政府资产负债管理风险
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摘要
欧洲主权债务危机指发端于希腊,蔓延至爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利(简称“欧洲五国”)的债务危机。债务危机是金融危机的普遍形式之一,大多数以债务违约或债务重组的形式告终。以“欧洲五国”为代表的欧洲地区出现主权债务危机,最直接的原因是政府资产负债管理不当导致不能偿还到期债务。本文以欧洲主权债务危机为切入点,运用财务管理理论和分析方法,系统分析了“欧洲五国”发生主权债务危机背后的政府资产负债管理风险问题,特别是政府债务风险问题,论证了“欧洲五国”政府负债积累是长期经济发展模式失衡以及脱离实际推行“福利国家”模式的结果,同时,收付实现制的政府会计模式虽然不是导致主权债务危机爆发的直接原因,但是在希腊等国家爆发债务危机过程中“推波助斓”,是危机爆发的“重要推手”。这对我国加强政府资产负债管理、加快政府会计改革具有重要借鉴意义,这正是本文研究的理论意义和现实意义。
本文以现代经济学、金融学、会计学的理论基础,综合运用历史分析法、对比分析法、理论分析法及实证分析法等方法,从多个视角对欧债危机的成因进行剖析。本文的主要贡献包括：首先,对“欧洲五国”政府资产负债管理风险进行了量化分析,并将“欧洲五国”主权债务危机置于全球金融危机背景下,分析了资产负债风险从家庭到金融机构,从美国到欧洲,从金融机构到政府部门的传导机制,从政府资产负债管理风险视角分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。借用修正的蒙代尔-弗莱明模型进一步分析了“欧洲五国”资产负债管理风险的影响因素对主权债务危机的影响,指出导致“欧洲五国”长期债务存量持续提高的主要因素有两个：一是欧洲国家国际收支持续逆差,二是扩张性财政政策导致的财政赤字。与此同时,长期债务的利息支付又通过经常账户加剧国际收支恶化,导致进一步的借债,债务的持续增加导致国家主权信用风险的持续升高,面对资本的流出,只有提高利率来吸引资本流入,但是当利率的升高远远超出市场预期时,利率对资本流动就变为负弹性,也就是说,无论多高的利率都无法阻挡资本的流出,此时政府主权债务危机就发生了；其次,采用计量经济理论中的PVAR模型,通过回归检验、脉冲响应分析和方差分解等方法对资产负债管理风险对欧洲主权债务危机的影响进行实证检验,证实了不合理经济结构造成的经常账户赤字以及高福利导致的政府财政赤字,是引起“欧洲五国”政府资产负债表出现风险,主权债务规模不断上升,并最终导致主权债务危机的重要原因。本文进而提出以下观点：导致希腊等国长期经常帐户赤字和财政赤字的根本原因不在于外部,而在于其内部不可持续的经济社会发展模式,具体包括不可持续的经济发展模式和福利国家模式；第三,从政府会计角度分析了会计对欧债危机的“推波助澜”作用。“会计是反映性的”,从会计角度看,欧洲主权债务危机的爆发在很大程度上是因为政府管理者利用政府会计信息系统的缺陷提供了虚假的会计信息,逃过了监督者的监管,使得风险逐渐积累,并最终酿成了灾难性后果。尽管以权责发生制为基础的政府会计改革也许不一定能直接解决债务危机,但它却一定能给政府财务状况提供更加准确的会计信息,因此欧洲国家的政府会计应该尝试采用权责发生制改革；第四,应用宏观财务理论,对三份关于中国政府资产负债表的研究报告进行分析,提出我国政府资产负债表面临的潜在风险,并归纳总结了我国政府资产负债管理存在潜在风险的根本原因是中国固有的发展模式,对我国发展模式面临的现实困境和挑战,以及如何保持可持续性进行了系统分析,进而提出了具有针对性的政策建议。
本文的主要内容包括：
第一,运用财务理论,通过对“欧洲五国”政府资产负债表的分析揭示政府资产负债管理的风险问题,认为欧洲主权债务危机爆发的征兆在于失衡的政府资产负债表,表现为主权债务的大量积累,国家负债持续超过总资产,国家净资产持续表现为负数。本文接着进一步揭示了“欧洲五国”的主权债务为什么会持续积累以致引起主权债务危机。通过蒙代尔-弗莱明模型分析,本文认为希腊等国长期债务的持续升高主要有两方面因素：一是经常账户赤字持续增加,二是财政赤字持续增加。
第二,通过比较分析,本文进一步认为导致希腊等国政府资产负债管理风险以及长期经常帐户赤字和财政赤字的根本原因不在于外部因素,而在于其内部不可持续的经济社会发展模式。欧洲国家的经济社会发展模式可以细分为北欧模式、莱茵模式、盎格鲁一撒克逊模式和地中海模式四种。在本次欧洲主权债务危机中,地中海(南欧)模式国家属于“重灾区”,而北欧模式和莱茵模式国家的经济状况良好,不仅没有发生主权债务危机,而且发挥着救助南欧国家的作用。欧洲主权债务危机不仅仅是债务危机、货币危机、银行业危机和产业结构危机,就其根本原因而言,更是南欧国家的经济社会发展模式危机。
第三,从经济发展模式角度分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。欧洲经济发展模式的特征主要体现在内部不均衡,具体而言就是“欧洲五国”的经济竞争力弱、产业结构失衡、创新能力差以及经济的内向化趋势明显,是欧元区的“非核心国家”,而“莱茵模式”构成了欧元区的“核心国家”。“核心国家”处于中心地位,而“非核心国家”处于依附地位。在两者的竞争中,“核心国家”追求的是出口导向型经济增长政策,即以牺牲非核心国家的经济平衡和债务积累为代价的政策,这导致了“核心国家”的经常账户盈余以及“非核心国家”的经常账户赤字。“非核心国家”政府部门为了摆脱不利竞争,通过大量增加开支来刺激经济增长,这不可避免的导致预算赤字和债务积累,这种不平衡的发展模式最终导致欧洲国家政府资产负债管理风险和主权债务危机的爆发。
