风险投资参与公司治理对业绩影响研究
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摘要
由于信息不对称性以及道德风险的存在,风险投资往往介入风险企业治理,以降低不确定性风险,对风险企业进行监管。本文以深市创业板和中小板上市公司为样本,对风险投资介入风险企业公司治理的效果进行研究。
首先分析风险投资参与公司治理对风险企业治理结构的影响,由实证检验结果发现,风险投资参与治理不能完全改善风险企业公司治理结构。风险投资参与公司治理能够对两职合一、高管平均持股比重、高管平均薪酬以及第一大股东持股比重产生影响,但是对独立董事比重没有影响,且对两职合一的影响与预期不一致。
在此基础上,从盈利能力和成长性角度分析分析风险投资参与公司治理对业绩的影响,实证结果显示,风险投资参与公司治理对于业绩有一定的提升作用,上市当年风险投资更为关注的是盈利能力,对成长性的关注正在下降。风险投资董事比重、高管平均持股比重、高管平均薪酬的增加在一定程度上有利于业绩增长,两职合一、第一大股东持股对业绩有抑制作用,而风险投资监事比重对盈利能力具有显著促进作用,对成长性作用不明显。此外,风险投资特征对业绩也具有一定的影响。经检验,风险投资持股期限对业绩无显著影响,政府背景对盈利能力具有抑制作用,对成长性具有促进作用,同时风险投资机构之间搭便车现象严重,风险投资之间没有达成很好的协作。
从整体上讲,风险投资参与公司治理对风险企业治理结构和业绩具有一定的促进作用,但还存在着许多不足,说明我国风险投资业还有待完善。应完善相关法律法规的建设,加强风险投资相关人才培养,同时风险投资机构也应加强自身能力建设。
Due to the information asymmetry and moral hazard exists, venture capitals usually supervise venture corporate by involving in corporate governance in order to reduce uncertainty risk. This paper analyzes the effect of venture capital involving in the SME (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) and GEM (Growth Enterprises Market) board's governance.
Firstly, we analyze the impact of venture capital involving in governance on the governance structure of SME and GEM board. The research shows that venture capital involving in governance doesn't play an effective role in improving all parts of governance structure. Venture capital involving in governance do influence the CEO duality, the average proportion of executives shares, average salary of the top three executives and the largest shareholding, while have no impact on the independent director proportion. What's more, the impact on CEO duality is inconsistent with expectation.
Secondly, we test empirically the impact of venture capital involving in governance on the entrepreneurial performance from the perspectives of the profitability and the growth rate respectively. The regression results show that venture capital involving in governance can enhance the performance to a certain extent, and in the IPO year, venture capital focus more on return on profitability, and pays less attention on growth rate comparatively. The proportion of venture capital directors, the average share proportion of executives' shares and the average salary of the top three executives places a positive impact on corporate performance to some extent, while CEO duality and the largest shareholding may restrain performance. The proportion of venture capital supervisors could significantly promote profitability, while it has not much impact on the growth rate. In addition, the duration of venture investors' participation in the firm doesn't affect corporate performance. Government background may deteriorate the profitability, while may encourage growth rate. Free-riding is serious in Syndication; venture capitals don't reach a good collaboration.
Totally, venture capital participating in corporate governance plays a certain role in improving governance structure and promoting performance. However, there are still many deficiencies which indicates China's venture capital industry needs perfect greatly. As a result of that, it's calling for construction of relative laws and regulations, cultivation of VC talents, while at the same time, VC organizations need to enhance capacity of there own.
