利益集团、权力结构与发展政策——对非洲国家经济发展的启示
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摘要
20世纪90年代以来,非洲经济实现了迅速增长,非洲和东亚在国家发展政策上的显著差异成为备受关注的问题。通过建立分析框架,可尝试对其实施不同发展政策的原因做出解释:在国家工业化初期所面临的差异化的国际和国内环境形成了不同的约束条件,进而塑造了不同的国家行为。具体而言,韩国集中化的国内权力结构(不存在强大的分利集团)和分散性的国际权力结构(国家间的战争威胁),使国家既有动员社会资源的能力,又有将资源用于经济发展的意愿,从而形成"发展型政策";尼日利亚独立后,部族势力削弱了国家的发展能力,和平的国际环境使国家行为缺少外部约束,国家为维护统治地位而进行持续的资源掠夺,形成了"掠夺型政策";埃塞俄比亚有较为集中的国家权力,但同样缺乏外部约束的国际环境使国家得以获取大量资源实现短期增长,长期发展则面临挑战。非洲国家经济政策问题的根源在于其未能完成现代国家构建,在依赖部族维持生存的政治体系中,国家和部族均致力于争夺经济资源和政治权力,很难形成长远的政治和经济规划。因此,国际社会和非洲国家应一方面增强国家的发展能力,一方面增强国家行为的约束性,实现国家的个体理性和社会的集体理性的统一,这也是非洲实现长期发展的必然路径。
Since the 1990 s,African economy has achieved rapid growth,and the significant differences in development policies between African and East Asian countries have become an important issue of concern. For the reasons why different development policies have been implemented in East Asian and African countries,we attempt to establish a relatively complete analytical framework. We argue that the differentiated international and domestic environments faced by countries in the early stage of industrialization have formed different constraints, thus shaping different national behaviors.Specifically,in South Korea,centralized domestic power structure( without strong profit-sharing groups) and decentralized international power structure( the threat of war among nations) have made the country both capable of mobilizing social resources and willing to use resources for economic development,thus forming a "developmental policy". As to Nigeria,after its independence,the power of ethnic groups has weakened the ability of the state to mobilize social resources while the peaceful international environment has made the state's behavior lack of restraint. Thus,the state has continued to plunder resources in order to maintain its dominant position and formed the"predatory policy". For Ethiopia,although it has relatively centralized state power,the lack of external constraints in the international environment has enabled the country to obtain large amounts of resources in the process of growth. Although short-term growth has been achieved,it poses a challenge to long-term development. The root causes of Africa's economic policy problems lie in the failure to complete the construction of modern states. In the political system that relies on ethnic groups to survive, both countries and ethnic groups are committed to competing for economic resources and political power,which makes it difficult to form long-term political and economic planning. Therefore,the international community and African countries should enhance the development capacity of the country on the one hand,and strengthen the binding nature of the state behavior on the other hand,and realize the unity of country's individual rationality and collective rationality of society,which is the inevitable path for Africa to achieve long-term development.
Since the 1990 s,African economy has achieved rapid growth,and the significant differences in development policies between African and East Asian countries have become an important issue of concern. For the reasons why different development policies have been implemented in East Asian and African countries,we attempt to establish a relatively complete analytical framework. We argue that the differentiated international and domestic environments faced by countries in the early stage of industrialization have formed different constraints, thus shaping different national behaviors.Specifically,in South Korea,centralized domestic power structure( without strong profit-sharing groups) and decentralized international power structure( the threat of war among nations) have made the country both capable of mobilizing social resources and willing to use resources for economic development,thus forming a "developmental policy". As to Nigeria,after its independence,the power of ethnic groups has weakened the ability of the state to mobilize social resources while the peaceful international environment has made the state's behavior lack of restraint. Thus,the state has continued to plunder resources in order to maintain its dominant position and formed the"predatory policy". For Ethiopia,although it has relatively centralized state power,the lack of external constraints in the international environment has enabled the country to obtain large amounts of resources in the process of growth. Although short-term growth has been achieved,it poses a challenge to long-term development. The root causes of Africa's economic policy problems lie in the failure to complete the construction of modern states. In the political system that relies on ethnic groups to survive, both countries and ethnic groups are committed to competing for economic resources and political power,which makes it difficult to form long-term political and economic planning. Therefore,the international community and African countries should enhance the development capacity of the country on the one hand,and strengthen the binding nature of the state behavior on the other hand,and realize the unity of country's individual rationality and collective rationality of society,which is the inevitable path for Africa to achieve long-term development.
引文
(1)John Page,“Africa’s Growth Turnaround:From Fewer Mistakes to Sustained Growth,”World Bank Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper,No.54,2009,pp.11-12; African Center for Economic Transformation(ACET),2014 African Transformation Report:Growth with Depth,Accra:ACET,2014,pp.26-31.
(2)亚历克斯·汤姆森分析了非洲殖民遗产和部族政治的长期影响,参见Alex Thomson,An Introduction to African Politics,3th edition,London:Routledge,2010,pp.12-28,60-83;非洲国家较低的资源动员能力及其与东亚国家不同的国内外环境,参见United Nations,Economic Development in Africa—Reclaiming Policy Space:Domestic Resource Mobilization and Developmental States, New York and Geneva:United Natious, 2007, pp. 6-7,pp.75-77,https://unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica2007_en.pdf,访问时间:2019年6月2日。此外,约翰·海尔布伦对资源型国家的殖民历史、掠夺型政策及其经济后果进行了深入分析,参见John R. Heilbrunn,Oil,Democracy,and Development in Africa,New York:Cambridge University Press,2014,pp.37-74,pp.145-181;对非洲增长的特征及其与东亚发展型国家的全面对比,参见Laura Routley,“Developmental States in Africa? A Review of Ongoing Debates and Buzzwords,” Development Policy Review,Vol.32,No.2,2014,pp.162-170。
(1)Peter Evans,Embedded Autonomy:States and Industrial Transformation,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1995,pp.12-17.
