论意图的聚合原则
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- 论文作者：朱菁
- 年：2005
- 作者机构：中国科学院研究生院人文学院;
- 会议召开时间：2005-09-01
- 会议录名称：外国哲学（第17辑）
- 语种：中文
- 分类号：B842
- 学会代码：WJWH
- 学会名称：商印文津文化(北京)有限责任公司
- 页数：15
- 文件大小：683k
- 原文格式：O
摘要
<正>意图的聚合原则由迈克尔·布拉特曼(Michael Bratman)最先提出,被称为是"一种对意图的天然约束"。根据这一原则,一位理性能动者的意图应该具有聚合性。本文首先对意图的聚合原则作出进一步的阐释和辨析,这一阐述不仅与布拉特曼所主张的意图的规划理论以及植根于该理论的关于意图的一致性原则是合拍的,而且还揭示出关于实践理性的一
引文
(1)Michael Bratman,Davidson s Theory of Intention,in B.Vermazen and M.Hintikka(eds.),Essays on Davidson-.Actions and Events,(Oxford:Clarendon Press,1985),pp.13—26,esp.22.Reprinted in his Faces of Intentions Selected Essays on Intention and Agency(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999),pp.209—224.
(1)Michael Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason(Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1987),p.134.
(2)Hugh McCann,'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',in P.French,T.Uehling,and H.Wettstein(eds.),Mid-west Studies of Philosophy X(Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,1986),pp.191—2111 Steven Sverdlik,'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26(1996),pp.515—522.
(3)M.Brand,Intending and Acting:Toward a Naturalized Action Theory(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1984);M.Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason(Cambridge,MA;Harvard University Press,1987);Faces of Intention;Selected Essays on Intention and Agency(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999))G.Harman,'Practical reasoning,'Review of Metaphysics 79(1976),pp.431—463)'Willing and intending,'in R.E.Grandy and R.Warner(eds.),Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:Intentions,Categories,Ends(Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986),pp.363—382)Change in View(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1986),chs.8&.9,A.Mele,Springs of Action:Understanding Intentional Behavior(New York:Oxford University Press,1992);J.Searle,Intentionality(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983),ch.3.
(1)有关意图可以还原为其他类型的心理状态的哲学讨论,参见Robert Audi,'Intending',Journal of Philosophy70(1973),pp.387—403,reprinted in his Action,Intention,and Reason(Ithaca,NY:Cornell University Press,1993),pp.36—73;Audi,'Intending and Its Place in the Theory of Action',in G.Holmestrom-Hintikka and R.Tuomela(eds.),Contemporary Action Theory,Volume 1:Individual Action(Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Publishers,1997)177—196;Wayne Davis,'A Causal Theory of Intending',American Philosophical Quarterly 21(1984),pp.43—54,reprinted in A.R.Mele ed..The Philosophy of Action(Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997),pp.131—148.
(2)见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,chs.2&3?
(3)同上,p.8。
(4)见Mele,Springs of Action,ch.10.
(1)见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.15—181 Mele,Springs of Action,ch.9.
(2)Bratman.Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,p.16.
(3)同上,pp.30一32。
(1)Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason.p.16.
(2)McCann,*Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198;Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.517.
(3)Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.517.
(1)参见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.10—11,28—30,关于我们心理活动所需资源的有限性对于我们的实践思考和筹划活动所产生的影响。
(2)Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.32—35.
(1)见Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.516.
(1)这一点也许会有例外。比如,在开车的同时与人交谈,可以使司机免于疲劳和乏味。不过,在这个例子中,驾驶与交谈对这位司机却很难被看作是两个具有竞争性的行为。
(2)McCann,'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198.
(3)Bratman,Intention.Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.137—1381 Alfred Mele,'Motivation,Self-Control,and the Agglomeration of Desires',Facta Philosophica 1(1999),pp.77—86.
(1)McCann,'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198.
(2)上面的例子来源于有名的“抽彩悖论”,是由亨利·凯伯格最先提出来的(Henry Kyburg,Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief(Middletown:Wesleyan Vniversity Press,1961))。“抽彩悖论”涉及确定性与知识之间的关系,关于这个问题的近期的讨论,参见Igor Douven,'A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability'.The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science53(2002),pp.391—410|Ruth Weintraub,'The lottery:A paradox regained and resolved',Synthese 129(2001),pp.439—4491 Dana Nelkin,'The lottery paradox,knowledge,and rationality',Philosophical Review 109(2000),pp.373—409.
(3)Bratman,'Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context',Mind 101(1992),pp.1—14,reprinted in his Faces of Intention,pp.15—34.Pascal Engel,'Believing,Holding True,and Accepting',Philosophical Explorations 1(1998),pp.140—151.Raimo Tuomela,'Belief versus Acceptance',Philosophical Explorations 3(2000),pp.122—137.
(1)McCann.'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198.
(1)McCann.'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.199.这个例子以布拉特曼用过的另一个例子为模本,参见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.113—118.
(2)Bratman.'Two Faces of Intention',Philosophical Review 93(1984),pp.375—4051 Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,chs.8&9.
