我国创业企业融资模式创新研究
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摘要
随知识经济时代的到来,创业企业正在成为决定一个国家和地区经济竞争实力发展的重要因素之一。但创业企业融资渠道不畅问题却一直阻碍着我国创业企业的发展。从我国风险投资业的发展来看,风险投资并没有发挥其应有的作用,导致我国创业企业仍面临融资渠道不畅这一发展瓶颈。因此,研究如何通过风险投资解决创业企业融资不畅问题有重大意义。
本文根据信息不对称理论和代理成本理论,在分析了我国创业企业融资现状之后,找出影响我国创业企业融资的主要因素。在对风险投资和创业企业进行信息不对称分析之后,发现道德风险问题和逆向选择问题是导致目前我国创业企业难以获得风险投资的主要原因。在分析了孵化器的特征功能之后,发现孵化器具备审核机制、增值服务和监督机制,而这三个功能正是风险投资需要用于解决与创业企业之间信息不对称的功能。因此,本文进一步分析了孵化器和风险投资融合的利弊之后,发现双方具有多个对接融合点,各自功能的互补使得双方的融合利远大于弊。因此,本文构建了一个创业企业融资新模式——风险投资和孵化器的融合,并对这一模式进行了博弈分析,从理论上证明了该模式的合理性。在此基础上,本文提出了五个研究假设,将风险投资、孵化器和创业企业融资作为三个变量构建了一个概念模型,并对样本数据进行结构方程模型分析,检验结果表明这一融资创新模式能够有效解决创业企业融资渠道不畅问题。
From the history of economic development in all of countries, starting a new undertaking is a source force for promoting national economic development. With the coming of knowledge-based economy, the enterprises that start new undertakings are becoming one of the important factors which decide the development of economic competitiveness in a country or a region. It is learnt from the development of Chinese VC industry that VC doesn't work, which results in a development bottleneck, that is, the difficulty of financing still exists among the enterprises that start new undertakings in China. Therefore, it has great significance to conduct the research on how to solve the problem of financing existing among these enterprises.
After analyzing the situation of financing existing in the enterprises mentioned above, the author of this thesis adopts asymmetric information theory and agency costs theory to find out the main factor which has an effect on financing of these enterprises. And, VC and these enterprises are analyzed by means of asymmetric information. Then, it is found that the main reasons which make these enterprises hard to obtain VC are the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection problem. After analyzing the characteristics of incubator function, the author of this thesis finds incubator having audit mechanism, value-added services and monitoring mechanisms which are the VC needed to address and Venture asymmetric information between functions. The author of this thesis also analyzes the characteristics and functions of incubator, the advantages and disadvantages of fusion of incubators and VC. The result of the analysis shows that there are several docking fusion points between incubator and VC, which make the two complement each other in function. As far as the fusion of incubator and VC is concerned, the advantage far outweighs the disadvantage. Therefore, an innovative model, the fusion of VC and incubator, is constructed. And this model has been put to test. On this basis, the paper proposes four hypotheses, VC, the financing of venture enterprise and incubator as the three variables constructed a conceptual model; obtained through the survey sample data analysis, structural equation modeling, found that the new model can effectively help start-ups access to financing. The result of which indicates that the model can solve the problem of financing effectively.
本文根据信息不对称理论和代理成本理论,在分析了我国创业企业融资现状之后,找出影响我国创业企业融资的主要因素。在对风险投资和创业企业进行信息不对称分析之后,发现道德风险问题和逆向选择问题是导致目前我国创业企业难以获得风险投资的主要原因。在分析了孵化器的特征功能之后,发现孵化器具备审核机制、增值服务和监督机制,而这三个功能正是风险投资需要用于解决与创业企业之间信息不对称的功能。因此,本文进一步分析了孵化器和风险投资融合的利弊之后,发现双方具有多个对接融合点,各自功能的互补使得双方的融合利远大于弊。因此,本文构建了一个创业企业融资新模式——风险投资和孵化器的融合,并对这一模式进行了博弈分析,从理论上证明了该模式的合理性。在此基础上,本文提出了五个研究假设,将风险投资、孵化器和创业企业融资作为三个变量构建了一个概念模型,并对样本数据进行结构方程模型分析,检验结果表明这一融资创新模式能够有效解决创业企业融资渠道不畅问题。
From the history of economic development in all of countries, starting a new undertaking is a source force for promoting national economic development. With the coming of knowledge-based economy, the enterprises that start new undertakings are becoming one of the important factors which decide the development of economic competitiveness in a country or a region. It is learnt from the development of Chinese VC industry that VC doesn't work, which results in a development bottleneck, that is, the difficulty of financing still exists among the enterprises that start new undertakings in China. Therefore, it has great significance to conduct the research on how to solve the problem of financing existing among these enterprises.
After analyzing the situation of financing existing in the enterprises mentioned above, the author of this thesis adopts asymmetric information theory and agency costs theory to find out the main factor which has an effect on financing of these enterprises. And, VC and these enterprises are analyzed by means of asymmetric information. Then, it is found that the main reasons which make these enterprises hard to obtain VC are the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection problem. After analyzing the characteristics of incubator function, the author of this thesis finds incubator having audit mechanism, value-added services and monitoring mechanisms which are the VC needed to address and Venture asymmetric information between functions. The author of this thesis also analyzes the characteristics and functions of incubator, the advantages and disadvantages of fusion of incubators and VC. The result of the analysis shows that there are several docking fusion points between incubator and VC, which make the two complement each other in function. As far as the fusion of incubator and VC is concerned, the advantage far outweighs the disadvantage. Therefore, an innovative model, the fusion of VC and incubator, is constructed. And this model has been put to test. On this basis, the paper proposes four hypotheses, VC, the financing of venture enterprise and incubator as the three variables constructed a conceptual model; obtained through the survey sample data analysis, structural equation modeling, found that the new model can effectively help start-ups access to financing. The result of which indicates that the model can solve the problem of financing effectively.
引文
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