政府基金政策对WEEE回收处理的引导作用及效果分析
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摘要
为了规范废弃电器电子产品(WEEE)的回收处理,2012年开始政府通过向生产企业征收基金、同时给予回收处理企业定额补贴的措施引导回收行业的有序开展,但现行基金政策在实施过程中面临着资金缺口的挑战,因此有必要探讨更加创新的激励约束机制。本文主要分析现行基金政策、资金平衡政策、以及基金减免政策对生产企业和回收处理企业的影响,通过比较企业利润、消费者剩余、环境收益、社会福利和政府资金投入等指标,综合评估三类政策的效果。研究结果表明,现行基金政策下生产企业缺少动力在生态设计、绿色生产等方面付诸环保努力,因此限制了废弃产品资源化的效率和效益。相对于现行基金政策,资金平衡政策的优势和劣势均较为突出,优势在于避免了政府财政负担,但劣势在于对生产企业的冲击过大,导致消费者剩余和社会福利下降。比较而言,基金减免政策在向生产企业征收处理基金的同时,还将根据废弃产品的处理数量给予生产企业相应的减免额度,这种压力与动力并举的措施能够更好地调动生产企业履行环境责任的积极性,激励生产企业与回收处理企业的共同努力。从评估指标来看,基金减免政策在提升WEEE的回收处理数量,改善回收处理企业的盈利状况,以及提高环境收益,降低政府开支方面具有显著的优越性。
According to the White Paper issued by China Household Electric Appliance Research Institute,China is entering apeak time of discarded electric and electronic products.In 2016,theoretical quantities of14 major WEEE in China reach 378 million sets,and the total amount of treated e-waste is 75 million sets.The growing e-waste not only causes environmental pollution,but also leads to the waste of available resources.In order to regulate the recycling industry,China-WEEE has been published since 2009 and implemented since 2011.In 2012,the Ministry of Finance announced the fund system's implementation by promulgating the WEEE Processing Fund Collection and Subsidy Management.In accordance with 2012 fund policy,the government collects the funds from producers,and then subsidizes the corresponding recycling enterprises.However,the 2012 fund policy encountered a dilemma.The White Paper shows in2016,the funds collected from producers were 2.61 billion yuan,but the subsidies to recycling enterprises were 4.714 billion yuan.The funding gap reached 2.104 billion yuan.Moreover,this policy incentivizes the recycling enterprises,but producers are lack of motivation to fulfill the environmental responsibility.How to motivate producers for their environmental efforts(for example eco-design)?How to solve the funding gap?To explore the innovation mechanisms in WEEE,Fund Balance Policy and Fund Relief Policy are mainly studied.Cost functions associated with producer's efforts on eco-design,green production,etc.are construeted,and the profit models are built for producer and recycling enterprise.Based on the optimal decisions under different policies,the consumer surplus,environmental benefits,social welfare and government expenditure are especially evaluated.The result shows the Fund Balance Policy can solve the funding gap,but this policy increases the fund collection standard.With the growing of WEEE treated,the collection standard rises significantly,which undoubtedly has a great negative impact on the producers.Compared with the 2012 fund policy,the Balance Policy still does not stimulate the producers' environmental efforts,but it leads to decreasing of producers' profits,consumer surplus and social welfare.Fund Relief Policy is another policy studied in this paper.Under this policy,the government collects the fund from producers,and then refunds some fee to producers according to the actual quantities of WEEE processed by recycling enterprises.The result shows the Fund Relief Policy can play apositive role in stimulating producers to make more efforts to fulfill their environmental responsibilities.On the whole,this policy outperforms the 2012 fund policy,particularly in promoting WEEE recycling,increasing recycling enterprises' profitability,improving environmental performance and decreasing government expenditure.
According to the White Paper issued by China Household Electric Appliance Research Institute,China is entering apeak time of discarded electric and electronic products.In 2016,theoretical quantities of14 major WEEE in China reach 378 million sets,and the total amount of treated e-waste is 75 million sets.The growing e-waste not only causes environmental pollution,but also leads to the waste of available resources.In order to regulate the recycling industry,China-WEEE has been published since 2009 and implemented since 2011.In 2012,the Ministry of Finance announced the fund system's implementation by promulgating the WEEE Processing Fund Collection and Subsidy Management.In accordance with 2012 fund policy,the government collects the funds from producers,and then subsidizes the corresponding recycling enterprises.However,the 2012 fund policy encountered a dilemma.The White Paper shows in2016,the funds collected from producers were 2.61 billion yuan,but the subsidies to recycling enterprises were 4.714 billion yuan.The funding gap reached 2.104 billion yuan.Moreover,this policy incentivizes the recycling enterprises,but producers are lack of motivation to fulfill the environmental responsibility.How to motivate producers for their environmental efforts(for example eco-design)?How to solve the funding gap?To explore the innovation mechanisms in WEEE,Fund Balance Policy and Fund Relief Policy are mainly studied.Cost functions associated with producer's efforts on eco-design,green production,etc.are construeted,and the profit models are built for producer and recycling enterprise.Based on the optimal decisions under different policies,the consumer surplus,environmental benefits,social welfare and government expenditure are especially evaluated.The result shows the Fund Balance Policy can solve the funding gap,but this policy increases the fund collection standard.With the growing of WEEE treated,the collection standard rises significantly,which undoubtedly has a great negative impact on the producers.Compared with the 2012 fund policy,the Balance Policy still does not stimulate the producers' environmental efforts,but it leads to decreasing of producers' profits,consumer surplus and social welfare.Fund Relief Policy is another policy studied in this paper.Under this policy,the government collects the fund from producers,and then refunds some fee to producers according to the actual quantities of WEEE processed by recycling enterprises.The result shows the Fund Relief Policy can play apositive role in stimulating producers to make more efforts to fulfill their environmental responsibilities.On the whole,this policy outperforms the 2012 fund policy,particularly in promoting WEEE recycling,increasing recycling enterprises' profitability,improving environmental performance and decreasing government expenditure.