第四,从“福利国家”模式分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。“欧洲五国”虽然经济发展水平相对德法等欧盟核心国家不高,但属于欧洲“福利国家”模式,特别是加入欧元区之后,“欧洲五国”的福利赶超特征十分明显,支撑福利赶超的来源有两个：一是公共借贷,二是欧盟援助。用“适度”的社会保障水平衡量,“欧洲五国”普遍存在社会保障支出水平“超度”现象,希腊的适度社会保障水平为13.9%,但是实际社会保障水平为21.3%,超过适度水平53%。爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利的实际社会保障水平也都超过适度水平50%-80%不等。“欧洲五国”的社会保障水平“超度”也可以从社会保障支出的增长变化中得到印证。从2007年到2010年,希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利税收收入分别下降-4.0%、-30.6%、-5.4%、-19.6%和-3.2%,但是社会保障支出却分别上升18.2%、23.9%、21.0%、29.6%和12.2%。“超度”的社会保障水平不仅会使国家财政入不敷出,而且对经济发展还会起到消极作用,抬高劳动力成本、导致产业转移和产业空心化、降低储蓄率、抑制经济活力,经济增长受限致使财政收入来源越来越少,财政支出则越来越重,导致政府资产负债表风险积聚,债务负担越来越重,最终走向了主权债务危机。
第五,从欧洲政府会计模式分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。“会计是反映性的”,政府资产负债表风险管理需要政府会计提供能够真实反映国家资产、负债等的信息,为及时有效对政府资产负债表风险进行控制提供保障。但是,希腊等国政府管理者却利用欧盟政府会计信息系统的缺陷提供了虚假的会计信息,逃过了监督者的监管,使得风险逐渐积累,并最终酿成了灾难性后果。尽管希腊等国实行以权责发生制为基础的政府会计改革也许不一定能直接解决债务危机,但它却一定能给政府财务状况提供更加准确的会计信息,预防债务危机的发生,因此国际会计师联合会鼓励每个国家都要尝试采用权责发生制改革,同时改革政府会计信息披露也十分必要。
第六,分析了欧债危机对我国的启示和借鉴。就政府资产负债表分析,我国当前和未来一段时期的宏观财务状况可以表述为：近则无忧,远则堪虞。但是,欧债危机反映的政府资产负债管理风险以及经济社会发展模式危机,对中国经济转型升级及加快调整发展模式具有重要的启示意义：一是改变经济和社会发展模式刻不容缓,中国要告别非平衡增长模式,调整发展模式,必须以降低整个经济体系运转、社会体系运转对增长速度的依赖为突破口；二是深化改革,注重经济社会协调性发展；三是加强对政府融资平台的监管,有效控制中国政府债务风险；四是因地制宜、量力而行,建立符合中国国情的福利模式；五是改革政府会计,改进政府资产负债信息披露。
European sovereign debt crisis refers to the crisis originated in Greece, developed in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (hereinafter called "PUGS"). Debt crisis is a widespread form of the financial crisis, most of which ended in debt default and debt restructuring. The direct reason of the sovereign debt crises occurred in Europe is the risk of assets and liabilities management. The dissertation analyzes the debt crisis in Europe from the perspective of finance and accounting, and argues that the government assets and liabilities management risk,which caused by the economy and society development model and welfare state model are the main causes of the crisis. Meanwhile government accounting model based on cash basis is not the root cause of the crisis, but one of the important causes. China should learn from the crisis, accelerate the transformation of economic development pattern, therefore, this study has important practical and theoretical significance.