首先分析风险投资参与公司治理对风险企业治理结构的影响,由实证检验结果发现,风险投资参与治理不能完全改善风险企业公司治理结构。风险投资参与公司治理能够对两职合一、高管平均持股比重、高管平均薪酬以及第一大股东持股比重产生影响,但是对独立董事比重没有影响,且对两职合一的影响与预期不一致。
在此基础上,从盈利能力和成长性角度分析分析风险投资参与公司治理对业绩的影响,实证结果显示,风险投资参与公司治理对于业绩有一定的提升作用,上市当年风险投资更为关注的是盈利能力,对成长性的关注正在下降。风险投资董事比重、高管平均持股比重、高管平均薪酬的增加在一定程度上有利于业绩增长,两职合一、第一大股东持股对业绩有抑制作用,而风险投资监事比重对盈利能力具有显著促进作用,对成长性作用不明显。此外,风险投资特征对业绩也具有一定的影响。经检验,风险投资持股期限对业绩无显著影响,政府背景对盈利能力具有抑制作用,对成长性具有促进作用,同时风险投资机构之间搭便车现象严重,风险投资之间没有达成很好的协作。
从整体上讲,风险投资参与公司治理对风险企业治理结构和业绩具有一定的促进作用,但还存在着许多不足,说明我国风险投资业还有待完善。应完善相关法律法规的建设,加强风险投资相关人才培养,同时风险投资机构也应加强自身能力建设。
Due to the information asymmetry and moral hazard exists, venture capitals usually supervise venture corporate by involving in corporate governance in order to reduce uncertainty risk. This paper analyzes the effect of venture capital involving in the SME (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) and GEM (Growth Enterprises Market) board's governance.
Firstly, we analyze the impact of venture capital involving in governance on the governance structure of SME and GEM board. The research shows that venture capital involving in governance doesn't play an effective role in improving all parts of governance structure. Venture capital involving in governance do influence the CEO duality, the average proportion of executives shares, average salary of the top three executives and the largest shareholding, while have no impact on the independent director proportion. What's more, the impact on CEO duality is inconsistent with expectation.
Secondly, we test empirically the impact of venture capital involving in governance on the entrepreneurial performance from the perspectives of the profitability and the growth rate respectively. The regression results show that venture capital involving in governance can enhance the performance to a certain extent, and in the IPO year, venture capital focus more on return on profitability, and pays less attention on growth rate comparatively. The proportion of venture capital directors, the average share proportion of executives' shares and the average salary of the top three executives places a positive impact on corporate performance to some extent, while CEO duality and the largest shareholding may restrain performance. The proportion of venture capital supervisors could significantly promote profitability, while it has not much impact on the growth rate. In addition, the duration of venture investors' participation in the firm doesn't affect corporate performance. Government background may deteriorate the profitability, while may encourage growth rate. Free-riding is serious in Syndication; venture capitals don't reach a good collaboration.
Totally, venture capital participating in corporate governance plays a certain role in improving governance structure and promoting performance. However, there are still many deficiencies which indicates China's venture capital industry needs perfect greatly. As a result of that, it's calling for construction of relative laws and regulations, cultivation of VC talents, while at the same time, VC organizations need to enhance capacity of there own.
引文
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[37]Dushnitsky G, Lenox M. J. When Do Firms Undertake R&D by Investing in New Ventures? Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(10):947-965.
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[2]陈强.论创业板市场与中国风险投资的互动.当代财经,2001(5)：46-48.
[3]陈艳红,程桂花.风险资本与高新技术企业的公司治理.商业经济,2009(9)：74-75
[4]陈玉罡,王苏生.创业投资IPO偏低定价与退出绩效实证研究.证券市场导报2007,(10)：60-64
[5]党兴华,贺利平.基于典型相关的风险企业控制权结构与企业成长能力的实证研究.软科学,2008,22(4)：136-144.
[6]邓尧刚.风险投资对于上市公司发行市盈率的影响——基于创业板上市公司的实证分析.改革与开放,2010(18)：52-56.
[7]豆建民.风险投资：基于企业治理结构的分析.财经研究,2000,26(10)：23-29.
[8]侯建仁,李强,曾勇.风险投资、股权结构与创业绩效.研究与发展管理,2009,21(4)：10-19.
[9]胡婉丽,汤书昆,肖向兵.上市公司高官薪酬和企业绩效关系研究.运筹与管理,2004(6)：118-123.