(2)迈克尔·罗瑞奥克斯:《法国的发展型国家:神话与道德抱负》,载禹贞恩编,曹德军译:《发展型国家》,长春:吉林出版集团有限公司2008年版,第269—273页。
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(4)Robert Wade,Governing the Market:Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation,Princeton:Princeton University Press,pp.8-15; Jung-en Woo,Race to the Swift:State and Finance in Korean Industrialization,New York:Columbia University Press,1991,pp.6-7.
(5)Araon Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,Chaim:Palgrave Macmillan,2017,p.135; Claude Ake,Democracy and Development in Africa,Washington,D. C.:Brookings Institution,1996,p.7; Peter Evans,Embedded Autonomy:States and Industrial Transformation,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1995,pp.45-47.
(1)Robin Theobald,“Patrimonialism,” World Politics,Vol.34,No.4,1982,pp.548-559.
(2)Tuong Vu,“State Formation and the Origins of Developmental States in South Korea and Indonesia,”Studies in Comparative International Development,Vol.41,No.4,2007,pp.27-56; Laura Routley,“Developmental States in Africa? A Review of Ongoing Debates and Buzzwords,”Development Policy Review,Vol.32,No.2,2014,pp.159-177.
(3)潘佩尔:《变化世界经济中的发展型体制》,载禹贞恩:《发展型国家》,第185页; Hagen Koo,“The Interplay of State,Social Class,and World System in East Asian Development,”in Frederic C. Deyo,ed.,Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism,p.171。
(4)Peter Evans,“Class,State,and Dependence in East Asia:Lessons for Latin Americanists,” in Frederic C. Deyo,ed.,Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism,pp.214-215.
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(1)李文刚:《“联邦特征”原则与尼日利亚民族国家构建》,载《西亚非洲》,2012年第1期,第84—100页。
(2)Jeffrey Herbst,States and Power in Africa:Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000,pp.108-109.
(3)David Waldner,State Building and Late Development,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1999,p.125.
(4)曼瑟·奥尔森著,苏长和等译:《权力与繁荣》,上海:上海人民出版社2005年版,第48—49页。利益集团理论指出,行为者的掠夺动机通常先于交易动机,如果部分行为体比其他行为体拥有强得多的社会权力,它更可能通过使用武力威胁而不是平等交易实现自己的利益。
(5)曼瑟·奥尔森著,吕应中等译:《国家兴衰探源——经济增长、滞胀与社会僵化》,北京:商务印书馆1999年版,第81—85页。
(6)曼瑟·奥尔森:《权力与繁荣》,第5—11页。
(7)对于如何限制国家的掠夺动机,奥尔森认为只有逐步建立民主制度,才能全面保障个人权利、减少国家的掠夺,实现社会繁荣。但是在经济发展的初始阶段,大部分国家并非民主国家,而且有研究指出,后发国家的发展型政策与民主制度可能并不兼容,这导致国家维护统治地位的目标偏离社会整体目标。因此,在经济增长的初始阶段,国家实施有利于经济增长的政策需要一定内外因素。参见琳达·维斯等著,黄兆辉等译:《国家与经济发展——一个比较及历史性的分析》,长春:吉林出版集团有限公司2009年版,第280—283页。
(1)Pranab Bardhan,“State and Development:The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature,” Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.54,No.3,2016,pp.862-892;戴维·兰德斯著,门洪华等译:《国富国穷》,北京:华夏出版社2010年版,第33、36—37页。
(2)道格拉斯·诺斯著,钟正生等译:《理解经济变迁过程》,北京:中国人民大学出版社2007年版,第123页。
(3)Eric Jones,The European Miracle:Environments,Economics and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2003,pp.104-126;戴维·兰德斯:《国富国穷》,第37—44页。
(4)1660年后,欧洲国际关系的最重要特征为多极体系的形成,战争在规模、技术和开支等方面远高于其他时期,这不仅增强了国家提高财政收入的要求,也提升了其对科技人才、军事技术的需求,促进了重商主义的发展。参见Lawrence Stone,“State Control in Sixteenth-Century England,”Economic History Review,Vol.17,No.2,1947,p.110。
(5)Charles Tilly,“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter B. Evans,eds.,Bringing the State Back In,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985,pp.170-172,pp.175-177.
(6)Mark Dincecco,“Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913,” The Journal of Economic History,Vol.69,No.1,2009,p.48.
(1)分利集团力量较强会导致国家权力分散,国家管辖权的集中将克服分利集团各自为政的寻租行为,带来较高增长,参见曼瑟·奥尔森著,李增刚译:《国家的兴衰:经济增长、滞胀和社会僵化》,上海:上海人民出版社2005年版,第121—135页;战争与国家形成理论也认为,国内分利集团势力较小的国家,更能够增强国家汲取能力。参见Charles Tilly,“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,”pp.181-183。
(2)曼瑟·奥尔森:《国家的兴衰:经济增长、滞胀和社会僵化》,第52—71页。
(3)Richard Sandook, Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985,pp.36-41.
(1)David Waldner,State Building and Late Development,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1999,pp.8-17.
(2)近代早期英国的发展也体现了国家权力集中的作用,参见Joel Mokyr and John V. C. Nye,“Distribution Coalitions,the Industrial Revolution,and the Origins of Economic Growth in Britain,”Southern Economic Journal,Vol.74,No.1,2007,pp.50-70;伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦著,郭方等译:《现代世界体系》(第2卷),北京:社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第352页。
(3)Charles Tilly,“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” pp.170-172.
(4)Stephen R. Epstein,Freedom and Growth:The Rise of States and Markets in Europe,1300-1750,London:Routledge,2000,p.170.
