)：22-29
[124]杨继光.商业银行经济资本测度方法及其应用研究：[D].上海：上海交通大学,2009
[125]张子良.积极发展农业保险探索建立“信贷+保险”农村金融服务新模式[J].中国经贸导刊,2009,(9)：39
[126]方晓燕.贷款定价理论与实践探讨[J].价值工程,2006,(4)：123-126
[127]汪办兴.对Shibor基础的票据定价建模问题的思考[J].中国货币市场,2009,(3)：34-39
[128]刘彦文 管玲芳.基于期权博弈的商业银行贷款定价模型[J].统计与决策,2009,(2)：62-63
[128]朱志强 杨红员.建立以Shibor为基准的贴现利率定价机制研究[J].华北金融,2008,(6)：13-15
[129]曹霞 常玉春.利率市场化条件下贷款定价模式分析兼论贷款定价中的利率期限结构问题[J].湖南大学学报(社会科学版),2002,16(3)：117-120
[130]李学文.农村信用社贷款定价问题研究：[D].长沙：湖南农业大学,2008
[131]刘进宝 何广文.农村信用社贷款利率定价方法探析[J].调研世界,2006,(12)：9-11
[132]陈可辉.农信社贷款利率定价问题探讨：基于肇庆市的实践与思考[J].南方金融,2007,(7)：29-31
[133]鲁爱民 林静姗 吴茜.小额贷款公司的利率定价问题研究[J].北方经济,2010,(9)：82-84
[134]徐芳芳.我国农村金融服务体系的缺陷及完善：[D].长沙：中南大学,2007
[135]高忆红.金融支持新农村经济建设的思考与对策[J].金融理论与实 践,2010,(3)：119-120
[136]项继权操家齐.困局与突围：我国农户金融供需现状及政策建议—基于全国28个省市(自治区)抽样调查的分析[J].浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版),2011,(3)：1-10
[137]吴盛光.农村金融产品创新：品类、特点、困境与可持续之策[J].南方金融,2010,(4)：76-80
[138]李筠.农村金融产品和服务方式创新：实践经验与发展思路[J].南方金融,2010,(11)：8-11
[139]李延刚.我国农村金融产品和服务创新的现状与对策研究[J].中国乡镇企业会计,2009,(7)：58-59
[140]范子辰.我国农村金融需求与供给问题浅析[J].改革与开放,2009,(8)：49
[150]严璐.对开拓农村保险市场、促进农村保险事业发展的探讨[J].特区经济,2006,(8)：127-128
[160]李霄震.农村保险存在的弊端及建议[J].浙江金融,2007,(12)：50-51
[161]田吉生.农村保险市场发展策略研究—兼谈浙江农村保险[J].中国保险,2007,(12)：41-44
[147]管公明.培育农村保险消费群体[J].中国金融,2006,(11)：54-55
[148]彭石普.论农村保险市场的开拓[J].商业研究,2005,(7)：145-146
[149]丁霞颜鹏飞.农村保险市场创新发展探析[J].福建论坛,2010,(9)：16-20
[150]吴思王长征.农村保险市场营销模式创新—基于水平营销的视角[J].保险研究,2010,(4)：72-76
[151]李金安.我国农村保险发展问题探索[J].科技资讯,2007,(18)：239
[152]赵利梅.新形势下中国农村保险业的发展及其创新[J].农村经济,2006,(10)：60-61
[153]赵庆栋.山东省农村信用社中间业务流程再造研究：[D].济南：山东大学,2008
[154]张蕾.河北省农村信用社中间业务营销研究：[D].河北：河北大学,2010
[155]潘志刚.农村信用社中间业务：特点、制约因素及发展战略选择[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(1)：28-32
[156]康赟德 徐亨章.农村信用社中间业务发展的困难与对策[J].中国科技信息,2005,(23)：49-50
[157]杨代平龚卫东.农村信用社中间业务发展的障碍与策略[J].南方金融,2004,(1)：38-40
[158]田璐.农村信用社中间业务发展问题探析[J].企业导报,2010,(1)：168-169
[159]房小蔚.谈谈加快发展国有商业银行中间业务的必要性及对策[J].中华女子 学院山东分院学报,2001,(4)：50-53
[160]黄平恨.对农村信用社信贷风险管理的理性分析[J].金融与经济,2006,(12)：53-54
[161]雷春晓.论农村信用社信贷风险的控制[J].科技信息,2009,(29)：1188-1189
[162]宋魁.农村合作银行贷款风险控制研究[J].商场现代化,2010,(9)：186-187
