交易费用、农户契约选择与土地承包经营权流转
|
摘要
肇始于1978年的以家庭联产承包经营责任制为核心的农村土地制度改革,被人们普遍认为是20世纪后期中国最成功的农村改革。这次历史性改革的主要成就在于赋予了农民生产自主权、收益索取权和土地处置权,由此带来生产效率的提高是改革开放初期农业保持高速增长的首要原因。然而,随着工业化、城镇化的深入推进,改革能量的逐步释放和消失,这种高度平均的制度安排与现代农业之间的矛盾日益突出,资源配置的低效性已经越来越无法适应以市场化、规模化、信息化为主的现代农业发展要求。如何实现适度规模经营就成为农业现代化进程中亟需解决的重要问题之一。在确保土地承包关系稳定并长久不变的前提下,允许农民以多种形式流转土地承包经营权,建立和发展土地流转市场,就成为可能的现实选择。
事实上,经济转型以来,中国政府对农村土地承包使用权流转一直是鼓励和支持的。但大量的经验证据表明,土地流转的高潮并没有随着政策的推行而随之到来,土地流转率偏低,流转市场仍不活跃。旨在通过供求价格和数量调整来实现资源最优配置,构建完善的土地流转市场,在理论上看似无懈可击,却在实践中并没有出现?不管是国家法律法规还是地方实践操作,土地流转的形式为何又如此繁杂众多?现有研究大多沿着新古典经济学的分析框架进行,然而这样对于解释土地承包经营权流转的现实意义可能十分有限。因为,新古典经济学框架更多地注重市场均衡,而忽视了交易费用的存在。事实上,不论是实现何种交易的市场均衡都是需要成本的,如果忽视了这些成本的存在,就有可能出现对土地流转“成本—收益”衡量的不准确,进而造成结论的不准确,导致理论与实践的脱节。梳理现有的研究,从交易费用的视角来研究土地承包经营权流转,目前还较为缺乏。尽管要准确把握交易费用的大小还较为困难,本文从农户微观主体这一视角出发,尝试构建了一个将交易费用、农户契约选择与土地承包经营权流转紧密结合起来的分析框架。并以此为核心,沿着交易费用经济学的主线,辅之以成渝经济区农户田野调查资料,测算农地流转交易费用；探讨资产专用性、不确定性对交易费用的影响；进而验证交易费用对农户不同的契约选择的影响,以期探寻科学合理的制度安排和治理结构设计,从而达到节省交易费用的目的。
要实现既定的研究目标,本文设计了三个部分的研究内容。第一部分理论基础(第1—3章)。第1章对研究背景、意义、目标、内容、方法和技术路线进行了必要而简明的阐述；第2章从新古典经济学到新制度经济学不断拓展的角度,对现有文献进行了系统的梳理和归纳,从而找到研究的切入点；第3章在基本概念辨析的基础上,引申出交易费用和契约这两个核心概念的内涵和外延,简要阐释了现有理论对研究的借鉴意义,最后构建了本文的分析框架。第二部分是实证检验(第4—7章)。第4章沿袭德姆塞茨产权演进模型的分析范式,梳理中国农村土地承包经营权流转演化变迁历程,运用全国农村住户观察点数据和对成渝经济区农户的田野调查,对现阶段农村土地流转市场发展及特点进行评价。第5章从交易费用的三个阶段出发,构建了一个反映农村土地承包经营权流转交易费用的指标体系,并运用主成分分析法和因子分析法进行了测算。同时,实证考察了资产专用性、交易不确定性等因素对交易费用的影响作用。第6章采用离散选择模型实证检验交易费用对农户契约选择的影响。第7章通过对仁寿村、永兴村、安德镇、皇城村四个典型案例考察,探讨了在特定的契约结构下,如何达到节省交易费用的目的。第三部分是第8章,即研究结论与政策启示。通过对上述内容的系统分析,主要研究结论如下：
(1)对农村土地承包经营权流转制度演化的考察中发现,变迁源于外部性内在化的动机,是典型的诱致性制度变迁方式,先后经历了“不允许、例外允许、小范围允许、全面推广”四个阶段；引致于家庭联产承包责任制的土地承包经营权流转,先后经历了“明令禁止、适当放开、规范发展”三个阶段,制度演化历程也是制度运行效率不断提高的过程。不论是从外部政策的外部调整,还是流转形式的内部发展,既是交易费用减少的过程,也是从传统形式向更高级的规模化流转形式转变的过程。现阶段改革的方向也是在坚持土地集体所有制的前提下,沿着产权分割(所有权与使用权分离)、产权清晰(确权颁证)、放活市场(土地流转)的路径演进。
(2)对农村土地承包经营权流转市场发展的考察发现,尽管20世纪90年代中期以来,农村土地流转的速度和规模呈加速发展趋势,但不论是全国层面,还是典型地区,流转发生率仍然较低,适度经营规模偏小、土地细碎化没有得到有效改善。全国层面的住户调查显示,2009年年底,户均年转入耕地0.68亩,仅比1986年增加0.37亩,转出耕地0.47亩,呈现出较大的区域差异。对典型地区的调查显示,户均流转总体水平偏低,仅4亩／户左右,尤其是在一些丘陵地区和偏远山区,由于农业比较效益的制约,弃耕、撂荒现象严重,还处于“非正式契约流转”层面上,民间化、口头化、短期化、随意化现象突出,往往在熟人、亲戚和朋友之间进行。
(3)对交易费用与土地承包经营权流转的研究发现,在土地承包经营权流转过程中,信息搜寻沟通成本、合同执行成本、流转双方关系、法律凭证及程序、农户谈判能力是影响交易费用的重要因素,交易前信息搜寻、交易中谈判成本是构成交易费用的主要部分。对资产专用性、不确定的分析表明,影响交易费用的因素分别是地理位置专用性、教育型人力资本、实物资产专用性、状态型人力资本和个人社会资本,其中地理位置专用性影响最大；信息不确定性、政策不确定性和行为不确定性对交易费用也具有重要的影响。对转入和转出的分析表明,地理位置专用性、教育型人力资本2个主因子对土地承包经营权流转交易费用具有显著影响。
(4)对交易费用与契约选择的研究发现,从缔约双方来看,农户之间进行流转的交易费用相对较小,农户与村集体经济组织进行流转的交易费用相对较大。同时,以农户之间的土地流转为参照,实证检验交易费用对农户选择流转对象的影响,研究表明,相对于农户自发流转,信息搜寻沟通成本、合同执行成本、状态型人力资本对选择农民专业合作组织和企业有负向影响；流转双方关系、法律凭证及程序对选择农民专业合作组织、村集体、企业有正向影响；地理位置专用性和实物资产专用性对选择企业有显著的影响；教育型人力资本对选择村集体交易有正向影响；个人社会资本对选择农民专业合作组织和企业交易有正向影响。表明,农户为了节约信息搜寻沟通成本和合同执行成本,更愿意与农户交易；为强化法律约束、降低合同违约风险,更倾向与农民专业合作组织和企业交易；农户受教育程度越高,拥有社会资本越多,越愿意选择与农民专业合作组、村集体和企业交易。此外,地理位置较好的地区,企业更加容易进入,农户与其交易也更便利；农户自身拥有的实物资产越多,增加了与企业进行交易的谈判成本。从其他控制变量来看,相对农户自发流转而言,家庭非农兼业情况的影响并不显著；家庭土地资源禀赋越好的农户,越倾向选择企业交易。在政策因素方面,由于村集体对土地流转的限制,农户更愿意选择农民专业合作组织和企业进行交易。在价格因素方面,农户为了获取更高的价格,更愿意选择与农民专业合作组织和企业交易。
从交易类型来看,代耕的交易费用相对较小,出租的交易费用相对较大。同时,以股份合作为参照,分析交易费用对农户选择流转类型的影响,结果表明,相对于股份合作,流转双方关系、法律凭证和程序、农户谈判能力、个人社会资本对农户选择转包、转让、互换、出租、代耕土地流转类型有负向影响；状态型人力资本对农户选择转包、转让、互换、出租、代耕等类型有正向影响；合同执行成本对农户选择互换有负向影响；信息搜寻沟通成本对农户选择转包和出租有正向影响,对农户选择互换有负向影响。由此表明,法律凭证和程序越严格,农户拥有的社会资本越多,谈判能力越强,越倾向于选择组织程序更加规范的股份合作；农户的身体状况越好,自己耕种土地的能力越强,更愿意选择转包、互换、代耕等形式。从其他控制变量来看,相对于股份合作而言,家庭非农兼业情况促使农户选择代耕；家庭土地资源禀赋对农户选择流转类型的影响并不显著。政策因素方面,村集体对农户流转的限制,将促使农户更多的选择股份合作。在价格因素方面,农户为了获取更高的价格,更愿意选择出租,而不愿意选择价格较低的转让和互换。
(5)对交易费用与契约结构的典型案例考察发现,相对于农户自发流转,“龙头企业+农户”、“企业+合作社+农户”、土地租赁、土地银行等契约安排,对节省交易费用起到了积极的作用。同时,在现阶段农村土地流转的实践中,没有一个模式是单独存在,为了节约交易费用、降低违约的风险,通常一个模式是和其它模式相伴而生,相辅相成,从而匹配更加稳定的契约治理结构。
基于上述研究结果,文章从降低交易费用的治理结构出发,对今后一个阶段有效促进土地承包经营权流转、实现适度规模经营,提供了一些政策启示,主要包括强化土地产权,降低交易的不确定性；强化流转服务,降低土地的交易频率；强化统筹配套,弱化土地的保障功能；强化机制创新,推进多种形式的流转；土地入股流转,发展股份合作经济等。
全文最重要的创新在于：(1)基于农户微观主体的视角,尝试着将交易费用、契约选择结合起来形成土地承包经营权流转新的分析框架,这在理论上是一个新的尝试和提升。(2)沿着交易费用“三个阶段”的基本逻辑,尝试着对交易费用进行量化测算；并从“三个维度”的基本属性,实证检验了资产专用性、交易不确定性对交易费用的影响。(3)采用分析结构选择的分析方法,实证检验了交易费用对农户契约选择的影响大小；(4)采用案例分析法,探讨了在特定的契约安排下如何达到节约交易费用的目的,案例考察有利于增强研究的可靠性,更重要的政策启示在于采取股份合作制的混合治理结构,更能有效推进土地承包经营权流转。
The core of reform of the land system is the household contract responsibility system from1978, is generally regarded as the most successful rural reform in the end of20th century in China. The main achievement of this historical reform is that farmer has the right of self-production, getting profit, and dealing with the land. The improvement of productivity caused by the reform was the main reason of the continually high growth rate of the agriculture development in the beginning of reform and opening. However, with the deeper development of industrialization and urbanization, the effect of the reform has been disappearing step by step. The contradiction between highly average arrangement and modern agriculture has gradually become more and more obvious. The lowly efficient deployment of resource can not meet the need of modern agriculture any more, based on market, scale, and information. How to realize appropriate scale of management turns to be the thorny problem in the agriculture modernized progress which needs to be solved immediately. Under the premise of stable and constant land contract relations, the government should permit farmer to transfer the land use right in multiple ways, and set up a special market for it. It is practical for appropriate scale of management.