(5)近代以来,英国的崛起过程也体现了国际竞争的作用,英国与法国长期的大规模战争导致君主面临生存威胁和财政危机,从而推行了一系列重商主义措施,有助于大西洋贸易和国内市场整合,促进了长期发展和制度变迁。参见Nial Ferguson,The Cash Nexus:Money and Power in the Modern World,1700-2000,New York:Basic Book,2001,p.41;华尔特·W.罗斯托著,黄其祥等译:《这一切是怎么开始的:现代经济的起源》,北京:商务印书馆2014年版,第47页;张宇燕、高程:《美洲金银和西方世界的兴起》,北京:中信出版社2016年版,第121—123页。
(6)根据相关研究,“自主性”是指国家能够独立地制定经济政策和目标、不受社会中分利集团的影响的能力,参见Peter B. Evans,“Predatory,Developmental,and Other Apparatuses:A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” Sociological Forum,Vol.4,No.4,1989,pp.571-574;琳达·维斯:《国家与经济发展——一个比较及历史性的分析》,第183—187页。
(1)由于篇幅所限,本文并未全面分析近代初期法国与其他欧洲国家的经济政策,我们将会在后续研究中进一步加以讨论和完善。
(2)法国贸易公司表现出更多的政府作用,其商人参与程度远低于英国和荷兰,甚至有研究认为英国和荷兰的贸易公司是商人行为、法国是政府行为,这也是法国和英国重商政策的重要差异。参见乔治·杜比主编,吕一民等译:《法国史》(上卷),北京:商务印书馆2010年版,第718页。
(1)理查德·雷德著,王毅等译:《现代非洲史》,上海:上海人民出版社2014年版,第297—300页。
(2)Jeffrey Herbst,State and Power in Africa:Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000,pp.105-112.
(3)Jeffrey Herbs,t“War and the State in Africa,” International Security,Vol.14,Issue 4,1990,pp.117-139.
(4)在这方面,欧洲与日本殖民者对殖民地的统治方式有着根本的不同。从19世纪开始,英国、法国和美国的殖民主义者维持了非直接统治型结构,其形式是精简的官僚阶层、殖民官员与当地权贵结盟,因而统治者没有渗透殖民社会的权力。但是在韩国,日本殖民当局建立了直接统治型国家,高度渗透力的殖民官僚机构取代了原有权贵阶层,消灭了农业精英,建立了较为均等化的权力结构,这也是韩国能够迅速推行工业化战略的重要原因。参见Joel S. Migdal,Strong Societies and Weak States:State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World,Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 52-89; Hagen Koo,“The Interplay of State, Social Class,and World System in East Asian Development,”in Frederic C. Deyo,ed.,Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism,pp.170-172。
(5)Claude Ake,Democracy and Development in Africa,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1996,pp.7-8.
(1)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,pp.335-336.
(2)戈翁军政府在石油财政的支持下废除了以部族为基础的政党、增加了州的数量,体现了其增强国家能力的努力;但是部族分裂远未消除,石油收入下降后,原有矛盾进一步凸显。参见Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,pp.344-345。
(3)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.336.
(4)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.350,p.353.据研究,1974年石油收入达到尼日利亚国家总收入的80%,1976年石油出口占尼日利亚总出口比重的94%。参见法洛拉著,沐涛译:《尼日利亚史》,上海:上海人民出版社2015年版,第130—131页。
(5)尤为重要的是,石油财富使中央收入大大增加,引起了各州对联邦权力的激烈争夺,成为政治不稳定的来源。
(1)Alex Gboyega,et al.,“Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5799,2005, p. 15, https://openknowledge. worldbank. org/handle/10986/3542,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(2)Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008,pp.183-184.
(3)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.356.
(1)World Bank,World Development Report 2011:Conflict, Security, and Development, Washington, D. C.:World Bank Group,2011,p.51,https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(2)由于非洲国家间的冲突在时间、强度、对政权的威胁等方面远低于近代早期的欧洲战争,因此相关研究将存在冲突的国家称为“国际对手”,发现其对国家构建不能产生显著作用。参见卢凌宇:《战争与撒哈拉以南非洲国家建设》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第11期,第12—15页。
(3)S. Rubenson,The Survival of Ethiopian Independence,London:Heinemann,1976,pp.31-32.转引自肖玉华:《当代埃塞俄比亚政治进程研究》,杭州:浙江人民出版社2014年版,第54—55页。
(4)孟尼利克二世(Menelik II)是集权化国家的缔造者,建立了以亚的斯亚贝巴为中心的国家,建立了强有力的君主管理体系。参见Aaron Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,pp.42-44。
(5)Paulos Chanie,“The Challenge of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia,” Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review,Vol.17,No.1,2001,pp.79-102.
(6)李安山等:《非洲梦:探索现代化之路》,南京:江苏人民出版社2013年版,第323页。
(1)Aaron Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,pp.67-72.
(2)Paulos Chanie,“Clientelism and Ethiopia’s Post-1991 Decentralization,”Journal of Modern African Studies,Vol.45,No.3,2007,pp.368-370.
(3)Aaron Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,p.133.
(4)World Bank,Ethiopia’s Great Run:The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It,World Bank Group Report,No.99399-ET,2015,pp.24-25,http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/693561467988949839/,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(1)IMF,“The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia:Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11-2014/15,” IMF Country Report,No. 11/303,2011,pp. 4-7,https://www. imf. org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Federal-Democratic-Republic-of-Ethiopia-Poverty-Reduction-StrategyPaper-Joint-Staff-25282,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(2)Christopher Clapham,“The Ethiopian Developmental State,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 39, Issue 6,2018,pp.1151-1165.