This dissertation is based on theoretical foundation of modern economics, finance, and use historical, comparative, theoretical and empirical analysis methods comprehensively to analyze on the related issues of European sovereign debt crisis. The main contributions of this dissertation includes the following:first of all, analyze the balance sheet of PⅡGS, and then construct the analyzing framework of the crisis based on the Mundell-Fleming Model to carry on the analysis of the crisis formation mechanism, and also explore the role which economic development pattern plays in the formation of the crisis. Next, this dissertation adopts PVAR model in econometrics'theory, to carry on an empirical test of the formation mechanism of the European sovereign debt crisis through regression test, impulse response analysis and variance decomposing method, and confirms the conclusion that the current account deficit caused by unreasonable economic structure as well as the government financial deficit caused by the high welfare are the main and root reason for the rising sovereign debt, and ultimately lead to a sovereign debt crisis. This dissertation then puts forward that, the root cause of the long-term current account deficit and fiscal deficit in Greece and other countries is not external factors, but the internal unsustainable economic and social development model, including the unsustainable economic development model and the welfare state model; Third, the dissertation argue that although the government accounting based on cash basis is not the direct cause of the crisis, it played an important role in the outbreak of the crisis. And transform from cash basis to accrual basis is important tc prevent the crisis which is encouraged by IFAC. Fourth, summarizing China's development model, systematically analyzing its practical difficulties and challenges, as well as how to maintain the sustainability, and providing targeted policy recommendations.
The main content of this dissertation are as follows:
First, this dissertation analyzes the causes of sovereign debt continued accumulation in the 'PUGS' based on the Mundell-Fleming Model. The author thinks that the direct cause of the outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in the'PUGS'is the massive accumulation of sovereign debt, but the root causes leading to debt accumulation can't simply be attributed to external factors such as euro defects, the global financial crisis, the American deliberate suppression or global economic imbalances. Based on the amended Mundell-Fleming Model, the long-term debt of Greece and other countries continued to rise mainly due to two factors:the constant increase of the current account and fiscal deficits. In the European single-currency zone, Greece and other countries lost their method of filling the gap through the issuance of currency, therefore, they had no choice but borrow heavily to fill the gaps in the balance of payments and domestic fiscal revenue and expenditure. A lot of debt interest payments exacerbated the imbalance of payments through the current account, leading to further large-scale borrowing. The continued increase of sovereign debt led to the constant rising of sovereign credit risk. In the face of capital outflows, Greece and other countries had no choice but raise interest rates to attract capital inflows, but when interest rates raised far beyond market expectations, interest rates had negative elasticity on capital flows, that is, no matter how high the interest rates were, the outflow of capital couldn't be stopped, then the sovereign debt crisis broke out. Therefore, euro defects and the global financial crisis are only external causes for the outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in Greece and other countries, the internal cause is the long-term accumulation of current account and fiscal deficits.
