国家审计与公众参与:基于政府信息公开的中介效应研究
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摘要
采用2009—2016年间30个省、自治区和直辖市的审计机关数据,实证发现:国家审计能够通过监督和信息保障功能促进公众参与的实现,政府信息公开在这一进程中充当部分桥梁和媒介的作用,且政府执政效率越高,审计独立性受影响就越小,国家审计对公众参与的促进效果也越好。进一步研究表明,国家审计在不同领域间对公众参与的促进程度具有异质性,国家审计促进公众参与的主要机制以及在有限的审计资源下审计机关应关注的重点方向。
It is a question worth to be studied whether and how state audit can promote public participation. This paper used a panel data of 30 provinces,autonomous regions and municipalities' audit institutions from 2009 to 2016 to examine the subject. We found that state audit can promote public participation through its supervision and information guarantee functions,and that government information disclosure plays as a partial intermediary in this process,and this intermediary effect is more outstanding in the district where the government is more efficient and less intervention to the audit institutions. Further results showed that in different fields the promotion degree of state audit to public participation is heterogeneous. This article reveals the main mechanism that how state audit can promote public participation and the key work direction of audit institutions under limited resources.
It is a question worth to be studied whether and how state audit can promote public participation. This paper used a panel data of 30 provinces,autonomous regions and municipalities' audit institutions from 2009 to 2016 to examine the subject. We found that state audit can promote public participation through its supervision and information guarantee functions,and that government information disclosure plays as a partial intermediary in this process,and this intermediary effect is more outstanding in the district where the government is more efficient and less intervention to the audit institutions. Further results showed that in different fields the promotion degree of state audit to public participation is heterogeneous. This article reveals the main mechanism that how state audit can promote public participation and the key work direction of audit institutions under limited resources.
引文
[1]United States Environmental Protection Agency(US EPA). Public participation guide:introduction to public participation[EB/OL]. https://www.epa.gov/international-cooperation/Publ-ic-participation-guide-introduction-public-participation.2018-02-22/2018-03-19.
[2]俞可平.公民参与的几个理论问题[N].学习时报,2006-12-18(05).
[3]陶东明,陈明明.当代中国政治参与[M].杭州:浙江人民出版社,1998.
[4]王芳,彭超然.公众集聚度与政府审计质量—基于公共选择理论的分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2015(2):72-79.
[5]郭芮佳,池国华,程龙.公众参与对政府审计腐败治理效果的影响研究—基于国家治理视角的实证分析[J].审计与经济研究,2018(2):19-28.
[6]崔雯雯,张立民.国家审计促进官民共治的作用研究[J].北京交通大学学报:社会科学版,2015(4):52-58.
[7]庄尚文.公众效用约束视角下强化国家审计的治理逻辑及其制度供给[J].审计与经济研究,2017(1):15-22.
[8]吴秋生,黄贤环.国家审计参与实现国家善治要素的路径研究[J].当代财经,2016(3):120-128.
[9]王绍光.祛魅与超越[M].北京:中信出版社,2010.
[10]吴秋生,上官泽明.国家审计能力对政府预算透明度影响的实证研究—基于国际视野的经验证据[J].南京审计学院学报,2015(5):3-11.
[11]谢柳芳.政府审计与政府信息披露—基于民主政治视角的分析[J].财会通讯,2015(6):10-13.
[12]赖诗攀.问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究[J].公共管理学报,2013(2):18-27.
[13]上官泽明.最高审计机关特征、财政审计报告质量与预算透明度[D].太原:山西财经大学,2018。
[14]Ingram R W. Economic incentives and the choice of state government accounting practices[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1984,22(1):126-144.
[15]郑石明.数据开放、公众参与和环境治理创新[J].行政论坛,2017(4):76-81.
[16]蔡春,朱荣,蔡利.国家审计服务国家治理的理论分析与实现路径探讨—基于受托经济责任观的视角[J].审计研究,2012(1):6-11.
[17]王少华,上官泽明,吴秋生.审计监督、公众参与和预算透明度—基于跨国数据的实证研究[J].科学决策,2017(9):44-64.
[18]崔雯雯.基于国家治理的国家审计问责机制:理论与实证研究[D].北京:北京交通大学,2017.
[19]Grimmelikhuijsen S G,Welch E W. Developing and testing a theoretical framework for computer-Mediated transparency of local govern ments[J]. Public Administration Review,2012,72(4):562-571.