[163]俞建新章明华.农村信用社信贷风险管理探讨[J].浙江金融,1998,(4)：38-39
[164]谢承恒.农村信用社信贷风险管理探析[J].当代经济,2010,(3)：28-29
[165]李文文.我国农村金融机构信贷风险管理的对策[J].山西财经大学学报,2010,32(2)：102
[166]钟声张坤.新形势下农村信用社信贷风险分析及对策[J].经济理论研究,2009,(6)：64
[167]孔荣.涉农小企业融资问题研究：[D].杨凌：西北农林科技大学,2002
[168]刘轶.县域中小企业融资与金融结构优化：以湖南为例：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2008
[169]宋晓静.农户融资特征及其影响因素分析—以江苏省宏图村为例：[D].南京：南京农业大学,2008
[170]聂国强.金融抑制下的农户信贷行为分析—以四川省邓昧市农村地区为例：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2009
[171]刘莉亚胡乃红李基礼柳永明骆玉鼎.农户融资现状及其成因分析—基于中国东部、中部、西部千社万户的调查[J].中国农村观察2009,(3)：2-11
[172]熊建国.中国农户融资的现状分析与民间金融一来自江西省上饶市的个案调查与思考[J].中国农村经济,2006,(3)：59-63
[173]刘刚.解决农业产业化龙头企业融资困难的思考[J].新西部,2009,(8)：28
[174]郑竑.论农村小额保险与农户小额信贷的结合[J].福建金融,2009,(6)：1 7-18
[175]年艳.浅析我国农业产业化发展现状[J].农业科技与信息,2009,(19)：10-11
[176]李文中.住房贷款研究：[D].北京：首都经贸大学,2004
[177]谢国.汽车消费贷款保证保险运行机制及风险防范研究：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2007
[178]王晓燕.我国银行保险发展模式的探讨：[D].大连：东北财经大学,2007
[179]孙浩.我国银行保险业务风险管理研究——以SN寿险公司为例：[D].天津：天津大学,2009
[180]王东胜.农村信贷+保险模式的可行性分析[J].新疆金融2009,(1)：39-42
[181]陈荣邦.农业保险与农村小额信贷协同发展问题研究[J].2009,(10)：39-42
[182]李喜梅.小额信贷与小额保险合作发展研究[J].经济问题.2010,(5)：95-97
[183]胡梦雅.中国银行保险业务的现状及发展对策：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2003
[184]独孤昌慧.银行保险及其效应分析：[D].吉林：吉林大学,2005
[185]邹新克.论银行保险的发展模式：[D].四川：四川大学,2005
[186]吴文星.延边银行保险业务发展现状及对策：[D].延吉：延边大学,2005
[187]张明珠.我国银行保险产品创新研究：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2009
[188]叶扬.“农村小额信贷,农村保险”模式的可行性分析[J].金融与经济,2008,(3)：75-76
[189]郑吉凯.中国农业政策性金融体系构建研究：[D].北京：北京工商大学,2007
[190]谭中明冯学峰.健全我国农业巨灾风险保险分散机制的探讨[J].金融与经济,2011,(3)：78-82
[191]唐婷婷.促进我国小额保险发展的政策思路探索：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2009
[192]黄华盈.西藏地区农牧业信贷与农业保险相连接的可行性分析[J].时代经贸,2007,5(82)：115-116
[193]周健.保险市场与农村信贷市场的对接模式研究[J].改革与战略,2009,25(189)：38-42
[194]吕萍孙琰华.国外农地转用价格的确定方法[J].中国土地科学,2004,18(3)：54-59
[195]徐琼英.我国银行保险的深层次发展：模式选择及风险防范：[D].成都：西南财经大学,2007
[196]曹青董战鲲.促进与完善银保合作[J].金融理论与实践,2004,(10)：44-45
[197]吴占权刘莎.反向抵押贷款：银保合作的新业务[J].河北金融,2006,(4)：20-22
[198]刘江林.加强银保合作促进共同发展——关于推进银行保险业合作发展的思考.2007,(10)：63-64
[199]叶扬.“农村小额信贷+农村保险”模式的可行性分析[J].金融与经济,2008,3.