Since economic transition, Chinese government has been always encouraged and supported the land use right transfer. But a large number of experiences and evidences indicate that the high tide of farmland transfer has not come with the policy. The rate of farmland transfer is low, and the transfer market is not active. Theoretically, it is perfect to realize an optimal deployment according to the price and demand, and to build a thorough farmland transfer market system. But why it failed in practice? No matter how the national law or the practice of local government is, why are the forms of farmland transfer so complicated and various? The present researches are mainly following the analytical frame of new classical economics, while these researches could hardly explain the realistic meaning of farmland transfer. Because the new classical economics pays more attention to the market balance, and ignores the transaction costs. Actually, no matter what kind of realization of a balance trading market is, it needs money. Ignorance of the cost will make the "Cost—Benefit" measurement of farmland transfer inaccurate and then get a false conclusion which will lead to the separation of theory and practice. At present, there is little research of farmland transfer from the angle of transaction costs, combining with farmer contract choices. Therefore, it is significant to study the different structures of contract from the angle of transaction costs. Although it is difficult to get the accurate amount of transaction costs, this dissertation manage to build an analytic frame which tightly combines the transaction costs, farmer contact choices, and the right to land contractual management, form the angle of farmer. Form this perspective, the dissertation will test and verify the influence of transaction costs on different choices of contract, mainly following the transaction costs economics, cooperating with the investigation of the farmer in Chengdu-Chongqing economic zone, measuring the transaction costs of farmland transfer, discussing the influence of specific and uncertain assets on transaction costs, looking for the scientific and rational arrangement and design of governing structure, with the aim of saving the transaction costs.
To achieve this research goal, the dissertation has three parts. The first part is basic theory (Chapter4to7). Chapter1is brief introduction to the background, significance, target, content, means and technologies of the research. Chapter2is literature review from the angle of new classical economics and new policy economics, and obtains the entrance of the research. Chapter3builds the analytic frame, on the basic of analyzing basis concepts and, extending the meaning of the transaction costs and contract, briefly explaining the mirror effect of present theories on the research. The second part is test and verifies (Chapter4to7). Chapter4, following the Demesetz Property Rights Model (DPRM), analyze the whole progress of the Chinese farmland contractual management, with the observing data of the national rural residents and the investigation of Chengdu-Chongqing economic zone rural resident, to evaluate the development and character of farmland transfer market. Chapter5, from the basic reason of "three dimensions, three phases" of transaction costs, builds a system to showing the transaction costs of farmland transfer, with the Principal Component Analysis and Pactor Analysis. In chapter6, the dissertation verifies the influence of transaction costs on the choices of contract by Multinomial Logit Model. Chapter7, According to the investigation of the particular case of Renshou village, Yongxing village, Ande village, Huangcheng village, discusses how to save transaction costs under the particular contact structure. The third part is Chapter8, which is the conclusion of the research and inspiration of policy. As mentioned above, the conclusions are as follows:
Firstly, from the investigation on system evolution of the rural land contractual management right circulation, the change is from the internalization of external motivation, and it also is a typical way of induced institutional change, which has experienced four phases of'not allowed, exception allowed, allows a small scale, comprehensive promotion'. And the different phases are also the process which the system operating efficiency enhances increasingly. Whether from external policy adjustment, or the changing of the circulation in the form of development, it is the process that both to reduce transaction costs, and also transform the traditional form to a more advanced form of large-scale circulation. The direction of reform at present is to adhere to the premise of collective land ownership. And the reform evolves along the path of division of property rights (separation of ownership and use right), clearly established ownership (identify the land right and certification), allowing flexibility market (land transfer).
Secondly, from the investigation about the market development of the rural land contractual management right circulation, the speed and scale of rural land circulation showed a trend of accelerated development form the mid-1990s. Both in the national level and in the typical area, the circulation incidence is still low, the moderate management is still in the small-scale, and the land fragmentation has not been improved effectively. National level residents'survey shows that by the end of2009, the annual average per family transferred in0.68acres of arable land, more than only0.37acres in1986, and transferred out0.47acres of arable land, showing a large regional difference. Typical areas'survey shows that the overall level of average household circulation is low, only about4acres/household. Especially in some hilly areas and remote mountainous areas, the phenomenon of abandoning arable land is serious because of the constraints of the agricultural comparative effectiveness. And those areas are also at the level of informal circulation contracts, where civil, rural, short-term and random phenomenon is often among acquaintances, relatives and friends
Thirdly, according to a study in the process of right to the contracted management of land circulation, On the transaction costs and the contracted management of land circulation, information search and communication costs, contract implementation costs, circulation relations, legal documents and program, farmers negotiations ability are the important factors that influence transaction cost, on the other side transaction cost of information search, business negotiation consist the major parts of the transaction costs. The analysis of roll-in and roll-out shows that10main factors have a significant influence on the right to the contracted management of land circulation of transaction costs, including information search and communication cost are the major parts of the transaction costs; Physical asset specificity, the conversion relations are on the other hand the two main factors that affects the overall transaction costs; two personal social capital factors, legal documents and procedures, have less impact on the overall transaction costs.
Fourthly, on the research of the transaction cost and contract choice, according to a study from the point of the contracting parties, farmers transfer between the transaction costs are relatively small, farmer and village collective economic organization on circulation of transaction costs is relatively large. At the same time, taking land circulation as the reference, between farmers empirically transaction cost's influence on farmers choose circulation object, research has shown that compared with farmers spontaneous circulation, information search and communication costs, contract implementation costs, state type of human capital, those facts have a negative impact on the choice of farmers' professional cooperative organizations and enterprises; in addition, the good geographical position area is willing more easily into the enterprise, farmers and their trade is also more convenient; The more farmers to the physical assets of its own, the more increasing the cost negotiations with trading companies are. From other control variables, the relative farmer's spontaneous circulation, family situation, there is no significant difference among the non-agricultural development; Family farmers land resources endowment, the good, the more likely they choose corporate transactions. In the aspect of policy factors, Due to the village collective restrictions on transfers of land, the peasants are more specialized to cooperate with organizations and farmers are more willing to choose trading enterprises. On price factors, in order to obtain a higher price, farmers are more willing to choose deal with farmers' professional cooperative organizations and enterprises.
For the transaction type, transaction costs of substantial rouge are relatively small, rental fee is relatively large. At the same time, share cooperation as the reference, the analysis of the effect of transaction costs for farmers choose circulation type, the results show that, relative to the joint-stock cooperative relations, the flow, legal documents and procedures, farmers negotiating skills have a negative impact on personal social capital for peasant households to choose subcontract, transfer, swaps, rent, assistant plough land circulation type; State type of human capital of farmers have positive influence on choosing to subcontract, transferring, exchanging, renting, assistant plough type; Contract execution cost has a negative effect on farmers choose to swap; Information search and communication cost have positive effects on farmers choose subcontracting and rent, has a negative effect on farmers choose to swap. All above suggesting that the more rigorous legal documents and procedures are, the more farmers get social capital, the more bargaining ability is, the more tend to choose more formal joint-stock cooperative organization program:the stronger to choose the ability to land to farm, prefer to choose subcontracting, swaps, assistant plough forms and so on.
From other control variables, compare to the stock cooperation, family non-farm development situation prompted farmers choose assistant plough; the influence of Household land resources endowment of farmers choose type is not significant. On Policy factors, the village collective restrictions on farmers flow will lead to more farmers choose cooperation. In terms of price factors, farmers in order to obtain a higher price, more willing to choose to rent, and not willing to choose low price transfer and swap.
Fifthly, the typical case study of transaction cost and contract structure found that spontaneous flow relative to farmers,'leading enterprise and peasant household","sharing cooperation, cooperative association and peasant household', land leasing, land contract arrangement such as Banks, played a positive role in saving transaction cost. At this stage but at the same time, on the practice of the rural land circulation, there is no one model which exists alone, usually a pattern and other patterns is supplement with each other, in order to save transaction cost, reduce the risk of default so as to match the contract governance structure is more stable.
Based on the above research results, the article starting from the governance structure of lower transaction costs, provided some policy implications on the stage for the future promote effectively the right to the contracted management of land circulation and the realization of the moderate scale management of land, and, including strengthening land property rights, reduce the uncertainty of trading:Improved circulation service, reducing land trading frequency; Improved as a whole, weaken the land safeguard function; Strengthening mechanism innovation, and promote various forms of circulation.
The main creative points in this article are as follows. The first, analysis of transfer of land use rights by combing transaction expenses and contract option based on the peasant household, this is an improvement for the theory. Secondly, quantitative measured according to the three periods of transaction expenses. And inspect the impact of assets specificity and uncertainty of transaction to transaction expenses from the three based characteristics. Thirdly, using comparative institutional analysis method, empirical analysis how the contract option of peasant households influence transaction expenses. Fourthly, to discuss how to save the transaction expenses though different contract using case study. The conclusion of the whole research is to adopt the shareholding co-operative system, which will improve the land use transfer.
