从南海争端分析中美之间的博弈
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- 英文论文题名：The Analysis on Sino-US Game in the South China Sea Dispute
- 论文作者：董梁 ; 彭伟 ; 汤伟
- 英文论文作者：DONG Liang ; PENG Wei ; TANG Wei ; Cadets management team ; PLA University of Sci.&Tech. ; Institute of Command Information System ; PLA University of Sci.&Tech.
- 年：2017
- 作者机构：解放军理工大学指挥信息系统学院学员大队;解放军理工大学指挥信息系统学院军事信息学教研中心;
- 论文关键词：中美博弈 ; 中菲博弈 ; 连续升级威慑 ; 一带一路
- 英文论文关键词：Sino-US Game ; Game between China and the Philippines ; Continuous Upgrade Deterrence ; the Belt and Road
- 会议召开时间：2017-07-03
- 会议录名称：第五届中国指挥控制大会论文集
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：D822.371.2
- 学会代码：ZHKZ
- 会议名称：第五届中国指挥控制大会
- 会议地点：中国北京
- 主办单位：中国指挥与控制学会
- 学会名称：中国指挥与控制学会
- 页数：4
- 文件大小：415k
- 原文格式：D
- 会议级别：全国
摘要
南海问题的博弈,不应把目光局限于南海,而应将视野拉伸至整个亚洲,甚至全世界来分析,而其中的重中之重就是中美博弈。本文从全球资本争夺的角度出发,结合一带一路政策、萨德事件、兰德报告分析了南海背后的中美之争;并构建博弈模型分析了中菲之间的博弈,指出美国介入南海争端的途径和手段。最后提出"连续升级威慑"概念,指出我们应避开美国的锋芒,采取连续渐进的策略,增加谈判的筹码。
The game of South China Sea issue should not be confined to the South China Sea, but should be stretched to the Asia, and even to the world to analyze, and one of the most important games is Sino-US game. From the perspective of global competition for capital, combined with the Belt and Road Initiative policy, Thad events, and The RAND report, the Sino-US dispute behind the South China Sea was analyzed. A game model was established to analyze the game between China and the Philippines, and the ways and means for the United States to intervene in the South China Sea dispute were pointed out. Finally, the concept of "continuous upgrade deterrence" was put forward; it was pointed out that we should avoid the cutting edge of the United States, and adopt continuous and progressive strategies to provide the bargaining chip.
The game of South China Sea issue should not be confined to the South China Sea, but should be stretched to the Asia, and even to the world to analyze, and one of the most important games is Sino-US game. From the perspective of global competition for capital, combined with the Belt and Road Initiative policy, Thad events, and The RAND report, the Sino-US dispute behind the South China Sea was analyzed. A game model was established to analyze the game between China and the Philippines, and the ways and means for the United States to intervene in the South China Sea dispute were pointed out. Finally, the concept of "continuous upgrade deterrence" was put forward; it was pointed out that we should avoid the cutting edge of the United States, and adopt continuous and progressive strategies to provide the bargaining chip.
引文
[1]魏茗远.南海问题中的中美博弈探究[D].吉林大学硕士学位论文,2016.
[2]胡波.中美南海战略博弈的现状与未来[J].军事文摘,2016(19):12-16.
[3]兰德报告:中美若开战,谁的损失会更大.凤凰国际智库[OL].http://pit.ifeng.com/a/20161207/50376909_0.shtml,2016(2016-12-7).
[4]托马斯·谢林.冲突的战略[M].赵华,译.北京:华夏出版社,2006.
[5]艾里克·拉斯缪森.博弈与信息[M].韩松,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2009.
[6]许浩.南海油气资源的冲突分析[J].创新,2003(5):71-75.
[2]胡波.中美南海战略博弈的现状与未来[J].军事文摘,2016(19):12-16.
[3]兰德报告:中美若开战,谁的损失会更大.凤凰国际智库[OL].http://pit.ifeng.com/a/20161207/50376909_0.shtml,2016(2016-12-7).
[4]托马斯·谢林.冲突的战略[M].赵华,译.北京:华夏出版社,2006.
[5]艾里克·拉斯缪森.博弈与信息[M].韩松,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2009.
[6]许浩.南海油气资源的冲突分析[J].创新,2003(5):71-75.