中国纳税遵从问题的研究
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摘要
自税收出现以来,纳税人便开始了采用各种方法逃避税收的历程,正如有的学者所说,“人的一生中有三件事情是确定的：死亡,税收以及人类为逃避这两件事所做出的不懈努力”。因此,纳税不遵从现象在世界各国从未得到杜绝。与西方发达国家相比,由于我国开征个人所得税的时间较短,相关征管法规还有待进一步完善,纳税不遵从问题显得尤为突出。
纳税遵从客观上成为衡量国家税收征纳关系是否和谐的标志之一,税收遵从问题导致的税赋不公也引起了社会舆论的广泛关注,各国政府都对税收管理中的税收遵从问题给予了相当重视,因此研究纳税遵从对于从根本上提高税收征管的质量和效率有着深远意义。尽管我国政府在《2002年—2006年中国税收征收管理战略规划纲要》中正式提出了纳税遵从(tax compliance)概念,但是比较笼统,为此,本文将首先介绍国内外关于纳税遵从定义的界定,通过对纳税遵从内涵和外延的概括,对纳税遵从的理论依据进行了清晰展示。纳税遵从虽然是税收研究领域中的一个重要理论问题,但从总体上来看,国内的纳税遵从的研究只是取得了初步进展,传统的纳税遵从理论并不能深入解释纳税遵从行为,我们在更加客观的环境中研究纳税遵从,从而揭示纳税遵从的本质,这是本文一直所追寻的。
由于国外的税收是以所得税为主体的综合税制,而我国却一直以流转税为主体,且所得税为分税制,面对巨大的国情差异,我们很有必要结合本国实际,从纳税遵从度不高的表现手法以及效应来分析纳税遵从的现状,通过对我国税制基本国情的剖析,找出影响纳税遵从的各种因素,如税制因素、个体特征因素、税收道德因素、公平合理因素,从而对纳税遵从做出全面的分析。
借助博弈论模型,本文对我国纳税遵从问题进行了理论分析,并将经济学、管理学、社会学和心理学等学科结合起来,对纳税遵从影响因素进行了细致考察,不仅分析了一般经济影响因素,而且还分析了社会根源和制度方面的影响因素。为了克服现行研究的一个不足,本文创新性地引用了博弈论模型来分析纳税遵从度不高的原因。为了分析网络技术在提高我国纳税遵从中的作用,本文通过对关联规则挖掘技术和OLAP技术在税务系统中应用进行分析,而技术基础是提高我国纳税遵从的一个基础条件,从而对提高我国纳税遵从度进行相关应用分析。
在前文分析的基础上,针对我国纳税遵从的现状,结合模型分析的结果,本文对提高纳税遵从度进行了详细的对策分析,从健全机制、强化管理、推行信息化管税、开展税源专业化管理等方面对于提高纳税遵从提出了对策建议。本文创新性提出,从推行信息化管税入手,以风险管理为导向,依托专业化、信息化管理方式,优化服务,加强评估,集约稽查,依法征税,强化监督,以达到促进纳税遵从的目的,这是本文的核心内容。在当前税收征管改革的背景下,通过优化我国税收征管模式,适当调整税收征管策略,以提高纳税遵从度,增加国家的税收收入,实现资源的优化配置。
Since the emergence of taxation, taxpayers have to try various methods to evade taxes, as some scholars said, "there are three things that are certain in people's life:death, taxes and the effort people try to avoid from these two things." Therefore, the phenomenon of tax non-compliance in the world has never been eliminated. Due to the fact that the introduction of personal income tax in China has being with a shorter period compared with western countries, the relevant laws and regulations need to be further improved, and the problem of tax non-compliance is particularly prominent.
Tax compliance has been seen as one of determination to measure of whether the relationship of levied for the state tax is harmonious, the issues caused by unfair taxes have also caused widespread concern in society, the governments have given considerable attention on tax compliance of tax administration. Therefore, the study of tax compliance has far-reaching impact on improving the quality and efficiency of tax collection. However, the Chinese government has formally proposed the concept of tax compliance in "2002-2006 The plan of Chinese strategic tax collection", unfortunately it is quite general. Therefore, this article will firstly describe the definition of domestic and international tax compliance, through the summary of connotation and extension of tax compliance, the theoretical basis for tax compliance has been displayed clearly. In the article, although the tax is an important theoretical issue in research area, but generally speaking, the study of domestic tax compliance was just made a junior development, the traditional tax compliance could not be resolved with the behavior of tax compliance. Thus, we study it in an objective environment in order to express the nature of the tax compliance. That is what we are looking at.
The foreign countries have made income tax as their main comprehensive tax system; however China has made turnover tax as the main tax system and shared the income tax. With the huge differences, it is necessary to combine our own reality with the tax compliance which is not high performance, highlighting the status of tax compliance through the analysis of the basic national conditions of China's tax system in order to identify the current factors affecting tax compliance, such as tax factors, individual characteristics factors, taxes and moral factors, the factors affecting equity theory in order to make a comprehensive analysis of tax compliance.
For the purpose of comprehensive analysis of factors affecting tax compliance, this article will defines the concept of tax compliance first. On this basis, using the theory model of tax compliance issues of theoretical analysis, and economics, management, sociology and psychology and other disciplines combine the factors affecting tax compliance conducted a detailed study. This paper not only analyzes the impact of general economic factors, but also analyzes the social roots and institutional factors. In order to overcome the lack of current research, this paper innovative in applying theory, a detailed discussion of the economic environment, institutional deficiencies, lack of management tools degree of tax compliance impact, in which model analysis of tax compliance is insufficient for quantitative analysis. To analyze the degree of the improvement of the tax compliance in China, this paper will discuss the association rule mining and OLAP applications in the tax system to conduct a feasibility analysis, and improve our technology base is a basic condition for tax compliance, tax compliance and thus improve our degree of feasibility analysis.
Based on the analysis of previous paper, we put forward the suggestions of enhancing the degree of tax compliance under the circumstance of China. The suggestions are made up of system complement, management strengthen, implementation of information technology management of tax, professional management of tax sources and so on. The innovation of this paper is that we put forward the advices of information technology management of tax and professional management of tax sources, which serves the tax compliance. Under the circumstance of current reform of tax, it is urgent to enhance the degree of tax compliance and therefore increase the financial revenues and allocate the sources best by optimizing our country's collection mode and adjusting collection strategies.
纳税遵从客观上成为衡量国家税收征纳关系是否和谐的标志之一,税收遵从问题导致的税赋不公也引起了社会舆论的广泛关注,各国政府都对税收管理中的税收遵从问题给予了相当重视,因此研究纳税遵从对于从根本上提高税收征管的质量和效率有着深远意义。尽管我国政府在《2002年—2006年中国税收征收管理战略规划纲要》中正式提出了纳税遵从(tax compliance)概念,但是比较笼统,为此,本文将首先介绍国内外关于纳税遵从定义的界定,通过对纳税遵从内涵和外延的概括,对纳税遵从的理论依据进行了清晰展示。纳税遵从虽然是税收研究领域中的一个重要理论问题,但从总体上来看,国内的纳税遵从的研究只是取得了初步进展,传统的纳税遵从理论并不能深入解释纳税遵从行为,我们在更加客观的环境中研究纳税遵从,从而揭示纳税遵从的本质,这是本文一直所追寻的。
由于国外的税收是以所得税为主体的综合税制,而我国却一直以流转税为主体,且所得税为分税制,面对巨大的国情差异,我们很有必要结合本国实际,从纳税遵从度不高的表现手法以及效应来分析纳税遵从的现状,通过对我国税制基本国情的剖析,找出影响纳税遵从的各种因素,如税制因素、个体特征因素、税收道德因素、公平合理因素,从而对纳税遵从做出全面的分析。
借助博弈论模型,本文对我国纳税遵从问题进行了理论分析,并将经济学、管理学、社会学和心理学等学科结合起来,对纳税遵从影响因素进行了细致考察,不仅分析了一般经济影响因素,而且还分析了社会根源和制度方面的影响因素。为了克服现行研究的一个不足,本文创新性地引用了博弈论模型来分析纳税遵从度不高的原因。为了分析网络技术在提高我国纳税遵从中的作用,本文通过对关联规则挖掘技术和OLAP技术在税务系统中应用进行分析,而技术基础是提高我国纳税遵从的一个基础条件,从而对提高我国纳税遵从度进行相关应用分析。
在前文分析的基础上,针对我国纳税遵从的现状,结合模型分析的结果,本文对提高纳税遵从度进行了详细的对策分析,从健全机制、强化管理、推行信息化管税、开展税源专业化管理等方面对于提高纳税遵从提出了对策建议。本文创新性提出,从推行信息化管税入手,以风险管理为导向,依托专业化、信息化管理方式,优化服务,加强评估,集约稽查,依法征税,强化监督,以达到促进纳税遵从的目的,这是本文的核心内容。在当前税收征管改革的背景下,通过优化我国税收征管模式,适当调整税收征管策略,以提高纳税遵从度,增加国家的税收收入,实现资源的优化配置。
Since the emergence of taxation, taxpayers have to try various methods to evade taxes, as some scholars said, "there are three things that are certain in people's life:death, taxes and the effort people try to avoid from these two things." Therefore, the phenomenon of tax non-compliance in the world has never been eliminated. Due to the fact that the introduction of personal income tax in China has being with a shorter period compared with western countries, the relevant laws and regulations need to be further improved, and the problem of tax non-compliance is particularly prominent.
Tax compliance has been seen as one of determination to measure of whether the relationship of levied for the state tax is harmonious, the issues caused by unfair taxes have also caused widespread concern in society, the governments have given considerable attention on tax compliance of tax administration. Therefore, the study of tax compliance has far-reaching impact on improving the quality and efficiency of tax collection. However, the Chinese government has formally proposed the concept of tax compliance in "2002-2006 The plan of Chinese strategic tax collection", unfortunately it is quite general. Therefore, this article will firstly describe the definition of domestic and international tax compliance, through the summary of connotation and extension of tax compliance, the theoretical basis for tax compliance has been displayed clearly. In the article, although the tax is an important theoretical issue in research area, but generally speaking, the study of domestic tax compliance was just made a junior development, the traditional tax compliance could not be resolved with the behavior of tax compliance. Thus, we study it in an objective environment in order to express the nature of the tax compliance. That is what we are looking at.
The foreign countries have made income tax as their main comprehensive tax system; however China has made turnover tax as the main tax system and shared the income tax. With the huge differences, it is necessary to combine our own reality with the tax compliance which is not high performance, highlighting the status of tax compliance through the analysis of the basic national conditions of China's tax system in order to identify the current factors affecting tax compliance, such as tax factors, individual characteristics factors, taxes and moral factors, the factors affecting equity theory in order to make a comprehensive analysis of tax compliance.
For the purpose of comprehensive analysis of factors affecting tax compliance, this article will defines the concept of tax compliance first. On this basis, using the theory model of tax compliance issues of theoretical analysis, and economics, management, sociology and psychology and other disciplines combine the factors affecting tax compliance conducted a detailed study. This paper not only analyzes the impact of general economic factors, but also analyzes the social roots and institutional factors. In order to overcome the lack of current research, this paper innovative in applying theory, a detailed discussion of the economic environment, institutional deficiencies, lack of management tools degree of tax compliance impact, in which model analysis of tax compliance is insufficient for quantitative analysis. To analyze the degree of the improvement of the tax compliance in China, this paper will discuss the association rule mining and OLAP applications in the tax system to conduct a feasibility analysis, and improve our technology base is a basic condition for tax compliance, tax compliance and thus improve our degree of feasibility analysis.
Based on the analysis of previous paper, we put forward the suggestions of enhancing the degree of tax compliance under the circumstance of China. The suggestions are made up of system complement, management strengthen, implementation of information technology management of tax, professional management of tax sources and so on. The innovation of this paper is that we put forward the advices of information technology management of tax and professional management of tax sources, which serves the tax compliance. Under the circumstance of current reform of tax, it is urgent to enhance the degree of tax compliance and therefore increase the financial revenues and allocate the sources best by optimizing our country's collection mode and adjusting collection strategies.
引文
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