事实上,经济转型以来,中国政府对农村土地承包使用权流转一直是鼓励和支持的。但大量的经验证据表明,土地流转的高潮并没有随着政策的推行而随之到来,土地流转率偏低,流转市场仍不活跃。旨在通过供求价格和数量调整来实现资源最优配置,构建完善的土地流转市场,在理论上看似无懈可击,却在实践中并没有出现?不管是国家法律法规还是地方实践操作,土地流转的形式为何又如此繁杂众多?现有研究大多沿着新古典经济学的分析框架进行,然而这样对于解释土地承包经营权流转的现实意义可能十分有限。因为,新古典经济学框架更多地注重市场均衡,而忽视了交易费用的存在。事实上,不论是实现何种交易的市场均衡都是需要成本的,如果忽视了这些成本的存在,就有可能出现对土地流转“成本—收益”衡量的不准确,进而造成结论的不准确,导致理论与实践的脱节。梳理现有的研究,从交易费用的视角来研究土地承包经营权流转,目前还较为缺乏。尽管要准确把握交易费用的大小还较为困难,本文从农户微观主体这一视角出发,尝试构建了一个将交易费用、农户契约选择与土地承包经营权流转紧密结合起来的分析框架。并以此为核心,沿着交易费用经济学的主线,辅之以成渝经济区农户田野调查资料,测算农地流转交易费用；探讨资产专用性、不确定性对交易费用的影响；进而验证交易费用对农户不同的契约选择的影响,以期探寻科学合理的制度安排和治理结构设计,从而达到节省交易费用的目的。
要实现既定的研究目标,本文设计了三个部分的研究内容。第一部分理论基础(第1—3章)。第1章对研究背景、意义、目标、内容、方法和技术路线进行了必要而简明的阐述；第2章从新古典经济学到新制度经济学不断拓展的角度,对现有文献进行了系统的梳理和归纳,从而找到研究的切入点；第3章在基本概念辨析的基础上,引申出交易费用和契约这两个核心概念的内涵和外延,简要阐释了现有理论对研究的借鉴意义,最后构建了本文的分析框架。第二部分是实证检验(第4—7章)。第4章沿袭德姆塞茨产权演进模型的分析范式,梳理中国农村土地承包经营权流转演化变迁历程,运用全国农村住户观察点数据和对成渝经济区农户的田野调查,对现阶段农村土地流转市场发展及特点进行评价。第5章从交易费用的三个阶段出发,构建了一个反映农村土地承包经营权流转交易费用的指标体系,并运用主成分分析法和因子分析法进行了测算。同时,实证考察了资产专用性、交易不确定性等因素对交易费用的影响作用。第6章采用离散选择模型实证检验交易费用对农户契约选择的影响。第7章通过对仁寿村、永兴村、安德镇、皇城村四个典型案例考察,探讨了在特定的契约结构下,如何达到节省交易费用的目的。第三部分是第8章,即研究结论与政策启示。通过对上述内容的系统分析,主要研究结论如下：
(1)对农村土地承包经营权流转制度演化的考察中发现,变迁源于外部性内在化的动机,是典型的诱致性制度变迁方式,先后经历了“不允许、例外允许、小范围允许、全面推广”四个阶段；引致于家庭联产承包责任制的土地承包经营权流转,先后经历了“明令禁止、适当放开、规范发展”三个阶段,制度演化历程也是制度运行效率不断提高的过程。不论是从外部政策的外部调整,还是流转形式的内部发展,既是交易费用减少的过程,也是从传统形式向更高级的规模化流转形式转变的过程。现阶段改革的方向也是在坚持土地集体所有制的前提下,沿着产权分割(所有权与使用权分离)、产权清晰(确权颁证)、放活市场(土地流转)的路径演进。
(2)对农村土地承包经营权流转市场发展的考察发现,尽管20世纪90年代中期以来,农村土地流转的速度和规模呈加速发展趋势,但不论是全国层面,还是典型地区,流转发生率仍然较低,适度经营规模偏小、土地细碎化没有得到有效改善。全国层面的住户调查显示,2009年年底,户均年转入耕地0.68亩,仅比1986年增加0.37亩,转出耕地0.47亩,呈现出较大的区域差异。对典型地区的调查显示,户均流转总体水平偏低,仅4亩／户左右,尤其是在一些丘陵地区和偏远山区,由于农业比较效益的制约,弃耕、撂荒现象严重,还处于“非正式契约流转”层面上,民间化、口头化、短期化、随意化现象突出,往往在熟人、亲戚和朋友之间进行。
(3)对交易费用与土地承包经营权流转的研究发现,在土地承包经营权流转过程中,信息搜寻沟通成本、合同执行成本、流转双方关系、法律凭证及程序、农户谈判能力是影响交易费用的重要因素,交易前信息搜寻、交易中谈判成本是构成交易费用的主要部分。对资产专用性、不确定的分析表明,影响交易费用的因素分别是地理位置专用性、教育型人力资本、实物资产专用性、状态型人力资本和个人社会资本,其中地理位置专用性影响最大；信息不确定性、政策不确定性和行为不确定性对交易费用也具有重要的影响。对转入和转出的分析表明,地理位置专用性、教育型人力资本2个主因子对土地承包经营权流转交易费用具有显著影响。
(4)对交易费用与契约选择的研究发现,从缔约双方来看,农户之间进行流转的交易费用相对较小,农户与村集体经济组织进行流转的交易费用相对较大。同时,以农户之间的土地流转为参照,实证检验交易费用对农户选择流转对象的影响,研究表明,相对于农户自发流转,信息搜寻沟通成本、合同执行成本、状态型人力资本对选择农民专业合作组织和企业有负向影响；流转双方关系、法律凭证及程序对选择农民专业合作组织、村集体、企业有正向影响；地理位置专用性和实物资产专用性对选择企业有显著的影响；教育型人力资本对选择村集体交易有正向影响；个人社会资本对选择农民专业合作组织和企业交易有正向影响。表明,农户为了节约信息搜寻沟通成本和合同执行成本,更愿意与农户交易；为强化法律约束、降低合同违约风险,更倾向与农民专业合作组织和企业交易；农户受教育程度越高,拥有社会资本越多,越愿意选择与农民专业合作组、村集体和企业交易。此外,地理位置较好的地区,企业更加容易进入,农户与其交易也更便利；农户自身拥有的实物资产越多,增加了与企业进行交易的谈判成本。从其他控制变量来看,相对农户自发流转而言,家庭非农兼业情况的影响并不显著；家庭土地资源禀赋越好的农户,越倾向选择企业交易。在政策因素方面,由于村集体对土地流转的限制,农户更愿意选择农民专业合作组织和企业进行交易。在价格因素方面,农户为了获取更高的价格,更愿意选择与农民专业合作组织和企业交易。
从交易类型来看,代耕的交易费用相对较小,出租的交易费用相对较大。同时,以股份合作为参照,分析交易费用对农户选择流转类型的影响,结果表明,相对于股份合作,流转双方关系、法律凭证和程序、农户谈判能力、个人社会资本对农户选择转包、转让、互换、出租、代耕土地流转类型有负向影响；状态型人力资本对农户选择转包、转让、互换、出租、代耕等类型有正向影响；合同执行成本对农户选择互换有负向影响；信息搜寻沟通成本对农户选择转包和出租有正向影响,对农户选择互换有负向影响。由此表明,法律凭证和程序越严格,农户拥有的社会资本越多,谈判能力越强,越倾向于选择组织程序更加规范的股份合作；农户的身体状况越好,自己耕种土地的能力越强,更愿意选择转包、互换、代耕等形式。从其他控制变量来看,相对于股份合作而言,家庭非农兼业情况促使农户选择代耕；家庭土地资源禀赋对农户选择流转类型的影响并不显著。政策因素方面,村集体对农户流转的限制,将促使农户更多的选择股份合作。在价格因素方面,农户为了获取更高的价格,更愿意选择出租,而不愿意选择价格较低的转让和互换。
(5)对交易费用与契约结构的典型案例考察发现,相对于农户自发流转,“龙头企业+农户”、“企业+合作社+农户”、土地租赁、土地银行等契约安排,对节省交易费用起到了积极的作用。同时,在现阶段农村土地流转的实践中,没有一个模式是单独存在,为了节约交易费用、降低违约的风险,通常一个模式是和其它模式相伴而生,相辅相成,从而匹配更加稳定的契约治理结构。
基于上述研究结果,文章从降低交易费用的治理结构出发,对今后一个阶段有效促进土地承包经营权流转、实现适度规模经营,提供了一些政策启示,主要包括强化土地产权,降低交易的不确定性；强化流转服务,降低土地的交易频率；强化统筹配套,弱化土地的保障功能；强化机制创新,推进多种形式的流转；土地入股流转,发展股份合作经济等。
全文最重要的创新在于：(1)基于农户微观主体的视角,尝试着将交易费用、契约选择结合起来形成土地承包经营权流转新的分析框架,这在理论上是一个新的尝试和提升。(2)沿着交易费用“三个阶段”的基本逻辑,尝试着对交易费用进行量化测算；并从“三个维度”的基本属性,实证检验了资产专用性、交易不确定性对交易费用的影响。(3)采用分析结构选择的分析方法,实证检验了交易费用对农户契约选择的影响大小；(4)采用案例分析法,探讨了在特定的契约安排下如何达到节约交易费用的目的,案例考察有利于增强研究的可靠性,更重要的政策启示在于采取股份合作制的混合治理结构,更能有效推进土地承包经营权流转。
The core of reform of the land system is the household contract responsibility system from1978, is generally regarded as the most successful rural reform in the end of20th century in China. The main achievement of this historical reform is that farmer has the right of self-production, getting profit, and dealing with the land. The improvement of productivity caused by the reform was the main reason of the continually high growth rate of the agriculture development in the beginning of reform and opening. However, with the deeper development of industrialization and urbanization, the effect of the reform has been disappearing step by step. The contradiction between highly average arrangement and modern agriculture has gradually become more and more obvious. The lowly efficient deployment of resource can not meet the need of modern agriculture any more, based on market, scale, and information. How to realize appropriate scale of management turns to be the thorny problem in the agriculture modernized progress which needs to be solved immediately. Under the premise of stable and constant land contract relations, the government should permit farmer to transfer the land use right in multiple ways, and set up a special market for it. It is practical for appropriate scale of management.
Since economic transition, Chinese government has been always encouraged and supported the land use right transfer. But a large number of experiences and evidences indicate that the high tide of farmland transfer has not come with the policy. The rate of farmland transfer is low, and the transfer market is not active. Theoretically, it is perfect to realize an optimal deployment according to the price and demand, and to build a thorough farmland transfer market system. But why it failed in practice? No matter how the national law or the practice of local government is, why are the forms of farmland transfer so complicated and various? The present researches are mainly following the analytical frame of new classical economics, while these researches could hardly explain the realistic meaning of farmland transfer. Because the new classical economics pays more attention to the market balance, and ignores the transaction costs. Actually, no matter what kind of realization of a balance trading market is, it needs money. Ignorance of the cost will make the "Cost—Benefit" measurement of farmland transfer inaccurate and then get a false conclusion which will lead to the separation of theory and practice. At present, there is little research of farmland transfer from the angle of transaction costs, combining with farmer contract choices. Therefore, it is significant to study the different structures of contract from the angle of transaction costs. Although it is difficult to get the accurate amount of transaction costs, this dissertation manage to build an analytic frame which tightly combines the transaction costs, farmer contact choices, and the right to land contractual management, form the angle of farmer. Form this perspective, the dissertation will test and verify the influence of transaction costs on different choices of contract, mainly following the transaction costs economics, cooperating with the investigation of the farmer in Chengdu-Chongqing economic zone, measuring the transaction costs of farmland transfer, discussing the influence of specific and uncertain assets on transaction costs, looking for the scientific and rational arrangement and design of governing structure, with the aim of saving the transaction costs.
To achieve this research goal, the dissertation has three parts. The first part is basic theory (Chapter4to7). Chapter1is brief introduction to the background, significance, target, content, means and technologies of the research. Chapter2is literature review from the angle of new classical economics and new policy economics, and obtains the entrance of the research. Chapter3builds the analytic frame, on the basic of analyzing basis concepts and, extending the meaning of the transaction costs and contract, briefly explaining the mirror effect of present theories on the research. The second part is test and verifies (Chapter4to7). Chapter4, following the Demesetz Property Rights Model (DPRM), analyze the whole progress of the Chinese farmland contractual management, with the observing data of the national rural residents and the investigation of Chengdu-Chongqing economic zone rural resident, to evaluate the development and character of farmland transfer market. Chapter5, from the basic reason of "three dimensions, three phases" of transaction costs, builds a system to showing the transaction costs of farmland transfer, with the Principal Component Analysis and Pactor Analysis. In chapter6, the dissertation verifies the influence of transaction costs on the choices of contract by Multinomial Logit Model. Chapter7, According to the investigation of the particular case of Renshou village, Yongxing village, Ande village, Huangcheng village, discusses how to save transaction costs under the particular contact structure. The third part is Chapter8, which is the conclusion of the research and inspiration of policy. As mentioned above, the conclusions are as follows:
Firstly, from the investigation on system evolution of the rural land contractual management right circulation, the change is from the internalization of external motivation, and it also is a typical way of induced institutional change, which has experienced four phases of'not allowed, exception allowed, allows a small scale, comprehensive promotion'. And the different phases are also the process which the system operating efficiency enhances increasingly. Whether from external policy adjustment, or the changing of the circulation in the form of development, it is the process that both to reduce transaction costs, and also transform the traditional form to a more advanced form of large-scale circulation. The direction of reform at present is to adhere to the premise of collective land ownership. And the reform evolves along the path of division of property rights (separation of ownership and use right), clearly established ownership (identify the land right and certification), allowing flexibility market (land transfer).
Secondly, from the investigation about the market development of the rural land contractual management right circulation, the speed and scale of rural land circulation showed a trend of accelerated development form the mid-1990s. Both in the national level and in the typical area, the circulation incidence is still low, the moderate management is still in the small-scale, and the land fragmentation has not been improved effectively. National level residents'survey shows that by the end of2009, the annual average per family transferred in0.68acres of arable land, more than only0.37acres in1986, and transferred out0.47acres of arable land, showing a large regional difference. Typical areas'survey shows that the overall level of average household circulation is low, only about4acres/household. Especially in some hilly areas and remote mountainous areas, the phenomenon of abandoning arable land is serious because of the constraints of the agricultural comparative effectiveness. And those areas are also at the level of informal circulation contracts, where civil, rural, short-term and random phenomenon is often among acquaintances, relatives and friends
Thirdly, according to a study in the process of right to the contracted management of land circulation, On the transaction costs and the contracted management of land circulation, information search and communication costs, contract implementation costs, circulation relations, legal documents and program, farmers negotiations ability are the important factors that influence transaction cost, on the other side transaction cost of information search, business negotiation consist the major parts of the transaction costs. The analysis of roll-in and roll-out shows that10main factors have a significant influence on the right to the contracted management of land circulation of transaction costs, including information search and communication cost are the major parts of the transaction costs; Physical asset specificity, the conversion relations are on the other hand the two main factors that affects the overall transaction costs; two personal social capital factors, legal documents and procedures, have less impact on the overall transaction costs.