Second, through a comparative analysis, this dissertation further argues that the root cause for the long-term current account and fiscal deficits in Greece and other countries does not lie in external factors, but in their internal unsustainable economic and social development model. The economic and social development model for European countries can be divided into four types:the Nordic model, the Rhine model, the Anglo-Saxon model and the Mediterranean model. In this European sovereign debt crisis, the Mediterranean (Southern Europe) countries became the 'disaster area', while countries of the Nordic model and the Rhine model maintained fine economic conditions, they was not only hit by sovereign debt crises, but also played the role of relief for southern European countries. European sovereign debt crisis is not just debt crisis, currency crisis, banking crisis and industrial structure crisis, in terms of the root cause, it is the economic and social development model crisis in southern European countries. The sustainability of the development model of Greece and other countries showed in the following two aspects:first, the unsustainable economic development model led to the industrial hollowing of the southern European countries; second, the excessive social security system led to higher labor costs in southern European countries, which limited their competitiveness. In the case of European monetary integration, the sovereign debt of the southern European countries has become a veritable "hard debt", losing the possibility of debt monetization; therefore, the economic and social development model crisis eventually broke out in the form of sovereign debt crisis.
Third, from the perspective of the economic development model, the characteristics of the European economic development model are mainly internal imbalance. Specifically speaking, the'PUGS'have weak economic competitiveness, unbalanced industrial structure, poor innovation capability and domestic-oriented economy. They are the'non-core countries' in the euro area, and the'Rhine model'constitutes the'core countries' of the euro area. The 'core countries'are in the central position, while the'non-core countries'are in the dependent position. During competition, the'core countries'pursued the export-oriented economic growth policy, that is the'beggar-thy-neighbor'policy'at the cost of economic balance and debt accumulation of non-core countries', which led to the current account surplus in'core countries'as well as the current account deficit in'non-core countries'. Therefore, the government departments of'non-core countries'increased expenditure to stimulate economic growth in order to get rid of competitive disadvantage, which inevitably led to budget deficits and debt accumulation. This imbalanced development model eventually led to the sovereign debt crisis. From the post Keynesian perspective, the outbreak of debt crisis is the result of external economic imbalances instead of its cause, and the external economic imbalances are caused by imbalances of the economic development model of the euro-zone countries.
Fourth, from perspective of the welfare state model, the'PUGS'belong to the European welfare state model, especially after joining the euro zone, their welfare catch-up characteristics are very obvious. There are two sources supporting the welfare catch-up: public borrowing and EU assistance. Measuring with the'moderate' social security expenditure level, the social security expenditure level of the'PⅡGS'are commonly 'excessive'. The moderate social security expenditure level in Greece is13.9%, while the actual level is21.3%,53%higher than the moderate level. The actual social security expenditure level in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy are50%-80%higher than the moderate level. The'excessive'social security expenditure level in the'PIIGS'can also be confirmed from the change of social security expenditure growth. From2007to2010, tax revenues in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy respectively have decreased by4.0%,30.6%,5.4%,19.6%and3.2%respectively, while their social security expenditures have increased by18.2%,23.9%,21.0%,29.6%and12.2%.'Excessive' social security expenditure level does not only make the national finance unable to make ends meet, but also has negative effect on economic development. The economic effects generated by'excessive' social security expenditure level include:raising labor costs, resulting in welfare dependency, leading to industrial transfer and industrial hollowing, decreasing savings rate, inhibiting the economic vitality, limiting the economic growth, so the fiscal revenue source is getting less and less, while the fiscal spending is getting heavier and heavier, which makes the government debt burden getting heavier and heavier, and ultimately break out the sovereign debt crisis.
Fifth, the dissertation analyzes the government balance sheet risk from perspective of the government accounting model."The accounting is reflective", in order to manage the risk of government balance sheet, information of government assets and liabilities are needed which should be provided by the government accounting system. But in Europe, Greece government provided the false accounting information which escaped the supervision of the Union, and led to the accumulation of risks and went to the crisis at the end. Although the government accounting reform based on accrual system would not solve the crisis directly, it could provide more accrute accounting information, which could prevent the outbreak of crisis. That is why the IFAC encourage every country to execute the reformation of government accounting based on accrual system, and encourage the reformation of accounting information disclosure as well.