(3)Rene Lefor,t“Free Market Economy,‘Developmental State’ and Party-State Hegemony in Ethiopia:The Case of the ‘Model Farmers’,”The Journal of Modern African Studies,Vol.50,No.4,2012,p.693.多个地区的政党均建立了相关基金,例如Amhara的TIRET,Oromia的DINSHO以及SNNP的WONDO。
(1)Rene Lefor,t“The Ethiopian Economy:The Developmental State vs. the Free Market,”in Gerard Prunier and Eloi Ficquet,eds.,Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia:Monarchy,Revolution and the Legacy of Melese Zenawi,London:C. Hurst and Company,2015,pp.366-367.
(2)Emanuele Fantin,i“Development State,Economic Transformation and Social Diversification in Ethiopia,”ISPI Analysis,No.163,2013,pp.6-7.
(3)Rene Lefor,t“The Ethiopian Economy:The Developmental State vs. the Free Market,” pp.366-367.
(4)朝鲜半岛分裂之初,韩国经济基础远弱于朝鲜。重工业、化工业和自然资源均在北方,南方为农业地区,仅有少量棉纺织工业,而且由于400万难民和侨胞回国,韩国成为世界上三大人口稠密国家之一。朝鲜战争使40%的生产设施遭到破坏,1954年开始建设51座小规模工厂,绝大多数直至20世纪60年代才最终建成,因此实现经济发展是韩国面临的迫切任务。参见金正濂著,张可喜译:《韩国经济腾飞的奥秘——汉江奇迹与朴正熙》,北京:新华出版社1993年版,第5—6页。
(1)沈志华、董洁:《朝鲜战后重建与中国的经济援助(1954—1960)》,载《中共党史研究》,2011年第3期,第55—57页; David C. Kang,“Rethinking North Korea,” Asian Survey,Vol.35,No.3,1995,p.254。
(2)World Bank,World Bank Annual Report, various years, Washington, D. C.; Stephen Wing-Kai Chiu,The State and the Financing of Industrialisation in East Asia:Historical Origins of Comparative Divergences,Ph.D.Dissertationof Princeton University,1992,p.144.
(3)斯蒂芬·哈格德著,陈慧荣译:《走出边缘:新兴工业化经济体成长的政治》,长春:吉林出版集团有限公司2009年版,第64页。美国对韩国的援助1960年为2.45亿美元,仅为1957年的64%,援助资金的减少明显降低了韩国的投资水平,参见Jung-en Woo,Race to the Swift:State and Finance in Korean Industrialization,p.46。
(4)一般而言,欧洲的长期大规模战争通过政治威胁和财政危机提升了国家的发展意愿;由于20世纪60年代朝鲜半岛并未再发生大规模战争,因此韩国没有产生财政危机,但国内经济形势恶化和美国援助减少使韩国经济面临严重困难,迫使韩国推动迅速的工业化,以增强国防力量、应对安全威胁。参见David C. Kang,Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004,p.39。
(5)Hagen Koo,“The Interplay of State,Social Class,and World System in East Asian Development,”p.171.
(6)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,pp.28-32.
(7)David C. Kang,Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,pp.27-28.
(1)David C. Kang,Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,p.39.
(2)Larry L. Burmeister,“State, Industrialization and Agricultural Policy in Korea,” Development and Change,Vol.21,No.2,1990,pp.201-204; Byung-Nak Song,The Rise of the Korean Economy,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1990,p.91.
(3)斯蒂芬·哈格德:《走出边缘:新兴工业化经济体成长的政治》,第70页。
(4)Wan Ki Paik,“The Formation of the Governing Elites in Korean Society,”in Gerald E. Caiden and Bun Woong Kim,eds.,A Dragon’s Progress:Development Administration in Korea, West Hartford:Kumarian Press,1991,pp.43-57.
(1)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.104.
(2)斯蒂芬·哈格德:《走出边缘:新兴工业化经济体成长的政治》,第70页。
(3)David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,pp.107-116.
(4)这些贷款覆盖了出口生产和采购的所有阶段,对经济扩张的作用相当重要。信贷与国民生产总值(GNP)比例由1963年的15.8%上升至1973年的38.7%,信贷与制造业的平均比例达到55%,大型企业的股本债务比率甚至达到5∶1。参见John Minns,The Politics of Developmentalism,p.121; Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.91。
(5)David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,pp.116-120.
(1)Yung Whee Rhee,Bruce Ross-Larson and Garry Pursell,Korea’s Competitive Edge:Managing the Entry into World Markets,Baltimore and London:The Johns Hopkins University Press,1984,pp.29-35.
(2)Jung-en Woo,Race to the Swift:State and Finance in Korean Industrialization,p.135.
(3)案例参见Alice H. Amsden,Asia’s Next Giant:South Korea and Late Industrialization,New York and Oxford:Oxford University Press,1989,pp.15-16。
(4)科利的研究表明,韩国政府虽然在信贷、补贴等方面有意“扭曲”了价格,但远没有其他发展中国家的严重程度。参见Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.114。
(5)琳达·维斯等:《国家与经济发展——一个比较及历史性的分析》,第205—210页。
(1)Mark Dincecco,“The Rise of Effective States in Europe,” The Journal of Economic History,Vol.75,No.3,2015,pp.903-907.
(1)尤为重要的是,在20世纪80年代联邦原则实践的基础上,阿巴查政府于1995年颁布了新宪法,进一步以“分区制”和“总统轮换制”为核心,对国家政治体制进行重新规划,包括建立从中央到州政府和地方政府的三级行政体制等,成为打破北方人垄断政治职位、实现各方利益平衡的重要标志。
(2)刘鸿武等著:《尼日利亚建国百年史》,杭州:浙江人民出版社2014年版,第180、208页。
(3)African Development Bank,African Economic Outlook 2010,Abidjan:African Development Bank Group,2010,p.87.