Fourthly, on the research of the transaction cost and contract choice, according to a study from the point of the contracting parties, farmers transfer between the transaction costs are relatively small, farmer and village collective economic organization on circulation of transaction costs is relatively large. At the same time, taking land circulation as the reference, between farmers empirically transaction cost's influence on farmers choose circulation object, research has shown that compared with farmers spontaneous circulation, information search and communication costs, contract implementation costs, state type of human capital, those facts have a negative impact on the choice of farmers' professional cooperative organizations and enterprises; in addition, the good geographical position area is willing more easily into the enterprise, farmers and their trade is also more convenient; The more farmers to the physical assets of its own, the more increasing the cost negotiations with trading companies are. From other control variables, the relative farmer's spontaneous circulation, family situation, there is no significant difference among the non-agricultural development; Family farmers land resources endowment, the good, the more likely they choose corporate transactions. In the aspect of policy factors, Due to the village collective restrictions on transfers of land, the peasants are more specialized to cooperate with organizations and farmers are more willing to choose trading enterprises. On price factors, in order to obtain a higher price, farmers are more willing to choose deal with farmers' professional cooperative organizations and enterprises.
For the transaction type, transaction costs of substantial rouge are relatively small, rental fee is relatively large. At the same time, share cooperation as the reference, the analysis of the effect of transaction costs for farmers choose circulation type, the results show that, relative to the joint-stock cooperative relations, the flow, legal documents and procedures, farmers negotiating skills have a negative impact on personal social capital for peasant households to choose subcontract, transfer, swaps, rent, assistant plough land circulation type; State type of human capital of farmers have positive influence on choosing to subcontract, transferring, exchanging, renting, assistant plough type; Contract execution cost has a negative effect on farmers choose to swap; Information search and communication cost have positive effects on farmers choose subcontracting and rent, has a negative effect on farmers choose to swap. All above suggesting that the more rigorous legal documents and procedures are, the more farmers get social capital, the more bargaining ability is, the more tend to choose more formal joint-stock cooperative organization program:the stronger to choose the ability to land to farm, prefer to choose subcontracting, swaps, assistant plough forms and so on.
From other control variables, compare to the stock cooperation, family non-farm development situation prompted farmers choose assistant plough; the influence of Household land resources endowment of farmers choose type is not significant. On Policy factors, the village collective restrictions on farmers flow will lead to more farmers choose cooperation. In terms of price factors, farmers in order to obtain a higher price, more willing to choose to rent, and not willing to choose low price transfer and swap.
Fifthly, the typical case study of transaction cost and contract structure found that spontaneous flow relative to farmers,'leading enterprise and peasant household","sharing cooperation, cooperative association and peasant household', land leasing, land contract arrangement such as Banks, played a positive role in saving transaction cost. At this stage but at the same time, on the practice of the rural land circulation, there is no one model which exists alone, usually a pattern and other patterns is supplement with each other, in order to save transaction cost, reduce the risk of default so as to match the contract governance structure is more stable.
Based on the above research results, the article starting from the governance structure of lower transaction costs, provided some policy implications on the stage for the future promote effectively the right to the contracted management of land circulation and the realization of the moderate scale management of land, and, including strengthening land property rights, reduce the uncertainty of trading:Improved circulation service, reducing land trading frequency; Improved as a whole, weaken the land safeguard function; Strengthening mechanism innovation, and promote various forms of circulation.
The main creative points in this article are as follows. The first, analysis of transfer of land use rights by combing transaction expenses and contract option based on the peasant household, this is an improvement for the theory. Secondly, quantitative measured according to the three periods of transaction expenses. And inspect the impact of assets specificity and uncertainty of transaction to transaction expenses from the three based characteristics. Thirdly, using comparative institutional analysis method, empirical analysis how the contract option of peasant households influence transaction expenses. Fourthly, to discuss how to save the transaction expenses though different contract using case study. The conclusion of the whole research is to adopt the shareholding co-operative system, which will improve the land use transfer.
引文
① 中共中央国务院关于当前农业和农村经济发展的若干政策措施(中发(1993)11号)
② 国务院批转农业部《关于稳定和完善土地承包关系的意见》的通知(国发(1995]7号)。
③ 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于进一步稳定和完善农村土地承包关系的通知(中办发(1997)16号)。
④ 中共中央关于农业和农村工作若干重大问题的决定(1998年10月14日中国共产党第十五届中央委员会第三次全体会议通过)
⑤ 中共中央国务院关于做好一九九九年农村和农业工作的意见(中发(1999)3号)。
① 中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题决定(2008年10月12日中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第三次全体会议通过)
1. Alchian A., and Demsetz H.,1972, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization", American Economic Review,62 (50):777-795
2. Alain J., Marcel F., and Elisabeth S.,1991, "Peasant Household Behaviour with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained", Ecnomic Journal,101 (409):1400-1417
3. Arrow K. L.,1969, "The Organization of Economic Activity:Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Non-market Allocation", in The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PBB-System, Joint Economic Committee,91st Congress,1st sessin, Vol.1, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,59-73
4. Barzel Y.,1997, Economic Analysis of Property Rights,2nd edn, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press
5. Besley J.,1987, "Economic and Econogical Approaches to Land Fragmentation in Deference of Muchaligned Phennenon". Annual Review of Anthropology, (16):31-67
6. Besley T.,1995, "Property Rights and Investment Incentives:Theory and Evidence from China". Journal of Political Economy,103 (3):903-937
7. Brandtl L., Huang J. K., and Li G., et al.,2002, "Land rights in China:Facts, Fictions, and Issues". China Journal, Al:67-97
8. Bromley D.W.,2000, "A Most Difficult Passage:the Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union", Journal of Transforming Economies and Societies,7(3): 3-23
9. Bolton P., and M. Dewatripont,2005, "Contract Theory", MA:MIT Press
10. Coase, R.,1937, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica,16 (4):386-405
11. Coase, R.,1960, "The Nature of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics,3 (1):1-44
12. Commons J. R.,1934, Institutional Economics, Madison:University of Wisconsin Press,58-64
13. Colby B. G.,1990, "Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation", Amercian Journal of Agricultural Economics,72:1-44
14. Demsetz H.,1967, "Toward a Theory of Propery Rights". Amercian Economic Rieview. (2):347-348
15. Demsetz H.,1968, "The Cost of Transacting", Quarterly Journal of Economic,82:33-53
16. Douglase M.,2000, "An Econmoic Case for Land Reform", Land Use Policy,17:49-57
17. Dong X. Y.,1996, "Two-Tier Land Tenure System and Sustained Economic Growth in Post-1978 Ruarl China", World Development,24 (5):915-928
18. Elizabeth B., and Chip S.,2002, "Agricultural Land Fragmentation:the Spatial Effects of Three Land Protection Strategies in the Eastern United States", Landscape and Urban Planning,58: 255-268
19. Edgeworth F. Y.,1881, "Mathematical Psychics", London:Routledge & Kegan Pau Co.l,16-20
20. Eggertsson T.,1990a, Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press
21. Eggertsson T.,1990b, "The Role of Transaction Costs and Propety Rights in Economic Analysis" European Economic Review,34 (2):450-457
22. Feder G., and Feeney,1993, "The Theory of Land Tenure and Property Rights", World Bank Eonomic Review,5:135-153
23. Fleishr B. M., and Liu Y. H.,1992, "Economics of Scale, Plotsize. Human Capital and Productivity in Chinese Agriculture", Quanterly Review of Economics and Finance,32 (3):112-123
24. Furubotn E. G., and R. Richter,1997, Institutions and Economic Theory:The Contribution of the New Insitutional Economics, Ann Arbor, Michgan:University of Michigan Press