Sixth, the European debt crisis reflects an economic and social development model crisis, which is of important significance for China's economic transformation and upgrading as well as acceleration of development model adjustment:First, China should change the economic and social development model without delay. To bid farewell to the non-equilibrium growth mode, China should reduce the dependence of the entire economic and social system operation on the growth rate as a breakthrough; Second, China should deepen its financial system reform, focusing on the coordination of political and financial economic development; Third, China should strengthen the supervision of the government financing platform, effectively control Chinese government debt risk; Fourth, it should be prudent to push forward the process of internationalization of the RMB; Five, China should act according to its ability and establish the welfare model and the social security system in line with China's national conditions.
本文以现代经济学、金融学、会计学的理论基础,综合运用历史分析法、对比分析法、理论分析法及实证分析法等方法,从多个视角对欧债危机的成因进行剖析。本文的主要贡献包括：首先,对“欧洲五国”政府资产负债管理风险进行了量化分析,并将“欧洲五国”主权债务危机置于全球金融危机背景下,分析了资产负债风险从家庭到金融机构,从美国到欧洲,从金融机构到政府部门的传导机制,从政府资产负债管理风险视角分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。借用修正的蒙代尔-弗莱明模型进一步分析了“欧洲五国”资产负债管理风险的影响因素对主权债务危机的影响,指出导致“欧洲五国”长期债务存量持续提高的主要因素有两个：一是欧洲国家国际收支持续逆差,二是扩张性财政政策导致的财政赤字。与此同时,长期债务的利息支付又通过经常账户加剧国际收支恶化,导致进一步的借债,债务的持续增加导致国家主权信用风险的持续升高,面对资本的流出,只有提高利率来吸引资本流入,但是当利率的升高远远超出市场预期时,利率对资本流动就变为负弹性,也就是说,无论多高的利率都无法阻挡资本的流出,此时政府主权债务危机就发生了；其次,采用计量经济理论中的PVAR模型,通过回归检验、脉冲响应分析和方差分解等方法对资产负债管理风险对欧洲主权债务危机的影响进行实证检验,证实了不合理经济结构造成的经常账户赤字以及高福利导致的政府财政赤字,是引起“欧洲五国”政府资产负债表出现风险,主权债务规模不断上升,并最终导致主权债务危机的重要原因。本文进而提出以下观点：导致希腊等国长期经常帐户赤字和财政赤字的根本原因不在于外部,而在于其内部不可持续的经济社会发展模式,具体包括不可持续的经济发展模式和福利国家模式；第三,从政府会计角度分析了会计对欧债危机的“推波助澜”作用。“会计是反映性的”,从会计角度看,欧洲主权债务危机的爆发在很大程度上是因为政府管理者利用政府会计信息系统的缺陷提供了虚假的会计信息,逃过了监督者的监管,使得风险逐渐积累,并最终酿成了灾难性后果。尽管以权责发生制为基础的政府会计改革也许不一定能直接解决债务危机,但它却一定能给政府财务状况提供更加准确的会计信息,因此欧洲国家的政府会计应该尝试采用权责发生制改革；第四,应用宏观财务理论,对三份关于中国政府资产负债表的研究报告进行分析,提出我国政府资产负债表面临的潜在风险,并归纳总结了我国政府资产负债管理存在潜在风险的根本原因是中国固有的发展模式,对我国发展模式面临的现实困境和挑战,以及如何保持可持续性进行了系统分析,进而提出了具有针对性的政策建议。
本文的主要内容包括：
第一,运用财务理论,通过对“欧洲五国”政府资产负债表的分析揭示政府资产负债管理的风险问题,认为欧洲主权债务危机爆发的征兆在于失衡的政府资产负债表,表现为主权债务的大量积累,国家负债持续超过总资产,国家净资产持续表现为负数。本文接着进一步揭示了“欧洲五国”的主权债务为什么会持续积累以致引起主权债务危机。通过蒙代尔-弗莱明模型分析,本文认为希腊等国长期债务的持续升高主要有两方面因素：一是经常账户赤字持续增加,二是财政赤字持续增加。
第二,通过比较分析,本文进一步认为导致希腊等国政府资产负债管理风险以及长期经常帐户赤字和财政赤字的根本原因不在于外部因素,而在于其内部不可持续的经济社会发展模式。欧洲国家的经济社会发展模式可以细分为北欧模式、莱茵模式、盎格鲁一撒克逊模式和地中海模式四种。在本次欧洲主权债务危机中,地中海(南欧)模式国家属于“重灾区”,而北欧模式和莱茵模式国家的经济状况良好,不仅没有发生主权债务危机,而且发挥着救助南欧国家的作用。欧洲主权债务危机不仅仅是债务危机、货币危机、银行业危机和产业结构危机,就其根本原因而言,更是南欧国家的经济社会发展模式危机。