(4)UNECA,Economic Report on Africa 2014:Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa,United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,2014,pp.78-79.
(5)Alex Gboyega,et al.,“Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria,” p.15.
(1)Mark Dincecco,“Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913,” pp.51-53.
(2)Stephen R. Epstein,Freedom and Growth:The Rise of States and Markets in Europe,1300-1750,pp.169-170 ; Mark Dincecco,“The Rise of Effective States in Europe,” pp.907-909.
(1)数据来源自世界银行数据库。
(2)UNCTAD,Economic Development in Africa Report 2014:Catalyzing Investment for Transformative Growth in Africa,New York and Geneva,2014,p.24; World Bank,Ethiopia’s Great Run:The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It,Washington,D.C.:World Bank Group,2012,p.15.
(3)World Bank,Ethiopia’s Great Run:The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It,pp.13-18.
(4)Christopher Clapham,“The Ethiopian Developmental State,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, 2017,pp.1151-1165.
(5)AfD B,African Economic Outlook 2016,Abidja:African Development Bank Group,2016,p.62.
(1)戴维·瓦尔纳德总结指出,国家构建有多重内涵,包括政府职能与社会制度的最初分化到绝对主义国家的权力集中,再到国家制度的扩展和合理化。本文根据迪辛克的观点,将现代国家构建理解为现代有效国家的兴起,包括国家拥有汲取能力来获得收入,同时对国家分配公共资源的行为有效的限制。参见David Waldner,State Building and Late Development,p.21; Mark Dincecco,“The Rise of Effective States in Europe,”pp.901-905。
(2)David S. Landes,The Unbound Prometheus:Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1969,pp.17-18.
(3)Thomas Ertman,Birth of the Leviathan:Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe,pp.140-145.
(1)Robert H. Bates,When Things Fell Apart:State Failure in Late-Century Africa,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008,pp.64-69.
(2)亚历克斯·汤姆森分析了非洲殖民遗产和部族政治的长期影响,参见Alex Thomson,An Introduction to African Politics,3th edition,London:Routledge,2010,pp.12-28,60-83;非洲国家较低的资源动员能力及其与东亚国家不同的国内外环境,参见United Nations,Economic Development in Africa—Reclaiming Policy Space:Domestic Resource Mobilization and Developmental States, New York and Geneva:United Natious, 2007, pp. 6-7,pp.75-77,https://unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica2007_en.pdf,访问时间:2019年6月2日。此外,约翰·海尔布伦对资源型国家的殖民历史、掠夺型政策及其经济后果进行了深入分析,参见John R. Heilbrunn,Oil,Democracy,and Development in Africa,New York:Cambridge University Press,2014,pp.37-74,pp.145-181;对非洲增长的特征及其与东亚发展型国家的全面对比,参见Laura Routley,“Developmental States in Africa? A Review of Ongoing Debates and Buzzwords,” Development Policy Review,Vol.32,No.2,2014,pp.162-170。
(1)Peter Evans,Embedded Autonomy:States and Industrial Transformation,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1995,pp.12-17.
(2)迈克尔·罗瑞奥克斯:《法国的发展型国家:神话与道德抱负》,载禹贞恩编,曹德军译:《发展型国家》,长春:吉林出版集团有限公司2008年版,第269—273页。
(3)Chalmers Johnson,“Political Institutions and Economic Performance:The Government-Business Relationship in Japan,South Korea,and Taiwan,”in Frederic C. Deyo,ed.,The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialisation,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1987,pp.160-162.
(4)Robert Wade,Governing the Market:Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialisation,Princeton:Princeton University Press,pp.8-15; Jung-en Woo,Race to the Swift:State and Finance in Korean Industrialization,New York:Columbia University Press,1991,pp.6-7.
(5)Araon Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,Chaim:Palgrave Macmillan,2017,p.135; Claude Ake,Democracy and Development in Africa,Washington,D. C.:Brookings Institution,1996,p.7; Peter Evans,Embedded Autonomy:States and Industrial Transformation,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1995,pp.45-47.
(1)Robin Theobald,“Patrimonialism,” World Politics,Vol.34,No.4,1982,pp.548-559.
(2)Tuong Vu,“State Formation and the Origins of Developmental States in South Korea and Indonesia,”Studies in Comparative International Development,Vol.41,No.4,2007,pp.27-56; Laura Routley,“Developmental States in Africa? A Review of Ongoing Debates and Buzzwords,”Development Policy Review,Vol.32,No.2,2014,pp.159-177.
(3)潘佩尔:《变化世界经济中的发展型体制》,载禹贞恩:《发展型国家》,第185页; Hagen Koo,“The Interplay of State,Social Class,and World System in East Asian Development,”in Frederic C. Deyo,ed.,Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism,p.171。
(4)Peter Evans,“Class,State,and Dependence in East Asia:Lessons for Latin Americanists,” in Frederic C. Deyo,ed.,Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism,pp.214-215.
(5)Chalmers Johnson,Japan,Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State,New York:W. W. Norton,1995,pp.51-68.
(6)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development:Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004,pp.33-40.
(7)Meredith Woo-Cumings,“Political Economy of Growth in East Asia,” in Masahiko Aoki,et al.,eds.,The Role of Government in East Asian Economic Development:Comparative Institutional Analysis,New York:Oxford University Press,1996,p.334.
(8)Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States:State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World,Princeton:Princeton University Press,pp.206-237.
(1)李文刚:《“联邦特征”原则与尼日利亚民族国家构建》,载《西亚非洲》,2012年第1期,第84—100页。
(2)Jeffrey Herbst,States and Power in Africa:Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000,pp.108-109.
(3)David Waldner,State Building and Late Development,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1999,p.125.