25. Grossman S., and Hart O.,1983, "An Analysis of the Principal Agent Problem", Econometrica,5: 7-45
26. Grossman S., and Hart O.,1986, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Politcal Economy,94:691-719
27. Hart O., and J. Moore,1990. "Proterty Rights and Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy,98 (6):1119-1158
28. Hart O., and J. Moore,2008, "Contracts as Refrence Points", Quarterly Journal of Economics,123 (1):1-48
29. Heston A., and Kumar D.1983, "The Persistence of Land Peasant Agriculture", South Asia Explores in Economic History, (20):199-220
30. Huang Jikun, and Scott Rozelle,1996, "Technological Change:the Rediscovering of the Engine of Productivity Growth in China's Rural Economy", Journal of Development Economics,49:337-369
31. Holmstrom B.,1982a, "Moral Hazard in Team", Bell Journal of Economics,10:74-91
32. Holmstrom B.,1982b, "Managerial Incentive Problems:A Dynamic Perspective", Review of Economics Studies,66 (1):169-182
33. Jean O. L.,1999, "Infomration and the Operation of Markets:Tests Based on Ageneral Equilibrium Model of Land Leasing in India", Journal of Development Economics,60:497-527
34. Jensen M., and W. Meckling.,1976, "Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics,60:497-527
35. Jill E. Hobbs,1997, "Measuring the Importance of Transaction Costs in Cattle Marketing", American Journal of Agricultural Economics,19 (4):1083-1095
36. Johnson D., and Gale,1997, "Agriculture and Wealth of Nations", Ameriean Economic Review,87 (2):11-12
37. Julinao J., Assung, Maitreesh G.,2003, "Can Unobserved Heterogeneity in Farmer Ability Explain the Inverse Relationship Between Farm Size Produetiviyt", Economics Letters,80:189-194
38. Justin Yifu Lin,1992, "Rural Reform and Agricultural Growth in China", American Economic Review,82 (1):34-51
39. Kenneth J. Arrow, and Gerard Deberu,1954, "Existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy", Economyetric,22 (3):265-290
40. Klaus D., and Jin S. Q.,2005, "The Potential of Land Rental markets in the Process of Economic Development:Evidence from China", Journal of Development Economics,72 (2):241-270
41. Klein B.,1980, "Borderlins of Law and Economic Theory:Transaction Cost Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedding,70: 356-362
42. Kung J. K. S.,2002, "Off-Farm Labor Markets and the Emergence of Land Rental Market in Rural China".Journal of Comparative Economics, (30):395-414
43. Kung J. K.,1995, "Equal Entitlement versus Tenure Security under a Regime of Collective Property Rights:Peasants Performance for Institutions in Post-reform Chinese Agriculture" Journal of Comparative Economics,21:82-111
44. Kung J. K.,2000, "Common Property Rights andLand Reallocations in Rural China:Evidence from a village Survey," World Development,28:701-719
45. Lori L., and Lovell,2003, "Combing Spatial and Survey Data to Explain Participation in Agricultural Land Participation Programs", Land Economics,79 (2):259-276
46. Macher J. T., and Richman B. D.,2006, "TCE, an Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Science", Duke Law School Working Paper Series,62
47. Masten S. E.,1984, "The Organization of Production:Evidence from the Aerospace Industy", Journal of Law and Economics,27:403-417
48. Masten S. E., and Saussier S.,2000, "Econometrics of Contracts:An Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contraction", Revue D'EConomie Industrieelle,92:215-236
49. Matthew G.,2001, "Agricultural and Reform in Moldova," Land use Policy,18:269-279
50. Mccann L., et al.,2005, "Transaction Cost Measurement for Evaluating Environmental Poicies" Ecological Economics,52:527-542
51. McMillan John, John Whalley, and Lijing Zhu,1989, "The Impact of China's Economic Reformson Agricultural Productivity Growth", Journal of Political Economy,97:781-807
52. North D.,1990a, "A Transaction Cost Theory Politics", Journal of Political Economy,2 (4):355-367
53. North D.,1990b, "Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance", Combridge: Combridge University Press
54. P. Samueslson, and William D. N.,2009, "Economics (19th) ", McGraw Hill Higher Education
55. Rothschild M., and Stihlitz J. E.,1976, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:An Eassy on the Economics of Imperfect Information". Quarterly Journal of Economic.80:629-649
56. Ross S. A.,1973, "The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal's Probelem", Journal of Economic Perspecttives,13 (4):169-192
57. Shelanski H. A., and Klein P. G.,1995, "Empirical Research in Transaction Costs Eonomics, a Review and Assessment", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,11:335-361
58. Simon H. A.,1955, "Behavioral Model of Rational Choice". Quarterly Journal of Economic,69: 99-118
59. Stihlitz J. E., and Weiss A.,1981, "Credit Rationing in Market with Imperfect Information", American Economic Review,71:393-410
60. Steven N. S. Cheung,1969, "The Theory of Share Tenancy", Chicgo:University of Chicago Press
61. Steven N. S. Cheung,1983, "The Contracture Nature of the Firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26:1-21
62. Tan R., Heeringk N., and Qu F. T.,2006, "Land Fragmentation and Its Driving Forces in China" Land Use Policy,23:272-285
63. Tan R., Heeringk N., Kruseman G., and Qu F. T.,2008, "Do Fragmented Landholdings Have Higher Production Costs? Evidence From Rice Farmers in Jiangxi Province, P. R. China", China Economic Review,3:347-358
64. Terry D.,2003, "Scenarios of Central European Land Fragmentation", Land Use Policy,20:149-158
65. Yao Y.,2000, "The Development of Land Lease Market in Rural China", Land Economics,72 (2): 252-266
66. Wan G. H., and Cheng E. J.,2001, "Effects of Land Fragmentation and Returns to Scale in the Chinese Farming Sector", Applied Economics,33:183-194
67. Wang J. R., Gail L., and Cramer E. J.,2000, "Production Eficiency of Chinese Agriculture: Evidence from Rural Household Datas", Agricultural Economics, (15):17-28
68. Wen G., and Kevin P.,2007, "Transactiong Costs and Cattle Farmers'Choice Channels in China:A Tobit Analysis", Mannagement Research News,30 (1)
69. Williamson O. E.,1979, "Transaction-Cost Economics:The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, XXII,2:233-261
70. Williamson O. E.,1985, "The Economic Institutions of Capitalism", New York:Fress Press
71. Williamson O. E.,1991, "Comparative Economics Organization:The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Adminsittration Science Quarterly,36:269-96
72. Williamson O. E.,1996, "The Mechanism of Governance", New York:Oxford University. Press
73. Williamson O. E.,2000, "The New Institutional Economics:Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", Journal of Economic literature, XXXⅧ,3:596-613
74. Williamson O. E.,2002, "The Therory of the Firm as Governance Structure:From Choice to Contract", Journal of Economic Perspectives,16 (3):171-195
75. Yvrande-Billon A., and Saussier S.,2004, "Do Organzation Choices Matter? Assessing the Importance of Governance through Performance Comparisons", in J.Harvey (Ed.), New Ideas in Contraction and Organizational Economic Research, Norwell MA:Kluwer Academic Publishers
76.[俄]A·恰亚诺夫.萧正洪译.农民的经济组织[M].北京：中国编译出版社,1996：307—310
77.北京天则经济研究所《中国土地问题》课题组.土地流转与农业现代化[J].管理世界,2010,(9)：66—85、97
78.卜范达,韩喜平.“农户经营”内涵探析[J].当代经济研究,2003,(9)：37—41
79.柏振忠,王红玲.“双重有限约束下”的我国农地承包经营权流转的影响因素实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2010,(3)：121—128
80.蔡荣,虢佳花,祁春节.“公司+农户”的交易效率与契约选择[J].商业研究,2008,(2)：54—56
81.陈美球,邓爱珍,周丙娟,等.耕地流转中农户行为的影响因素实证研究--基于江西省42个县市64个乡镇74个行政村的抽样调查[J].中国软科学,2008,(7)：6—13
82.陈铁,孟令杰.土地调整、地权稳定性与农户长期投资：基于江苏省调查数据的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2007,(10)：4-11
83.陈锡文.中国农村改革：回顾与展望[M].天津：天津人民出版社,1993
84.陈曜,罗进华.对中国农村土地流转缓慢原因的研究[J].上海经济研究,2004,(6)：29—35
85.程志强.对我国土地信用合作社时间的思考--以宁夏平罗为例[J].管理世界,2008,(11)：1—8
86.邓大才.试论农村地产市场发育的障碍及对策[J].中国软科学,1997,(11)：22—29
87.邓大才.农地流转的交易成本与价格研究--农地流转的价格决定因素[J].财经问题研究,2007,(9)：89—95
88.邓大才.农地流转市场何以形成--以红旗村、梨园屯村、湖村、小岗村为例[J].中国农村观察,2009a,(3)：26—35
89.邓大才.制度安排、交易成本与农地流转价格[J].中州学刊,2009b,(3)：58—61
90.邓宏图,崔宝敏.制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择：一个有关合作经济的案例分析[J]管理世界,2008,(6)：61—67、94
91.邓宏图,李德良.农地产权、合约选择与制度变迁：一个有关农地租约的历史逻辑分析[J].江苏社会科学,2008,(5)：39—47
92.杜文星,黄贤金.区域农户农地流转意愿差异及其驱动力研究--以上海市、南京市、泰州市、扬州市农户调查为例[J].资源科学,2005,(6)：90—94
93.杜润生.杜润生自述：中国农村体制改革重大决策纪实[M].北京：人民出版社,2005：100
94.方鹏,黄贤金,陈志刚,等.区域农村土地市场发育的农户行为响应与农业土地利用变化— —以江苏省苏州市、南京市、扬州市村庄及农户调查为例[J].自然资源学报,2003,(3)：319-325
95.[法]费尔南·布罗代尔.资本主义的动力[M].杨起译.北京：读书·生活·新知三联出版社,1997：102
96.韩俊等.破解三农难题--30年农村改革和发展[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2008：98
97.韩俊.我国农村下一步改革的重点及政策走向[J].发展研究,2009,(7)：26-31
98.韩连贵.关于农村土地使用权流转的发展趋势分析[J].经济研究参考,2005,(3)：33-36
99.何一鸣,罗必良.农地流转、交易费用与产权管制：理论范式与博弈分析[J].农村经济,2012,(1)：7—12.
100.黄季焜.六十年中国农业的发展和三十年改革奇迹：制度创新、技术进步和市场改革[J].农业技术经济,2010,(1)：4—18
101.黄少安.从家庭承包制的土地经营权到股份合作制的“准土地股权”：理论矛盾、形成机理和解决思路[J].经济研究,1995,(1)：20、32-37
102.黄贤金,张安录主编.土地经济学[M].北京：中国农业大学出版社,2008：264
103.胡新艳,张日新.农地规模流转视角的转型发展：自发达地区的一个村观察[J].改革,2010：83-90
104.胡冬生,余秀江,王宣喻.农业产业化路径选择：农地入股流转、发展股份合作经济：以广东梅州长教村为例,2010,(3)：47-59
105.金松青,Klaus D.中国农村土地租赁市场的发展及其在土地使用公平性和效率性上的含义[J].经济学(季刊),2004,(4)：1003—1027
106.冀县卿,钱忠好.农地产权结构变迁与中国农业增长：一个经济解释[J].管理世界,2009,(1)：172—173
