创业投资参与对创业板上市公司成长能力影响的实证研究
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摘要
创业板是一个全新的资本市场,我国创业板从1999年筹备设立到2009年最终成功开幕,一直备受人们关注,创业板的推出不仅丰富了我国多层次的资本市场,也缓解了高新技术创业型企业融资难的问题。随着创业板的开埠,一批批企业的上市,其背后的创投机构也成了最受关注的焦点。创业投资对中小企业尤其是高新技术创业型企业发展的推动作用是毋庸置疑的,它不仅能够为企业提供资金,还能通过对企业的监督、管理支持、提供网络资源等方式提高被投资企业的管理运营水平,因此创业投资对创业板公司综合能力的提升起着巨大的作用,从而创业投资对于高新技术产业发展、国家经济结构调整都具有十分重要的意义。
目前,国内外关于创业投资与企业成长领域的研究已取得了很多有价值的结论,但现有研究基本上都以创业投资业较为发达的国家为样本,针对像中国这样创业投资处于起步阶段、相关配套法规政策不完善、资本市场不健全国家的研究较少,来自发达国家的研究结论是否同样适用于中国呢?因此,本文在前人研究的基础上,以我国新兴的创业板市场中有创投参与的103家公司作为研究样本,试图通过研究创投机构的特征因素与创业板公司成长能力之间的关系,考察什么样的创投机构能够对企业发挥管理增值功能,从而促进了创业板公司的成长,以求对我国创业投资业以及创业板市场的进一步发展有所建议。本文采取实证研究的方式,从创投机构的声誉、持股比例、政府背景以及联合投资四个方面探讨了创投机构不同的属性特征与创业板公司成长性之间的关系,得出主要结论如下：
第一,政府背景、联合投资两项特征对创业板公司的成长能力有显著影响,即具有政府背景的创投机构、多家机构共同投资往往带来被投资公司的高成长；第二,创投机构的声誉机制在一定程度上发挥了作用,高声誉的创投机构更能促进被投资企业的成长,但是这一结果未完全通过检验,有待今后研究进一步验证；第三,创投机构的高持股比例并不能促进创业板公司成长能力的提升。
目前国内外研究很少探讨创业投资机构对创业企业上市后的作用,因此本文是一个初步的尝试,本文的研究结果对于政府以及上市公司来说均具有重要的启示作用。但是本文的样本数量受限,另外在客观数据获取、研究方法选择等方面都存在一些不足,还有待在今后的研究中不断完善。
The Chinext is a brand new capital market. China's Chinext had been preparing establishing in1999, and eventually successfully opened in2009. It always got people's concern. The established of Chinext not only enriched the different layers of the China capital market, but also released the problem that the Hi-tech creative companies are hard to get development fund. Along with the Chinext opened, lots of companies got public and China's VC industry arrived to a peak. It is no doubt that the promotion effect from VC is obviously for SMEs, especially for the Hi-tech companies. VC not only provides the funds, but also can improve SMEs operation capability from inspecting the company, management supporting, offering network resources and so on. In a word, VC is playing the very important role in enhancing the comprehensive capability of the Chinext listed companies. As a result, the research on VC has the great worth for the Hi-tech industry's development and the adjustment of the national economic industry.
Currently, there are lots of valuable conclusion in the field of the relationship between VC and company's growth and development, whatever aboard and at home. But lots of the researches are based on the country which the VC industry is more mature. The researches focus on the country like China which VC industry is just on the beginning, the relative law and policy in not mature, the capital market is imperfect are rare. Whether the conclusions from the developed country are fit for China's market status, it is a question. So this paper will base the conclusion of the existing result, and pick up103companies which listed on Chinext also invested by VC as the research sample. Try to find out the relative between different characteristics of VC and the growth capacity of the Chinext listed companies. Then get the results in whether China's VC promoted the Hi-tech companies growth, and hopes can give some further advices for VC industry and Chinext.
This dissertation adopts the empirical research, came to the conclusion on discussing the relationship of Chinext listed companies and different characteristics of VC from four aspects:VC's reputation, Shareholding ratio, government background of the company and joint venture.
The research show:Firstly, government background of the company and joint venture has the significant influent on Chinext's company. This kind of companies always has stronger growth capacity; Secondly, the mechanism of VC reputation makes the effect in an extent. The well reputation VC can promote development. But this result has not completely passed the examination, needs more data to prove in the further research; Thirdly, the high shareholding ratio of VC cannot promote Chinext's company' growth capacity.
Currently, there are limited research in the area of the VC's effect on the Hi-tech company after published; therefore, this research is a preliminary attempt. The result of this paper has the important enlightenment for both government and published companies. But limited by the sample quantities, and also some the inadequate in data and methods selecting, will make further effort for the constantly improves.