(4)曼瑟·奥尔森著,苏长和等译:《权力与繁荣》,上海:上海人民出版社2005年版,第48—49页。利益集团理论指出,行为者的掠夺动机通常先于交易动机,如果部分行为体比其他行为体拥有强得多的社会权力,它更可能通过使用武力威胁而不是平等交易实现自己的利益。
(5)曼瑟·奥尔森著,吕应中等译:《国家兴衰探源——经济增长、滞胀与社会僵化》,北京:商务印书馆1999年版,第81—85页。
(6)曼瑟·奥尔森:《权力与繁荣》,第5—11页。
(7)对于如何限制国家的掠夺动机,奥尔森认为只有逐步建立民主制度,才能全面保障个人权利、减少国家的掠夺,实现社会繁荣。但是在经济发展的初始阶段,大部分国家并非民主国家,而且有研究指出,后发国家的发展型政策与民主制度可能并不兼容,这导致国家维护统治地位的目标偏离社会整体目标。因此,在经济增长的初始阶段,国家实施有利于经济增长的政策需要一定内外因素。参见琳达·维斯等著,黄兆辉等译:《国家与经济发展——一个比较及历史性的分析》,长春:吉林出版集团有限公司2009年版,第280—283页。
(1)Pranab Bardhan,“State and Development:The Need for a Reappraisal of the Current Literature,” Journal of Economic Literature,Vol.54,No.3,2016,pp.862-892;戴维·兰德斯著,门洪华等译:《国富国穷》,北京:华夏出版社2010年版,第33、36—37页。
(2)道格拉斯·诺斯著,钟正生等译:《理解经济变迁过程》,北京:中国人民大学出版社2007年版,第123页。
(3)Eric Jones,The European Miracle:Environments,Economics and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2003,pp.104-126;戴维·兰德斯:《国富国穷》,第37—44页。
(4)1660年后,欧洲国际关系的最重要特征为多极体系的形成,战争在规模、技术和开支等方面远高于其他时期,这不仅增强了国家提高财政收入的要求,也提升了其对科技人才、军事技术的需求,促进了重商主义的发展。参见Lawrence Stone,“State Control in Sixteenth-Century England,”Economic History Review,Vol.17,No.2,1947,p.110。
(5)Charles Tilly,“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter B. Evans,eds.,Bringing the State Back In,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985,pp.170-172,pp.175-177.
(6)Mark Dincecco,“Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913,” The Journal of Economic History,Vol.69,No.1,2009,p.48.
(1)分利集团力量较强会导致国家权力分散,国家管辖权的集中将克服分利集团各自为政的寻租行为,带来较高增长,参见曼瑟·奥尔森著,李增刚译:《国家的兴衰:经济增长、滞胀和社会僵化》,上海:上海人民出版社2005年版,第121—135页;战争与国家形成理论也认为,国内分利集团势力较小的国家,更能够增强国家汲取能力。参见Charles Tilly,“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,”pp.181-183。
(2)曼瑟·奥尔森:《国家的兴衰:经济增长、滞胀和社会僵化》,第52—71页。
(3)Richard Sandook, Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985,pp.36-41.
(1)David Waldner,State Building and Late Development,Ithaca:Cornell University Press,1999,pp.8-17.
(2)近代早期英国的发展也体现了国家权力集中的作用,参见Joel Mokyr and John V. C. Nye,“Distribution Coalitions,the Industrial Revolution,and the Origins of Economic Growth in Britain,”Southern Economic Journal,Vol.74,No.1,2007,pp.50-70;伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦著,郭方等译:《现代世界体系》(第2卷),北京:社会科学文献出版社2013年版,第352页。
(3)Charles Tilly,“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” pp.170-172.
(4)Stephen R. Epstein,Freedom and Growth:The Rise of States and Markets in Europe,1300-1750,London:Routledge,2000,p.170.
(5)近代以来,英国的崛起过程也体现了国际竞争的作用,英国与法国长期的大规模战争导致君主面临生存威胁和财政危机,从而推行了一系列重商主义措施,有助于大西洋贸易和国内市场整合,促进了长期发展和制度变迁。参见Nial Ferguson,The Cash Nexus:Money and Power in the Modern World,1700-2000,New York:Basic Book,2001,p.41;华尔特·W.罗斯托著,黄其祥等译:《这一切是怎么开始的:现代经济的起源》,北京:商务印书馆2014年版,第47页;张宇燕、高程:《美洲金银和西方世界的兴起》,北京:中信出版社2016年版,第121—123页。
(6)根据相关研究,“自主性”是指国家能够独立地制定经济政策和目标、不受社会中分利集团的影响的能力,参见Peter B. Evans,“Predatory,Developmental,and Other Apparatuses:A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State,” Sociological Forum,Vol.4,No.4,1989,pp.571-574;琳达·维斯:《国家与经济发展——一个比较及历史性的分析》,第183—187页。
(1)由于篇幅所限,本文并未全面分析近代初期法国与其他欧洲国家的经济政策,我们将会在后续研究中进一步加以讨论和完善。
(2)法国贸易公司表现出更多的政府作用,其商人参与程度远低于英国和荷兰,甚至有研究认为英国和荷兰的贸易公司是商人行为、法国是政府行为,这也是法国和英国重商政策的重要差异。参见乔治·杜比主编,吕一民等译:《法国史》(上卷),北京:商务印书馆2010年版,第718页。
(1)理查德·雷德著,王毅等译:《现代非洲史》,上海:上海人民出版社2014年版,第297—300页。
(2)Jeffrey Herbst,State and Power in Africa:Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000,pp.105-112.
(3)Jeffrey Herbs,t“War and the State in Africa,” International Security,Vol.14,Issue 4,1990,pp.117-139.