107.[美]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨,等著.[瑞]拉斯·沃因,汉斯·韦坎德,编.李凤圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1999：9—12
108.孟召将.交易费用决定了农地流转契约选择——区域比较研究[J].江西财经大学学报,2012,(4)：13—20
109.聂辉华.声誉、契约与组织[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2009：15
110.农业部农村合作经济研究课题组.1990：中国农村土地承包经营制度及合作组织运行考察[J]农业经济问题,1991,(8)：33—48
111.农业部农村合作经济研究课题组.中国农村土地承包经营制度及合作组织运行考察[J].农业经济问题,1993,(11)：45—53
112.农业部农村合作经济研究课题组.中国农村土地承包经营制度及合作组织运行考察(一)[J].农业经济问题,1996,(1)：41—43
113.姜爱林.改革开放以来中国土地政策的发展变迁[J].中州学刊,2003,(5)：48—53
114.孔祥智,徐珍源.转出土地农户选择流转对象的影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2010,(12)：17—25、67
115.孔祥智,涂圣伟,史冰清.中国农村改革30年：历程、经验和前景展望[J].教学与研究,2008,(9)：19—25
116.[法]莱昂·瓦尔拉斯.纯粹经济学要义[M].蔡受百译.北京：商务印书馆,1989
117.刘成玉,杨琦.对农村土地流转几个理论问题的认识[J].农业经济问题,2010,(10)：48—52
118.林毅夫.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海：上海三联书店,1994
119.罗必良,吴晨.交易效率：农地承包经营权流转的新视角——基于广东个案研究[J].农业技术经济,2008,(2)：12—18
120.罗必良,李尚蒲.农地流转的交易费用：威廉姆森分析范式及广东的证据[J].农业经济问题,2010,(12)：30—40
121.罗必良,汪沙,李尚蒲.交易费用、农户认知与农地流转——来自广东省的农户问卷调查[J].农业技术经济,2012,(1)：11—21
122.[美]罗思高,黄季焜,[日]大塚启二郎.中国农业的发展动力：生物技术进步、市场化和土地租赁[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2006,(1)：16—28
123.刘克春,林坚.农地承包经营权市场流转与行政性调整：理论与实证分析--基于农户层面和江西省实证研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2005,(11)：99—111
124.刘克春,池泽新.农业税费减免及粮食补贴、地租与农户农地转入行为——以江西省为例[J].农业技术经济,2008,(1)：79-83
125.刘克春,苏为华.资源禀赋、交易费用与农地流转[J].统计研究,2006,(5)：73—77
126.刘克春.农户要素禀赋、交易费用与农户农地转出行为——基于江西省农户调查[J].商业研究,2008,(8)：164—168
127.刘广栋,程久苗.1949年以来中国农村土地制度变迁的理论与实践[J].中国农村观察,2007,(2)：70—80
128.廖洪乐.农村改革试验区的土地制度建设试验[J].管理世界,1998,(2)：154—163
129.廖洪乐.农村承包地调整[J].中国农村观察,2003,(1)：46—54
130.刘守英.中国农地集体所有制的结构与变迁：来自村庄的经验[J].中国社会科学,1997,(3)：39—53
131.李启宇,张文秀.城乡统筹背景下农户农地经营权流转意愿及其影响因素分析——基于成渝地区428户农户的调查数据[J].农业技术经济,2010,(5)：47—54
132.李孔岳.农地专用性资产与交易的不确定性对农地流转交易费用的影响[J].管理世界,2009,(3)：92—98
133.卢现祥,朱巧玲.交易费用测量的两个层次及其相互关系研究述评[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006,(3)：97—108
134.牛梅武.土地承包经营权流转市场建设问题研究[D].乌鲁木齐：新疆农业大学,2010
135.乔榛,焦方义,李楠.中国农村经济制度变迁与农业增长——对1978—-2004年中国农业增长的实证分析[J].经济研究,2006,(7)：73—82
136.钱忠好.节约交易费用：农业产业企业经营成功的关键——对江苏如意集团的个案研究[J].中国农村经济,2000,(8)：62—66
137.钱忠好.中国农村土地承包经营权的产权残缺与重建研究[J].江苏社会科学,2002a：39—47
138.钱忠好.农村土地承包经营权产权残缺与市场流转困境：理论与政策分析[J].管理世界,2002b,(6)：35—45
139.钱忠好.农地承包经营权市场流转：理论与实证分析--基于农户层面的经济分析[J].经济研究,2003,(5)：83—91
140.[法]让·雅克·卢梭.何兆武译.社会契约论(修订第3版)[M].上海：商务印书馆,2003
141.[日]速水佑次郎,[美]拉坦.郭保熙,张进铭,等译.农业发展的国际分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2000：183—185
142.苏旭霞,王秀清.农用地细碎化与农户粮食生产[J].中国农村经济,2002,(4)：22—28
143.史清华,贾生华.农户家庭农地要素流动趋势及其根源比较[J].管理世界,2002(1)：71—77、92
144.史清华,贾生华.农户家庭农地流转及形成根源——以东部沿海苏鲁浙三省为例[J].中国经济问题,2003,(4)：41—54
145.史清华,徐翠萍.农户家庭农地流转行为的变迁和形成根源——1986—2005年长三角15村调查[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2007,(6)：1—9
146.邵传林.农村土地信用合作社兴起的逻辑——来自宁夏平罗县的个案研究[J].农业经济问题,2010,(6)：69—74
147.田传浩,贾生华.农地制度、地权稳定性与农地使用权市场发育：理论与来自苏浙鲁的经验[J].经济研究,2004,(1)：112—119
148.谭丹,黄贤金.区域农村劳动力市场发育对农地流转的影响——以江苏省宝应县为例[J].中国土地科学,2007,(6)：64—68
149.谭淑豪,曲福田,Nico H.土地细碎化的成因及其影响因素分析[J].中国农村观察,2003,(6)：24—30、70
150.[英]托马斯·霍布斯.黎思复,黎延弼译.利维坦[M].上海：商务印书馆,1980：195、685—686
151.王颜齐,郭翔宇.农地规模化流转背景下的农业雇佣生产合约：理论模型及实证分析[J].中国农村观察,2011a,(4)：61—76
152.王颜齐,郭翔宇.土地承包经营权流转：双边交易与集中交易[J].农业技术经济,2011b,(10)：46—53、54
153.王兴稳,钟甫宁.土地细碎化与农用地流转市场[J].中国农村观察,2008,(4)：29—34
154.王秀清,苏旭霞.农用地细碎化对农业生产的影响--以山东省莱西市为例[J].农业技术经济,2002,(2)：3—7
155.王景新.中国农村土地制度的世纪变革[J].北京：中国经济出版社,2001：14
156.王晓兵,侯麟杰,张砚杰,等.中国农村土地流转市场发育及其对农业生产的影响[J].农业 技术经济,2011,(4)：40-45
157.汪丁丁.从“交易费用”到博弈均衡[J].经济研究,1995,(9)：72—80
158.伍振军,张云华,孔祥智.交易费用、政府行为和模式比较：中国土地承包经营权流转实证研究[J].中国软科学,2011,(4)：174—183
159.[美]约瑟夫·熊彼特.朱泱译.经济分析史[M].北京：商务印书馆,1991：345
160.许恒周、郭忠兴和郭玉燕.农民职业分化、养老保障与农村土地流转——基于南京市372份农户问卷调查的实证研究[J].农业技术经济,2011,(1)：81—85
161.徐旭,蒋文华,应风其.我国农村土地流转的动因分析[J].管理世界,2002,(2)：144--145
162.许庆,章元.土地调整、地权稳定性与农民长期投资激励[J].经济研究,2005,(10)：59—69
163.许庆,尹荣梁,章辉.规模经济、规模报酬与农业适度规模经营--基于我国粮食生产的实证研究[J].经济研究,2011,(3)：59—71、94
164.[美]西奥多·w·舒尔茨.梁小民译.改造传统农业[M].北京：商务印书馆,2003：22—48
165.[英]亚当·斯密.郭大力,王亚南译.国民财富的性质和原因的研究[M].北京：商务印书馆,2005
166.岳意定,刘莉君.基于网络层次分析法的农村土地流转经济绩效评价[J].中国农村经济,2010,(8)：36-47
167.[英]约翰·伊特韦尔,[美]默里·米尔盖特,[美]彼得·纽曼,编.陈岱孙主编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996
168.俞海,黄季焜,Soctt Roszelle,等.地权稳定性、土地流转与农地资源持续利用[J].经济研究,2003,(9)：82-95
169.[英]约翰·希克斯.价值与资本：经济理论的若干基本原则之探究[M].薛蕃康译.北京：商务印书馆,2008
170.余鹏翼,李善民.中国发达地区农地使用权流转性问题探讨——以广东省南海市为例[J].中国农村经济,2004,(12)：22-26
171.杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论：一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：104-115
172.叶剑平.中国农村土地产权制度研究[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2000：16
173.叶剑平,蒋妍,丰雷.中国农村土地流转市场的调查研究——基于2005年17省调查的分析和建议[J].中国农村观察,2006,(4)：48—55
174.叶剑平,丰雷,蒋妍,等.中国农村土地使用权调查研究——17省份调查结果与政策建议[J].管理世界,2010,(1)：64—73
175.易宪容.交易行为与合约选择[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1999
176.姚洋.农地制度与农业绩效的实证研究[J].中国农村观察,1998,(6)：1—10
177.姚洋.非农就业结构与土地租赁市场的发育[J].中国农村观察,1999,(2)：16-21
178.姚洋.集体决策下的诱导性制度变迁--中国农村地权稳定性演化的实证分析[J].中国农村观察,2000(2)：11-18
179.晏智杰.边际革命和新古典经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2004
180.中央书记处农村政策研究室.中国农村社会经济典型调查(1985)[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1998：84
181.钟甫宁,王兴稳.现阶段农地流转市场能减轻土地细碎化程度吗?——来自江苏兴化和黑龙江宾县的初步证据[J].农业经济问题,2010,(1)：23—32
182.钟甫宁,纪月清.土地产权、非农就业机会与农户农业生产投资[J].经济研究,2009,(12)：43—51
183.钟林,唐小我.农地流转交易的市场均衡分析[J].中国管理科学,2009,(4)：141—147
184.张文秀,李冬梅,邢殊媛,等.农户土地流转行为的影响因素分析[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(10)：14—17
185.张红宇.中国农地调整与使用权流转：几点评论[J].管理世界,2002,(5)：76—87
186.张五常.经济解释[M].北京：商务印书馆,2000：407
187.张三峰,杨德才.农民的土地调整意愿及其影响因素分析——基于2006年中国综合社会调查数据[J].中国农村观察,2010,(1)：15—24、33
188.张忠明,钱文荣.农户土地经营规模与粮食生产效率关系实证研究[J].中国土地科学,2010,(8)：52-58
189.钟涨宝,汪萍.农地流转过程中的农户行为分析[J].中国农村观察,2003,(6)：55-64
190.赵其卓,唐忠.农用土地流转现状与农户土地流转合约选择的实证研究——以四川省绵竹市为例[J].中国农村观察,2008,(3)：13—19、28
191.赵德起.中国农村地权的理论探索与路径选择[J].财经问题研究,2007,(3)：74-80
192.赵德起,汪洋.中国农村地权的市场配置——契约与产权的视角[J].经济社会体制比较,2008,(1)：26-32
193.周其仁.中国农村改革：国家与所有权关系的变化——一个经济体制变迁史的回顾(上)[J].管理世界,1995,(3)：178—198、220
194.周其仁.中国农村改革：国家与所有权关系的变化——一个经济体制变迁史的回顾(下)[J].管理世界,1995,(4)：147-155
195.邹伟,吴群.基于交易成本分析的农用地内部流转对策研究[J].农村经济,2006,(12)：41—43
② 国务院批转农业部《关于稳定和完善土地承包关系的意见》的通知(国发(1995]7号)。
③ 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于进一步稳定和完善农村土地承包关系的通知(中办发(1997)16号)。
④ 中共中央关于农业和农村工作若干重大问题的决定(1998年10月14日中国共产党第十五届中央委员会第三次全体会议通过)
⑤ 中共中央国务院关于做好一九九九年农村和农业工作的意见(中发(1999)3号)。
① 中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题决定(2008年10月12日中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第三次全体会议通过)
1. Alchian A., and Demsetz H.,1972, "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization", American Economic Review,62 (50):777-795
2. Alain J., Marcel F., and Elisabeth S.,1991, "Peasant Household Behaviour with Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained", Ecnomic Journal,101 (409):1400-1417
3. Arrow K. L.,1969, "The Organization of Economic Activity:Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Non-market Allocation", in The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PBB-System, Joint Economic Committee,91st Congress,1st sessin, Vol.1, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,59-73
4. Barzel Y.,1997, Economic Analysis of Property Rights,2nd edn, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press
5. Besley J.,1987, "Economic and Econogical Approaches to Land Fragmentation in Deference of Muchaligned Phennenon". Annual Review of Anthropology, (16):31-67
6. Besley T.,1995, "Property Rights and Investment Incentives:Theory and Evidence from China". Journal of Political Economy,103 (3):903-937
7. Brandtl L., Huang J. K., and Li G., et al.,2002, "Land rights in China:Facts, Fictions, and Issues". China Journal, Al:67-97
8. Bromley D.W.,2000, "A Most Difficult Passage:the Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union", Journal of Transforming Economies and Societies,7(3): 3-23
9. Bolton P., and M. Dewatripont,2005, "Contract Theory", MA:MIT Press
10. Coase, R.,1937, "The Nature of the Firm", Economica,16 (4):386-405
11. Coase, R.,1960, "The Nature of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics,3 (1):1-44
12. Commons J. R.,1934, Institutional Economics, Madison:University of Wisconsin Press,58-64
13. Colby B. G.,1990, "Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation", Amercian Journal of Agricultural Economics,72:1-44
14. Demsetz H.,1967, "Toward a Theory of Propery Rights". Amercian Economic Rieview. (2):347-348
15. Demsetz H.,1968, "The Cost of Transacting", Quarterly Journal of Economic,82:33-53
16. Douglase M.,2000, "An Econmoic Case for Land Reform", Land Use Policy,17:49-57
17. Dong X. Y.,1996, "Two-Tier Land Tenure System and Sustained Economic Growth in Post-1978 Ruarl China", World Development,24 (5):915-928
18. Elizabeth B., and Chip S.,2002, "Agricultural Land Fragmentation:the Spatial Effects of Three Land Protection Strategies in the Eastern United States", Landscape and Urban Planning,58: 255-268
19. Edgeworth F. Y.,1881, "Mathematical Psychics", London:Routledge & Kegan Pau Co.l,16-20
20. Eggertsson T.,1990a, Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press
21. Eggertsson T.,1990b, "The Role of Transaction Costs and Propety Rights in Economic Analysis" European Economic Review,34 (2):450-457