[10]靳明,王娟.风险投资介入中小企业公司治理的机理与效果研究.财经论丛,2010(11)：84-90.
[11]李金龙,费方域,谈毅.不完全合同、创新与联合投资.财经科学,2006：74-80.
[12]刘国丰.中国风险投资对被投资公司治理的影响研究——以中小板上市公司为例.陕西农业科学,2009,55(5)：144-146.
[13]刘延明.美、日、中风险投资公司支撑环境比较研究.长春：吉林大学硕士学位论文,2004.
[14]罗铮.发展我国风险投资业的对策建议.商业研究,2002(15)：4-6.
[15]吕长江,王力斌.上市公司董事会设置与公司业绩的实证研究.财经问题研究,2004(10)：65-72.
[16]谈毅,叶岑.风险投资在公司治理结构中的效率分析.中国软科学,2001(4)：46-51.
[17]王春红,张洁.建设我国创业板市场研究.价值工程,2005,24(3)：3-6.
[18]熊波,陈柳.论风险投资与高新技术企业公司治理结构.当代财经,2006(4)：65-69.
[19]肖阳,李爱平.高科技产业发展与风险投资的治理机制.管理科学,2003,16(6)：72-76.
[20]向锐,冯建.董事会特征与公司经营绩效的关系.财经科学,2008(11)：91-99.
[21]谢科范,彭华涛,谢冰.联合投资的风险不守恒分析.财经理论与实践,2004(3)：43-46.
[22]徐光宇,陈德棉,徐光伟.风险投资企业战略联盟管理研究.科学管理研究,2004, 22(6)：112-115.
[23]杨新立,杨德礼.风险资本联合投资的激励契约设计.中国管理科学,2007,1(5)：107-111.
[24]翟丽,鹿溪,宋学明.上市公司参与公司风险投资的收益及其影响因素实证研究.研究与发展管理,2010,22(5)：104-112,133
[25]张丰,张健.风险投资家背景与创业企业经营绩效关系分析.价值工程,2009(4)：146-149.
[26]赵息,杜玉鹏.公司治理对高管薪酬激励敏感度的影响.软科学,2009,23(11)92-95,113.
[27]赵炎,卢颖.风险投资与上市公司经营业绩之间的关系——以我国中小企业板上市公司为样本.科技进步与对策,2009,26(23)：108-111.
[28]曾蔚,游迭明,刘爱东,联合风险投资的价值溢出机理与案例分析.研究与发展管理,2008,20(4)：101-105.
[29]曾文强,李洪成,王嘉毅.中国商界.风险投资和IPO抑价实证研究,2010(1)：3-4
[30]周佰成,王北星.中国上市公司治理、绩效与高管薪酬相关性研究.数理统计与管理,2007,26(4)：669-675.
[31]Admati A.R, Pfleiderer P. Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists. Journal of Finance,1994,49(2):371-402.
[32]Baker, M. and P. A. Gompers. The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering. Journal of Law & Economics,2003:569-598.
[33]Berglof, E. A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance. Journal of Law Economics &Organization,1994,10(2):247-67.
[34]Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M. and Hellmann, T. Who Are the Active Investors? Evidence from Venture Capital. Journal of Financial Economics,2008,89(3):488-512.
[35]Bouresli A.K, W. N. Davidson and F. A. Abdulsalam. Role of Venture Capitalists in IPO Corporate Governance and Operating Performance. Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics,2002:71-80.
[36]Cornelli, F. and Karakas, O.Private Equity and Corporate Governance:Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards? Working Paper (2010).
[37]Dushnitsky G, Lenox M. J. When Do Firms Undertake R&D by Investing in New Ventures? Strategic Management Journal,2005,26(10):947-965.
[38]Faccio M, Lang L. The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporate. Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.
[39]Garry D Bruton, David Ahlsrton. An Institutional View of China's Venture Capital Industry:Explaining the Differences between China and the West. Journey of Business Venturing,2003:223-259.
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