(4)在这方面,欧洲与日本殖民者对殖民地的统治方式有着根本的不同。从19世纪开始,英国、法国和美国的殖民主义者维持了非直接统治型结构,其形式是精简的官僚阶层、殖民官员与当地权贵结盟,因而统治者没有渗透殖民社会的权力。但是在韩国,日本殖民当局建立了直接统治型国家,高度渗透力的殖民官僚机构取代了原有权贵阶层,消灭了农业精英,建立了较为均等化的权力结构,这也是韩国能够迅速推行工业化战略的重要原因。参见Joel S. Migdal,Strong Societies and Weak States:State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World,Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 52-89; Hagen Koo,“The Interplay of State, Social Class,and World System in East Asian Development,”in Frederic C. Deyo,ed.,Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism,pp.170-172。
(5)Claude Ake,Democracy and Development in Africa,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1996,pp.7-8.
(1)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,pp.335-336.
(2)戈翁军政府在石油财政的支持下废除了以部族为基础的政党、增加了州的数量,体现了其增强国家能力的努力;但是部族分裂远未消除,石油收入下降后,原有矛盾进一步凸显。参见Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,pp.344-345。
(3)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.336.
(4)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.350,p.353.据研究,1974年石油收入达到尼日利亚国家总收入的80%,1976年石油出口占尼日利亚总出口比重的94%。参见法洛拉著,沐涛译:《尼日利亚史》,上海:上海人民出版社2015年版,第130—131页。
(5)尤为重要的是,石油财富使中央收入大大增加,引起了各州对联邦权力的激烈争夺,成为政治不稳定的来源。
(1)Alex Gboyega,et al.,“Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5799,2005, p. 15, https://openknowledge. worldbank. org/handle/10986/3542,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(2)Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, A History of Nigeria, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008,pp.183-184.
(3)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.356.
(1)World Bank,World Development Report 2011:Conflict, Security, and Development, Washington, D. C.:World Bank Group,2011,p.51,https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(2)由于非洲国家间的冲突在时间、强度、对政权的威胁等方面远低于近代早期的欧洲战争,因此相关研究将存在冲突的国家称为“国际对手”,发现其对国家构建不能产生显著作用。参见卢凌宇:《战争与撒哈拉以南非洲国家建设》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第11期,第12—15页。
(3)S. Rubenson,The Survival of Ethiopian Independence,London:Heinemann,1976,pp.31-32.转引自肖玉华:《当代埃塞俄比亚政治进程研究》,杭州:浙江人民出版社2014年版,第54—55页。
(4)孟尼利克二世(Menelik II)是集权化国家的缔造者,建立了以亚的斯亚贝巴为中心的国家,建立了强有力的君主管理体系。参见Aaron Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,pp.42-44。
(5)Paulos Chanie,“The Challenge of Civil Service Reform in Ethiopia,” Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review,Vol.17,No.1,2001,pp.79-102.
(6)李安山等:《非洲梦:探索现代化之路》,南京:江苏人民出版社2013年版,第323页。
(1)Aaron Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,pp.67-72.
(2)Paulos Chanie,“Clientelism and Ethiopia’s Post-1991 Decentralization,”Journal of Modern African Studies,Vol.45,No.3,2007,pp.368-370.
(3)Aaron Tesfaye,States and Economic Development in Africa:The Case of Ethiopia,p.133.
(4)World Bank,Ethiopia’s Great Run:The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It,World Bank Group Report,No.99399-ET,2015,pp.24-25,http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/693561467988949839/,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(1)IMF,“The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia:Joint Staff Advisory Note on the Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11-2014/15,” IMF Country Report,No. 11/303,2011,pp. 4-7,https://www. imf. org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Federal-Democratic-Republic-of-Ethiopia-Poverty-Reduction-StrategyPaper-Joint-Staff-25282,访问时间:2019年5月31日。
(2)Christopher Clapham,“The Ethiopian Developmental State,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 39, Issue 6,2018,pp.1151-1165.
(3)Rene Lefor,t“Free Market Economy,‘Developmental State’ and Party-State Hegemony in Ethiopia:The Case of the ‘Model Farmers’,”The Journal of Modern African Studies,Vol.50,No.4,2012,p.693.多个地区的政党均建立了相关基金,例如Amhara的TIRET,Oromia的DINSHO以及SNNP的WONDO。
(1)Rene Lefor,t“The Ethiopian Economy:The Developmental State vs. the Free Market,”in Gerard Prunier and Eloi Ficquet,eds.,Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia:Monarchy,Revolution and the Legacy of Melese Zenawi,London:C. Hurst and Company,2015,pp.366-367.
(2)Emanuele Fantin,i“Development State,Economic Transformation and Social Diversification in Ethiopia,”ISPI Analysis,No.163,2013,pp.6-7.
(3)Rene Lefor,t“The Ethiopian Economy:The Developmental State vs. the Free Market,” pp.366-367.
(4)朝鲜半岛分裂之初,韩国经济基础远弱于朝鲜。重工业、化工业和自然资源均在北方,南方为农业地区,仅有少量棉纺织工业,而且由于400万难民和侨胞回国,韩国成为世界上三大人口稠密国家之一。朝鲜战争使40%的生产设施遭到破坏,1954年开始建设51座小规模工厂,绝大多数直至20世纪60年代才最终建成,因此实现经济发展是韩国面临的迫切任务。参见金正濂著,张可喜译:《韩国经济腾飞的奥秘——汉江奇迹与朴正熙》,北京:新华出版社1993年版,第5—6页。
(1)沈志华、董洁:《朝鲜战后重建与中国的经济援助(1954—1960)》,载《中共党史研究》,2011年第3期,第55—57页; David C. Kang,“Rethinking North Korea,” Asian Survey,Vol.35,No.3,1995,p.254。
(2)World Bank,World Bank Annual Report, various years, Washington, D. C.; Stephen Wing-Kai Chiu,The State and the Financing of Industrialisation in East Asia:Historical Origins of Comparative Divergences,Ph.D.Dissertationof Princeton University,1992,p.144.