22. Feder G., and Feeney,1993, "The Theory of Land Tenure and Property Rights", World Bank Eonomic Review,5:135-153
23. Fleishr B. M., and Liu Y. H.,1992, "Economics of Scale, Plotsize. Human Capital and Productivity in Chinese Agriculture", Quanterly Review of Economics and Finance,32 (3):112-123
24. Furubotn E. G., and R. Richter,1997, Institutions and Economic Theory:The Contribution of the New Insitutional Economics, Ann Arbor, Michgan:University of Michigan Press
25. Grossman S., and Hart O.,1983, "An Analysis of the Principal Agent Problem", Econometrica,5: 7-45
26. Grossman S., and Hart O.,1986, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Politcal Economy,94:691-719
27. Hart O., and J. Moore,1990. "Proterty Rights and Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political Economy,98 (6):1119-1158
28. Hart O., and J. Moore,2008, "Contracts as Refrence Points", Quarterly Journal of Economics,123 (1):1-48
29. Heston A., and Kumar D.1983, "The Persistence of Land Peasant Agriculture", South Asia Explores in Economic History, (20):199-220
30. Huang Jikun, and Scott Rozelle,1996, "Technological Change:the Rediscovering of the Engine of Productivity Growth in China's Rural Economy", Journal of Development Economics,49:337-369
31. Holmstrom B.,1982a, "Moral Hazard in Team", Bell Journal of Economics,10:74-91
32. Holmstrom B.,1982b, "Managerial Incentive Problems:A Dynamic Perspective", Review of Economics Studies,66 (1):169-182
33. Jean O. L.,1999, "Infomration and the Operation of Markets:Tests Based on Ageneral Equilibrium Model of Land Leasing in India", Journal of Development Economics,60:497-527
34. Jensen M., and W. Meckling.,1976, "Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure", Journal of Financial Economics,60:497-527
35. Jill E. Hobbs,1997, "Measuring the Importance of Transaction Costs in Cattle Marketing", American Journal of Agricultural Economics,19 (4):1083-1095
36. Johnson D., and Gale,1997, "Agriculture and Wealth of Nations", Ameriean Economic Review,87 (2):11-12
37. Julinao J., Assung, Maitreesh G.,2003, "Can Unobserved Heterogeneity in Farmer Ability Explain the Inverse Relationship Between Farm Size Produetiviyt", Economics Letters,80:189-194
38. Justin Yifu Lin,1992, "Rural Reform and Agricultural Growth in China", American Economic Review,82 (1):34-51
39. Kenneth J. Arrow, and Gerard Deberu,1954, "Existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy", Economyetric,22 (3):265-290
40. Klaus D., and Jin S. Q.,2005, "The Potential of Land Rental markets in the Process of Economic Development:Evidence from China", Journal of Development Economics,72 (2):241-270
41. Klein B.,1980, "Borderlins of Law and Economic Theory:Transaction Cost Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements", American Economic Review Papers and Proceedding,70: 356-362
42. Kung J. K. S.,2002, "Off-Farm Labor Markets and the Emergence of Land Rental Market in Rural China".Journal of Comparative Economics, (30):395-414
43. Kung J. K.,1995, "Equal Entitlement versus Tenure Security under a Regime of Collective Property Rights:Peasants Performance for Institutions in Post-reform Chinese Agriculture" Journal of Comparative Economics,21:82-111
44. Kung J. K.,2000, "Common Property Rights andLand Reallocations in Rural China:Evidence from a village Survey," World Development,28:701-719
45. Lori L., and Lovell,2003, "Combing Spatial and Survey Data to Explain Participation in Agricultural Land Participation Programs", Land Economics,79 (2):259-276
46. Macher J. T., and Richman B. D.,2006, "TCE, an Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Science", Duke Law School Working Paper Series,62
47. Masten S. E.,1984, "The Organization of Production:Evidence from the Aerospace Industy", Journal of Law and Economics,27:403-417
48. Masten S. E., and Saussier S.,2000, "Econometrics of Contracts:An Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contraction", Revue D'EConomie Industrieelle,92:215-236
49. Matthew G.,2001, "Agricultural and Reform in Moldova," Land use Policy,18:269-279
50. Mccann L., et al.,2005, "Transaction Cost Measurement for Evaluating Environmental Poicies" Ecological Economics,52:527-542
51. McMillan John, John Whalley, and Lijing Zhu,1989, "The Impact of China's Economic Reformson Agricultural Productivity Growth", Journal of Political Economy,97:781-807
52. North D.,1990a, "A Transaction Cost Theory Politics", Journal of Political Economy,2 (4):355-367
53. North D.,1990b, "Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance", Combridge: Combridge University Press
54. P. Samueslson, and William D. N.,2009, "Economics (19th) ", McGraw Hill Higher Education
55. Rothschild M., and Stihlitz J. E.,1976, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets:An Eassy on the Economics of Imperfect Information". Quarterly Journal of Economic.80:629-649
56. Ross S. A.,1973, "The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal's Probelem", Journal of Economic Perspecttives,13 (4):169-192
57. Shelanski H. A., and Klein P. G.,1995, "Empirical Research in Transaction Costs Eonomics, a Review and Assessment", Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,11:335-361
58. Simon H. A.,1955, "Behavioral Model of Rational Choice". Quarterly Journal of Economic,69: 99-118
59. Stihlitz J. E., and Weiss A.,1981, "Credit Rationing in Market with Imperfect Information", American Economic Review,71:393-410
60. Steven N. S. Cheung,1969, "The Theory of Share Tenancy", Chicgo:University of Chicago Press
61. Steven N. S. Cheung,1983, "The Contracture Nature of the Firm", Journal of Law and Economics, 26:1-21
62. Tan R., Heeringk N., and Qu F. T.,2006, "Land Fragmentation and Its Driving Forces in China" Land Use Policy,23:272-285
63. Tan R., Heeringk N., Kruseman G., and Qu F. T.,2008, "Do Fragmented Landholdings Have Higher Production Costs? Evidence From Rice Farmers in Jiangxi Province, P. R. China", China Economic Review,3:347-358
64. Terry D.,2003, "Scenarios of Central European Land Fragmentation", Land Use Policy,20:149-158
65. Yao Y.,2000, "The Development of Land Lease Market in Rural China", Land Economics,72 (2): 252-266
66. Wan G. H., and Cheng E. J.,2001, "Effects of Land Fragmentation and Returns to Scale in the Chinese Farming Sector", Applied Economics,33:183-194
67. Wang J. R., Gail L., and Cramer E. J.,2000, "Production Eficiency of Chinese Agriculture: Evidence from Rural Household Datas", Agricultural Economics, (15):17-28
68. Wen G., and Kevin P.,2007, "Transactiong Costs and Cattle Farmers'Choice Channels in China:A Tobit Analysis", Mannagement Research News,30 (1)
69. Williamson O. E.,1979, "Transaction-Cost Economics:The Governance of Contractual Relations", Journal of Law and Economics, XXII,2:233-261
70. Williamson O. E.,1985, "The Economic Institutions of Capitalism", New York:Fress Press
71. Williamson O. E.,1991, "Comparative Economics Organization:The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives", Adminsittration Science Quarterly,36:269-96
72. Williamson O. E.,1996, "The Mechanism of Governance", New York:Oxford University. Press
73. Williamson O. E.,2000, "The New Institutional Economics:Taking Stock, Looking Ahead", Journal of Economic literature, XXXⅧ,3:596-613
74. Williamson O. E.,2002, "The Therory of the Firm as Governance Structure:From Choice to Contract", Journal of Economic Perspectives,16 (3):171-195
75. Yvrande-Billon A., and Saussier S.,2004, "Do Organzation Choices Matter? Assessing the Importance of Governance through Performance Comparisons", in J.Harvey (Ed.), New Ideas in Contraction and Organizational Economic Research, Norwell MA:Kluwer Academic Publishers
76.[俄]A·恰亚诺夫.萧正洪译.农民的经济组织[M].北京：中国编译出版社,1996：307—310
77.北京天则经济研究所《中国土地问题》课题组.土地流转与农业现代化[J].管理世界,2010,(9)：66—85、97
78.卜范达,韩喜平.“农户经营”内涵探析[J].当代经济研究,2003,(9)：37—41
79.柏振忠,王红玲.“双重有限约束下”的我国农地承包经营权流转的影响因素实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2010,(3)：121—128
80.蔡荣,虢佳花,祁春节.“公司+农户”的交易效率与契约选择[J].商业研究,2008,(2)：54—56
81.陈美球,邓爱珍,周丙娟,等.耕地流转中农户行为的影响因素实证研究--基于江西省42个县市64个乡镇74个行政村的抽样调查[J].中国软科学,2008,(7)：6—13
82.陈铁,孟令杰.土地调整、地权稳定性与农户长期投资：基于江苏省调查数据的实证分析[J].农业经济问题,2007,(10)：4-11
83.陈锡文.中国农村改革：回顾与展望[M].天津：天津人民出版社,1993
84.陈曜,罗进华.对中国农村土地流转缓慢原因的研究[J].上海经济研究,2004,(6)：29—35
85.程志强.对我国土地信用合作社时间的思考--以宁夏平罗为例[J].管理世界,2008,(11)：1—8
86.邓大才.试论农村地产市场发育的障碍及对策[J].中国软科学,1997,(11)：22—29
87.邓大才.农地流转的交易成本与价格研究--农地流转的价格决定因素[J].财经问题研究,2007,(9)：89—95
88.邓大才.农地流转市场何以形成--以红旗村、梨园屯村、湖村、小岗村为例[J].中国农村观察,2009a,(3)：26—35
89.邓大才.制度安排、交易成本与农地流转价格[J].中州学刊,2009b,(3)：58—61
90.邓宏图,崔宝敏.制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择：一个有关合作经济的案例分析[J]管理世界,2008,(6)：61—67、94
91.邓宏图,李德良.农地产权、合约选择与制度变迁：一个有关农地租约的历史逻辑分析[J].江苏社会科学,2008,(5)：39—47
92.杜文星,黄贤金.区域农户农地流转意愿差异及其驱动力研究--以上海市、南京市、泰州市、扬州市农户调查为例[J].资源科学,2005,(6)：90—94
93.杜润生.杜润生自述：中国农村体制改革重大决策纪实[M].北京：人民出版社,2005：100
94.方鹏,黄贤金,陈志刚,等.区域农村土地市场发育的农户行为响应与农业土地利用变化— —以江苏省苏州市、南京市、扬州市村庄及农户调查为例[J].自然资源学报,2003,(3)：319-325
95.[法]费尔南·布罗代尔.资本主义的动力[M].杨起译.北京：读书·生活·新知三联出版社,1997：102
96.韩俊等.破解三农难题--30年农村改革和发展[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2008：98
97.韩俊.我国农村下一步改革的重点及政策走向[J].发展研究,2009,(7)：26-31
98.韩连贵.关于农村土地使用权流转的发展趋势分析[J].经济研究参考,2005,(3)：33-36
99.何一鸣,罗必良.农地流转、交易费用与产权管制：理论范式与博弈分析[J].农村经济,2012,(1)：7—12.