目前,国内外关于创业投资与企业成长领域的研究已取得了很多有价值的结论,但现有研究基本上都以创业投资业较为发达的国家为样本,针对像中国这样创业投资处于起步阶段、相关配套法规政策不完善、资本市场不健全国家的研究较少,来自发达国家的研究结论是否同样适用于中国呢?因此,本文在前人研究的基础上,以我国新兴的创业板市场中有创投参与的103家公司作为研究样本,试图通过研究创投机构的特征因素与创业板公司成长能力之间的关系,考察什么样的创投机构能够对企业发挥管理增值功能,从而促进了创业板公司的成长,以求对我国创业投资业以及创业板市场的进一步发展有所建议。本文采取实证研究的方式,从创投机构的声誉、持股比例、政府背景以及联合投资四个方面探讨了创投机构不同的属性特征与创业板公司成长性之间的关系,得出主要结论如下：
第一,政府背景、联合投资两项特征对创业板公司的成长能力有显著影响,即具有政府背景的创投机构、多家机构共同投资往往带来被投资公司的高成长；第二,创投机构的声誉机制在一定程度上发挥了作用,高声誉的创投机构更能促进被投资企业的成长,但是这一结果未完全通过检验,有待今后研究进一步验证；第三,创投机构的高持股比例并不能促进创业板公司成长能力的提升。
目前国内外研究很少探讨创业投资机构对创业企业上市后的作用,因此本文是一个初步的尝试,本文的研究结果对于政府以及上市公司来说均具有重要的启示作用。但是本文的样本数量受限,另外在客观数据获取、研究方法选择等方面都存在一些不足,还有待在今后的研究中不断完善。
The Chinext is a brand new capital market. China's Chinext had been preparing establishing in1999, and eventually successfully opened in2009. It always got people's concern. The established of Chinext not only enriched the different layers of the China capital market, but also released the problem that the Hi-tech creative companies are hard to get development fund. Along with the Chinext opened, lots of companies got public and China's VC industry arrived to a peak. It is no doubt that the promotion effect from VC is obviously for SMEs, especially for the Hi-tech companies. VC not only provides the funds, but also can improve SMEs operation capability from inspecting the company, management supporting, offering network resources and so on. In a word, VC is playing the very important role in enhancing the comprehensive capability of the Chinext listed companies. As a result, the research on VC has the great worth for the Hi-tech industry's development and the adjustment of the national economic industry.
Currently, there are lots of valuable conclusion in the field of the relationship between VC and company's growth and development, whatever aboard and at home. But lots of the researches are based on the country which the VC industry is more mature. The researches focus on the country like China which VC industry is just on the beginning, the relative law and policy in not mature, the capital market is imperfect are rare. Whether the conclusions from the developed country are fit for China's market status, it is a question. So this paper will base the conclusion of the existing result, and pick up103companies which listed on Chinext also invested by VC as the research sample. Try to find out the relative between different characteristics of VC and the growth capacity of the Chinext listed companies. Then get the results in whether China's VC promoted the Hi-tech companies growth, and hopes can give some further advices for VC industry and Chinext.
This dissertation adopts the empirical research, came to the conclusion on discussing the relationship of Chinext listed companies and different characteristics of VC from four aspects:VC's reputation, Shareholding ratio, government background of the company and joint venture.
The research show:Firstly, government background of the company and joint venture has the significant influent on Chinext's company. This kind of companies always has stronger growth capacity; Secondly, the mechanism of VC reputation makes the effect in an extent. The well reputation VC can promote development. But this result has not completely passed the examination, needs more data to prove in the further research; Thirdly, the high shareholding ratio of VC cannot promote Chinext's company' growth capacity.
Currently, there are limited research in the area of the VC's effect on the Hi-tech company after published; therefore, this research is a preliminary attempt. The result of this paper has the important enlightenment for both government and published companies. But limited by the sample quantities, and also some the inadequate in data and methods selecting, will make further effort for the constantly improves.
引文
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[2]陈玉呈、王苏生,创业投资IPO偏低定价与退出绩效实证研究[J],证券市场导报,2007,第10期。
[3]成思危,积极稳妥地推进我国的风险投资事业[J],管理世界,1999,第1期。
[4]成思危,依靠风险投资推进高技术产业化[J],中国高新技术企业,2000,第2期。
[5]党兴华、贺利平、王雷,基于典型相关的风险企业控制权结构与企业成长能力的实证研究[J],软科学,2008,第4期。
[6]侯建仁、李强、曾勇,风险投资、股权结构与创业绩效[J],研究与发展管理,2009,第21卷第4期。
[7]刘纪鹏、付宇,创业板家族企业一股独大比发行制度不合理更可怕[J],证券时报,2011-05-19。
[8]刘建钧,创业投资原理与方略：对“风险投资”范式的反思与超越[M],北京：中国经济出版社,2002。
[9]刘正仁,创业投资风险评估决策准则之研究[D],硕士学位论文,国立高雄第一科技大学,2006。
[10]陆正华、梁彤缨、陈锐锋,创业投资对IPO抑价程度影响的实证分析[C],第三届(2008)中国管理学年会论文集,2008。
[11]齐绍洲、罗威,风险投资基金对企业治理结构的影响[J],证券市场导报,2004,第4期。
[12]钱苹、张炜,我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素[J],经济研究,2007,第5期。
[13]盛立军,风险投资操作机制与策略[M],上海：上海远东出版社,1999：137-146。
[14]唐云舒、徐泰玲、谈毅,风险投资认证影响新股发行吗——来自香港创业板的经验证据[J],证券市场导报：中小企业与创业板研究,2008,第11期。
[15]王娟,风险投资介入中小企业公司治理的过程与效果研究[D],硕士学位论文,浙江财经学院,2010。
[16]王敏,创业投资机构行为、企业能力与高新技术企业成长研究[D],博士学位论文,浙江大学,2009。
[17]吴斌、黄明峰,风险投资企业高管人力资本特征与经营绩效：来自深市中小板的经验数据[J],山西财经大学学报,2010,第3期。
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