(3)斯蒂芬·哈格德著,陈慧荣译:《走出边缘:新兴工业化经济体成长的政治》,长春:吉林出版集团有限公司2009年版,第64页。美国对韩国的援助1960年为2.45亿美元,仅为1957年的64%,援助资金的减少明显降低了韩国的投资水平,参见Jung-en Woo,Race to the Swift:State and Finance in Korean Industrialization,p.46。
(4)一般而言,欧洲的长期大规模战争通过政治威胁和财政危机提升了国家的发展意愿;由于20世纪60年代朝鲜半岛并未再发生大规模战争,因此韩国没有产生财政危机,但国内经济形势恶化和美国援助减少使韩国经济面临严重困难,迫使韩国推动迅速的工业化,以增强国防力量、应对安全威胁。参见David C. Kang,Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004,p.39。
(5)Hagen Koo,“The Interplay of State,Social Class,and World System in East Asian Development,”p.171.
(6)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,pp.28-32.
(7)David C. Kang,Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,pp.27-28.
(1)David C. Kang,Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,p.39.
(2)Larry L. Burmeister,“State, Industrialization and Agricultural Policy in Korea,” Development and Change,Vol.21,No.2,1990,pp.201-204; Byung-Nak Song,The Rise of the Korean Economy,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1990,p.91.
(3)斯蒂芬·哈格德:《走出边缘:新兴工业化经济体成长的政治》,第70页。
(4)Wan Ki Paik,“The Formation of the Governing Elites in Korean Society,”in Gerald E. Caiden and Bun Woong Kim,eds.,A Dragon’s Progress:Development Administration in Korea, West Hartford:Kumarian Press,1991,pp.43-57.
(1)Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.104.
(2)斯蒂芬·哈格德:《走出边缘:新兴工业化经济体成长的政治》,第70页。
(3)David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,pp.107-116.
(4)这些贷款覆盖了出口生产和采购的所有阶段,对经济扩张的作用相当重要。信贷与国民生产总值(GNP)比例由1963年的15.8%上升至1973年的38.7%,信贷与制造业的平均比例达到55%,大型企业的股本债务比率甚至达到5∶1。参见John Minns,The Politics of Developmentalism,p.121; Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.91。
(5)David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism:Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines,pp.116-120.
(1)Yung Whee Rhee,Bruce Ross-Larson and Garry Pursell,Korea’s Competitive Edge:Managing the Entry into World Markets,Baltimore and London:The Johns Hopkins University Press,1984,pp.29-35.
(2)Jung-en Woo,Race to the Swift:State and Finance in Korean Industrialization,p.135.
(3)案例参见Alice H. Amsden,Asia’s Next Giant:South Korea and Late Industrialization,New York and Oxford:Oxford University Press,1989,pp.15-16。
(4)科利的研究表明,韩国政府虽然在信贷、补贴等方面有意“扭曲”了价格,但远没有其他发展中国家的严重程度。参见Atul Kohli,State-Directed Development,p.114。
(5)琳达·维斯等:《国家与经济发展——一个比较及历史性的分析》,第205—210页。
(1)Mark Dincecco,“The Rise of Effective States in Europe,” The Journal of Economic History,Vol.75,No.3,2015,pp.903-907.
(1)尤为重要的是,在20世纪80年代联邦原则实践的基础上,阿巴查政府于1995年颁布了新宪法,进一步以“分区制”和“总统轮换制”为核心,对国家政治体制进行重新规划,包括建立从中央到州政府和地方政府的三级行政体制等,成为打破北方人垄断政治职位、实现各方利益平衡的重要标志。
(2)刘鸿武等著:《尼日利亚建国百年史》,杭州:浙江人民出版社2014年版,第180、208页。
(3)African Development Bank,African Economic Outlook 2010,Abidjan:African Development Bank Group,2010,p.87.
(4)UNECA,Economic Report on Africa 2014:Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa,United Nations Economic Commission for Africa,2014,pp.78-79.
(5)Alex Gboyega,et al.,“Political Economy of the Petroleum Sector in Nigeria,” p.15.
(1)Mark Dincecco,“Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913,” pp.51-53.
(2)Stephen R. Epstein,Freedom and Growth:The Rise of States and Markets in Europe,1300-1750,pp.169-170 ; Mark Dincecco,“The Rise of Effective States in Europe,” pp.907-909.
(1)数据来源自世界银行数据库。
(2)UNCTAD,Economic Development in Africa Report 2014:Catalyzing Investment for Transformative Growth in Africa,New York and Geneva,2014,p.24; World Bank,Ethiopia’s Great Run:The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It,Washington,D.C.:World Bank Group,2012,p.15.
(3)World Bank,Ethiopia’s Great Run:The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace It,pp.13-18.
(4)Christopher Clapham,“The Ethiopian Developmental State,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, 2017,pp.1151-1165.
(5)AfD B,African Economic Outlook 2016,Abidja:African Development Bank Group,2016,p.62.
(1)戴维·瓦尔纳德总结指出,国家构建有多重内涵,包括政府职能与社会制度的最初分化到绝对主义国家的权力集中,再到国家制度的扩展和合理化。本文根据迪辛克的观点,将现代国家构建理解为现代有效国家的兴起,包括国家拥有汲取能力来获得收入,同时对国家分配公共资源的行为有效的限制。参见David Waldner,State Building and Late Development,p.21; Mark Dincecco,“The Rise of Effective States in Europe,”pp.901-905。
(2)David S. Landes,The Unbound Prometheus:Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1969,pp.17-18.
(3)Thomas Ertman,Birth of the Leviathan:Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe,pp.140-145.
(1)Robert H. Bates,When Things Fell Apart:State Failure in Late-Century Africa,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2008,pp.64-69.