第三,从经济发展模式角度分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。欧洲经济发展模式的特征主要体现在内部不均衡,具体而言就是“欧洲五国”的经济竞争力弱、产业结构失衡、创新能力差以及经济的内向化趋势明显,是欧元区的“非核心国家”,而“莱茵模式”构成了欧元区的“核心国家”。“核心国家”处于中心地位,而“非核心国家”处于依附地位。在两者的竞争中,“核心国家”追求的是出口导向型经济增长政策,即以牺牲非核心国家的经济平衡和债务积累为代价的政策,这导致了“核心国家”的经常账户盈余以及“非核心国家”的经常账户赤字。“非核心国家”政府部门为了摆脱不利竞争,通过大量增加开支来刺激经济增长,这不可避免的导致预算赤字和债务积累,这种不平衡的发展模式最终导致欧洲国家政府资产负债管理风险和主权债务危机的爆发。
第四,从“福利国家”模式分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。“欧洲五国”虽然经济发展水平相对德法等欧盟核心国家不高,但属于欧洲“福利国家”模式,特别是加入欧元区之后,“欧洲五国”的福利赶超特征十分明显,支撑福利赶超的来源有两个：一是公共借贷,二是欧盟援助。用“适度”的社会保障水平衡量,“欧洲五国”普遍存在社会保障支出水平“超度”现象,希腊的适度社会保障水平为13.9%,但是实际社会保障水平为21.3%,超过适度水平53%。爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利的实际社会保障水平也都超过适度水平50%-80%不等。“欧洲五国”的社会保障水平“超度”也可以从社会保障支出的增长变化中得到印证。从2007年到2010年,希腊、爱尔兰、葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利税收收入分别下降-4.0%、-30.6%、-5.4%、-19.6%和-3.2%,但是社会保障支出却分别上升18.2%、23.9%、21.0%、29.6%和12.2%。“超度”的社会保障水平不仅会使国家财政入不敷出,而且对经济发展还会起到消极作用,抬高劳动力成本、导致产业转移和产业空心化、降低储蓄率、抑制经济活力,经济增长受限致使财政收入来源越来越少,财政支出则越来越重,导致政府资产负债表风险积聚,债务负担越来越重,最终走向了主权债务危机。
第五,从欧洲政府会计模式分析了“欧洲五国”主权债务危机的成因。“会计是反映性的”,政府资产负债表风险管理需要政府会计提供能够真实反映国家资产、负债等的信息,为及时有效对政府资产负债表风险进行控制提供保障。但是,希腊等国政府管理者却利用欧盟政府会计信息系统的缺陷提供了虚假的会计信息,逃过了监督者的监管,使得风险逐渐积累,并最终酿成了灾难性后果。尽管希腊等国实行以权责发生制为基础的政府会计改革也许不一定能直接解决债务危机,但它却一定能给政府财务状况提供更加准确的会计信息,预防债务危机的发生,因此国际会计师联合会鼓励每个国家都要尝试采用权责发生制改革,同时改革政府会计信息披露也十分必要。
第六,分析了欧债危机对我国的启示和借鉴。就政府资产负债表分析,我国当前和未来一段时期的宏观财务状况可以表述为：近则无忧,远则堪虞。但是,欧债危机反映的政府资产负债管理风险以及经济社会发展模式危机,对中国经济转型升级及加快调整发展模式具有重要的启示意义：一是改变经济和社会发展模式刻不容缓,中国要告别非平衡增长模式,调整发展模式,必须以降低整个经济体系运转、社会体系运转对增长速度的依赖为突破口；二是深化改革,注重经济社会协调性发展；三是加强对政府融资平台的监管,有效控制中国政府债务风险；四是因地制宜、量力而行,建立符合中国国情的福利模式；五是改革政府会计,改进政府资产负债信息披露。
European sovereign debt crisis refers to the crisis originated in Greece, developed in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (hereinafter called "PUGS"). Debt crisis is a widespread form of the financial crisis, most of which ended in debt default and debt restructuring. The direct reason of the sovereign debt crises occurred in Europe is the risk of assets and liabilities management. The dissertation analyzes the debt crisis in Europe from the perspective of finance and accounting, and argues that the government assets and liabilities management risk,which caused by the economy and society development model and welfare state model are the main causes of the crisis. Meanwhile government accounting model based on cash basis is not the root cause of the crisis, but one of the important causes. China should learn from the crisis, accelerate the transformation of economic development pattern, therefore, this study has important practical and theoretical significance.