[200]林杰.保险与农业信贷供求的“帕累托改进”[J].福建金融,2008,6.
[201]杨宜,杨泽云.农户信贷保证保险：解决农村信贷担保的新机制[J].改革与战略,2009,9.
[202]张丽霞.小额信贷可持续发展的思考-探析“小额信贷+保险”模式[J].科技创新月刊,2008,5.
[203]张子良.积极发展农业保险探索建立“信贷+保险”农村金融服务新模式[J].中国经贸导刊,2009,9.
[204]祁金星,杨煦.北海市银行业金融机构“信贷+保险”业务情况调查[J].区域金融研究,2009,3.
[205]潘石金.建立农村信贷资产保险保障机制初探[J].浙江金融,2004,1 0.
[206]郑竑.论农村小额保险与农户小额信贷的结合[J].福建金融,2009,9.
[207]吕秀萍,杨兆廷.农村保险拓展农村信贷抵押物研究[J].农村金融研究,2009,6.
[208]尹成远,任鹏充,陈伟华.农村小额保险与小额信贷结合发展及其模式探讨[J].现代财经,2010,3.
[209]中国人民银行肇庆市中心支行课题组.农户小额信贷保险实践[J].银行家,2006,10.
[210]卢成,王雅超.农业保险引入相互保险形式的可行性研究——基于已有案例的总结[J].安徽农业科学,2006,34.
[211]陈荣邦.农业保险与农村小额信贷协同发展问题研究[J].上海金融,2009,10.
[212]张浩,李前进,吴莹.农业保险与农村信贷互动机制研究[J].上海金融,2010,3.
[213]张森.浅析安徽省农村“信贷+保险”模式[J].经济研究导刊,2010,12.
[214]俞爱平,张军璞.浅析中国农村小额信贷保险[J].考试周刊,2008,22.
[215]郭永利,潘志恒.上海信贷保险直通农民合作社[J].中国保险,2010,4.
[216]喻晓.我国信贷保险制度建设的设想[J].湖南税务高等专科学校学报,2009,6.
[217]周健.保险市场与农村信贷市场的对接模式研究[J].改革与战略,2009,5.
[218]周慧.小额信贷保险初探[J].企业导报,2009,3.
[219]胡惊鸿.小额信贷保险的可行性分析[J].中国电子商务,2009,11.
[220]李喜.小额信贷与小额保险合作发展研究[J].经济问题,2010,5.
[221]石骏,魏灿秋.信合保险在信用社小额信贷及农村金融中的作用[J].中国农学通报,2006,1.
[222]陈泰名,孙强,张译文.小额信贷保险由乡村走向城镇的若干思考-从风险管理视角出发[J].中国集体经济.2010,1.
[223]王东胜.农村信贷+保险模式的可行性分析[J].新疆金融,2009,1.
[224]杨青坪.对汉中市涉农保险发展的分析[J].西安金融,2006,11.
[225]杜庆鑫.发展农村小额保险支持农村小额信贷持续健康发展[J].成人高教学刊,2008,5.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |