中国发展消费信贷问题研究
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摘要
消费信贷的产生和发展无疑是有其宏观经济背景和微观经济机制。从微观经济机制来看，现代市场经济条件下的消费信贷产生于追求盈利最大化的商业银行与追求个人效用最大化的消费者之间的博弈结果。博弈结果是精炼贝叶斯均衡。从宏观的角度看，消费信贷是卖方市场向买方市场转型的产物。发展消费信贷是通过刺激消费需求从而促进经济增长的需求管理政策。从中国经济增长的需求结构分析表明，提高居民收入水平、以发展消费信贷为手段提高中国居民最终消费率并以此促进产业结构和消费结构升级，已经成为中国经济增长需求政策的首要问题。
本文的模型分析表明，在消费信贷利率限制的条件下，在消费信贷经过一段时间的高速发展后，中国商业银行将面临消费信贷合约设计中的困境。中国商业银行无法根据借款人的风险类型设计出分类式消费信贷合约来，所以实行单一合约，并要求较高的担保。
个人信用制度的作用在于降低消费信贷交易成本，并通过个人信用信息共享机制和对违约者的惩戒机制，为商业银行发展消费信贷提供评估借款人、实施信贷监管和控制消费信贷风险的制度基础。中国发展消费信贷还受到诸如缺乏消费信贷担保制度、法律制度和收入分配制度的约束。
消除消费信贷的制度约束是为了加强中国发展消费信贷的风险管理。建立和完善个人信用制度、建立起完善的个人信用法律体系，是中国发展消费信贷的制度环境，也是中国商业银行进行消费信贷风险管理的制度基础。还可以通过保险和证券化来转移和分散消费信贷风险，通过建立政府支持的住房贷款担保机构，放开消费信贷利率，对提前偿还加收罚息等等方式来控制或分散消费信贷风险，并用科学的方法管理消费信贷风险。这些方法都是中国促进消费信贷发展的有力措施。
J.P.Morgan和合作机构开发的“信用度量术”——VaR方法可以在消费信贷贷前、贷中和贷后的管理决策中得到应用。这种方法提高了消费信贷风险管理的科学性，使银行家对消费信贷风险有一个比较明确的掌握，从而可以为银行家的决策提供明确的风险标准或警戒线。
It is without doubt from the background of macroeconomics and the mechanism of microeconomics that consumption credit come into being and develop. On the mechanism of microeconomics, consumption credit result from the game's perfect Bayesian equilibrium between the bank of maximizing its profits and the consumer of maximizing his/her utility under the condition of modem market economics, and from the transitional economy transferred from selling market to purchasing market on the background of macroeconomics. Developing consumption credit is the managing demand policy for economic growth through stimulating consumption demand then aggregate domestic demand. It has been becoming one of the most important demand policy for the economic growth of China that increase the inhabitant's income, and the inhabitant's final consuming rate in GDP by developing consumer loans so as to promoting the industry structure and the consumption structure on the basis of the analysis of the demand structure of the economic growth in China.
The result of the analysis of the model in this article shows, the commercial banks of China would face the dilemma hi the design of restrictive covenants of consumption credit after the period of the rapid increase of consumer loans under the condition of the restrictive interest rate of consumer loans. That is, the commercial banks of China couldn't put forward classified covenants according to the risk type of the borrowers, and so that they supply the same type of restrictive covenants and claim the high-level collateral net worth in the covenants.
Personal credit institution results in lowering the transaction cost of consumer credit, and provides the commercial banks for developing consumer credit with the institution condition for assessing the borrowers, exerting credit monitor and controlling the risk of the consumer credit through the sharing mechanism of the personal credit information and the punishing mechanism of it to the defaulter. The developing of the consumer credit is also under the restriction of the inhabitant income allocation institution, the scarcity of collateral institution and the unavailable legal system of personal credit in China.
Breakup of the institution restriction of consumer credit is to promote the development of consumer credit of China through enforcing the risk management of consumer credit. Therefore it becomes the institutional environment in which to push to develop the consumer credit of China to found and improve the personal credit institution, especially the institutional background on which the China's commercial
banks manage the risk of consumer loans to found the improved legal system of personal credit. In addition, it is the effective measure for promoting the development of consumption credit of China to transfer and dispel the risk of consumer credit by insurance and security, to construct collateral institution supported by the government, to exert market-oriented interest rate reform of consumer loans step by step, to claim the additional penalty interest rate for ahead-payment and to apply the scientific technology for managing the risk of the consumer credit.
J.P.Morgan's CreditMetrics, or VaR can be applied to making management strategies for being before-, in- and after-credit. This scientific approach makes the bankers the masters of the risk of consumer credit, and then provides the bankers for management strategy in operation on consumer credit with the precise risk-standard or the precise risk-horizon.
本文的模型分析表明，在消费信贷利率限制的条件下，在消费信贷经过一段时间的高速发展后，中国商业银行将面临消费信贷合约设计中的困境。中国商业银行无法根据借款人的风险类型设计出分类式消费信贷合约来，所以实行单一合约，并要求较高的担保。
个人信用制度的作用在于降低消费信贷交易成本，并通过个人信用信息共享机制和对违约者的惩戒机制，为商业银行发展消费信贷提供评估借款人、实施信贷监管和控制消费信贷风险的制度基础。中国发展消费信贷还受到诸如缺乏消费信贷担保制度、法律制度和收入分配制度的约束。
消除消费信贷的制度约束是为了加强中国发展消费信贷的风险管理。建立和完善个人信用制度、建立起完善的个人信用法律体系，是中国发展消费信贷的制度环境，也是中国商业银行进行消费信贷风险管理的制度基础。还可以通过保险和证券化来转移和分散消费信贷风险，通过建立政府支持的住房贷款担保机构，放开消费信贷利率，对提前偿还加收罚息等等方式来控制或分散消费信贷风险，并用科学的方法管理消费信贷风险。这些方法都是中国促进消费信贷发展的有力措施。
J.P.Morgan和合作机构开发的“信用度量术”——VaR方法可以在消费信贷贷前、贷中和贷后的管理决策中得到应用。这种方法提高了消费信贷风险管理的科学性，使银行家对消费信贷风险有一个比较明确的掌握，从而可以为银行家的决策提供明确的风险标准或警戒线。
It is without doubt from the background of macroeconomics and the mechanism of microeconomics that consumption credit come into being and develop. On the mechanism of microeconomics, consumption credit result from the game's perfect Bayesian equilibrium between the bank of maximizing its profits and the consumer of maximizing his/her utility under the condition of modem market economics, and from the transitional economy transferred from selling market to purchasing market on the background of macroeconomics. Developing consumption credit is the managing demand policy for economic growth through stimulating consumption demand then aggregate domestic demand. It has been becoming one of the most important demand policy for the economic growth of China that increase the inhabitant's income, and the inhabitant's final consuming rate in GDP by developing consumer loans so as to promoting the industry structure and the consumption structure on the basis of the analysis of the demand structure of the economic growth in China.
The result of the analysis of the model in this article shows, the commercial banks of China would face the dilemma hi the design of restrictive covenants of consumption credit after the period of the rapid increase of consumer loans under the condition of the restrictive interest rate of consumer loans. That is, the commercial banks of China couldn't put forward classified covenants according to the risk type of the borrowers, and so that they supply the same type of restrictive covenants and claim the high-level collateral net worth in the covenants.
Personal credit institution results in lowering the transaction cost of consumer credit, and provides the commercial banks for developing consumer credit with the institution condition for assessing the borrowers, exerting credit monitor and controlling the risk of the consumer credit through the sharing mechanism of the personal credit information and the punishing mechanism of it to the defaulter. The developing of the consumer credit is also under the restriction of the inhabitant income allocation institution, the scarcity of collateral institution and the unavailable legal system of personal credit in China.
Breakup of the institution restriction of consumer credit is to promote the development of consumer credit of China through enforcing the risk management of consumer credit. Therefore it becomes the institutional environment in which to push to develop the consumer credit of China to found and improve the personal credit institution, especially the institutional background on which the China's commercial
banks manage the risk of consumer loans to found the improved legal system of personal credit. In addition, it is the effective measure for promoting the development of consumption credit of China to transfer and dispel the risk of consumer credit by insurance and security, to construct collateral institution supported by the government, to exert market-oriented interest rate reform of consumer loans step by step, to claim the additional penalty interest rate for ahead-payment and to apply the scientific technology for managing the risk of the consumer credit.
J.P.Morgan's CreditMetrics, or VaR can be applied to making management strategies for being before-, in- and after-credit. This scientific approach makes the bankers the masters of the risk of consumer credit, and then provides the bankers for management strategy in operation on consumer credit with the precise risk-standard or the precise risk-horizon.
引文
[1] Minsky Hyman. The Financial Fragility Hypothesis: Capitalist Process and the Behavior of the Economy, in Financial Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982
[2] Kregel J A. Margins of Safety and Weight of the Argument in Generating Financial Fragility. Journey of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1997, (15): 245～274
[3] Graham Benjamin, Dodd David. Security Analysis. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934
[4] Keynes J M. Essays in Persuasion: The Collected Writtings of John Maynard Keynes. London: Macmillan for the Royal Economics Society, 1971
[5] Minsky Hyman. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986
[6] Fischer Irving. The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great DePressions. Econometrica, 1933, (10): 337～357
[7] Bernanke B S, Gertler M. Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations. American Economic Review 1989,79(3): 114～131
[8] 奥利维尔 琼 布兰查德，斯坦利 费希尔．宏观经济学：高级教程．北京：经济科学出版社，1998
[9] Stiglitz J E, Weiss A. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. America Economic Review, 1981, 71 (3): 393～410
[10] 米什金．货币金融学．第四版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，1998
[11] Mishkin F S. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 6th ed. America: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., a Pearson Education Company, 2001
[12] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，1996．
[13] 黄志凌．中国居民的金融否决权与私人财经服务．经济研究，1995，(12)：15～28
[14] 龚六堂．高级宏观经济学．武汉：武汉大学出版社，2001
[15] 袁志刚，朱国林．消费理论中的收入分配与总消费．中国社会科学，2002，(2)：69～76
[16] Romer David. Advanced Macroeconomics, Second edition. America: The McGraw-Hill Education, Co., 2000
[17] Alan S Blinder. A Model of Inherited Wealth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1975, (12): 946～970
[18] 王海侠．以博弈理论分析我国信贷市场效率．金融研究，2000，(10)：60～68
[19] 彼得 罗斯．商业银行管理．第四版．北京：机械工业出版社，2001
[20] 齐天翔，李文华．消费信贷与居民储蓄．金融研究，2000，(2)：111～116
[21] Keeton William. Equilibrium Credit Rationing. New York: Garland Press, 1979
[22] English William B. Credit Rationing in General Equilibrium. University of Pennsylvania, Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences. Working Paper 20～86, 1986
[23] 多恩布什，费希尔，斯塔兹．宏观经济学．第七版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[24] 刘方(木或)，张少龙．支撑经济增长．北京：华文出版社，2001
[25] 吴易风．从西方市场经济理论和政策看我国需求不足问题．宏观经济研究，2003，(2)：48-64
[26] 中国社会科学院经济研究所课题组．宏观经济理论研究的新进展．人民日报，12／28／2002
[27] 中国统计年鉴．北京：中国统计出版社，2002
[28] 世界银行．世界发展报告．1992，1996
[29] 黄金老．金融自由化与金融脆弱性．北京：中国城市出版社，2001
[30] 李扬．中国金融改革研究．南京：江苏人民出版社，1999
[31] 中国人民银行．关于开展个人消费信贷的指导意见．02／23／1999
[32] 中国人民银行．个人住房贷款管理办法．05／09／1998
[33] 中国人民银行．汽车消费贷款管理办法．09／11／1998
[34] Besanko D, A V Thakor. Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets. International Economic Review, 1987, (28): 671～689
[35] Chan Y, G Kanatas. Asymmetric valuation and the role of collateral in loan agreements. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1985, (17): 284～325
[36] Innes R. Limited liability and incentive contracting with exante action choices. Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, (52): 345～367
[37] Barro R J.The loan market, collateral and rates of interest. The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1976, (8): 439～456
[38] 中国经济景气月报．北京：中国统计出版社，2003(2)
[39] 中国人民银行货币政策司．中国消费信贷发展报告．金融时报，03／22／2002
[40] 易纲．中国的货币、银行和金融市场：1984～1993．1996年版．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，1996
[41] 孔刘柳．商业银行信贷合约行为理论．上海：上海财经大学出版社，2001
[42] 科斯，汉斯·韦坎德等．契约经济学．北京：经济科学出版社，1999
[43] 国务院研究室赴美考察组．美国信用体系考察报告．经济研究参考，2002，(67)：2～33
[44] 粟勤，消费信贷．北京：中国审计出版社，2001
[45] “信用消费比较研究”课题组．借鉴国际经验推动我国信用消费发展．财贸经济，2000，(11)：35～43
[46] 梁燕君．论进一步扩大消费信贷的政策选择．现代财经，2000，(12)：17～19
[47] 中国国家计委宏观经济研究院课题组．居民收入分配差距扩大的状况、原因和对策研究．经济研究参考，2002，(68)：1～37
[48] 卢精诚．中国职工生活进步调查．北京：中国物价出版社，1999
[49] 孙凤．消费者行为数量研究．上海：三联书店，上海人民出版社，2002
[50] 臧旭恒．居民资产与消费选择行为分析．上海：三联书店，上海人民出版社，2001
[51] 龙海明，黄卫．VaR在消费信贷风险管理中的应用．财经理论与实践，2002，(6)：19～24
[52] 王春峰．金融市场风险管理．天津：天津大学出版社，2002
[53] J P Morgan. CreditMetrics~[TM]-Technical Document. New York, April2, 1997
[54] 陈松男．金融工程学．上海：复旦大学出版社，2002
[55] 宋逢明．金融工程原理：无套利均衡分析．北京：清华大学出版社，1999
[2] Kregel J A. Margins of Safety and Weight of the Argument in Generating Financial Fragility. Journey of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1997, (15): 245～274
[3] Graham Benjamin, Dodd David. Security Analysis. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1934
[4] Keynes J M. Essays in Persuasion: The Collected Writtings of John Maynard Keynes. London: Macmillan for the Royal Economics Society, 1971
[5] Minsky Hyman. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986
[6] Fischer Irving. The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great DePressions. Econometrica, 1933, (10): 337～357
[7] Bernanke B S, Gertler M. Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations. American Economic Review 1989,79(3): 114～131
[8] 奥利维尔 琼 布兰查德，斯坦利 费希尔．宏观经济学：高级教程．北京：经济科学出版社，1998
[9] Stiglitz J E, Weiss A. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. America Economic Review, 1981, 71 (3): 393～410
[10] 米什金．货币金融学．第四版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，1998
[11] Mishkin F S. The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets, 6th ed. America: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., a Pearson Education Company, 2001
[12] 张维迎．博弈论与信息经济学．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，1996．
[13] 黄志凌．中国居民的金融否决权与私人财经服务．经济研究，1995，(12)：15～28
[14] 龚六堂．高级宏观经济学．武汉：武汉大学出版社，2001
[15] 袁志刚，朱国林．消费理论中的收入分配与总消费．中国社会科学，2002，(2)：69～76
[16] Romer David. Advanced Macroeconomics, Second edition. America: The McGraw-Hill Education, Co., 2000
[17] Alan S Blinder. A Model of Inherited Wealth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1975, (12): 946～970
[18] 王海侠．以博弈理论分析我国信贷市场效率．金融研究，2000，(10)：60～68
[19] 彼得 罗斯．商业银行管理．第四版．北京：机械工业出版社，2001
[20] 齐天翔，李文华．消费信贷与居民储蓄．金融研究，2000，(2)：111～116
[21] Keeton William. Equilibrium Credit Rationing. New York: Garland Press, 1979
[22] English William B. Credit Rationing in General Equilibrium. University of Pennsylvania, Center for Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences. Working Paper 20～86, 1986
[23] 多恩布什，费希尔，斯塔兹．宏观经济学．第七版．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2000
[24] 刘方(木或)，张少龙．支撑经济增长．北京：华文出版社，2001
[25] 吴易风．从西方市场经济理论和政策看我国需求不足问题．宏观经济研究，2003，(2)：48-64
[26] 中国社会科学院经济研究所课题组．宏观经济理论研究的新进展．人民日报，12／28／2002
[27] 中国统计年鉴．北京：中国统计出版社，2002
[28] 世界银行．世界发展报告．1992，1996
[29] 黄金老．金融自由化与金融脆弱性．北京：中国城市出版社，2001
[30] 李扬．中国金融改革研究．南京：江苏人民出版社，1999
[31] 中国人民银行．关于开展个人消费信贷的指导意见．02／23／1999
[32] 中国人民银行．个人住房贷款管理办法．05／09／1998
[33] 中国人民银行．汽车消费贷款管理办法．09／11／1998
[34] Besanko D, A V Thakor. Collateral and rationing: sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets. International Economic Review, 1987, (28): 671～689
[35] Chan Y, G Kanatas. Asymmetric valuation and the role of collateral in loan agreements. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1985, (17): 284～325
[36] Innes R. Limited liability and incentive contracting with exante action choices. Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, (52): 345～367
[37] Barro R J.The loan market, collateral and rates of interest. The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1976, (8): 439～456
[38] 中国经济景气月报．北京：中国统计出版社，2003(2)
[39] 中国人民银行货币政策司．中国消费信贷发展报告．金融时报，03／22／2002
[40] 易纲．中国的货币、银行和金融市场：1984～1993．1996年版．上海：上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，1996
[41] 孔刘柳．商业银行信贷合约行为理论．上海：上海财经大学出版社，2001
[42] 科斯，汉斯·韦坎德等．契约经济学．北京：经济科学出版社，1999
[43] 国务院研究室赴美考察组．美国信用体系考察报告．经济研究参考，2002，(67)：2～33
[44] 粟勤，消费信贷．北京：中国审计出版社，2001
[45] “信用消费比较研究”课题组．借鉴国际经验推动我国信用消费发展．财贸经济，2000，(11)：35～43
[46] 梁燕君．论进一步扩大消费信贷的政策选择．现代财经，2000，(12)：17～19
[47] 中国国家计委宏观经济研究院课题组．居民收入分配差距扩大的状况、原因和对策研究．经济研究参考，2002，(68)：1～37
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[49] 孙凤．消费者行为数量研究．上海：三联书店，上海人民出版社，2002
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