This dissertation is based on theoretical foundation of modern economics, finance, and use historical, comparative, theoretical and empirical analysis methods comprehensively to analyze on the related issues of European sovereign debt crisis. The main contributions of this dissertation includes the following:first of all, analyze the balance sheet of PⅡGS, and then construct the analyzing framework of the crisis based on the Mundell-Fleming Model to carry on the analysis of the crisis formation mechanism, and also explore the role which economic development pattern plays in the formation of the crisis. Next, this dissertation adopts PVAR model in econometrics'theory, to carry on an empirical test of the formation mechanism of the European sovereign debt crisis through regression test, impulse response analysis and variance decomposing method, and confirms the conclusion that the current account deficit caused by unreasonable economic structure as well as the government financial deficit caused by the high welfare are the main and root reason for the rising sovereign debt, and ultimately lead to a sovereign debt crisis. This dissertation then puts forward that, the root cause of the long-term current account deficit and fiscal deficit in Greece and other countries is not external factors, but the internal unsustainable economic and social development model, including the unsustainable economic development model and the welfare state model; Third, the dissertation argue that although the government accounting based on cash basis is not the direct cause of the crisis, it played an important role in the outbreak of the crisis. And transform from cash basis to accrual basis is important tc prevent the crisis which is encouraged by IFAC. Fourth, summarizing China's development model, systematically analyzing its practical difficulties and challenges, as well as how to maintain the sustainability, and providing targeted policy recommendations.
The main content of this dissertation are as follows:
First, this dissertation analyzes the causes of sovereign debt continued accumulation in the 'PUGS' based on the Mundell-Fleming Model. The author thinks that the direct cause of the outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in the'PUGS'is the massive accumulation of sovereign debt, but the root causes leading to debt accumulation can't simply be attributed to external factors such as euro defects, the global financial crisis, the American deliberate suppression or global economic imbalances. Based on the amended Mundell-Fleming Model, the long-term debt of Greece and other countries continued to rise mainly due to two factors:the constant increase of the current account and fiscal deficits. In the European single-currency zone, Greece and other countries lost their method of filling the gap through the issuance of currency, therefore, they had no choice but borrow heavily to fill the gaps in the balance of payments and domestic fiscal revenue and expenditure. A lot of debt interest payments exacerbated the imbalance of payments through the current account, leading to further large-scale borrowing. The continued increase of sovereign debt led to the constant rising of sovereign credit risk. In the face of capital outflows, Greece and other countries had no choice but raise interest rates to attract capital inflows, but when interest rates raised far beyond market expectations, interest rates had negative elasticity on capital flows, that is, no matter how high the interest rates were, the outflow of capital couldn't be stopped, then the sovereign debt crisis broke out. Therefore, euro defects and the global financial crisis are only external causes for the outbreak of sovereign debt crisis in Greece and other countries, the internal cause is the long-term accumulation of current account and fiscal deficits.
Second, through a comparative analysis, this dissertation further argues that the root cause for the long-term current account and fiscal deficits in Greece and other countries does not lie in external factors, but in their internal unsustainable economic and social development model. The economic and social development model for European countries can be divided into four types:the Nordic model, the Rhine model, the Anglo-Saxon model and the Mediterranean model. In this European sovereign debt crisis, the Mediterranean (Southern Europe) countries became the 'disaster area', while countries of the Nordic model and the Rhine model maintained fine economic conditions, they was not only hit by sovereign debt crises, but also played the role of relief for southern European countries. European sovereign debt crisis is not just debt crisis, currency crisis, banking crisis and industrial structure crisis, in terms of the root cause, it is the economic and social development model crisis in southern European countries. The sustainability of the development model of Greece and other countries showed in the following two aspects:first, the unsustainable economic development model led to the industrial hollowing of the southern European countries; second, the excessive social security system led to higher labor costs in southern European countries, which limited their competitiveness. In the case of European monetary integration, the sovereign debt of the southern European countries has become a veritable "hard debt", losing the possibility of debt monetization; therefore, the economic and social development model crisis eventually broke out in the form of sovereign debt crisis.