(3)对“简单观点”的阐释和辩护,参见McCann.'Rationality and the Range of Intentions';'Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints'.American Philosophical Quarterly 28(1991),pp.25—36,reprinted in A.R.Mele ed.,The Philosophy of Action(Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997),pp.204—222;Frederick Adams,'Intention and Intentional Action:The Simple View'.Mind and Language 1(1986),pp.281—301!David Chan,'A Not-So-Simple View of Intentional Action',Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80(1999),pp.1—16.
(1)关于意图的自信度的概念,见David Chan,'A Not-So-Simple View of Intentional Action'.
(1)Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.517.
(2)同上。
(3)同上.p.518。
(1)Michael Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason(Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1987),p.134.
(2)Hugh McCann,'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',in P.French,T.Uehling,and H.Wettstein(eds.),Mid-west Studies of Philosophy X(Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,1986),pp.191—2111 Steven Sverdlik,'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26(1996),pp.515—522.
(3)M.Brand,Intending and Acting:Toward a Naturalized Action Theory(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1984);M.Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason(Cambridge,MA;Harvard University Press,1987);Faces of Intention;Selected Essays on Intention and Agency(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1999))G.Harman,'Practical reasoning,'Review of Metaphysics 79(1976),pp.431—463)'Willing and intending,'in R.E.Grandy and R.Warner(eds.),Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:Intentions,Categories,Ends(Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986),pp.363—382)Change in View(Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1986),chs.8&.9,A.Mele,Springs of Action:Understanding Intentional Behavior(New York:Oxford University Press,1992);J.Searle,Intentionality(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1983),ch.3.
(1)有关意图可以还原为其他类型的心理状态的哲学讨论,参见Robert Audi,'Intending',Journal of Philosophy70(1973),pp.387—403,reprinted in his Action,Intention,and Reason(Ithaca,NY:Cornell University Press,1993),pp.36—73;Audi,'Intending and Its Place in the Theory of Action',in G.Holmestrom-Hintikka and R.Tuomela(eds.),Contemporary Action Theory,Volume 1:Individual Action(Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Publishers,1997)177—196;Wayne Davis,'A Causal Theory of Intending',American Philosophical Quarterly 21(1984),pp.43—54,reprinted in A.R.Mele ed..The Philosophy of Action(Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997),pp.131—148.
(2)见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,chs.2&3?
(3)同上,p.8。
(4)见Mele,Springs of Action,ch.10.
(1)见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.15—181 Mele,Springs of Action,ch.9.
(2)Bratman.Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,p.16.
(3)同上,pp.30一32。
(1)Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason.p.16.
(2)McCann,*Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198;Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.517.
(3)Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.517.
(1)参见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.10—11,28—30,关于我们心理活动所需资源的有限性对于我们的实践思考和筹划活动所产生的影响。
(2)Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.32—35.
(1)见Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.516.
(1)这一点也许会有例外。比如,在开车的同时与人交谈,可以使司机免于疲劳和乏味。不过,在这个例子中,驾驶与交谈对这位司机却很难被看作是两个具有竞争性的行为。
(2)McCann,'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198.
(3)Bratman,Intention.Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.137—1381 Alfred Mele,'Motivation,Self-Control,and the Agglomeration of Desires',Facta Philosophica 1(1999),pp.77—86.
(1)McCann,'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198.
(2)上面的例子来源于有名的“抽彩悖论”,是由亨利·凯伯格最先提出来的(Henry Kyburg,Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief(Middletown:Wesleyan Vniversity Press,1961))。“抽彩悖论”涉及确定性与知识之间的关系,关于这个问题的近期的讨论,参见Igor Douven,'A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability'.The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science53(2002),pp.391—410|Ruth Weintraub,'The lottery:A paradox regained and resolved',Synthese 129(2001),pp.439—4491 Dana Nelkin,'The lottery paradox,knowledge,and rationality',Philosophical Review 109(2000),pp.373—409.
(3)Bratman,'Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context',Mind 101(1992),pp.1—14,reprinted in his Faces of Intention,pp.15—34.Pascal Engel,'Believing,Holding True,and Accepting',Philosophical Explorations 1(1998),pp.140—151.Raimo Tuomela,'Belief versus Acceptance',Philosophical Explorations 3(2000),pp.122—137.
(1)McCann.'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.198.
(1)McCann.'Rationality and the Range of Intentions',p.199.这个例子以布拉特曼用过的另一个例子为模本,参见Bratman,Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,pp.113—118.
(2)Bratman.'Two Faces of Intention',Philosophical Review 93(1984),pp.375—4051 Intention,Plans,and Practical Reason,chs.8&9.
(3)对“简单观点”的阐释和辩护,参见McCann.'Rationality and the Range of Intentions';'Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints'.American Philosophical Quarterly 28(1991),pp.25—36,reprinted in A.R.Mele ed.,The Philosophy of Action(Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997),pp.204—222;Frederick Adams,'Intention and Intentional Action:The Simple View'.Mind and Language 1(1986),pp.281—301!David Chan,'A Not-So-Simple View of Intentional Action',Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80(1999),pp.1—16.
(1)关于意图的自信度的概念,见David Chan,'A Not-So-Simple View of Intentional Action'.
(1)Sverdlik.'Consistency among Intentions and the"Simple View"',p.517.
(2)同上。
(3)同上.p.518。