100.黄季焜.六十年中国农业的发展和三十年改革奇迹：制度创新、技术进步和市场改革[J].农业技术经济,2010,(1)：4—18
101.黄少安.从家庭承包制的土地经营权到股份合作制的“准土地股权”：理论矛盾、形成机理和解决思路[J].经济研究,1995,(1)：20、32-37
102.黄贤金,张安录主编.土地经济学[M].北京：中国农业大学出版社,2008：264
103.胡新艳,张日新.农地规模流转视角的转型发展：自发达地区的一个村观察[J].改革,2010：83-90
104.胡冬生,余秀江,王宣喻.农业产业化路径选择：农地入股流转、发展股份合作经济：以广东梅州长教村为例,2010,(3)：47-59
105.金松青,Klaus D.中国农村土地租赁市场的发展及其在土地使用公平性和效率性上的含义[J].经济学(季刊),2004,(4)：1003—1027
106.冀县卿,钱忠好.农地产权结构变迁与中国农业增长：一个经济解释[J].管理世界,2009,(1)：172—173
107.[美]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨,等著.[瑞]拉斯·沃因,汉斯·韦坎德,编.李凤圣主译.契约经济学[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1999：9—12
108.孟召将.交易费用决定了农地流转契约选择——区域比较研究[J].江西财经大学学报,2012,(4)：13—20
109.聂辉华.声誉、契约与组织[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2009：15
110.农业部农村合作经济研究课题组.1990：中国农村土地承包经营制度及合作组织运行考察[J]农业经济问题,1991,(8)：33—48
111.农业部农村合作经济研究课题组.中国农村土地承包经营制度及合作组织运行考察[J].农业经济问题,1993,(11)：45—53
112.农业部农村合作经济研究课题组.中国农村土地承包经营制度及合作组织运行考察(一)[J].农业经济问题,1996,(1)：41—43
113.姜爱林.改革开放以来中国土地政策的发展变迁[J].中州学刊,2003,(5)：48—53
114.孔祥智,徐珍源.转出土地农户选择流转对象的影响因素分析[J].中国农村经济,2010,(12)：17—25、67
115.孔祥智,涂圣伟,史冰清.中国农村改革30年：历程、经验和前景展望[J].教学与研究,2008,(9)：19—25
116.[法]莱昂·瓦尔拉斯.纯粹经济学要义[M].蔡受百译.北京：商务印书馆,1989
117.刘成玉,杨琦.对农村土地流转几个理论问题的认识[J].农业经济问题,2010,(10)：48—52
118.林毅夫.制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M].上海：上海三联书店,1994
119.罗必良,吴晨.交易效率：农地承包经营权流转的新视角——基于广东个案研究[J].农业技术经济,2008,(2)：12—18
120.罗必良,李尚蒲.农地流转的交易费用：威廉姆森分析范式及广东的证据[J].农业经济问题,2010,(12)：30—40
121.罗必良,汪沙,李尚蒲.交易费用、农户认知与农地流转——来自广东省的农户问卷调查[J].农业技术经济,2012,(1)：11—21
122.[美]罗思高,黄季焜,[日]大塚启二郎.中国农业的发展动力：生物技术进步、市场化和土地租赁[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2006,(1)：16—28
123.刘克春,林坚.农地承包经营权市场流转与行政性调整：理论与实证分析--基于农户层面和江西省实证研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2005,(11)：99—111
124.刘克春,池泽新.农业税费减免及粮食补贴、地租与农户农地转入行为——以江西省为例[J].农业技术经济,2008,(1)：79-83
125.刘克春,苏为华.资源禀赋、交易费用与农地流转[J].统计研究,2006,(5)：73—77
126.刘克春.农户要素禀赋、交易费用与农户农地转出行为——基于江西省农户调查[J].商业研究,2008,(8)：164—168
127.刘广栋,程久苗.1949年以来中国农村土地制度变迁的理论与实践[J].中国农村观察,2007,(2)：70—80
128.廖洪乐.农村改革试验区的土地制度建设试验[J].管理世界,1998,(2)：154—163
129.廖洪乐.农村承包地调整[J].中国农村观察,2003,(1)：46—54
130.刘守英.中国农地集体所有制的结构与变迁：来自村庄的经验[J].中国社会科学,1997,(3)：39—53
131.李启宇,张文秀.城乡统筹背景下农户农地经营权流转意愿及其影响因素分析——基于成渝地区428户农户的调查数据[J].农业技术经济,2010,(5)：47—54
132.李孔岳.农地专用性资产与交易的不确定性对农地流转交易费用的影响[J].管理世界,2009,(3)：92—98
133.卢现祥,朱巧玲.交易费用测量的两个层次及其相互关系研究述评[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2006,(3)：97—108
134.牛梅武.土地承包经营权流转市场建设问题研究[D].乌鲁木齐：新疆农业大学,2010
135.乔榛,焦方义,李楠.中国农村经济制度变迁与农业增长——对1978—-2004年中国农业增长的实证分析[J].经济研究,2006,(7)：73—82
136.钱忠好.节约交易费用：农业产业企业经营成功的关键——对江苏如意集团的个案研究[J].中国农村经济,2000,(8)：62—66
137.钱忠好.中国农村土地承包经营权的产权残缺与重建研究[J].江苏社会科学,2002a：39—47
138.钱忠好.农村土地承包经营权产权残缺与市场流转困境：理论与政策分析[J].管理世界,2002b,(6)：35—45
139.钱忠好.农地承包经营权市场流转：理论与实证分析--基于农户层面的经济分析[J].经济研究,2003,(5)：83—91
140.[法]让·雅克·卢梭.何兆武译.社会契约论(修订第3版)[M].上海：商务印书馆,2003
141.[日]速水佑次郎,[美]拉坦.郭保熙,张进铭,等译.农业发展的国际分析[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2000：183—185
142.苏旭霞,王秀清.农用地细碎化与农户粮食生产[J].中国农村经济,2002,(4)：22—28
143.史清华,贾生华.农户家庭农地要素流动趋势及其根源比较[J].管理世界,2002(1)：71—77、92
144.史清华,贾生华.农户家庭农地流转及形成根源——以东部沿海苏鲁浙三省为例[J].中国经济问题,2003,(4)：41—54
145.史清华,徐翠萍.农户家庭农地流转行为的变迁和形成根源——1986—2005年长三角15村调查[J].华南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2007,(6)：1—9
146.邵传林.农村土地信用合作社兴起的逻辑——来自宁夏平罗县的个案研究[J].农业经济问题,2010,(6)：69—74
147.田传浩,贾生华.农地制度、地权稳定性与农地使用权市场发育：理论与来自苏浙鲁的经验[J].经济研究,2004,(1)：112—119
148.谭丹,黄贤金.区域农村劳动力市场发育对农地流转的影响——以江苏省宝应县为例[J].中国土地科学,2007,(6)：64—68
149.谭淑豪,曲福田,Nico H.土地细碎化的成因及其影响因素分析[J].中国农村观察,2003,(6)：24—30、70
150.[英]托马斯·霍布斯.黎思复,黎延弼译.利维坦[M].上海：商务印书馆,1980：195、685—686
151.王颜齐,郭翔宇.农地规模化流转背景下的农业雇佣生产合约：理论模型及实证分析[J].中国农村观察,2011a,(4)：61—76
152.王颜齐,郭翔宇.土地承包经营权流转：双边交易与集中交易[J].农业技术经济,2011b,(10)：46—53、54
153.王兴稳,钟甫宁.土地细碎化与农用地流转市场[J].中国农村观察,2008,(4)：29—34
154.王秀清,苏旭霞.农用地细碎化对农业生产的影响--以山东省莱西市为例[J].农业技术经济,2002,(2)：3—7
155.王景新.中国农村土地制度的世纪变革[J].北京：中国经济出版社,2001：14
156.王晓兵,侯麟杰,张砚杰,等.中国农村土地流转市场发育及其对农业生产的影响[J].农业 技术经济,2011,(4)：40-45
157.汪丁丁.从“交易费用”到博弈均衡[J].经济研究,1995,(9)：72—80
158.伍振军,张云华,孔祥智.交易费用、政府行为和模式比较：中国土地承包经营权流转实证研究[J].中国软科学,2011,(4)：174—183
159.[美]约瑟夫·熊彼特.朱泱译.经济分析史[M].北京：商务印书馆,1991：345
160.许恒周、郭忠兴和郭玉燕.农民职业分化、养老保障与农村土地流转——基于南京市372份农户问卷调查的实证研究[J].农业技术经济,2011,(1)：81—85
161.徐旭,蒋文华,应风其.我国农村土地流转的动因分析[J].管理世界,2002,(2)：144--145
162.许庆,章元.土地调整、地权稳定性与农民长期投资激励[J].经济研究,2005,(10)：59—69
163.许庆,尹荣梁,章辉.规模经济、规模报酬与农业适度规模经营--基于我国粮食生产的实证研究[J].经济研究,2011,(3)：59—71、94
164.[美]西奥多·w·舒尔茨.梁小民译.改造传统农业[M].北京：商务印书馆,2003：22—48
165.[英]亚当·斯密.郭大力,王亚南译.国民财富的性质和原因的研究[M].北京：商务印书馆,2005
166.岳意定,刘莉君.基于网络层次分析法的农村土地流转经济绩效评价[J].中国农村经济,2010,(8)：36-47
167.[英]约翰·伊特韦尔,[美]默里·米尔盖特,[美]彼得·纽曼,编.陈岱孙主编.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1996
168.俞海,黄季焜,Soctt Roszelle,等.地权稳定性、土地流转与农地资源持续利用[J].经济研究,2003,(9)：82-95
169.[英]约翰·希克斯.价值与资本：经济理论的若干基本原则之探究[M].薛蕃康译.北京：商务印书馆,2008
170.余鹏翼,李善民.中国发达地区农地使用权流转性问题探讨——以广东省南海市为例[J].中国农村经济,2004,(12)：22-26
171.杨瑞龙,聂辉华.不完全契约理论：一个综述[J].经济研究,2006,(2)：104-115
172.叶剑平.中国农村土地产权制度研究[M].北京：中国农业出版社,2000：16
173.叶剑平,蒋妍,丰雷.中国农村土地流转市场的调查研究——基于2005年17省调查的分析和建议[J].中国农村观察,2006,(4)：48—55
174.叶剑平,丰雷,蒋妍,等.中国农村土地使用权调查研究——17省份调查结果与政策建议[J].管理世界,2010,(1)：64—73
175.易宪容.交易行为与合约选择[M].北京：经济科学出版社,1999
176.姚洋.农地制度与农业绩效的实证研究[J].中国农村观察,1998,(6)：1—10
177.姚洋.非农就业结构与土地租赁市场的发育[J].中国农村观察,1999,(2)：16-21
178.姚洋.集体决策下的诱导性制度变迁--中国农村地权稳定性演化的实证分析[J].中国农村观察,2000(2)：11-18
179.晏智杰.边际革命和新古典经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2004
180.中央书记处农村政策研究室.中国农村社会经济典型调查(1985)[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1998：84
181.钟甫宁,王兴稳.现阶段农地流转市场能减轻土地细碎化程度吗?——来自江苏兴化和黑龙江宾县的初步证据[J].农业经济问题,2010,(1)：23—32
182.钟甫宁,纪月清.土地产权、非农就业机会与农户农业生产投资[J].经济研究,2009,(12)：43—51
183.钟林,唐小我.农地流转交易的市场均衡分析[J].中国管理科学,2009,(4)：141—147
184.张文秀,李冬梅,邢殊媛,等.农户土地流转行为的影响因素分析[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(10)：14—17
185.张红宇.中国农地调整与使用权流转：几点评论[J].管理世界,2002,(5)：76—87
186.张五常.经济解释[M].北京：商务印书馆,2000：407
187.张三峰,杨德才.农民的土地调整意愿及其影响因素分析——基于2006年中国综合社会调查数据[J].中国农村观察,2010,(1)：15—24、33
188.张忠明,钱文荣.农户土地经营规模与粮食生产效率关系实证研究[J].中国土地科学,2010,(8)：52-58
189.钟涨宝,汪萍.农地流转过程中的农户行为分析[J].中国农村观察,2003,(6)：55-64
190.赵其卓,唐忠.农用土地流转现状与农户土地流转合约选择的实证研究——以四川省绵竹市为例[J].中国农村观察,2008,(3)：13—19、28
191.赵德起.中国农村地权的理论探索与路径选择[J].财经问题研究,2007,(3)：74-80
192.赵德起,汪洋.中国农村地权的市场配置——契约与产权的视角[J].经济社会体制比较,2008,(1)：26-32
193.周其仁.中国农村改革：国家与所有权关系的变化——一个经济体制变迁史的回顾(上)[J].管理世界,1995,(3)：178—198、220
194.周其仁.中国农村改革：国家与所有权关系的变化——一个经济体制变迁史的回顾(下)[J].管理世界,1995,(4)：147-155
195.邹伟,吴群.基于交易成本分析的农用地内部流转对策研究[J].农村经济,2006,(12)：41—43