Third, from the perspective of the economic development model, the characteristics of the European economic development model are mainly internal imbalance. Specifically speaking, the'PUGS'have weak economic competitiveness, unbalanced industrial structure, poor innovation capability and domestic-oriented economy. They are the'non-core countries' in the euro area, and the'Rhine model'constitutes the'core countries' of the euro area. The 'core countries'are in the central position, while the'non-core countries'are in the dependent position. During competition, the'core countries'pursued the export-oriented economic growth policy, that is the'beggar-thy-neighbor'policy'at the cost of economic balance and debt accumulation of non-core countries', which led to the current account surplus in'core countries'as well as the current account deficit in'non-core countries'. Therefore, the government departments of'non-core countries'increased expenditure to stimulate economic growth in order to get rid of competitive disadvantage, which inevitably led to budget deficits and debt accumulation. This imbalanced development model eventually led to the sovereign debt crisis. From the post Keynesian perspective, the outbreak of debt crisis is the result of external economic imbalances instead of its cause, and the external economic imbalances are caused by imbalances of the economic development model of the euro-zone countries.
Fourth, from perspective of the welfare state model, the'PUGS'belong to the European welfare state model, especially after joining the euro zone, their welfare catch-up characteristics are very obvious. There are two sources supporting the welfare catch-up: public borrowing and EU assistance. Measuring with the'moderate' social security expenditure level, the social security expenditure level of the'PⅡGS'are commonly 'excessive'. The moderate social security expenditure level in Greece is13.9%, while the actual level is21.3%,53%higher than the moderate level. The actual social security expenditure level in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy are50%-80%higher than the moderate level. The'excessive'social security expenditure level in the'PIIGS'can also be confirmed from the change of social security expenditure growth. From2007to2010, tax revenues in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy respectively have decreased by4.0%,30.6%,5.4%,19.6%and3.2%respectively, while their social security expenditures have increased by18.2%,23.9%,21.0%,29.6%and12.2%.'Excessive' social security expenditure level does not only make the national finance unable to make ends meet, but also has negative effect on economic development. The economic effects generated by'excessive' social security expenditure level include:raising labor costs, resulting in welfare dependency, leading to industrial transfer and industrial hollowing, decreasing savings rate, inhibiting the economic vitality, limiting the economic growth, so the fiscal revenue source is getting less and less, while the fiscal spending is getting heavier and heavier, which makes the government debt burden getting heavier and heavier, and ultimately break out the sovereign debt crisis.
Fifth, the dissertation analyzes the government balance sheet risk from perspective of the government accounting model."The accounting is reflective", in order to manage the risk of government balance sheet, information of government assets and liabilities are needed which should be provided by the government accounting system. But in Europe, Greece government provided the false accounting information which escaped the supervision of the Union, and led to the accumulation of risks and went to the crisis at the end. Although the government accounting reform based on accrual system would not solve the crisis directly, it could provide more accrute accounting information, which could prevent the outbreak of crisis. That is why the IFAC encourage every country to execute the reformation of government accounting based on accrual system, and encourage the reformation of accounting information disclosure as well.
Sixth, the European debt crisis reflects an economic and social development model crisis, which is of important significance for China's economic transformation and upgrading as well as acceleration of development model adjustment:First, China should change the economic and social development model without delay. To bid farewell to the non-equilibrium growth mode, China should reduce the dependence of the entire economic and social system operation on the growth rate as a breakthrough; Second, China should deepen its financial system reform, focusing on the coordination of political and financial economic development; Third, China should strengthen the supervision of the government financing platform, effectively control Chinese government debt risk; Fourth, it should be prudent to push forward the process of internationalization of the RMB; Five, China should act according to its ability and establish the welfare model and the social security system in line with China's national conditions.
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