引文
[1]中国废弃电器电子产品回收处理及综合利用行业白皮书2016[R].中国家用电器研究院,2017.
[2]Zeng Xianlai,Gong Ruying,Chen Weiqiang,et al.Uncovering the recycling potential of“new”WEEE in China[J].Environmental Science&Technology,2016,50(3):1347-1358.
[3]中国政府网.《废弃电器电子产品回收处理管理条例》.[EB/OL].(2009-02-25)[2009-03-04].http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-03/04/content_1250844.htm.
[4]Wang Zhaohua,Zhang Bin,Yin Jianhua,et al.Willingness and behavior towards e-waste recycling for residents in Beijing city,China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2011,19(9):977-984.
[5]Zhang Suopeng,Zhang Mingli,Yu Xueying,et al.What keeps Chinese from recycling:Accessibility of recycling facilities and the behavior[J].Resources Conservation&Recycling,2016,109:176-186.
[6]王兆华,尹建华.我国家电企业电子废弃物回收行为影响因素及特征分析[J].管理世界,2008,(4):175-176.
[7]周旭,张斌,王兆华.企业履行废弃产品回收责任影响因素研究[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2014,(2):24-32.
[8]Sheu J B,Chen Y J.Impact of government financial intervention on competition among green supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,138(1):201-213.
[9]Toyasaki F,Boyacl T,Verter V.An analysis of monopolistic and competitive take-back schemes for WEEErecycling[J].Production&Operations Management,2011,20(6):805-823.
[10]陈德敏,高艳红.劳动力成本上升背景下废旧物资回收企业与政府行为分析---一个激励契约的设计[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2013,(12):165-170.
[11]Yu Luling,He Wenzhi,Li Guangming,et al.The development of WEEE management and effects of the fund policy for subsidizing WEEE treating in China[J].Waste Management,2014,34(9):1705-1714.
[12]计国君,黄位旺.WEEE回收条例有效实施问题研究[J].管理科学学报,2012,(5):1-9.
[13]付小勇,朱庆华,窦一杰.中国版WEEE法规实施中政府和电子企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论,2011,23(10):171-176.
[14]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):36-41.
[15]Hong I H,Ke J S.Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in“E-scrap”reverse supply chains[J].Journal of Environmental Management,2011,92(6):1459-1502.
[16]马祖军,胡书,代颖.政府规制下混合渠道销售/回收的电器电子产品闭环供应链决策[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):82-90.
[17]Gu Yifan,Wu Yufeng,Xu Ming,et al.To realize better extended producer responsibility:Redesign of WEEE fund mode in China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017,164:347-356.
[2]Zeng Xianlai,Gong Ruying,Chen Weiqiang,et al.Uncovering the recycling potential of“new”WEEE in China[J].Environmental Science&Technology,2016,50(3):1347-1358.
[3]中国政府网.《废弃电器电子产品回收处理管理条例》.[EB/OL].(2009-02-25)[2009-03-04].http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-03/04/content_1250844.htm.
[4]Wang Zhaohua,Zhang Bin,Yin Jianhua,et al.Willingness and behavior towards e-waste recycling for residents in Beijing city,China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2011,19(9):977-984.
[5]Zhang Suopeng,Zhang Mingli,Yu Xueying,et al.What keeps Chinese from recycling:Accessibility of recycling facilities and the behavior[J].Resources Conservation&Recycling,2016,109:176-186.
[6]王兆华,尹建华.我国家电企业电子废弃物回收行为影响因素及特征分析[J].管理世界,2008,(4):175-176.
[7]周旭,张斌,王兆华.企业履行废弃产品回收责任影响因素研究[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2014,(2):24-32.
[8]Sheu J B,Chen Y J.Impact of government financial intervention on competition among green supply chains[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,138(1):201-213.
[9]Toyasaki F,Boyacl T,Verter V.An analysis of monopolistic and competitive take-back schemes for WEEErecycling[J].Production&Operations Management,2011,20(6):805-823.
[10]陈德敏,高艳红.劳动力成本上升背景下废旧物资回收企业与政府行为分析---一个激励契约的设计[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2013,(12):165-170.
[11]Yu Luling,He Wenzhi,Li Guangming,et al.The development of WEEE management and effects of the fund policy for subsidizing WEEE treating in China[J].Waste Management,2014,34(9):1705-1714.
[12]计国君,黄位旺.WEEE回收条例有效实施问题研究[J].管理科学学报,2012,(5):1-9.
[13]付小勇,朱庆华,窦一杰.中国版WEEE法规实施中政府和电子企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论,2011,23(10):171-176.
[14]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):36-41.
[15]Hong I H,Ke J S.Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in“E-scrap”reverse supply chains[J].Journal of Environmental Management,2011,92(6):1459-1502.
[16]马祖军,胡书,代颖.政府规制下混合渠道销售/回收的电器电子产品闭环供应链决策[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):82-90.
[17]Gu Yifan,Wu Yufeng,Xu Ming,et al.To realize better extended producer responsibility:Redesign of WEEE fund mode in China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2017,164:347-356.