[20]Cuillier D,Piotrowski S J. Internet information-seeking and its relation to support for access to government record[J]. Government Information Quaterly,2009,26(3):441-449.
[21]Choi H,Varian H. Predicting the present with google trends[J]. Economic Record,2009,88(special issue):2-9.
[22]Zheng S,Wu J,Kahn M E,Deng Y. The mascent market for“green”real estate in Beijing[J]. European Economic Review,2012,26(5):974-984.
[23]Taylor A B,Mackinnon D P,Tein J Y. Tests of the three path mediated effect[J]. Organizational Research Methods,2008,11(2):241-269.
[24]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014(5):731-745.
[25]Roberts A. Blacked out:givernment secrecy in the information age[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
[26]徐仁璋.中国地方政府的系统结构[J].中国行政管理,2002(8):29-31.
(1)由于百度指数的披露始于2009年,故本文以2009年作为时间节点。
(2)由于审计结果公告数据基本未披露,故本文剔除西藏自治区数据。
[2]俞可平.公民参与的几个理论问题[N].学习时报,2006-12-18(05).
[3]陶东明,陈明明.当代中国政治参与[M].杭州:浙江人民出版社,1998.
[4]王芳,彭超然.公众集聚度与政府审计质量—基于公共选择理论的分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2015(2):72-79.
[5]郭芮佳,池国华,程龙.公众参与对政府审计腐败治理效果的影响研究—基于国家治理视角的实证分析[J].审计与经济研究,2018(2):19-28.
[6]崔雯雯,张立民.国家审计促进官民共治的作用研究[J].北京交通大学学报:社会科学版,2015(4):52-58.
[7]庄尚文.公众效用约束视角下强化国家审计的治理逻辑及其制度供给[J].审计与经济研究,2017(1):15-22.
[8]吴秋生,黄贤环.国家审计参与实现国家善治要素的路径研究[J].当代财经,2016(3):120-128.
[9]王绍光.祛魅与超越[M].北京:中信出版社,2010.
[10]吴秋生,上官泽明.国家审计能力对政府预算透明度影响的实证研究—基于国际视野的经验证据[J].南京审计学院学报,2015(5):3-11.
[11]谢柳芳.政府审计与政府信息披露—基于民主政治视角的分析[J].财会通讯,2015(6):10-13.
[12]赖诗攀.问责、惯性与公开:基于97个公共危机事件的地方政府行为研究[J].公共管理学报,2013(2):18-27.
[13]上官泽明.最高审计机关特征、财政审计报告质量与预算透明度[D].太原:山西财经大学,2018。
[14]Ingram R W. Economic incentives and the choice of state government accounting practices[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1984,22(1):126-144.
[15]郑石明.数据开放、公众参与和环境治理创新[J].行政论坛,2017(4):76-81.
[16]蔡春,朱荣,蔡利.国家审计服务国家治理的理论分析与实现路径探讨—基于受托经济责任观的视角[J].审计研究,2012(1):6-11.
[17]王少华,上官泽明,吴秋生.审计监督、公众参与和预算透明度—基于跨国数据的实证研究[J].科学决策,2017(9):44-64.
[18]崔雯雯.基于国家治理的国家审计问责机制:理论与实证研究[D].北京:北京交通大学,2017.
[19]Grimmelikhuijsen S G,Welch E W. Developing and testing a theoretical framework for computer-Mediated transparency of local govern ments[J]. Public Administration Review,2012,72(4):562-571.
[20]Cuillier D,Piotrowski S J. Internet information-seeking and its relation to support for access to government record[J]. Government Information Quaterly,2009,26(3):441-449.
[21]Choi H,Varian H. Predicting the present with google trends[J]. Economic Record,2009,88(special issue):2-9.
[22]Zheng S,Wu J,Kahn M E,Deng Y. The mascent market for“green”real estate in Beijing[J]. European Economic Review,2012,26(5):974-984.
[23]Taylor A B,Mackinnon D P,Tein J Y. Tests of the three path mediated effect[J]. Organizational Research Methods,2008,11(2):241-269.
[24]温忠麟,叶宝娟.中介效应分析:方法和模型发展[J].心理科学进展,2014(5):731-745.
[25]Roberts A. Blacked out:givernment secrecy in the information age[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press,2006.
[26]徐仁璋.中国地方政府的系统结构[J].中国行政管理,2002(8):29-31.
(1)由于百度指数的披露始于2009年,故本文以2009年作为时间节点。
(2)由于审计结果公告数据基本未披露,故本文剔除西藏自治区数据。